GRISWOLD VS CONNECTICUT

The case concerned a Connecticut law that criminalized the encouragement or use of birth
control. The 1879 law provided that "any person who uses any drug, medicinal article or
instrument for the purposes of preventing conception shall be fined not less than forty dollars or
imprisoned not less than sixty days." The law further provided that "any person who assists,
abets, counsels, causes, hires or commands another to commit any offense may be prosecuted
and punished as if he were the principle offender."

Estelle Griswold, the executive director of Planned Parenthood League of Connecticut, and Dr.
C. Lee Buxton, doctor and professor at Yale Medical School, were arrested and found guilty as
accessories to providing illegal contraception. They were fined $100 each. Griswold and Buxton
appealed to the Supreme Court of Errors of Connecticut, claiming that the law violated
the U.S. Constitution. The Connecticut court upheld the conviction, and Griswold and Buxton
appealed to the U.S. Supreme Court, which reviewed the case in 1965.

The Supreme Court, in a 7-2 decision written by Justice William O. Douglas, ruled that the
law violated the "right to marital privacy" and could not be enforced against married
people. Justice Douglas contended that the Bill of Right's specific guarantees have
"penumbras," created by "emanations from these guarantees that help give them life and
opinion." In other words, the "spirit" of the First Amendment (free speech), Third
Amendment (prohibition on the forced quartering of troops), Fourth Amendment (freedom from
searches and seizures), Fifth Amendment (freedom from self-incrimination), and Ninth
Amendment (other rights), as applied against the states by the Fourteenth Amendment, creates
a general "right to privacy" that cannot be unduly infringed.

Further, this right to privacy is "fundamental" when it concerns the actions of married couples,
because it "is of such a character that it cannot be denied without violating those fundamental
principles of liberty and justice which lie at the base of our civil and political institutions."
Because a married couple's use of contraception constitutes a "fundamental" right, Connecticut
must prove to the Court that its law is "compelling" and "absolutely necessary" to overcome that
right (i.e., the "strict scrutiny test"). Because Connecticut failed to prove this, the law was struck
down as applied.

Yet, for all their differences, the majority in Griswold v. Connecticut agreed that the "right to
privacy," in addition to being "fundamental," was "substantive." In West Coast Hotel v. Parrish
(1937), the Court had rejected the idea that the Constitution protects "substantive rights," i.e.,
protects certain activities from government interference that are not explicitly mentioned in the
Bill of Rights. In Griswold, however, it ruled that "substantive rights" do exist in non-economic
areas like "the right to privacy," even if they do not in economic activities like the right to
contract. Over the next 10 years, the Court expanded this fundamental, substantive "right to
privacy" beyond the marital bedroom, ruling that the state could not ban the use of
contraceptives by anyone (Eisenstadt v. Baird [1972]), and that the state could not ban most
abortions (Roe v. Wade [1973]).
In Griswold v. Connecticut (1965), the Supreme Court ruled that a state's ban on the use of
contraceptives violated the right to marital privacy
 EISENTAND VS BAIRD, 405 US 438

RULE:
If the right of privacy means anything, it is the right of the individual, married or single, to be free from
unwarranted governmental intrusion into matters so fundamentally affecting a person as the decision
whether to bear or beget a child.

FACTS:
Appellant was convicted of, among other things, giving vaginal foam to an unmarried woman at the close
of a lecture, a violation of Mass. Gen. Law Ann. ch. 272, § 21. The district court dismissed appellant's
petition for habeas corpus relief, but the circuit court vacated the district court's order, and remanded with
instructions to grant the writ. Appellee sheriff sought review of an order of the United States Court of
Appeals for the First Circuit vacating the district court's order dismissing appellant's petition for a writ of
habeas corpus. The Court affirmed the circuit court's order. 
Appellant had standing to assert the rights of unmarried people to access the contraception because he
served as an advocate for this third-party right.  In so ruling, the Court emphasized that the reason for
giving away the foam was to test the statute. Then, the Court held that the state statute violated the Equal
Protection Clause of U.S. Const. amend. XIV. The Court rejected appellee's argument that the distinction
was health related, noting that unmarried persons had as great an interest in avoiding the spread of
harmful diseases.

ISSUE:
Did appellee lack standing to assert the rights of unmarried persons denied access to contraceptives
because he was neither an authorized distributor under the statute nor a single person unable to obtain
contraceptives?

