CRIMINAL LAW
PEOPLE v PANCHO
BOOK 1 (ARTICLES 1-99, RPC)
FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES
MALA IN SE AND MALA PROHIBITA
PADILLA v. DIZON
(158 SCRA 127)
The respondent-judge has shown gross ignorance of
the law in holding that to convict the accused for
violation of Central Bank Circular No. 960 i.e.,
smuggling of foreign currency out of the country, the
prosecution must establish that the accused had the
criminal intent to violate the law. The respondent ought
to know that proof of malice or deliberate intent (mens
rea) is not essential in offenses punished by special
laws, which are mala prohibita.
IMPOSSIBLE CRIMES
INTOD ET. AL. v CA
(215 SCRA 52)
G.R. No. 103119
Intod fired at Palangpangan's room, although in reality,
the latter was not present in his room; thus, Intod failed
to kill him. The factual situation in the case at bar
presents an inherent impossibility of accomplishing the
crime. Under Article 4, paragraph 2 of the Revised
Penal Code, such is sufficient to make the act an
impossible crime.
Legal impossibility occurs where the intended acts
even if completed, would not amount to a crime.
PEOPLE v DOMASIAN
(219 SCRA 245)
The accused illegally detained a child and sent a ransom
note to the latter's parents, but the child was rescued even
before the ransom note was received. The act cannot be
considered an impossible crime because there was no
inherent impossibility of its accomplishment or the
employment of inadequate or ineffective means, and the
delivery of the ransom note after the rescue of the victim
did not extinguish the offense, which had already been
consummated when the accused deprived the child of his
liberty.
STAGES OF EXECUTION
PEOPLE v LAMAHANG
(91 Phil 703)
The accused was caught in the act of making an opening
with an iron bar on the wall of a store, and succeeded in
breaking one board and in unfastening another from the
wall. The crime committed was not attempted robbery but
only attempted trespass to dwelling, since based on the
facts established, his intention was to enter by means of
force into the said store against the will of its owner.
1
(416 SCRA 506)
November 27, 2003
G.R. 136592-93
Under Art. 6, in relation to Art. 335, of the Revised Penal
Code, rape is attempted when the offender commences
the commission of rape directly by overt acts, but does
not perform all the acts of execution which should
produce the crime of rape by reason of some cause or
accident other than his own spontaneous desistance.
There is no attempted rape in this case because the
accused just dragged the victim and held her feet, which
are not indicative of an intent or attempt to rape the
victim.
PEOPLE v ORANDE
(415 SCRA 699)
November 12, 2003
G.R. No. 141724
The trial court convicted the accused of frustrated rape
due to the fact that the latter did not succeed in inserting
his penis in the victim’s vagina. There is no such crime as
frustrated rape. Instead, the accused is guilty of
consummated rape since perfect penetration is not
essential for the consummation of rape.
VALENZUELA v PEOPLE
(525 SCRA 306)
The accused argued that he should only be convicted of
frustrated theft for taking cartons of detergent from the
supermarket since he was immediately apprehended by
the security guard. Thus, was not able to freely dispose
of the said stolen articles. Theft cannot have a frustrated
stage and the accused is guilty of consummated theft
since he has obtained possession over the stolen item
and the presumed inability of the offender to freely
dispose of the stolen property does not negate the fact
that the owners have already been deprived of their right
to possession upon the completion of the taking.
Unlawful taking is deemed complete from the moment the
offender gains possession of the thing. The ability of the
offender to freely dispose of the property stolen is not a
constitutive element of the crime of theft.
CONSPIRACY AND PROPOSAL
PEOPLE v RECONES, ET. AL.
(310 SCRA 809)
July 20, 1999
G. R. No. 129535
Three (3) accused were charged with murder. The first
one hit the victim repeatedly with a stone marker, the
second one pummeled the victim with his fists while the
third only watched and acted as lookout in case others
will try to intervene. All of them, including the lookout, are
guilty of murder and are accountable for the death of the
victim on the principle that the act of one is the act of all.
Proof of a previous agreement to commit a felony is not
necessary to establish conspiracy, it being sufficient that
the acts of the accused, before, during, and after the
commission of the felony, demonstrate its existence.
 PEOPLE v CANTUBA
(183 SCRA 289)
G. R. No. 79811
The accused was correctly convicted as a co-conspirator.
His knowledge of the plot to assassinate the victim, the
fact that he had been ordered to scout for a man who
could do the job and his knowledge of the place, date
and time of the assault are sufficient to show unity of
purpose. At the very least, therefore, he had to know the
plot and decided to join the execution. From the legal
viewpoint, conspiracy exists if, at the time of the
commission of the offense, the accused had the same
purpose and were united in its execution.
The degree of actual participation in the commission of
the crime is immaterial in conspiracy.
CONTINUING CRIMES
PEOPLE v TUMLOS
(67 PHIL 320)
April 13, 1939
G.R. No. 46248
The theft of the thirteen (13) cows committed by the
defendant took place at the same time and in the same
place. Consequently, he performed but one act. The fact
that eight (8) of the said cows belong to one owner and
five (5) to another does not make him criminally liable for
two (2) distinct offenses for the reason that to be liable for
two (2) distinct offenses, the act must be divided into two
(2). In this case, the act is not susceptible of division. The
intention was likewise one, namely, to take for the
purpose of appropriating or selling the thirteen (13) cows
which he found grazing in the same place.
PEOPLE v JARANILLA
(55 SCRA 563)
February 22, 1974
G.R. No. L-28547
The taking of the six fighting cocks from their coop should
be characterized as a single offense of theft as the
assumption is that the accused were animated by a
single criminal impulse. The taking of the fighting cocks in
the same place and on the same occasion cannot give
rise to separate crimes of theft.
SANTIAGO v GARCHITORENA
(228 SCRA 214)
G.R. No. 109266
Public prosecutors filed thirty-two (32) Amended
Informations against Santiago for violation of Section 3
(e) of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, allegedly
committed by giving "unqualified" aliens with the benefits
of the Alien Legalization Program. The thirty-two (32)
Amended Informations charged the accused with what is
known as delito continuado or "continued crime" and
hence, there should only be one information to be filed
against Santiago. The concept of delito continuado is
applicable to crime penalized under special laws.
2
ILAGAN v COURT OF APPEALS
(239 SCRA 575)
G.R. No. 110617
The series of acts committed against the seven (7) lot
buyers were not the product of a single criminal intent.
The misrepresentation or deceit was employed against
each lot buyer on different dates and in separate places,
hence, they originated from separate criminal intents and
consequently resulted in separate felonies.
COMPOUND CRIMES
PEOPLE v CASTROMERO
(280 SCRA 421)
G.R. No. 118992
The rape victim jumped from a window of her house to
escape from the accused; as a result, she suffered
serious physical injuries specifically a broken vertebra
which required medical attention and surgery for more
than ninety days. Here, the rape was complexed with the
crime of serious physical injuries, in accordance with the
settled principle that a person who creates in another’s
mind an immediate sense of danger that causes the latter
to try to escape is responsible for whatever injuries the
other person may consequently suffer.
PEOPLE v COMADRE
(431 SCRA 366)
June 8, 2004
G.R. No. 153559
The accused dropped a hand grenade inside a house,
killing one and causing 4 others to suffer shrapnel
wounds on their bodies. The accused was found guilty of
the complex crime of murder with multiple attempted
murder under Article 48, and the penalty for the most
serious crime (murder) shall be imposed.
PEOPLE v MELECIO ROBINOS
(382 SCRA 581)
May 29, 2002
G.R. No. 138453
The accused stabbed his pregnant wife with a knife,
causing the instantaneous death of the latter and the
fetus inside her womb. He was convicted of the complex
crime of parricide with unintentional abortion, and the
penalty to be imposed on him should be that for the
graver offense which is parricide.
When a single act constitutes two or more grave or less
grave felonies, the penalty for the most serious crime
shall be imposed.
PEOPLE v BALOTOL
(84 Phil 289)
The accused stabbed the victim at the back with the use
of a bolo. The bolo pierced through the victim's
abdominal region which also wounded another person,
resulting to the death of both victims. The crime
committed was double murder, defined and penalized in
Article 248, in relation to Article 48, of the Revised Penal
Code.

COMPLEX CRIME PROPER
PEOPLE v TALO
October 25, 2000
G.R. No. 125542
The accused forcibly took the victim from her parents'
house and, in a ricefield about 800 meters away, forced
her to have sexual intercourse with him. The accused
was found guilty of the complex crime of forcible
abduction with rape, as the crime of forcible abduction
was a necessary means for committing the crime of rape.
PEOPLE v SABREDO
(331 SCRA 663)
May 11, 2000
G.R. 126114
The accused, using a blade, forcibly took away the victim
from Cebu to Masbate, and eventually raped her. The
crime committed is simple rape only since the information
failed to allege that the forcible taking of the victim was
done with lewd designs (an element of forcible
abduction). Hence, the crime of rape may absorb forcible
abduction.
PEOPLE v BARBAS
(60 PHIL 241)
The defendant, a public officer, altered the duplicates of
the cedulas by erasing the names originally written on
them and replacing the same with new names for the
purpose of selling them to other people and
misappropriating the money. The falsification of public
documents was, therefore, the means which the
defendant availed himself of in committing the crime of
malversation.
CIRCUMSTANCES AFFECTING CRIMINAL LIABILITY
JUSTIFYING CIRCUMSTANCES
PEOPLE v ABRAZALDO
(397 SCRA 137)
While the accused admitted the commission of the crime
in order to preserve his own life, he maintained that the
victim accidentally stabbed himself while they were
grappling for the knife. The justifying circumstance of
self-defense cannot be appreciated considering the
accused-appellant’s flight from the crime scene, his
failure to inform the authorities of the incident and his
failure to surrender the knife to the authorities. The
aforesaid circumstances are inconsistent with having a
clean conscience and, instead, indicate his culpability to
the crime charged.
PEOPLE v TAC-AN
(182 SCRA 601)
G.R. Nos. 76338-39
The accused killed the victim but claimed self-defense.
The victim previously uttered some threatening words
against him. Assuming that the victim uttered those
words, such utterances cannot be regarded as the
unlawful aggression which is the first and most
fundamental requirement of self-defense, and such
3
statements could not reasonably inspire the "well
grounded and reasonable belief" claimed by Renato that
"he was in imminent danger of death or bodily harm."
PEOPLE v PATOTOY
(261 SCRA 37)
G.R. No. 102058
The accused admitted to having killed the victim but
claims to have done so in self-defense. The victim
appeared to draw something from his waist during their
confrontation. The victim's alleged act of drawing
"something" from his waist certainly is not the "unlawful
aggression" meant in the law that would justify a fatal
strike at him and no veritable physical force on the part of
the latter has been shown that could have really
endangered the life of the accused. Hence, self-defense
cannot exist in this case.
Without unlawful aggression, self-defense cannot exist
nor be an extenuating circumstance.
PEOPLE VS. GENEBLAZO
(361 SCRA 572)
July 20, 2001
G.R. No. 133580
Assuming that the version of the accused of the incidents
is true, that unlawful aggression emanated from the
victim and his companion by throwing stones at him, the
aggression ceased to exist when the victim and his
companion ran away. There was no longer any real
danger to the life or personal safety of the accused.
When the perpetrator does not persist in his purpose or
when he discontinues his attitude to the extent that the
object of his attack is no longer in peril, an act of
aggression is not unlawful aggression warranting self-
defense.
PEOPLE V. BAUTISTA
(424 SCRA 63)
February 27, 2004
G.R. No. 139530
There is no self-defense in this case because even if the
accused believed that the victim did try to kill him when
he saw him raise his bolo, such aggression ceased when
accused succeeded in grabbing the bolo and he was not
hit by the stone hurled at him by the victim; hence, the
accused no longer faced any danger to his life and limb.
When an unlawful aggression no longer exists, the one
making a defense has no right to kill or even injure the
former aggressor.
PEOPLE v ESCARLOS
(410 SCRA 463)
September 10, 2003
G.R. No. 148912
Even assuming arguendo that there was an altercation
before the stabbing incident and that some danger did in
fact exist, the imminence of that danger had already
ceased the moment the accused disarmed the victim by
seizing the knife from the latter. After the accused had
successfully seized it, there was no longer any unlawful
aggression to speak of that would have necessitated the
need to kill the victim. Hence, the accused became the
unlawful aggressor when he stabbed the victim.

