G.R. No.

166471: March 22, 2011 | TAWANG MULTI-PURPOSE

COOPERATIVE Petitioner,v. LA TRINIDAD WATER DISTRICT,
Respondent. CARPIO, J.:

FACTS: Tawang Multi-Purpose Cooperative (TMPC) is a cooperative,

organized to provide domestic water services in Barangay Tawang, La
Trinidad, Benguet. La Trinidad Water District (LTWD) is a local water utility
created under Section 47 of Presidential Decree (PD) No. 198, as amended. It
is authorized to supply water for domestic, industrial and commercial
purposes within the municipality of La Trinidad, Benguet.
TMPC filed with the National Water Resources Board (NWRB) an application
for a certificate of public convenience (CPC) to operate and maintain a
waterworks system in Barangay Tawang. LTWD opposed TMPCs application,
arguing that its franchise is exclusive as provided under PD 198. A CPC is
however granted. LTWD filed a motion for reconsideration but the same was
denied by NWRB. LTWD then appealed to the RTC where it court set aside
the NWRB decision. Hence, this petition.

ISSUE: Whether or not the petition may be granted

HELD: Yes. RTC Decision Set Aside.  No franchise, certificate, or any other
form of authorization for the operation of a public utility shall be granted
except to citizens of the Philippines or to corporations or associations
organized under the laws of the Philippines, at least sixty per centum of
whose capital is owned by such citizens, nor shall such franchise, certificate
or authorization be exclusive in character or for a longer period than fifty
years.
Plain words do not require explanation. The 1935, 1973 and 1987
Constitutions are clear franchises for the operation of a public utility cannot be
exclusive in character. The 1935, 1973 and 1987 Constitutions expressly and
clearly state that,"nor shall such franchise x x x be exclusive in
character."There is no exception.
When the law is clear, there is nothing for the courts to do but to apply it. The
duty of the Court is to apply the law the way it is worded. What cannot be
legally done directly cannot be done indirectly. This rule is basic and, to a
reasonable mind, does not need explanation. Indeed, if acts that cannot be
legally done directly can be done indirectly, then all laws would be illusory.
Indeed, the President, Congress and the Court cannot create directly
franchises that are exclusive in character. What the President, Congress and
the Court cannot legally do directly they cannot do indirectly. Thus, the
President, Congress and the Court cannot create indirectly.
In PD No. 198, as amended, former President Ferdinand E. Marcos
(President Marcos) created indirectly franchises that are exclusive in
character by allowing the BOD of LTWD and the LWUA to create directly
franchises that are exclusive in character.
In case of conflict between the Constitution and a statute, the Constitution
always prevails because the Constitution is the basic law to which all other
laws must conform to. The duty of the Court is to uphold the Constitution and
to declare void all laws that do not conform to it. Petition Granted. Section
47 of PD 198 is UNCONSTITUTIONAL.
G.R. No. 170735 (December 17, 2007)
Immaculada L. Garcia v. Social Security Commission Legaland Collection &
SSS

FACTS:
Petitioner Immaculada L. Garcia, Eduardo de Leon, Ricardo de Leon, Pacita
Fernandez, and Consuelo Villanueva were directors of Impact Corporation.
The corporation was engaged in the business of manufacturing aluminum
tube containers and operated two factories. One was a "slug" foundry- factory
located in Cuyapo, Nueva Ecija, while the other was an Extrusion Plant in
Cainta, Metro Manila, which processed the "slugs" into aluminum collapsible
tubes and similar containers for toothpaste and other related products.
Records show that around 1978, Impact Corporation started encountering
financial problems. By 1980, arises a problem with the employees of the
corporation due unremitted SSS contributions issues.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the only surviving director of the corporation is liable for all the
workers whole collected and unremitted SSS contributions, with penalties.

HELD: The petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit.

