WEEK 3 Case Digests (CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I)

Prof. Atty. Glenda Yuson

1. ANNOTATION – JUDICIAL REVIEW, 583 SCRA 142 (2009)

LARRY V. CAMINOS, JR., G.R. No. 147437

- versus - TINGA, VELASCO, JR.,
LEONARDO DE CASTRO,** and BRION, JJ.

Facts:
1. Arnold Litonjua , was traversing Ortigas Avenue. He prepared to make a left turn as he
reached the intersection of Ortigas Avenue and Columbia Street, and as soon as he had
maneuvered the turn through the break in the traffic island, the car driven by petitioner suddenly
came ramming into his car from his right-hand side. Petitioner, who was also traversing Ortigas
Avenue, approached the same intersection from the opposite direction.
2. The sketch, signed by both petitioner and Arnold and countersigned by Patrolman
Santos, shows
petitioners car which, it seems, was able to keep its momentum and general direction even
upon impact, was stalled a few feet away from the intersection whereas Arnold’s car had settled
on the outer lane.
3. The report revealed that at the time of the collision, Arnold’s car, which had no right of way,
was turning left whereas petitioner’s car was going straight and was exceeding lawful speed. It
also indicated that the vision of the drivers was obstructed by the center island flower bed.

Issue:
1. Whether or not the Court of Appeals had misapplied the principle of last clear
chance. Rulings:
2. Yes, but such misapplication did not work for the benefit of the petitioner. Principle of last clear
chance states that a negligent plaintiff can nonetheless recover if he is able to show that the
defendant had the last opportunity to avoid the accident. It operates when the plaintiff is unable
to avoid the accident by the exercise of reasonable vigilance and care, whereas, the defendant
is negligent in failing to utilize, with reasonable care and competence, his then existing
opportunity to avoid the harm when latter: (a) knows of the plaintiff's situation, and (b) realizes or
has
reason to realize that the plaintiff is inattentive and therefore unlikely to discover his peril in time
to avoid the harm, and (c) thereafter is negligent in failing to utilize with reasonable care and
competence his then existing opportunity to avoid the harm.
In this case, physical evidence on record likewise seems to negate petitioner’s contention that he
was
driving at a reasonable speed at the time of the accident. The entry in the TAIR also noted
petitioner’s speed to be beyond what is lawful which raises the presumption of imprudent
driving. As to Arnold, as shown by the evidence, had been able to establish himself at the
intersection significantly ahead of petitioner. This defies logic to accord even a semblance of
truth to petitioner’s assertion that he had not seen Arnolds car entering the intersection. Also,
Arnold’s view at an intersection is obstructed so he was not able to get a good view to the right
or left until he is close to the intersection. Prudence would dictate that he take particular care to
observe the traffic before entering the intersection or otherwise use reasonable care to avoid a
collision.
With these, the benefit of the principle of last clear chance should not be granted to the petitioner
2. Angara v. Electoral Commission, GR No. 45081, July 15, 1936, 63 Phil.
139

Fact:

1. Jose A. Angara and Pedro Ynsua, candidates for the position of

member of National Assembly for the district of Tayabas, are both
struggling for the incoming 1935 elections. After the said event, on the
th
7 day of October in the same year, provincial board of canvassers
th
declared the victory of Angara and had his oath in the 17 of
November. In December 3, 1935, the National Assembly passed the
Resolution No. 8 which fixes the date where complaints and electoral
protests can be made. On the other hand, in December 8 still in the
same year, Ynsua filed a protest against election of the petitioner.
The next day, December 9, 1935, the Electoral Commission adopted
the aforementioned resolution which dictates the end date of electoral
protest. However, by the time that the protest was made, the
jurisdiction to resolve the case is still lodge with the Electoral
Commission. The petitioner believed that no complaints must be
submitted after December 3, 1935, filed a petition for a writ of
prohibition against the said commission.

Issue:

Whether the Electoral Commission has the jurisdiction over all contests
relating to election, returns and qualifications of the members of National
Assembly by the time the electoral protest against the petitioner has been
submitted.

3. Held:

Writ for Prohibition filed by the petitioner was denied and the court affirmed
that the Electoral Commission still possesses sole authority by the time the
complaint was filed. It was also ruled that Resolution No. 8 cannot be
considered as a limitation upon the time for the initiation of contests and that
the Electoral Commission, granted by the constitution as a separate organ of
government, can fully execute its functions such arbitrating predicaments
within its jurisdiction.
3. Case Digest: RE: COA opinion on the computation of the appraised value of the
properties purchased by the retired Chief / associate justices of the supreme
court A.M. NO. 11-7-10-SC JULY 31, 2012
6/27/2020

ISSUE: Whether or not COA’s interference, in this case, violates the judiciary’s autonomy.

FACTS: Office of the General Counsel of the Commission on Audit (COA) found that an
underpayment amounting to P221,021.50 resulted when five retired Supreme Court justices
purchased from the Supreme Court the personal properties assigned to them during their
incumbency in the Court. The COA attributed this underpayment to the use by the Property
Division of the Supreme Court of the wrong formula in computing the appraisal value of the
purchased vehicles. According to the COA, the Property Division erroneously appraised the
subject motor vehicles by applying Constitutional Fiscal Autonomy Group (CFAG) Joint
Resolution No. 35 and its guidelines, in compliance with the Resolution of the Court En
Banc in A.M. No. 03- 12-01, when it should have applied the formula found in COA
Memorandum No. 98-569-A4. Atty. Candelaria, Deputy Clerk of Court and Chief
Administrative Officer, recommended that the Court advise the COA to respect the in-house
computation based on the CFAG formula, noting that this was the first time that the COA
questioned the authority of the Court in using CFAG Joint Resolution No. 35 and its
guidelines in the appraisal and disposal of government property since these were issued in
1997. As a matter of fact, in two previous instances involving two retired Court of Appeals
Associate Justices, the COA upheld the in-house appraisal of government property using
the formula found in the CFAG guidelines. More importantly, the Constitution itself grants the
Judiciary fiscal autonomy in the handling of its budget and resources.

DECISION: Yes

RATIO DECIDENDI: The COA’s authority to conduct post-audit examinations on

constitutional bodies granted fiscal autonomy is provided under Section 2(1), Article IX-D of
the 1987 Constitution. This authority, however, must be read not only in light of the Court’s
fiscal autonomy, but also in relation with the constitutional provisions on judicial
independence and the existing jurisprudence and Court rulings on these matters. Any kind of
interference on how these retirement privileges and benefits are exercised and availed of,
not only violates the fiscal autonomy and independence of the Judiciary, but also encroaches
upon the constitutional duty and privilege of the Chief Justice and the Supreme Court En
Banc to manage the Judiciary’s own affairs.
 4. GARCIA V. DRILON, 699 SCRA 352 (2013)

FACTS:

Petitioner Jesus Garcia (husband) admitted having an affair with a bank manager. His
infidelity emotionally wounded private respondent which spawned several quarrels that left
respondent wounded. Petitioner also unconscionably beat up their daughter, Jo-ann.

The private respondent was determined to separate from petitioner. But she was afraid he
would take away their children and deprive her of financial support. He warned her that if
she pursued legal battle, she would not get a single centavo from him. After she confronted
him of his affair, he forbade her to hold office. This deprived her of access to full information
about their businesses. Hence, no source of income.

Thus, the RTC found reasonable ground to believe there was imminent danger of violence
against respondent and her children and issued a series of Temporary Protection Orders
(TPO) pursuant to RA 9262.

Republic Act No. 9262 is a landmark legislation that defines and criminalizes acts of violence
against women and their children (VAWC) perpetrated by women's intimate partners.

Petitioner hence, challenged the constitutionality of RA 9262 on making a gender-based

classification.

ISSUE:

Whether or not RA 9262 is discriminatory, unjust, and violative of the equal protection
clause.

RULING:

No. The equal protection clause in our Constitution does not guarantee an absolute
prohibition against classification. The non-identical treatment of women and men under RA
9262 is justified to put them on equal footing and to give substance to the policy and aim of
the state to ensure the equality of women and men in light of the biological, historical, social,
and culturally endowed differences between men and women.