PEOPLE v APOLINAR
C.A., 38 O.G. 2870
The accused, while looking over his land and believing
that the victim had stolen his palay, shouted for the latter
to stop, fired his gun in the air and then at the victim,
causing the latter’s death. Defense of property is not of
such importance as the right to life and it can be invoked
only as a justifying circumstance when it is coupled with
an attack on the person of the one entrusted with the said
property.
BATTERED WOMAN SYNDROME
PEOPLE v GENOSA
September 8, 2010
G.R. No. 135981
Marivic Genosa, charged with parricide for the killing of
her husband, anchored her defense on the theory of
battered woman syndrome (BWS), which constituted a
form of cumulative provocation that broke down her
psychological resistance and self-control. The Court
convicted Genosa as the defense failed to establish all
the elements of self-defense arising from BWS: (1) each
of the phases of the cycle of violence must be proven to
have characterized at least two battering episodes
between the appellant and her intimate partner; (2) the
final acute battering episode preceding the killing of the
batterer must have produced in the battered person's
mind an actual fear of an imminent harm from her
batterer and an honest belief that she needed to use
force in order to save her life; (3) at the time of the killing,
the batterer must have posed probable -- not necessarily
immediate and actual -- grave harm to the accused,
based on the history of violence perpetrated by the
former against the latter.
EXEMPTING CIRCUMSTANCES
PEOPLE v DOMINGO
(580 SCRA 436)
The accused asserted that he was insane or completely
deprived of intelligence during the commission of the
crimes and presented the results of a medical
examination showing that he was suffering from
Schizophrenia. The medical examination was taken four
years after the crimes were committed. The alleged
insanity of an accused should relate to the period
immediately before or at the very moment the felony is
committed, not at any time thereafter. Medical findings of
mental disorder referring to a period after the time the
crime was committed will not exempt him from criminal
liability.
LLAVE v PEOPLE
(488 SCRA 376)
April 26, 2006
G.R. No. 166040
The accused (a minor), with methodical fashion, dragged
the resisting victim behind a pile of hollow blocks to
ensure that passersby would not discover his acts. When
he was discovered, he hastily fled from the scene to
escape arrest. The Court ruled that he acted with
4
discernment when he had carnal knowledge with the
victim. Based on the circumstances, the minor knew what
he was doing and that it was wrong. Such circumstances
included the gruesome nature of the crime and the
minor’s cunning and shrewdness.
U.S. V. TANEDO
(15 PHIL 196)
The accused, while hunting fired a shot at wild chickens;
however, the slug recoiled and fatally hit another man. A
person who, while performing a legal act with due care,
causes some injury by mere accident without fault or
intention of causing it, is not criminally liable.
PEOPLE v FALLORINA
(428 SCRA ___)
May 4, 2004
G.R. No. 137347
The accused claims that the victim's death was caused
by his gun accidentally going off. The Court convicted
him for the victim's death due to his failure to prove with
clear and convincing evidence his defense of accident.
The following proved otherwise that the accused
accidentally shot the victim: (1) his refusal to answer
clarificatory questions of the prosecutor, which casted
doubt on his defense; (2) his refusal to surrender himself
and his firearm after the shooting; and (3) other pieces of
evidence which belie his claim that the death of the victim
was accidental and that he was not negligent.
PEOPLE v AYAYA
(52 PHIL 354)
The accused, in order to prevent the door from crushing
her son's head, jabbed her husband with her umbrella
which later led to her husband's death. The Court
concluded that in thrusting her umbrella in the opening of
the door in question, the accused did so to free her son
from the imminent danger of having his head crushed or
being strangled and if she consequently caused her
husband's injury, it was by a mere accident, without any
fault or intention to cause it.
PEOPLE V. GENITA
(425 SCRA 343)
March 11, 2004
G.R. No. 126171
The appellant's claim that he "accidentally shot" the two
victims is incredible. In this case, it is clear that the
requisites of accident as an exempting circumstance
were not proven: (1) appellant's manner of carrying his
rifle negates his claim of due care in the performance of
an act since he should have seen to it that its safety lock
was intact; (2) the fact that both victims sustained more
than one wound shows that the shooting was not merely
accidental; (3) appellant manifested an unmistakable
intent to kill the victims when he reloaded his rifle after
his first unsuccessful attempt to kill them.
PEOPLE v CASTILLO
(526 SCRA 215)
June 29, 2007
G.R. No. 172695
Appellant contends that assuming he was the one who
killed his wife, the same was accidental and not
intentional. However, the Court does not agree. By no
stretch of imagination could playing with or using a
deadly sling and arrow be considered as performing a
lawful act. Thus, on this ground alone, appellant’s
defense of accident must be struck down because he
was performing an unlawful act during the incident.
PEOPLE v BANDIAN
(63 PHL 530)
September 30, 1936
G.R. No. 45186
The mother who went to the thicket to respond to the call
of nature but, instead, gave birth therein is not criminally
liable for infanticide for leaving the child behind. She
should not be blamed for the act of abandonment
because it all happened by mere accident, she was
overcome by strong dizziness and extreme debility (also
considered as an insuperable cause). Any person who
acts and behaves under such circumstances is exempted
from liability.
PEOPLE v MORENO
(77 PHIL 548)
The accused admitted to having killed the victim but
claimed that he should be exempted from liability
because he did so in obedience to an order given him by
Japanese officers of the navy. The latter informed him
that the victim was one of those who were encountered
by the Japanese in a mountain and wounded a Japanese
soldier. The accused was held guilty because the law
provides that to be exempted from criminal liability, it is
not enough to prove that the act was committed in
obedience to an order, it must also be established that
the order being followed is lawful.
JUVENILE JUSTICE AND WELFARE ACT OF 2006
(R.A. NO. 9344); ALSO REFER TO CHILD AND YOUTH
WELFARE CODE (P.D. 603, AS AMENDED)
VALCESAR ESTIOCA v PEOPLE
(556 SCRA 300)
June 27, 2008
G.R. No. 173876
The accused was 14 years old at the time he committed
the robbery which occurred in 2001. Although R.A. 9344
or the Juvenile Justice and Welfare Act of 2006 took
effect only on May 20, 2006, the said law should be given
retroactive effect in favor of the accused who was not
shown to be a habitual criminal (penal laws shall have a
retroactive effect insofar as they favor the person guilty of
a felony who is not a habitual criminal).Hence, the
accused was exempt from criminal liability.
JOEMAR ORTEGA v PEOPLE
(562 SCRA 450)
August 20, 2008
G.R. No. 151085
The accused was only 13 years old at the time of the
commission of the rape and under R.A. No. 9344 (which
was applied retroactively), he is exempted from criminal
liability. Section 64 of the law further provides that cases
of children 15 years old and below, at the time of the
5
commission of the crime, shall immediately be dismissed
and the child shall be referred to the appropriate Local
Social Welfare and Development Officer (LSWDO).
MITIGATING CIRCUMSTANCES
PEOPLE v JAURIGUE
(C.A. NO. 384)
The deceased placed his hand on the upper portion of
the woman's thigh without her consent, which led to the
woman stabbing the neck of the deceased to defend her
honor. The means employed in the defense of her honor
was excessive and she cannot be declared completely
exempt from criminal liability. However, the fact that she
had acted in the immediate vindication of a grave offense
committed against her a few moments before, and upon
such provocation as to produce passion and obfuscation,
or temporary loss of reason and self-control, should be
considered as mitigating circumstance in her favor.
U.S. v AMPAR
(37 Phil 201)
The accused, a 70-year old man, killed the deceased for
telling him, "Come here and I will make roast pig of you."
The offense which the defendant was trying to vindicate
would be considered a mere trifle to the average person
but it was evidently a serious matter to be made the butt
of a joke for the old man. Hence, he was given the
benefit of a mitigating circumstance.
PEOPLE v IGNAS
(412 SCRA 311)
September 30, 2003
G.R. No. 140514
The accused killed his wife's lover 2 weeks after he
discovered his wife's extramarital dalliance, but the court
did not consider the mitigating circumstance of passion
and obfuscation because for the same to be well
founded, the following requisites must concur: (1) there
should be an act both unlawful and sufficient to produce
such condition of mind; and (2) the act which produced
the obfuscation was not far removed from the
commission of the crime by a considerable length of time,
during which the perpetrator might recover his moral
equanimity. The period of two weeks between the
discovery of his wife’s extramarital dalliance and the
killing of her lover was sufficient time for appellant to
reflect and cool off.
PEOPLE v BENITO
(74 SCRA 271)
December 17, 1976
G.R. No. L-38091
The accused (who had a pending case with the Civil
Service) contended that the victim insulted him when he
(the victim) remarked that a thief was loitering in the
premises of the Civil Service Commission and further
argued that that remark "was tantamount to kicking a
man already down and to rubbing salt into a raw wound"
and that, as it was made publicly and in a loud voice, he
was exposed to ridicule in the presence of his
officemates. Assuming that the remark was directed at
the accused, the Court did not apply the mitigating
circumstance of vindication for a grave offense for the
killing of the victim because the accused had more than
sufficient time to suppress his emotion over said remark if
he ever did resent it.
U.S. V. HICKS
(14 PHIL 217)
The accused and the victim illicitly lived together for 5
years. After they separated, the accused killed the victim
for living with another man. No mitigating circumstance
was considered in his favor, not even the loss of reason
and self-control produced by jealousy as alleged by the
defense, inasmuch as the only causes which mitigate the
criminal responsibility for the loss of self-control are those
which originate from legitimate feelings and not those
which arise from vicious, unworthy, and immoral
passions.
U.S. V. DELA CRUZ
March 29, 1912
G.R. No. L-7094
The accused, in the heat of passion, killed his former
lover upon discovering her in flagrante in carnal
communication with a mutual acquaintance. The accused
was entitled to the mitigating circumstance because in
this case, the impulse upon which defendant acted and
which naturally "produced passion and obfuscation" was
not that the woman declined to have illicit relations with
him but the sudden revelation that she was untrue to him,
and his discovery of her in flagrante in the arms of
another.
PEOPLE v RABAO
(67 PHIL 255)
April 10, 1939
G.R. No. L-46530
The accused and his wife had a heated argument
because the wife wanted to give their sick child a bath
which was against the wishes of the accused. The Court
considered mitigating circumstance in his favor since,
although he transgressed the law by an unjust attack on
his wife, the accused did not really have the intention of
committing so grave a crime as parricide, and the quarrel
that led to the aggression had its origin from the natural
and justifiable desire of the accused, as a father, to
prevent his child, which was then ill, from being given a
bath.
PEOPLE v DAWATON
(389 SCRA 277)
September 17, 2002
G.R. No. 146247
In trying to avail of the mitigating circumstance of
voluntary surrender, the accused argues that he was not
arrested but "fetched" as he voluntarily went with the
policemen when they came for him. That he did not try to
escape or resist arrest after he was taken into custody by
the authorities did not amount to voluntary surrender and
it is also settled that voluntary surrender cannot be
appreciated where the evidence adduced shows that it
was the authorities who came looking for the accused.
PEOPLE v VIERNES
(372 SCRA 231)
6
December 13, 2001
G.R. No. 136733
Going to the police station “to clear his name” does not
show any intent of the accused to surrender
unconditionally to the authorities. The act of surrender
must be spontaneous, accompanied by an
acknowledgment of guilt, or an intention to save the
authorities the trouble and the expense that search and
capture would require.
PEOPLE v ABOLIDOR
(423 SCRA 260)
February 18, 2004
G.R. No. 147231
The accused surrendered to the authorities more than
one year after the incident in order to disclaim
responsibility for the killing of the victim. The Court did
not consider the mitigating circumstance of voluntary
surrender because: (1) the facts of the case do not show
repentance or acknowledgment of the crime nor intention
to save the government the trouble and expense
necessarily incurred in his search and capture; and (2) at
the time of his surrender, there was a pending warrant of
arrest against him.
AGGRAVATING CIRCUMSTANCES
PEOPLE v CALISO
(58 PHIL 283)
July 1, 1933
G.R. No. L-37271
In the commission of the crime, the aggravating
circumstance of grave abuse of confidence was present
since the appellant was the domestic servant of the
family and was sometimes the deceased child's "amah".
The circumstance that the crime had been committed in
the dwelling of the offended party which was considered
by the lower court as another aggravating circumstance
should be disregarded as both the victim and the
appellant were living in the same house.
PEOPLE v LORA
(113 SCRA 366)
March 30, 1982
G.R. No. L-49430
The accused was charged for the crime of serious illegal
detention with murder for illegally detaining a 3-year old
child, and attacking the same, which resulted to the
child's death. There are three aggravating circumstances
in this case, namely: (1) lack of respect due to the tender
age of the victim; (2) cruelty, for gagging the victim's
mouth with stockings thereby causing slow suffocation;
and (3) abuse of confidence since the main duty of the
accused in the household was to take care of the minor
child.
PEOPLE v LAGUARDIA
(148 SCRA 133)
February 27, 1987
G.R. No. L-63243
The following aggravating circumstances were present in
this case of robbery with homicide: (1) despoblado or
uninhabited place since evidence shows that the accused
lay in wait for the truck being driven by the victim at an
isolated portion of the highway, choosing that particular
spot where they could commit the crime without
disturbance or discovery and with easy opportunity for
escape; and (2) use of motor vehicles because the
conspirators took the vehicle of the victim to facilitate
their escape and to prevent the other passengers from
reporting the offense to the authorities. The following
aggravating circumstances were rejected: (1) nighttime
because it was not especially sought, as the victim's trip
schedule and not the discretion of the culprits determined
the time of its commission; (2) evident premeditation
because it is inherent in the crime of robbery and was not
proved in the commission of the killing; and (3) treachery,
as there is no evidence of its employment since none of
the witnesses actually saw the shooting.
PEOPLE v ZETA
(549 SCRA 541)
March 27, 2008
G.R. No. 178541
The span of thirty minutes or half an hour from the time
the accused showed their determination to kill the victim
(2:00 in the morning of 28 October 1995) up to the time
the accused shot to death the victim (2:15-2:30 in the
morning of 28 October 1995) could not have afforded
them full opportunity for meditation and reflection on the
consequences of the crime they committed. The Court
held that the lapse of thirty minutes between the
determination to commit a crime and the execution
thereof is insufficient for a full meditation on the
consequences of the act. Hence, the aggravating
circumstance of evident premeditation cannot be
appreciated in this case.
ACCESSORIES
PEOPLE v ORTIZ AND ZAUSA
(55 PHIL 993)
August 27, 1986
G.R. No. L-3507
Ortiz and Zausa were charged with conspiracy to kill the
victim but Ortiz contends that he should be acquitted
because he did not take part in the attack. The Court
ruled that Ortiz cannot be convicted either as principal or
as accessory, for it has been shown that there was
neither plan nor agreement between him and Zausa to
commit the crime, and that he took no part in the latter's
attack with the spear.
VINO v PEOPLE
(178 SCRA 626)
October 19, 1989
G.R. No. 84163
The information was correct. An accused can be validly
convicted as an accomplice or accessory under an
information charging him as a principal. Also, the trial of
an accessory can proceed without awaiting the result of
the separate charge against the principal for the
corresponding responsibilities of the principal, accomplice
and accessory are distinct from each other.
PEOPLE v FERNANDEZ
(183 SCRA 511)
7
March 22, 1990
G.R. No. L-62116
The accused entered the bathroom together with
accused Fernandez. In the bathroom, the latter tied a
piece of cloth around the victim’s neck while accused
Conrado held her hands placing them behind her body.
Thereafter, they raped the victim one after the other.
Hence ,the Court was correct in imposing on each of the
accused of the penalty corresponding to two crimes of
rape because each of them (accused) cooperated in the
commission of the rape perpetrated by the others, by
acts without which it would not have been accomplished.
PEOPLE v CASTILLO
(17 SCRA 721)
July 26, 1966
G.R. No. L-19238
After his son had fatally hacked the victim with a bolo and
was about to strike the victim a second time, the accused
shouted: "You kill him." The accused is not guilty as
principal by inducement because in determining whether
the utterances of an accused are sufficient to make him
guilty as co-principal by inducement, it must appear that
the inducement was of such nature and was made in
such a way as to become the determining cause of the
crime and that such inducement was uttered with the
intention of producing the result.
PEOPLE v DUMANCAS
(320 SCRA 584)
December 13, 1999
G.R. No. 133527–28
The accused cannot be held guilty as principal by
inducement when she told the policemen to "take care of
the two" victims, who were later killed by the said
policemen. There are 2 ways of directly inducing another
to commit a crime, namely: (i) by giving a price, or
offering reward or promise, and (ii) by using words of
command and in this case, there is no evidence that the
accused offered any price or reward should they kill the
victims, nor can the remark of the accused be deemed as
a command required by law to justify a finding that she is
guilty as a principal by inducement.
CARINO v PEOPLE
(7 SCRA 900)
April 30, 1963
G.R. No. L-14752
The accused cannot be held guilty as an accomplice in
the crime of rebellion through his acts of sending or
furnishing cigarettes and food supplies to a famous Huk,
as well as changing $6,000 to Philippine money or in
helping Huks to open accounts (which were said to be
part of his functions as an employee of a bank). These
acts by themselves do not and cannot carry or prove any
criminal intent of helping the Huks in committing the
crime of insurrection or rebellion and they cannot be said
to constitute acts of cooperation in the execution of the
act of overthrowing the government.
PEOPLE v DELA CERNA
(21 SCRA 569)
October 30, 1967
G.R. No. L-20911

