Hearing Date: No hearing scheduled Location: <> ‘Judge: Calendar, H FILED 10/6/2022 12:01 AM IN THE CIRCUIT COURT OF COOK COUNTY, ILLINOIS IRIS Y. MARTINEZ CIRCUIT CLERK COUNTY DEPARTMENT, LAW DIVISION GOOK COUNTY, IL 20221003763 ROBERT BRONSTEIN, et al. Calendar, H 19781683 Plaintiffs, vs. Case No. 2022-L-003763 LATIN SCHOOL OF CHICAGO, et al. Hon. John Ehrlich Defendants, AND DUSTIN MORAN, et al. FILED DATE: 10/2022 1201 AM. 20221008763, Respondents-In-Discovery. DEFENDANT LATIN SCHOOL OF CHICAGO'S 2:619.1 MOTION TO DISMISS PLAINTIFFS’ COMPLAINTFILED DATE: 101672022 12:01 AM 20221003763, IL A. 1 2 2. WV. ‘TABLE OF CONTENTS. INTRODUCTION SUMMARY OF PLAINTIFFS’ ALLEGED FACTS AND EXHIBITS ... (COUNT 1): PLAINTIFFS’ WRONGFUL DEATH CLAIM FAILS AS A MATTER OF ILLINOIS LAW. PLAINTIFFS CANNOT ALLEGE PROXIMATE CAUSE AS A MATTER OF LAW [2-615]. Plaintiffs cannot establish legal cause because suicide is an unforeseeable, intervening cause... Plaintiffs fail to allege that the School’s conduct was the cause in fact of death. TLLINols Law Does NOT IMPOSE A DUTY TO PREVENT SUICIDE ON PERSONS WHO ARE NOT MEDICAL CARE PROVIDERS OR HAVE CUSTODY OVER THE DECEDENT [§ 2-615}. PLAINTIFFS CANNOT ASSERT A WRONGFUL DEATH CLAIM BASED ON NEGLIGENCE BECAUSE LATIN AND ITS EMPLOYEES ARE IMMUNE FROM SUCH CLAIMS UNDER THE TLUNoIs SCHOOL CoDE.. Latin and Its Employees Are Immune under the School Code [§ 2-619} Plaintiffs fail to plead facts sufficient to establish the willful and wanton ‘conduct exception to immunity under the School Code [§ 2-615] (COUNT II): PLAINTIFFS FAIL TO ALLEGE FACTS SUFFICIENT TO STATE ACCLAIM FOR TIED [§ 2-615}. LATIN’s ALLEGED CONDUCT TOWARDS N.B. WAS NOT “EXTREME AND ‘OurRacEoUs.”, PLAINTIFFS ALLEGE No FACTS SHOWING THE SCHOOL INTENDED TO INFLICT ‘SEVERE EMOTIONAL DISTRESS, AND THEIR EXHIBITS AND ALLEGATIONS SHOW THE OpPosire... PLAINTIFFS PLEAD No FACTS SHOWING THAT LATIN’S CONDUCT CAUSED N.B. EMOTIONAL DISTRESS. (COUNT V)): PLAINTIFFS’ BREACH OF CONTRACT CLAIM FAILS AS A MATTER OF ILLINOIS LAW [§2-615}.... PLAINTIFFS’ CLAIMS FOR RELIEF SHOULD BE STRICKEN FOR IMPROPERLY PLEADING AN AD DAMNUM.FILED DATE: 10162022 12:01 AM 20221005763 TABLE OF AUTHORITIES Page(s) Cases Adams v. Sussman & Hertzberg, Ltd., 292 Ill. App. 3d 30 (ist Dist. 1997) Bovan v. Am. Family Life Ins. Co., 386 Ill. App. 3d 933 (Ist Dist. 2008) Chalhoub v. Dixon, 338 Ill. App. 3d 535 (Ist Dist. 2003) City of Chicago v. Beretta U.S.A. Corp. 213 MIL 2d 351 (2004)... Coghlan v. Beck, 2013 TL App (Ist) 120891 Doe v. Coe, 2019 IL 123521 (2019), $f] 23-24, 28-29. 8,9 Duffy v. Orlan Brook Condo. Owners’ Ass'n, 2012 IL App (Ist) 113577. 14, 15, 16 First Springfield Bank & Tr. v. Galman, 188 Ill. 2d 252 (1999). Gara v. Lomonaco, 199 Tl App. 3d 633 (Ist Dist. 1990).. Giraldi v. Lamson, 205 Ill. App. 3d 1025 (Ist Dist. 1990) Harris v. Adler School of Prof. Psych. 309 II App. 3d 856 (Ist Dist. 1999).. In re Marriage of Reicher, 2021 TL App (24) 200454 Invenergy Nelson LLC v. Rock Falls T'ship High School District No. 301, 2020 IL App (2d) 190374 Jane Doe-3 v. McLean Cty. Unit Dist. No. 5 Bd. of Dir., 2012 IL 112479FILED DATE: 10/8/2022 1201 AM. 20221008769, Khan v. American Airlines, 266 Ill. App. 3d 726 (Ist Dist. 1994), abrogated on other grounds by, 308 Ill. App. 3d 923 (Ist Dist. 1999).. E15) Kirk v. Michael Reese Hosp. & Med. Center, 117 Ill. 2d $07 (1987). Knapp v. Hill, 276 IN. App. 3d 376 (Ist Dist. 1995).. 12, 13,14 Kobylanski v. Chicago Bd. of Ea., 63 Ill. 2d 165 (1976) Krumlauf v. Benedictine Univ., 09C7641, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 34131 (N.D. Ill. Apr. 7, 2010). McCaskill v. Barr, 92 ILL App. 3d 157 (4th Dist. 1980). Mulvey v. Carl Sandburg High Sch., 2016 IL App (Ist) 151615. ‘Neuberg v. Michael Reese Hosp., 60 Il. App. 3d 679 (Ist Dist. 1978) Pepper Const. Co. v. Palmolive Tower Condos., LLC, 2016 IL App (Ist) 142754. Price v. Philip Morris, Inc., 219 Il, 2d 182 (2005) Public Fin. Corp. v. Davis, 66 Ill. 2d 85 (1976) Rockett v. Chevrolet Motor Division, General Motors Corp. 31 IIL App. 3d 217 (Ist Dist. 1975). Rudis v. Nat'l College of Educ., 191 IIL App. 3d 1009 (Ist Dist. 1989) Stiff v. Eastern Ill. Area of Special Ed., 279 Ill. App. 3d 1076 (4th Dist. 1996). Tabora v. Gottlieb Mem. Hosp., 279 Ill, App. 3d 108 (Ist Dist. 1996)... Thomas v. Chicago Bd. of Ed., TIM. 2d 165 (1979)FILED DATE: 1015/2022 1201 AM 2022L009763, Turcios v. DeBruler, 2015 IL 117962. Watson v. Enter. Leasing Co., 325 Ill. App. 3d 914 (Ist Dist. 2001).. Welsh v. Commonwealth Edison Co., 306 Ill. App. 3d 148 (Ist Dist. 1999). Winger v. Franciscan Medical Center, 299 Ill. App. 3d 364 (3d Dist. 1998)... Young v. Bryco Arms, 213 Il. 2d 433 (2004).. Ziemba v. Mierzwa, 142 Ill. 2 42 (1991) STATUTES 105 ILCS 5/24-24.... 1 105 ILCS 5/34-84a.. 5, 11, 12, 14 735 ILCS 5/2-604.2 ... 2,21 735 ILCS 5/2-615 2 ivFILED DATE: 10/6/2022 12:01 AM 2022.003763 I. INTRODUCTION Plaintiffs’ teenage son, N.B., tragically took his own life in their home on Thursday, January 13, 2022, nearly a month after he withdrew from Latin School of Chicago (“Latin” or the “School”) and thirty-one days after his last alleged contact with any Latin staff on December 13, 2021. N.B. was home on winter break and was scheduled to return to his prior high school later that month, after a single semester at Latin, The Latin community is heartbroken for N.B. and his family, but their legal claims are without merit. The record confirms that the School responded diligently and compassionately to Mrs. Bronstein’s inquiries about her son's acclimation and to 'N.B’s only communication to Latin of any issue with a social media exchange initiated from his account. The Complaint shows that N.B. met with his Dean on December 13, 2021, to discuss a Snapchat meme; there are no allegations that N.B. was not satisfied by the results of that meeting, or that any conduct that could be characterized as “harassing” occurred after that date. Plaintiffs’ ‘own admissions and exhibits contradict their conclusions that they and N.B. were “disregarded.” They were not. The Complaint’s twenty-eight exhibits quote multiple emails exchanged with the School, but none show that Mrs. Bronstein ever reported that N.B. was bullied or requested the ‘School investigate any claim of bullying. While Plaintiffs want to blame the School for the death of their son, there is no legal basis to