Filoteo Jr.

vs Sandiganbayan
263 SCRA 222
October 16, 1996

FACTS

The petitioner Jose D. Filoteo, Jr. was a police investigator of the Western Police District in Metro
Manila. Together with his co-accused, he was charged of masterminding the armed hijacking of a
postal delivery van.

That on or about May 3, 1982 at Bulacan Philippines, the accused, together with three other men of
whom were armed with guns, conspired and confederated together did then and there wilfully,
unlawfully and feloniously with the intent to gain and by means of violence, threat and intimidation,
stop a Postal Delivery Truck which belonged to the Bureau of Posts while it was travelling along the
said municipality. At gunpoint, the petitioner with his cohorts then consequently took, rob and
carried away with them the following:

(1) Postal Delivery Truck;

(2) Social Security System Medicare Checks and Vouchers;
(3) Social Security System Pension Checks and Vouchers;
(4) Treasury Warrants, and
(5) Several Mail Matters from abroad in the total amount of Php253,728.29 more or less.

Filoteo admitted involvement in the crime and pointed to three other soldiers, namely, Eddie
Saguindel, Bernardo Relator and Jack Miravalles, a discharged soldier, as his confederates. At 1:45 in
the afternoon of May 30, 1982, petitioner executed a sworn statement in Tagalog before M/Sgt.
Arsenio C. Carlos and Sgt. Romeo P. Espero detailing the confession.

Sandiganbayan found the accused guilty of Presidential Decree No. 532, otherwise known as the
Anti-Piracy and Anti-Highway Robbery Law of 1974.

Petitioner’s then filed for a Motion for Reconsideration for the said Decision however he was denied
by the Sandiganbayan in its Resolution dated July 27, 1987.

Petitioner filed for certiorari with the Supreme Court alleging that the Sandiganbayan committed
grave abuse of its discretion amounting to the lack or excess of its jurisdiction for its Decision with
regards to the case.

Petitioner sought that his confession be inadmissible evidence, saying that:

A. The extrajudicial confession executed by the accused was without the presence of his lawyer
and based on the new law the petitioner contended it to be applied retroactively, this is to
be deemed inadmissible as the law should favor him as an accused

B. The statements were also obtained through torture, duress, maltreatment and intimidation
and therefore illegal and inadmissible.

C. His arrest was warrantless and thus invalid.

 D. The evidence is insufficient to find guilt beyond reasonable doubt.

ISSUES

1) Whether or not the written statements, particularly the extrajudicial confession executed by the
accused without the presence of his lawyer can be admissible as evidence against him;

2) Whether or not the said statements were obtained through torture, duress, maltreatment and
intimidation shall be deemed illegal and inadmissible

3) Whether or not the petitioner’s warrantless arrest is valid and proper?

4) Whether or not the evidence of the prosecution is sufficient to find the petitioner guilty beyond
reasonable doubt?

RULING

The Supreme Court consequently ruled in favor of the decision of the Sandiganbayan which
imparted a penalty of GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt as co-principal in the crime of robbery as
defined in Arts. 293 and 295 (previously Presidential Decree No. 532, otherwise known as the Anti--
Piracy and Anti-Highway Robbery Law of 1974 in the SandiganBayan decision) and penalized under
Art. 294, paragraph 5, of the Revised Penal Code and subsequently denied the petition of Filoteo Jr.
on the following grounds;

1) YES. Uncounseled waiver on the right to counsel relating to extrajudicial confession is

admissible.

Uncounseled waiver no legal effect as a ‘judge-made law’’/judicial decision

The doctrine that an uncounseled waiver of the right to counsel is not to be given legal effect
was initially a judge-made one and was first announced on 26 April 1983 in Morales vs. Enrile
and reiterated on 20 March 1985 in People vs. Galit.

No retroactive application

While the Morales-Galit doctrine eventually became part of Section 12(1) of the 1987
Constitution, that doctrine affords no comfort to appellant for the requirements and restrictions
outlined in Morales and Galit have no retroactive effect and do not reach waivers made prior to
26 April 1983 the date of promulgation of Morales.