The accused furnished the gun that was used to kill the
victim Casiano, however, he cannot be held liable as an
accomplice because he merely conspired with the
principal to kill another victim, Rafael. The accused here
was not aware that the principal would use the gun to kill
Casiano. Hence, for other acts done outside the
contemplation of the co-conspirators or which are not the
necessary and logical consequences of the intended
crime, only the actual perpetrators are liable.
DURATION OF PENALTIES
PEOPLE v ALVARADO
(275 SCRA 727)
July 21, 1997
G.R. No. 117402
The Supreme Court reiterated the ruling in People v.
Lucas, January 9, 1995, where it was clarified that
“Although Section 17 of R.A. No. 7659 has fixed the
duration of reclusion perpetua from twenty (20) years and
one (1) day to forty (40) years, there was no clear
legislative intent to alter its original classification as an
indivisible penalty. Reclusion perpetua, therefore, retains
its nature as having no minimum, medium and maximum
periods and is imposed in its entirety regardless of any
mitigating or aggravating circumstances that may have
attended the commission of the crime.
PEOPLE v MANTALABA
(654 SCRA 188)
July 20, 2011
G.R. No. 186227
The privileged mitigating circumstance of minority was
appreciated in fixing the penalty necessarily reducing the
penalty from reclusion perpetua to reclusion temporal,
which is one degree lower. The ISLAW is also applicable
in the present case because the penalty which has been
originally an indivisible penalty (reclusion perpetua to
death), where ISLAW is inapplicable, became a divisible
penalty (reclusion temporal) by virtue of the presence of
the privileged mitigating circumstance of minority. Hence,
the minimum penalty should be taken from the penalty
next lower in degree which is prision mayor and the
maximum penalty shall be taken from the medium period
of reclusion temporal.
PEOPLE v ESCARES
(102 PHIL 677)
December 23, 1957
G.R. Nos. L-11128-33
It should be noted that the imposable penalty in each of
the six cases where appellant pleaded guilty in
accordance with paragraph 5, Article 294, of the Revised
Penal Code, is prision correccional in its maximum period
to prision mayor in its medium period, which should be
applied in its minimum period in view of the mitigating
circumstance of plea of guilty, not offset by any
aggravating circumstance, or from 4 years 2 months and
1 day to 6 years one month and 10 days. In applying the
Indeterminate Sentence Law, the appellant should be
sentenced for each crime to an indeterminate penalty the
minimum of which shall not be less than 4 months and 1
day of arresto mayor nor more than 4 years and 2
months of prision correccional, and the maximum shall
8
not be less than 4 years 2 months and 1 day of prision
correccional nor more than 6 years 1 month and 10 days
of prision mayor. The trial court; however, committed an
error in applying the proper penalty by using the three-
fold rule. Hence, the penalty imposed upon appellant by
the trial court should be modified in the sense that he
should suffer in each of the six cases an indeterminate
penalty of not less than 4 months and 1 day of arresto
mayor and not more than 4 years 2 months and 1 day of
prision correccional, plus the corresponding accessory
penalties provided for by law.
MEJORADA v SANDIGANBAYAN
(151 SCRA 399)
June 30, 1987
G.R. Nos. L-51065-72
The Sandiganbayan imposed eight penalties for the eight
informations (for violating Section 3E of Republic Act No.
3019, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt
Practices Act) filed against the accused. The penalties
totaled to fifty-six years and eight days of imprisonment
which the accused impugns as contrary to the three-fold
rule and insists that the duration of the aggregate
penalties should not exceed forty (40) years. The
accused is mistaken in his application of the three-fold
rule as set forth in Article 70 of the Revised Penal Code
since this article is to be taken into account not in the
imposition of the penalty but in connection with the
service of the sentence imposed. It merely provides that
the prisoner cannot be made to serve more than three
times the most severe of these penalties the maximum of
which is forty years.
PEOPLE v ALFREDO BON
(506 SCRA 168)
October 30, 2006
G.R. No. 166401
In view of the statutory disallowance of the death penalty
through Rep. Act No. 9346, "death," as provided in Article
71 of the Revised Penal Code shall no longer form part of
the equation in the graduation of penalties. In the case of
the accused, the determination of his penalty for
attempted rape shall be reckoned not from two degrees
lower than death, but two degrees lower than reclusion
perpetua. Therefore, the maximum term of his penalty
shall no longer be reclusion temporal but prision mayor.
PROBATION LAW
FRANCISCO v CA
(243 SCRA 384)
April 6, 1995
G.R. No. 108747
The accused who was found guilty by the MeTC of grave
oral defamation in 4 of the 5 cases filed against him and
sentenced to a prison term of 1 year and 1 day to 1 year
and 8 months of prision correccional in each crime
committed appealed his case before the RTC but
eventually applied for probation. The Court, in ruling that
the accused is no longer eligible for probation, listed the
following reasons: (1) Sec. 4 of the Probation Law clearly
mandates that "no application for probation shall be
entertained or granted if the defendant has perfected the
appeal from the judgment of conviction;" (2) the penalties
imposed by the MeTC were already probationable,
hence, there was no need to appeal if only to reduce the
penalties to within the probationable period (multiple
prison terms should not be added up); (3) the accused
appealed to the RTC not to reduce or even correct the
penalties imposed by the MeTC, but to assert his
innocence; (4) the application for probation was filed way
beyond the period allowed by law, in this case was filed
"only after a warrant for the arrest of petitioner had been
issued . . . (and) almost two months after (his) receipt of
the Decision" of the RTC.
SORIANO v CA
(304 SCRA 231)
March 4, 1999
G.R. No. 123936
Petitioner, whose probation was revoked since he was
not able to comply with one of the conditions of probation
which is to indemnify the heirs of the victim in the amount
of P98,560.00, asserts that his non-compliance was due
to his poor financial condition and that his enjoyment of
probation should not be made to depend on the
satisfaction of his civil liability. The Supreme Court, in
ruling that the revocation of probation was lawful and
proper, held that his continued refusal to submit a
program of payment creates the impression that he wants
to completely avoid paying his civil liability and that the
conditions of probation must be satisfied in order that the
purposes of probation be fulfilled, which include
promoting the correction and rehabilitation of an offender
by providing him with individualized treatment, and
providing an opportunity for the reformation of a penitent
offender which might be less probable if he were to serve
a prison sentence.
TOLENTINO v JUDGE ALCONCEL
(121 SCRA 92)
Petitioner Tolentino, who pleaded not guilty to the charge
of violation of Section 4 of the Dangerous Drugs Act,
changed his plea of not guilty to the lesser offense of
illegal possession of marijuana, which Judge Alconcel
allowed, sentencing petitioner to imprisonment of 6
months and 1 day to 2 years and 4 months plus fines.
The Supreme Court, in upholding the decision of Judge
Alconcel to deny Tolentino's subsequent application for
probation on the ground that "probation will depreciate
the seriousness of the offense committed", held that the
potentiality of the offender to reform is not the sole or
primordial factor that should be considered and that the
demands of justice and public interest must be observed
in the grant or denial of an application for probation.
CABATINGAN v SANDIGANBAYAN
(102 SCRA 187)
January 22, 1981
G.R. No. L-55333
Sandiganbayan, in denying the application for probation
by the petitioner, merely relied on a report of the
probation officer which in itself, was mostly hearsay, and
did not give the petitioner a chance to be heard before it
issued its resolution denying the application for probation.
The Supreme Court held that respondent court appears
to have wholly relied on the probation report and did not
make its own determination as to whether or not
probation would serve the ends of justice and the best
interest of the public and the applicant. It was not enough
9
for the respondent court to deny petitioner's application
solely on the report that she was involved in "maisiao"
and that she was facing another preliminary investigation
for the "additional shortage" of the funds of which she
had already pleaded guilty.
BALA v JUDGE MARTINEZ
(181 SCRA 459)
January 29, 1990
G.R. No. L-67301
Petitioner violated the terms and conditions of his
probation but contends that there was no valid reason for
its revocation since his probation period had already
terminated on August 10, 1983 (although no order of final
discharge was issued as the probation officer had not yet
submitted his final report). The Supreme Court, in holding
that the probation is revocable before the final discharge
of the probationer by the court, held that: (1) the
expiration of the probation period alone does not
automatically terminate probation; (2) nowhere in the
provisions of the probation law can be found the ipso
facto termination of probation; (3) probation is not
coterminous with its period; (4) there must first be issued
by the court of an order of final discharge based on the
report and recommendation of the probation officer and
only from such issuance can the case of the probationer
be deemed terminated.
JUVENILE JUSTICE AND WELFARE ACT OF 2006
(REPUBLIC ACT NO. 9344)
PEOPLE v SARCIA
(599 SCRA 20)
September 10, 2009
G.R. No. 169641
If a mature minor, maybe 16 years old to below 18 years
old is charged, accused with, or may have committed a
serious offense, and may have acted with discernment,
then the child could be recommended by the Department
of Social Welfare and Development (DSWD), by the
Local Council for the Protection of Children (LCPC), or by
Office of Juvenile Welfare and Restoration to go through
a judicial proceeding; but the welfare, best interests, and
restoration of the child should still be a primordial or
primary consideration. In this case, since the accused-
appellant is about 31 years of age, the suspension of
sentence has become moot and academic but he is still
entitled to confinement in agricultural camps and other
training facilities under Sec. 51 of R.A. No. 9344.
PEOPLE v HERMIE JACINTO
(645 SCRA 590)
March 16, 2011
G.R. No. 182239
The benefits of a suspended sentence can no longer
apply to appellant who is now 25 years old since the
suspension of sentence lasts only until the child in
conflict with the law reaches the maximum age of twenty-
one (21) years. However, the offender shall be entitled to
the right of restoration, rehabilitation and reintegration in
accordance with Republic Act No. 9344 in order that
he/she will have the chance to live a normal life and
become a productive member of the community. Thus,
appellant may be confined in an agricultural camp or any
other training facility in accordance with Sec. 51 of
Republic Act No. 9344.
PADUA v PEOPLE
(559 SCRA 519)
July 23, 2008
G.R. No. 168546
The suspension of sentence under Section 38 of R.A. No.
9344 could no longer be retroactively applied for
petitioner’s benefit as Section 38 provides that once a
child under 18 years of age is found guilty of the offense
charged, instead of pronouncing the judgment of
conviction, the court shall place the child in conflict with
the law under suspended sentence. Section 40 of Rep.
Act No. 9344 provides that once the child reaches 18
years of age, the court shall determine whether to
discharge the child, order execution of sentence, or
extend the suspended sentence for a certain specified
period or until the child reaches the maximum age of 21
years. However, since petitioner has already reached 21
years of age or over, he could no longer be considered a
child for purposes of applying Rep. Act No. 9344.
REMIENDO v PEOPLE
(603 SCRA 274)
October 9, 2009
G.R. No. 184874
The accused, being above 15 and under 18 years of age
at the time of the rape, and having acted with
discernment, claimed for the benefits of R.A. No. 9344 in
view of Section 40, which provides that "if the child in
conflict with the law has reached eighteen (18) years of
age while under suspended sentence, the court shall
determine whether to discharge the child in accordance
with this Act, to order execution of sentence, or to extend
the suspended sentence for a certain period or until the
child reaches the maximum age of twenty-one (21)
years." However, the application of Section 40 is
rendered moot and academic since the accused was
already 22 years old and could no longer be considered a
child for the purposes of applying R.A. No. 9344.
MODIFICATION AND EXTINCTION OF CRIMINAL
LIABILITY
DAMASCO v LAQUI
(166 SCRA 214)
September 30, 1988
G.R. No. 81381
The petitioner was charged with the crime of grave
threats (the crime was committed on 8 July 1987 and the
information was filed only on 17 September 1987 or after
the lapse of 71 days), but was only found guilty by the
court of light threats (with a prescriptive period of 2
months or 60 days). The Supreme Court, in agreeing with
petitioner's contention that he cannot be convicted of light
threats since it had already prescribed, held that where
an accused has been found to have committed a lesser
10
offense includible with the graver offense charged, he
cannot be convicted of the lesser offense if it has already
prescribed. To hold otherwise would be to sanction a
circumvention of the law on prescription by the simple
expedient of accusing the defendant of the graver
offense.
YAPDIANGCO v BUENCAMINO
(122 SCRA 713)
June 24, 1983
G.R. No. L-28841
On February 1, 1965, the fiscal filed an information for
slight physical injuries (with a prescriptive period of 60
days) allegedly committed by the petitioner on December
2, 1964. Thereafter, petitioner moved to quash the
criminal prosecution on the ground that the information
having been filed on the sixty first day following the
commission of the offense, the sixty days prescriptive
period had lapsed. The Supreme Court (in disagreeing
with the lower court's denial of the motion to quash due to
the fact that the 60th day fell on a Sunday and
considering the rule that when the last day for the filing of
a pleading falls on a Sunday, the same may be filed on
the next succeeding business day) held that "where the
sixtieth and last day to file an information falls on a
Sunday or legal holiday, the sixty-day period cannot be
extended up to the next working day for prescription has
automatically set in”.
PEOPLE v BAYOTAS
(236 SCRA 239)
September 2, 1994
G.R. No. 102007
The Supreme Court held that the death of the accused
Bayotas extinguished his criminal liability and civil liability
based solely on the act complained of, i.e., rape. The
Court ruled that: (1) death of the accused pending appeal
of his conviction extinguishes his criminal liability as well
as the civil liability based solely thereon; (2) the claim for
civil liability survives notwithstanding the death of
accused, if the same may also be predicated on a source
of obligation other than delict, such as law, contracts,
quasi-contracts or quasi-delicts; (3) where the civil liability
survives, as explained in Number 2 above, an action for
recovery therefor may be pursued but only by way of
filing a separate civil action and subject to Section 1,
Rule 111 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure; and
(4) the private offended party need not fear a forfeiture of
his right to file this separate civil action by prescription, in
cases where during the prosecution of the criminal action
and prior to its extinction, the private-offended party
instituted together therewith the civil action for in such
case, the statute of limitations on the civil liability is
deemed interrupted during the pendency of the criminal
case.
SERMONIA v CA
(233 SCRA 155)
June 14, 1994
G.R. NO. 109454
Petitioner, in contending that his criminal liability for
bigamy has been obliterated by prescription, insists that
since the second marriage contract was duly registered
with the Office of the Civil Registrar in 1975, such fact of
registration makes it a matter of public record and
constitutes notice to the whole world. Hence, the
offended party is considered to have had constructive
notice of the subsequent marriage as of 1975 and that
prescription commenced to run on the day the marriage
contract was registered. The Supreme Court held that
unlike in the case of real property, the principle of
constructive notice should not be applied in regard to the
crime of bigamy as judicial notice may be taken of the
fact that a bigamous marriage is generally entered into by
the offender in secrecy from the spouse of the previous
subsisting marriage and that a bigamous marriage is
generally entered into in a place where the offender is not
known to be still a married person in order to conceal his
legal impediment to contract another marriage.
CABRAL V. PUNO
(70 SCRA 606)
April 30, 1976
G.R. No. L-41692
Petitioner was charged with the crime of falsification (with
a prescriptive period of 10 years) for allegedly forging a
document that was registered in the Register of Deeds on
August 26, 1948. The complaint of respondent, filed on
September 24, 1974, was dismissed on the ground of
prescription since the respondent had actual if not
constructive notice of the alleged forgery upon its
registration in the Register of Deeds.
Act No. 3326, As Amended
ZALDIVIA v REYES
(211 SCRA 277)
July 3, 1992
G.R. No. 102342
The prescriptive period for the crime imputed to the
petitioner (quarrying for commercial purposes without a
mayor's permit in violation of Ordinance No. 2, Series of
1988, of the Municipality of Rodriguez, in the Province of
Rizal) commenced from its alleged commission on May
11, 1990, and ended two months thereafter, on July 11,
1990, in accordance with Section 1 of Act No. 3326 and it
was not interrupted by the filing of the complaint with the
Office of the Provincial Prosecutor on May 30, 1990, as
this was not a judicial proceeding. The judicial
proceeding that could have interrupted the period was
the filing of the information with the Municipal Trial Court
of Rodriguez, but this was done only on October 2, 1990,
after the crime had already prescribed.
PCGG v DESIERTO
(527 SCRA 61)
July 9, 2007
G.R. No. 140231
The respondents were charged with violation of R.A. No.
3019 (amending said law, Section 4, Batas Pambansa
Blg. 195 increased the prescriptive period from 10 to 15
years), and the applicable law in the computation of the
prescriptive period is Section 2 of Act No. 3326, which
provides that "prescription shall begin to run from the day
of the commission of the violation of the law, and if the
11
same not be known at the time, from the discovery
thereof and the institution of judicial proceedings for its
investigation and punishment". Records show that the act
complained of was discovered in 1992 and the complaint
was filed with the Office of the Ombudsman on April 5,
1995, or within three (3) years from the time of discovery.
Thus, the filing of the complaint was well within the
prescriptive period of 15 years.
PRESCRIPTION OF PENALTIES
DEL CASTILLO v TORRECAMPO
(394 SCRA 221)
December 18, 2002
G.R. No. 139033
10 years after the petitioner was found guilty for violating
the Election Code (whereby he was never apprehended
and remained at large), he filed before the trial court a
motion to quash the warrant issued for his arrest on the
ground of prescription of the penalty imposed upon him.
He based his claims on Article 93 of the Revised Penal
Code which provides that the period of prescription shall
commence to run from the date when the culprit should
evade the service of his sentence. The petition must be
denied since under Article 93, prescription shall
commence to run from the date the felon evades the
service of his sentence, which is inapplicable in the case
at bar since the petitioner was never brought to prison
and cannot be said to have escaped therefrom.
PANGAN v GATBALITE
(449 SCRA 144)
January 21, 2005
G.R. No. 141718
Petitioner, who failed to appear during the promulgation
of the decision in the MTC on August 9, 1991, questioned
his arrest on January 24, 2000 on the ground that the
same was illegal since the straight penalty of two months
and one day of arresto mayor prescribes in five years
under No. 3, Article 93 [of the] Revised Penal Code. In
ruling against the petitioner, the Court held that the
prescription of penalties found in Article 93 of the
Revised Penal Code applies only to those who are
convicted by final judgment and are serving sentence
which consists of deprivation of liberty. Hence, the period
for prescription of penalties begins only when the convict
evades service of sentence by escaping during the term
of his sentence.
PARDON BY OFFENDED PARTY
PEOPLE v TADULAN
(271 SCRA 233)
April 15, 1997
G.R. No. 117407
The supposed pardon of the accused was allegedly
granted only by the mother (BBB) without the
concurrence of the offended minor, AAA. Hence, even if
it be assumed for the sake of argument that the initial
desistance of the said mother from taking any action
against the accused constitutes pardon, it is clear that
upon the authorities cited above, such pardon is
ineffective without the express concurrence of the
offended minor herself.
PEOPLE v LIM
(206 SCRA 176)
February 13, 1992
G.R. No. 95753
The accused, who was charged with the crime of rape,
insists that he was pardoned by the offended party when
she executed an Affidavit of Desistance, stating that the
rape case arose out of a mere misunderstanding. The
Supreme Court did not agree and held that to warrant the
dismissal of the complaint, the victim's retraction or
pardon should be made prior to the institution of the
criminal action. Hence, the alleged pardon could not be
considered in his favor since the Affidavit was executed
after the present case was filed.
PARDON BY THE CHIEF EXECUTIVE
PEOPLE v SALLE
(250 SCRA 581)
December 4, 1995
G.R. No. 103567
The accused was granted conditional pardon, but for the
said pardon to take effect, he must first withdraw his
appeal. The conditional pardon granted the said
appellant shall be deemed to take effect only upon the
grant of such withdrawal and in case of non-compliance
with this Resolution, the Director of the Bureau of
Corrections must exert every possible effort to take back
into his custody the said accused, for which purpose he
may seek the assistance of the Philippine National Police
or the National Bureau of Investigation.
PEOPLE v BACANG
(260 SCRA 44)
July 30, 1996
G.R. NO. 116512
The conditional pardons were granted to accused-
appellants during the pendency of their appeal. The
Court held that such conditional pardons are void since
the “conviction by final judgment” limitation under Section
19, Article VII of the present Constitution prohibits the
grant of pardon, whether full or conditional, to an accused
during the pendency of his appeal from his conviction by
the trial court and any application therefor, if one is made,
should not be acted upon or the process toward its grant
should not be begun unless the appeal is withdrawn.
BOOK II (ARTICLES 114-365, RPC) AND
SPECIFICALLY INCLUDED SPECIAL LAWS
CRIMES AGAINST NATIONAL SECURITY
(ARTS. 114- 123)
TREASON
LAUREL v MISA
(77 Phil. 856)
Petitioner filed a petition for habeas corpus claiming that
a Filipino citizen who adhered to the enemy, giving the
12
latter aid and comfort during the Japanese occupation,
cannot be prosecuted for the crime of treason for the
reasons that: (1) the sovereignty of the legitimate
government in the Philippines and, consequently, the
correlative allegiance of Filipino citizens thereto was then
suspended; and (2) that there was a change of
sovereignty over these Islands upon the proclamation of
the Philippine Republic. The Supreme Court dismissed
the petition and ruled that the absolute and permanent
allegiance of the inhabitants of a territory occupied by the
enemy of their legitimate government or sovereign is not
abrogated or severed by the enemy occupation because
the sovereignty of the government or sovereign de jure is
not transferred thereby to the occupier, and if it is not
transferred to the occupant it must necessarily remain
vested in the legitimate government.
PEOPLE v PEREZ
(83 PHIL 314)
7 counts of treason were filed against Perez for
recruiting, apprehending and commandeering numerous
girls and women against their will for the purpose of using
them to satisfy the immoral purposes of Japanese
officers. The Supreme Court held that his
"commandeering" of women to satisfy the lust of
Japanese officers or men or to enliven the entertainment
held in their honor was not treason even though the
women and the entertainment helped to make life more
pleasant for the enemies and boost their spirit; he was
not guilty any more than the women themselves would
have been if they voluntarily and willingly had
surrendered their bodies or organized the entertainment.
PEOPLE v ADRIANO
(78 PHIL 561)
Adriano was convicted for the crime of treason for being
a member of the Makapili, a military organization
established and designed to assist and aid militarily the
Japanese Imperial forces in the Philippines in the said
enemy's war efforts and operations against the United
States and the Philippines. The Supreme Court in
upholding the conviction held that the mere fact of having
joined a Makapili organization is evidence of both
adherence to the enemy and giving him aid and comfort
and that being a Makapili is in itself constitutive of an
overt act. Hence, it is not necessary, except for the
purpose of increasing the punishment, that the defendant
actually went to battle or committed nefarious acts
against his country or countrymen.
PEOPLE v MANAYAO
(78 PHIL 721)
Manayao argues that he cannot be charged with treason
because he had already lost his Filipino citizenship when
he joined the Makapili, having considered himself a
member of the Japanese armed forces. Manayao cannot
divest himself of his Philippine citizenship, otherwise, his
very crime would be the shield that would protect him
from punishment and would essentially place himself
beyond the arm of our treason law.
CRIMES AGAINST THE FUNDAMENTAL LAWS OF
THE STATE
ARBITRARY DETENTION