do so. No facts alleged in the Complaint establish that the School was legally responsible for N.B. on January 13, 2022, when he took his own life at home after withdrawing from Latin, While Plaintiffs’ grief is understandable, it does not justify lashing out against minor children and dedicated educators with a Complaint that is rife with unsupported conclusions, mischaracterizations, critical omissions, inaccuracies, and is dominated by inflammatory rhetoric that has no relevance to the claims asserted. When stripped of its rhetoric, the Complaint lacks the necessary facts to state cognizable claims under well-established Illinois law.FILED DATE: 101672022 12:01 AM 2022.003763 Plaintiffs’ “Wrongfuul Death” claim in Count I fails because suicide is an unforeseeable intervening act as a matter of law. (See § IILA, pp. 5-9.) Illinois law does not impose a legal duty to prevent suicide because the act is not legally foreseeable as a matter of law. (See § IIL.B, pp. 9- 11.) Furthermore, Latin and its employees are immune from claims based on ordinary negligence under the Illinois School Code, and Plaintiffs fail to allege facts of willful and wanton conduct ~ the only exception to such immunity. (See § TII.C, pp. 11-14.) Plaintiffs’ claim for Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress (“IED”) in Count II fails because Plaintiffs have not pled facts that establish a single element of IIED. (See § IV, pp. 14-18.) Plaintiffs’ breach of contract claim in Count VI fails because school conduct policies are not enforceable contracts under Illinois taw. (See § V. pp. 18-21.) Lastly, the Court should strike Plaintiffs’ claims for relief in Counts | and I (Compl. pp. 50, 54) because Plaintiffs improperly plead a nine-figure ad damnum, ie., a request for money damages, in violation of 735 ILCS 5/2-604.2. (See § VI, p. 21.) Tl. SUMMARY OF PLAINTIFFS’ ALLEGED FACTS AND EXHIBITS! N.B. was a student at Latin for only one semester, from late August through mid-December 2021. (Compl. ff 51, 130-132). His parents transferred him to Latin from the nearby Francis W. Parker School (“Parker”) as a 10th grader. (Id. at 99.31, 130-132). N.B. wanted to remain at Parker, and his parents began to take steps to transfer him back to Parker no later than mid-October, 2021. (Id. $969, 78, 81, 87, Ex. Z.) By November 30, Plaintiffs informed Latin that they were “allowing, ‘N.B. to transfer back to Parker in January, 2022.” (Id. 130, Ex. Y.) During N.B.’s brief time at the School, Mrs. Bronstein contacted the School over 30 times. (id. at 4 5.) Its staff responded to Mrs. Bronstein’s numerous inquiries in a professional, On motions to dismiss brought pursuant to 735 ILCS 5/2-615 or -619, defendants must accept as true the well-pled allegations of fact in the complaint, though they need not accept conclusions. Therefore, the School is confined, solely for the purposes of this motion, to Plaintiffs? own allegations of fact and the exhibits attached to the Complaint even where those facts are inaccurate or disputed. 2FILED DATE: 101672022 12:01 AM 20221003763 compassionate, and timely manner — often within minutes. (Compl. at e.g., $9 64-66, 76-79, 83- 87, Exs. L, M, N.) N.B. was resistant to School staff helping him acclimate to Latin. (Id. at { 78, 83, 85, Exs. L-N.) He was open only to returning to Parker. (Id. at $f 78, 87.) ‘After his parents transferred him to Latin, N.B. exhibited a “marked change in behavior at home” and began “acting out at home.” (Id. at $f] 64, 72 (emphasis added)). In October, Mrs. Bronstein told the School that “{tJhings at home (with N.B.] are horrific. [N.B.] has gone crazy. [We] think we need to send him away, he is terrorizing us and sabotaging his school responsibilities.” (Id. § 84 (emphasis added)). Mrs. Bronstein further said that N.B. “needed to be medicated” and that she was afraid he would “hurt himself or hurt me.” (/d. 4] 86 (emphasis added)). She did not mention bullying in these communications, nor identify other students as causing the problems she described at home; she sought help from an outside psychiatrist. (Id. at 84-86.) Defendant Kranz, a Latin counselor, immediately spoke to Mrs. Bronstein by phone and followed up by email, recommending outside resources, including family counseling services, “given this [was] a family issue.” (Jd. at 87, Ex. N.) She also noted that N.B. was resistant to “any support at Latin” and that he “refusfed] to be open to any alternatives other than returning to Parker.” (Id. at] 87, Ex.N) Plaintiffs conclude that N.B.’s behavior towards them at home changed because of “enduring bullying” he experienced at School (Compl. 88), but the Complaint does not include a single fact or exhibit supporting that conclusion or showing that Plaintiffs informed the School of any such belief. (Id.) And Plaintiffs do not allege that they ever challenged or disagreed with Ms. Kranz’s statements that this was a “family issue,” that N.B. was resistant to accepting Latin, ‘or that he only wanted to return to Parker. (Id. 4 88.) Of the 28 exhibits attached to their Complaint, not one includes any statement from Mrs. Bronstein reporting that N.B. was being bullied duringFILED DATE: 10162022 12:01 AM 20221005763 the brief time he was a student at Latin The only specific incidents that Mrs. Bronstein allegedly reported to the School, and which Plaintiffs now characterize as “bullying,” were that in September 2021, N.B. was not invited to a ‘homecoming party (id. at { 55), and that N.B. was asked by unnamed students in October why he transferred to Latin, (Jd. at 4 79.) N.B. was allegedly asked by two unidentified students whether his parents were against the COVID-19 vaccine, but there are no allegations he reported those ‘occurrences to the School. (/d. at] 58.) In fact, neither Plaintiffs nor N.B. considered these events significant enough to submit any disciplinary complaint to the School. Likewise, Plaintiffs allege that, in or around October or November 2021, Defendant Sanchez, a geometry teacher, responded to an in-class comment by N.B. about math proofs by purportedly stating that N.B. “was going nowhere in life.” (Id. at $9 89-90.) Plaintiffs plead no other context for this single alleged exchange, which they base in part “on information and beli without alleging any facts supporting a source of such belief. (Id. at ] 90.) They also do not