RA 9262, by affording special and exclusive protection to women and children, who are
vulnerable victims of domestic violence, undoubtedly serves the important governmental
objectives of protecting human rights, insuring gender equality, and empowering women.
The gender-based classification and the special remedies prescribed by said law in favor of
women and children are substantially related, in fact essentially necessary, to achieve such
objectives. Hence, said Act survives the intermediate review or middle-tier judicial scrutiny.
The gender-based classification therein is therefore not violative of the equal protection
clause embodied in the 1987 Constitution.
5. CARPIO-MORALES V. CA, 774 SCRA 431 (2015)
 Revised Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service (RRACC S); and
Third, Binay, Jr.’s position gave him access to public records and tne
ability to influence possible witnesses, and his continued stay in office
would have prejudiced the investigation.
5) After receipt of the said preventive suspension order on 11 March 2015,
Binay, J r. filed a petition for certiorari before the CA38 praying for:
(1) The nullification of the preventive suspension order
(2) A TRO and/or WPI to enjoin its implementation.

6) According to him, he could not be held administratively liable for any

anomalous activity attending any of the five phases of the construction of
the Makati Parking Building since Phases I and II were completed before
he was elected Mayor of Makati in 2010, and Phases III to V had taken
place during his first term in office Citing the condonation doctrine in tne
main, he argued that his landslide re-election for a second term, as City
Mayor of Makati, effectively condoned any administrative liability from his
previous term, i.e., that he could no longer be removed from his position
on those grounds. Moreover, he claimed that the Ombudsman had failed
to show that tne evidence of his guilt was strong enough so as to warrant
the issuance of a preventive suspension order.
7) On 16 March 2015, at around 8:24 a.m„ DILG officials implemented the
suspension order by posting its copy on the wall of the Makati City Hall. A
little over an hour later, the Assistant City Prosecutor of Makati
administered the Oath of Office to then Vice Mayor Romulo V. Peña, Jr.
(Peña, Jr.). At noon of the same day, notwithstanding that Peña, J r. had
already been sworn in as Acting Mayor, the CA issued a resolution granting
Binay, Jr.’s prayer for an issuance of a TRO. Citing the case of Governor
Garcia, Jr. v. Court of Appeals, the CA held that it was more prudent to
issue a TRO given that, if it were to be established that the acts giving
rise to administrative liability had in fact transpired prior to Binay, Jr.’s re-
election for a second term, the condonation doctrine would apply,
effectively rendering h is past administrative offe nses moot and
academic. In her Manifestation before the CA, tne Ombudsman
countered that there was nothing for tne TRO to restrain because the
preventive suspension order had already been served and Peña, Jr.
sworn in when the CA issued the TRO. Apparently disagreeing with the
Ombudsman, Binay, Jr. filed a petition for contempt against her and other
government officials. The CA consolidated the petition for contempt with
tne petition for certiorari before it and scheduled a hearing for oral
arguments. Prior to the said oral arguments, however, the Ombudsman
filed a petition for certiorari before the Supreme Court — the instant case.
Binay, J r. reiterated in his Comment before the Supreme Court that,
inter alia, ”he could not be held administratively liable for any of the
charges against him since his subsequent re-election in 2013 operated
as a condonation of any administrativ e offenses he may have
 committed during his previous term.“ During the pendency of the
instant case, the CA issued a WPI against the implementation of the
Ombudsman’s preventive suspension order. Citing Aguinaldo v.
Santos, SalaJima v. Guingona, Jr., and Mayor Garcia v. Mojica, 57 the
CA ratiocinated in its order granting the WPI

Due to the issuance of the WPI, the Ombudsman filed a supplemental petition
adding “that the condonation doctrine [was] irrelevant to the determination of
whether the evidence guilt is strong for purposes of issuing preventive
suspension orders.“
8) of Among the contentions brought up to the Supreme Coun, the
debate on the legality of the condonation doctrine became the focal
point of public interest in the instant case.

Issue:
Is the doctrine of condonation should apply in Binay’ s case.

Ruling:

The petition is partly meritorious,

This Court simply finds no legal authority to sustain the condonation doctrine in
this jurisdiction. It was a doctrine adopted from one class of US rulings way
back in 1959 and thus, out of touch from — and now rendered obsolete by —
the current legal regime. In consequence, it is high time for this Court to
abandon the condonation doctrine that originated from PaSEUdI, dcd affirmed in
the cases following the same, such as Aguinaldo, Salalima, Mayor Garcia, and
Governor Garcia, Jr. which were all relied upon by the CA.

It should, however, be clarified that this Coun’s abandonment of the

condonation doctrine should be prospective in application for the reason that
judicial decisions applying or interpreting the laws or the Constitution, until
reversed, shall form part of the legal system of the Philippines.

The condonation doctrine was first enunciated in Pascual v. Hon. Provincial Board
of Nueva Ecija, There is no truth in Pascual’ s postulation that the courts would
be depriving the electorate of their right to elect their officers if condonation
were not to be sanctioned. In political law, election pertains to the process by
which a panicular constituency chooses an individual to hold a public office.

In this jurisdiction, there is, again, no legal basis to conclude that election
automatically implies condonation, Neither is there any legal basis to say that
every democratic and republican state has an inherent regime of condonation.
If condonation of an elective official‘s administrative liability would perhaps, be
allowed in this jurisdiction, then the same should have been provided by law
under
our governing legal mechanisms. May it be at the time of Pascual or at present, by no
means has it been shown that such a law, whether in a constitutional or statutory
provision, exists.

Therefore, inferring from this manifest absence, it cannot be said that the
electorate’s will has been abdicated.

Terms

Condonation: as the voluntary overlooking or pardon of an offense. The term

has a similar meaning in law : victim’s express or implied forgiveness of an
offense, especially by treating the offender as if there had been no offense

The PascualCase
The Philippine Supreme Court first addressed the applicability of the doctrine of
condonation in the 1959 case of Pascual. In the said case, Arturo B. Pascual
(Pascual) was elected mayor of San Jose, Nueva Ecija in 1951, and subseque ntly
re-elected in 1955. 100 In 1956, the Acting Provincial Governor of the province
filed with the Provincial Board three administrative charges against Pascual.
With regard to the third charge, the complaint a8ainst Pascual stated that he
had assumed the judicial powers of the justice of the peace by accepting a
criminal complaint filed, issuing an arrest warrant, and setting and collecting a
bail bond despite the fact that a justice of the peace, who was not Pascual, had
been available. Pascual sought to have the third charge dismissed on the ground
that the acts were committed during his first term of office, and could, thus, not
constitute a ground for disciplining him during his second term. The Supreme
Court, “in the absence of any precedent in this jurisdiction
.. resorted to American authorities. The rationale, according to the Supreme Court,
was that “each term is separate from other terms, and the reelection to
office operates as condonation of the officer’s previous misconduct to the
extent of cutting off the right to remove him therefor."

the Supreme Court applied the condonation doctrine in Philippine jurisdiction

using the considerations108 enumerated earlier. Since Pascual was decided
under the 1935 Constitution — a Constitution preceded by a centuries-long
struggle for liberation from foreign rule that naturally rendered Filipinos more
apprehensive of external enemies than of internal accountability — the
Supreme Court gave more credence to the People’s right of suffrage that
presumably carried with it knowledge of prior misconduct by the public officers
they elected. This made sense given the text of the 1935 Constitution, unlike
that of the 1987 Constitution, where provisions that described the duty of the
government as protector of the people eclipsed those of service to the people.
 6. PEREZ V. PEOPLE, 544 SCRA 532 (2008)

ZENON R. PEREZ VS PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES G.R. No. 164763, February 12,
2008

Malversation of Public Funds

Facts:

An audit team conducted a cash examination on the account of petitioner, who was then the
acting municipal treasurer of Tubigon, Bohol. In the course of the audit, the amount of
P21,331.79 was found in the safe of petitioner. The audit team embodied their findings in the
Report of Cash Examination, which also contained an inventory of cash items. Based on the
said audit, petitioner was supposed to have on hand the total amount of P94,116.36, instead
of the P21,331.79, incurring a shortage of P72,784.57. When asked by the auditing team as
to the location of the missing funds, petitioner verbally explained that part of the money was
used to pay for the loan of his late brother, another portion was spent for the food of his
family, and the rest for his medicine.

As a result of the audit, Arlene R. Mandin prepared a memorandum dated January

13, 1989 addressed to the Provincial Auditor of Bohol recommending the filing of the
appropriate criminal case against petitioner.

Petitioner was charged before the Sandiganbayan with malversation of public funds,
defined and penalized by Article 217 of the Revised Penal Code

Issue:

Is petitioner guilty of malversation?

Ruling:

YES. Malversation is defined and penalized under Article 217 of the Revised Penal
Code. The acts punished as malversation are: (1) appropriating public funds or property, (2)
taking or misappropriating the same, (3) consenting, or through abandonment or negligence,
permitting any other person to take such public funds or property, and (4) being otherwise
guilty of the misappropriation or malversation of such funds or property.