UMIL v RAMOS
(187 SCRA 311)
Subversion is a continuing crime. As such, authorities,
upon determination of probable cause may execute a
valid arrest pursuant to Rule 113 of the Revised Rules on
Criminal Procedure.
PEOPLE v BURGOS
(144 SCRA 1)
When the accused is arrested on the sole basis of a
verbal report, the arrest without a warrant under Section
6(a) of Rule 113 is not lawful and legal since the offense
must also be committed in his presence or within his
view. It is not enough that there is reasonable ground to
believe that the person to be arrested has committed a
crime for an essential precondition under the rule is that
the crime must in fact or actually have been committed
first.
DELAY IN THE DELIVERY OF DETAINED PERSONS
EXPULSION
VILLAVICENCIO v LUKBAN
(39 Phil 778)
The forcible taking of the women from Manila by officials
of that city, who handed them over to other parties and
deposited them in a distant region, deprived these
women of freedom of locomotion just as effectively as if
they had been imprisoned. There is no law expressly
authorizing the deportation of prostitutes to a new
domicile against their will and in fact Article 127 punishes
public officials, not expressly authorized by law or
regulation, who compel any person to change his
residence.
SEARCH WARRANTS MALICIOUSLY OBTAINED
STONEHILL v DIOKNO
(20 SCRA 383)
Search warrant authorizing the seizure of books and
records “showing all the business transactions” of certain
persons regardless of whether the transactions were
legal or illegal is a general warrant which contravenes the
Constitution and the Rules of Court which require that the
things to be seized should be particularly described.
BURGOS v CHIEF OF STAFF
(133 SCRA 800)
When the search warrant applied for is directed against a
newspaper publisher or editor in connection with the
publication of subversive materials, the application and/
or its supporting affidavits must contain a specification,
stating with particularity the alleged subversive material
he has published or intending to publish since mere
generalization will not suffice. Also, ownership is of no
consequence and it is sufficient that the person against
whom the warrant is directed has control or possession of
the property sought to be seized.
OFFENDING THE RELIGIOUS FEELINGS
13
PEOPLE v BAES
68 Phil 203
Whether or not the act complained of is offensive to the
religious feelings of the Catholics, is a question of fact
which must be judged only according to the feelings of
the Catholic and not those of other faithful ones. It is
possible that certain acts may offend the feelings of those
who profess a certain religion, while not otherwise
offensive to the feelings of those professing another faith.
CRIMES AGAINST PUBLIC ORDER
REBELLION, INSURRECTION, COUP D’ ETAT
UMIL v RAMOS
(187 SCRA 85)
July 9, 1990
G.R. 81567
Being a member of the New People’s Army, an outlawed
organization, is punishable. Subversion like rebellion or
insurrection is perceived as a continuing offense and
unlike other so called “common” offenses i.e. adultery,
murder, arson, etc. which generally end upon their
commission, subversion and rebellion are anchored on
an ideological base which compels the repetition of the
same acts of lawlessness and violence until the
overriding objective of overthrowing organized
government is attained.
PEOPLE v LOVERDIORO
(250 SCRA 389)
November 29, 1995
G.R. 112235
In deciding if the crime committed is rebellion, not
murder, it becomes imperative for the courts to ascertain
whether or not the act was done in furtherance of a
political end. The political motive of the act should be
conclusively demonstrated as it is not enough that the
overt acts of rebellion are duly proven otherwise if no
political motive is established and proved, the accused
should be convicted of the common crime and not of
rebellion.
PEOPLE v GERONIMO
(100 PHIL 90)
October 23, 1956
G.R. L-8936
Not every act of violence is deemed absorbed in the
crime of rebellion solely because it was committed
simultaneously with or in the course of the rebellion. If the
killing, robbing, etc. were done for private purposes or
profit, without any political motivation, the crime would be
separately punishable and would not be absorbed by the
rebellion and the individual misdeed could not be taken
with the rebellion to constitute a complex crime, for the
constitutive acts and intent would be unrelated to each
other. The individual crime would not be a means
necessary for committing the rebellion, as it would not be
done in preparation or in furtherance of the latter.
SEDITION
PEOPLE v UMALI
(96 PHIL 185)
 November 29, 1954
G.R. L-5803
Where the purpose of the raid and acts of the raiders in
rising publicly and taking up arms, were not exactly
against the Government and for the purpose of doing the
things defined in Article 134 of the Revised Penal Code
under rebellion, but rather, by means of force and
intimidation, to inflict an act of hate or revenge upon the
person or property of a public official, the crime
committed is sedition. The raiders did not even attack the
seat of the local government rather, the object was to
attain by means of force, intimidation, etc. one object, to
inflict an act of hate or revenge upon the person or
property of a public official.
PEOPLE v CABRERA
(43 PHIL 64)
March 6, 1922
G.R. 17748
Seventy-seven members of the Philippine Constabulary
who rose publicly and tumultuously in order to attain by
force and outside of legal methods the object of inflicting
an act of hate or revenge upon the police of the City of
Manila were found guilty of the crime of sedition as
defined and punished by Act No. 292 of the Philippine
Commission.
The Philippine Law on sedition (Act No. 292), makes all
persons who rise publicly and tumultuously in order to
obtain by force or outside of legal methods any one of
five objects, including that of inflicting any act of hate or
revenge upon the person or property of any official or
agent of the Insular Government or of a provincial or
municipal government, guilty of sedition. In order to be a
violation of paragraph 3 of section 5 of Act No. 292, it is
not necessary that the offender be a private citizen and
the offended party a public functionary since the law
makes no distinction between the persons to which it
applies.
PEOPLE v HADJI
(9 SCRA 252)
October 24, 1963
G.R. L-12686
The rule in this jurisdiction allows the treatment of the
common offenses of murder etc. as distinct and
independent acts separable from sedition. Where the
acts of violence were deemed absorbed in the crime of
rebellion, the same does not apply in the crime of
sedition.
INCITING TO SEDITION
US v TOLENTINO
(5 PHIL 682)
March 6, 1906
G.R. L-1451
The manifest, unmistakable tendency of the play, in view
of the time, place, and manner of its presentation, was to
inculcate a spirit of hatred and enmity against the
American people and the Government of the United
States. The principal object and intent of its author was to
incite the people of the Philippines to open armed
resistance to the constituted authorities, and to induce
14
them to conspire together for the secret organization of
armed forces, to be used when the opportunity present
itself, for the purpose of overthrowing the present
Government and the setting up another in its stead. The
manner and form in which the drama was presented at
such a time and under such conditions renders absurd
the pretense that it was merely or even principally a
literary or artistic production.
ESPUELAS v PEOPLE
December 17, 1951
G.R. L-2990
A published writing which calls our government one of
crooks and dishonest persons ("dirty") infested with Nazis
and Fascists i.e. dictators, and which reveals a tendency
to produce dissatisfaction or a feeling incompatible with
the disposition to remain loyal to the government, is a
scurrilous libel against the Government. The violent and
provocative statements made by the accused against the
state was neither constructive nor with reason. It,
instead, went beyond the ambit of criticism legally
permitted since it had the dangerous tendency of
appealing to the common mind and suggesting or inciting
rebellious conspiracies and riots against the duly
constituted government.
MENDOZA v PEOPLE
(90 PHIL 524)
December 17 1951
G.R. L-2990
A published writing which calls our government one of
crooks and dishonest persons ("dirty") infested with Nazis
and Fascists i.e. dictators, and which reveals a tendency
to produce dissatisfaction or a feeling incompatible with
the disposition to remain loyal to the government, is a
scurrilous libel against the Government. Any citizen may
criticize his government and government officials and
submit his criticism to the "free trade of ideas" but such
criticism should be specific and constructive, specifying
particular objectionable actuations of the government. It
must be reasoned or tempered and not a contemptuous
condemnation of the entire government set-up.
VIOLATION OF PARLIAMENTARY IMMUNITY
MARTINEZ v MORFE
(44 SCRA 22)
March 24, ___
G.R. L-34022
The members of the legislature are privileged from arrest
on civil process during the session of that body, and for a
reasonable time before and after, to enable them to go to
and return from the same. Prosecution for a criminal
offense is excluded from this grant of immunity. It would
amount to the creation of a privileged class, without
justification in reason, if notwithstanding their liability for a
criminal offense, they would be considered immune
during their attendance in Congress and in going to and
returning from the same.
ILLEGAL ASSOCIATION
PEOPLE v EVANGELISTA
(57 PHIL 372)
October 26, 1932
 G.R. L-36277
The principal defense that the Communist Party of the
Philippines is not an illegal association in that it preaches
only a social but not an armed revolution is obviously
useless, since a mere reading of the constitution of the
Communist Party will show that the purpose of such
association is to incite class struggle and to overthrow
the present government by peaceful means or by armed
revolution. Therefore, the purpose of such association is
to alter the social order and to commit the crimes of
rebellion and sedition. An association having such an
object must necessarily be illegal.
PEOPLE v RODIL
(109 SCRA 306)
November 20 1981
G.R. L-35156
While the evidence definitely demonstrated that the
appellant knew because the victim, who was in civilian
clothing, told him that he was an agent of a person in
authority, he cannot be convicted of the complex crime of
homicide with assault upon an agent of a person in
authority for the simple reason that the information does
not allege the fact that the accused then knew that,
before or at the time of the assault, the victim was an
agent of a person in authority. Such knowledge must be
expressly and specifically averred in the information,
otherwise, in the absence of such allegation, the required
knowledge, like a qualifying circumstance, although
proven, would only be appreciated as a generic
aggravating circumstance.
PEOPLE v TAC-AN
(182 SCRA 601)
February 26, 1990
G.R. 76338-39
The last paragraph of Article 152 shows that while a
teacher or professor of a public or recognized private
school is deemed to be a "person in authority," such
teacher or professor is so deemed only for purposes of
application of Articles 148 (direct assault upon a person
in authority), and 151 (resistance and disobedience to a
person in authority or the agents of such person) of the
Revised Penal Code. A teacher or professor of a public
or recognized private school cannot be regarded as a
"public authority" within the meaning of paragraph 2 of
Article 14 of the Revised Penal Code.
ILLEGAL POSSESION OF FIREARMS (PD 1866, AS
AMENDED BY RA 8294 AND RA 9516)
PEOPLE v QUIJADA
(259 SCRA 191)
July 24, 1996
G.R. 115008-09
The killing of a person with the use of an unlicensed
firearm cannot serve to increase the penalty for homicide
or murder but rather, by express provision of P.D. No.
1866, shall increase the penalty for illegal possession of
firearm. When an accused is prosecuted for homicide or
murder and for aggravated illegal possession of firearm,
15
the constitutional bar against double jeopardy will not
apply since these offenses are quite different from one
another, with the first punished under the Revised Penal
Code and the second under a special law.
CELINO v CA
(526 SCRA 195)
June 29, 2007
G.R. 170562
When the other offense is one of those enumerated
under RA 8294, any information for illegal possession of
firearms should be quashed because the illegal
possession of firearm would have to be tried together
with such other offense, either considered as an
aggravating circumstance in murder or homicide, or
absorbed as an element of rebellion, insurrection,
sedition or attempted coup d’ etat and conversely, when
the other offense involved is not one of those
enumerated under RA 8294, then the separate case for
illegal possession of firearm should continue to be
prosecuted. The constitutional bar against double
jeopardy will not apply since these offenses are quite
different from one another, with the first punished under
the Revised Penal Code and the second under a special
law.
DIRECT ASSAULT
PEOPLE v BELTRAN
(138 SCRA 521)
September 13, 1985
G.R. L-37168-69
Shooting the mayor and a policeman on duty is
attempted murder with assault. Considering that Mayor
Quirolgico is a person in authority and Pat. Rolando
Tolentino is a policeman who at the time was in his
uniform, and both were performing their official duties to
maintain peace and order in the community, appellants
are guilty of attempted murder with direct assault.
PEOPLE v DOLLANTES
(151 SCRA 592)
June 30, 1987
G.R. 70639
When a barangay Captain is in the act of trying to pacify
a person who was making trouble in the dance hall, he is
therefore killed while in the performance of his duties. As
the barangay captain, it was his duty to enforce the laws
and ordinances within the barangay and if in the
enforcement thereof, he incurs, the enmity of his people
who thereafter treacherously slew him, the crime
committed is murder with assault upon a person in
authority.
JUSTO v COURT OF APPEALS
(99 PHIL 453)
June 28, 1956
G.R. L-8611
The character of person in authority is not assumed or
laid off at will, but attaches to a public official until he
ceases to be in office. Assuming that the complainant is
not actually performing the duties of his office when
assaulted, this fact does not bar the existence of the
crime of assault upon a person in authority, so long as
the impelling motive of the attack is the performance of
official duty.||| Also, where there is a mutual agreement to
fight, an aggression ahead of the stipulated time and
place would be unlawful since to hold otherwise would be
to sanction unexpected assaults contrary to all sense of
loyalty and fair play.
PEOPLE v RECTO
(367 SCRA ___)
October 17, 2001
G.R. 129069
The victim is considered a mere bystander even if he is a
Barangay Chief Tanod, an agent of a person in authority,
if he is not acting and had no occasion to act in the
performance of his official duties. As such, the attacks on
him do not amount to direct assault.
RESISTANCE AND DISOBEDIENCE TO A PERSON IN
AUTHORITY OR THE AGENTS OF SUCH PERSONS
VYTIACO v CA
(19 SCRA 744)
April 24, 1967
G.R. L-20246-48
The accused cannot be held liable when the evidence
shows that the Constabulary Soldier was in civilian
clothes, did not exhibit any badge and simply identified
himself verbally after the petitioner had wrested his gun
from him since before a person can be held guilty of the
crime of resistance or disobedience to a person in
authority or the agent of such person it must be shown
beyond reasonable doubt that the accused knew that the
person he disobeyed or resisted is a person in authority
or the agent of such person who is actually engaged in
the performance of his official duties. Moreover, the
refusal of petitioner to return the Constabulary Soldier's
gun was but a continuation of his efforts to defend
himself from whatever harm that could come from.
DELIVERY OF PRISONERS FROM JAIL
ALBERTO v DELA CRUZ
(98 SCRA 406)
June 30, 1980
G.R. L-31839
The crime delivering prisoners from jail under Article 156
is usually committed by an outsider who removes from
jail any person confined therein or helps him escape and
not by a jailer of the province and by an assistant
provincial warden since if the offender is a public officer
who has custody or charge of the prisoner, he is liable for
infidelity in the custody of prisoner. However in Article
223, it is necessary that the public officer had consented
to, or connived in, the escape of the prisoner under his
custody or charge.
EVASION OF SERVICE OF SENTENCE
TANEGA v MASAKAYAN
(19 SCRA 564)
February 28, 1967
G.R. L-27191
16
Prescription shall only begin to run when he escapes
confinement. When the accused is never placed in
confinement, prescription of penalty will not run in his
favor.
PEOPLE v ABILONG
(82 PHIL ___)
November 26, 1948
G.R. L-1960
Although destierro does not constitute imprisonment, it is
a deprivation of liberty, though partial, in the sense that
as in the present case, the appellant by his sentence of
destierro was deprived of the liberty to enter the City of
Manila. Thus, if a person sentenced to destierro by virtue
of final judgment and prohibited from entering the City of
Manila enters said city within the period of his sentence,
he is guilty of evasion of sentence under Article 157 of
the Revised Penal Code.
VIOLATION OF CONDITIONAL PARDON
TORRES v GONZALES
(152 SCRA 272)
A convict granted conditional pardon with an undertaking
that he would “not again violate any of the penal laws of
the Philippines” who is recommitted should be convicted
by final judgment of a court of the subsequent crime or
crimes with which he was charged before the criminal
penalty for such subsequent offense(s) can be imposed
upon him. Article 159 of the Revised Penal Code defines
a distinct and substantive felony, the parolee or convict
who is regarded as having violated the provisions thereof
must be charged, prosecuted and convicted by final
judgment before he can be made to suffer the prescribed
penalty.
QUASI-RECIDIVISM
PEOPLE v DIOSO
October 23, 1964
G.R. L-38346-47
When the accused is a quasi-recidivist, having committed
the crime charged while serving sentence for a prior
offense, the maximum penalty prescribed by law for
murder is death, regardless of the presence or absence
of mitigating or aggravating circumstance such as
voluntary surrender and plea of guilty or the complete
absence thereof.
CRIMES AGAINST PUBLIC INTEREST
COUNTERFEITING
PEOPLE v KONG LEON
(48 O.G. 664)
The making of false coins of a foreign country is
punishable under Article 163, paragraph 3 of the Revised
Penal Code even if said country has withdrawn the coins
from circulation therein.
FORGERY
DEL ROSARIO v PEOPLE
 (3 SCRA 650)
Possession of genuine treasury notes of the Philippines
any of "the figures, letters, words or signs contained" in
which had been erased and/or altered, with knowledge of
such erasure and alteration, and with the intent to use
such notes of the Philippines, is punishable under Art.
168 in relation to Art. 166, subdivision (1) of the Revised
Penal Code. Thus, possession of genuine treasury notes
of the Philippine Government where one of the digits of
the penultimate had been altered and changed from 9 so
as to read 0 is punishable.
FALSIFICATION
SIQUIAN v PEOPLE
(171 SCRA 223)
Falsification of public document is committed when the
accused issues a certification which states that funds are
available for the position to which a person is appointed
and the accused knows that, in reality, the position itself
does not even exist and no funds had been appropriated
therefor. The existence of a wrongful intent to injure a
third person is not necessary when the falsified document
is a public document. In falsification of public documents,
the controlling consideration is the public character of a
document and the existence of any prejudice caused to
third persons or, at least, the intent to cause such
damage becomes immaterial.
PEOPLE v VILLALON
(192 SCRA 521)
The charge of estafa thru falsification of a public
document has sufficient basis to exist in fact and in law
since falsification of a public document may be a means
of committing estafa because before the falsified
document is actually utilized to defraud another, the
crime of falsification has already been consummated,
damage or intent to cause damage not being an element
of the crime of falsification of public, official or
commercial documents. The damage to another is
caused by the commission of estafa and not by the
falsification of the document, hence, the falsification of
the public, official or commercial document is only a
necessary means to commit the estafa.
US v CAPULE
(24 PHIL 12)
January 2, 1913
G.R. L-7447
A person who, taking advantage of the occasion when a
power of attorney is presumably being drawn up,
prepares instead thereof, contrary to the wishes of the
interested parties and with malice aforethought, an
instrument of sale in his own favor, using deceit as to the
parties and the witnesses, and afterwards induces a
notary to certify falsely that the supposed vendors
actually appeared and ratified such instrument, is guilty of
the falsification of a notarial or public document.
PEOPLE v MANANSALA
(58 PHIL 796)
November 18, 1933
G.R. L-38948
17
When a person has in his possession a falsified
document and makes use of the same, the presumption
or inference is justified that such person is the forger.
BERADIO VS CA
(103 SCRA 567)
The crime of falsification of public document cannot be
imputed to the accused when it is found that no criminal
intent to commit falsification can be imputed on the
accused who in submitting daily time records not as a
legal obligation but as a matter of practice, made entries
therein that were not absolutely false but had a color of
truth and who had caused no damage to the government,
or to third parties but on the contrary rendered service in
the interest of the public with proper permission from the
superiors.
LUAGUE v CA
(112 SCRA 97)
If the accused acted in good faith when she signed her
spouse's name to the checks and encashed them to pay
for the expenses of the spouse’s last illness and burial
upon the belief that the accused is entitled to them and
considering that the government sustained no damage
due to such encashment, criminal intent may not be
ascribed, and the accused should be acquitted to such
crime.
PEOPLE VS SENDAYDIEGO
(81 SCRA 120)
If the falsification is resorted to for the purpose of hiding
the malversation, the falsification and malversation are
separate offenses. Thus, where the provincial treasurer,
as the custodian of the money forming part of the road
and bridge fund, effected payments to his co-accused for
construction materials supposedly delivered to the
province for various projects when in fact no such
materials were delivered, and to camouflage or conceal
the defraudation, the accused used six vouchers which
had genuine features and which appear to be
extrinsically authentic but which were intrinsically fake,
the crimes committed are not complex but separate
crimes of falsification and malversation and the
falsifications cannot be regarded as constituting one
continuing offense impelled by a single criminal impulse.
USE OF FALSIFIED DOCUMENT
US v CASTILLO
(6 PHIL 453)
September 19, 1906
G.R. 2829
The Court held that the unexplained fact that the accused
altered a forged check which is strong evidence tending
to prove that the accused either forged the check himself
or caused it to be forged when accompanied by proof of
other facts, which render it difficult to understand how the
check could have been forged without the intervention of
the accused, is sufficient to sustain a conviction for
forgery.