ANSWER:
No

CONCLUSION:
Appellant had standing to assert the rights of unmarried people to access the contraception because he
served as an advocate for this third-party right. In so ruling, the Court emphasized that the reason for
giving away the foam was to test the statute. Then, the Court held that the state statute violated the Equal
Protection Clause of U.S. Const. amend. XIV. There was no rational reason for the different treatment of
married and unmarried people. The right of privacy to be free of unwanted intrusions into the fundamental
decision of whether to have children was the same for married and unmarried alike. The Court rejected
appellee's argument that the distinction was health related, noting that unmarried persons had as great an
interest in avoiding the spread of harmful diseases.
GELUZ VS CA

Nita Villanueva & Antonio Geluz met in 1948 through Nita’s aunt.
In 1950, she got pregnant. To conceal her pregnancy from her parents, she had an abortion.
When they got married, she got pregnant again. Since she was an employee of COMELEC and
her pregnancy would be inconvenient to her, she had an abortion in Oct 1953.
In 1955, she again became pregnant after 2 years and had an abortion for the third and last
time.
The last abortion constituted the plaintiff’s basis in filing an action for the award of damages. CA
and the trial court granted the award of damages.
ISSUE: Whether the husband of a woman, who voluntarily procured her abortion, could recover
damages from the physician who caused the same.
HELD: The Supreme Court believed that the minimum award fixed at P3,000 for the death of a
person. It does not cover cases of an unborn fetus that is not endowed with personality which
the trial court and Court of Appeals predicated.
Since an action for pecuniary damages on account of personal injury or death pertains primarily
to the one injured, it is easy to see that if no action for such damages could be instituted on
behalf of the unborn child on account of the injuries it received, no such right of action could
deliberately accrue to its parents or heirs.
In fact, even if a cause of action did accrue on behalf of the unborn child, the same was
extinguished by its pre-natal death, since no transmission to anyone can take place from one
that lacked juridical personality under Article 40 of the Civil Code, which expressly limits such
provisional personality by imposing the condition that the child should be subsequently alive.
It is apparent that he consented to the previous abortions. It made his action questionable for
why he only filed for damages on his wife’s third abortion. Also, SC held that the fetus wasn’t
born yet so it has no juridical personality. The award for the death of a person does not cover
the case of an unborn fetus that is not endowed with personality and incapable of having rights
and obligations.

PEOPLE VS. TIROL AND BALDESCO 102 SCRA 558

ADAMS RALPH JORDAN S. ELEGINO

Facts: BONIFACIO TIROL and CIRIACO BALDESCO are convicted for seven (7)
murders and for two (2) frustrated murders. Sentences each of them to suffer the
supreme penalty of death for each of the seven murders of the seven deceased, and to an
imprisonment of TEN (10) YEARS to SEVENTEEN (17) YEARS and FOUR (4)
MONTHS for each of the two Frustrated Murders of the two wounded persons and to
indemnify jointly and severally the heirs of each of the seven deceased with the sum of
SIX THOUSAND PESOS (P6,000.00) for each of the seven deceased, or FORTY-TWO
THOUSAND PESOS (P42,000.00) in all, and pay the costs, fifty-fifty.

The penalty herein imposed for each of the seven murders being the maximum -
death - the records of this case are hereby automatically elevated to the Supreme Court.
During the pendency of this appeal, or on October 23, 1977, appellant Baldesco
died in the New Bilibid Prison so that on January 28, 1978, We resolved to dismiss this
case insofar as the criminal liability of the said appellant is concerned.
Issue: Whether or not, the trial on Baldesco will be dismiss on the grounds that the
accused is already dead.

Held: Trial will proceed but this appeal will be resolved insofar as Baldesco is
concerned only for the purpose of determining his criminal liability which is the basis of
the civil liability for which his estate may be liable.
Death of the accused will extinguished criminal liability but not civil liability.

