Name: Rachell Ann Uson Subject: Consti

Case: THE COLLECTOR OF INTERNAL REVENUE, Syllabus:

PETITIONER, VS. ANTONIO CAMPOS RUEDA, RESPONDENT Module 2. State Vs Country
G.R. No. L- 13250 October 29, 1971
Facts:
● This is the petition filed by CIR to the Supreme Court in their prayer to reversed the decision
of the Court of Tax Appeals granting Antonio Campos Rueda to be exempted from the
deficiency estate and inheritance taxes according to the rule of Section 122 of the National
Internal Revenue Code (NIRC).

● The respondent is the administrator of the estate of the late Estrella Soriano Vda. de
Cerdeira. The deceased is a Spanish national and a resident of Tangier, Morocco from 1931
to 1955. According to CIR, respondent is liable for the sum of P161,874.95 for the transfer of
intangible personal properties in the Philippines.

● Rueda filed an amended return wherein intangible personal properties with the value of
P396,308.90 were claimed as exempted from taxes. CIR denied the request for exemption on
the ground that the law of Tangier is not reciprocal to Section 122 of the NIRC. CIR insisted
that Tangier is just a mere principality, not a foreign country which is a requirement in the
provision.
● The matter was then elevated to the Court of Tax Appeals on the issue on reciprocity aspect
and if Tangier was not a foreign country within the meaning of Section 122.
● In Ruling, the CTA sided with Rueda and stated that the foreign country mentioned in Section
122 "refers to a government of that foreign power which, although not an international person
in the sense of international law, does not impose transfer or death upon intangible person
properties of our citizens not residing therein, or whose law allows a similar exemption from
such taxes. It is, therefore, not necessary that Tangier should have been recognized by our
Government order to entitle the petitioner to the exemption benefits of the proviso of Section
122 of our Tax. Code." CTA also submitted copies of legislation of Tangier manifesting its
reciprocity satisfying Sec 122(b) of NIRC.

● CIR now petitioned to the SC to elucidate if requisites of statehood must be satisfied for a
"foreign country" to fall within the exemption of Section 122 of the NIRC.
Issue:
1. WON requisites of statehood, may be necessary for the acquisition of an international
personality, must be satisfied for a "foreign country" to fall within the exemption of Section 122
of the NIRC?
2. WON Tangier, Morocco is an international personality, a State or a Foreign Country and falls
under the provision of Section 122 of NIRC?

Ruling: The decision of the respondent Court of Tax Appeals of October 30, 1957 is affirmed.
Without pronouncement as to costs.
1. No, Supreme Court held that the aforesaid provision does not require that the "foreign
country" possess an international personality to come within the terms of Section 122 of the
 NIRC. The Supreme Court also noted that there is already an existing jurisprudence
(Collector vs De Lara) which provides that even a tiny principality, that of Liechtenstein, hardly
an international personality in the sense, did fall under the exempt category provided for in
Section 22 of the Tax Code. Thus, recognition is not necessary.
2. Yes. Tangier is a foreign country even though it is not considered an international personality
or an official State. The controlling legal provision as noted is a proviso in Section 122 of the
National Internal Revenue Code. "That no tax shall be collected under this Title in respect of
intangible personal property (b) if the laws of the foreign country of which the decedent was a
resident at the time of his death allow a similar exemption from transfer taxes or death taxes
of every character in respect of intangible personal property owned by citizens of the
Philippines not residing in that foreign country."
● Since Tangier is considered to be a foreign country with respect to the doctrine of
reciprocity it falls under the abovementioned provision. It doesn’t say there that it
should be an international personality nor a State.
● A State, according to Pound's formulation, must be a politically organized sovereign
community independent of outside control bound by penalties of nationhood, legally
supreme within its territory, acting through a government functioning under a regime
of law.
● A foreign country is thus a sovereign person with the people composing it viewed as an
organized corporate society under a government with the legal competence to exact
obedience to its commands.

Supporting Articles and Definition:

Section 122 of the National Internal Revenue Code (1939) Definitions.
For the purposes of this Title, the terms “gross estate” and “gift” include real estate and tangible
personal property, or mixed, physically located in the Philippines; franchise which must be exercised
in the Philippines; shares, obligations, or bonds issued by any corporation or sociedad anonima
organized or constituted in the Philippines in accordance with its laws; shares, obligations, or bonds
issued by any foreign corporation eighty-five per centum of the business of which is located in the
Philippines; shares, obligations, or bonds issued by any foreign corporation if such shares, obligations,
or bonds have acquired a business situs in the Philippines; shares, or rights in any partnership,
business or industry established in the Philippines; or any personal property, whether tangible or
intangible, located in the Philippines:
Provided, however, That in the case of a resident, the transmission or transfer of any tangible personal
property, regardless of its location, is subject to the taxes prescribed in this Title: And provided, further,
That no tax shall be collected under this Title in respect of intangible personal property
(a) if the decedent at the time of his death was a resident of a foreign country which at the time
of his death did not impose a transfer tax or death tax of any character in respect of intangible
personal property of citizens of the Philippines not residing in that foreign country, or
(b) if the laws of the foreign country of which the decedent was a resident at the time of his
death allow a similar exemption from transfer taxes or death taxes of every character in respect
of intangible personal property owned by citizens of the Philippines not residing in that foreign
country.
Bugayong BTX notes---
State Nation
● State is a community of persons, ● A people bound together by common
more or less numerous, permanently attractions and repulsions into a
 occupying a fixed territory, and
possessed of an independent
government organized for political
ends to which the great body of
inhabitants render habitual
obedience.
● Political concept
● Not subject to external control
● May consist of one or more nations
or peoples
living organism possessed of a
common pulse, a common
intelligence and inspiration, and
destined apparently to have a
common history and a common fate.
● Racial concept
● May or may not be independent of
external control
● May be made up of several states

Name: Salem A. Rangiris, Jr. Subject: Constitutional Law 1

Case: Magallona V. Ermita Syllabus: Module 2 – Concept of State
Facts:
Petitioners challenge the constitutionality of RA9522 on two principal grounds, namely: (1) RA 9522
reduces Philippine maritime territory, and logically, the reach of the Philippine state’s sovereign
power, in violation of Article 1 of the 1987 Constitution, embodying the terms of the Treaty of Paris
and ancillary treaties, and (2) RA 9522 opens the country’s waters landward of the baselines to
maritime passage by all vessels and aircrafts, undermining Philippine sovereignty and national
security, contravening the country’s nuclear-free policy, and damaging marine resources, in violation
of relevant constitutional provisions.

Additionally, petitioners contend that RA 9522’s treatment of the KIG as "regime of islands" not only
results in the loss of a large maritime area but also prejudices the livelihood of subsistence
fishermen.To buttress their argument of territorial diminution, petitioners facially attack RA 9522 for
what it excluded and included – its failure to reference either the Treaty of Paris or Sabah and its
use of UNCLOS III’s framework of regime of islands to determine the maritime zones of the KIG and
the Scarborough Shoal.
Issue:
1. WON petitioners possess locus standi to bring this suit;
2. WON the writs of certiorari and prohibition are the proper remedies to assail the constitutionality
of RA 9522; and
2. WON RA 9522 is unconstitutional.
Ruling:

The Supreme Court held that:

1. YES. Petitioners possess locus standi to bring this suit as citizens with constitutionally
sufficient interest in the resolution of the case which raises national significance (petitoners
alleges neither infringement of legislative prerogative nor misuse of public funds. Their petition
raises neither infringement of legislative prerogative nor misuse of public funds.
2. YES. The writs of certiorari and prohibition are proper remedies to test the constitutionality of
RA 9522 (while the respondents submission -that writs cannot be issued in the absence of
any showing of grave abuse of discretion in the exercise of judicial, quasi judicial or ministerial
powers on the part of respondents and resulting prejudice on the part of the petitioner- holds
true in ordinarily civil proceedings, the High Court viewed the writs of certiorari and prohibition
as proper to test the constitutionality of statutes.
 3. No basis to declare RA 9522 unconstitutional. RA 9522 is a statutory tool to demarcate the
country’s maritime zones and continental shelf under UNCLOS III, not to delineate Philippine
territory
4. RA 9522’s Use of the Framework of Regime of Islands to Determine the Maritime Zones of
the KIG and the Scarborough Shoal, not Inconsistent with the Philippines’ Claim of
Sovereignty Over these Areas
5. Statutory Claim Over Sabah under RA 5446 Retained. Petitioners’ argument for the invalidity
of RA 9522 for its failure to textualize the Philippines’ claim over Sabah in North Borneo is
also untenable. Section 2 of RA 5446, which RA 9522 did not repeal, keeps open the door for
drawing the baselines of Sabah:

Section 2. The definition of the baselines of the territorial sea of the Philippine Archipelago as
provided in this Act is without prejudice to the delineation of the baselines of the territorial sea
around the territory of Sabah, situated in North Borneo, over which the Republic of the
Philippines has acquired dominion and sovereignty. (Emphasis supplied)

Petitioners’ invocation of non-executory constitutional provisions in Article II (Declaration of

Principles and State Policies) must also fail. Our present state of jurisprudence considers the
provisions in Article II as mere legislative guides, which, absent enabling legislation, "do not
embody judicially enforceable constitutional rights x x x."

NAME: Marivic A. Rivera SUBJECT: Constitutional 1

CASE: Edu vs. Ericta SYLLABUS: Module 2

FACTS:

1. LTO Commissioner adheres to the constitutionality of the REFLECTOR LAW - ADMINISTRATIVE

ORDER NO.5 despite petitions to annul & set aside.

No motor vehicles shall be registered if not equipped with reflectors.

Physical requirements of the glass reflectors are enumerated

2. Penalties are imposed for violation of this provision cause to refuse registration of the motor
vehicle affected or suspension of the registration pursuant to provisions of Section 16, R.A. 4136.

Violation of Section 1(a) and (b) and paragraph 8, Section 3 where a fine shall be imposed.

ISSUE: W/N Administrative Order No. 2 is contrary to the principle of non-delegation of legislative
power

SUPPORTING ARTICLES:

There is the power of petitioner as Land Transportation Commissioner to promulgate rules and
regulations to give life to and translate is the fundamental purpose. His power is clear. There has
been no abuse.

The writs of certiorari and prohibition prayed for are GRANTED, the orders of May 28, 1970 of
respondent Judge for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction, the writ of preliminary injunction
of June 1, 1970 and his order of June 9, 1970 denying reconsideration are ANNULLED and SET
ASIDE.

Respondent Judge is likewise directed to DISMISS the petition for certiorari and prohibition filed by
respondent, there being no cause of action as the Reflector Law and Administrative Order No. 2 of
petitioner have not been shown to be tainted by invalidity. Without pronouncement as to costs.

Name: De Guzman, Mark Daniel Subject: Consti Law 1

Case: Bacani, plaintiffs-appellees vs Syllabus: Module 2, Concpet of the State
National Coconut Corp, defendants- -Constituent v. Ministrant
appellants
Facts:
Plaintiffs herein are court stenographers assigned in Branch VI of the Court of First Instance of
Manila. During the pendency of Civil Case No. 2293 of said court, entitled Francisco Sycip vs.
National Coconut Corporation, Assistant Corporate Counsel Federico Alikpala, counsel for
defendant, requested said stenographers for copies of the transcript of the stenographic notes
taken by them during the hearing. Plaintiffs complied with the request by delivering to Counsel
Alikpala the needed transcript containing 714 pages and thereafter submitted to him their bills for
the payment of their fees. The National Coconut Corporation paid the amount of P564 to Leopoldo
T. Bacani and P150 to Mateo A. Matoto for said transcript at the rate of P1 per page.