There are four elements that must concur in order that one may be found guilty of the crime.
They are: (a) That the offender be a public officer; (b) That he had the custody or control
of funds or property by reason of the duties of his office;(c) That those funds or property
involved were public funds or property for which he is accountable; and (d) That he has
appropriated, took or misappropriated or consented or, through abandonment or
negligence, permitted another person to take them.

Evidently, the first three elements are present in the case at bar. At the time of the
commission of the crime charged, petitioner was a public officer, being then the acting
municipal treasurer of Tubigon, Bohol. By reason of his public office, he was accountable for
the public funds under his custody or control. In malversation, all that is necessary to prove
is that the defendant received in his possession public funds; that he could not account for
them and did not have them in his possession; and that he could not give a reasonable
excuse for its disappearance. An accountable public officer may be convicted of
malversation even if there is no direct evidence of misappropriation and the only evidence is
shortage in his accounts which he has not been able to explain satisfactorily.

Verily, an accountable public officer may be found guilty of malversation even if there
is no direct evidence of malversation because the law establishes a presumption that mere
failure of an accountable officer to produce public funds which have come into his hands on
demand by an officer duly authorized to examine his accounts is prima facie case of
conversion. Because of the prima facie presumption in Article 217, the burden of
evidence is shifted to the accused to adequately explain the location of the funds or
property under his custody or control in order to rebut the presumption that he has
appropriated or misappropriated for himself the missing funds. Failing to do so, the accused
may be convicted under the said provision.

However, the presumption is merely prima facie and a rebuttable one. The
accountable officer may overcome the presumption by proof to the contrary. If he adduces
evidence showing that, in fact, he has not put said funds or property to personal use, then
that presumption is at end and the prima facie case is destroyed. In the case at bar,
petitioner was not able to present any credible evidence to rebut the presumption that he
malversed the missing funds in his custody or control.
 7. MANILA MEMORIAL V. DSWD, 711 SCRA 302 (2013)

TOPIC: Bill of Rights; Eminent Domain v. Police Power

FACTS: RA 7432 Was passed into law (amended by RA 9257), granting senior citizens 20% discount
on certain establishments.

To implement the tax provisions of RA 9257, the Secretary of Finance and the DSWD issued its own
Rules and Regulations.

Hence, this petition.

Petitioners are not questioning the 20% discount granted to senior citizens but are only assailing the
constitutionality of the tax deduction scheme prescribed under RA 9257 and the implementing rules
and regulations issued by the DSWD and the DOF.

Petitioners posit that the tax deduction scheme contravenes Article III, Section 9 of the Constitution,
which provides that: "private property shall not be taken for public use without just compensation."

Respondents maintain that the tax deduction scheme is a legitimate exercise of the State’s police
power.

ISSUE: Whether the legally mandated 20% senior citizen discount is an exercise of police power or
eminent domain.

RULING: The 20% senior citizen discount is an exercise of police power.

It may not always be easy to determine whether a challenged governmental act is an exercise of police
power or eminent domain. The judicious approach, therefore, is to look at the nature and effects of the
challenged governmental act and decide on the basis thereof.

The 20% discount is intended to improve the welfare of senior citizens who, at their age, are less likely
to be gainfully employed, more prone to illnesses and other disabilities, and, thus, in need of subsidy
in purchasing basic commodities. It serves to honor senior citizens who presumably spent their lives
on contributing to the development and progress of the nation.

In turn, the subject regulation affects the pricing, and, hence, the profitability of a private
establishment.

The subject regulation may be said to be similar to, but with substantial distinctions from, price
control or rate of return on investment control laws which are traditionally regarded as police power
measures.

The subject regulation differs therefrom in that (1) the discount does not prevent the establishments
from adjusting the level of prices of their goods and services, and (2) the discount does not apply to all
customers of a given establishment but only to the class of senior citizens. Nonetheless, to the degree
material to the resolution of this case, the 20% discount may be properly viewed as belonging to the
category of price regulatory measures which affect the profitability of establishments subjected
thereto. On its face, therefore, the subject regulation is a police power measure.
 8. Funa v. MECO

Facts: On 23 August 2010, petitioner sent a letter to the COA requesting for a “copy of the
latest financial and audit report” of the MECO invoking, for that purpose, his “constitutional
right to information on matters of public concern.” The petitioner made the request on the
belief that the MECO, being under the “operational supervision” of the Department of Trade
and Industry (DTI), is a government owned and controlled corporation (GOCC) and thus
subject to the audit jurisdiction of the COA.

Petitioner’s letter was received by COA Assistant Commissioner Jaime P. Naranjo, the
following day. On 25 August 2010, Assistant Commissioner Naranjo issued a memorandum
referring the petitioner’s request to COA Assistant Commissioner Emma M. Espina for
“further disposition.” In this memorandum, however, Assistant Commissioner Naranjo
revealed that the MECO was “not among the agencies audited by any of the three Clusters of
the Corporate Government Sector.”

Issue: Whether or not MECO is a GOCC covered by the auditing power of COA.

Held: No. Government instrumentalities are agencies of the national government that, by
reason of some “special function or jurisdiction” they perform or exercise, are allotted
“operational autonomy” and are “not integrated within the department framework.”
Subsumed under the rubric “government instrumentality” are the following entities:

1. regulatory agencies,

2. Chartered institutions,

3. government corporate entities or government instrumentalities with corporate powers

(GCE/GICP), and

4. GOCCs

The Administrative Code defines a GOCC:

(13) Government-owned or controlled corporation refers to any agency organized as a stock

or non-stock corporation, vested with functions relating to public needs whether
governmental or proprietary in nature, and owned by the Government directly or through its
instrumentalities either wholly, or, where applicable as in the case of stock corporations, to
the extent of at least fifty-one (51) per cent of its capital stock: . . . .
 The above definition is, in turn, replicated in the more recent Republic Act No. 10149 or the
GOCC Governance Act of 2011 m, to wit:

(o) Government-Owned or -Controlled Corporation (GOCC) refers to any agency organized

as a stock or non-stock corporation, vested with functions relating to public needs whether
governmental or proprietary in nature, and owned by the Government of the Republic of the
Philippines directly or through its instrumentalities either wholly or, where applicable as in
the case of stock corporations, to the extent of at least a majority of its outstanding capital
stock: . . .

REPORT THIS AD
GOCCs, therefore, are “stock or non-stock” corporations “vested with functions relating to
public needs” that are “owned by the Government directly or through its instrumentalities.”
By definition, three attributes thus make an entity a GOCC: first, its organization as stock or
non-stock corporation; second, the public character of its function; and third, government
ownership over the same.

Possession of all three attributes is necessary to deem an entity a GOCC.

In this case, there is not much dispute that the MECO possesses the first and second
attributes. It is the third attribute, which the MECO lacks.

The MECO is not a GOCC or government instrumentality. It is a sui generis private entity
especially entrusted by the government with the facilitation of unofficial relations with the
people in Taiwan without jeopardizing the country’s faithful commitment to the One China
policy of the PROC. However, despite its non-governmental character, the MECO handles
government funds in the form of the “verification fees” it collects on behalf of the DOLE and
the “consular fees” it collects under Section 2 (6) of EO No. 15, s. 2001. Hence, under
existing laws, the accounts of the MECO pertaining to its collection of such “verification
fees” and “consular fees” should be audited by the COA.
 9. DISINI V. SECRETARY OF JUSTICE, 716 SCRA 237 (2014)

Facts:

These consolidated petitions seek to declare several provisions of Republic Act (RA) 10175, the
Cybercrime Prevention Act of 2012, unconstitutional and void.

The cybercrime law aims to regulate access to and use of the cyberspace. The cyberspace is a
boon to the need of a current generation for greater information and facility of communication.
But all is not well with the system since it could not filter out a number of persons of ill will who
would want to use cyberspace technology for mischiefs and crimes. One of them can, for
instance, avail himself of the system to unjustly ruin the reputation of another or bully the latter
by posting defamatory statements against him that people can read.

And because linking with the internet opens up a user to communication from others, the ill-
motivated can use the cyberspace for committing theft by hacking into or surreptitiously
accessing his bank account or credit card or defrauding him through false representations.

The wicked can use the cyberspace, too, for illicit trafficking in sex or for exposing to
pornography guileless children who have access to the internet.

For these reasons, the government has a legitimate right to regulate the use of cyberspace and
contain and punish wrongdoings. The government certainly has the duty and the right to
prevent these tomfooleries from happening and punish their perpetrators, hence the
Cybercrime Prevention Act.

But petitioners claim that the means adopted by the cybercrime law for regulating undesirable
cyberspace activities violate certain of their constitutional rights.