DAVA v PEOPLE
(202 SCRA 62)
G.R. 73
A blank form of the driver's license which is filled up with
personal data and the signature of the registrar of the
San Fernando LTC agency was affixed therein, even if
the same was simulated, becomes a public document
within the purview of Articles 171 and 172.The driver's
license being a public document, proof of the fourth
element of damage caused to another person or at least
intent to cause such damage has become immaterial
since the principal thing being punished is the violation of
the public faith and the destruction of the truth proclaimed
therein.
ILLEGAL POSSESSION AND USE OF FALSE BANK
NOTES
MARTINEZ v PEOPLE
(652 SCRA ___)
June 15, 2011
G.R. 194367
Possession of false treasury or bank notes alone, without
anything more, is not a criminal offense since the
possession must be with intent to use said false treasury
or bank notes. Hence, the pieces of counterfeit bills
allegedly seized are not sufficient to show the element of
intent to use any of such forged or falsified instruments,
for there must be an overt act to manifest such intent.
USURPATION
GIGANTONI v PEOPLE
(162 SCRA 158)
It is incumbent upon the prosecution to establish by
positive evidence the allegation that an accused falsely
represents himself. It is essential to present proof that
one actually knows at the time of the alleged commission
of the offense that he is already dismissed from the
service.
An argument that it makes no difference whether the
accused was suspended or dismissed from the service,
“for both imply the absence of power to represent oneself
as vested with authority to perform acts pertaining to an
office to which he knowingly was deprived of” is correct
only when an accused is charged with Usurpation of
Official Function but not if one is charged with Usurpation
of Authority.
ESTRADA v DESIERTO
(445 SCRA 655)
December 9, 2004
GR 156160
When a person who issued a notice has obtained an
authority to issue the same, for instance being an officer-
in-charge of a Philippine Government or agency, a
charge for Usurpation of Official Function does not apply.
18
In order for one to be held liable for Usurpation of Official
Function, there must be a clear showing that the person
being charged had performed an act pertaining to any
person in authority or public officer of the Philippine
Government or any agency thereof, under pretense of
official position, and without being lawfully entitled to do
so.
USING FICTITIOUS NAME
CA 142 AS AMENDED BY RA 6085 (ACT REGULATING
THE USE OF ALIASES)
HOCK LIAN v REPUBLIC
(17 SCRA 188)
Aside from using one name, a person using another
name wherein no evidence is shown that he was
baptized with the latter name or that he has been known
by it since childhood or that the court has authorized the
use thereof may be liable for Using a Fictitious Name.
LEGAMIA v IAC
(131 SCRA 478)
A woman who has been living with a married man for
almost 20 years, where the latter introduced the woman
to the public as his wife, assumed the role of being a wife
and the family name of the man without any sinister
purpose or personal material gain in mind cannot be held
liable of the crime Using Fictitious Name. The absence of
sinister purpose or personal material gain has removed
the act from being a crime herein mentioned.
PERJURY
DIAZ v PEOPLE
(191 SCRA 86)
A person who stated under oath in his application to take
a police examination that he had never been convicted of
any crime, when as a matter of fact he has previous
convictions, committed perjury. The elements of the
crime of the crime of perjury are: 1) the accused made a
statement under oath or executed an affidavit upon a
material matter 2) that the statement or affidavit was
made before a competent officer authorized to receive
and administer oath 3) accused made a willful and
deliberate assertion of falsehood 4) that a sworn
statement or affidavit containing the falsity is required by
law or made for a legal purpose.
MACHINATION IN PUBLIC AUCTIONS
OUANO v CA
(188 SCRA 799)
Once two persons have promised to share in a property
subject to an issue as a consideration for one to refrain
from taking part in the public auction, and have attempted
to cause and succeeded in causing another bidder to
stay away from an auction in order to cause reduction of
the price of the property auctioned, machination in public
auctions under Art 185 of the RPC has been committed.
Causing another bidder to stay away from the auction in
order to cause reduction of the price of the property
auctioned is an act constituting the crime of machination
in public auctions.
CRIMES RELATIVE TO OPIUM AND OTHER
PROHIBITED DRUGS
PEOPLE v LAGATA
(396 SCRA ___)
June 25, 2003
G.R. 135323
Appellant's lack of knowledge of the contents of the
plastic bag becomes all the more credible considering
that when the NBI agents conducted a test buy to
validate the tip given to them by their confidential
informant, they relied entirely on the information that a
certain "Baby" and "Chinggay" were selling "shabu."
Moreover, the testimony of the poseur-buyer becomes
material and indispensable when the appellant denies
having committed the prohibited act and without the
testimony of the poseur-buyer especially if there are no
other eyewitness to the illicit transaction, the non-
presentation of the poseur buyer can be fatal to the
case of the prosecution, thus a hearsay.
PEOPLE v BONGCARAWAN
(384 SCRA 525)
The possession of dangerous drugs must be with
knowledge of the accused, or that animus possidendi
existed together with the possession or control of such
articles but the possession of dangerous drugs
constitutes prima facie evidence of knowledge or animus
possidendi sufficient to convict an accused in the
absence of a satisfactory explanation of such
possession. Another is that the things in possession of a
person are presumed by law to be owned by him and that
to overcome this presumption, it is necessary to present
clear and convincing evidence to the contrary.
PEOPLE v SUZUKI
(414 SCRA 43)
October 23, 2003
G.R. 120670
It bears stressing that mere possession of the prohibited
substance is a crime per se and the burden of proof is
upon appellant to show that he has a license or permit
under the law to possess the prohibited drug. Here,
appellant failed to prove that he has a license to possess
the marijuana and so the Court held that such
possession constitutes prima facie evidence of animus
possidendi sufficient to convict an accused in the
absence of any satisfactory explanation.
PEOPLE v CHUA
(396 SCRA 657)
The crime under consideration is malum prohibitum,
hence, lack of criminal intent or good faith does not
exempt appellants from criminal liability. Mere possession
of a regulated drug without legal authority is punishable
under the Dangerous Drugs Act.
PEOPLE v CASIMIRO
(383 SCRA 390)
Failure to prove that the specimen of marijuana
examined by the forensic chemist was that seized from
19
the accused was fatal to the prosecution's case. The
prosecution failed to prove the crucial first link in the
chain of custody when the prosecution witnesses
admitted that they did not write their initials on the brick of
marijuana immediately after allegedly seizing it from
accused-appellant outside the grocery store but only did
so in their headquarters and the narcotics field test,
which initially identified the seized item as marijuana, was
likewise not conducted at the scene of the crime, but only
at the narcotics office; leading to a reasonable doubt as
to whether the item allegedly seized from accused-
appellant is the same brick of marijuana marked by the
policemen in their headquarters and given by them to the
crime laboratory for examination.
CRIMES AGAINST PUBLIC MORALS
IMMORAL DOCTRINES, OBSCENE PUBLICATIONS
AND EXHIBITIONS
PEOPLE v KOTTINGER
(45 PHIL 352)
Obscenity is something which is offensive to chastity,
decency or delicacy. The test to determine the existence
of obscenity is whether the tendency of the matter
charged as obscene is to deprave or corrupt those whose
minds are open to such immoral influences and into
whose hands a publication or other article charged as
being obscene may fall.
PEOPLE v APARICI
(52 OG 249)
In a dark theater with stage dimly lit where a person is
swaying to and fro with the middle part of her body, and
dancing with her hips swaying and sometimes raising her
feet, the Court provided that the test whether a particular
act is obscene is its tendency to deprave or corrupt those
whose minds are open to such immoral influences, be
they cultured or not.
PEOPLE v PADAN
(101 PHIL 749)
In an actual exhibition of a sexual act, preceded by acts
of lasciviousness, there can be no redeeming features; in
it there is no room for art. It is clear and an unmitigated
obscenity, indecency and an offense to public morals and
causing as it does, nothing but lust and lewdness, and
exerting a corrupting influence especially on the youth of
the land.
FERNANDO v CA
(510 SCRA 351)
December 6, 2006
G.R. No. 159751
To be held liable for obscenity, the prosecution must
prove that (a) the materials, publication, picture or
literature are obscene; and (b) the offender sold,
exhibited, published or gave away such materials; that
which shocks the ordinary and common sense of men as
an indecency. A picture being obscene or indecent must
depend upon the circumstances of the case, and that
ultimately, the question is to be decided by the judgment
of the aggregate sense of the community reached by it.
It is an issue proper for judicial determination and should
be treated on a case to case basis and on the judge’s
sound discretion.
CRIMES COMMITED BY PUBLIC OFFICERS
RA 3019 AS AMENDED (ANTI GRAFT AND CORRUPT
PRACTICES ACT)
TRIESTE v SANDIGANBAYAN
(146 SCRA 508)
An official involved need not dispose of his shares in a
corporation as long as he does not do anything for the
firm in its contract with another. The matter contemplated
in Section 3(h) of the Anti-Graft Law is the actual
intervention in the transaction in which one has financial
or pecuniary interest in order that liability may attach.
MEJORADA v SANDIGANBAYAN
(151 SCRA 399)
Section 3 of Republic Act No. 3019 refers to “any public
officer”. It makes no distinction or qualification and
specifies the acts declared unlawful. A violation may
occur when an officer takes advantage of his position and
divests private parties of compensation they must
receive.
MALVERSATION
LABATAGOS v SANDIGANBAYAN
(183 SCRA 415)
When a collecting officer of a government institution
assigns his or her work to another without the former
being the one to misappropriate a government fund or
property malversation may still be at hand. Malversation
consists not only in misappropriation or converting public
funds or property to one’s personal use but also by
knowingly allowing others to make use of them.
ILOGON v SANDIGANBAYAN
(218 SCRA 766)
An official custodian who fails to show possession of a
public fund or property may be held liable for
malversation. In malversation, all that is necessary for
conviction is proof that the accountable officer had
received public funds and that he did not have them in
possession when demand therefore was made; no need
of direct evidence of personal misappropriation as long
as there is shortage in his account and that it must be
said that the return of the thing malversed is not a
defense.
INFIDELITY IN THE CUSTODY OF PRISONERS
RODILLAS v SANDIGANBAYAN
(161 SCRA 347)
Failure to undertake necessary precautions take for
instance, allowing a prisoner to have lunch with family
when the former should be brought to jail, failing to follow
the prisoner in the restroom or assigning someone to
watch over the former leading to the prisoner’s escape,
will make the officer’s act as a laxity or negligence
amounting to deliberate non-performance of duty. A claim
that there was no connivance with the prisoner must fail
20
considering that connivance or giving one’s consent to
evasion is a distinct crime from infidelity in the custody of
prisoner through negligence.
CRIMES AGAINST PERSONS
(ARTICLES 246-266)
PARRICIDE
PEOPLE v DALAG
(402 SCRA 254)
April 30, 2003
G.R. No. 129895
In the crime of parricide, the prosecution is mandated to
prove the following essential elements: (1) a person is
killed; (2) the deceased is killed by the accused; and (3)
the deceased is the father, mother or child, whether
legitimate or illegitimate, or any of his ascendants, or
descendants, or his spouse. In the case of parricide of a
spouse, the best proof of the relationship between the
accused and the deceased would be the marriage
certificate which in this case, the prosecution was able to
present and prove together with all the essential
elements of parricide.
PEOPLE v DELA CRUZ
(612 SCRA 364)
February 11, 2010
G.R. No. 187683
In the case of a Parricide of a spouse, the best proof of
the relationship between the accused and the deceased
would be the marriage certificate. In this case, the
testimony of the accused that he was married to the
victim, in itself, is ample proof of such relationship as the
testimony can be taken as an admission against penal
interest.
PEOPLE V JUMAWAN
(116 SCRA 739)
September 23, 1982
G.R. No. L-50905
Presentacion should have been accused of parricide but
since her relationship to the deceased, as wife, is not
alleged in the information, she can be convicted of
murder only qualified by abuse of superior strength.
PEOPLE v TOMOTORGO
(136 SCRA 238)
April 30, 1985
G.R. No. L-47941
The fact that the appellant intended to maltreat the victim
only or inflict physical injuries does not exempt him from
liability for the resulting and more serious crime of
parricide. Appellant is only entitled to the mitigating
circumstance of lack of intent to commit so grave a wrong
(Article 13 (3 Id).)
PEOPLE V GENOSA
(419 SCRA 537)
January 15, 2004
G.R. No. 135981
To appreciate battered woman syndrome (BWS) as self-
defense, appellant must prove the following: (1) each of
the phases of the cycle of violence must be proven to
have characterized at least two battering episodes
between the appellant and her intimate partner; (2) the
final acute battering episode preceding the killing of the
batterer must have produced in the battered person's
mind an actual fear of an imminent harm from her
batterer and an honest belief that she needed to use
force in order to save her life; and (3) at the time of the
killing, the batterer must have posed probable -- not
necessarily immediate and actual -- grave harm to the
accused, based on the history of violence perpetrated by
the former against the latter. Under the existing facts of
the present case, however, not all of these elements
were duly established.
DEATH OR PHYSICAL INJURIES INFLICTED UNDER
EXCEPTIONAL CIRCUMSTANCES
PEOPLE v ABARCA
(153 SCRA 735)
September 14, 1987
G.R. No. 74433
The provision in Article 247 of the Revised Penal Code
that the accused shall kill any or both of them
immediately after surprising his spouse and her paramour
in the act of intercourse does not say that he should
commit the killing instantly thereafter. Although about one
hour had passed between the time the husband
discovered his wife having sexual intercourse with the
victim and the time the latter was actually shot, the
shooting falls within the provision as the death caused
was the proximate result of the outrage overwhelming the
accused after chancing upon his spouse in the basest act
of infidelity.
PEOPLE v OYANIB
(354 SCRA 196)
March 12, 2001
G.R. Nos. 130634-35
To be relieved of any criminal liability, the accused
having admitted the killing must prove that the death
caused is the proximate result of the outrage
overwhelming him after chancing upon his spouse in the
act of infidelity. Further, he must have not promoted or
facilitated the prostitution of his wife nor consented to her
infidelity.
MURDER
PEOPLE v DELA CRUZ
(612 SCRA 738)
February 16, 2010
G.R. No. 188353
For the charge of murder to prosper, the prosecution
must prove that: (1) the offender killed the victim, (2)
through treachery, or by any of the other five qualifying
circumstances, duly alleged in the Information. Generally,
the elements of murder are: 1. That a person was killed.
2. That the accused killed him. 3. That the killing was
attended by any of the qualifying circumstances
mentioned in Art. 248. 4. The killing is not parricide or
infanticide.
HOMICIDE
21
PEOPLE v PUGAY
(167 SCRA 439)
November 17, 1988
G.R. No. 74324
Having taken the can with the stinging smell of flammable
liquid from the engine of the Ferris wheel and holding it
before pouring its contents on the body of the deceased,
the accused knew that the can contained gasoline.
Clearly, he failed to exercise all the diligence necessary
to avoid every undesirable consequence arising from any
act that may be committed by his companions who at the
time were making fun of the deceased.
UNINTENTIONAL ABORTION
PEOPLE v SALUFRANIA
(159 SCRA 401)
March 30, 1988
G.R. No. L-50884
That the accused boxed his pregnant wife on the
stomach which caused her to fall and then strangled her
is not sufficient proof to show intent to cause an abortion.
Thus, the accused should not be held guilty of the
complex crime of Parricide with Intentional Abortion but
the complex crime of Parricide with Unintentional
Abortion.
MUTILATION
AGUIRRE v SECRETARY OF JUSTICE
(547 SCRA 431)
March 3, 2008
G.R. No. 170723
Mutilation under the first paragraph of Article 262 of the
Revised Penal Code requires (1) that there be a
castration, that is, mutilation of organs necessary for
generation and (2) that the mutilation is caused purposely
and deliberately to deprive the offended party of some
essential organ for reproduction. In this present petition,
the bilateral vasectomy done on Larry could not have
amounted to the crime of mutilation because though
undeniably, vasectomy denies a man his power of
reproduction, such procedure does not deprive him,
"either totally or partially, of some essential organ for
reproduction."
RAPE
PEOPLE v ORITA
(184 SCRA 105)
March 3, 2008
G.R. No. 170723
For the consummation of rape, perfect penetration is not
essential. Entry of the labia or lips of the female organ
without rupture of the hymen or laceration of the vagina is
sufficient to warrant conviction. Necessarily, rape is
attempted if there is no penetration of the female organ
because although the offender has commenced the
commission of a felony directly by overt acts, not all acts
of execution was performed.
PEOPLE v CASTRO
(196 SCRA 679)
May 6, 1991
 G.R. No. 91490
Perfect penetration, rupture of the hymen and laceration
of the vagina are not essential for the offense of
consummated rape as entry, to the least extent, of the
labia or lips of the female organ is sufficient. Thus, the
victim's remaining a virgin does not negate rape.
PEOPLE v ACHAS
(595 SCRA 341)
August 4, 2009
G.R. No. 185712
The absence of external signs or physical injuries on the
complainant’s body does not necessarily negate the
commission of rape. This is because hymenal laceration
is not an element of the crime of rape, albeit a healed or
fresh laceration is a compelling proof of defloration.
PEOPLE v CRUZ
(595 SCRA 411)
August 4, 2009
G.R. No. 186129
Most important in a prosecution for statutory rape is to
prove the following elements: 1. that the accused had
carnal knowledge with a woman; and (2) that the woman
was below 12 years of age. These elements were
sufficiently established during trial and were not rebutted
by the defense with any solid evidence to the contrary.
PEOPLE v MANGALINO
(182 SCRA 329)
February 15, 1990
G.R. No. 79011
In statutory rape, proof of intimidation or force used on
the 12 year old victim, or lack of it is immaterial. Further,
the absence of penetration due to the one-centimeter
diameter of the victim’s hymen is also inconsequential for
proof of entrance of the male organ within the labia or
pudendum of the female organ is sufficient to warrant
conviction.
PEOPLE v ERINIA
(50 PHIL 998)
January 20, 1927
G.R. No. L-26298
The crime of rape may be committed upon child of the
age of 3 years and 11 months.
PEOPLE V ATENTO
(196 SCRA 357)
April 26, 1991
G.R. No. 84728
The accused was held guilty under paragraph 3 of Article
335 of the Revised Penal Code even if the circumstances
of force and intimidation or of the victim being deprived of
reason or otherwise unconscious are absent. If sexual
intercourse with a victim under twelve years of age is
rape, then it should follow that carnal knowledge with a
seventeen-year old girl whose mental capacity is that of a
seven year old child would constitute rape.
PEOPLE v PORAS
(612 SCRA 624)
February 16, 2010
22
G.R. No. 177747
Even assuming, for the sake of argument, that the
appellant succeeded in inserting his fingers in AAA’s
vagina, this act still would not suffice to convict the
appellant of rape because in 1994, the insertion of one or
more fingers into a woman’s vagina without her consent
did not constitute rape. It was only in 1997 that the law on
rape expanded to include this act.
DE CASTRO v FERNANDEZ
(515 SCRA 682)
February 14, 2007
G.R. No. 155041
Petitioner insists that a “finger” does not constitute an
object or instrument in contemplation of RA 8353. The
insertion of one’s finger into the genital of another
constitutes “rape through sexual assault”. Hence, the
prosecutor did not err in charging petitioner with the
crime of rape under Article 266-A, paragraph 2 of the
Revised Penal Code.
PEOPLE v FUNESTO
(655 SCRA 357)
August 3, 2011
G.R. No. 182237
Jurisprudence firmly holds that the force or violence
required in rape cases is relative; it does not need to be
overpowering or irresistible; it is present when it allows
the offender to consummate his purpose. In this case, the
appellant employed that amount of force sufficient to
consummate rape.
PEOPLE v MIRANDILLA
(654 SCRA 761)
July 27, 2011
G.R. No. 186417
The sweetheart theory as a defense however,
necessarily admits carnal knowledge, the first element of
rape. Effectively, it leaves the prosecution the burden to
prove only force or intimidation, the coupling element of
rape.
PEOPLE v MADSALI
(611 SCRA 596)
February 4, 2010
G.R. No. 179570
Delay in reporting an incident of rape due to death
threats does not affect the credibility of the complainant,
nor can it be taken against her such as in this case when
BBB explained that she did not immediately report the
abduction, rape, and detention of her daughter to the
authorities because Egap threatened to kill AAA, who
was then in his custody. The charge of rape is rendered
doubtful only if the delay was unreasonable and
unexplained.
CRIMES AGAINST PERSONAL LIBERTY AND
SECURITY (ARTICLES 267-292)
KIDNAPPING AND ILLEGAL DETENTION
PEOPLE v MUIT
(568 SCRA 251)
 October 8, 2008
G.R. No. 181043
The elements of the crime of kidnapping and serious
illegal detention are the following: (a) the accused is a
private individual; (b) the accused kidnaps or detains
another, or in any manner deprives the latter of his
liberty; (c) the act of detention or kidnapping is illegal;
and (d) the commission of the offense, any of the four
circumstances mentioned in Article 267 is present. The
totality of the prosecution’s evidence in this case
established the commission of kidnapping for ransom
with homicide.
PEOPLE v GUTTIEREZ
(658 SCRA ___ )
October 3, 2011
G.R. No. 168552
The essence of the crime of kidnapping is the actual
deprivation of the victim’s liberty, coupled with the intent
of the accused to effect it. It includes not only the
imprisonment of a person but also the deprivation of his
liberty in whatever form and for whatever length of time. It
involves a situation where the victim cannot go out of the
place of confinement or detention, or is restricted or
impeded in his liberty to move.
PEOPLE V TOMIO
(202 SCRA 77)
September 30, 1991
G.R. No. 74630
Even granting for the sake of argument that, in effect,
there was created a simple loan contract between
appellants and Mr. Nagao, as asserted by appellant
Tomio Maeda, the deprivation of the former's liberty until
the amount shall have been fully "paid" to them, is still
kidnapping or illegal detention for ransom.
PEOPLE V LIM
(190 SCRA 706)
The fact of detention which is an essential element in the
kidnapping was not clearly established as there was no
showing that there was actual confinement or restriction
on the person of the offended party. The two minors
voluntarily entered the appellant's residence and there is
no indication that one of the minors was locked up,
physically restrained of her liberty or unable to
communicate with anyone.
PEOPLE V PADICA
(221 SCRA 362)
Where the taking of the victim was incidental to the basic
purpose of killing, the crime is only murder and this is
true even if before the killing, the victim was taken from
one place to another. From the acts of the accused, it
cannot be inferred that the latter's purpose was actually
to detain or deprive the victims of their liberty and the fact
alone that ransom money was demanded did not per se
qualify the crime to kidnapping in the absence of other
elements.
23
PEOPLE v RAMOS
(297 SCRA ___ )
October 12, 1998
G.R. No. 118570
Actual restraint of the victim's liberty was evident from the
moment she was forcibly prevented by accused-appellant
from going to work at MERALCO and taken instead
against her will to Bulacan. Further, no other logical
meaning can be ascribed to the victim's statement to that
"she needed P200, 000.00 immediately otherwise she
might not be able to go home anymore," other than that
the money was intended as ransom, i.e., as
consideration for her release from captivity.
KIDNAPPING AND FAILURE
TO RETURN A MINOR
PEOPLE v TY
(263 SCRA 754)
May 12, 1978
G.R. No. L-32529
What is actually punishable is not the kidnapping of the
minor but rather the deliberate failure or refusal of the
custodian of the minor to restore the latter to his parents
or guardians. Said failure or refusal, however, must not
only be deliberate but must also be persistent as to
oblige the parents or the guardians of the child to seek
the aid of the courts in order to obtain custody.
GRAVE THREATS
REYES v PEOPLE
(27 SCRA 686)
March 28, 1969
G.R. Nos. L-21528 and L-21529
The demonstration led by petitioner against the
complainant in front of the main gate of the naval station;
the fact that placards with threatening statements were
carried by the demonstrators; their persistence in trailing
Hallare in a motorcade up to his residence; and the
demonstration conducted in front thereof, culminating in
repeated threats flung by petitioner in a loud voice show
that the threats were made with deliberate purpose of
creating in the mind of Hallare the belief that the threat
would be carried into effect. Indeed, Hallare became so
apprehensive of his safety that he sought the protection
of Col. Monzon therefore, the appellate court was correct
in upholding petitioner's conviction for the offense of
grave threats.
CALUAG v PEOPLE
(580 SCRA 575)
March 4, 2009
G.R. No. 171511
In grave threats, the wrong threatened amounts to a
crime which may or may not be accompanied by a
condition. Considering the mauling incident which
transpired earlier between petitioner and Julia’s husband,
petitioner’s act of pointing a gun at Julia’s forehead
clearly enounces a threat to kill or to inflict serious
physical injury on her person which constituted grave
threat.
GRAVE COERCION
TIMONER v PEOPLE
(125 SCRA 830)
November 25, 1983
G.R. No. L-62050
Grave coercion is committed when "a person who,
without authority of law, shall by means of violence,
prevent another from doing something not prohibited by
law or compel to do something against his will, either it
be right or wrong." In the case at bar, the Mayor is not
guilty of grave coercion as the element that the restraint
made by the Mayor upon complainant, the owner of the
barbershop considered as a public nuisance, was not
made under authority of law or in the exercise of a lawful
right, is absent.
LEE v CA
(201 SCRA 405)
September 6, 1991
G.R. No. 90423
There is nothing unlawful when petitioner demanded that
the private respondent return the proceeds of the check
accompanied by a threat to file criminal charges. Her
lengthy stay in the bank and return of money was not due
to petitioner’s threat but to show good faith. The most
telling proof of the absence of intimidation was the fact
that the complainant refused to sign the promissory note
in spite of the alleged threats of the petitioner.
UNJUST VEXATION
PEOPLE v REYES
(60 PHIL 369)
The disturbance or interruption of any ceremony of a
religious character under the old Penal Code was
denounced by article 571 and was punished by arrest
from one to ten days and a fine ranging from 15 to 125
pesetas. But this article was omitted from the Revised
Penal Code and the offense, if any was committed by the
appellants, is denounced in Article 287 as an "unjust
vexation" and punished by arresto menor or a fine
ranging from 5 to 200 pesos or both.
CRIMES AGAINST PROPERTY
(ARTICLES 293-332)
ROBBERY
NAPOLIS v COURT OF APPEALS
(43 SCRA 301)
February 28, 1972
G.R. No. L-28865
It is more plausible to believe that Article 294 applies only
where robbery with violence against or intimidation of
person takes place without entering an inhabited house,
under the conditions set forth in Article 299 of the
Revised Penal Code. When the elements of both
provisions are present, the crime is a complex one,
calling for the imposition – as provided in Article 48 of the
24
Code – of the penalty for the most serious offense, in its
maximum period, which, in the case at bar, is reclusion
temporal in its maximum period.
PEOPLE v BIRUAR
(130 SCRA 513)
July 25, 1984
G.R. Nos. L-32202-04
In this case, the accused, after committing the crime of
robbery in band in the house of Gorgonio Mosende, went
to the neighboring house of George Kalitas where they
committed the crimes of Arson and Robbery with
Homicide and Physical Injuries. Obviously, the rule
enunciated in People v De Leon cannot be made
applicable since the herein accused performed different
acts with distinct purposes which resulted in juridically
independent crimes.
ROBBERY WITH HOMICIDE
PEOPLE v MANGULABNAN
(99 PHIL 992)
September 28, 1956
G.R. No. L-8919
In order to determine the existence of the crime of
robbery with homicide, it is enough that a homicide would
result by reason or on the occasion of the robbery and it
is immaterial that the death would supervene by mere
accident provided that the homicide produced by reason
or on occasion of the robbery inasmuch as it is only the
result obtained, without reference or distinction as to the
circumstances, causes, modes or persons intervening in
the commission of the crime, that has to be taken into
consideration.
PEOPLE v CALIXTO
(123 SCRA 369)
The appellants committed robbery in band with homicide
despite the fact that Cuevas was one of them and not a
robbery victim, an innocent bystander or a stranger
because Article 294 (1) of the Revised Penal Code says
so.
PEOPLE v QUINONES
(183 SCRA 747)
March 28, 1990
G.R. No. 80042
There is no crime of robbery with multiple homicide under
the Revised Penal Code thus the charge should have
been for robbery with homicide only regardless of the fact
that three persons were killed in the commission of the
robbery. In this special complex crime, the number of
persons killed is immaterial and does not increase the
penalty prescribed in Article 294 of the said Code.
ROBBERY WITH RAPE
PEOPLE v DINOLA
(183 SCRA 747)
March 22, 1990
G.R. No. L-54567
If the intention of the accused was to commit robbery but
rape was also committed even before the robbery, the
crime of robbery with rape is committed however, if the
original design was to commit rape but the accused after
committing rape also committed robbery because the
opportunity presented itself, the criminal acts should be
viewed as two distinct offenses. In the case at bar, after
the complainant was raped by the accused, the latter
threatened to kill her if she did not give watch on her wrist
to him and forcibly took it from her. Hence, the accused
was convicted for two crimes of rape and robbery.
PEOPLE v MORENO
(220 SCRA 292)
January 25, 2002
G.R. No. 140033
Accused Juan Moreno, who took no part in the rape, is
guilty of robbery only under Article 294, No. 5 of the
Revised Penal Code but as to appellant Reynaldo
Maniquez, who had raped Mary Ann Galedo, he should
be guilty of the special complex crime of robbery with
rape, under Article 294, No. 2 of the Revised Penal
Code.
ROBBERY WITH PHYSICAL INJURIES
PEOPLE v SALVILLA
(184 SCRA 671)
April 26, 1990
G.R. No. 86163
It is not a defense that appellant and his co-accused had
no opportunity to dispose of the personalities taken. From
the moment the offender gained possession of the thing,
even if the culprit had no opportunity to dispose of the
same, the unlawful taking is complete.
ROBBERY IN BAND
PEOPLE v APDUHAN
(24 SCRA 798)
August 30, 1968
G.R. No. L-19491
The circumstance of band is a qualifying circumstance
only in robbery punished by subdivisions 3, 4, and 5 of
Article 294 and a generic aggravating circumstance in
robbery with homicide, rape, intentional mutilation, and
lesiones graves resulting in insanity, imbecility, impotency
or blindness. Hence, if robbery with homicide is
committed by a band, the indictable offense would still be
"robbery with homicide" under Article 294(1) and not
“robbery with homicide in band."
ROBBERY WITH USE OF FORCE UPON THINGS
PEOPLE V JARANILLA
(55 SCRA 563)
February 22, 1974
G.R. No. L-28547
One essential requisite of robbery with force upon things
under Articles 299 and 302 is that the malefactor should
enter the building or dependency where the object to be
taken is found. In the instant case, the chicken coop
where the six roosters were taken cannot be considered
25
a building within the meaning of Article 302, thus, it
cannot be said that the accused entered the same in
order to commit the robbery by means of any of the five
circumstances enumerated in Article 302.
ANTI-FENCING LAW (P.D. 1612) AND ITS
IMPLEMENTING RULES AND REGULATIONS
DIZON-PAMINTUAN v PEOPLE
(234 SCRA 63)
July 11, 1994
G.R. No. 111426
The elements of the crime of fencing are: 1. A crime of
robbery or theft has been committed; 2. The accused,
who is not a principal or accomplice in the commission of
the crime of robbery or theft, buys, receives, possesses,
keeps, acquires, conceals, sells or disposes, or buys and
sells, or in any manner deals in any article, item, object or
anything of value, which has been derived from the
proceeds of the said crime; 3. The accused knows or
should have known that the said article, item, object or
anything of value has been derived from the proceeds of
the crime of robbery or theft; and 4. There is, on the part
of the accused, intent to gain for himself or for another.
RAMON TAN v PEOPLE
(313 SCRA 220)
August 26, 1999
G.R. No. 134298
The crimes of robbery and theft, on the one hand, and
fencing on the other, are separate and distinct offenses
thus, the State may choose to prosecute the accused
either under the Revised Penal Code or Presidential
Decree No. 1612, although the preference would seem
inevitable considering that fencing is malum prohibitum,
and Presidential Decree No. 1612 creates a presumption
of fencing and prescribes a higher penalty based on the
value of property. Further, the law on fencing does not
require the accused to have participated in the criminal
design to commit, or to have been in any wise involved in
the commission of, the crime of robbery or theft.
ANTI-CARNAPPING ACT OF 1972
(R.A. NO. 6539), AS AMENDED BY R.A. NO. 7659
PEOPLE v DELA CRUZ
(183 SCRA ___ )
March 29, 1990
G.R. No. 83798
The crime committed is Carnapping with Homicide.
Carnapping is defined under RA No. 6539 as "the taking,
with intent to gain, of a motor vehicle belonging to
another without the latter's consent, or by means of
violence against or intimidation of persons, or by using
force upon things." The same law prescribes the penalty
of life imprisonment to death when the owner, driver or
occupant of the carnapped motor vehicle is killed in the
commission of the carnapping.
IZON v PEOPLE
(107 SCRA ___)
August 31, 1981
G.R. No. L-51370
Under the Anti-Carnapping law, any vehicle which is
motorized using the streets which are public, not
exclusively for private use, comes within the concept of
motor vehicle. Thus, stealing a motorized tricycle running
in droves along public highways going to the north like
Baguio City is a crime falling under the Anti-Carnapping
law and not a crime of simple robbery punishable under
the Revised Penal Code.
THEFT
VALENZUELA v PEOPLE
(525 SCRA __ )
June 21, 2007
G.R. No. 160188
The elements of theft as provided for in Art. 308 of the
Revised Penal Code are (1) that there be taking of
personal property; (2) that said property belongs to
another; (3) that the taking be done with intent to gain; (4)
that the taking be done without the consent of the owner;
and, (5) that the taking be accomplished without the use
of violence against or intimidation of persons or force
upon things.
PEOPLE v GULINAO
(180 SCRA ___)
December 4, 1989
G.R. No. 82264-66
Gulinao should have been convicted of the crime of theft
under Article 308 of the Revised Penal Code and not
robbery with the use of violence against or intimidation of
a person under par. 5, Article 294 since the taking of the
ring of Dr. Chua was merely an afterthought. The force
employed in the killing of Dr. Chua has no bearing on the
taking of his ring.
SANTOS v PEOPLE
(181 SCRA ___ )
January 29, 1990
G.R. No. 77429
The principal distinction between the theft and estafa is
that in theft, the thing is taken while in estafa, the
accused receives the property and converts it to his own
use or benefit. However, there may be theft even if the
accused has possession of the property such as when he
was entrusted only with the material or physical (natural)
or de facto possession of the thing, his misappropriation
of the same constitutes theft, but if he has the juridical
possession of the thing, his conversion of the same
constitutes embezzlement or estafa."
QUALIFIED THEFT
EMPELIS v IAC
(132 SCRA ___ )
September 28, 1984
G.R. No. L-66136
The stealing of coconuts when they are still in the tree or
deposited on the ground within the premises is qualified
theft but when the coconuts are stolen in any other place,
26
it is simple theft. In the case at bar, petitioners committed
only frustrated qualified theft because although they were
seen carrying away fifty coconuts while they were still in
the premises of the plantation, they were not able to carry
the coconuts away from the plantation due to the timely
arrival of the owner.
ESTAFA THROUGH UNFAITHFULNESS OR ABUSE
OF CONFIDENCE
SADDUL v CA
(192 SCRA ___)
December 10, 1990
G.R. No. 91041
The accused was acquitted of the crime of estafa with
abuse of confidence for the following reasons: (1) Saddul
received the spare parts from AFP in trust for Land Rover
which authorized him to sell; (2) Saddul sold them in
accordance with the authority given to him; (3) AMPI or
Cuevas not being the owner of the property incurred no
loss and suffered injury on account of Sadul’s retention of
proceeds and; (4) no demand for return was made by
AMPI or Cuevas who knew that the spare parts are to be
sold for the account of Land Rover.
ESTAFA THROUGH FALSE PRETENSES,
FARUDULENT ACTS OR MEANS
PEOPLE v MONTANER
(656 SCRA ___ )
August 31, 2011
G.R. No. 184053
The elements of estafa under paragraph 2(d), Article 315
of the Revised Penal Code are: (1) the post-dating or
issuance of a check in payment of an obligation
contracted at the time the check was issued; (2) lack of
sufficiency of funds to cover the check; and (3) damage
to the payee.
PEOPLE v ONG
(204 SCRA ___)
December 20, 1991
G.R. No. 93849
In the crime of estafa by postdating or issuing a bad
check, deceit and damage are essential elements of the
offense and have to be established with satisfactory proof
to warrant conviction. In the present case, the
prosecution failed to prove that the accused-appellant
had such knowledge with respect to the subject checks
that he indorsed.
BOUNCING CHECKS LAW (B.P. BLG. 22), PLUS
ADMINISTRATIVE CIRCULAR NO. 12-2000 RE:
PENALTY FOR VIOLATION OF B.P. 22 AND
ADMINISTRATIVE CIRCULAR NO. 13-2001 RE:
CLARIFICATION OF ADMIN. CIRCULAR NO. 12-2000;
AND P.D. NO. 1689 (INCREASING THE PENALTY FOR
CERTAIN FORMS OF SWINDLING OR ESTAFA)
DOMAGSANG v CA
(347 SCRA 75)
December 5, 2000
G.R. No. 139292