Auditor General disallowed the payment of these fees and sought the recovery of the amounts
paid. On January 19, 1953, the Auditor General required the plaintiffs to reimburse said amounts
on the strength of a circular of the Department of Justice wherein the opinion was expressed that
the National Coconut Corporation, being a government entity, was exempt from the payment of the
fees in question.

Issue:
W/N the National Coconut Corporation is exempt from paying stenographers fees pursuant to
section 2 of the Revised Administrative Code of 1917 “Exempting Gov’t in paying legal fees”

Ruling: SC DISMISSED the petition and ruled in favour of the Plaintiffs.

Section 2 of the Revised Administrative Code defines the scope of the term "Government of the
Republic of the Philippines" as follows:

"'The Government of the Philippine Islands' is a term which refers to the corporate governmental entity
through which the functions of government are exercised throughout the Philippine Islands, the
various arms through which political authority is made effective in said Islands, whether
pertaining to the central Government or to the provincial or municipal branches or other form
of local government."

The Constitution provides that the Gov’t is composed of three branches; the Executive, Legislative
and Judiciary through which the powers and functions of government are exercised. These powers
are two-fold constitute and ministrant. The former are those which constitute the very bonds of
society and are compulsory in nature; the latter are those that are undertaken only by way of
advancing the general interests of society, and are merely optional.
The National Coconut Corporation falls in the ministrant capacity of power and as defined; “are those
that are undertaken only by way of advancing the general interests of society, and are merely
optional.”
It is also classified as Government-Owned and Controlled Corporation (GOCC) which may take on the
form of a private enterprise or one organized with powers and formal characteristics of a private
corporations under the Corporation Law.

GOCC’s are given a corporate power separate and distinct from our government, it was made
subject to the provisions of our Corporation Law in so far as its corporate existence and the powers
that it may exercise are concerned (sections 2 and 4, Commonwealth Act No. 518). It may sue and
be sued in the same manner as any other private corporations, and in this sense it is an entity
different from our government. Their powers, duties and liabilities have to be determined in the light
of Corporation Law and of their corporate charters. They do not therefore come within the
exemption clause prescribed in section 16, Rule 130 of our Rules of Court.

Supporting Articles:

“Government” may be defined as “that institution or aggregate of institutions by which an independent

society makes and carries out those rules of action which are necessary to enable men to live in a
social state, or which are imposed upon the people forming that society by those who possess the
power or authority of prescribing them” (U.S. vs. Dorr, 2 Phil., 332). This institution, when referring to
the national government, has reference to what our Constitution has established composed of three
great departments, the legislative, executive, and the judicial, through which the powers and functions
of government are exercised. These functions are twofold:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary constitute and
ministrant. The former are those which constitute the very bonds of society and are compulsory in
nature; chan roblesvirtualawlibrarythe latter are those that are undertaken only by way of advancing
the general interests of society, and are merely optional. President Wilson enumerates the constituent
functions as follows:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
“‘(1) The keeping of order and providing for the protection of persons and property from violence and
robbery.
‘(2) The fixing of the legal relations between man and wife and between parents and children.
‘(3) The regulation of the holding, transmission, and interchange of property, and the determination of
its liabilities for debt or for crime.
‘(4) The determination of contract rights between individuals.
‘(5) The definition and punishment of crime.
‘(6) The administration of justice in civil cases.
‘(7) The determination of the political duties, privileges, and relations of citizens.
‘(8) Dealings of the state with foreign powers:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary the preservation of the state
from external danger or encroachment and the advancement of its international interests.’“ (Malcolm,
The Government of the Philippine Islands, p. 19.)
"Public corporations are those formed or organized for the government of a portion of the State."
(Section 3, Republic Act No. 1459, Corporation Law). "'The generally accepted definition of a
municipal corporation would only include organized cities and towns, and like organizations, with
political and legislative powers for the local, civil government and police regulations of the inhabitants
of the particular district included in the boundaries of the corporation.' Heller vs. Stremmel, 52 Mo.
309, 312." "In its more general sense the phrase 'municipal corporation' may include both towns and
counties, and other public corporations created by government for political purposes. In its more
common and limited signification, it embraces only incorporated villages, towns and cities. Dunn vs.
Court of County Revenues, 85 Ala. 144, 146, 4 So. 661." (McQuillin, Municipal Corporations, 2nd
ed., Vol. 1, p. 385.) "We may, therefore, define a municipal corporation in its historical and strict
sense to be the incorporation, by the authority of the government, of the inhabitants of a particular
place or district, and authorizing them in their corporate capacity to exercise subordinate specified
powers of legislation and regulation with respect to their local and internal concerns. This power of
local government is the distinctive purpose and the distinguishing feature of a municipal corporation
proper." (Dillon, Municipal Corporations, 5th ed., Vol. I, p. 59.)

Name: Bagsit, Michael Subject: Constitutional Law 1

Case: Philippines Virginia Tobacco Syllabus:
Administration v CIR

Facts:
This is the case of Philippines Virginia Tobacco Administration v CIR.

The facts are undisputed. On December 20, 1966, claimants, now private respondents, filed with
respondent Court a petition wherein they alleged their employment relationship, the overtime services
in excess of the regular eight hours a day rendered by them, and the failure to pay them overtime
compensation in accordance with Commonwealth Act No. 444.

Petitioner Philippine Virginia Tobacco Administration, as had been noted, would predicate its plea for
the reversal of the order complained of on the basic proposition that it is beyond the jurisdiction of
respondent Court as it is exercising governmental functions and that it is exempt from the operation
of Commonwealth Act No. 444.

There was a motion for reconsideration, but respondent Court en banc denied the same. Hence this
petition for certiorari.
Issue:
The issues in this case whether or not Judge Sevilla acted with grave abuse of discretion in releasing
the funds to the applicant of the letter of credit.
Ruling:

The decision of the Supreme Court denying a motion for reconsideration are hereby affirmed.
Under the Constitution, in the case of Philippines Virginia Tobacco Administration v CIR an
irrevocable letter of credit cannot, during its lifetime, be cancelled or modified without the express
permission of the beneficiary.

Name: Joannie Lumbao Subject: Consti

Case: Gov’t of the Philippines v. Monte Syllabus: Concept of State
de Piedad

Facts:
About $400,000 were subscribed and paid into the treasury of the Phil. Islands by the inhabitants of
the Spanish Dominion for the relief of those damaged by an earthquake which took place in the Phil.
Islands. However, part of the money collected was never distributed and was instead deposited with
respondent bank Monte de Piedad. On account of various petitions of persons and heirs of the
victims to whom the money was supposed to be given, the Phil. Islands filed an action for recovery.
A judgment was rendered in favor of the govt. Monte de Piedad appealed, questioning the
personality of the Govt. of the Phil. Islands to institute the action, contending that the suit can only be
instituted by the intended beneficiaries or by the heirs of the victims.
Issue:
Does the Phil. Govt have the personality to institute the action?
Ruling:
Yes. In this country, the Govt as parens patriae has the right to enforce all charities of public
nature, by virtue of its general superintending authority over the public interests, where no other
person is entrusted with it. This prerogative of parens patriae is inherent in the supreme power of
[the] State xxx. It is a most beneficent function, and often necessary to be exercised in the interest
of humanity, and for the prevention of injury to those who cannot protect themselves. Furthermore,
it would be impracticable for the beneficiaries to institute an action or actions either individually or
collectively.20 The only course that can be satisfactorily pursued is for the Government to again
assume control of the fund and devote it to the object for which it was originally destined. The
Republic established during Japanese occupation was a de facto govt of the second kind. Judicial
proceedings not of political complexion of a de facto govt remain good and valid even after
occupation

Name: Teruel, Emmanuel R. Subject: CONSTI 1

Case: Syllabus: Module II. Concept of State
Cabanas v. Pilapil G.R. No. L-25843
Facts:

Florentino Pilapil, the husband of Melchora Cabanas and the father of Millian Pilapil, left aninsurance
having his child as the beneficiary and authorized his brother, Francisco Pilapil, to act as trustee
during his daughter’s minority. Upon the death of the father, the child was 10 years old, thus
Francisco received the proceeds of the insurance in behalf of the child. The mother, Melchora filed
a complaint that she instead shall be the trustee of her child and claim the insurance proceeds in
behalf of Millian. Francisco claims the retention of the amount in question by invoking the terms of
the insurance policy
Issue:
• Whether or not Melchora Cabana, the mother, be entitled to be the trustee of Millian
as the beneficiary of the proceeds of the insurance policy
Ruling:

The state as its role, parens patriae, has jurisdiction to interfere with the terms of the insurance
that adheres to the provision of the Article 2, Sec. 12 of the constitution that states that, ‘The state
shall strengthen the family as a basic social institution, another supporting provision is the Article
15, which specifically defines the rights of families.’ The court validates the merit and validity of the
plea, as the mother is the closest relative to the child thus the court find it justifiable that the best
interest of the child is assured with the mother
Supporting Articles:

Provisions under Art. 320 and 321 of the Civil Code

Article 320 states that “the father, or in his absence the mother, is the legal administrator of the property
pertaining to the child under parental authority. If the property is worth more than two thousand pesos,
the father or mother shall give a bond subject to the approval of the Court of First Instance." And Article
321 states that "The property which the child has acquired or may acquire with his work or industry,
or by any lucrative title, belongs to the child in ownership, and in usufruct to the father or mother under
whom he is under parental authority and whose company he lives.
Name: LOTERONO, Rechelle Mae L. Subject: CONSTI 1
Case: Koh Kim Cham v. Valdez Tan Keh Syllabus:
75 Phil. 113 Module 2: Concept of the State

Facts:
● Petition for mandamus was sought in which the Petitioner (Co Kim Cham) plead that the
respondent judge of the lower court be ordered to continue the proceedings in civil case No.
3012, which were initiated under the regime of the so-called Republic of the Philippines
established during the Japanese military occupation of these Islands.
● The Respondent Judge of the lower court refused to take cognizance of and continue the
proceeding of civil case of said court and argued that the proclamation issued by Gen.
Douglas MacArthur had the effect of invalidating and nullifying all judicial proceedings and
judgements of the courts of the said governments. He also argued that the said
governments during the Japanese occupation were not de facto governments.
● During the Japanese occupation, no substantial change was affected in the organization and
jurisdiction of the different courts that functioned during the Philippine Executive
Commission, and in the laws, they administered and enforced.
Issues:
1. WON judicial proceedings and decisions during the Japanese Occupation were valid and
remained valid.

2. Whether the proclamation issued by General Douglas MacArthur, in which he declared

that “all laws, regulations and processes of any of the government in the Philippines than
that of the said Commonwealth are null and void and without legal effect in the areas of
the Philippines free of enemy occupation and control”, has invalidated all judgments and
judicial acts and proceedings of the said courts
Ruling:

1. YES. According to the law of nations, said judicial acts are legal and valid before and
after the occupation has ceased and the legitimate government has been restored. In
political and international law, all acts and proceedings of the legislative, executive and
judicial departments of a de facto government are valid. Being a de facto government,
judicial acts done under its control, when they are not political in nature, to the extent that
they effect during the continuance and control of said government remain good. All
judgment and judicial proceedings which are not of political complexion were good and
valid before and remained as such even after the occupied territory had come again into
power of true and original sovereign.