Pending hearing and adjudication of the issues presented in these cases, on February 5, 2013,
the Court extended the original 120-day temporary restraining order (TRO) that it earlier
issued on October 9, 2012, enjoining respondent government agencies from implementing the
cybercrime law until further orders.

ISSUES:

1. The petitioners contend that Section 4(a)(1) fails to meet the strict scrutiny standard required
of laws that interfere with the fundamental rights of the people. Is Section 4(a)(1) on Illegal
Access unconstitutional?
 2. Petitioners claim that Section 4(a)(3) suffers from overbreadth in that, while is seeks to
discourage data interference, it intrudes into the area of protected speech and expression,
creating a chilling and deterrent effect on these guaranteed freedoms.
3. Petitioners claim that Section 4(a)(6) or cyber-squatting violates the equal protection clause in
that, not being narrowly tailored, it will cause a user using his real name to suffer the same
fate as those who use aliases or take the name of another in satire, parody, or any other literary
device.
4. Petitioners claim that Section 4(b)(3) violates the constitutional rights to due process and to
privacy and correspondence, and transgresses the freedom of the press.
5. Petitioners claim that cybersex violates the freedom of expression clause of the Constitution.
6. Petitioners are wary that a person who merely doodles on paper and imagines a sexual abuse
of a 16-year old is not criminally liable for producing child pornography but one who
formulates the idea on his laptop would be.
7. Is Section 4(c)(3) unconstitutional for penalizing the transmission of unsolicited commercial
communications?
8. Petitioners dispute the constitutionality of both the penal code provisions on libel as well as
Section4(c)(4) of the Cybercrime Prevention Act on cyberlibel.
9. Petitioners assail the constitutionality of Section 5 that renders criminally liable any person
who wilfully abets or aids in the commission or attempts to commit any of the offenses
enumerated as cybercrimes. It suffers from overbreadth, creating a chilling and deterrent
effect on protected expression.
10. Is Section 6 on the penalty of one degree higher constitutional?
11. Is Section 7 on the prosecution under both the Revised Penal Code (RPC) and RA 10175
constitutional?
12. Is Section 8 valid and constitutional?
13. Is Section 12 on Real-Time collection of traffic data valid and constitutional?
14. Is Section 13 on preservation of computer data valid and constitutional?
15. Is Section 14 on disclosure of computer data valid and constitutional?
16. Is Section 15 on search, seizure and examination of computer data valid and constitutional?
17. Is Section 17 on destruction of computer data valid and constitutional?
18. Is Section 19 on restricting or blocking access to computer data valid and constitutional?
19. Is Section 20 on obstruction of justice valid and constitutional?
20. Is Section 24 on Cybercrime Investigation and Coordinating Center (CICC) valid and
constitutional?
21. Is Section 26(a) on CICC’s power and functions valid and constitutional?

Ruling:

1. No. The strict scrutiny standard, an American constitutional construct, is useful in

determining the constitutionality of laws that tend to target a class of things or persons.
According to this standard, a legislative classification that impermissibly interferes with the
exercise of fundamental right or operates to the peculiar class disadvantage of a suspect class
is presumed unconstitutional. The Court finds nothing in Section 4(a)(1) that calls for the
application of the strict scrutiny standard since no fundamental freedom, like speech, is
involved in punishing what is essentially a condemnable act – accessing the computer system
of another without right. It is a universally condemnable act.
2. Under the overbreadth doctrine, a proper governmental purpose, constitutionally subject to
state regulation, may not be achieved by means that unnecessarily sweep its subject broadly,
thereby invading the area of protected speech. Section 4(a)(3) does not encroach on these
freedoms at all. It simply punishes what essentially is a form of vandalism, the act of wilfully
destroying without right the things that belong to others, in this case their computer data,
electronic document, or electronic data message. Such act has no connection to guaranteed
freedoms. Ergo, there is no freedom to destroy other people’s computer systems and private
documents. All penal laws, like the cybercrime law, have of course an inherent chilling effect,
an in terrorem effect, or the fear of possible prosecution that hangs on the heads of citizens
who are minded to step beyond the boundaries of what is proper. But to prevent the State from
legislating criminal laws because they instil such kind of fear is to render the state powerless
in addressing and penalizing socially harmful conduct.
3. No, the challenge to the constitutionality of Section 4(a)(6) is baseless. The law is reasonable
in penalizing the act of acquiring the domain name in bad faith to profit, mislead, destroy
reputation, or deprive others who are not ill-motivated of the rightful opportunity of
registering the same. It is the evil purpose for which one uses the name that the law
condemns.
4. No. In assessing the challenge that the State has impermissibly intruded into these zones of
privacy, a court must determine whether a person has exhibited a reasonable expectation of
privacy and, if so, whether that expectation has been violated by unreasonable government
intrusion. The law punishes those who acquire or use identifying information without right,
implicitly to cause damage. Petitioners fail to show how government effort to curb computer-
related identity theft violates the right to privacy and correspondence as well as the right to
due process. There is no fundamental right to acquire another’s personal right. The Court has
defined intent to gain as an internal act which can be established through overt acts of the
offender, and it may be presumed from the furtive taking of useful property pertaining to
another, unless special circumstances reveal a different intent on the part of the perpetrator.
As such, the press, whether in the quest of news reporting or social investigation, has nothing
to fear since a special circumstance is present to negate intent to gain which is required by this
Section.
5. The Court will not declare Section 4(c)(1) unconstitutional where it stands a construction that
makes it apply only to persons engaged in the business of maintaining, controlling, or
operating, directly or indirectly, the lascivious exhibition of sexual organs or sexual activity
with the aid of a computer system as Congress has intended.
6. The constitutionality of Section 4(c)(3) is not successfully challenged. The law makes the
penalty higher by one degree when the crime is committed in cyberspace. But no one can
complain since the intensity or duration of penalty is a legislative prerogative and there is a
rational basis for such higher penalty.
7. Yes, because to prohibit the transmission of unsolicited ads would deny a person the right to
read his emails, even unsolicited commercial ads addressed to him. Commercial speech is a
separate category of speech which us not accorded the same level of protection as that given
to other constitutionally guaranteed forms of expression but is nonetheless entitled to
protection. The State cannot rob him of this right without violating the constitutionally
guaranteed freedom of expression. Thus, unsolicited advertisements are legitimate forms of
expression.
8. Since the penal code and implicitly, the cybercrime law, mainly target libel against private
persons, the Court recognizes that these laws imply a stricter standard of malice to convict the
author of a defamatory statement where the offended party is a public figure. The elements of
libel are: (a) the allegation of a discreditable act or condition concerning another; (b)
publication of the charge; (c) identity of the person defamed; and (d) existence of
 malice.There is actual malice or malice in fact when the offender makes the defamatory
statement with the knowledge that it is false or with reckless disregard of whether it was false
or not. The reckless disregard standard used here required a high degree of awareness of
probable falsity. There must be sufficient evidence to permit the conclusion that the accused
in fact entertained serious doubts as to the truth of the statement he published. Gross or even
extreme negligence is not sufficient to establish actual malice. The defense of absence of
actual malice, even when the statement turns out to be false, is available where the offended
party is a public official or a public figure. But, where the offended party is a private
individual, the prosecution need not prove the presence of actual malice. For his defense, the
accused must show that he has a justifiable reason for the defamatory statement even if it was
in fact true.
9. A governmental purpose, which seeks to regulate the use of cyberspace communication
technology to protect a person’s reputation and peace of mind, cannot adopt means that will
unnecessarily and broadly sweep, invading the area of protected freedoms. If such means are
adopted, self-inhibition borne of fear of what sinister predicaments await internet users will
suppress otherwise robust discussion of public issues. Democracy will be threatened and with
it, all liberties. Penal laws should provide reasonably clear guidelines for law enforcement
officials and triers of facts to prevent arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement. The terms
“aiding or abetting” constitute broad sweep that generates chilling effect on those who
express themselves through cyberspace posts, comments, and other messages. Hence, Section
5 of the cybercrime law that punishes “aiding or abetting” libel on the cyberspace is a nullity.
10. Yes, because there exists a substantial distinction between crimes committed through the use
of information and communication technology and similar crimes committed using other
means. In using the technology in question, the offender often evades identification and is
able to reach far more victims or cause greater harm.
11. The Court resolves to leave the determination of the correct application of Section 7 that
authorizes prosecution of the offender under both the Revised Penal Code and Republic Act
10175 to actual cases, with the exception of the crimes of:
1. Online libel as to which, charging the offender under both
Section 4(c)(4) of Republic Act 10175 and Article 353 of the
Revised Penal Code constitutes a violation of the proscription
against double jeopardy; as well as
2. Child pornography committed online as to which, charging the
offender under both Section 4(c)(2) of Republic Act 10175 and
Republic Act 9775 or the Anti-Child Pornography Act of 2009
also constitutes a violation of the same proscription, and, in
respect to these, is void and unconstitutional.
12. Valid and constitutional, because the matter of fixing penalties for the commission of crimes
is as a rule a legislative prerogative.
13. Void and unconstitutional, because Section 12 does not permit law enforcement authorities to
look into the contents of the messages and uncover the identities of the sender and the
recipient. Thus, the authority that Section 12 gives law enforcement agencies is too sweeping
and lacks restraint.
14. Valid and constitutional, because the user ought to have kept a copy of that data when it
crossed his computer if he was so minded. There was no undue deprivation of property since
the data that service providers preserve on orders of law enforcement authorities are not made
accessible to users by reasons of the issuance of such orders.
15. Valid and constitutional, because what Section 14 envisions is merely the enforcement of a
duly issued court warrant. Disclosure can be made only after judicial intervention.
Valid and constitutional, because Section 15 merely enumerates the duties of law enforcement authorities that wo
Valid and constitutional, because it is unclear that the user has a demandable right to require the service provider
Void and unconstitutional, because Section 19 not only precludes any judicial intervention but it also disregards ju
Valid and constitutional insofar as it applies to the provisions of Chapter IV which are not struck down by the Co
and 21. Valid and constitutional, because cybercrime law is complete in itself when it directed the CICC to formu
10.