B.P. Blg. 22 or "Bouncing Checks Law," enumerates the
elements of the crime, to wit: (1) the making, drawing and
issuance of any check to apply for account or for value;
(2) the knowledge of the maker, drawer, or issuer that at
the time of issue he does not have sufficient funds in or
credit with the drawee bank for the payment of the check
in full upon its presentment; and (3) the subsequent
dishonor of the check by the drawee bank for
insufficiency of funds or credit or would have been
dishonored for the same reason had not the drawer,
without any valid cause, ordered the bank to stop
payment.
NIERRAS v DACUYCUY
(181 SCRA 1)
January 11, 1990
G.R. Nos. 59568-76
Deceit and damage are essential elements in Article 315
(2-d) of the Revised Penal Code, but are not required in
Batas Pambansa Bilang 22. Under the latter law, mere
issuance of a check that is dishonored gives rise to the
presumption of knowledge on the part of the drawer that
he issued the same without sufficient funds and hence
punishable which is not so under the Penal Code.
VACA v CA
(298 SCRA ___ )
November 16, 1998
G.R. No. 131714
While it may be true that it was the company's accountant
who actually prepared the rubber check, petitioners in
this case cannot pretend ignorance of the insufficiency of
funds since they are the owners and officers of the
company. The testimony of petitioner Nieto that after the
check in question was dishonored, he instructed their
company accountant to prepare a replacement check
belies petitioners' claim that they had no hand in the
preparation of checks and shows that petitioners were in
control of the finances of the company.
PEOPLE v NITAFAN
(207 SCRA ___)
April 6, 1992
G.R. Nos. 81559-60
Acts involving the violation of trust receipt agreements
occurring after 29 January 1973 (date of enactment of
P.D. 115) would make the accused criminally liable for
estafa under paragraph 1 (b), Article 315 of the Revised
Penal Code (RPC) pursuant to the explicit provision in
Section 13 of P.D. 115. The failure, therefore, to account
for the P114,884.22 balance in 1980 or during the
effectivity of P.D. 115. makes the accused-respondent
criminally liable for estafa.
LIM LAO v CA
(274 SCRA 472)
June 20, 1997
G.R. No. 119178
The fact that petitioner was a signatory to the checks that
were subsequently dishonored merely engenders the
prima facie presumption that she knew of the
insufficiency of funds, but it does not render her
27
automatically guilty under B.P. 22. The trial court itself
found that no personal notice of dishonor to petitioner
Lina Lim Lao was made by the drawee bank hence, the
prima facie presumption that she knew about the
insufficiency of funds cannot apply.
IDOS v CA
(296 SCRA ___)
September 25, 1998
G.R. No. 110782
When there was no consideration whatsoever for the
issuance of the check such as when the subject check
was issued merely to evidence complainant's interest in
the partnership and was not intended to apply on account
or for value and when the check was issued without
actual knowledge of the insufficiency of funds, there is no
violation of BP 22. Further, the failure of the complainant
or by the drawee bank to send a notice of dishonor to the
petitioner precludes any finding of prima facie evidence
of knowledge of insufficiency of funds.
WONG v CA
(351 SCRA 100)
February 2, 2001
G.R. No. 117857
When private respondent deposited the checks 157 days
after the date of the checks, the presumption of
knowledge of insufficiency of funds was lost. But such
knowledge could still be proven by direct or circumstantial
evidence such as in this case, the trial court found that
petitioner made reassurance that he would issue new
checks but failed to do so, was duly notified of the
dishonour of the checks and failed to make arrangements
for full payment within five (5) banking days thereof.
OTHER DECEITS
VILLAFLOR V CA
(192 SCRA 680)
Appellant was guilty of fraudulent misrepresentation
when, knowing that the car was then owned by the
Northern Motors, Inc., still told the complainant that the
car was actually owned by him for purposes of and at the
time he obtained the loan from the latter. Indubitably, the
accused was in bad faith when he obtained the said loan
under such deliberate pretenses.
MALICIOUS MISCHIEF
TAGUINOD v PEOPLE
(659 SCRA ___)
October 12, 2011
G.R. 185833
The elements of the crime of malicious mischief under
Article 327 of the Revised Penal Code are: (1) That the
offender deliberately caused damage to the property of
another; (2) That such act does not constitute arson or
other crimes involving destruction; (3) That the act of
damaging another’s property be committed merely for the
sake of damaging it.
CABALLES V DAR
(168 SCRA 247)
December 5, 1988
 G.R. No. 78214
The private respondent cannot be held criminally liable
for malicious mischief in cutting the banana trees
because, as an authorized occupant or possessor of the
land, and as planter of the banana trees, he owns said
crops including the fruits thereof. Thus, an essential
element of the crime of malicious mischief, which is
"damage deliberately caused to the property of another,"
is absent because the private respondent merely cut
down his own plantings.
CRIMES AGAINST CHASTITY
(ARTICLES 333-334, 336-346)
QUALIFIED SEDUCTION
PEOPLE v FONTANILLA
(23 SCRA 127)
June 28, 1968
G.R. No. L-25354
While deceit is an essential element of ordinary or simple
seduction, it does not have to be proved or established in
a charge of qualified seduction. It is replaced by abuse of
confidence. Under Art. 337 of the Revised Penal Code,
the seduction of a virgin over twelve and under eighteen
years of age, committed by any person in public
authority, priest, house servant, domestic guardian,
teacher, or any person who, in any capacity, shall be
entrusted with the education or custody of the woman
seduced is "constitutive" of the crime of qualified
seduction even though no deceit intervenes or even
when such carnal knowledge was voluntary on the part of
the virgin.
BABANTO v ZOSA
(120 SCRA 834)
February 28, 1983
G.R. No. L-32895
The complaint alleged that the accused abused his
position as a policeman; that Leonida Dagohoy was of
the tender age of 13; and that the accused had carnal
knowledge of the complainant. However, there is no
allegation that the complainant was a "virgin". Although it
may be true that virginity is presumed if the girl is over 12
and under 18 years of age, is unmarried and of good
reputation, the accused charged with rape cannot be
convicted of qualified seduction for failure to allege
virginity in the complaint which is an essential element of
the same.
PEREZ v CA
(168 SCRA 236)
November 29, 1988
G.R. No. L-80838
There are similar elements between Consented
Abduction and Qualified Seduction, namely: (1) that the
offended party is a virgin, and, (2) that she must be over
twelve (12) and under eighteen (18) years of age.
However, Consented Abduction, in addition to the two
common elements, requires that: (1) the taking away of
the offended party must be with her consent, after
solicitation or cajolery from the offender, and, (2) the
taking away of the offended party must be with lewd
designs while Qualified Seduction requires that: (1) the
28
crime be committed by abuse of authority, confidence or
relationship, and, (2) the offender has sexual intercourse
with the woman.
ABDUCTION, FORCIBLE ABDUCTION
WITH RAPE
PEOPLE v ALBURO
(184 SCRA 655)
April 26, 1990
G.R. No. 85822
The Court is not persuaded by the theory that appellant
and Evelyn were sweethearts because if they were,
surely, Evelyn would not have jeopardized their
relationship by accusing him of having deflowered her
and, on top of it all, filing a criminal charge against him.
Moreover, appellant was not able to present any
convincing evidence to substantiate his claim like love
letters, notes and other symbols of affection.
PEOPLE v GODINES
(196 SCRA 765)
May 7, 1991
G.R. No. 93410
A medical examination is not an indispensable element in
a prosecution of rape. Further, the defense of alibi cannot
prosper because the distance between the alleged
whereabouts of the appellants at the time of the
commission of the crime and the scene of the crime itself
may be easily negotiated by ordinary means and in light
of the positive identification of the accused as the authors
of the crime.
PROSECUTION OF PRIVATE OFFENSES
PILAPIL v IBAY-SOMERA
(174 SCRA 653)
June 30, 1989
G.R. No. 80116
Under Article 344 of the Revised Penal Code, the crime
of adultery cannot be prosecuted except upon a sworn
written complaint filed by the offended spouse. Private
respondent, being no longer the husband of petitioner for
having obtained a valid divorce decree in Germany, had
no legal standing to commence the adultery case under
the imposture that he was the offended spouse at the
time he filed suit.
CRIMES AGAINST CIVIL STATUS
(ARTICLES 347-352)
BIGAMY
TEVES v PEOPLE
(656 SCRA 307)
August 24, 2011
G.R. No. 188775
The elements of bigamy are as follows: 1. That the
offender has been legally married; 2. That the marriage
has not been legally dissolved, or in case his/her spouse
is absent, the absent spouse could not yet be presumed
dead according to the Civil Code; 3. That he contracts a
second or subsequent marriage which has all the
essential requisites for validity.