2. NO. The word "processes," as used in the proclamation of General Douglas MacArthur of
October 23, 1944, cannot be interpreted to mean judicial processes; that term should be
construed to mean legislative and constitutional processes, by virtue of the maxim
"noscitur a sociis." According to this maxim, where a particular word or phrase is
ambiguous in itself or is equally susceptible of various meanings, its meaning may be
made clear and specific by considering the company in which it is found. Since the
proclamation provides that "all laws, regulations and processes of any other government
in the Philippines than that of the said Commonwealth are null and void," the word
"processes" must be interpreted or construed to refer to the Executive Orders of the
Chairman of the Philippine Executive Commission, ordinances promulgated by the
President of the so-called Republic of the Philippines, and the Constitution itself of said
 Republic, and others that are of the same class as the laws and regulations with which
the word "processes" is associated.

Therefore, the writ of mandamus is issued to the Judge of the Court of First Instance of
Manila ordering him to take cognizance and continue to final judgement the proceedings
in Case No. 3012.

Name: Santos, Dara Agatha Subject: Consti-1

Case: ANASTACIO LAUREL, petitioner, vs. Syllabus: Module 2 – Concept
ERIBERTO MISA, as Director of Prisons, respondent of the State
Facts:
Petitioner Anastacio Laurel is detained as a political prisoner by the US Army, and was later turned
over to the Commonwealth Government, as he was said to have aid the Japanese Soldiers during
the latter's occupation.

The petitioner contends that giving aid to the Japanese Soldiers and comfort during the Japanese
occupation cannot be prosecuted for the crime of treason defined and penalized by Art.114 of the
RPC because the sovereignty of the legitimate government in the Philippines and consequently, the
correlative allegiance of Filipino citizens was then suspended, and that there was a change of
sovereignty over these islands upon the proclamation of the Philippine Republic.

Issue:
WON, the change of sovereignty can suspend the allegiance of a Filipino Citizen
Ruling:
NO, a citizen or subject owes, not a qualified and temporary, but an absolute and permanent
allegiance, which consists in the obligation of fidelity and obedience to his government of sovereign.
The absolute and permanent allegiance of the inhabitants of a territory occupied by the enemy to
their legitimate government or sovereign is not abrogated or severed by the enemy occupation,
because the sovereignty of the government or sovereign de jure is not transferred thereby the
occupier.
Supporting Articles:
Art. 114 of the RPC - Any person who, owing allegiance to (the United States or) the Government
of the Philippine Islands, not being a foreigner, levies war against them or adheres to their
enemies, giving them aid or comfort within the Philippine Islands or elsewhere, shall be punished
by reclusion temporal to death and shall pay a fine not to exceed P20,000 pesos. No person shall
be convicted of treason unless on the testimony of two witnesses at least to the same overt act or
on confession of the accused in open court.

Likewise, an alien, residing in the Philippine Islands, who commits acts of treason as defined in
paragraph 1 of this Article shall be punished by prision mayor to death and shall pay a fine not to
exceed P20,000 pesos.

Name: Ferdinand E. Apolonio Jr. Subject: CONSTILAW1

Case: Syllabus:
Ruffy v. Chief of Staff

This was a petition for prohibition, praying that the respondents, the Chief of Staff and the
General Court Martial of the Philippine Army, be commanded to desist from further
proceedings in the trial of petitioners before that body.

Facts:
 ● During the Japanese insurrection in the Philippines, military men were assigned at designated
camps or military bases all over the country.
● When the Japanese forces reached Mindoro, Ruffy and his band were forced to retreat to the
mountains. A guerilla outfit was then organized, called as the “Bolo Area”.
● However, a certain Capt. Esteban Beloncio relieved petitioners of their positions and duties in
the “Bolo Area”, after Lieut. Col. Enrique Jurado effected a change of command.
● The latter, however, was slain allegedly by petitioners, and it was this murder which gave rise
to petitioners’ trial, the legality of which is now being contested.
Issue:
● Whether petitioner was subject to military law at the time the alleged offense was committed.

Ruling:
● YES, petitioner was subject to military law at the time the alleged offense was committed. The
rule that laws of political nature or affecting political relations are considered superseded or in
abeyance during the military occupation, is intended for the governing of the civil inhabitants
of the occupied territory.
● It is not intended for and does not bind the enemies in arms. By the occupation of the
Philippines by Japanese forces, the officers and men of the Philippine army did not cease to
be fully in the service, though, in a measure, only in measure, they were not subject to the
military jurisdiction, if they were not in active duty.
● In the latter case, like officers and soldiers on leave of absence or held as prisoners of war,
they could not be held guilty of breach of the discipline of the command or of a neglect of duty
x x x; but for an act unbecoming of a gentleman or an act which constitutes an offense of the
class specified in the 95th Article of War, they may in general be legally held subject to military
jurisdiction and trial. Moreover, petitioners, by their acceptance of appointments as officers in
the Bolo Area from the General Headquarters of the 6th Military District, they became
members of the Philippine Army amenable to the Articles of War. x x x As officers in the Bolo
Area and the 6th Military District, the petitioners operated under the orders of a duly
established and duly appointed commanders of the United States Army and thus covered by
Article 2 of the Articles of War which provides for persons subject to military law.
Supporting Articles:
● Sec 2, Articles of War Persons Subject to Military Law. — The following persons are subject
to these articles and shall be understood as included in the term "any person subject to military
law" or "persons subject to military law," whenever used in these articles: "
o (a) All officers, members of the Nurse Corps and soldiers in the active service of the
Armed Forces of the Philippines or of the Philippine Constabulary; all members of the
reserve force, from the dates of their call to active duty and while on such active duty;
all trainees undergoing military instructions; and all other persons lawfully called,
drafted, or ordered into, or to duty or for training in, the said service, from the dates
they are required by the terms of the call, draft, or order to obey the same;
o (b) Cadets, flying cadets, and probationary second lieutenants;
o (c) All retainers to the camp and all persons accompanying or serving with the Armed
Forces of the Philippines in the field in time of war or when martial law is declared
though not otherwise subject to these articles; "
o (d) All persons under sentence adjudged by courts-martial."

Name: JL Dormido Subject: CONSTI 1

Case: People v. Gozo Syllabus: Concept of State: Territory
Facts:
1. The accused brought a house and lot located inside the United States Naval Reservation
within the territorial jurisdiction of Olongapo City. She demolished the house and built
 another one in its place, without a building permit from the City Mayor of Olongapo City,
because she was told that such building permit was not necessary for the construction of the
house.
2. Accused was charged of Municipal Ordinance No. 14, Series of 1964, then she elevated the
case to the Court of Appeals questioning the constitutionality of the said Ordinance.

Issue: Whether or not the Philippine has administrative jurisdiction within the naval base
leased to the American armed forces?
Ruling:
The appealed decision is affirmed insofar as it found the accused, Loreta Gozo, guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of a violation of Municipal Ordinance No. 14

Rationale:
1. The Philippine Government has not abdicated its sovereignty over the bases as part of the
Philippine territory or divested itself completely of jurisdiction over offenses committed
therein. Under the terms of the treaty, the United States Government has prior or preferential
but not exclusive jurisdiction of such offenses.
2. The extent of the jurisdiction of the Philippines within its limits is supremacy of its decrees,
its commands paramount and its laws govern therein. Everyone to whom it applies must
submit to its terms.
3. Principle of Auto-Limitation is to be admitted that any state may, by its consent, express or
implied, submit to a restriction of its sovereign rights.
4. Naval bases under lease to the American armed forces by virtue of the Military Bases
Agreement of 1947 are not and cannot be foreign territory. While the Philippines allows
another power to participate in the exercise of jurisdictional rights over certain portions of its
territory. Such areas become impressed with an alien character, however, they retain their
status as native soil and they are still subject to Philippine authority. Its jurisdiction may be
diminished, but it does not disappear.
5. Within the limits of Philippine territory, whatever statutory powers are vested upon it may be
validly exercised. Any residual authority and therein conferred, whether expressly or
impliedly, belongs to the national government, not to an alien country.
6. The accused is not included in the Bases Agreement which is the concern of the contracting
parties (USA and Philippine Gov’t) alone.
Supporting Articles:

-Municipal Ordinance No. 14, Series of 1964: requiring a permit from the municipal mayor for
the construction or erection of a building, as well as any modification, alteration, repair or
demolition thereof.

-People v. Acierto
"By the Agree it should be noted, the Philippine Government merely consents that the United
States exercise jurisdiction in certain cases. The consent was given purely as a matter of comity,
courtesy, or expediency. The Philippine Government has not abdicated its sovereignty over the
bases as part of the Philippine territory or divested itself completely of jurisdiction over offenses
committed therein. Under the terms of the treaty, the United States Government has prior or
preferential but not exclusive jurisdiction of such offenses. The Philippine Government retains not
only jurisdictional lights not granted, but also all such ceded rights as the United States Military
authorities for reasons of their own decline to make use of. The first proposition is implied from the
fact of Philippine sovereignty over the bases; the second from the express provisions of the treaty.
 -Reagan v. Commisioner of Internal Revenue
“Nothing is better settled than that the Philippines being independent and sovereign, its authority
may be exercised over its entire domain. There is no portion thereof that is beyond its power.
Within its limits, its decrees are supreme, its commands paramount. Its laws govern therein, and
everyone to whom it applies must submit to its terms. That is the extent of its jurisdiction, both
territorial and personal. Necessarily, likewise, it has to be exclusive. If it were not thus, there is a
diminution of it sovereignty.”

CONSTITUTION 1
PEOPLE VS PERFECTO
43 PHIL 887

SUBJECT OUTLINE: CONSTITUTION – BASIC CONCEPTS AND PRINCIPLES

FACTS:
● FERNANDO GUERERO, discovered disappearance of documents containing testimony of
witnesses in OIL COMPANIES INVESTIGATION.
● Informed the senate
● GREGORIO PERFECTO editor of LA NACION NEWS PAPER published: “THE AUTHOR/S
OF THE ROBBERY OF THE RECORDS FROM SAID IRON SAFE OF THE SENATE HAVE,
PERHAPS, FOLLOWED THE EAXMPLE OF CERTAIN SENATORS WHO SECURED THEIR
ELECTION THROUGH ROBBERY AND FRAUD.”
● Charged with violation of ARTICLE 256 of the SPANISH PENAL CODE

ISSUE:
● W/N PERFECTO IS LIABLE FOR LIBEL (NO)
RULING:
● POLITAL LAW: Article 256 pertains to DISPRESPECT or INSULTS to the MINISTERS OF
THE CROWN during the Spanish regime that has ceded after a US sovereignty. Thus, it
totally abrogated its relations to the citizens of the Philippines…
● It was repealed by RA 277 (Phil Libel Law), which has no retroactive effect on the accused..

RA 277 (PHIL. LIBEL LAW)

● Defines LIBEL as malicious defamation (writing, print, signs/pictures, or the like) defects one
alive, exposed to hatred.

Name: Rachell Ann Uson Subject: Consti

Case: BERNARDITA R. MACARIOLA, complainant, Syllabus:
vs. HONORABLE ELIAS B. ASUNCION, Judge of the Court of Module 2. Sovereignty
First Instance of Leyte, respondent.

Facts:

● Judge Asuncion was charged to have been told to violate Article 14 of the Code of Commerce
because there was a certain case involving a land dispute and ultimately there was a decision
made in that case. The land included in the mentioned case was later on acquired by him and
his wife.
 ● They alleged that Judge Asuncion violated Article 14 of the Code of Commerce because this
cited provision prohibits public officers from engaging any business

Issue: WON Judge Asuncion violated the Code of Commerce?