Limjoco v. Intestate Estate of PioFragante, 80 Phil 776

FACTS: Pedro Fragante, a Filipino citizen at the time of his death, applied for a certificate of
public convenience to install and maintain an ice plant in San Juan, Rizal. His intestate estate is
financially capable of maintaining the proposed service. The Public Service Commission issued
a certificate of public convenience to Intestate Estate of the deceased through its special or
judicial administrator appointed by the proper court of competent jurisdiction to maintain and
operate the said plant. Petitioner claims that the granting of certificate applied to the estate is a
contravention of law.
ISSUE: W/N the estate of Fragante may be extended an artificial judicial personality
HELD: Yes, because under the Civil Code, “estate of a dead person could be considered as
artificial juridical person for the purpose of settlement and distribution of his properties.”
Fragante has rights and fulfillment of obligation which survived after his death. One of those
rights involved the pending application for public convenience before the PSC. The state or the
mass of property, rights left by the decedent, instead of heirs directly, become vested and
charged with his rights and obligations. Under the present legal system, rights and obligations
which survived after death have to be exercised and fulfilled only by the estate of the deceased.
Joaquin v. Navarro, 93 Phil 257
FACTS: During the battle of liberation of Manila on February 6, 1945, the following sought
refuge on the ground floor of German Club building: Joaquin Navarro Sr (70); Angela Joaquin
(67); daughter Pilar (32-33); daughter Concepcion (23-25); son Joaquin Natividad Jr (30); and
wife of Jr Adela Conde (--). The building was set on fire and Japanese started shooting the
daughters who fell. Sr. decided to leave the building. His wife didn’t want to leave so he left with
his son, Jr., and Jr.’s wife and neighbor Francisco Lopez. As they came out, Jr. was hit and fell
on the ground and rest lay flat on the ground to avoid bullets. German Club collapsed trapping
many people presumably including Angela Joaquin. Sr., Adela, and Francisco sought refuge in
an air aid shelter where they hid for 3 days. On February 10, 1945, on their way to St. Theresa
Academy, they met Japanese patrols. Sr. and Adela were hit and killed. The trial court ruled that
Angela Joaquin outlived her son while CA ruled that son outlived his mother.
ISSUE: W/N the son/mother died first before the other.
[If the son died first, petitioner would reap the benefits of succession. If mother died first,
respondent Antonio, son of Jr. by his first marriage, would inherit]
HELD: Based on the story of Francisco Lopez, Jr. died before his mother did. This presumption
was based on speculations, not evidence. Gauged by the doctrine of preponderance of
evidence on which civil cases are to be decided, this inference should prevail. Evidence of
survivorship may be direct, indirect, circumstantial or inferential.

STANDARD OIL CO VS ARENAS

On December 5, 1908, Vicente Sixto Villanueva assumed as a surety, among other parties, to
the obligation of Arenas & Co. to pay, jointly and severally, to the corporation, The Standard
Oil Company of New York, the sum of P3,305.76, at three months from date, with interest at
P1 per month. In April 5, 1909, The Standard Oil Company sued the five debtors for the
payment of the aforesaid amount. On May 12, 1909, Villanueva and Ho were declared in
default. On August 28, 1909, the Court of First Instance of Manila ordered all defendants
therein to settle the payment with Standard Oil Company, together with the interest thereon at
1 per cent per month from December 15, 1908, until complete payment should have been
made of the principal, and to pay the costs. Elisa Torres Villanueva, wife of Vicente Sixto
Villanueva, then appeared and petitioned the Court to reopen the trial to introduce new
evidence on the mental state of his husband. Elisa alleged that on July 24,1909, her husband
was declared to be insane by the Court of First Instance of the city of Manila. She further
alleged that due to monomania, her husband was already insane when he executed and
signed the bond. The said court ruled that on the execution of the bond in question, Vicente
understood perfectly well the nature and consequences of his action; hence, the judgment
originally petitioned against was to be executed. The appellant filed an appeal to the Supreme
Court with a bill of exceptions. The Court ruled in the negative and affirmed the judgment
appealed from.

Doctrine:
Capacity to act must be supposed to attach to a person who has not previously been declared
incapable, and such capacity is presumed to continue so long as the contrary be not proved.

Facts:

 On December 5, 1908, Vicente Sixto Villanueva assumed as a surety, among other

parties, to the obligation of Arenas & Co. to pay The Standard Oil Company of New
York, the sum of P3,305.76, at three months from date, with interest at P1 per month.
The Standard Oil Company then sued the five debtors for their failure to comply with
the same.
 In August 28, 1909, said debtors were ordered to pay, jointly and severally, the amount
in question, with interest.
 Elisa Villanueva, spouse of Vicente, then appeared and petitioned for the reopening of
the trial alleging insanity on the part of his husband thereby invalidating his act as
surety to the bond in question.
 The said court ruled that on the execution of the bond in question, Vicente understood
perfectly well the nature and consequences of his action; hence, the judgment
originally petitioned against was to be executed.
 Unconvinced, Elisa filed an appeal to the Supreme Court.
Issues Ratio:
ISSUE: W/N Vicente Villanueva may be exempted from the judgment appealed from on
account of his alleged mental incapacity

NO. The Court ruled that, in the absence of any direct and specific evidence pertaining
to the mental condition of Vicente Villanueva affecting his action on December 5, 1908,
his mental state due to monomania is not enough proof to exempt him from his liability
as surety to the bond in question.