NOLLORA v PEOPLE
(657 SCRA 330)
September 17, 2011
G.R. No. 191425
The circumstances in the present case satisy all the
elements of bigamy. (1) Nollora is legally married to
Pinat; (2) Nollora and Pinat’s marriage has not been
legally dissolved prioir to the date of the second
marriage; (3) Nollora admitted the existence of the
second marriage to Geraldino; and (4) Nollora and
Geraldino’s marriage has all the essential requisites for
validity except for lack of capacity of Nollora due to his
prior marriage.
PEOPLE v ARAGON
(100 PHIL 103)
February 28, 1957
G.R. No. L-10016
A subsequent marriage contracted by any person during
the lifetime of his first spouse is illegal and void from its
performance, and no judicial decree is necessary to
establish its invalidity, as distinguished from mere
annullable marriages.
MERCADO V TAN
(337 SCRA ___ )
August 1, 2000
G.R. No. 137110
The fact that petitioner subsequently obtained a judicial
declaration of the nullity of the first marriage after having
contracted the second marriage was already immaterial
since the crime had already been consummated. By
contracting a second marriage while the first was still
subsisting, he committed that acts punishable under
Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code.
MORIGO v PEOPLE
(422 SCRA 376)
February 6, 2004
G.R. No. 145226
Under the principle of retroactivity of a marriage being
declared void ab initio, the petitioner and Lucia Barrete
were never married "from the beginning." Thus, when
petitioner contracted marriage with Maria Jececha, no
bigamy was committed since the first element of
existence and the validity of the first marriage is lacking.
TENEBRO v CA
(422 SCRA ___ )
February 18, 2004
G.R. No. 150758
As a second or subsequent marriage contracted during
the subsistence of petitioner's valid marriage to
Villareyes, petitioner's marriage to Ancajas would be null
and void ab initio completely regardless of petitioner's
psychological capacity or incapacity. Since a marriage
contracted during the subsistence of a valid marriage is
automatically void, the nullity of this second marriage is
not per se an argument for the avoidance of criminal
liability for bigamy.
MARRIAGE CONTRACTED
29
AGAINST PROVISION OF THE LAW
COSCA v PALAYPAYON
(237 SCRA 249)
September 30, 1994
A.M. No. MTJ-92-721
The Revised Penal Code provides that "(p)riests or
ministers of any religious denomination or sect, or civil
authorities who shall perform or authorize any illegal
marriage ceremony shall be punished in accordance with
the provisions of the Marriage Law." This is within the
province of the prosecutorial agencies of the
Government.
CRIMES AGAINST HONOR
(ARTICLES 353-364)
LIBEL
ALCANTARA v PONCE
(517 SCRA 74)
February 28, 2007
G.R. No. 156183
The crime of libel, as defined in Article 353 of the
Revised Penal Code, has the following elements: (1)
imputation of a crime, vice or defect, real or imaginary, or
any act, omission, condition, status or circumstance; (2)
publicity or publication; (3) malice; (4) direction of such
imputation at a natural or juridical person, or even a dead
person and (5) tendency to cause the dishonor, discredit,
or contempt of the person defamed.
DIAZ v PEOPLE
(523 SCRA 194)
May 25, 2007
G.R. No. 159787
For an imputation to be libelous, the following requisites
must be present: (a) it must be defamatory; (b) it must be
malicious; (c) it must be given publicity; and (d) the
victims must be identifiable. Absent one of these
elements, a case for libel will not prosper.
GONZALES v ARCILLA
(203 SCRA 609)
November 18, 1991
G.R. No. L-27923
"Mang-aagaw ng asawa ng may asawa," even if
translated as "one who grabs another's husband," does
not necessarily mean an adulteress but at most, it may
imply that the person to whom it is addressed is a "flirt, a
temptress, or one who indulges in enticing other
husbands." Hence, it is more of an imputation of a vice,
condition or act not constituting a crime. Further, the
phrases "tibihon," "putang ina," "walang hiya," and "patay
gutom" do not impute the commission of a crime but were
uttered to impute a condition, defect, status or vice
intended to cause dishonor, discredit or contempt on the
offended party.
SAZON v CA
 (255 SCRA 692)
March 29, 1996
G.R. No. 120715
The test to determine the defamatory character of words
was satisfied in the case at bench because the words
and phrases "mandurugas," "mag-ingat sa panlilinlang,"
"matagal na tayong niloloko," "may kasamang
pagyayabang," "ang ating pobreng super kulit." "patuloy
na kabulastugan," "mastermind sa paninirang puri," etc
are indisputably defamatory for they impute upon the
private complainant a condition that is dishonorable and
shameful, since they tend to describe him as a swindler
and/or a deceiver.
VASQUEZ v CA
(314 SCRA 460)
September 15, 1999
G.R. No. 118971
Petitioner was able to prove the truth of his charges
against the barangay official while the prosecution failed
to prove not only that the charges made by petitioner
were false but also that petitioner made them with
knowledge of their falsity or with reckless disregard of
whether they were false or not. If the defamatory matter
either constitutes a crime or concerns the performance of
official duties, and the accused proves the truth of his
charge, he should be acquitted.
BRILLANTE v CA
(440 SCRA 541)
October 19, 2004
G.R. Nos. 118757 & 121571
In the cases at bar, it was proven that Brillante uttered
defamatory statements during the press conference
attended by some fifty journalists and caused the open
letter which explicitly referred to reprehensible acts
allegedly committed by Binay, Prudente and their
associates, such as the use of goons to threaten Binay's
opponents in the election and the plotting of Syjuco's
assassination, to be published in several newspapers.
ALONZO v CA
(241 SCRA 51)
February 1, 1995
G.R. No. 110088
There was no publication when Atty. Balasabas, a third
person to whom the private respondents entrusted the
documents with the request that he give them to their
counsel, read the complaint against Dr. Velasco and the
report of the petitioner attached thereto. Where the
plaintiff himself communicated or by his acts caused the
communication of the libelous matter to a third person,
there was no actionable publication.
BUATIS v PEOPLE
March 24, 2006
G.R. No. 142509
30
The element of publication in libel is present in this case
when petitioner's subject letter-reply itself addressed to
respondent states that the same was copy furnished to
all concerned, its contents were dictated to his secretary
and was found in the mailbox, open, not contained in an
envelope thus, open to public. Such publication had
already created upon the minds of the readers a
circumstance which brought discredit and shame to
respondent's reputation.
NEWSWEEK v IAC
(142 SCRA 171)
May 30, 1986
G.R. No. L-63559
The disputed portion of the news article which refers to
plaintiff Sola and which was claimed to be libelous never
singled out plaintiff Sola as a sugar planter as it merely
stated that the victim had been arrested by members of a
special police unit brought into the area by Pablo Sola,
the mayor of Kabankalan. Hence, the report, referring as
it does to an official act performed by an elective public
official, is within the realm of privilege and protected by
the constitutional guarantees of free speech and press.
MERCADO v CFI
August 25, 1982
G.R. No. L-38753
A libel prosecution must survive the test of whether or not
the offending publication is within the guarantees of free
speech and free press.
BULLETIN PUBLISHING v NOEL
(167 SCRA 255)
November 9, 1988
G.R. No. 76565
No libel has been committed because the published work
alleged to contain libelous statements is not founded on
the late Amir Mindalano or his family and appears simply
expository in character, matter-of-fact, and unemotional
in tone and tenor, without any evidence of malevolent
intent, either on the part of the author or the publisher of
the article. Further, personal hurt or embarrassment,
even if real, is not automatically equivalent to defamation;
community standards not personal or family standards
are the basis for evaluating a publication claimed to be
defamatory.
SANTOS v CA
(203 SCRA 110)
October 21, 1991
G.R. No. L-45031
Publication of a complaint, being a true and fair report of
a judicial proceeding, made in good faith and without
comments or remarks, is privileged and comes under
Item 2 of Article 354.
BORJAL v CA
January 14, 1999
G.R. No. 126466
The doctrine of fair comment means that while in general
every discreditable imputation publicly made is deemed
false because every man is presumed innocent until his
guilt is judicially proved, and every false imputation is
deemed, malicious, nevertheless, when the discreditable
imputation is directed against a public person in his
public capacity, it is not necessarily actionable. In order
that such discreditable imputation to a public official may
be actionable, it must either be a false allegation of fact
or a comment based on a false supposition.
FLOR v PEOPLE
(454 S 440)
March 31, 2005
G.R. No. 139987
Where the issue of cash advances against the coffers of
the provincial government was a major political topic in
that locality at that time, it was clearly a legitimate topic to
be discussed not only by the members of the media but
by public as what was involved was the dispensation of
taxpayers’ money. The inference that the accused media
men drew from the note given by their source that the
governor prodded some of the provincial government
officials to take out cash advances may have been false
but the same does not warrant a conviction for libel nor
support a claim for damages.
AGUSTIN v PAMINTUAN
(467 SCRA 601)
August 22, 2005
G.R. No. 164938
Under the old rule, the offended party could harass the
accused in a libel case by laying the venue of the criminal
action in a remote or distant places. To obviate
controversies as to the venue of the criminal action from
written defamation, the complaint or Information should
contain allegations as to whether the offended party was
a public officer or a private individual at the time the
offense was committed, and where he was actually
residing at that time. Whenever possible, the place where
the written defamation was printed and first published
should likewise be alleged.
FERMIN v PEOPLE
March 28, 2008
G.R. No. 157643
Proof adduced during the trial showed that accused was
the manager of the publication without the corresponding
evidence that, as such, he was directly responsible for
the writing, editing, or publishing of the matter contained
in the said libelous article. Article 360 of the Revised
Penal Code, however, includes not only the author but
also the person who prints or published it. Thus, proof of
knowledge or participation in the publication of the
offending article is not required.
SLANDER
GONZALES v ARCILLA
(203 SCRA 609)
November 18, 1991
G.R. No. L-27923
Slander is oral defamation while libel is defamation in
writing. In both, there is a public and malicious imputation
of a crime, or of a vice or defect, real or imaginary, or any
act, omission, condition, status, or circumstance tending
to cause the dishonor, discredit, or contempt of a natural
31
or juridical person, or to blacken the memory of one who
is dead.
BALITE v PEOPLE
(18 SCRA 280)
September 30, 1966
G.R. No. L-21475
Defamatory words constitute either grave or light slander
depending not only upon their sense and grammatical
meaning, judging them separately, but also upon the
special circumstances of the case, antecedents or
relationship between the offended party and the offender,
which might tend to prove the intention of the offender at
the time. In the case at bar, the statements of the
accused, alluding to the offended party that he “has sold
the union”, he “has swindled the money of the members’,
he “received P6,000.00’; he is “engaged in racketeering
and enriching himself with capitalist”; he “has spent funds
of the union for his own personal use” are serious and
insulting, and no amount of sophistry will take them out of
the compass of grave oral defamation.
REYES v PEOPLE
(27 SCRA 686)
March 28, 1969
G.R. Nos. L-21528 and L-21529
The words, "Agustin, putang ina mo" is a common
enough expression in the dialect that is often employed,
not really to slander but rather to express anger or
displeasure. In the instant case, it should be viewed as
part of the threats voiced by appellant against Agustin
Hallare, evidently to make the same more emphatic.
VICTORIO V CA
(173 SCRA 645)
May 3, 1989
G.R. Nos. L-32836-37
Appellant-petitioner admitted having called Atty. Vivencio
Ruiz, “kayabang,” “tunaw na utak,” “swapang,” and
"estapador", which attributes to the latter the crime of
estafa, a serious and insulting imputation. Defamatory
words uttered specifically against a lawyer when touching
on his profession are libellous per se.
INTRIGUING AGAINST HONOR
BETGUEN v MASANGCAY
(238 SCRA 475)
Article 364 of the Revised Penal Code defines "intriguing
against honor" as any intrigue which has for its principal
purpose to blemish the honor and reputation of a person.
This felony undoubtedly falls under the coverage of
crimes involving moral turpitude, the latter term having
been defined as "an act of baseness, vileness, depravity
in the private and social duties which a man owes his
fellow man, or to society in general, contrary to the
accepted and customary rule of right and duty between
man and man, or conduct contrary to justice, honesty,
modesty and good morals."
 CRIMINAL NEGLIGENCE (ARTICLE 365) the same vehicular accident, because the second
accusation places the appellant in second jeopardy for
CARILLO v PEOPLE the same offense.
(229 S 386)