Ruling:
No, Judge Asuncion did not violate the Code of Commerce because it took effect in 1888 under the
Spanish Regime and this is a question for political law because there is a change in sovereignty
from Spain to the United States. The provision is deemed automatically abrogated. When there is a
change of Sovereignty, the political laws of the former sovereign whether compatible or not are
automatically abrogated unless they are explicitly reenacted by the affirmative act of the new
sovereign.
Hence, Judge Asuncion could have not violated the Code of Commerce because it was already
abrogated being a political law in nature. Supreme court also defined Political Law as that branch of
public law which deals with the organization and operation of the governmental organs of the State
and define the relations of the state with the inhabitants of its territory. Article 14 of the Code of
Commerce partakes more of the nature of an administrative law because it regulates the conduct of
certain public officers and employees with respect to engaging in business; hence, political in
essence.

Supporting Articles and Definition: From MyLegalWHiZ

Change in Sovereignty (Effect on Political Laws)

3. Under paragraphs 1 and 5, Article 14 of the Code of Commerce, justices and judged and certain public
officials cannot engage in commerce, either in person or by proxy, nor can they hold any office or have any
direct, administrative, or financial intervention in commercial or industrial companies within the limits of the
districts, provinces, or towns in which they discharge their duties.

4. The court held that although the above provision is incorporated in the Code of Commerce which is part of
the commercial laws of the Philippines, it, however, partakes of the nature of a political law as it regulates the
relationship between the government and certain public officers and employees, like justices and judges.

6. The present Spanish Code of Commerce of 1885 was extended to the Philippines by Royal Decree and
took effect as law in this jurisdiction on December 1, 1888. Upon the transfer of sovereignty from Spain to the
United States and later on from the United States to the Republic of the Philippines, Article 14 of this Code of
Commerce must be deemed to have been abrogated because where there is change of sovereignty, the
political laws of the former sovereign, whether compatible or not with those of the new sovereign, are
automatically abrogated, unless they are expressly re-enacted by affirmative act of the new sovereign.

7. There appears no enabling or affirmative act that continued the effectivity of the aforestated provision of the
Code of Commerce after the change of sovereignty from Spain to the United States and then to the Republic
of the Philippines. Consequently, Article 14 of the Code of Commerce has no legal and binding effect and
cannot apply to Judge Asuncion.

8. While municipal laws of the newly acquired territory not in conflict with the laws of the new sovereign
continue in force without the express assent or affirmative act of the conqueror, the political laws do not.
However, such political laws of the prior sovereignty as are not in conflict with the constitution or institutions of
the new sovereign, may be continued in force if the conqueror shall so declare by affirmative act of the
commander-in-chief during the war, or by Congress in time of peace (Roa vs. Collector of Customs)
 7. It is a general principle of the public law that on acquisition of territory the previous political relations of the
ceded region are totally abrogated

Judiciary not prohibited from engaging in lawful business or profession

8. Section 3(h) of Republic Act No. 3019 or the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, provides that public
officers are deemed to be enaged in corrupt practices by “directly or indirectly having financial or pecuniary
interest in any business, contract or transaction in connection with which he intervenes or takes part in his
official capacity, or in which he is prohibited by the Constitution or by any law from having any interest."

9. Judge Asuncion cannot be held liable under the said provision because there is no showing that he
participated or intervened in his official capacity in the business or transactions of the Traders Manufacturing
and Fishing Industries, Inc. The business of the corporation has obviously no relation or connection with his
judicial office.

10. It is not enough to be a public official to be subject to this crime: it is necessary that by reason of his office,
he has to intervene in said contracts or transactions; and, hence, the official who intervenes in contracts or
transactions which have no relation to his office cannot commit this crime.

11. There is no existing law expressly prohibiting members of the Judiciary from engaging or having interest
in any lawful business.

14. Vilas v. City of Manila c/o Rangiris

Name: De Guzman, Mark Daniel Subject: Consti Law 1

Case: Alcantara vs Director of Syllabus: Module 2, Sovereignty
Prisons Effect of Belligerent Occupation

Facts:
Petition is for the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus and for the release of the petitioner on the
ground that the latter is unlawfully imprisoned and restrained of his liberty by the respondent
Director of Prisons in the provincial jail at Vigan, Ilocos Sur.

Petitioner was convicted by the COFI, Ilocos Sur (Criminal case No. 23) crime of illegal discharge
of firearms with less serious physical injuries. CA Northern Luzon, Baguio modified decision and
sentenced the petitioner to an indeterminate penalty of from four months and twenty-one days of
arresto mayor to three years, nine months and three days of prision correccional. The sentence
as modified became final on September 12, 1944, and on June 23, 1945, petitioner commenced
serving his sentence.

Petitioner assail the decision of CA on sole ground that the said court was only a creation of the
Republic of the Philippines during the Japanese military occupation of the Philippine Islands and
that the Court of Appeals was not authorized by Commonwealth Act. No. 3 to hold sessions in
Baguio, and that only two Justices constituted the majority which promulgated the decision of his
case.
Issue:
W/N the Court of Appeals under the de facto government organized by the belligerent
occupant (Japanese Empire) with respect to its judicial acts were good and valid.
Ruling: SC En Banc DISMISSED the petition and ruled in favour of the respondent.

Even assuming that the Court of Appeals of Northern Luzon was a new court created by the
belligerent occupant or the de facto governments established by him, the judgments of such court,
like those of the courts which were continued during the Japanese occupation, were good
and valid and remained good and valid, and therefore enforceable now after the liberation or
reoccupation of the Philippines, provided that such judgments do not have a political complexion