Imbong v. Ochoa 721 SCRA 146

ISSUE: Whether or not RH Law violated the one subject-one title rule under the
Constitution

FACTS: Petitioners question the constitutionality of the RH Law, claiming that it

violates Section 26(1), Article VI of the Constitution, prescribing the one subject-
one title rule. According to them, being one for reproductive health with responsible
parenthood, the assailed legislation violates the constitutional standards of due
process by concealing its true intent – to act as a population control measure. On
the other hand, respondents insist that the RH Law is not a birth or population
control measure, and that the concepts of “responsible parenthood” and
“reproductive health” are both interrelated as they are inseparable.

DECISION: Partly Granted.

RATIO DECIDENDI: No. In this case, a textual analysis of the various provisions
of the law shows that both “reproductive health” and “responsible parenthood” are
interrelated and germane to the overriding objective to control the population
growth. Considering the close intimacy between “reproductive health” and
“responsible parenthood” which bears to the attainment of the goal of achieving
“sustainable human development” as stated under its terms, the Court finds no
reason to believe that Congress intentionally sought to deceive the public as to the
contents of the assailed legislation.
11. RAPPLER V. BAUTISTA, 788 SCRA 442 (2016)

(constitutional law; freedom of the press)

FACTS
Rappler, Inc. signed a Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) to sponsor the Presidential and
Vice-Presidential debates. Alleging that it is being discriminated particularly as regards the
MOA provisions on live audio broadcast via online streaming, Rappler argues that the MOA
grants radio stations the right to simultaneously broadcast live the audio of the debates, even
if the radio stations are not obliged to perform any obligation under the MOA. However, the
right to broadcast by online live streaming the audio of the debates is denied to the petitioner
and other online media entities which also have the capacity to live stream the audio of the
debates.

Rappler filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition against COMELEC Chairman Andres
Bautista to nullify MOA provisions on the ground of violating the fundamental rights
protected under the Constitution.

ISSUE
Whether petitioner has the right to live stream the debates

RULING
Yes, Rappler has the right to live stream the debates because the exercise to do so is its
contractual right under the MOA. Under the MOA, as long as it complies with the copyright
conditions for the debates, it can live stream the debates.

The MOA recognizes the right of other mass media entities, not parties to the MOA, to
reproduce the debates subject to the same copyright conditions. The freedom of the press to
report and disseminate the live audio can no longer be infringed or subject to prior restraint.
Such freedom of the press to report and disseminate the live audio of the debates is now
protected and guaranteed under Section 4, Article III of the Constitution, which provides that,
“No law shall be passed abridging the freedom…of the press.”

The petition was partially granted. The COMELEC Chairman was directed to allow the
debates to be shown or live streamed unaltered on the petitioner’s website subject to the
copyright condition that the source is clearly indicated.
12. JAVIER V. COMELEC, 144 SCRA 194 (1986)

THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, and ARTURO F. PACIFICADOR, respondents.

Raul S. Roco and Lorna Patajo-Kapunan for petitioner.

Facts:

The petitioner and the private respondent were candidates in Antique for the Batasang
Pambansa in the May 1984 elections. On May 13, 1984, the eve of the elections, the bitter
contest between the two came to a head when several followers of the petitioner were
ambushed and killed, allegedly by the latter’s men. Seven suspects, including respondent
Pacificador, are now facing trial for these murders.

It was in this atmosphere that the voting was held, and the post-election developments were
to run true to form. Owing to what he claimed were attempts to railroad the private
respondent’s proclamation, the petitioner went to the Commission on Elections to question
the canvass of the election returns. His complaints were dismissed and the private respondent
was proclaimed winner by the Second Division of the said body. The petitioner thereupon
came to this Court, arguing that the proclamation was void because made only by a division
and not by the Commission on Elections en banc as required by the Constitution.

On May 18, 1984, the Second Division of the Commission on Elections directed the
provincial board of canvassers of Antique to proceed with the canvass but to suspend the
proclamation of the winning candidate until further orders. On June 7, 1984, the same Second
Division ordered the board to immediately convene and to proclaim the winner without
prejudice to the outcome of the case before the Commission. On certiorari before this Court,
the proclamation made by the board of canvassers was set aside as premature, having been
made before the lapse of the 5-day period of appeal, which the petitioner had seasonably
made. Finally, on July 23, 1984, the Second Division promulgated the decision now subject
of this petition which inter alia proclaimed Arturo F. Pacificador the elected assemblyman of
the province of Antique. The petitioner then came to this Court, asking to annul the said
decision on the basis that it should have been decided by COMELEC en banc.
The case was still being considered when on February 11, 1986, the petitioner was gunned
down in cold blood and in broad daylight. And a year later, Batasang Pambansa was
abolished with the advent of the 1987 Constitution.

Respondents moved to dismiss the petition, contending it to be moot and academic.

Issues:

1. Whether it is correct for the court to dismiss the petition due to the petitioner being dead
and the respondent missing.

2. Whether the Second Division of the Commission on Elections was authorized to

promulgate its decision of July 23, 1984, proclaiming the private respondent the winner in the
election?

Held:

1. No.

The abolition of the Batasang Pambansa and the disappearance of the office in dispute
between the petitioner and the private respondent-both of whom have gone their separate
ways-could be a convenient justification for dismissing this case. But there are larger issues
involved that must be resolved now, once and for all, not only to dispel the legal ambiguities
here raised. The more important purpose is to manifest in the clearest possible terms that this
Court will not disregard and in effect condone wrong on the simplistic and tolerant pretext
that the case has become moot and academic.

The Supreme Court is not only the highest arbiter of legal questions but also the conscience
of the government. The citizen comes to us in quest of law but we must also give him justice.
The two are not always the same. There are times when we cannot grant the latter because the
issue has been settled and decision is no longer possible according to the law. But there are
also times when although the dispute has disappeared, as in this case, it nevertheless cries out
to be resolved. Justice demands that we act then, not only for the vindication of the outraged
right, though gone, but also for the guidance of and as a restraint upon the future.
2. No.

The applicable provisions are found in Article XII-C, Sections 2 and 3, of the 1973
Constitution.

Section 2 confers on the Commission on Elections the power to:

(2) Be the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of all
member of the Batasang Pambansa and elective provincial and city officials.

Section 3 provides:

The Commission on Elections may sit en banc or in three divisions. All election cases may be
heard and decided by divisions except contests involving members of the Batasang
Pambansa, which shall be heard and decided en banc. Unless otherwise provided by law, all
election cases shall be decided within ninety days from the date of their submission for
decision.

We believe that in making the Commission on Elections the sole judge of all contests
involving the election, returns and qualifications of the members of the Batasang Pambansa
and elective provincial and city officials, the Constitution intended to give it full authority to
hear and decide these cases from beginning to end and on all matters related thereto,
including those arising before the proclamation of the winners.