Petitioner anesthesiologist when summoned could not be

readily found and when he finally appeared at 10:30 in
the evening, he was evidently in a bad temper,
commenting critically on the dextrose bottles before
ordering their removal, a circumstance indicative that he
was not disposed to attend to this unexpected call, in
violation of the canons of his profession that as a
physician, he should serve the interest of his patient "with
the greatest of solicitude, giving them always his best
talent and skill." In the crime of simple negligence, the
gravamen of the offense is the failure to exercise the
diligence necessitated or called for the situation which
was not immediately life-destructive but which
culminated, in the present case, in the death of a human
being three (3) days later.

QUIZON v JUSTICE OF THE PEACE

(97 PHIL. 342)

Damage to property through reckless negligence is not a

variant of malicious mischief. “Malicious mischief”, as
used in sec. 87, par. 6, of the Judiciary Act, has exclusive
reference to the willful and deliberate crimes described in
Arts. 327 to 331 of the Revised Penal Code and to no
other.

PEOPLE v FALLER
(67 Phil. 529)

Under an information for malicious damage to another’s

property, the accused may be convicted of the crime of
damage through reckless imprudence.

GAN v COURT OF APPEALS

(165 SCRA 378)

Under the emergency rule, one who suddenly finds

himself in a place of danger, and is required to act
without time to consider the best means that may be
adopted to avoid the impending danger, is not guilty of
negligence, if he fails to adopt what subsequently and
upon reflection may appear to have been a better
method, unless the emergency in which he finds himself
is brought about by his own negligence. Applying the
above test to the case at bar, we find the petitioner not
guilty of the crime of Simple Imprudence resulting in
Homicide because there was no evidence presented that
would tend to prove that petitioner did have sufficient
time to reflect on the consequences of her instant
decision to swerve her car to the light without stepping on
her brakes.

PEOPLE v BUAN
(22 SCRA 1383)

The exoneration of Jose Buan, by the Justice of the

Peace (now Municipal Court) of Guiguinto, Bulacan, of
the charge of slight physical injuries through reckless
imprudence, prevents his being prosecuted for serious
physical injuries through reckless imprudence in the
Court of First Instance of the province, where both
charges are derived from the consequences of one and

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