NAME NINOTCHKA D.

ABABA
JD1-C
Constitutional Law 1
CASE Prof. Magallona, Hontiveros, Prof. Roque and 38 UP College of Law
TITLE Students

-vs-

Ermita Exec.Sec., Romulo Sec DFA, Andaya Sec DBM, Ventura

Administrator NationalMapping & Resource Information Authority and
Davide Jr
DATE August 16, 2011; G.R No. 187167
FACTS The boundaries of the Philippine archipelago's baselines are one of the
provisions of RA 3046, which was passed in 1961. In line with UNCLOS I,
this is.

RA 5446 amended RA 3046 in terms of typographical errors and included

Section 2 in which the government reserved the drawing of baselines in
Sabah in North Borneo.

RA 9522, which amended RA 5446, went into force in March 2009. The
revisions, which are in accordance with UNCLOS III, to which the
Philippines is a signatory, shorten one baseline while maximizing the other
and designate Scarborough Shoal and the Kalayaan Group of Islands as
Regimes of Island.

As taxpayers, citizens, and legislators, the petitioners criticized RA 9522's

constitutionality on the grounds that it violates the Constitution by reducing
Philippine territory and by allowing foreign ships and planes to fly over the
nation, endangering the nation's economy, sovereignty, and security as well
as the Constitution. They continued by saying that the fishermen's quality of
life will suffer as a result of the designation of Regime of Islands.
ISSUE/S 1. WON the petitioners have locus standi to bring the suit.
2. WON RA 9522 is unconstitutional
RULING 1. 1. The Supreme Court concluded that the lawsuit is a citizen lawsuit
rather than a taxpayer or lawmaker lawsuit because it is the citizens
who will suffer a direct loss and gain from the relief provided by the
remedy sought.
2. The petition was dismissed because RA 9522 is constitutional. RA
9522 is not unconstitutional because it is only a statutory instrument
to define the nation's maritime zones and continental shelf in
accordance with UNCLOS III, not to define Philippine territory.

Second, the classification of KGI and Scarborough Shoal as Regime of

Islands is consistent with the Philippines’ sovereignty. Had RA 9522
enclosed the islands as part of the archipelago, the country will be violating
UNCLOS III since it categorically stated that the length of the baseline shall
 not exceed 125 nautical miles. So, the classification is in accordance with the
Philippines sovereignty and State’s responsible observance of its pacta sunt
servanda obligation under UNCLOS III.

Third, the new base line introduced by RA 9522 is without prejudice with
delineation of the baselines of the territorial sea around the territory of Sabah,
situated in North Borneo, over which the Republic of the Philippines has
acquired dominion and sovereignty.

And lastly, the UNCLOS III and RA 9522 are not incompatible with the
Constitution’s delineation of internal waters. The Court emphasized that the
Philippines exercises sovereignty over the body of water lying landward of
the baselines, including the air space over it and the submarine areas
underneath, regardless of whether internal or archipelagic waters. However,
sovereignty will not bar the Philippines to comply with its obligation in
maintaining freedom of navigation and the generally accepted principles of
international law. It can be either passed by legislator as a municipal law or in
the absence thereof, it is deemed incorporated in the Philippines law since the
right of innocent passage is a customary international law, thus automatically
incorporated thereto.

The enactment of UNCLOS III compliant baselines law for the Philippine
archipelago and adjacent areas, as embodied in RA 9522, allows an
internationally recognized delimitation of the breadth of the Philippines’
maritime zones and continental shelf. RA 9522 is therefore a most vital step
on the part of the Philippines in safeguarding its maritime zones, consistent
with the Constitution and our national interest.

NAME NINOTCHKA D. ABABA

JD1-C
Constitutional Law 1
CASE TITLE Arigo vs. Swift
DATE September 16, 2014; G.R. No. 206510
DOCTRINE The State may not be sued without its consent.
FACTS The USS Guardian grounded near the South Shoal of the Tubbataha Reef in
Palawan in January 2013. The salvage operation for the ship then continued
around the reef under the direction of the US Navy. The Petitioners submitted
a petition to the Supreme Court in April 2013 asking for the granting of a
Writ of Kalikasan. Respondent Scott Swift, the 7th US Fleet Commander,
and a few others were named in the Petition.