As correctly observed by the petitioner, the purpose of Section 3 in requiring that cases
involving members of the Batasang Pambansa be heard and decided by the Commission en
banc was to insure the most careful consideration of such cases. Obviously, that objective
could not be achieved if the Commission could act en banc only after the proclamation had
been made, for it might then be too late already. We are all-too-familiar with the
grab-the-proclamation-and-delay-the-protest strategy of many unscrupulous candidates,
which has resulted in the frustration of the popular will and the virtual defeat of the real
winners in the election. The respondent’s theory would make this gambit possible for the pre-
proclamation proceedings, being summary in nature, could be hastily decided by only three
members in division, without the care and deliberation that would have otherwise been
observed by the Commission en banc.

WHEREFORE, let it be spread in the records of this case that were it not for the supervening
events that have legally rendered it moot and academic, this petition would have been
granted and the decision of the Commission on Elections dated July 23, 1984, set aside as
violative of the Constitution.
13. ABS-CBN v. COMELEC (2000)

FACTS:

COMELEC issued a Resolution approving the issuance of a restraining order to stop

ABS CBN or any other groups, its agents or representatives from conducting exit surveys.
The Resolution was issued by
the Comelec allegedly upon "information from a reliable source that ABS-CBN (Lopez
Group) has prepared a project, with PR groups, to conduct radio-TV coverage of the elections
and to make an exit survey of the vote during the elections for national officials particularly
for President and Vice President, results of which shall be broadcasted immediately.” The
electoral body believed that such project might conflict with the official Comelec count, as
well as the unofficial quick count of the National Movement for Free Elections (Namfrel). It
also noted that it had not authorized or deputized ABS-CBN to undertake the exit survey.

Two days before the elections on May 11, 1998, the Court issued the Temporary
Restraining Order prayed for by petitioner ABS-CBN. The Comelec was directed to cease
and desist, until further orders, from implementing the assailed Resolution or the restraining
order issued pursuant thereto, if any. In fact, the exit polls were actually conducted and
reported by media without any difficulty or problem.

ISSUE: W/N the Comelec, in the exercise of its powers, can absolutely ban exit
polls

ABS-CBN: The holding of exit polls and the nationwide reporting of their results
are valid exercises of the freedoms of speech and of the press

COMELEC:

1) The issuance thereof was "pursuant to its constitutional and statutory powers to promote a
clean, honest, orderly and credible May 11, 1998 elections"; and "to protect, preserve and
maintain the secrecy and sanctity of the ballot."

2) It contends that "the conduct of exit surveys might unduly confuse and influence the
voters," and that the surveys were designed "to condition the minds of people and cause
confusion as to who are the winners and the losers in the election," which in turn may result
in "violence and anarchy."

3) "exit surveys indirectly violate the constitutional principle to preserve the sanctity of the
ballots," as the "voters are lured to reveal the contents of ballots," in violation of Section 2,
Article V of the Constitution and relevant provisions of the Omnibus Election Code. It
submits that the constitutionally protected freedoms invoked by petitioner "are not immune to
regulation by the State in the legitimate exercise of its police power," such as in the present
case.
4) "[p]ress freedom may be curtailed if the exercise thereof creates a clear and present danger
to the community or it has a dangerous tendency." It then contends that "an exit poll has the
tendency to sow confusion considering the randomness of selecting interviewees, which
further make[s] the exit poll highly unreliable. The probability that the results of such exit
poll may not be in harmony with the official count made by the Comelec x x x is ever
present. In other words, the exit poll has a clear and present danger of destroying the
credibility and integrity of the electoral process."

SUPREME COURT: The COMELEC Resolution on exit polls ban is nullified and set
aside.

1) Clear and present danger of destroying the integrity of electoral processes

Speculative and Untenable. First, by the very nature of a survey, the interviewees or
participants are selected at random, so that the results will as much as possible be
representative or reflective of the general sentiment or view of the community or group
polled. Second, the survey result is not meant to replace or be at par with the official Comelec
count. It consists merely of the opinion of the polling group as to who the electorate in
general has probably voted for, based on the limited data gathered from polled individuals.
Finally, not at stake here are the credibility and the integrity of the elections, which are
exercises that are separate and independent from the exit polls. The holding and the reporting
of the results of exit polls cannot undermine those of the elections, since the former is only
part of the latter. If at all, the outcome of one can only be indicative of the other.

2) Overbroad
The Comelec's concern with the possible noncommunicative effect of exit polls -- disorder
and confusion in the voting centers -- does not justify a total ban on them. Undoubtedly, the
assailed Comelec Resolution is too broad, since its application is without qualification as to
whether the polling is disruptive or not.[44] Concededly, the Omnibus Election Code prohibits
disruptive behavior around the voting centers.[45] There is no showing, however, that exit
polls or the means to interview voters cause chaos in voting centers. Neither has any evidence
been presented proving that the presence of exit poll reporters near an election precinct tends
to create disorder or confuse the voters. Moreover, the prohibition incidentally prevents the
collection of exit poll data and their use for any purpose. The valuable information and ideas
that could be derived from them, based on the voters' answers to the survey questions will
forever remain unknown and unexplored. Unless the ban is restrained, candidates,
researchers, social scientists and the electorate in general would be deprived of studies on the
impact of current events and of election-day and other factors on voters' choices.

3) Violation of Ban Secrecy

The contention of public respondent that exit polls indirectly transgress the sanctity and the
secrecy of the ballot is off-tangent to the real issue. Petitioner does not seek access to the
ballots cast by the voters. The ballot system of voting is not at issue here.
The reason behind the principle of ballot secrecy is to avoid vote buying through voter
identification. Thus, voters are prohibited from exhibiting the contents of their official ballots
to other persons, from making copies thereof, or from putting distinguishing marks thereon so
as to be identified. Also proscribed is finding out the contents of the ballots cast by particular
voters or disclosing those of disabled or illiterate voters who have been assisted. Clearly,
what is forbidden is the association of voters with their respective votes, for the purpose of
assuring that the votes have been cast in accordance with the instructions of a third party.
This result cannot, however, be achieved merely through the voters' verbal and confidential
disclosure to a pollster of whom they have voted for.

In exit polls, the contents of the official ballot are not actually exposed. Furthermore, the
revelation of whom an elector has voted for is not compulsory, but voluntary. Voters may also
choose not to reveal their identities. Indeed, narrowly tailored countermeasures may be
prescribed by the Comelec, so as to minimize or suppress incidental problems in the conduct
of exit polls, without transgressing the fundamental rights of our people.##

An exit poll is a species of electoral survey conducted by qualified individuals or groups of

individuals for the purpose of determining the probable result of an election by confidentially
asking randomly selected voters whom they have voted for, immediately after they have
officially cast their ballots. The results of the survey are announced to the public, usually
through the mass media, to give an advance overview of how, in the opinion of the polling
individuals or organizations, the electorate voted. In our electoral history, exit polls had not
been resorted to until the recent May 11, 1998 elections.
14. CENTRAL BANK V. BSP, 446 SCRA 229 (2004)

FACTS:

The Central Bank (now BSP) Employees Association Inc, filed a Petition for Prohibition
against BSP and the Executive Secretary of the Office of the President, to restrain
respondents from further implementing the last provisio in Section 15 (c), Article II of RA
No 7653, on the ground that it is unconstitutional.

BACKGROUND:

July 3, 1993, RA No 7653 (The New Central Bank Act) took effect. It abolished the old
Central Bank of the Philippines and created a new BSP.

Article II, Section 15 (c) RA 7653: A compensation structure based on job evaluation studies
and wage surveys and subject to the Boards approval, shall be instituted as an integral
component of the Bank Sentrals human resource development program. Provided that the
Monetary Board shall make its own system conform as closely as possible with the principles
provided for under RA No 6758 (Salary Standardization Act). Provided, however, that
compensation and wage structure of employees whose positions fall under salary grade 19
and below shall be in accordance with the rates prescribed under RA No 6758.

7 Subsequent Laws were enacted exempting all other rank-and-file employees of

Government Financial Institutions from the SSL. These are: RA No 7907 (1995) – LBP, RA
No 8282 (1997) – SSS, RA No 8289 (1997) – SBGFC, RA No 8291 – GSIS, RA No 8523
(1998) – DBP, RA No 8763 (2000) – HGC, and RA No 9302 (2004) – PDIC.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the last paragraph of Section 15 (c), Article II of RA No 7653, runs afoul of
the constitutional mandate that “No person shall be … denied equal protection of the laws”

HELD:

The last paragraph of Section 15 (c), Article II of RA No 7653, is unconstitutional.

RULING:

With the passage of the subsequent laws amending the charter of the other government
financial institutions (GFIs), the continued operation of the last provisio of Sec 15 (c), Art II
of RA No 7653, constitutes invidious discrimination on the 2,994 rank-and-file employees of
Banko Sentral ng Pilipinas.