allege that this purported exchange had any effect on N.B., or that he reported it to his parents, the School, a therapist, or a doctor. Plaintiffs allege that N.B. joined the School’s JV basketball team, based on Ms. Kranz’s recommendation, to help him acclimate to the School. (Compl. $f 76, 81.) Between December 10- 13, 2021, a few days before N.B. withdrew from Latin, N.B. received negative comments via a private group text account involving some of his teammates. (Jd. at ff] 91-92, Exs. O-P.) The text thread shows that these teammates were responding to a post made to the team’s social media account, predicting that the Latin basketball team would lose to its rival Parker. (Id.) That post came from N.B's account, and the players were upset with N.B. for posting it — the only reason given for the negative comments. (Id.) N.B. apologized for that post and certain teammates statedFILED DATE: 101672022 12:01 AM 20221003763 they were not angry at N.B. (Id. at $92, Ex. P.) Plaintiffs further allege that a Minor Defendant sent a Snapchat castigating N.B. around the same time as the text string. (Id. at 98, Ex. T.) The Snapchat depicted a student beneath a basketball hoop giving his middle finger to the camera, with the words “FUCK [last name of N.B.}” id.) N.B, met with Defendant Dean Hennessy on December 13 to discuss the Snapchat image and the circumstances surrounding it. (/d.) Plaintiffs also allege, on “information and belief” that one Minor Defendant sent N.B. a separate Snapchat message on or around December 13, purportedly telling N-B. to kill himself. (Compl. ] 96.) No other information is provided. Plaintiffs neither attach a copy of this purported message nor allege that N.B. complained about it to the School or his parents. Conspicuously, the Complaint is silent about anything N.B. experienced between December 13,2021 and January 13, 2022. When N.B. died, he was at home, was no longer enrolled at Latin, and was preparing to start classes at Parker later in January. (Id. #1, 130-132.) There are no allegations that N.B. had any interactions with the Defendants between his December 13, 2021 ‘meeting with Dean Hennessy and his death on January 13, 2022, thirty-one days later. II. (COUNT 1): PLAINTIFFS’ WRONGFUL DEATH CLAIM FAILS AS A MATTER OF ILLINOIS LAW. Plaintiffs cannot state a negligence claim for wrongful death resulting from N.B.’s suicide. Plaintiffs must allege: (1) the School owed a legal duty to prevent the suicide; (2) it breached that duty; (3) the breach was the proximate cause of N.B.’s death; and (4) monetary damages resulted toN.B.’s next of kin, Bovan v. Am. Family Life Ins. Co., 386 Ill. App. 3d 933, 938 (Ist Dist. 2008). Their Complaint, however, lacks facts that establish a legal duty, breach of that duty, or a breach caused N.B.'s death. Further, Illinois law grants schools and their employees immunity from claims of wrongful death based on negligence. 105 ILCS 5/34-84a.FILED DATE: 10162022 12:01 AM 20221003763 A. Plaintiffs Cannot Allege Proximate Cause as a Matter of Law /2-615). N.B.’s suicide precludes Plaintiffs from establishing proximate cause as a matter of law. Proximate cause consists of two elements: (1) cause in fact and (2) legal cause. Young v. Bryco Arms, 213 Ill. 2d 433, 447 (2004). To determine whether cause in fact exists, the question is whether the injury would have occurred “but for” the defendant’s conduct. Price v. Philip Morris, Inc., 219 Ill. 2d 182, 269 (2005). “Legal cause” is a question of foreseeabi . First Springfield Bank & Tr. v. Galman, 188 Ill, 2d 252, 258, (1999). The relevant inquiry is whether a reasonable person would foresee the injury as a likely result of their conduct. /d.; Watson v. Enter. Leasing Co,, 325 Ill. App. 3d 914, 922 (Ist Dist. 2001). 1. Plaintiffs cannot legal cause because suicide isan unforeseeable, intervening cause. Illinois law is clear that a decedent’s voluntary act of suici is an “independent intervening act that is unforeseeable as a matter of law, and which breaks the chain of causation.” Turcios v. DeBruler, 2015 IL 117962, §¥ 20, 31, 40-41. In Turcios, the Illinois Supreme Court reasoned that suicide can result “from a complex combination of psychological, psychiatric, chemical, emotional, and environmental factors.” 41. Thus, “it is the rare case in which the decedent's suicide would not break the chain of causation and bar a cause of action for wrongful death, even where the plaintiff alleges the defendant inflicted severe emotional distress.” Id. (affirming dismissal of wrongful death claim). Plaintiffs cannot overcome this controlling precedent holding that “suicide is deemed unforeseeable as a matter of law.” /d. at J¥ 31, 40-41. In Turcios, the Court reversed the Appellate Court and affirmed the trial court's § 2-615 dismissal of a wrongful death claim founded upon allegations that defendant's intentional infliction of emotional distress drove a father to his suicide. Id. at $f 6-7, 42, 45. The plaintiff- Parents in Turcios signed a lease to rent an apartment for themselves and their children. Id, at ] 5.FILED DATE: 10162022 12:01 AM 20221009763 Within a few weeks of moving in, management informed them that the building was being demolished and that their lease was terminated. Jd. Demolition began while the family still ‘occupied the unit, and the decedent took his life. 1d. at 17. The decedent in Turcios had made statements to his wife and left a note pointing to the defendant's efforts to evict his family as the ‘motivating factor for his suicide. Jd. at {]7, 9. The Court held that to overcome the rule that suicide is unforeseeable as a matter of law, plaintiffs “must plead facts demonstrating that the suicide was foreseeable, i.e., that it was a likely result of the defendant's conduct.” Id. at 40 (emphasis added). Despite plaintiffs’ allegations of intentional infliction of emotional distress and an express statement by the decedent connecting his suicide to the defendant’s conduct, the Supreme Court held this was still “not one of those rare cases” that could overcome the rule that “[a]s a matter of law, decedent’s suicide was not a reasonably foreseeable result” of defendant's conduct. Id. at $Y 41-42, 45. N.B's death at home, like the decedent in Turcios, was not foreseeable because it was not the likely result of the School’s conduct. The grounds for foreseeability