Petitioners claim that the grounding, salvaging, and post-salvaging operations

of the USS Guardian cause and continue to cause environmental damage in
different provinces surrounded by the Sulu Sea, which events violate their
constitutional rights to a balanced and healthful ecology. They also sought a
directive for the institution of civil, criminal and administrative suits for acts
 committed in violation of environmental laws in connection with the
grounding incident. Ultimately, they wanted particular provisions of the
Visiting Forces Agreement (VFA) be declared unconstitutional.

On the other hand, the Respondents asserted that the issuance of a Writ of
Kalikasan has become fait accompli because the salvaging operations on the
USS Guardian has been completed. Further, the petition improperly raises
issues involving the VFA.
ISSUE/S Whether or not the Court has jurisdiction over the US respondents who did
not submit any pleading or manifestation in the case.

Whether or not the waiver of immunity from suit under VFA applies in this
case.
RULING 1.) No. All states are sovereign equals and cannot assert jurisdiction over
one another. The rule is that if the judgment against such officials will
require the state itself to perform an affirmative act to satisfy the
same, such as the appropriation of the amount needed to pay the
damages awarded against them, the suit must be regarded as against
the state itself although it has not been formally impleaded.
2.) unity under the VFA pertains only to criminal jurisdiction and not to
special civil actions such as the present petition for issuance of a writ
of Kalikasan. A ruling on the application or non-application of
criminal jurisdiction provisions of the VFA to US personnel who may
be found responsible for the grounding of the USS Guardian, would
be premature and beyond the province of a petition for a writ of
Kalikasan.

Petition for the issuance of the privilege of the Writ of Kalikasan is hereby
DENIED.

NAME NINOTCHKA D. ABABA

JD1-C
Constitutional Law 1
CASE TITLE Republic v. Villasor
DATE November 28, 1973; G.R. No. L-30671
FACTS The Republic of the Philippines brought the action in an effort to overturn the
Cebu Court of First Instance's decision to seize public monies designated for
the Philippine Armed Forces. A ruling in Special Proceedings No. 2156-R in
favor of respondents was made on July 3, 1961. The arbitration award in the
sum of P1,712,396.40, the subject of Special Proceedings, was confirmed
against J. Kiener Co., Ltd., Gavino Unchuan, and International Construction
Corporation, as well as the petitioner here. On June 24, 1969, the respondent,
the Honorable Guillermo P. Villasor, issued an order making the judgement
final and executory and ordered the sheriffs of Manila, Quezon City, and
Rizal Province to carry it out. On June 26, 1969, the corresponding Alias
Writ of Execution was released. The Provincial Sheriff of Rizal served
 Notices of Garnishment with numerous Banks dated June 28, 1969, based on
the Alias Writ of Execution. The money of the Armed Forces of the
Philippines deposited with Philippine Veterans Bank and PNB are public
funds that have been properly appropriated and distributed for the upkeep and
operation of the AFP as well as the payment of retiree pensions, pay, and
allowances. On July 7, 1969, the petitioner filed a prohibition action against
the respondent Judge Villasor for acting outside of his legal authority and
gravely abusing his discretion, which amounted to a lack of jurisdiction when
he issued a Writ of Execution on the AFP's property.
ISSUE/S Whether or not the state can be sued without its consent.
RULING No. The State, by virtue of its sovereignty, may not be sued in its own courts
except by express authorization by the Legislature, and to subject its officers
to garnishment would be to permit indirectly what is prohibited directly.
Another reason is that moneys sought to be garnished, as long as they remain
in the hands of the disbursing officer of the Government, belong to the latter,
although the defendant in garnishment may be entitled to a specific portion
thereof.