Article 8 of the Civil Code which provides that “(j)udicial decisions applying or interpreting the
laws or the Constitution shall form part of the legal system of the Philippines,” and Article 4 of
the same Code which states that “(l)aws shall have no retroactive effect unless the contrary is
provided,” the principle of prospectivity of statutes, original or amendatory, shall apply to
judicial decisions, which, although in themselves are not laws, are nevertheless evidence of what
the law means.
 Constitutional Provision vs. Penal Laws

While Article 22 of the Revised Penal Code provides that “(p)enal laws shall have a retroactive
effect insofar as they favor the person guilty of a felony who is not a habitual criminal,” what is
being construed here is a constitutional provision specifically contained in the Bill of Rights
(Article III, Section 12 of the 1987 Constitution) which is obviously not a penal statute.

2) NO. No sufficient evidence of torture, force or intimidation. Statements are admissible.

The allegation of torture was negated by the medical report 81 showing no evidence of physical
injuries upon his person.

In view of the foregoing, his extrajudicial confession is presumed to have been voluntarily made,
in the absence of conclusive evidence showing that petitioner’s consent in executing the same
had been vitiated

3) YES. Objection to warrantless arrest is waived. Insufficient to invalidate judgment.

Must be made before entering plea

It is well-settled that any objection involving a warrant of arrest or procedure in the acquisition
by the court of jurisdiction over the person of an accused must be made before he enters his
plea, otherwise the objection is deemed waived (People vs. Lopez, Jr).

Not sufficient to invalidate judgment

The illegal arrest of an accused is not sufficient cause for setting aside a valid judgment rendered
upon a sufficient complaint after trial free from error (People vs. Lopez, Jr).

4) YES. Culpability is proven through sufficient evidence.

The facts presented in the case sufficiently prove that it is beyond dispute that petitioner was a
direct participant in the commission of the crime. His alibi has been correctly considered by the
Sandiganbayan to be weak and implausible.
MATUGUINA INTEGRATED WOOD INC. vs. COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. No. 98310
October 24, 1996

FACTS:

On June 28, 1973, the acting director of Bureau of Forest Development issued Provisional
Timber License no. 30, converting an area of 5400 hectares, to Milagros Matuguina who was
conducting a business under the name of Matuguina Lumber Enterprises (MLE). A portion,
1900 hectares of the area was located within the territorial boundary of Governor Generoso
of Mati, Davao Oriental and adjoined the Timber concession of DAVENCOR.

Milagros Matuguina became the majority stockholder of Matuguina Integrated Wood

Products, Inc. (MIWPI) on September 24, 1974, when the latter’s Board of Directors
approved by Resolution the transfer of 1,000,000 shares from Henry Wee to Milagros
Matuguina, thus giving her seventy percent (70%) stock ownership of MIWPI.

In an undated letter to the Director of Forest Development (BFD) on November 26, 1974,
Milagros Matuguina requested the Director for a change of name and transfer of
management of PTL No. 30, from a single proprietorship under her name, to that of MIWPI.
This request was favorably endorsed on December 2, 1974 by the BFD’s Acting Director,
Jose Viado to respondent Secretary of Natural Resources, who approved the same on
September 5, 1975.

On July 17, 1975, MLE and MIWP executed a deed of transfer, transfering all the rights,
interests, ownershipa, and participation in PTL no. 30 to the latter fir and in consideration of
P148000 shares of stock in MIWP.

On July 28, 1975, the DAVENCOR, through its General Manager, filed a complaint fir MLE’s
illegal encroachment in their forest concessionaire.

Issues:

1. Whether or not the Petitioner was denied due process when it was adjudged liable with
MLE for encroaching upon the timber concession of DAVENCOR in the respondent Minister's
order of execution.

2. Whether or not the petitioner is a transferee of MLE's interest, as to make it liable for the
latter’s illegal logging operations in DAVENCOR’s timber concession.
Ruling:

The SC ruled in favor of MIWPI. The widely accepted principle that no man shall be affected by any
proceeding to which he is a stranger, and strangers to a case not bound by judgment rendered by
the court.

In the same manner an execution can be issued only against a party and not against one who did not
have his day in court. There is no basis for the issuance of the Order of Execution against the MIWPI.
The same was issued without giving MIWPI an opportunity to defend itself and oppose the request
of DAVENCOR for the issuance of a writ of execution against it. In fact, it does not appear that MIWPI
was at all furnished with a copy of DAVENCOR’s letter requesting for the Execution of the Minister’s
decision against it. MIWPI was suddenly made liable upon the order of execution by the respondent
Secretary’s expedient conclusions that MLE and MIWPI are one and the same, apparently on the
basis merely of DAVENCOR’s letter requesting for the Order, and without hearing or impleading
MIWPI. Until the issuance of the Order of execution, MIWPI was not included or mentioned in the
proceedings as having any participation in the encroachment in DAVENCOR’s timber concession.