here are far more attenuated than those dismissed with prejudice in Turcios. Unlike in Turcios, the Complaint in this case contains no allegations of a note or explanation from N.B. for his suicide. Nor is it alleged that N.B. complained of any conduct by the School. The Complaint also does not claim there were any prior suicide attempts or that N.B. ever disclosed suicidal thoughts to the School. His death, as noted in Turcios, could have resulted from myriad “psychological, psychiatric, chemical, emotional, or environmental factors.” (Id. at 41.) Ascribing cause to the School is unfounded and wholly speculative. In contrast to Turcios, there are no allegations that the School or its employees were bullying, harassing or engaged in any contact or communications with N.B. at the time of his death, and no allegations of any such conduct in the month after his meeting with Dean HennessyFILED DATE: 10162022 12:01 AM 20221003763 on December 13. There are no allegations that N.B. was under the School's custody, clinical treatment, or supervision when he died. To the contrary, N.B. had been home for close to a month after getting his parents’ permission to withdraw from Latin, as he had wished. (Compl. 9 130- 32, 178.) School personnel knew that returning to Parker was what N.B. wanted. (/d. at {¥] 69, 78, 132) Under these circumstances, applying the legal standard set by Turcias, there is no basis to find that the School could reasonably foresee that suicide was the likely result of their conduct. Turcios, 2015 TL 117962, $9 40, 42. Thus, Plaintiffs’ wrongful death claim should be dismissed with prejudice, as a matter of law. Turcios, 2015 IL 117962, $f] 40, 42; see also Doe v. Doe, 2016 TL App (1*) 153272, $f] 13-17 (trial court did not abuse its discretion by denying leave to amend a complaint alleging minor defendant social media users knew decedent was suicidal and deliberately encouraged her to take her own life because suicide is an independent intervening act which is unforeseeable as a matter of law, and because defendants did not fall into the two recognized exceptions, either: 1) having caused a physical injury leaving the deceased bereft of reason, or 2) a mental health care professional who assumed the treatment, custody, or control of the deceased knowing they exhibited suicidal tendencies). 2 Plaintiffs fail to allege that the School’s conduct was death. The Complaint also fails to satisfy the “but for” test needed to establish cause in fact. No well-pled fact ties any School conduct to any injury NB. experienced, let alone to triggering his, suicide. For example, in contrast to Turcios, Plaintiffs do not allege any note from N.B. or any other evidence tying N.B.’s motivation to School conduct. Plaintiffs’ bare conclusions of fact and law are insufficient to state a claim and should be disregarded. City of Chicago v. Beretta U.S.A. Corp., 213 Ill, 2d 351, 368-69 (2004) (motion to dismiss is properly granted even if complaintFILED DATE: 10/6/2022 12:01 AM 20221003763, contains conclusions that generally inform the defendant of the nature of the claim); Doe, 2016 TL App (1*) 153272, 9 (conclusions concerning causation insufficient to defeat motion to dismiss ‘wrongfill death claim based on conduct allegedly causing suicide). Itis entirely speculative as to whether a different investigative or disciplinary outcome, or informing Plaintiffs about N.B.’s December 13 meeting with Dean Hennessy, would have had any effect whatsoever on N.B.’s suicide a full month later. It is equally likely that informing them would have changed nothing or made the situation worse. (See Compl. $f 55, 65 (Plaintiffs allege that prior parental involvement regarding a homecoming party “backfired” and “made matters worse” for N.B.).) See Rockett v. Chevrolet Motor Division, General Motors Corp., 31 Ill. App. 3d 217, 222 (Ist Dist. 1975) (existence of numerous equally possible causes of injury would require jury to engage in “gross guesswork” and directed verdict was affirmed). Because there is no well-pled fact in the Complaint that can satisfy the “but-for” test to establish the cause-in-fact prong of proximate cause, the wrongful death count should be dismissed, B. Mlinois Law Does Not Impose a Duty to Prevent Suicide on Persons Who Are Not Medical Care Providers or Have Custody over the Decedent /§ 2-615). While schools should always prioritize the health and safety of their students, schools do not have a general legal duty to prevent student suicide, particularly one occurring without prior attempts or threats, at home after the semester had ended and the student has withdrawn. Whether a legal duty exists in a given case is a question of law focusing in large part on the relationship of the parties. See Ziemba v. Mierzwa, 142 Ill. 2d 42, 47 (1991). Courts consider the likelihood of injury, the foreseeability of that injury, the magnitude of the burden of eliminating or guarding against the risk, and the consequence of imposing that burden on the defendant. Kirk v. MichaelFILED DATE: 101672022 12:01 AM 2022L003769 Reese Hosp. & Med. Center, 117 Ill. 2d 507, 526 (1987)? Though the School responded diligently to Mrs. Bronstein’s and N.B.’s requests, the ‘School owed no duty under Illinois law to prevent N.B.’s suicide, particularly after he left the ‘School. In Chalhoub v. Dixon, the Appellate Court refused to impose a legal duty to prevent suicide on a stepfather who failed to secure a handgun just days after picking up his depressed stepson from the hospital following the stepson’s threat to commit suicide. 