The surviving director of the Impact Corporation is solely liable for the
unremitted SSS premium contributions and penalties therefor. The petitioner
avers that under the social security law provision, the liability does not include
liability for the unremitted SSS premium contributions. But accordingly, the
sections must be understood or interpreted as a whole and not by parts. The
liability imposed as contemplated under the provisions of the social security
law does not preclude the liability for the unremitted amount
Social Security Commission and Social Security System v. Teresa Favila
G.R. No. 170195, March 28, 2011
J. Del Castillo
DOCTRINE:
A spouse who claims entitlement to death benefits as a primary beneficiary
under the Social Security Law must establish two qualifying factors, to wit: (a)
that s/he is the legitimate spouse; and (b) that s/he is dependent upon the
member for support.
FACTS:
Respondent, Teresa G. Favila filed a Petition before the Social Security
Commission (S.S.C.) in which Favila averred therein that she was married to
Florante Favila (Florante) on January 17, 1970, and the latter designated her
and their three children as beneficiaries before petitioner Social Security
System (SSS). Moreover, Teresa also averred that when Florante died, his
pension benefits under the SSS were given to their only minor child at the
time, Florante II, but only until his emancipation at the age of 21.
As the surviving legal wife, Teresa Avila believed that she was entitled to
receive Florante’s pension from the SSS. She subsequently filed her claim for
said benefits before the SSS. The SSS denied this claim which was later
affirmed by the Social Security Commission (SSC) pursuant to the provisions
cited in Sections 8 (k) and 13 of R.A. No. 1161 as amended otherwise known
as Social Security (SS) Law. The SSC held that the surviving spouse’s
entitlement to an SSS member’s death benefits is dependent on two factors
which must concur at the time of the latter’s death, to wit: (1) legality of the
marital relationship; and (2) dependency for support. Despite Teresa being
the legal spouse and one of Florante's named beneficiaries, the SSC decided
that she was ineligible to receive death benefits because she was determined
not to be dependent on Florante for support at the time of his death in light of
their marital infidelity. Teresa seeked recourse in the Court of Appeals and the
C.A. reversed the decision of the SSC claiming that Teresa was eligible to
receive the pension benefits from her late husband on the grounds that she is
Florante's legally recognized surviving spouse regardless of the integrity of
their marriage. The C.A. also found that the SSS unilaterally added to the
requirements of the law the condition that a surviving spouse must be actually
dependent for support upon the member spouse during the latter’s lifetime by
virtue of their interpretation of the said SS Law.
Teresa, along with the C.A. mainly contended that courts (or quasi-
judicial agencies for that matter), may not, in the guise of interpretation,
enlarge the scope of a statute and include therein situations not provided nor
intended by lawmakers.
ISSUE:
Is Teresa Favila entitled to the death benefits accruing from the death
of Florante, in contemplation of the Social Security Law?
RULING:
No, Teresa Favila is not entitled to the death benefits accruing from the
death of Florante, in contemplation of the Social Security Law.
Under the principles of statutory construction, if a statute is clear, plain and
free from ambiguity, it must be given its literal meaning and applied without
attempted interpretation. This plain meaning rule or verba legis, derived from
the maxim index animo sermo est (speech is the index of intention), rests on
the valid presumption that the words employed by the legislature in a statute
correctly expresses its intent by the use of such words as are found in the
statute. Verba legis non est recedendum, or, from the words of a statute there
should be no departure.
In this case, Paragraphs (e) and (k) of Section 8 of RA 1161 provides
the statutory construction of the definitions of “Dependent” and “Beneficiaries”
very clearly. There is no question that Teresa was Florante’s legal wife.
However, with her bare claim that she was dependent upon her
husband for support along with her misplaced reliance on the presumption of
dependency by reason of her valid and then subsisting marriage with
Florante, Teresa had not presented sufficient evidence to discharge her
burden of proving that she was indeed dependent upon her husband for
support at the time of his death.
Additionally, the fact of dependency is a mandatory requirement of the
law and as further prevailing jurisprudence would state, a wife who is already
separated de facto from her husband cannot be said to be ‘dependent for
support’ upon the husband without evidence to the contrary.
Therefore, Teresa’s failure to show that she was dependent upon
Florante for support at the time of his death disqualifies her as a primary
beneficiary of Florante’s pension by virtue of not satisfying the necessary
requirements provided in paragraphs (e) and (k) of Section 8 of RA 1161.
Thus, Teresa Favila is not entitled to the death benefits accruing from
the death of Florante.
Caltex v. Palomar G.R. No. L-19650 (1966)
Topic. Definition of Statutory Construction