Political Complexion refers to a penal sentence that penalizes a new act not defined in the municipal
laws or acts already penalized as a crime against a legitimate government, but taken out of the
context of territorial law and penalized as new offenses committed against the belligerent occupant.
Meaning, acts or omissions committed against the belligerent occupant (Japanese Empire) in the
case at bar.
Supporting Articles:
DE JOYA, J., concurring:
The principal question involved in this habeas corpus case is the validity of the judicial proceedings
held, during the Japanese occupation, in the Court First Instance of Ilocos Sur, in which herein
petitioner was accused of frustrated murder, and in the Court of Appeals of Northern Luzon, in which,
on appeal, said petitioner was found guilty of illegal discharge of firearms with less serious physical
injuries, and sentenced to a term of imprisonment ranging from four moths and twenty-one days of
arresto mayor to three years, and nine months and three days of prison correccional; and the effect
on said proceedings of the proclamation of General Douglas McArthur, dated October 24 1944. The
decision of this questions requires the application of principles of International Law, in connection
with the municipal law of this country.
Under the Constitution Commonwealth of the Philippines, International Law is part of the
Fundamental law of the land (Article II, sec. 3). As International Law is an integral part of our law, it
must be ascertained and administered by this Court, whenever question of right depending upon it
are presented for our determination (Kansas vs. Colorado, 185 U.S. 146; 22 Sup. Ct., 552; 46 Law.
ed., 838).
Since International Law is a body of rules accepted by nations as regulating their mutual relations,
the proof of their existence is to be found in the consent of the nations to abide by them; and this
consent is evidenced chiefly by the usages and customs of nation, as found in the writings of publicist
and in the decisions of the highest courts of the different countries of the world (The Habana, 175 U.
S., 677; 20 Sup. Ct., 290; 44 Law. ed., 320.).
But while usages and customs are the older original source of International Law, great international
treaties are a latter source of increasing importance, such as The Hogue Conventions of 1899 and
1907.
The Hague Conventions of 1899, respecting laws and customs of war on land, expressly declare
that:
ARTICLE XLII. Territory is considered occupied when it is actually placed under the authority of the
hostile army.
The occupation applies only to the territory where such authority is established, and in a position to
assert itself.
ART. XLII. The authority of the legitimate power having actually passed into the hands of the
occupant, the latter shall take all steps in his power to reestablish and insure, as far as possible,
public order and safety, while respecting, unless absolutely prevented, the laws in force in the
country. (32 Stat., II, 1821.).
The above provisions of the Hague Conventions have been adopted by the nations giving adherence
to them, among which is the United States of America (32 Stat., II, 1821).
The commander in chief of the invading forces or military occupant may exercise governmental
authority, but only when in actual possession of the enemy's territory, and this authority will be
exercised upon principles of International Law (New Orleans vs. Steamship Co. [1874], 20 Wall.,
387; Kelly vs. Sanders [1878], 99 U.S., 441; MacLeod vs. United States 229 U.S. 416; 33 Sup Ct.,
955; 57 Law. ed., 1260; II Oppenheim on International Law, sec. 167).
It will thus be readily seen that the civil laws of the invaded state continue in force, in so far as they
do not affect the hostile occupant unfavorably. The regular judicial tribunals of the occupied territory
continue to act in cases not affecting the military occupation, and is not usual for the invader to take
the whole administration into his own hands, because it is easier to preserve order through the
agency of the native officials, and also because the latter are more competent to administer the laws
of the territory; and the military occupant generally keeps in their posts such of the judicial and
administrative officers as are willing to serve under him, subjecting them only to supervision by the
military authorities, or by superior civil authorities appointed by him (Young vs. United States, 97 U.S.
39; 24 Law. ed 992; Coleman vs. Tennessee, 97 U.S. 509; 24 Law ed., 1118; MacLeod vs. United
States, 229 U.S. 416; 33 Sup Ct., 955; 57 Law. ed., 1260 Taylor, International Law, secs. 576, 578;
Wilson, International Law, pp. 331-337; Hall, International Law, 6th ed. [1909], pp. 464, 465, 475,
476; Lawrence, International Law, 7th ed., 412, 413; Davis, Elements of International Law, 3d ed.,
pp. 330-332, 335; Holland, International Law, pp. 356, 357, 359; Westlake, International Law, Part II,
2d ed., pp. 121-123).
In 1811, during the occupation of Catalonia, Spain, by the French army, a Frenchman, accused of
the murder of a Catalan in that province, was tried and convicted by the assize Court of the
Department of the Pyrenees Orientales, France. Upon appeal to the French Court of Cassation, the
conviction was quashed, on the ground that the courts of the territory within which the crime had
been committed had exclusive jurisdiction to try the case and that "the occupation of Catalonia by
French troops and its government by the French authorities had not communicated to its inhabitants
the character of French citizens, nor to their territory the character of French territory, and that such
character could only be acquired by a solemn act of incorporation which had not been gone through."
(Hall, International Law, 6th ed., p. 461.)
It is, therefore, evident that the establishment of the government under the name of the
Philippine Executive Commission, or the so-called Philippine Republic, afterwards, during
Japanese occupation, respecting the laws in force in the country, and permitting our courts
to function and administer said laws, as proclaim in the City of Manila, by the commander in
chief of the Japanese Imperial Forces, on January 3, 1942, was in accordance with the rules
and principles of International Law.
If the military occupant is thus in duty bound to establish in the territory under military occupation
governmental agencies for the preservation of peace and order and for the proper administration of
justice, in accordance with the local laws, it must necessarily follow that the judicial proceeding
conducted before the courts established by the military occupant must be considered legal and valid,
even after said government established by the military occupant had been displaced by the legitimate
government of the territory.
Thus the judgments rendered by the Confederate Courts, during the American Civil War, merely
setting the rights of private parties actually within their jurisdiction, not only tending to defeat the legal
rights of citizens of the United States, nor in furtherance of laws passed in aid of the rebellion, had
been declared valid and binding (Cook vs. Oliver, 1 Woods, 437; Fed. Cas., No. 3, 164; Coleman vs.
Tennessee, 97 U.S., 509;24 Law. ed., 1118; Williams vs. Bruffy, 96 U.S. 176; Horn vs. Lockhart, 17
Wall., 570; Sprott vs. United States, 20 Wall., 459; Texas vs. White, 7 Wall., 700; Ketchum vs.
Buckley [1878], 99 U.S., 188); and the judgment of a court of Georgia rendered in November, 1861,
for the purchase money slaves was held valid judgment when entered, and enforceable in 1871
(French vs. Tumllin, 10 Am. Law. Reg. [N.S.], 641; Fed. Case, No. 5104).
The judgments by the courts of the states constituting the Confederate States of the America were
considered legal and valid and enforceable, even after the termination of the American Civil War,
because they had been rendered by the courts of a de facto government. The Confederate States
were a de facto government, in the sense that its citizens were bound to render the government
obedience in civil matters, and did not become responsible, as wrong-doers, for such act of
obedience (Thorington vs. Smith, 8 Wall. [U.S.] 9; 19 Law ed., 361).
In the more recent case of Ketchum vs. Buckley ([1878], 99 U.S., 188), the Supreme Court of the
United States held-- "It is now settled law in this court that during the late civil war the same general
law for the administration of justice and the protection of private rights, which had existed in the
States prior to the rebellion, remained during its continuance and afterwards. As far as the acts of
the States did not impair or tend to impair the supremacy of the national authority, or the just rights
of the citizens, under the Constitution, they are in general to be treated as valid and binding."
(Williams vs. Bruffy, 96 U.S., 176; Horn vs. Lockhart, 17 Wall., 570; Sprott vs. United States, 20 Wall.,
459; Texas vs. White 7 Wall., 700.)
The government established in the Philippines, during Japanese occupation, would seem to fall
under the following definition of de facto government given by the Supreme Court of the United
States:
But there is another description of government de facto, called also by publicists a government de
facto, but which might, perhaps, he more aptly denominated a government of paramount force. Its
distinguishing characteristics (1) that its existence is maintained by active military power within the
territories, and against the rightful authority of an established and lawful government; and (2) that
while it exists it must necessarily be obeyed in civil matters by private citizens who by acts of
obedience rendered in submission to such force, do not become responsible, as wrongdoers, for
those acts though not warranted by the laws of the rightful government. Actual governments of this
sort are established over districts differing greatly in extent and conditions. They are usually
administered directly by military authority, but they may be administered, also, by civil authority,
supported more or less directly by military force. (MacLeod vs. United States [1913], 229 U.S., 416.)
The government established in the Philippines, under the Philippine Executive Commission or under
the so-called Philippine Republic, during Japanese occupation, was and should, therefor, be
considered as a de facto government; and that the judicial proceedings conducted before the courts
has been established in this country, during said Japanese occupation, and are should be considered
as legal and valid enforceable, even after the liberation of this country by the American forces, as a
long a said judicial proceedings had been conducted, in accordance with the law of the
Commonwealth of the Philippines.
The judicial proceedings involved in the case under consideration merely refer to the prosecution of
the petitioner in this case, for the crime of frustrated murder, which was reduced to illegal discharge
of firearms with less serious physical injuries, under the provisions of the Revised Penal Code, in
force in this country under the Commonwealth government, before and during Japanese occupation.
Now, petitioner contends that the judicial proceedings in question are null and void, and that the
accused should be immediately released from the custody, under the provisions of the proclamation
issued by General Douglas McArthur dated October 23, 1944; as said proclamation nullifies all the
laws, regulations and processes of any other government in the Philippines than that of the
Commonwealth of the Philippines.
In other words petition demands a literal interpretation of said proclamation issued by the General
Douglas McArthur, a contention which, in our opinion, is untenable, as it would inevitably produce
judicial chaos and uncertainties. When an act is susceptible of two or more constructions, one of
which will maintain and the others destroy it, the Courts will always adopt the former (United States
vs. Coombs [1838]], 12 Pet., 72; 9 Law. ed., 1004; Board of Supervisors of Grenada County vs.
Brown [1884], 112 U.S., 261; 28 Law. ed., 704; 5 Sup. Ct. Rep., 125; In re Guariña [1913], 24 Phil.,
37; Fuentes vs. Director of Prisons [1924], 46 Phil., 22; Yu Cong Eng vs. Trinidad [1925], 47 Phil.,
385). The judiciary, always alive to the dictates of national welfare, can properly incline the scales of
its decisions in favor of that solution which will most effectively promote the public policy (Smith, Bell
& Co., Ltd. vs. Natividad [1919], 40 Phil., 136). All laws should receive a sensible construction as not
to lead it injustice, oppression or an absurd consequence. It will always, therefore, be presumed that
the legislature intended exception to its language, which would avoid results of this character. The
reason of the law in such cases should prevail over its letter (United States vs. Kirby, 7 Wall [U.S.],
482; 19 Law. ed, 278; Church of Holy Trinity vs. United States, 143 U.S., 461; 12 Sup. Ct., 511; 36
Law. ed., 226; Jacobson vs. Massachussetts, 197 U.S., 39; 25 Sup. Ct., 358; 49 Law. ed., 643; 3
Ann. Cas., 765; In re Allen, 2 Phil., 630). The duty of the court in construing a statute, which is
reasonably susceptible of two constructions to adopt that which saves its constitutionality, includes
the duty of a avoiding a construction which raises grave and doubtful constitutional questions, if it
can be avoided (United States vs. Delaware & Hudson Co., 213 U.S., 366; 29 Sup. Ct. 527; 53 Law.
ed., 836).
According to the rules and principles of International Law, and the legal doctrines cited above, the
judicial proceedings conducted before the court of the justice, established here during Japanese
military occupation, merely applying the provisions of the municipal law of the territory, as the
provisions of the Revised Penal Code in the instant case which have no political or military
significance, are and should be considered legal, valid and binding. It is to be presumed that General
Douglas McArthur knows said rules and principles of International Law, as International Law is an
integral part of the fundamental law of the land, in accordance with the provisions of the Constitution
of the United States. And it is also to be presumed that General Douglas McArthur has acted, in
accordance with said principles of International Law, which have been sanction by the Supreme
Court of the United States, as the nullification of all judicial proceedings conducted before our courts,
during the Japanese occupation would be highly detrimental to public interests.
For the forgoing reasons, I concur in the majority opinion, and the petition for habeas corpus filed in
this case should, therefore, be denied.

Name: Joannie Lumbao Subject: Consti

Case: Republic v. Sandoval Syllabus: State Immunity
Facts:
|||Following the “Mendiola Massacre”25 in 1987, Pres. Aquino created the Citizen’s Mendiola
Commission for the purpose of conducting an investigation of the disorder. She also joined the
farmers-marchers days after the ill-fated incident as an “act of solidarity” and promised that the
government would address the grievances of the rallyists. The Mendiola Commission
recommended, among others, that the victims be compensated by the government. Whereupon,
the petitioners filed a formal letter of demand for compensation. Due to the apparent inaction by the
government, the petitioners sued for damages against the Republic. The Solicitor General
contends that this is a case of the State being sued without its consent. Petitioners countered and
maintained that the State consented to suit when the Commission recommended that the victims
be indemnified. They likewise contend that the actuations of Pres. Aquino following the incident
constitute a waiver of the State immunity. Judge Sandoval upheld the State.
Issue:
(1) Did the State waive its immunity from suit?
(2) Does this case qualify as a suit against the State?
Ruling:
 No. The recommendation made by the Mendiola Commission regarding indemnification of
the victims of the incident by the gov’t does not in any way mean that liability automatically
attaches to the State. Notably, A.O. No. 11 which created the Commission expressly states that
its purpose was to conduct an “investigation of the disorder, deaths and casualties that took
place.” Evidently, it is only a fact-finding committee so that whatever may be its findings, the same
shall only serve as the cause of action in the event that any party decides to litigate his claim. Its
recommendations cannot in any way bind the State immediately, such recommendation not
having been final and executory. The President’s actuations likewise cannot be taken as a waiver
of State immunity. The act of jointing the marchers days after the incident, to borrow the words of
the petitioners, was but “an act of solidarity by the government with the people”. Her promise to
address the rallyists’ grievances cannot in itself give rise to the inference that the State has
admitted any liability, much less can it be inferred therefrom that it has consented to the suit.
No. While the Republic in this case is sued by name, the ultimate liability does not pertain
to the govt. Although the anti-riot forces were discharging their official functions when the incident
occurred, their functions ceased to be official the moment they exceeded their authority. Based
on the Commission findings, there was lack of justification by the government forces in the use of
firearms. Moreover, the members of the anti-riot forces committed an unlawful act as there was
unnecessary firing by them in dispersing the marchers.26 An officer cannot shelter himself by the
plea that he is a public agent acting under the color of his office when his acts are wholly without
authority.
An officer who acts outside the scope of his jurisdiction and without the authorization of
law renders himself amenable to personal liability in a civil suit. If he exceeds the power conferred
on him by law, he cannot shelter himself by the plea that he is a public agent acting under color
of his office.
Supporting Articles:
The so-called Mendiola Massacre was the well-publicized disordered
dispersal of the thousands of farmers-rallyists who were unsatisfied with the
agrarian reform program. The clash between the police anti-riot forces and the
farmers-rallyists resulted in 12 marchers confirmed dead, 39 wounded by gunshots
and 12 with minor injuries.
Magallona vs. Ermita

Summary Cases:

● Merlin M. Magallona vs. Eduardo Ermita

Subject: National territory, UNCLOS, baselines, internal waters, archipelagic waters

Facts:
Republic Act No. 3046 (RA 3046) demarcated the baselines of the Philippines and codified the right of
State parties under the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) I over their
territorial sea. The breadth, however, was not determined. Congress amended RA 3046 by enacting
Republic Act No. 9522 to comply with the terms of UNCLOS III. RA 9522 shortened one baseline,
optimized the location of some basepoints and classified the Kalayaan Island Group (KIG) and
Scarborough Shoal as "regimes of islands" which generate their own maritime zones.
This original action assails the constitutionality of RA 9522 on the ground that: (1) RA 9522 reduces
Philippine maritime territory in violation of Article 1 of the 1987 Constitution; and (2) RA 9522 opens the
country's waters landwards of the baselines to maritime passage by all vessels and aircrafts.
Held:
National Territory
1. UNCLOS III is not concerned with the acquisition or loss of territory. It is a multilateral treaty regulating,
among others, sea-use rights over maritime zones and continent shelves that UNCLOS III delimits.
2. Baseline laws are mere statutory mechanisms enacted simply to mark-out the basepoints from which
baselines are drawn to serve as the starting points from which to measure the breadth of the maritime
zones and continental shelf.
3. The baselines of the Philippines have to be drawn in accordance with RA 9522 because this law
conforms to UNCLOS III
4. States acquire or lose territory through occupation, accretion, cession and prescription and not by
executing multilateral treaties on the regulations of sea-use rights or enacting statutes to comply with the
treaty's terms to delimit maritime zones and continental shelves.
Regime of Islands
5. RA 9522 which classified the KIG and Scarborough Shoal as "regime of islands" does not weaken the
Philippines' claim of sovereignty. In fact, RA 9522 recognizes that the Philippines exercise sovereignty
and jurisdiction over these areas.
6. If RA 9522 enclosed KIG and Scarborough Shoal as part of the Philippine archipelago, the Philippines
would have committed a breach of two provisions of UNCLOS III:
(a) Article 47 (3) of UNCLOS III requires that "[t]he drawing of such baselines shall not depart to
any appreciable extent from the general configuration of the archipelago."
(b) Article 47 (2) of UNCLOS III requires that "the length of the baselines shall not exceed 100
nautical miles, save for three per cent (3%) of the total number of baselines which can reach up to
125 nautical miles."
Internal Waters
7. UNCLOS III and RA 9522 complies with the Constitution's delineation of internal waters
8. Whether referred to as "internal waters" under Article I of the Constitution or "archipelagic waters"
under UNCLOS III, Article 49 of the UNCLOS recognizes that a State party has sovereignty over the
body of water lying landward of the baselines, including the air space over it and the submarine areas
underneath.
9. Sovereignty, however, does not preclude the operation of international law subjecting the territorial
sea or archipelagic waters to burdens of maintaining unimpeded, expeditious international navigation
consistent with the principle of freedom of navigation.
10.To comply with international law, the Congress may pass laws designating routes within the
archipelagic waters to regulate innocent and sea lanes passage.