RATIO

 The Court ruled that Capacity to act must be supposed to attach to a person who has
not previously been declared incapable, and such capacity is presumed to continue so
long as the contrary be not proved, that is, that at the moment of his acting he was
incapable, crazy, insane, or out of his mind: which, in the opinion of this court, has not
been proved in this case.
 The Court explained that a person's believing himself to be what he is not or his taking
a mere illusion for a reality is not necessarily a positive proof of insanity or incapacity
to bind himself in a contract.
 The Court ruled that in the absence of any direct proof that at the date of the
performance of the act which is endeavored to  be invalidated for want of capacity on
the part of the executor for being insane or demented, thereby not able to give his free,
conscious, deliberate, and intentional consent, the executor was indeed dominated by
his malady, he is presumed to possess the necessary capacity to act and give his
consent.

Dispositive:
“Such is a summary of the facts relating to the debated incapacity of the appellant, and it is
very evident that it cannot be concluded therefrom that, on December 16, 1908, when
Villanueva subscribed the obligation now contested, he did not possess the necessary
capacity to give efficient consent with respect to the bond which he freely executed.
Therefore, the judgment appealed from is affirmed, with the costs of this instance against the
appellant. SO ORDERED.”

MERCADO VS ESPIRITU

FACTS:

The case was about the contract made by Luis Espiritu (father of Jose Espiritu, the defendant)
and the heirs of his sister Margarita Mercado; Domingo and Josepha Mercado, who pretended
to be of legal age to give their consent into the contract of sale of the land they inherited from
their deceased mother Margarita Mercado (sister of Luis Mercado). The siblings Domingo et. al.,
sought for the annulment of contract asserting that Domingo and Josepha were minors during
the perfection of contract.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the deed of sale is valid when the minors presented themselves that they were
of legal age.

HELD:

The court declared that the contract of sale was VALID, even if it were made and entered into
by minors, who pretended to be of legal age. The court stated that they will not be permitted to
excuse themselves from the fulfillment of the obligations contracted by them, or to have them
annulled.

The ruling was in accordance with the provisions on law on estoppel and Rule 123, Section 6
paragraph A which states that “whenever a party has, by its own declaration, act or omission,
intentionally and deliberately led another party to believe a particular thing to be true, and to act
upon such belief, he cannot, in any litigation arising out of such declaration, cannot be permitted
to falsify it.

BAMBALAN VS MARAMBA

FACTS: Bambalan’s parents received a loan from marimba. When the father died, Bambalan
was left as the sole heir of his father’s estate. Maramba forced Bambalan, who was at that time
a minor, to sell their land as payment for the loan. Bambalan signed because he was forced to
do so because they were threatening his mother with imprisonment. Muerang and Maramba
bought Bambalan’s 1st cedula to acknowledge the document
ISSUE: W/N the sale of land to Maramba was valid
HELD: The sale was void because he was a minor at the time of the execution. Doctrine of
Mercado vs Espiritu is not applicable because the plaintiff did not pretend to be of age, and the
defendant knew him as a minor.
BRAGANZA VS VILLA ABRILLA
FACTS: Rosario Braganza and her sons loaned from De Villa Abrille P70,000 in Japanese war
notes. They promised in writing to pay him P10,000 + 2% per annum in legal currency of the
Philippines in 2 years after cessation of war. Because they haven’t paid, Abrille sued them. CFI
Manila and CA held that they shall be liable to pay according to the contract they signed.
Braganza petitioned to review the decision of CA whereby they were ordered to pay Abrille
P10,000 + 2% interest, praying for consideration of the minority of her sons when they signed
the contract.
ISSUE: W/N the sons who were 16 and 18 are bound by the contract of loan which they have
signed
HELD: SC found Rosario will still be liable to pay her share in contract because the minority of
her sons does not release her from liability. She ordered to pay 1/3 of P10,000 + 2% interest.
Minority is a personal defense to the children. In order to hold a minor liable to the contract, the
fraud must be actual and not constructive.
Topic: Prodigality
Title: Martinez vs Martinez, 1 Phil 182
Facts: Pedro Martinez Ilustre, the son and the compulsory legal heir, brought an action against his
father, Francisco Martinez Garcia, for a declaration of prodigality.