Case. Petition for declaratory relief against Postmaster Palomar

Facts. Caltex initiated a promotional scheme entitled “Caltex Hooded Pump

Contest” where contenders would guess the amount of liters contained in a
covered pump. To join, participants need not purchase any Caltex products
but only to request entry forms from their local Caltex stations. Choosing
winners would be of three-levels: Dealer, Regional, and National Contest. At
the first level, whoever has the closest determinations of the hooded pump
contents wins along with other two runner-ups with corresponding prizes. First
prize for Dealer Contest elevates to Regional and the same mechanics of first,
second, third prizes come into play. First prize from the Regional goes to
National Contest.

Foreseeing the imminent bulk use of mail for the scheme, Caltex asked postal
authorities to be cleared of some pertinent provisions in the Postal Law. The
Postal Law enumerates non-mailable matters, authorizes issuance of fraud
order, and identifies effect of violating said law. Some items under non-
mailable matters are advertising on lottery, gift enterprise, or other similar
schemes. In response to Caltex’s request, Postmaster Palomar denied
Caltex’s plea saying that its scheme falls under advertising for lottery, which
constitute non-mailable matter. Caltex asked for reconsideration; Postmaster
reiterated his stance and added that if scheme pushes through, fraud order
would be served. Caltex sought judicial intervention. And trial court ruled in
their favor. Postmaster now appealed.

Issue. Does “Caltex Hooded Pump Contest” violate Postal Law? -No

Ratio. What is prohibited by the Postal Law is lottery, inter alia. Lottery
necessarily includes consideration, prize, and chance. Caltex’s contest does
include the elements of prize and chance but not consideration as no
purchase is required of participants. Is it a gift enterprise? Still no because no
purchase. Lottery is prohibited if there is consideration; thereby gift enterprise
is also prohibited if there is consideration, following noscitur a sociis. But as
demonstrated, neither is Caltex’s game a lottery nor a gift enterprise. Hence it
should be allowed to proceed.

Doctrine: Construction is defined as the “art or process of discovering and

expounding the meaning and intention of the authors of the law with respect
to its application to a given case, where that intention is rendered doubtful,
among others, by reason of the fact that the given case is not explicitly
provided for in the law”. It applies in this case in how the ponentia examined
the meaning of “lottery” to come to a conclusion. Specifically, it applied when
the court looked into what lottery meant: consideration, prize, and chance.
This allowed for a decisive interpretation of the word in question.