| Page 1 of 1
Edu vs. Ericta (1970)

Summary Cases:

● Edu vs. Ericta

Subject: Propriety of passing upon the constitutionality of the Reflector Law and the validity of
Administrative Order No. 2 to implement such law; Reflector Law enacted under the police power to
promote public safety; Police Power, defined; Rejection of the Laissez-faire principle under the 1935
Constitution; No undue delegation of legislative power as long as there is a standard provided in the
statute that will guide the implementing agency; Principle of "subordinate legislation"

Facts:

Teddy Galo, on his behalf and that of other motorist, filed a suit assailing the validity of the Reflector Law
as an invalid exercise of police power, for being violative of the due process clause. As an alternative
remedy, he sought that Administrative Order No. 2 of the Land Transportation Commissioner Edu,
implementing such legislation, be nullified for being in excess of the authority conferred and therefore
violative of the principle of non-delegation of legislative power.

Judge Ericta ordered the issuance of a preliminary injunction directed against the enforcement of the
Administrative Order. Hence this petition for certiorari and prohibition filed by Transportation
Commissioner Edu. The matter of the constitutionality of the Reflector Law was put in issue.

Held: Reflector Law is constitutional. Administrative Order No. 2 is valid.

Propriety of passing upon the constitutionality of the Reflector Law and the validity of
Administrative Order No. 2 to implement such law

1. The threshold question is whether it would be proper for this Court to resolve the issue of the
constitutionality of the Reflector Law. Our answer is in the affirmative. Since the special civil action for
certiorari and prohibition would seek a declaration of nullity of such enactment being in violation of the
due process guarantee in the deprivation of property rights. There is a great public interest to be served
by the final disposition of such crucial issue.

2. There is no principle of constitutional adjudication that bars this Court from similarly passing upon the
question of the validity of a legislative enactment in a proceeding before it to test the propriety of the
issuance of a preliminary injunction. The same need for resolving once and for all the vexing question as
to the constitutionality of a challenged enactment and thus serve public interest exists. What we have
done in the case of an order proceeding from one of the coordinate branches, the executive, we can very
well do in the matter before us involving the alleged nullity of a legislative act.

Reflector Law enacted under the police power to promote public safety

3. The Reflector Law reads in full: "(g) Lights and reflector when parked or disabled. — Appropriate
parking lights or flares visible one hundred meters away shall be displayed at a corner of the vehicle
whenever such vehicle is parked on highways or in places that are not well-lighted or is placed in such
manner as to endanger passing traffic. Furthermore, every motor vehicle shall be provided at all times
with built-in reflectors or other similar warning devices either pasted, painted or attached to its front and
back which shall likewise be visible at light at least one hundred meters away. No vehicle not provided
with any of the requirements mentioned in this subsection shall be registered." It is thus obvious that the
challenged statute is a legislation enacted under the police power to promote public safety.
| Page 1 of 4
4. It would be to close one's eyes to the hazards of traffic in the evening to condemn a statute of this
character. Such an attitude betrays lack of concern for public safety. The statute assailed is not infected
with arbitrariness. It is not the product of whim or caprice. It is far from oppressive. It is a legitimate
response to a felt public need.

Police Power, defined

5. Police power identified with state authority to enact legislation that may interfere with personal liberty
or property in order to promote the general welfare. Persons and property could thus "be subjected to all
kinds of restraints and burdens in order to secure the general comfort, health and prosperity of the state.
(Calalang v. Williams)

6. The power to prescribe regulations to promote the health, morals, peace, education, good order or
safety, and general welfare of the people. (Primicias v. Fugoso)

7. The greatest and most powerful attribute of government. It is to quote Justice Malcolm "the most
essential, insistent, and at least illimitable of powers," extending as Justice Holmes aptly pointed out "to
all the great public needs." Its scope, ever-expanding to meet the exigencies of the times, even to
anticipate the future where it could be done, provides enough room for an efficient and flexible response
to conditions and circumstances thus assuring the greatest benefits. In the language of Justice Cardozo:
"Needs that were narrow or parochial in the past may be interwoven in the present with the well-being of
the nation. What is critical or urgent changes with the time." The police power is thus a dynamic agency,
suitably vague and far from precisely defined, rooted in the conception that men in organizing the state
and imposing upon its government limitations to safeguard constitutional rights did not intend thereby to
enable an individual citizen or a group of citizens to obstruct unreasonably the enactment of such
salutary measures calculated to insure communal peace, safety, good order, and welfare.

Rejection of the Laissez-faire principle under the 1935 Constitution

8. Respondent Galo relies on American Jurisprudence. He ought to have been cautioned against an
indiscriminate acceptance of such doctrines predicated on what was once a fundamental postulate in
American public law, laissez faire.

9. While authoritative precedents from the United States federal and state jurisdictions were deferred to
when the Philippines was still under American rule, it cannot be said that the laissez-faire principle was
invariably adhered to by us even then. As early as 1919 in Rubi v. Provincial Board of Mindoro, Justice
Malcolm already had occasion to affirm: "The doctrines of laissez-faire and of unrestricted freedom of the
individual, as axioms of economic and political theory, are of the past. The modern period has shown a
widespread belief in the amplest possible demonstration of government activity."

10. The Constitutional Convention (for 1935 Constitution) saw to it that the concept of laissez-faire was
rejected. It entrusted to our government the responsibility of coping with social and economic problems
with the commensurate power of control over economic affairs. Thereby it could live up to its
commitment to promote the general welfare through state action. No constitutional objection to
regulatory measures adversely affecting property rights, especially so when public safety is the aim, is
likely to be heeded, unless of course on the clearest and most satisfactory proof of invasion of rights
guaranteed by the Constitution. On such a showing, there may be a declaration of nullity, but not
because the laissez-faire principle was disregarded but because the due process, equal protection, or
non-impairment guarantees would call for vindication.

No undue delegation of legislative power as long as there is a standard provided in the statute
| Page 2 of 4
that will guide the implementing agency

11. It is a fundamental principle flowing from the doctrine of separation of powers that Congress may not
delegate its legislative power to the two other branches of the government, subject to the exception that
local governments may over local affairs participate in its exercise. What cannot be delegated is the
authority under the Constitution to make laws and to alter and repeal them; the test is the completeness
of the statute in all its term and provisions when it leaves the hands of the legislature. To determine
whether or not there is an undue delegation of legislative power the inquiry must be directed to the scope
and definiteness of the measure enacted. The legislature does not abdicate its functions when it
describes what job must be done, who is to do it, and what is the scope of his authority. For a complex
economy, that may indeed be the only way in which the legislative process can go forward. A distinction
has rightfully been made between delegation of power to make the laws which necessarily involves a
discretion as to what it shall be, which constitutionally may not be done, and delegation of authority or
discretion as to its execution to be exercised under and in pursuance of the law, to which no valid
objection call be made.

12. To avoid the taint of unlawful delegation, there must be a standard, which implies at the very least
that the legislature itself determines matters of principle and lay down fundamental policy. Otherwise, the
charge of complete abdication may be hard to repel. A standard thus defines legislative policy, marks its
limits, its maps out its boundaries and specifies the public agency to apply it. It indicates the
circumstances under which the legislative command is to be effected. It is the criterion by which
legislative purpose may be carried out. Thereafter, the executive or administrative office designated may
in pursuance of the above guidelines promulgate supplemental rules and regulations.

13. The standard may be either express or implied. If the former, the non-delegation objection is
easily met. The standard though does not have to be spelled out specifically. It could be implied from
the policy and purpose of the act considered as a whole. In the Reflector Law, clearly the legislative
objective is public safety.

Principle of "subordinate legislation"

14. The principle of non-delegation has been made to adapt itself the complexities of modern
governments, giving rise to the adoption, within certain limits, of the principle of "subordinate
legislation" not only in the United States and England but in practically all modern governments.
Accordingly, with the growing complexity of modern life, the multiplication of the subjects of
governmental regulation, and the increased difficulty of administering the laws, there is a constantly
growing tendency toward the delegation of greater powers by the legislature and toward the approval of
the practice by the courts." What is delegated is authority non-legislative in character, the completeness
of the statute when it leaves the hands of Congress being assumed.

15. It is well established in this jurisdiction that, while the making of laws is a non-delegable activity that
corresponds exclusively to Congress, nevertheless the latter may constitutionally delegate authority to
promulgate rules and regulations to implement a given legislation and effectuate its policies, for the
reason that the legislature often finds it impracticable (if not impossible) to anticipate and proved for the
multifarious and complex situations that may be met in carrying the law in effect. All that is required is
that the regulation should germane to the objects and purposes of the law; that the regulation be
not in contradiction with it; but conform to the standards that the law prescribes.

16. The Reflector Law, construed together with the Land Transportation Code (Republic Act No. 4136),
of which it is an amendment, leaves no doubt as to the stress and emphasis on public safety which is the
prime consideration in statutes of this character. There is likewise a categorical affirmation of the power
| Page 3 of 4
of petitioner as Land Transportation Commissioner to promulgate rules and regulations to give life to and
translate into actuality such fundamental purpose. His power is clear. There has been no abuse.

| Page 4 of 4
Government of the Philippine Islands vs. Monte de Piedad (1916)

Summary Cases:

● Government of the Philippine Islands vs Monte de Piedad

Subject: $80,000 not intended as a donation to Monte de Piedad, but a returnable loan; Effect of
cessation of the Philippine Island to the United States on the action to recover the loan; Constitutionality
of Act No. 2109;

Facts:

About $400,000 were subscribed and paid into the Treasury of the Philippine Islands by the inhabitants
of the Spanish Dominions for the relief of those damages by the earthquake which took place in the
Philippine Islands on June 3, 1863. A central relief board was appointed, by authority of the King of
Spain, to distribute the moneys. The relief board allotted $365,703.50, and, by order of the
Governor-General of the Philippine Islands, a list of these allotments, together with the names of those
entitled thereto, was published in the Official Gazette of Manila in 1870 (Allotment List).

On February 1, 1833, the governing body of the Monte de Piedad filed a petition addressed to the
Governor-General of the Philippine Islands, in which it stated that the funds which the said institution
counted upon are nearly all invested in loans on jewelry and that the small amount remaining will
scarcely suffice to cover the transactions of the next two days. The petition was granted and the
Philippine Government directed its treasurer to turn over to the Monte de Piedad y Caja de Ahorros the
sum of $80,000 of the relief fund in installments of $20,000 each.