This action of the Minister disregards the most basic tenets of due process and elementary fairness.
The liberal atmosphere which pervades the procedure in administrative proceedings does not
empower the presiding officer to make conclusions of fact before hearing all the parties concerned.

According to section 61 of P.D. no. 705, the transferee shall assume all the obligations of the
transferor. However, the word obligations shall be construed in its common and ordinary usage. It
shall not be construed to mean those obligations and liabilities incurred by the transferor as a result
of transgressions of law, as these are the personal obligations of the transferor. It means that the
MIWP, the transferee, is not liable for the transferor’s illegal encroachment into another forest’s
concessionaire.
Bernardo vs. Bernardo
96 Phil 202
November 29, 1954

Facts:

On December 31, 1947, the Republic of the Philippines purchased from Roman Catholic Church the
estate known as the “Capeliana de Tambobong” in Malabon, Rizal under the provisions of Sec. 1 of
Commonwealth Act No. 539, which authorizes the expropriation of purchase of private lands and
that lands acquired thereunder should be subdivided into lots, for resale at reasonable prices to "
their bona fide tenants or occupants."

Enrique Bernardo the petitioner sold his lot to the respondent Crisostomo S. Bernardo.  That lot
also found that the house of the petitioner since July 13, 1944; that because of family relationship
the petitioners "were able to remain in the premises due to the tolerance of, and out of charity
from, the appellee (respondent Crisostomo Bernardo) and his deceased parents who were the
rightful lessees of the lot in question."

Due to his long stay in that parcel of land; the petitioner argue that he is a bona fide occupants
therof because of his long stay in said parcel of land.

Respondent Bernardo applied to the Rural Progress Administration for the purchase of the lot in
question. Petitioners Enrique Bernardo, et al., contested the application and claimed preferential
right to such purchase. Subsequently, the Rural Progress Administration resolved to recognize the
petitioners as entitled to preference.

Issue:

Whether or not the terms "actual bona fide settlers and occupants", plainly indicating that "actual"
and "bona fide" are synonymous based on the existing laws.

Ruling:

No. The term "bona fide occupant" (admittedly petitioner is not a tenant) has been defined as "one
who supposes he has a good title and knows of no adverse claim" (Philips vs. Stroup, 17 Atl.
220,221); "one who not only honestly supposes himself to be vested with true title but is ignorant
that the title is contested by any other person claiming a superior right to it" (Gresham vs. Ware to
that of a possessor in good faith in our Civil Law (Civil Code of 1889, art. 433; new Civil Code, art.
526).

The essence of the bona fides or good faith, therefore, lies in honest belief in the validity of one's
right, ignorance of a superior claim, and absence of intention to over each another.
The petitioner Enrique Bernardo falls short of this standard: for the precarious nature of his
occupancy, as mere licensee of respondents, duty bound to protect and restore that possession to
its real and legitimate holders upon demand, could never be hidden the Tambobong Estate,
petitioner had already parted with the house that was his remaining link with the occupancy of the
lot; and since 1945, even before the Government's purchase, he had been required to vacate.

Thus bereft of all stable interest in the land, petitioner nevertheless seeks to turn respondent's past
deferential regard to his own advantage, and to exploit his gratuitous stay at respondent's expense
for the purpose of ousting his benefactors and wiping out the investment that the latter, and their
predecessors in interest, had established and preserved charged for the lot in question. That the law,
in preferring "bona fide occupants," intended to protect or sanction such utter disregard of fair
dealing may well be doubted.
Malanyaon vs Lising
193 Phil. 425
Jul 30, 1981

Facts:

The late Mayor S.B. Pontanal is one of the accused in Criminal Case No. P-339 for Violation of the
Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act.  Upon the filing of the case against him in court and after
hearing, he was suspended from office and during his incumbency he died.  Due to his death the
charge against him in Criminal Case No. P-339 was dismissed. 