Case Digest Collaboration by: Group 1-Topic: Statutory Construction

Mina C. Nacilla and the late Roberto C. Jacobe represented herein by his
heir and
widow Normita Jacobe, (Petitioners) Vs. Movie and Television Review
and
Classification Board, (Respondent)
[G.R. No. 223449, November 10, 2020]
J. Caguioa
DOCTRINE:
The elementary rule in statutory construction is that when the words
and phrases
of the statute are clear and unequivocal, their meaning must be
determined from the
language employed and the statute must be taken to mean exactly what
it says. If a
statute is clear, plain and free from ambiguity, it must be given its literal
meaning and
applied without attempt.
MTRCB under Sec 16 of its charter “is given the power to suspend and
dismiss
for cause any employee and/or approve or disapprove the appointment,
transfer or
detail of employees."
The Office of the President is technically not a department under the
purview of
Resolution No. 07-0244, as "department", under said Resolution, refers
to "any of the
executive departments or entities having the category of a department,
including the
judiciary and the other constitutional commission and offices."
FACTS:
Mina C. Nacilla (Nacilla) and Roberto C. Jacobe (Jacobe) were former
employees of the MTRCB. Nacilla held the position of Administrative
Officer V with
Salary Grade (SG) 18 while Jacobe was formerly employed as Secretary
I or
Administrative Assistant I with SG 7. On October 29, 2004, MTRCB and
the MTRCB
Employees Association executed a Collective Negotiation Agreement
(2004 CNA)
covering the period from October 29, 2004, until October 29, 2007. In an
attempt to
register the 2004 CNA, Jacobe brought copies to the CSC Personnel
Relations Office
(CSC-PRO) where it was discovered that the MTRCBEA did not properly
ratify it and
that it was already passed 30 days from the execution when Jacobe
brought said CNA
for registration. Hence, the 2004 CNA could not be registered.
Following the advice from the CSC-PRO, Jacobe printed four copies of
the 2004
CNA and asked the then MTRCB Chairperson Ma. Consoliza P.
Laguardia (Laguardia)
Case Digest Collaboration by: Group 1-Topic: Statutory Construction
signed the reprinted copies on December 1, 2005. Jacobe explained to
Laguardia that
she needed to re-sign the 2004 CNA so it could be registered with the
CSC. Jacobe
then wrote "December 1, 2005" on the documents, the date Laguardia
actually
re-signed the re-printed 2004 CNA (2005 CNA). Except for the date
indicating it was
re-signed, all other provisions of the 2005 CNA were the same as the
2004 CNA. After
taking all necessary steps, the CSC issued a Certificate of Registration
of the 2005 CNA
and provided therein that it would be effective from December 1, 2005, to
December 1,
2008.
On October 1, 2007, since the 2004 CNA was about to expire, a CNA
Committee
was formed to convene with the officials and representatives of the
MTRCBEA in order
to frame a new CNA. During the meeting, Nacilla, as President of the
MTRCBEA,
informed the CNA Committee that it was not yet necessary to negotiate
a new CNA
since the 2005 CNA registered with the CSC was effective until
December 1, 2008.
Laguardia called for an investigation of the matter. As the MTRCB
Chairperson, the
investigating committee she created released its Report and
Recommendation dated
December 4, 2007, where petitioners were found to be responsible for
the falsification of
the 2005 CNA or at least making it appear as a new CNA covering a
different period in
order to secure benefits from the MTRCB. Laguardia then formally
charged petitioners
for violating civil service rules on dishonesty, grave misconduct, and
falsification of
official documents under Section 52(A) 1, 3, and 6 of the Uniform Rules
on
Administrative Cases in the Civil Service through a Formal Charge dated
December 4,
2007, which was amended on December 14, 2007.
Flow of Rulings: The Adjudication Committee created within the MTRCB,
rendered a Decision dated April 8, 2008, finding petitioners guilty of
dishonesty and
falsification of public documents and imposed the penalty of dismissal
from service.
Appeal on June 18, 2008, to the Office of the President (OP), which
issued an
Order dated July 15, 2008, stating that without necessarily giving due
course to the
appeal, petitioners were directed to pay the appeal fee and submit
pertinent documents.
It also dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction over administrative
cases of
government officials and employees who are not presidential
appointees.
The petitioners appealed to the CSC on November 25, 2013. The CSC,
without
delving into the merits, dismissed the appeal for being filed out of time.
Petitioners then
filed an appeal before the CA.
The CA affirmed the CSC. Similarly, without delving into the merits, the
CA ruled
that the appeal with the CSC was filed out of time.