338 Ill, App. 3d 535, 539 (I* Dist. 2003). The stepson used the gun to kill himself, and plaintiff claimed the stepfather should have foreseen and prevented that result. /d. The Chalhoub court held that the stepfather had no duty to safely store his gun, or to foresee and avoid the suicide, even though the stepfather knew that the handgun was dangerous and accessible and that his stepson was suffering from severe depression, had threatened to commit suicide, and had just been released from the hospital. Id. at 539 (emphasis added). The court found that the stepfather, as a non-medical professional, could not reasonably be expected to foresee that the failure to secure his gun would lead to his suicidal stepson using it to commit suicide; no such duty is imposed on persons who are not medical professionals. Id. at 539. Given that Illinois does not impose a legal duty to prevent suicide even in the extreme situation present by Chalhoub, there is no basis in law or fact to impose such a duty in this attenuated situation. The School was not responsible for and had no control over N.B.’s environment at home where he took his life; it had not assumed his medical care; there is no allegation that the School was aware of any suicide threats or attempts, medical diagnosis of depression, or hospitalizations; nor is there an allegation that the School was aware of any unsafe ? See also Turcios, 2015 IL 117962 4 24 (discussing foreseeability in the context of legal cause, and stating “. . . the consequences of every action stretch forward endlessly through time and the causes of every action stretch back to the dawn of human history, {proximate cause therefore limits liability] to only those injuries reasonably related” to the defendants’ actions). 10FILED DATE: 10162022 12:01 AM 20221008763 condition which might threaten N.B.’s life, let alone a condition created by the School itself. Plaintiffs’ allegations present no grounds to impose a new legal duty on schools to prevent student suicide. ‘The impact of imposing such a legal duty on schools is unjustified and unworkable. Illinois law recognizes a duty to prevent suicide only in the limited circumstance of a mental health professional who has knowledge of a patient’s suicidal tendencies and therefore assumes the patient’s duty of self-care. Winger v. Franciscan Medical Center, 299 Ill. App. 34 364, 374-75 (34 Dist. 1998). There is no Illinois authority imposing a student’s duty of self-care on a teacher, counselor, or school. To do so on these facts would create an unreasonable and infeasible precedent. There is no practical way for schools to control what happens to students off campus, at home, during breaks, or after they have withdrawn. See Chalhoub, 338 Ill. App. 3d at 539 (discussing the impracticality of such a duty on stepfather, which would require him to “suicide proof” his home by securing kitchen knives, razors, aspirin, ete.). This Court should not establish such a broad and indefinite duty, but should instead dismiss Count J, with prejudice. C. Plaintiffs Cannot Assert a Wrongful Death Claim Based on Negligence Because Latin and Its Employees Are Immune from Such Claims under the Illinois School Code. 1. Latin and Its Ey Are Immune under the School Code [§ 2-619 Plaintiffs’ wrongful death claim arising from alleged negligence (Compl. ff 182, 187-88) is barred by 105 ILCS 5/34-84a° of the Illinois School Code. Section 34-84a precludes private claims against school officials based on their discretionary actions concerning discipline, supervision, and oversight of students. Section 34-84a places teachers and school staff, when ‘overseeing students in school activities, in the same position as the parents (i.e., in loco parentis) ? Section 34-84a applies where schools sit in a city with a population over 500,000. Section 105 ILCS 5/24- 24 applies in towns with a population of less than 500,000. The sections provide the same immunity. ulFILED DATE: 1019/2022 12:01 AM 20221003763 and grants them the same legal immunity that parents possess. Kobylanski v. Chicago Bd. of Ed., 63 Ill. 2d 165, 170-73 (1976). Parents are not liable for negligence in the discipline, care, or supervision of their children, and therefore neither are teachers and school employees. Thomas v. Chicago Bd. of Ed, 77 Il. 2d 165, 171 (1979); Stiff v. Eastern Ill. Area of Special Ed., 279 Ml. App. 3d 1076, 1080-81 (4th Dist. 1996). The same immunity applies to the school. Knapp v. Hill, 276 Ill. App. 3d 376, 383 (Ist Dist. 1995). The policy reason for this immunity is to preclude Jawsuits that would distract educators, encourage second-guessing of their discretionary decisions, and discourage people from teaching careers. Id. Consequently, 105 ILCS 5/34-84a precludes Plaintiffs’ wrongful death claim based on negligence. 2. Plaintiffs fail to plead facts sufficient to establish the willful and wanton conduct ion to immunity under the School Code [§ 2-615] Plaintiffs try to invoke the exception to the School Code immunity by asserting that the School and its staff acted willfully or wantonly. (Id. $9 184-85, 189-91, 199, 203-206, 208, 212- 213, 217) But to sufficiently plead willful and wanton conduct, Plaintiffs must allege facts that establish both “the basic elements of a negligence claim” and “either a deliberate intention to harm or a conscious disregard for the plaintiff's welfare.” Jane Doe-3 v. McLean Cty. Unit Dist. No. 5 Bd, of Dir., 2012 IL 112479, § 19. Plaintiffs fail to satisfy this pleading threshold. Plaintiffs’ allegations of willful and wanton misconduct rest entirely on unsupported conclusory statements and at least ten allegations pled on “information and belief” or derived from those purported “beliefs.” (Compl. at §¥ 174-81, 193-94, 197, 200) Allegations on information and belief are insufficient to withstand a motion to dismiss absent allegations of the information forming the belief, which are lacking here. See In re Marriage of Reicher, 2021 IL App (24) 200454, 49] 42-43. Moreover, the Complaint and its exhibits contradict Plaintiffs’ conclusions. School 12FILED DATE: 10/6/2022 12:01 AM 20221009763, employees who had contact with the family during N.B.'s time at the School responded thoughtfully and swiftly to Mrs. Bronstein’s requests and to N.B.’s only communication with Latin about the social media issue. (Compl. {{] 69-87, Exs. M, N, O.) Those exhibits demonstrate the School's concern, responsiveness, and recommendations, and they control over the confli ‘unsupported allegations in the Complaint. Coghlan v. Beck, 2013 IL App (1*) 120891, 4 24. Further, the Complaint is devoid of any factual allegations establishing that specific individuals engaged in willful or wanton mistreatment of N.B. Plaintiffs plead no facts showing any interactions between N.B. and Defendants Knoche, Von Ogden, or Dunn during N.Bs lifetime.