BATCH: 2019-24

SUBJECT: CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE

CASE ANALYSIS ON:

MANOHAR LAL CHOPRA VS. RAI BAHADUR
RAO RAJA SETH HARILAL

SUBMITTED TO: SUMBITTED BY:

MR. KARTIK KACHHAWAH VAMAXI CHAUHAN
ASSISTANT PROFFESSOR 91909141011
FACULTY OF LAW B.COM LLB (Hons.)
MARWADI UNIVERISTY MARWADI UNIVERISTY

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DECLARATION BY STUDENT

I the undersigned solemnly declare that the project report titled case study on “Case study on:
Manohar lal Chopra v. Rai Bahadur Rao Raja Sheth Harilal” is based on my own work carried
out during the course of our study under the supervision of Mr.KARTIK KACHHAWAH I
assert the statements made and conclusions drawn are an outcome of my research work. I
further certify that
• The work contained in the report is original and has been done by me under the general
supervision of my supervisor.
• The work has not been submitted to any other Institution for any other
degree/diploma/certificate in this university or any other University of India or abroad.
• We have followed the guidelines provided by the university in writing the report.
• Whenever we have used materials (data, theoretical analysis, and text) from other
sources, we have given due credit to them in the text of the report and giving their
details in the references.

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SUPERVISOR’S CERTIFICATE

This is to certify that the work incorporated in the project report entitled “Case study on:
Manohar Lal Chopra vs. Rai Bahadur Rao Seth Harilal” is a record of work carried out by
VAMAXI SHIVKUMAR CHAUHAN,91901041011 Under my guidance and supervision for
the award of Degree OF B.Com LLB (Hons.), Faculty of Law, Marwadi University, Rajkot,
India. To the best of my/our knowledge and belief the project report

• Embodies the work of the candidates themselves,

• Has duly been completed,
• Fulfils the requirement of the Ordinance relating to the degree of the Marwadi
University and
• Is up to the desired standard both in respect of contents and language for being referred
to the examiners.

MR. KARTIK KACHHAWAH,

Assistant Professor
Faculty of Law

Marwadi University

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ACKNOWLEDGEMENT
The success and final outcome of this project necessitated a great deal of guidance and
assistance from many people, and I consider myself extremely fortunate to have received it
throughout the duration of my project. All of what I've accomplished has been possible only
because of their guidance and assistance, and I'd like to express my gratitude to them.

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Index:

Sr. No. Particulars Pg. No.

1 Introduction 6

2 Facts 6

3 Issues raised by the court 6

4 Judgement 7-9

5 Analysis 10-11

6 Conclusion 12

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Introduction:

The researcher will begin with an examination of Manohar Lal Chopra vs. Rai Bahadur Rao
Raja Sheth Harilal1, which is about analysing and interpreting the court's inherent powers in
the absence of issuing an injunction. This is a landmark decision that established that it is the
Court's responsibility to do justice in all cases, whether or not expressly provided for in the
statutes, and that the court has the necessary power to do so in the absence of express provision.
The court's inherent power, which is not conferred, is referred to as inherent power.

Facts:

In this particular instance, the plaintiff filed a money recovery suit against the respondent
before a Sub Ordinate Judge in Asansol. The respondent then filed a counter suit in Indore to
recover the money. The respondent attempted to put a stay on the case before Asansol, but it
was denied. The petition was also rejected by the Calcutta High Court, with the order that the
preliminary issue of jurisdiction be resolved by the trial court. Following that, the respondent
sought an injunction in the Indore court to stop the Asansol suit from proceeding, which was
granted under Order XXXIII of the Code2, but was dismissed when appealed to the High Court,
which held that an order of injunction could be made under the court's inherent powers under
Section 1513. As a result, the appellant is presented with this appeal to consider.

Issue:

“Whether the order of injunction could be issued in the exercise of the inherent powers of the
court under Section 151 of the Code for restraining party from proceeding suit in other court?”

1
Manoharlal Chopra vs. Rai Bahadur Rao Raja Seth Hiralal, AIR 1962 SC 527
2
Order XXXIII of the Civil Procedure Cose, 1908.
3
Section 151 deals with “Saving of inherent powers of Court.”