ISSUE:
1. Whether the Court of Appeals erred in ruling that the adjudication
committee had the
power or authority to order the dismissal of the petitioners.
2. Whether the Court of Appeals erred in finding that the petitioners lost
their right to
appeal to the CSC when they wrongly filed it with the Office of the
President.
HELD:
1. No, the court of appeals did not err in its decision. The adjudication
committee
had the power or authority to order the dismissal of the petitioners.
Section 16 of the MTRCB Charter provides that the MTRCB "shall have
the
power to suspend or dismiss for cause any employee and/or approve or
disapprove the
appointment, transfer or detail of employees." Further, Section 3(j) of
P.D. No. 1986
states that the Board can "prescribe the internal and operational
procedures for the
exercise of its powers and functions as well as the performance of its
duties and
responsibilities, including the creation and vesting of authority upon
sub-committees of
the BOARD for the work of review and other related matters." The
MTRCB was likewise
authorized to promulgate rules and regulations for the implementation
of P.D. No. 1986
and its purposes and objectives.
Further, Section 40 of the 1998 MTRCB Implementing Rules and
Regulations
(IRR) allowed the creation of a Hearing and Adjudication Committee
composed of three
members of the Board to be designated by the Chairperson to hear and
decide cases
involving violations of the MTRCB Charter and its IRR.
Thus, following Section 3(j) of the MTRCB Charter allowing the Board to
create
sub-committees for the work of review and other related matters, and
Section 40 of the
1998 MTRCB IRR where the Chairperson may designate the three
members of the
Hearing and Adjudication Committee, the Board issued the MTRCB
Rules of Procedure
on May 11, 1999. The Rules of Procedure were made applicable to any
administrative
complaint filed with the MTRCB for violation of the MTRCB Charter and
its IRR. The
Rules of Procedure likewise defined "Board" as the MTRCB, or the
Chairman of the
Board, or the Hearing and Adjudication Committee, acting for and on
behalf of the
Board.
Abang,Jadeeyah_Del Rosario,Angelo_Lawangen,Perchie
_Riparip,Renzon
Case Digest Collaboration by: Group 1-Topic: Statutory Construction
In this case, it is beyond dispute that the MTRCB Chairperson created
the
Adjudication Committee and designated three members of the Board as
members of the
committee.Further, the MTRCB Rules of Procedure were applicable to
complaints for
violations of the MTRCB Charter and its IRR, and there was no
indication therein that it
was applicable to disciplinary cases involving the MTRCB's employees.
Nonetheless, to
the mind of the Court, the steps followed by the MTRCB and its
Chairperson, which
mirrored steps followed for the adjudication of cases for violations of
the MTRCB
Charter and its IRR, were all in accord with the broad powers granted to
the MTRCB
and to its Chairperson.
It can also be said about the MTRCB, composed of 32 members,
including its
Chairperson and its Vice-Chairperson. As shown by the provisions
quoted from the
MTRCB's Charter, the MTRCB is empowered to create sub-committees
to exercise the
power granted to the Board. There is nothing in its charter that requires
that decisions
be made en banc when what is involved is a disciplinary proceeding
involving its
employees. Thus, the MTRCB was correct when it argued that the
Adjudication
Committee that directed petitioners' dismissal was no different from any
of its other
committees. It is a committee exercising the Board's disciplinary power
in a manner
allowed by its Charter, by acting through a sub-committee of the Board.
Further, to require that the MTRCB decide disciplinary proceedings en
banc
would indeed result in a logistical and administrative nightmare.
As the Board itself argued in its Comment:
If only the Board en banc can discharge the power to suspend and
dismiss an
MTRCB employee, as suggested by petitioners, then x x x all the thirty
(30) members,
the Chairperson, and the Vice Chairperson should convene in order to
constitute an
investigating body and then again convene to constitute an adjudicative
body so that it
could discipline its employees. To follow this proposition from the
petitioners would
result in an irrational and unreasonable requirement in the exercise of
said power, in
that, if all thirty-two (32) members of the MTRCB could not convene for
one reason or
another, it will result in the delay in the administration of justice,
particularly, the
suspension, removal or separation of erring government employees
from the service, or
exoneration, if found otherwise. This situation will prejudice the whole
office, the movie
and television industry, and, ultimately, the Filipino people in general. If
all members of
the MTRCB are required to convene to constitute an investigating body
or adjudicating
body, no one will be left to perform the other more important duties and
responsibilities
that the MTRCB is likewise mandated to do. Quite certainly, the framers
of the law did
not intend such kind of absurdity or irrationality. It is a rule of statutory
construction that
Abang,Jadeeyah_Del Rosario,Angelo_Lawangen,Perchie