Thereafter, the Philippine Legislature passed Act No. 2109 directing the Treasurer of the Philippine
Islands to bring suit against the Monte de Piedad to recover the $80,000 for the benefit of those persons
appearing in the list of names published in the Official Gazette. After due trial, judgment was entered in
favor of the Government for the sum of $80,000 gold or its equivalent in Philippine currency, together
with legal interest from February 28, 1912.

Monte de Piedad, in appealing the judgment, claims that the $80,000 was so given as a donation subject
to one condition: the return of the money to the Spanish Government of these Islands, within eight days
following the day when claimed, in case the Supreme Government of Spain should not approve the
action taken by the former government.

Monte de Piedad further questions the rulings of the court that: (a) the Government of the Philippine
Islands has subrogated the Spanish Government in its rights; (b) Act Numbered 2109 is constitutional; (c)
there is no prescription for the Government to file the present suit for reimbursement of the $80,000

Held:

$80,000 not intended as a donation to Monte de Piedad, but a returnable loan

1. The Monte de Piedad, after setting forth in its petition to the Governor-General its absolute necessity
for more working capital, asked that out of the sum of $100,000 held in the Treasury of the Philippine
Islands, at the disposal of the central relief board, there be transferred to it the sum of $80,000 to be held
under the same conditions, to wit, "at the disposal of the relief board." The Monte de Piedad agreed that
if the transfer of these funds should not be approved by the Government of Spain, the same would be
returned forthwith. It did not ask that the $80,000 be given to its as a donation.

| Page 1 of 4
2. It may be inferred from the royal orders that the Madrid Government did tacitly approve of the transfer
of the $80,000 to the Monte de Piedad as a loan without interest, but that Government certainly did not
approve such transfer as a donation for the reason that the Governor-General was directed by the royal
order of December 3, 1892, to inform the Madrid Government of the total available sum of the
earthquake fund, "taking into consideration the sums delivered to the Monte de Piedad pursuant to the
decree issued by your general Government on February 1, 1883."

3. Further, Monte de Piedad well knew that it received this sum as a loan, for it appears in its books that
it received the amount from the general treasury "as a returnable loan, and without interest." The amount
was thus carried in its books until January, 1899, when it was transferred to the account of the "Sagrada
Mitra"

4. Monte de Piedad claims the national subscription of $80,000 as a kind of pious work, for a charitable
purpose, by the Spanish King, who was a patron and protector of charitable institutions in his kingdoms,
and the entire subscription not being needed for its original purpose, the Governor-General of the
Philippines, as royal vice-patron, with the consent of the King, gave the surplus thereof to an analogous
purpose.

5. The above contention is untenable for two reasons, (1) such contention is based upon the erroneous
theory that the sum in question was a donation to the Monte de Piedad and not a loan, and (2) the
record shows clearly that the fund was given by the donors for a specific and definite purpose ---- the
relief of the earthquake sufferers ---- and for no other purpose. The Spanish government remitted the
money to the Philippine Government to be distributed among the sufferers. The church, as such, had
nothing to do with the fund in any way whatever until the $80,000 reached the coffers of the Monte de
Piedad (an institution under the control of the church) as a loan or deposit. If the charity has been
founded as an ecclesiastical pious work, the King of Spain and the Governor-General, in their capacities
as vicar-general of the Indies and as royal vice-patron, would have disposed of the fund as such and not
in their civil capacities, and such functions could not have been transferred to the present Philippine
Government, because the right to so act would have arisen out of the special agreement between the
Government of Spain and the Holy See, based on the union of the church and state which was
completely separated with the change of sovereignty.

Effect of cessation of the Philippine Island to the United States on the action to recover the loan

6. It is further contended that the obligation on the part of the Monte de Piedad to return the $80,000 to
the Government, even considering it a loan, was wiped out on the change of sovereignty, or in other
words, the present Philippine Government cannot maintain this action for that reason.

7. While the obligation to return the $80,000 to the Spanish Government was still pending, war between
the United States and Spain ensued. Under the Treaty of Paris of December 10, 1898, the Philippine
Islands was ceded to the United States for the sum of $20,000,000. As the $80,000 were not included
therein, it is said that the right to recover this amount did not, therefore, pass to the present sovereign.
This, in our opinion, does not follow as a necessary consequence, as the right to recover does not rest
upon the proposition that the $80,000 must be "other immovable property" mentioned in article 8 of the
treaty, but upon contractual obligations incurred before the Philippine Islands were ceded to the United
States.

8. The Central Relief Board was constituted under article 1 of the law of June 20, 1849, and the royal
decree of April 27, 1875.
We will now inquire what effect this cession had upon these laws. If the legal provisions are in conflict
with the political character, constitution or institutions of the new sovereign, they became inoperative, but
| Page 2 of 4
if they are among "that great body of municipal law which regulates private and domestic rights," they
continued in force and are still in force unless they have been repealed by the present Government. That
they fall within the latter class is clear from their very nature and character. They are laws which are not
political in any sense of the word. They conferred upon the Spanish Government the right and duty to
supervise, regulate, and to some extent control charities and charitable institutions.

9. It is further urged that "the only persons who could claim to be damaged by this payment to the Monte,
if it was unlawful, are the donor or the cestuis que trustent, and this Government is neither.
Consequently, the plaintiff is not the proper party to bring the action." The earthquake fund was the result
or the accumulation of a great number of small contributions. The names of the contributors do not
appear in the record. Their whereabouts are unknown. The impracticability of pursuing a different course,
however, is not the true ground upon which the right of the Government to maintain the action rests. The
true ground is that the money being given to a charity became, in a measure, public property and
became part of the public resources for promoting the happiness and welfare of the Philippine
Government. To deny the Government's right to maintain this action would be contrary to sound public
policy, as tending to discourage the prompt exercise of similar acts of humanity and Christian
benevolences in like instances in the future.

10. Further, upon the cession of the Philippine Islands the prerogatives of the crown of Spain devolved
upon the United States. under US doctrine, the legislature or government of the State, as parens partiae,
has the right to enforce all charities of a public nature, by virtue of its general superintending authority
over the public interests, where no other person is entrusted with it.

Constitutionality of Act No. 2109

11. As to the constitutionality of Act No. 2109, we have just held the present Philippine Government is
the proper party to the action. The Act is only a manifestation on the part of the Philippine Government to
exercise the power or right which it undoubtedly had. The Act is not in conflict with the fifth section of the
Act of Congress of July 1, 1902, because it does not take property without due process of law. In fact,
the defendant is not the owner of the $80,000, but holds it as a loan subject to the disposal of the central
relief board. Therefore, there can be nothing in the Act which transcends the power of the Philippine
Legislature.

Right of action to recover had not prescribed

12. It is argued that as the Monte de Piedad declined to return the $80,000 when ordered to do so by the
Department of Finance in June, 1893, the plaintiff's right of action had prescribed at the time this suit was
instituted on May 3, 1912,

13. Counsel for the defendant treat the question of prescription as if the action was one between
individuals or corporations wherein the plaintiff is seeking to recover an ordinary loan. Upon this theory
June, 1893, cannot be taken as the date when the statute of limitations began to run, for the reason that
the defendant acknowledged in writing on March 31, 1902, that the $80,000 were received as a loan,
thereby in effect admitting that it still owed the amount.

14. Moreover, the Philippine Government is not bound by the statute of limitations. In Gibson vs.
Chouteau: "It is a matter of common knowledge that statutes of limitation do not run against the State.
That no laches can be imputed to the King, and that no time can bar his rights. The maxim of the
common law was founded was founded on the principle of public policy, that as he was occupied with
the cares of government he ought not to suffer from the negligence of his officers and servants. The
principle is applicable to all governments, which must necessarily act through numerous agents, and is
| Page 3 of 4
essential to a preservation of the interests and property of the public. It is upon this principle that in this
country the statutes of a State prescribing periods within which rights must be prosecuted are not held to
embrace the State itself, unless it is expressly designated or the mischiefs to be remedies are of such a
nature that it must necessarily be included."

15. In the instant case the Philippine Government is not a mere nominal party because it, in bringing and
prosecuting this action, is exercising its sovereign functions or powers and is seeking to carry out a trust
devolved upon it when the Philippine Islands were ceded to the United States.

| Page 4 of 4
Co Kim Chan v. Valdez Tan Keh

Summary Cases:

● Co Kim Chan vs. Valdez Tan Keh 75 Phil 113

Subject: De Facto Government; Postliminy in International Law; Belligerent Occupation

Facts:

This involves a petition for mandamus praying that the respondent judge of the lower court be ordered
to continue the proceedings in a civil case before said court. The proceedings were initiated under the
regime of the government (called Republic of the Philippines) established during the Japanese military
occupation.

The respondent judge refused to take cognizance of and continue the proceedings in the said case on
the ground that the proclamation issued by General Douglas MacArthur, upon American re-occupation,
had the effect of invalidating all judicial proceedings and judgements of the court of the Philippines
under the Japanese military occupation, and that, the lower courts have no jurisdiction to take
cognizance of and continue judicial proceedings pending in the courts of the defunct Republic of the
Philippines in the absence of an enabling law granting such authority.

The respondent judge likewise contends that the government established in the Philippines during the
Japanese occupation were not de facto governments.

Held:

De Facto Government

All acts and proceedings of the legislative, executive, and judicial departments of a de facto
government are good and valid.
There are three kinds of de facto governments.
| Page 1 of 3
(a) Government de facto in the proper legal sense-- that government that gets possession and control
of, or usurps, by force or by the voice of the majority, the rightful legal governments and maintains
itself against the will of the latter.

(b) Government of paramount force-- that which is established and maintained by military forces who
invade and occupy a territory of the enemy in the course of war.

(c) That established as an independent government by the inhabitants of a country who rise in
insurrection against the parent state

The Philippine Executive Commission and the Republic of the Philippines, both governments
established during the Japanese military occupation, are de facto governments of the second kind.
The fact that they were a civil and not a military government and was run by Filipinos and not by
Japanese nationals, is of no consequence. The ultimate source of its authority was the same ? the
Japanese military authority and government.

Being de facto governments, it necessarily follows that the judicial acts and proceedings of the courts
of justice of those governments, which are not of a political complexion, were good and valid, and, by
virtue of the well-known principle of postliminy (postliminium) in international law, remained good and
valid after the liberation or reoccupation of the Philippines under the leadership of General Douglas
MacArthur.

Courts are creatures of statutes and such laws, not being a political nature, are not abrogated by a
change of sovereignty, and continue in force "ex proprio vigore" unless and until repealed by
legislative acts. A proclamation that said laws and courts are expressly continued is not necessary.
Principle of Postliminy

According to that principle in international law, the fact that a territory which has been occupied by an
enemy comes again into the power of its legitimate government of sovereignty, does not, except in a
very few cases, wipe out the effects of acts done by an invader, which for one reason or another it is
within his competence to do. Thus judicial acts done under his control, when they are not of a political
complexion, administrative acts so done, to the extent that they take effect during the continuance of
his control, and the various acts done during the same time by private persons under the sanction of
municipal law, remain good.

Effects of a belligerent occupation

| Page 2 of 3
According to the precepts of the Hague Conventions, the belligerent occupant:
(i) possesses all the powers of a de facto government;

(ii) can suspend the old laws and promulgate new ones and make such changes in the old as he may
see fit;

(iii) the municipal laws in force in the country must be respected, unless absolutely prevented by the
circumstances prevailing in the occupied territory.