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Judgement:

SHAH, J.-I have perused the judgment delivered by Mr. Justice Dayal. I agree with the
conclusion that the appeal must succeed but I am unable to hold that civil courts generally have
inherent jurisdiction in cases not covered by rr. 1 and 2 of O. 39, Civil Procedure Code to issue
temporary injunctions restraining parties to the proceedings before them from doing certain
acts. The powers of courts, other than the Chartertd High Courts, in the exercise of their
ordinary original Civil jurisdiction to issue temporary injunctions are defined by the terms of
s. 94(1)(c) and O. 39, Civil Procedure Code. A temporary injunction may issue if it is so
prescribed by rules in the Code. The provisions relating to the issue of temporary injunctions
are to be found in O. 39 rr. 1 and 2: a temporary injunction may be issued only in those cases
which come strictly within those rules, and normally the civil courts have no power to issue
injunctions by transgressing the limits prescribed by the rule. It is true that the High Courts
constituted under Charters and exercising ordinary original jurisdiction do exercise inherent
jurisdiction to issue an injunction to restrain parties in a suit before them from proceedings with
a suit in another court, but that is because the Chartered High Courts claim to have inherited
this jurisdiction from the Supreme Courts of which they were successors. This jurisdiction
would be saved by s. 9 of the Charter Act (24 and 25 Vict. c.104) of 1861, and in the Code of
Civil Procedure, 1908 it is expressly provided by s. 4. But the power of the civil courts other
than the Chartered High Courts must be found within s. 94 and O. 39 rr. 1 and 2 of the Civil
Procedure Code. The Code of Civil Procedure is undoubtedly not exhaustive: it does not lay
down rules for guidance in respect of all situations nor does it seek to provide rules for decision
of all conceivable cases which may arise. The civil courts are authorised to pass such orders(as
may be necessary for the ends of justice, or to prevent abuse of the process of court, but where
an express provision is made to meet a particular situation the Code must be observed, an
departure therefrom is not permissible. As observed "It is impossible to hold that in a matter
which is governed by an Act, which in some limited respects gives the court a statutory
discretion, there can be implied in court, outside the limits of the Act a general discretion to
dispense with the provisions of the Act." Inherent jurisdiction of the court to make order ex
debito justitiae is undoubtedly affirmed by s. 151 of the Code, but that jurisdiction cannot be

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exercised so as to nullify the provisions of the Code. Where the Code deals Expressly with a
particular matter, the provision should normally be regarded as exhaustive.

Power to issue an injunction is restricted by s. 94 and O. 39, and it is not open to the civil court
which is not a Chartered High Court to exercise that power ignoring the restriction imposed
there by, in purported exercise of its inherent jurisdiction. The decision of this Court in Padam
Sen v. The State of Uttar Pradesh does not assist the case of the appellant. In Padam Sen's case
this Court was called upon is a original appeal to consider whether an order of a Munsiff
appointing a commissioner for seizing certain account books of the plaintiff in a suit pending
before the Munsiff was an order authorised by law. It was the case for the prosecution that the
appellants offered a bribe to the commissioner as consideration for being allowed to tamper
with entries therein, and thereby the appellants committed an offence punishable under section
165 A of the Indian Penal Code. This Court held that the commissioner appointed by the civil
court in exercise of powers under O. 26 C. P. Code did not hold any office as a public servant
and the appointment by the Munsiff being without jurisdiction, the commissioner could not be
deemed to be a public servant. In dealing with the argument of counsel for the appellants that
the civil court had inherent powers to appoint a commissioner in exercise of authority under s.
151 Civil Procedure Code for purposes which do not fall within the provisions of section 75
and O. 26 Civil Procedure Code, the Court observed:

" Section 75 of the Code authorises the Court to issue a commission for four purposes:
examining any person, making or adjusting accounts, and making a partition, subject to any
conditions and limitations that may be imposed. Order XXVI establishes rules for the issuance
of commissions and related matters. Mr. Chatterjee, the appellants' learned counsel, has argued
that a Court's powers must be found within the four corners of the Code, and that when the
Code has expressly dealt with the subject of commissions in s. 75, the Court cannot invoke its
inherent powers under s. 151 and thus expand its powers. On the other hand, it is submitted for
the State, that the Code is not exhaustive and the Court, in the exercise of its inherent powers,
can adopt any procedure not prohibited by the Code expressly or by necessary implication if
the Court considers it necessary for the ends of justice or to prevent abuse of the process of the
Court. The Court's inherent powers are in addition to the powers specifically granted to it by
the Code. They are complementary to those powers, so it must be held that the Court is free to
exercise them for the purposes listed in s. 151 of the Code as long as doing so does not conflict
with what is expressly provided in the Code or go against the Legislature's intentions. It is also

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widely acknowledged that the inherent power should not be exercised in a manner that is
inconsistent with or different from the procedure set forth in the Code."