_Riparip,Renzon
Case Digest Collaboration by: Group 1-Topic: Statutory Construction
the court may consider the spirit and reason of a statute where a literal
meaning would
lead to absurdity, contradiction, injustice, or would defeat the clear
purpose of the
lawmakers.
Consequently, the Adjudication Committee's Resolution dated June 2,
2008,
which ruled on the petitioner's motion for reconsideration, and affirmed
the committee's
Decision dated April 8, 2008, indicates "BY AUTHORITY OF THE
BOARD". Thus, even
though the Adjudication Committee's Decision was initially
unauthorized, it was ratified.
Further, the absence of any proof otherwise will presume that the
Adjudication
Committee, the MTRCB, and its Chairperson were performing their
functions regularly
and that the Adjudication Committee was authorized to rule on the
complaint against
petitioners, and eventually direct their dismissal from service.
2. No. The Court of Appeals did not err in its decision finding that the
petitioners
lost their right to appeal to the CSC when they wrongly filed it with the
Office of
the President.
On February 7, 2007, the CSC issued Resolution No. 07- 0244, which
amended
Rule III, Section 43 of MC 19, as follows: Section 43. Filing of Appeals. —
Decisions of
heads of department, agencies, provinces, cities, municipalities and
other
instrumentalities imposing a penalty exceeding thirty (30) days
suspension or fine in an
amount exceeding thirty days salary, may be appealed to the
Commission Proper within
a period of fifteen (15) days from receipt thereof. In case the decision
rendered by a
bureau or office head is appealable to the Commission, the same may
be initially
appealed to the department head and finally to the Commission Proper.
Pending
appeal, the same shall be executory except where the penalty is
removed, in which
case the same shall be executory only after confirmation by the
Secretary concerned.
Unless otherwise provided by law, the decision of the head of an
attached agency
imposing a penalty exceeding thirty (30) days suspension or tine in an
amount
exceeding thirty days' salary, demotion in rank or salary or transfer,
removal or dismissal
from office is appealable directly to the Commission Proper within a
period of fifteen
(15) days from receipt thereof. Pending appeal, the penalty imposed
shall be executory,
including the penalty of removal from the service without need for the
confirmation by
the department secretary to which the agency is attached.
Based on the foregoing, when the Adjudication Committee rendered a
decision against petitioners on April 8, 2008, the applicable CSC rule
was MC 19,
as amended by Resolution No. 07-0244. Following Section 43 as
amended,
petitioners had two options: appeal to the department head before
appealing to
the CSC or directly file an appeal with the CSC.
Abang,Jadeeyah_Del Rosario,Angelo_Lawangen,Perchie
_Riparip,Renzon
Case Digest Collaboration by: Group 1-Topic: Statutory Construction
This is where petitioners made a grievous mistake when they appealed
to
the OP, which as they argue, is the department head. To our mind, the
phrase
"department head" when applied to this case refers to the Chairperson
of the
MTRCB. The interpretation of said phrase should be specific enough to
pertain to
the MTRCB Chairperson, or to Laguardia in particular since logically she
exercised supervision over the affairs of not only the whole Board but
also the
MTRCB employees. She technically does not report or answer to a
department
head, compared to other departments under the Office of the President
such as
the Department of Justice which has a department head in the person of
the
Secretary of Justice, who is also a presidential appointee. Treating
Laguardia as
the "department head" is a practical application of the phrase given that
it would
be illogical to require the Office of the President to rule upon the subject
of
Petitioners' dismissal from service when they were not even presidential
appointees.
Besides, the Office of the President is technically not a department
under
the purview of Resolution No. 07-0244. Specifically, "department" under
Resolution No. 07-0244 refers to "any of the executive departments or
entities
having the category of a department, including the judiciary and the
other
constitutional commission and offices." Similarly, the Administrative
Code defined
a department as an executive department created by law. Surely the
Office of the
President is not merely a department as it is considered as the head
office of the
executive branch of the government. Petitioners, therefore, had the
option of filing
an appeal with Laguardia or directly with the CSC. It was a mistake for
them to
appeal the decision of the Adjudication Committee with the OP as the
MTRCB had
its own charter and was considered a department under MC 19, as
amended by
Resolution No. 07- 0244, making Laguardia the department head.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED. The Decision dated November 3,
2015, and Resolution dated March 8, 2016, of the Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R. SP
No. 135862 are AFFIRMED.
Abang,Jadeeyah_Del Rosario,Angelo_Lawangen,Perchie
_Riparip,Renzon