NAME NINOTCHKA D. ABABA

JD1-C
Constitutional Law 1
CASE TITLE Sanders vs Veridiano II
DATE June 10, 1988; G.R. No. L-46930
DOCTRINE The State may not be sued without its consent.
FACTS Petitioner Sanders was the special services director of the U.S. Naval Station.
Petitioner Moreau was the commanding officer of the Subic Naval Base.
Private respondent Rossi is an American citizen with permanent residence in
the Philippines. Private respondent Rossi and Wyer were both employed as
game room attendants in the special services department of the NAVSTA.

On October 3, 1975, the private respondents were advised that their

employment had been converted from permanent full-time to permanent part-
time. They instituted grievance proceedings to the rules and regulations of
the U.S. Department of Defense. The hearing officer recommended for
reinstatement of their permanent full-time status. However, in a letter
addressed to petitioner Moreau, Sanders disagreed with the hearing officer’s
report. The letter contained the statements that: a) "Mr. Rossi tends to
alienate most co-workers and supervisors;" b) "Messrs. Rossi and Wyers
have proven, according to their immediate supervisors, to be difficult
employees to supervise;" and c) "even though the grievant were under oath
not to discuss the case with anyone, (they) placed the records in public places
where others not involved in the case could hear.

Before the start of the grievance hearings, a-letter from petitioner Moreau
was sent to the Chief of Naval Personnel explaining the change of the private
respondent’s employment status. So, private respondent filed for damages
 alleging that the letters contained libelous imputations and that the
prejudgment of the grievance proceedings was an invasion of their personal
and proprietary rights. However, petitioners argued that the acts complained
of were performed by them in the discharge of their official duties and that,
consequently, the court had no jurisdiction over them under the doctrine
of state immunity.

However, the motion was denied on the main ground that the petitioners had
not presented any evidence that their acts were official in nature. This
petition for certiorari, prohibition and preliminary injunction was thereafter
filed before this Court, on the contention that the above-narrated acts of the
respondent court are tainted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack
of jurisdiction.
ISSUE/S 1. Whether or not the petitioners were performing their official duties
when they did the acts for which the respondents have sued them for
damages.

2. Whether or not the case qualifies as a suit against the State.

RULING 1. Yes. The acts for which the petitioners are being called to account
were performed by them in the discharge of their official duties.
Sanders, as director of the special services department of NAVSTA,
had supervision over its personnel, including the private respondents,
and had a hand in their employment, work assignments, discipline,
dismissal and other related matters. It is not disputed that the letter he
had written was in fact a reply to a request from his superior, the other
petitioner, for more information regarding the case of the private
respondents. Moreover, even in the absence of such request, he still
was within his rights in reacting to the hearing officer’s criticism —
in effect a direct attack against him — that Special Services was
practicing “an autocratic form of supervision.”
2. No. The government of the United States has not given its consent to
be sued for the official acts of the petitioners, who cannot satisfy any
judgment that may be rendered against them. As it is the American
government itself that will have to perform the affirmative act of
appropriating the amount that may be adjudged for the private
respondents, the complaint must be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction.

The practical justification for the doctrine, as Holmes put it, is that “there can
be no legal right against the authority which makes the law on which the
right depends.” In the case of foreign states, the rule is derived from the
principle of the sovereign equality of states which wisely admonishes that par
in parem non habet imperium and that a contrary attitude would “unduly vex
the peace of nations.” Our adherence to this precept is formally expressed in
Article II, Section 2, of our Constitution, where we reiterate from our
previous charters that the Philippines “adopts the generally accepted
principles of international law as part of the law of the land.”
NAME NINOTCHKA D. ABABA
JD1-C
Constitutional Law 1
CASE MARIA CAROLINA P. ARAULLO, Petitioner,
TITLE vs.
BENIGNO SIMEON C. AQUINO III, Respondent
DATE July 1, 2014; G.R. No. 209287
FACTS On September 25, 2013, Sen. Jinggoy Ejercito Estrada delivered a privileged
speech. He stated that some Senators, including himself, were given an
incentive of ₱50 million to vote for the impeachment of Chief Justice Renato
C. Corona. In response to this, Secretary Florencio Abad gave a public
statement that the incentives were part of the Disbursement Acceleration
Program fundings and clarified that the fund releases were dependent on the
Senators’ letter of requests for fundings.