The case's principle is antagonistic to the appellants' arguments. Even though it is not
expressly stated that the Court has no power to appoint a commissioner for other purposes, a
prohibition to that effect is implicit in s. 76, according to the Court in Padam Sen's case. If the
power to issue injunctions can be exercised, and it is prescribed by rules in the Orders in
Schedule I, it must be deemed not exercisable in any other manner or for purposes other than
those set out in O. 39 rr. 1 and 2 by parity of reasoning.

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Analysis:

The researcher completely agrees with the outcome of the case as the Supreme Court has
decided the case after taking into consideration all the relevant facts and legal principles and
rules. My decision would have been in consonance of the Supreme Court’s decision if I had
decided the case. the researcher would keep few decisive elements in mind, prominently
emphasizing that before examining the contentions on the points of law raised in this case, it is
necessary to appreciate what the code sought to achieve and why it was brought on the statute
book. In order to do this, it is necessary to take stock of the position at the time of its enactment
so that attention may be focused on the situation calling for a remedy and how the legislature
sought to tackle it. The learned counsel for the appellant contended by stating that court could
not exercise its inherent powers when there were specific provisions under Section 94 and
Order 39 of the Civil Procedure Code for issue of interim injunctions. Pertaining to it, Supreme
Court was of the opinion that the section 94 does not expressly prohibits the issue of a
temporary injunction in circumstances not covered by Order 39 or by any rules made under the
code.

The provisions in question in the said case of the Civil Procedure Code are not exhaustive for
the simple reason that the Legislature was incapable of contemplating all the possible
circumstances and ambiguities which may arise in future litigation.

As the Hon’ble Justice J.C. Shah aforementioned, that powers of the courts other than the High
Court for the exercise of their civil jurisdiction to issue temporary injunctions are defined under
S. 94(1) (c) and Order 39 of the Code. The Code of Civil Procedure is seemingly not exhaustive,
it neither lay down rules for guidance in respect to all circumstances nor does it seek to provide
rules for decision of all comprehended cases which may be realized in the future. The Supreme
court directed their reasoning by establishing that if the power to issue injunctions are being
exercised and prescribed in a manner that they are in accordance with the rules in the Orders
in Schedule I, it must be deemed to be not exercisable in any other manner or for purposes
other than those set out in Rules 1 and 2 of Order 39 in the Civil Procedure Code.

Moreover, The section 151(Saving of inherent powers of the Court) does not confer any
powers, but only indicates that there is a power to make such orders as may be necessary for
achieving the ends of justice, and also to prevent an abuse of the process of the court. .it is a
prima facie understanding , it is not possible to hold that the provisions of the Code control the
inherent power by limiting it or otherwise affecting it.

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Thus for such reasons, the order of the High Court could not be found persistent and said to be
an order necessary in the interests of justice. Therefore, appeal was allowed to protect.

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Conclusion:

Section 151 of the Civil Procedure Code does not confer any powers; rather, it simply states
that the court has the authority to make such orders as are necessary to achieve the ends of
justice and to prevent an abuse of the court's process. Because the court's powers are broad in
scope and ambit, it is not powerless to grant relief when the ends of justice and equity demand
it. "The inherent power has not been conferred on the court," the Supreme Court said in
Manohar Lal Chopra v. Rai Bahadur Rao Raja Seth Hiralal, "but it is a power in the court by
virtue of its duty to do justice between the parties before it." However, the court's power is
limited to the extent that it cannot be exercised if it is inconsistent with, or in conflict with, any
of the powers conferred under the Code expressly or by necessary implication. Furthermore,
the power granted by section 151 cannot be used as an appellate power or to issue
administrative or ministerial orders.

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