Nilo Malanyaon, the petitioner was formerly known as a member of the Sangguniang Bayan of Bula,
Camarines Sur. He filed an action "to declare illegal the disbursement made by Cesario Goleta as
Municipal Treasurer of the Municipality of Bula, Camarines Sur, to Venancia Pontanal, widow of the
late Mayor S.B. Pontanal, in the amount of P5,000.00 representing a portion of the salary of the late
Mayor as such mayor of said municipality during the period of his suspension from August 16, 1977
up to November 28, 1979, and to restrain or prevent respondent Cesario Goleta as such Municipal
Treasurer of the aforementioned municipality from further paying or disbursing the balance of the
claim." (Par. 1 of the Order, supra.)

Petitioner contends that any disbursement of funds by the respondent, Cesario Goleta, in his

capacity as Municipal Treasurer in favor of the heirs of the late Mayor for salaries corresponding to
the period he was under suspension and other benefits will be illegal and contrary to the provisions
of Section 13 because said late Mayor S.B. Pontanal was not acquitted of the charge against him."

However, the respondent judge dismissed the action on the ground that "the criminal case against
the late Mayor S.B. Pontanal due to his death amounted to acquittal."

Issue:

Whether or not the dismissal of the case due to the death of the accused constitutes acquittal.

Ruling:

No.

The Court held that it is obvious that when the statute speaks of the suspended officer being
"acquitted" it means that after due hearing and consideration of the evidence against him, the Court
is of the opinion that his guilt has not been proved beyond reasonable doubt. Dismissal of the case
against the suspended officer will not suffice because dismissal does not amount to acquittal. 

As aptly stated in People v. Salico, 84 Phil. 722, 732-733[1949]:

"Acquittal is always based on the merits, that is, the defendant is acquitted because the evidence
does not show that defendant's guilt is beyond a reasonable doubt; but dismissal does not decide the
case on the merits or that the defendant is not guilty.   

Dismissal terminates the proceeding, either because the court is not a court of competent
jurisdiction, or the evidence does not show that the offense was committed within the territorial
jurisdiction of the court, or the complaint or information is not valid or sufficient in form and
substance, etc.   

The only case in which the word dismissal is commonly but not correctly used, instead of the proper
term acquittal, is when, after the prosecution has presented all its evidence, the defendant moves for
the dismissal and the court dismisses the case on the ground that the evidence fails to show beyond
a reasonable doubt that the defendant is guilty; for in such case the dismissal is in reality an acquittal
because the case is decided on the merits. 

If the prosecution fails to prove that the offense was committed within the territorial jurisdiction of
the court and the case is dismissed, the dismissal is not an acquittal, inasmuch as if it were so the
defendant could not be again prosecuted before the court of competent jurisdiction; and it is
elemental that in such case the defendant may again be prosecuted for the same offense before a
court of competent jurisdiction."

Respondents invoke Art. 81, No. 1 of the Revised Penal Code which provides that "Death of the
accused pending appeal extinguishes his criminal and civil liability." We do not see the relevance of
this provision to the case at bar.  For one thing the case against Mayor Pontanal was not on appeal
but on trial.  For another thing the claim for back salaries is neither a criminal nor a civil liability.   It is
in fact a right provided the conditions of the law are present.

The Supreme Court thereby declared illegal the payment of municipal funds for the salaries of the
late Mayor S.B. Pontanal during his suspension from office and has hereby ordered the respondent
treasurer to retrieve the payments disbursed to the former mayor’s heirs.
People v Delantar
G.R. No. 169143
February 2, 2007

Facts:

In August 1996, accused Simplicio Delantar was indicted for violating RA 7610 or the “Special
Protection of Children Against Abuse, Exploitation and Discrimination Act.” His act of selling in
prostitution his putative daughter, AAA, to an Arab national and for pimping and delivering AAA,
who was then 11 years of age to Congressman Romeo Jalosjos.

He entered a plea of not guilty and trial proceeded in due course. The RTC found accused guilty, for
two counts, of violation of RA 7610. The CA upheld the decision except that the appellate court ruled
Delantar should be convicted for one count only. The case reached the SC where accused appellant
decried the imposition of the maximum penalty when in fact there was no showing of the qualifying
circumstance of filial relationship between him and AAA.

Issue:

Whether or not there is a filial relationship between Delantar and AAA.

Ruling:

No.

The SC held that the birth certificate of AAA, which did not contain Delantar’s signature, is prima
facie evidence only of the fact of her birth and not of her relation to appellant.