Due to the revelation of Sen. Jinggoy Ejercito Estrada, Maria Carolina

Aurollo, Chairperson of Bagong Alyansang Makabayan, and other concerned
citizens filed a petition on the validity of the Disbursement Acceleration
Program.

Secretary Abad argued that the DAP is supported by laws like GAA (Savings
and Augments), Sec. 25(5) of the Constitution (Power of the President to
Augment), Sections 38 and 49 of the Executive Order 292 (Power of the
President to suspend expenditures and authority to use savings respectively.)
ISSUE/S 1. Whether or not the DAP violates the principle: "No money shall be
paid out of the Treasury except in pursuance of an appropriation made
by law.” under Sec. 29, Art. VI of the 1987 Constitution.
2. Whether or not the DAP, NBC No. 541, and all other executive
issuances allegedly implementing the DAP violates Sec. 25(5), Art.
VI of the 1987 Constitution.
3. Whether or not the release of unprogrammed funds under the DAP
was in accord with the GAAs.
RULING 1. No, DAP did not violate Sec. 29, Art. VI of the 1987 Constitution.
The respondent’s position is correct that no law was necessary for the
adoption and implementation of the DAP because it is neither a fund nor an
appropriation, but a program or an administrative system of prioritizing
spending; and that the adoption of the DAP was by virtue of the authority of
the President as Chief Executive. The DAP was a government policy
designed to stimulate the economy through accelerated spending. The
adoption and implementation of DAP under the Executive during the Budget
Execution Stage proves that Congress need not to legislate to adopt or to
implement the DAP. Strictly, appropriation is the legislative authorization
prescribed by the Constitution that money may be paid out of the Treasury.
The pooling of savings, and the identification of the PAPs to be funded under
the DAP did not involve appropriation because the money had been already
set apart from the public treasury by Congress through the GAAs. Thus, the
Executive did not usurp the power vested in Congress under Section 29(1),
Article VI of the Constitution.

2. Yes, DAP violated Sec. 25(5), Art. VI of the 1987 Constitution.

Sec. 25(5) can be construed through the following requisites: The first
requisite – GAA of 2011 and 2012 – lacked valid provisions to authorize
transfers of funds under the DAP; hence, transfers under the DAP were
unconstitutional. The Use of Savings provisions under GAAs 2011 and 2012
were textually unfaithful to the Constitution for not carrying the phrase "for
their respective offices" contained in Section 25(5), supra. The second
requisite - There were no savings from which funds could be sourced for the
DAP. The Court favored the petitioners’ claim that the funds used in the DAP
not actual savings within the context of Section 25(5), supra, and the relevant
provisions of the GAAs. Hence, the President could not circumvent this
provision by declaring unreleased appropriations and unobligated allotments
as savings prior to the end of the fiscal year. The third requisite – No funds
from savings could be transferred under the DAP to augment deficient items
not provided in the GAA. Moreover, cross-border augmentations from
savings were prohibited by Section 25(5), supra. Funds that are appropriated
for one office are prohibited from crossing over to another office even in the
guise of augmentation of a deficient item. Thus, the plain text of Section
25(5), supra, disallowing cross border transfers was disobeyed.

3. No, the release of unprogrammed funds under DAP was not according
to the GAA provisions.
Sourcing the DAP from unprogrammed funds despite not having the revenue
collections exceed revenue targets was invalid. Even though the respondents
emphasized that the unprogrammed funds were not brought under the DAP as
savings but as separate sources of funds, the Court cannot subscribe with the
respondents’ view.
The collection of additional revenues from new sources did not warrant the
release of the unprogrammed funds; hence, even if the revenues not
considered in the BESFs were collected, the basic condition that the revenue
collections should exceed the revenue targets must still be complied with in
order to justify the release of the unprogrammed funds. Releasing
unprogrammed funds simply because there was an excess revenue would be
an unsound fiscal management measure because it would disregard the
budget plan and foster budget deficits, in contravention of the Government’s
surplus budget policy.

Hence, the petitions are PARTLY GRANTED.