* Plaintiffs plead no facts connecting Defendant Kranz and N.B. after October 20, 2021. At most, Plaintiffs allege just one incident, on “information and belief,” claiming that Defendant ‘Sanchez made a single purported remark to N.B. while having some unspecified knowledge of Plaintiffs notifying the school about unspecified bullying concems. (Compl. { 90.) Neither this allegation, nor any others, would, even if proven, establish that Defendant Sanchez or any School employee intended to harm N.B. or disregarded any foreseeable danger to him. Plaintiffs? Complaint is far more speculative than the willful and wanton claim dismissed in Knapp, 276 Il. App. 3d at 383, 385. In Knapp, a parent brought a wrongful death action after their son died in an accident during his automotive-repair class. The plaintiff alleged that the defendant “knew or reasonably should have known” of the risk to students. In affirming the §2- 615 dismissal, the court rejected the plaintiff's conclusory allegations, holding that the plaintiff was required to allege facts showing a “conscious choice” by the school employee “either with knowledge of serious danger to others involved in it or with knowledge of facts which would disclose this danger to any reasonable” person. Id. at 383. The court concluded that plaintiffs’ "allegations of post-January 13, 2022 conduct are irrelevant surplusage and should be stricken, specifically, Compl. $f 149-165. See Doe v. Coe, 2019 IL 123521 (2019), 9 23-24, 28-29, 1BFILED DATE: 101672022 12:01 AM 20221005763 “general allegation(s}” were “mere conclusions premised upon unfounded speculation” about knowledge of the danger at issue. Id. at 384; accord Gara v. Lomonaco, 199 Ill. App. 34 633, 638- 40 ({st Dist. 1990) (affirming dismissal of claims based on general allegations that teacher “knew or should have known [of] . ...a dangerous condition”). ‘The same reasoning applies here. Plaintiffs have not pled facts showing that any specific ‘School employee made any conscious choice to either harm N.B. or disregard any “serious danger” to him. Consequently, the willful and wanton exception does not apply, and Section 34-84a bars the wrongful death claim against the Latin Defendants. IV. (COUNT Il): PLAINTIFFS FAIL TO ALLEGE FACTS SUFFICIENT TO STATE A CLAIM FOR HED /§ 2-615). To state an IED claim, Plaintiffs must allege facts showing that: (1) the conduct was truly extreme and outrageous; (2) the actor intended to inflict severe emotional distress, or knew there was at least a high probability thereof; and (3) the conduct actually caused severe emotional distress. Duffy v. Orlan Brook Condo. Owners’ Ass'n, 2012 IL App (1st) 113577, 36. IED cannot be based on “mere insults, i ies, threats, annoyances, petty oppressions, or other trivialities.” 1d, Rather, the conduct “must be so extreme as to go beyond all possible bounds of decency” and be regarded as intolerable. /d. (citing Restatement (Second) of Torts § 46 emt. D, at 73 (1965)). The distress must be so severe that no reasonable person could be expected to endure it. Public Fin. Corp. v. Davis, 66 Il. 24 85, 90 (1976). The claim must be specific and detailed beyond what is minimally permissible in pleading a tort. Welsh v. Commonwealth Edison Co., 306 Ill. App. 34 148, 155-56 (Ist Dist. 1999). A. Latin’s Alleged Conduct Towards N.B. Was Not “Extreme and Outrageous.” Plaintiffs have not come close to pleading facts showing that Lé 's conduct amounted to “extreme and outrageous” behavior. The bar is intentionally hi linois courts have “essentially 14FILED DATE: 10162022 12:01 AM. 2022003763 restricted” IIED to cases in which a defendant’s conduct is so abusive “that it would cause severe emotional distress to a person of ordinary sensibilities.” Rudis v. Nat'l College of Educ, 191 Ill. App. 3d 1009, 1013 (Ist Dist. 1989). To determine whether claims meet this high bar, courts consider whether: (1) the character of the conduct itself is extreme and outrageous; (2) the conduct arises out of an abuse of a position or relationship in which the defendant has authority over the plaintiff; or (3) the defendant knew of some peculiar susceptibility of the plaintiff to emotional distress. Id. at 1012. Courts may also consider the intensity and the duration of the distress as a factor in determining severity. Id. at 1012. The conduct is evaluated on an objective standard based on all facts and circumstances. Duffy, 2012 IL App (Ist) 113577, § 36. Plaintiffs' ITED claim fails to clear the bar. Their claim rests primarily on their contention that Latin “committed (IIED] upon N.B. through their willful, wanton and/or intentional failure to address or otherwise investigate known and/or foreseeable instances of bullying, cyberbullying, hate speech and/or other harassment.” (Compl., § 208 (emphasis added)). Plaintiffs cannot base an TIED claim on mere failures and omissions; ITED is an intentional tort that requires intentional conduct directed at N.B. See Adams v. Sussman & Hertzberg, Lid., 292 IN. App. 34 30, 40 (Ist Dist. 1997) (“[alny omission in failing to inform the prosecutor of newly discovered information relevant (o the criminal action set in motion would arguably, at best, constitute passive conduct that by is very nature could not rise to the level of outrageous conduct.”) No facts are alleged that any claimed failure to address or investigate was intentional. Absent are any allegations that Latin used the kind of “vituperative, profane, threatening, or coercive language or conduct” courts recognize as clearing the “extreme and outrageous” bar. Rudis, 191 Tl App. 3d at 1013-14. Courts have found conduct far more egregious than that alleged by Plaintiffs to be insufficient to state a claim. E.g., Khan v. American Airlines, 266 Ill. App. 34 15FILED DATE: 1016/2022 12:01 AM 2022.003763 726 (st Dist. 1994) (affirming dismissal of ITED claim on allegations that defendants knowingly sold a stolen airline ticket to plaintiff, causing him to be arrested and charged with theft, despite being aware that plaintiff was en route to his father’s funeral), abrogated on other grounds by, 308 Ill. App. 3d 923, 928, (Ist Dist. 1999); Tabora v. Gottlieb Mem. Hosp., 279 Ill. App. 3d 108, 120, (Ist Dist. 1996) (affirming dismissal of IIED claim where defendants engaged in a “five year campaign of harassment and intimidation” by falsely claiming that he was incompetent, revoking his privileges, and constantly berating him in front of hospital staff). The single, isolated comment that Defendant Sanchez allegedly made to N.B. ~ that he “was going nowhere in life” — does not surmount the bar for “extreme or outrageous” under Illinois law. As pled, the comment