After all, it is undisputed that appellant is not AAA’s biological father. Further, according to the
maxim noscitur a sociis, the correct construction of a word or phrase susceptible of various meanings
may be made clear and specific by considering the company of words in which it is found or with
which it is associated 87 Section 31(c) of R.A. No. 7610 contains a listing of the circumstances of
relationship between the perpetrator and the victim which will justify the imposition of the
maximum penalty, namely when the perpetrator is an "ascendant, parent, guardian, stepparent or
collateral relative within the second degree of consanguinity or affinity."

It should be noted that the words with which "guardian" is associated in the provision all denote a
legal relationship. From this description we may safely deduce that the guardian envisioned by law is
a person who has a legal relationship with a ward. This relationship may be established either by
being the ward’s biological parent (natural guardian) or by adoption (legal guardian). Appellant is
neither AAA’s biological parent nor is he AAA’s adoptive father. Clearly, appellant is not the
"guardian" contemplated by law.

Republic vs Santua
564 SCRA 331
September 8, 2008

Facts:

Petitioner Dominador Santua was claiming that he is the owner of a parcel of land in Calapan,
Oriental Mindoro. He could not, however, produce the original copy of the certificate as it was lost
during an earthquake in 1994. Furthermore, the records of the Registry of Deeds were destroyed
due to a fire in 1977.

Knowing that there were no encumbrances on the land. Santua then filed for reconstitution. He
presented a tax declaration, a survey plan and technical description of the land as evidence.

The Provincial Assessor, Mr. Naling, testified that the tax declaration submitted in evidence is a true
and genuine tax declaration issued by their office. Mrs. Flordeliza Villao, Records Officer III of the
Register of Deeds, also testified that the Certification issued by her office is a true and genuine
certification. The adjoining property owners were notified of the hearing of the petition, but no one
interposed any objection thereto.

The RTC then granted the petition to reconstitute the title of Mr. Santua. However, the Solicitor
General filed an appeal citing Tax Declarations, Technical Description and Lot Plans are insufficient
bases for the reconstitution of lost or destroyed certificates of title.

ISSUE:

Whether or not tax declarations, technical description and lot plans are sufficient bases for the
reconstitution of lost or destroyed certificates of titles.

Ruling:

No.
Section 3 of RA No. 26 provides:

SEC. 3. Transfer certificates of title shall be reconstituted from such of the sources hereunder
enumerated as may be available, in the following order:

a. The owner’s duplicate of the certificate of title;

b. The co-owners’, mortgagee’s or lessee’s duplicate of the certificate of title;
 c. A certified copy of the certificate of title, previously issued by the register of deeds or
by a legal custodian thereof;
d. The deed of transfer or other document on file in the registry of deeds, containing the
description of the property, or an authenticated copy thereof, showing that its original had
been registered, and pursuant to which the lost or destroyed transfer certificate of title was
issued;
e. A document, on file in the registry of deeds, by which the property the description of
which is given in said documents, is mortgaged, leased or encumbered, or an authenticated
copy of said document showing that its original had been registered; and
f. Any other document which, in the judgment of the court, is sufficient and proper basis for
reconstituting the lost or destroyed certificate of title.

Ejusdem Generis – “of the same kind”

Santua based his argument on Section 3 (F) of RA 26. However, in applying the principle of ejusdem
generis, Section 3 (F) of RA 26 should be pertinent to the items preceding it. Meaning, these should
be documents issued by or are on file with the Register of Deeds.

Moreover, the documents from which the particulars of the certificate of title or the circumstances
which brought about its issuance could readily be ascertained.
At most, the tax declaration can only be prima facie evidence of possession or a claim of ownership.

As for the survey plan and technical descriptions, these are not the documents referred to in Section
3(f) but merely additional documents that should accompany the petition for reconstitution.
Moreover, a survey plan or technical description prepared at the instance of a party cannot be
considered in his favor, the same being self-serving. Therefore, denying the petition for a
reconstitution of title.
Catu vs. Reliosa
February 19, 2008

Facts:

Petitioner initiated a complaint against Elizabeth Catu and Antonio Pastor who were occupying one
of the units in a building in Malate which was owned by the former. The said complaint was filed in
the Lupong Tagapamayapa of Barangay 723, Zone 79 of the 5th District of Manila where respondent
was the punong barangay.