The prior view on the constitutionality of RA 7653 was confined to an evaluation of its
classification between the rank-and-file and the officers of the BSP, found reasonable because
there were substantial distinction that made real differences between the 2 classes.
The subsequent enactments, however, constitute significant changes in circumstance that
considerably alter the reasonability of the continued operation of the last provisio of Sec 15
(c), Art II of RA No 7653. This relates to the constitutionality of classifications between
the
rank-and-file of the BSP and the 7 other GFIs. The classification must not only be reasonable,
but must also apply equally to all members of the class. The provisio may be fair on its face
and impartial in appearance but it cannot be grossly discriminatory in its operation, so as
practically to make unjust distinctions between persons who are without differences.

The inequality of treatment cannot be justified on the mere assertion that each exemption
rests on the policy determination by the legislature. The policy determination argument may
support the inequality of treatment between the rank-and-file and the officers of the BSP, but
it cannot justify the inequality of treatment between the rank-and-file of the BSP and the 7
other GFIs who are similarly situated.

The issue is not the declared policy of the law per se, but the oppressive results of Congress
inconsistent and unequal policy towards the rank-and-file of the BSP and the 7 other GFIs.
The challenge to the constitutionality of Sec 15 (c), Art II of RA No 7653 is premised
precisely on the irrational discriminatory policy adopted by Congress in its treatment of
persons similarly situated.

In the field of equal protection, the guarantee that “no person shall be denied the equal
protection of the laws” includes the prohibition against enacting laws that allow invidious
discrimination, directly or indirectly.

The equal protection clause does not demand absolute equality but it requires that all persons
shall be treated alike, under like circumstances and conditions both as to priveleges conferred
and liabilities enforced. Favoritism and undue preference cannot be allowed. For the
principles is that equal protection and security shall be given to every person under
circumstance which, if not identical are analogous.
15. YNOT V. IAC, 148 SCRA 659 (1987)

FACTS:

The case challenges the constitutionality of Executive Order 626-A which amends EO 626 and states
that:
SECTION 1. Executive Order No. 626 is hereby amended such that henceforth, no carabao
regardless of age, sex, physical condition or purpose and no carabeef shall be transported from one
province to another. The carabao or carabeef transported in violation of this Executive Order as
amended shall be subject to confiscation and forfeiture by the government, to be distributed to
charitable institutions and other similar institutions as the Chairman of the National Meat Inspection
Commission may ay see fit, in the case of carabeef, and to deserving farmers through dispersal as
the Director of Animal Industry may see fit, in the case of carabaos.

On January 13, 1984, petitioner Restituto Ynot had transported six carabaos in a pump boat from
Masbate to Iloilo when they were confiscated by the police station commander of Barotac Nuevo,
Iloilo, for violation of the above measure. The petitioner sued for recovery, and the Regional Trial
Court of Iloilo City issued a writ of replevin upon his filing of a supersedeas bond of P12,000.00. After
considering the merits of the case, the court sustained the confiscation of the carabaos and, since
they could no longer be produced, ordered the confiscation of the bond. The court also declined to
rule on the constitutionality of the executive order, as raised by the petitioner, for lack of authority and
also for its presumed validity.

The petitioner appealed the decision to the Intermediate Appellate Court, which upheld the trial court,
and now Ynot comes before the SC through a petition for review on certiorari.

Ynot’s petition assails that the questioned EO is unconstitutional insofar as it authorizes outright
confiscation of the carabao or carabeef being transported across provincial boundaries. Petitioner
claims that the penalty is invalid because it is imposed without according the owner a right to be heard
before a competent and impartial court as guaranteed by due process. He complains that the
measure should not have been presumed, and so sustained, as constitutional.

ISSUE:
WON EO 626-A constitutional.

RULING:

NO. In the instant case, the carabaos were arbitrarily confiscated by the police station commander,
were returned to the petitioner only after he had filed a complaint for recovery and given a
supersedeas bond of P12,000.00, which was ordered confiscated upon his failure to produce the
carabaos when ordered by the trial court. The executive order defined the prohibition, convicted the
petitioner and immediately imposed punishment, which was carried out forthright. The measure struck
at once and pounced upon the petitioner without giving him a chance to be heard, thus denying him
the centuries-old guaranty of elementary fair play.
It has already been remarked that there are occasions when notice and hearing may be validly
dispensed with notwithstanding the usual requirement for these minimum guarantees of due process.
It is also conceded that summary action may be validly taken in administrative proceedings as
procedural due process is not necessarily judicial only. In the exceptional cases accepted, however
there is a justification for the omission of the right to a previous hearing, to wit, the immediacy of the
problem sought to be corrected and the urgency of the need to correct it.

In the case at bar, there was no such pressure of time or action calling for the petitioner's peremptory
treatment. The properties involved were not even inimical per se as to require their instant
destruction. There certainly was no reason why the offense prohibited by the executive order should
not have been proved first in a court of justice, with the accused being accorded all the rights
safeguarded to him under the Constitution. Considering that, as the Court held in Pesigan v. Angeles,
Executive Order No. 626-A is penal in nature, the violation thereof should have been pronounced not
by the police only but by a court of justice, which alone would have had the authority to impose the
prescribed penalty, and only after trial and conviction of the accused.

To sum up, then, the SC finds that the challenged measure is an invalid exercise of the police power
because the method employed to conserve the carabaos is not reasonably necessary to the purpose
of the law and, worse, is unduly oppressive. Due process is violated because the owner of the
property confiscated is denied the right to be heard in his defense and is immediately condemned and
punished. The conferment on the administrative authorities of the power to adjudge the guilt of the
supposed offender is a clear encroachment on judicial functions and militates against the doctrine of
separation of powers. There is, finally, also an invalid delegation of legislative powers to the officers
mentioned therein who are granted unlimited discretion in the distribution of the properties arbitrarily
taken. For these reasons, we hereby declare Executive Order No. 626-A unconstitutional.
16. BROKENSHIRE V. MINISTER, 182 SCRA 5 (1990)

Doctrine:

The visitorial and enforcement power may not be exercised by the Regional

Director where the employer contests the labor regulation officers' findings and raises

issues which cannot be resolved without considering evidentiary matters not verifiable in

the normal course of inspection. In such an event, the case will have to be referred to

the corresponding Labor Arbiter for adjudication, since it falls within the latter's exclusive

original jurisdiction

Facts: Brokenshire Memorial Hospital Employees and Worker's Union (private respondent)
filed a complaint against Brokenshire Memorial Hospital (petitioner ) with the Regional
Office of the Ministry of Labor for non-compliance with the provisions of Wage Order No. 5.
After due hearing, the Regional Director (RD) rendered a decision in favor of private
respondents and thereafter issued a Writ of Execution whereby some movable properties of
the petitioner were levied upon and its operating expenses kept with the bank were garnished.

Petitioner however failed again to comply with Wage Order No. 5 and likewise, failed to
comply with the new Wage Order No. 6, prompting private respondents to file against
petitioner another complaint. In its answer, petitioner asserted that the Regional Office of the
Ministry of Labor did not acquire jurisdiction over it for want of allegation that it has the
capacity to be sued and that Wage Orders Nos. 5 and 6 are unconstitutional and therefore
void.

Regional Director: Ruled in favor of private respondents and declared that petitioner is
estopped from questioning the acquisition of jurisdiction because its appearance in the
hearing is in itself submission to jurisdiction and that this case is merely a continuance of a
previous case where the hospital already willingly paid its obligations to the workers on
orders of the Regional Office.

Aggrieved, petitioner appealed to the Office of the Minister of Labor

Office of the Minister of Labor: Dismissed the appeal for lack of merit. A motion for
reconsideration was likewise denied by said Office, giving rise to the instant petition
reiterating the issues earlier mentioned.

Issue: Whether the Regional Director has jurisdiction over the present case?

Held: No. The Court adopted the separate opinion of Justice Narvasa in the case of Briad
Agro. Justice Narvasa stated in the said case that any question of jurisdiction over a money
claim arising from employer-employee relations should first inquire whether employment
relation still exist between the claimant and the respondent. If the relation no longer exists,
and the claimant does not seek reinstatement, the case is cognizable by the Labor Arbiter, not
by the RD. On the other hand, if employment relation still exists, or reinstatement is sought,
the next inquiry should be into the amount involved. If the amount involved does not exceed
P5,000.00, the RD undeniably has jurisdiction. But even if the amount of the claim exceeds
P5,000.00, the claim is not necessary removed from the RD’s competence. He may still
exercise the visitorial and enforcement powers vested in him by Art. 128 of the Labor Code,
as amended, that is to say, he may still direct his labor regulations officers or industrial safety
engineers to inspect the employer's premises and examine his records; and if the officers
should find that there have been violations of labor standards provisions, the RD may, after
due notice and hearing, order compliance by the employer therewith and issue a writ of
execution to the appropriate authority for the enforcement thereof.