was made in response to N.B.'s unspecified classroom "comment about mathematical proofs." (Compl. {fj 89, 212(f)). There are no allegations that Defendant Sanchez's singular retort caused N.B. any distress, much less the required level of severe or extreme distress beyond what a reasonable person may endure. See Rudis, 191 Ill. App. 3d at 1011-12 (affirming dismissal where allegations that faculty members called plaintiff a “cheat” and accused her of ‘wrongful acts in obtaining her degree were insufficient to allege extreme and outrageous conduct). ‘Nor are there any allegations that Sanchez or others abused their authority or were aware that N.B. had any particular susceptibility to emotional distress. Absent such facts, the ITED claim fails. See Duffy v. Orlan Brook Condominium Owners’ Ass'n, 2012 TL App (1st) 113577, $42 (affirming §2- 615 dismissal where complaint failed to allege defendant knew plaintiff suffered from dementia or some other impairment); Rudis, 191 Ill. App. 3d at 1014 (rejecting argument that defendant school’s position of authority over plaintiff student “transform[s] conduct which otherwise amounts to no more than insults or indignities into extreme and outrageous conduct”). 16FILED DATE: 10162022 12:01 AM 20221003763 B. Plaintiffs Allege No Facts Showing the School Intended to Inflict Severe Emotional Distress, and Their Exhibits and Allegations Show the Opposite. Plaintiffs base their IED claim on the School's alleged inaction with respect to alleged bullying or harassment (Compl. § 210), but Illinois courts have dismissed LIED claims predicated on the defendant’s alleged failure to adequately investigate a harm. Giraldi v. Lamson, 205 Il. App. 3d 1025, 1029 (Ist Dist. 1990) (affirming dismissal of IIED claim based on defendant's alleged failure to investigate employee’s background); Krumlauf v, Benedictine Univ., 09C7641, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 34131, at *4-*6 (N.D. IIL. Apr. 7, 2010) (dismissing ITED claim under Illinois law based on alleged failure to act on complaints about faculty member's sexual conduct, towards students, explaining that “omission cannot fairly be said to have been done with knowledge or substantial certainty that the inaction would cause severe emotional distress”). Such precedent applies with equal force here. Plaintiffs cannot meet the high standard for TED merely by speculating that the Latin Defendants acted with "conscious disregard to known and/or foreseeable bullying, cyberbullying, hate speech and/or other harassment of N.B." (Compl., 213) or that they “carelessly and/or recklessly” failed to investigate complaints of bullying (Compl. 210(c)). There are no facts establishing that the Latin Defendants acted with the requisite intent to cause N.B. severe emotional distress or knew that such a result would occur. See Neuberg v. Michael Reese Hosp., 60 Ill. App. 34 679, 685 (Ist Dist. 1978) (dismissing IED claim lacking factual allegations that defendants acted with the intent to inflict severe emotional distress or knew severe emotional distress would occur). The Complaint and exhibits demonstrate Latin did just the opposite: its employees consistently, quickly, and compassionately responded to Mrs. Bronstein’s requests (often within minutes) and Dean Hennessy immediately met with N.B. to address his sole request for assistance. (See Compl., $1173, 76-77, 81, 83-87, 98, 130-33, Exs. L, M, N.) Thus, not only do Plaintiffs fail 7FILED DATE: 101672022 1201 AM 2022.009763 to plead the requisite intent, their allegations and exhibits establish that no such intent existed, and, thus, this Court should dismiss Plaintiffs’ claim for ITED, with prejudice. C. Plaintiffs Plead No Facts Showing that Latin’s Conduct Caused N.B. Emotional Distress. Plaintiffs, again, conclude baselessly that “Defendants? extreme and outrageous conduct did, in fact, cause N.B. severe emotional harm.” (Compl., 1214-215.) But “merely paraphras{ing] the elements of a cause of action in conclusory terms is not sufficient.” Welsh, 306 Ill. App. 3d at 155, Plaintiffs do not support their claim with any allegations of medical treatment, doctor visits, diagnoses, therapy, or other allegations to support their conclusion that the School's conduct caused N.B. severe emotional harm, Jd. (affirming dismissal of IED claim lacking allegations that defendant was hospitalized or required to seek medical care because of defendant's conduct); McCaskill v. Barr, 92 ll. App. 34 157, 158 (4th Dist. 1980) (allegations of IIED must be “specific, and detailed beyond what is normally considered permissible in pleading a tort action.”) Plaintiffs’ TIED claim against the School is merely conclusory. No elements are supported by allegations of specific facts, despite the high pleading burden for an IIED cause of action. Accordingly, the Court should dismiss Count Il V. (COUNT VI): PLAINTIFFS’ BREACH OF CONTRACT CLAIM FAILS AS A MATTER OF ILLINOIS LAW /§2-615). ‘The Court should dismiss Plaintiffs’ breach of contract claim because the Student Handbook disciplinary provisions upon which Plaintiffs rely are not enforceable contract terms under Illinois law. The essential elements of a claim for breach of contract are: (1) the existence of a valid and enforceable contract through an offer, acceptance, and exchange of consideration; (2) performance by the plaintiff; (3) breach by the defendant; and (4) resultant injury to the 18FILED ATE: 101672022 12:01 AM 20221009763, plaintiff.’ Pepper Const. Co. v. Palmolive Tower Condos., LLC, 2016 IL App (Ist) 142754, 4 85. Plaintiffs cannot plead the first element as a matter of law. Illinois courts have held that private school disciplinary policies do not constitute an enforceable promise to protect students from all misconduct addressed by the policy. Harris v. Adler School of Prof. Psych., 309 Ill. App. 3d 856, 861 (Ist Dist. 1999). Specifically, the creation, implementation, and enforcement of a policy prohibiting bullying “simply does not promise students and parents that attendance at the school guarantees the complete absence of bullying conduct, nor that every student engaging in such conduct will be disciplined in a particular manner.” Mulvey v. Carl Sandburg High Sch., 2016 IL App (Ist) 151615, § 32 (noting Adler's holding.) Plaintiffs’ Complaint mirrors the allegations of those found deficient in Mulvey. Plaintiffs allege that Latin, through its student disciplinary policies, promised to prevent bullying and harassment of N.B. (Compl. {ff 256-261.) The bullying policy at issue in Mulvey contained provisions for conducting prompt and thorough investigations of alleged bullying or harassment and enforcing progressive discipline over students who violate the policies. Mulvey, 2016 TL App (Ist) 151615 at $f 6-7. The Mulvey plaintiffs claimed that school officials violated the bullying policy by failing to recognize and address the alleged bullying, causing physical and emotional harm. Id. at 12. The Bronsteins allege the same. (Compl. ff 265-268.) While the School takes all allegations of bullying seriously, the Complaint here, just as in ‘Mulvey, does not and cannot cite any provision stating that the School promised to undertake any particular investigative or disciplinary actions. Plaintiffs cite only “general” and discretionary 5 As noted above, the Complaint contains no well-pled fact showing that any act or omission by the School or its personnel resulted in any grief, anguish, fright, nervousness, or complaints on the part of NB. Disregarding conclusions, Plaintiffs have not plead the fourth element of a breach of contract. 19FILED DATE: 10162022 12:01 AM. 20221003763, sections of the Handbook. (Compl. $¥ 38-40, 257-260; Ex. G at pp. 4, 89.) They allege that under the Handbook, certain types of student conduct including harassment and bullying, are treated “very seriously” (id. at §257), are “subject to disciplinary action” (id., at 258 (emphasis added)), and “can result in disciplinary action.” (Id. At 4 259-260; Ex. G pp. 4, 83 (emphasis added). But they do not and cannot allege that the Handbook promises either to prevent all bullying or undertake any particular investigative action or disciplinary outcome. Rather, just as in Mulvey, the Handbook® passages at issue are aspirational, stating that the ‘School “seeks” to “build a climate of respect . ..,.” that its “goal” is to “help students understand ‘what it means to be responsible citizens,” and that it has “aspirations to build an environment welcoming of diverse ideas...” (Compl. Ex. G pp. 4-5, 86.) The Handbook repeatedly states that investigation and discipline arising from alleged bullying are discretionary and rest solely with the ‘School. For example, the Handbook states that: * “The school reserves the right to investigate and proceed as the school considers appropriate” (Compl. Ex. G p. 89); © “The school has sole discretion concerning the investigatory process and methods” (id. at 92); © “The head of the school’s decisions in disciplinary matters are discretionary and based on determination of the best interests of the student involved and the community” (id. at 5); ‘© “{Flaculty, administration and the head of school keep in mind the age and developmental stage of each student as they make these decisions and ‘consequences may vary according to division” (id. at 5); © “If itis determined that harassment allegations are true, education ought to be the first goal. Consequences could also include suspension or expulsion.” (id. at 88); ‘+ “Latin uses a progressive discipline system in which behaviors are typically addressed at the lowest level possible. The primary purposes of Latin’s discipline process are to get the problem behaviors to stop and to educate the violating student 22 (id. at 96); ° By attaching various exhibits, including the Handbook as Exhibit G, Plaintiffs made those exhibits part of the Complaint. The exhibits control over conflicting allegations in the Complaint. Invenergy Nelson LLC ¥. Rock Falls T'ship High School District No. 301, 2020 IL App (24) 190374, 4 13. 20FILED DATE: 1016/2022 12:01 AM. 20221008769, + “When possible, the schoo! will take into consideration the reporting student's wishes” (id. at 92); © “Latin will not initiate investigations based on: Rumor; Second-hand reports; Reports with insufficient details [lack of offender names]; Parent reports... .” (emphasis added) ‘The relevant Handbook provisions thus “convey no specific promises” that the School ‘would take any particular action in any specific circumstance or enforce discipline for any reports or violations in any specific manner. Absent such promises, Plaintiffs’ contract claims fail. See Mulvey, 2016 IL App (Ist) 151615 at § 32; Adler School, 309 Ill. App. 3d at 86. VI. PLAINTIFFS’ CLAIMS FOR RELIEF SHOULD BE STRICKEN FOR IMPROPERLY PLEADING AN AD DAMNUM. [§ 2-615] This Court should strike Plaintiffs’ claims for relief in Counts | and It (Compl. pp. 50, 54) because they are personal injury claims in which Plaintiffs have improperly plead a nine-figure ad damnum in violation of 735 ILCS 5/2-604.2. Section 2-604,2(a) states that “[iJn a personal injury action, if a complaint is filed that contains an amount claimed and the claim is not necessary to comply with the circuit court rules about where a case is assigned, the complaint shall be dismissed .” The School therefore requests that this Court strike Plaintiffs’ improper claims for relief in Counts I and Il CONCLUSION Forall of the foregoing reasons, each of Plaintiffs’ causes of action against the Latin School of Chicago — wrongful death (Count 1), IED (Count 11), and common law breach of contract (Count VI) ~ should be dismissed with prejudice. 21FILED DATE: 10/6/2022 12:01 AM. 20221003769 Respectfully Submitted, THE LATIN SCHOOL OF CHICAGO By: /s/_Michael A. Grill By: /s/_Michael T. Trucco Timothy Ray Michael T. Trucco Michael A. Grill Stamos & Trucco LLP HOLLAND & KNIGHT LLP One East Wacker Drive 150N. Riverside Plaza, Suite 2700 Third Floor Chicago, TL 60606 Chicago, Illinois 60601 (312) 263-3600 (312) 630-7979 timothy.ray@hklaw.com mtrucco@stamostrucco.com michael.grill@hklaw.com Firm LD. 18324 Firm LD. 37472 By: /s/ Paul G. Lannon Paul G. Lannon, Jr. (Pro Hac Vice) Holland & Knight LLP 10 St. James Avenue 11th Floor Boston, MA 02116 (617) 523-2700 paul lannon@hklaw.com Firm LD. 37472 2FILED DATE: 10162022 12:01 AM 20221005763 CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE Under penalties as provided by law pursuant to Section 1-109 of the Illinois Code of Civil Procedure, the undersigned certifies that on October 6, 2022, the foregoing was served via electronic mail and the court’s electronic system, upon all counsel of record. ‘sl_Michael A. Grill