The son claimed that the father is dissipating and squandering his estate by making donations
to his second wife and to her parents of properties amounting to over $200,000; that he has
given over the administration of this estate to the management of his wife; that the defendant
has a propensity for litigation and has instituted groundless actions against the plaintiff in order
to take possession of the property held in common with the plaintiff to give it to his wife and
her relatives. The defendant alleged that he has executed in favor of the plaintiff a general
power of attorney under which the plaintiff has administered the community estate for several
years; that the plaintiff has caused the ships Germana, Don Francisco, and Balayan,
belonging to the estate, to be registered in his own name without the consent of the father and
is otherwise mismanaging and misappropriating the property of the estate, which caused the
defendant to revoke the power of attorney given to plaintiff, and that the suit brought by the
defendant against the plaintiff was due to the attitude of the son, who, notwithstanding the fact
that the power of attorney had been revoked, refused to render an account of his
administration. The Court of First Instance rendered judgment against the plaintiff and
adjudged the costs against him. The plaintiff has appealed to this court.
Issues: Whether or not Francisco Martinez is suffering from prodigality that causes injury on the estate
of his son?
Ruling: No.

Under our law, it may be inferred that the acts of prodigality must show a morbid state of mind
and a disposition to spend, waste, and lessen the estate to such an extent as is likely to
expose the family to want of support or to deprive the forced heirs of their indisposable part of
the estate.

In this case, Don Francisco Martinez is far from being a prodigal and still in the full exercise of
his faculties and still possesses the industry, thrift, and ability that resulted in the accumulation
of a splendid estate after the date of his marriage with the mother of the plaintiff. Moreover, the
son has been in possession of a greater part of the estate since November, 1897, collecting
the revenue from the ships and rents from the city property. The testimony on the part of the
plaintiff was wholly insufficient to support the allegations of his complaint. It was vague,
indefinite, and of an inconclusive nature.

Hence, Francisco Martinez is not suffering from prodigality that cause injury on the estate of
his son.

of such
ESTRELLITA TADEO-MATIAS v. REPUBLIC OF THEPHILIPPINESG.R. No. 230751 April 25,
2018TOPIC
: Judicial Declaration of Presumptive Death

CASE LAW/ DOCTRINE

Judicial declaration of presumptive death is only applicable for the purpose of
contracting a validsubsequent marriage
under Art. 41 of the Family Code.
Articles 390 and 391 of the Civil Code involve a presumption of death already established by
law.There is no need to file such petition under said provisions before the court.
FACTS:
 
Estrellita Tadeo-Matias (Petitioner) was married to Wilfredo Matias who was a member of
thePhilippine Constabulary and assigned in Araya, Pampanga. They were married on January
7, 1968.2.
 
On September 15, 1979, Wilfredo left their conjugal home at San Miguel, Tarlac City in order to
servehis duties. He was never seen or heard from again and has never made contact with any
of his or
Petitioner’s relatives. Petitioner constantly sought updates from the Philippine Constabulary
regarding the whereabouts of her husband to no avail.3.
 
After 3 decades of waiting, Petitioner sought for a claim of death benefits under P.D. 1638 from
the
Philippine Veteran’s Affair Office (PVAO) of the AFP. O
ne of its requirements is a judicial declarationof presumptive death.4.
 
RTC: Affirmed Petitioner and declared Petitioner’s husband presumptive
ly dead under Art. 41 of theFamily Code.5.
 
CA: Reversed RTC ruling since Art. 41only allows such declaration in cases of remarriage
whichPetitioner did not seek.
ISSUE(S)
: Whether Petitioner can validly be granted the judicial declaration of presumptive death.
HELD
: No. Petitioner erred in filing for judicial declaration of presumptive death which is not a viable
suit.
RATIO
 
Article 41 of the FC involves that presumption of death established therein is only applicable for
thepurpose of
contracting a valid subsequent marriage.
The RTC erred in considering said petition because it was not filed for the purpose of
remarriageunder the FC but Art. 390 and 391 of the Civil Code.
 Art. 390
. After an absence of seven years, it being unknown whether or not the absence still lives,
heshall be presumed dead for all purposes except for those of succession. The absentee shall
not
be presumed dead for the purpose of opening his succession till after an absence of five yea
rs shall besufficient in order that his succession may be opened
 Art. 391.
The following shall be presumed dead for all purposes, including the division of the
estateamong the heirs:(1) A person on board a vessel lost during a sea voyage, or an
aeroplane which is missing, who has notbeen heard of for four years since the loss of the
vessel or aeroplane;(2) A person in the armed forces who has taken part in war, and has been
missing for four years;(3) a person who has been in danger of death u