The parties, having been summoned for conciliation proceedings and failing to arrive at an amicable
settlement, were issued by the respondent a certification for the filing of the appropriate action in
court.

Petitioner, thus, filed a complaint for ejectment against Elizabeth and Pastor in the Metropolitan
Trial Court of Manila where respondent entered his appearance as counsel for the defendants.
Because of this, petitioner filed the instant administrative complaint against the respondent on the
ground that he committed an act of impropriety as a lawyer and as a public officer when he stood as
counsel for the defendants despite the fact that he presided over the conciliation proceedings
between the litigants as punong barangay.

In his defense, respondent claimed that as punong barangay, he performed his task without bias and
that he acceded to Elizabeth’s request to handle the case for free as she was financially distressed.
The complaint was then referred to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) where after
evaluation, they found sufficient ground to discipline respondent. According to them, respondent
violated Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and, as an elective official, the
prohibition under Section 7(b) (2) of RA 6713. Consequently, for the violation of the latter
prohibition, respondent committed a breach of Canon 1. Consequently, for the violation of the latter
prohibition, respondent was then recommended suspension from the practice of law for one month
with a stern warning that the commission of the same or similar act will be dealt with more severely.

Issue:

Whether or not the foregoing findings regarding the transgression of respondent as well as the
recommendation on the imposable penalty of the respondent were proper.

Ruling:

No.

Firstly, respondent  cannot  be  found liable for violation of Rule 6.03 the Code of Professional
Responsibility as this applies only to a lawyer who has left government service and in connection to
former government lawyers who  are  prohibited  from  accepting employment in connection with
any matter in which [they] had intervened while in their service. In the case at bar, respondent was
an incumbent punong barangay. Apparently, he does not fall within the purview of the said
provision.

Second, it is not Section 90 of RA 7160 but Section 7(b) (2) of RA 6713 which governs the practice of
profession of elective local government officials. While  RA  6713 generally applies to all public
officials and employees, RA 7160, being a special law, constitutes an exception to RA
6713 .Moreover,  while  under RA  7160,certain local elective officials (like governors, mayors, 
provincial  board  members  and councilors) are expressly subjected to a total or  partial 
proscription  to  practice  their profession or engage in any occupation, no such interdiction is made
on the punong barangay and  the  members  of  the sangguniang barangay. Expressio unius est
exclusio alterius since they are excluded from any prohibition, the presumption is that they are
allowed to practice their profession. Respondent, therefore, is not forbidden to practice his
profession.

Third, notwithstanding all of these, respondent still should have procured a prior permission or
authorization from the head of his Department, as required by civil service regulations. The failure of
respondent to comply with Section 12, Rule XVIII of the Revised Civil Service Rules constitutes a
violation of his oath as a lawyer: to obey the laws. In acting as counsel for a party without first
securing the required written permission, respondent not only engaged in the unauthorized practice
of law but also violated a civil service rules which is a breach of Rule 1.01 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility:

 Rule 1.01 - A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful,  dishonest, immoral or deceitful  conduct.

For not living up to his oath as well as for not complying with the exacting ethical standards of the
legal profession, respondent failed to comply with Canon 7 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility:

 CANON 7. A LAWYER SHALL AT ALL TIMES UPHOLD THE INTEGRITY AND THE  DIGNITY  OF
THE LEGAL PROFESSION AND SUPPORT THE ACTIVITIES OF THE INTEGRATED BAR.

            
A lawyer who disobeys the law disrespects it. In so doing, he disregards legal ethics and disgraces
the dignity of the legal profession. Every lawyer should act and comport himself in a manner that
promotes public confidence in the integrity of the legal profession. A member of the bar may be
disbarred or suspended from his office as an attorney for violation of the lawyer's oath  and/or
for breach of the ethics of the legal profession as embodied in the Code of Professional
Responsibility.

Wherefore, the Supreme Court found respondent Atty. Vicente G. Rellosa GUILTY of professional
misconduct for violating his oath as a lawyer and Canons 1 and 7 and Rule 1.01 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility.

He was SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period of six months effective from his receipt of
the resolution. Furthermore he was sternly WARNED that any repetition of similar acts shall be dealt
with more severely.

Respondent is strongly advised to look up and take to heart the meaning of the word delicadeza.