However, this power may not be exercised by him where the employer contests the labor
regulation officers' findings and raises issues which cannot be resolved without considering
evidentiary matters not verifiable in the normal course of inspection. In such an event, the
case will have to be referred to the corresponding Labor Arbiter for adjudication, since it falls
within the latter's exclusive original jurisdiction.

Based on the such considerations, the findings of the labor regulations officers may not be
deemed uncontested as to bring the case at bar within the competence of the RD. Considering
further that the aggregate claims involve an amount in excess of P5,000.00, the Court found it
more appropriate that the issue of petitioner hospital's liability therefor, including the
proposal of petitioner that the obligation of private respondents to the former in the aggregate
amount of P507,237.57 be used to offset its obligations to them, be ventilated and resolved,
not in a summary proceeding before the Regional Director under Article 128 of the Labor
Code, as amended, but in accordance with the more formal and extensive proceeding before
the Labor Arbiter.

Nevertheless, it should be emphasized that the amount of the employer's liability is not quite
a factor in determining the jurisdiction of the Regional Director. However, the power to order
compliance with labor standards provisions may not be exercised where the employer
contends or questions the findings of the labor regulation officers and raises issues which
cannot be determined without taking into account evidentiary matters not verifiable in the
normal course of inspection, as in the case at bar.
17. ONGSUCO V. MALONES, 604 SCRA 449 (2009)
Evelyn Ongsuco v. Mariano Malones
18. SERRANO DE AGBAYANI V. PNB, 38 SCRA 429 (1971)

FACTS: Plaintiff obtained a loan from PNB dated July 19, 1939, maturing on July 19, 1944,
secured by real estate mortgage. On July 13 1959 or 15 years after maturity of the loan,
defendant instituted extra-judicial foreclosure proceedings for the recovery of the balance of
the loan remaining unpaid. Plaintiff countered with his suit against both alleging that the
mortgage sought to be foreclosed had long prescribed, fifteen years having elapsed from the
date of maturity. PNB on the other hand claims that the defense of prescription would not be
available if the period from March 10, 1945, when Executive Order No. 32 1 was issued, to
July 26, 1948, when the subsequent legislative act 2 extending the period of moratorium was
declared invalid, were to be deducted from the computation of the time during which the
bank took no legal steps for the recovery of the loan. The lower court did not find such
contention persuasive and decided the suit in favor of plaintiff.

ISSUE: W/N the period of the effectivity of EO 32 and the Act extending the
Moratorium Law before the same were declared invalid tolled the period of prescription
(Effect of the declaration of Unconstitutionality of a law)

HELD: YES. In the language of an American Supreme Court decision: «The actual existence
of a statute, prior to such a determination [of unconstitutionality], is an operative fact and
may have consequences which cannot justly be ignored. The past cannot always be erased by
a new judicial declaration. The effect of the subsequent ruling as to invalidity may have to be
considered in various aspects, with respect to particular relations, individual and corporate,
and particular conduct, private and official.» 4

The now prevailing principle is that the existence of a statute or executive order prior to its
being adjudged void is an operative fact to which legal consequences are attached. Precisely
because of the judicial recognition that moratorium was a valid governmental response to the
plight of the debtors who were war sufferers, this Court has made clear its view in a series of
cases impressive in their number and unanimity that during the eight-year period that
Executive Order No. 32 and Republic Act No. 342 were in force, prescription did not run.

The error of the lower court in sustaining plaintiff’s suit is thus manifest. From July 19, 1944,
when her loan matured, to July 13, 1959, when extra-judicial foreclosure proceedings were
started by appellant Bank, the time consumed is six days short of fifteen years. The
prescriptive period was tolled however, from March 10, 1945, the effectivity of Executive
Order No. 32, to May 18, 1953, when the decision of Rutter v. Esteban was promulgated,
covering eight years, two months and eight days. Obviously then, when resort was had
extra-judicially to the foreclosure of the mortgage obligation, there was time to spare before
prescription could be availed of as a defense.
19. FLORES V. DRILON, 223 SCRA 568 (1993)

FACTS:

The constitutionality of Sec. 13, par. (d), of R.A. 7227, otherwise known as the "Bases
Conversion and Development Act of 1992," under which respondent Mayor Richard J.
Gordon of Olongapo City was appointed Chairman and Chief Executive Officer of the Subic
Bay Metropolitan Authority (SBMA), is challenged with prayer for prohibition, preliminary
injunction and temporary restraining order. Said provision provides the President the power
to appoint an administrator of the SBMA provided that in the first year of its operation, the
Olongapo mayor shall be appointed as chairman and chief of executive of the Subic
Authority. Petitioners maintain that such infringes to the constitutional provision of Sec. 7,
first par., Art. IX-B, of the Constitution, which states that "no elective official shall be eligible
for appointment or designation in any capacity to any public officer or position during his
tenure," The petitioners also contend that Congress encroaches upon the discretionary power
of the President to appoint.

ISSUE:

Whether or not said provision of the RA 7227 violates the constitutional prescription against
appointment or designation of elective officials to other government posts.

RULING:

The court held the Constitution seeks to prevent a public officer to hold multiple functions
since they are accorded with a public office that is a full time job to let them function without
the distraction of other governmental duties.

The Congress gives the President the appointing authority which it cannot limit by providing
the condition that in the first year of the operation the Mayor of Olongapo City shall assume
the Chairmanship. The court points out that the appointing authority the congress gives to the
President is no power at all as it curtails the right of the President to exercise discretion of
whom to appoint by limiting his choice.
20. ALDOVINO V. ALUNAN III, 230 SCRA 825 (1994)

VIOLETA ALDOVINO and co. v. SECRETARY RAFAEL ALUNAN III, DEPARTMENT

OF TOURISM and co.

Facts:
Herein petitioners and intervenors seek reinstatement and payment of back wages, citing
Mandani v Gonzales and Abrogarv Garrucho Jr. and Garrucho.Mandani v Gonzales:EO #120,
Sec. 29 took effect upon approval that reorganizes the Ministry of Tourism, providing that the
incumbentswhose positions are not included in the new system of position structure and
staffing pattern are separated from service.Then Ministry of Tourism, afterwhich issued office
orders and memoranda vacating many positions and effecting theseparation of employees
including petitioners Mandani, Abrogar and Arnaldo which made them file their cases
andinstant petition.In Mandani, the office orders and memoranda issued by MoT were
declared null and void pursuant to EO#120 and toimmediately restore the petitioners to their
positions with salaries computed under the new position and staffing systemfrom the dates of
their invalid terminations at rates not lower than their former salaries.

Issue: Whether or not the petitioners and intervenors must be reinstated and paid of their back
wages.

Ruling: It was the public respondents who created the problem of petitioners and intervenors
by illegally abolishing their positionsand terminating their services in outrageous disregard of
the basic protection accorded civil servants, hence our repeatedpronouncement that it was
unconstitutional.

The Supreme Court ruled that herein petitioners are reinstated immediately to their former
positions without los,s ofseniority rights and with back salaries computed under new staffing
pattern from the dates of their invalid dismissal at ratesnot lower than their former salaries
but not to exceed a period of 5 years with several provisions. Having found out that
theExecutive Order is unconstitutional, thus dismissal of the employees is also
unconstitutional.

The courts declared its totalnullity. An unconstitutional act is not a law, it confers no
rights, imposes no duties and affords no protection. In legal contemplation, it is inoperative
as if it had not been passed. It is therefore stricken from the statute books and
considerednever to have existed at all. All persons are legal contemplationration of
unconstitutionality which means that no one may thereafter invoke it nor may the courts be
permitted to apply it in subsequent cases.

It is as if the intervenors were never served their termination orders and, consequently, were
never separated from the service. Whenever the courts declaredan administrative official to
have acted in an unlawful manner, that official must undo the harmful effects of his illegal act
andto accord to the aggrieved parties restoration or restitution in good faith to make up for an
the deprivations which may havesuffered because of his act.

21. HACIENDA LUISITA V. PARC, 660 SCRA 525 (2011)

22. COCOFED V. REPUBLIC, 663 SCRA 514 (2012)

23. CIR V. PUREGOLD, 760 SCRA 96 (2015)

24. OPOSA V. FACTORAN, 224 SCRA 792 (1993)

25. COMELEC V. CRUZ, 605 SCRA 167 (2009)

26.VINUYA V. ROMULO, 619 SCRA 533 (2010) AND 732 SCRA 595 (2014)