(i.e. affect private rights of person and property and provide for the punishment of crime);

(iv) laws of a political nature or affecting political relations are considered as suspended during the
military occupation

(i.e. right of assembly, the right to bear arms, the freedom of the press, and the right to travel freely in
the territory occupied);

(v) local ordinary tribunals are authorized to continue administering justice; judges and other judicial
officers are kept in their posts if they accept the authority of the belligerent occupant or are required to
continue in their positions under the supervision of the military or civil authorities appointed.

(vi) There is no transfer of sovereignty during a belligerent occupation. The occupation, being
essentially provisional, does not serve to transfer sovereignty over the territory controlled. The de jure
government, during the period of occupancy, is deprived of the power to exercise its rights as such.
(Note: There is no suspension of sovereignty during a belligerent occupation, but merely the
suspension of the exercise of sovereignty by the de jure government)

| Page 3 of 3
People vs. Gregorio Perfecto (1922)

Summary Cases:

● People vs. Gregorio Perfecto 43 Phil 887

Subject: Repealing effect of the Philippine Libel Law (Act No. 277) on Article 256 of the Spanish Penal
Code; Effect of the change of occupation (from Spanish to American sovereignty) on the political and
municipal laws; Article 256 of the Spanish Penal Code, being inconsistent with the American Constitution,
have been abrogated by implication upon the establishment of the new system of government

Facts:

At about August 20, 1920, the Secretary of the Philippine Senate, Fernando M. Guerrero, discovered
that certain documents which constituted the records of testimony given by witnesses in the investigation
of oil companies, had disappeared from his office. Secretary Guerrero informed the Philippine Senate of
the loss of the documents and of the steps taken by him to discover the guilty party. The day following
the covening of the Senate, September 7, 1920, the newspaper La Nacion, edited by Mer. Gregorio
Perfecto, published an article, a portion of which states “..."The author or authors of the robbery of the
records from the said iron safe of the Senate have, perhaps, but followed the example of certain
Senators who secured their election through fraud and robbery."

As a result, an information was filed in the municipal court of the city of Manila by an assistant city fiscal,
in which the editorial in question was alleged to have constituted a violation of article 256 of the Penal
Code. The defendant Gregorio Perfecto was found guilty in the municipal court and again in the Court of
First Instance (CFI) of Manila.

On the subject of whether or not article 256 of the Penal Code is in force, the CFI judge considered
himself bound to follow the rule announced in the case of United States vs. Helbig (G.R. No. 14705 not
published). In that case, the accused was charged with having said, "To hell with the President and his
proclamations, or words to that effect," which was found to be in violation of article 256 of the Penal
Code.

Held:

Repealing effect of the Philippine Libel Law (Act No. 277) on Article 256 of the Spanish Penal
Code

1. The Philippine Libel Law (Act No. 227) is a complete and comprehensive law on the subject of libel.
The well-known rule of statutory construction is, that where the later statute clearly covers the old
subject-matter of antecedent acts, and it plainly appears to have been the purpose of the legislature to
give expression in it to the whole law on the subject, previous laws are held to be repealed by
necessary implication. (1 Lewis' Sutherland Statutory Construction, p.465.) For identical reasons, it is
evident that Act No. 277 had the effect of repealing article 256 of the Penal Code, or at least so
much of this article as punishes defamation, abuse, or insults by writing.

2. Section 1 of the Libel Law defines libel as a "malicious defamation, expressed either in writing, printing,
or by signs or pictures, or the like, or public theatrical exhibitions, tending to blacken the memory of one
who is dead or to impeach the honesty, virtue, or reputation, or natural defects of one who is alive, and
thereby expose him to public hatred, contempt or ridicule." Section 13 provides that "All laws and parts of
laws now in force, so far as the same way be in conflict herewith, are hereby repealed. . . ."

| Page 1 of 3
3. Title X of Book II of the Penal Code, covering the subjects of columny and insults, must have been
particularly affected by the Libel Law. Recently, in People vs. Castro, it was found that those provisions
of the Penal Code on the subject of calumny and insults in which the elements of writing and publicity
entered, were abrogated by the Libel Law. The Libel Law must have had the same result on other
provisions of the Penal Code, as for instance, article 256.

Effect of the change of occupation (from Spanish to American sovereignty) on the political and
municipal laws

4. It is a general principle of the public law that on acquisition of territory the previous political relations of
the ceded region are totally abrogated. "Political" is here used to denominate the laws regulating the
relations sustained by the inhabitants to the sovereign.

5. As a matter of course, all laws, ordinances and regulations in conflict with the political character,
institutions and Constitution of the new government are at once displaced. Thus, upon a cession of
political jurisdiction and legislative power - and the latter is involved in the former - to the United States,
the laws of the country in support of an established religion or abridging the freedom of the press, or
authorizing cruel and unusual punishments, and the like, would at once cease to be of obligatory force
without any declaration to that effect. Every nation acquiring territory by treaty or otherwise, must hold it
subject to the Constitution and laws of its own government, and not according to those of the
government, and not according to those of the government ceding it." (Pollard vs. Hagan)

6. On American occupation of the Philippines, the municipal laws of the conquered territory affecting
private rights of person and property and providing for the punishment of crime were nominally
continued in force in so far as they were compatible with the new order of things.

7. Title III of the Spanish Penal Code, in which article 256 is found, punishes the crimes of rebellion,
sedition, assaults upon persons in authority, and their agents, and contempts, insults, injurias, and
threats against persons in authority, and insults, injurias, and threats against their agents and other
public officers. All those provisions of the Spanish Penal Code having to do with such subjects as
treason, lesse majeste religion and worship, rebellion, sedition, and contempts of ministers of the crown,
are no longer in force. Our present task is a determination of whether article 256 has met the same fate,
or, more specifically stated, whether it is in the nature of a municipal law or a political law, and is
consistent with the Constitution and laws of the United States and the characteristics and institutions of
the American Government.

Article 256 of the Spanish Penal Code, being inconsistent with the American Constitution, have
been abrogated by implication upon the establishment of the new system of government

8. Art 256 reads as follows: "Any person who, by word, deed, or writing, shall defame, abuse, or insult
any Minister of the Crown or other person in authority, while engaged in the performance of official duties,
or by reason of such performance, provided that the offensive conduct does not take place in the
presence of such minister or person or the offensive writing be not addressed to him, shall suffer the
penalty of arresto mayor," - that is, the defamation, abuse, or insult of any Minister of the Crown of the
Monarchy of Spain (for there could not be a Minister of the Crown in the United States of America), or
other person in authority in the Monarchy of Spain.

9. According to our view, Article 256 of the Spanish Penal Code was enacted by the Government of
Spain to protect Spanish officials who were the representatives of the king. With the chance of
sovereignty, a new government, and a new theory of government, was set up in the Philippines. No
longer is there a Minister of the Crown or a person in authority of such exalted position that the citizen
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must speak of him only with bated breath. "In the eye of our Constitution and laws, every man is a
sovereign, a ruler and a freedom, and has equal rights with every other man.

10. In the United States, the offense of scandalum magnatum is not known. In the early days of the
American Republic, a sedition law was enacted, making it an offense to libel the Government, the
Congress, or the President of the United States, but the law met with so much popular disapproval, that
it was soon repealed.

11. Article 256 of the Penal code is contrary to the genius and fundamental principles of the American
character and systems of government. This article was crowded out by implication as soon as the United
States established its authority in the Philippine Islands. Penalties out of all proportion to the gravity of
the offense, grounded in a distorted monarchical conception of the nature of political authority, as
opposed to the American conception of the protection of the interest of the public, have been obliterated
by the present system of government in the Islands.

12. It must be noted that this article punishes contempts against executive officials, although its terms
are broad enough to cover the entire official class. Punishment for contempt of non judicial officers has
no place in a government based upon American principles. Our official class is not, as in monarchies, an
agent of some authority greater than the people but it is an agent and servant of the people themselves.
These officials are only entitled to respect and obedience when they are acting within the scope of their
authority and jurisdiction.

13. The crime of lese majeste disappeared in the Philippines with ratification of the Treaty of Paris .
Ministers of the Crown have no place under the American flag. All the members of the court are of the
opinion, although for different reasons, that the judgment should be reversed and the defendant and
appellant acquitted.

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Macariola vs Asuncion (1982)

Summary Cases:

● Bernardita R. Macariola vs. Elias B. Asuncion 114 SCRA 77

Subject:

Prohibited Sales (Art 1491, New Civil Code); Effect of Change in Sovereignty in Political Laws; Judicial
Ethics;

Facts:

Bernardita Macariola filed an administrative complaint against Judge Asuncion of CFI Leyte (now CA
Justice) with "acts unbecoming a judge.”

The complaint stemmed from a partition case filed by the Reyes siblings against Macariola concerning
properties left by the deceased Francisco Reyes, the common father of the parties. Judge Asuncion,
before whom the case was filed, issued the partition order. The decision order became final and the
property was partitioned.

One of the properties in the partition was Lot 1184 which was subdivided into five lots denominated as
Lot 1184-A to 1184-E.

Lot 1184-E was sold to Dr. Arcadio Galapon. Less than a year later, Dr. Galapon and his wife sold a
portion of Lot 1184-E to Judge Asuncion and his wife, Victoria S. Asuncion.

Subsequently, spouses Asuncion and spouses Galapon conveyed their respective interest in Lot 1184-E
to The Traders Manufacturing and Fishing Industries Inc., (Traders) of which Judge Asuncion is the
President and his wife is the secretary.

Bernardita Macariola alleges that Judge Asuncion violated (a) Article 1491(5) of the New Civil Code in
acquiring by purchase a portion of the property involved in a case decided by him; (b) the Anti-Graft and
Corrupt Practices Act, the Civil Service Rules, and Canon 25 of the Canons of Judicial Ethics, by
associating himself with Traders as a stockholder and a ranking officer while he was a judge.

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Held:

Prohibited Sales (Article 1491), NCC

1. There was no violation of paragraph 5, Article 1491 of the New Civil Code. The prohibition in the said
Article applies only to the sale or assignment of the property which is the subject of litigation to the
persons disqualified therein. For the prohibition to operate, the sale or assignment of the property must
take place during the pendency of the litigation involving the property.

2. When Judge Asuncion purchased the subject property, the decision was already final because none
of the parties filed an appeal within the prescribed period; hence, the lot in question was no longer
subject of the litigation. Furthermore, the judge did not buy the lot directly from the plaintiffs in the case
but from Dr. Galapon who earlier purchased the same from plaintiffs after the finality of the decision.

Change in Sovereignty (Effect on Political Laws)

3. Under paragraphs 1 and 5, Article 14 of the Code of Commerce, justices and judged and certain
public officials cannot engage in commerce, either in person or by proxy, nor can they hold any office or
have any direct, administrative, or financial intervention in commercial or industrial companies within the
limits of the districts, provinces, or towns in which they discharge their duties.

4. The court held that although the above provision is incorporated in the Code of Commerce which is
part of the commercial laws of the Philippines, it, however, partakes of the nature of a political law as it
regulates the relationship between the government and certain public officers and employees, like
justices and judges.

5. Political Law has been defined as that branch of public law which deals with the organization and
operation of the governmental organs of the State and define the relations of the state with the
inhabitants of its territory. Article 14 of the Code of Commerce partakes more of the nature of an
administrative law because it regulates the conduct of certain public officers and employees with respect
to engaging in business; hence, political in essence.

6. The present Spanish Code of Commerce of 1885 was extended to the Philippines by Royal Decree
and took effect as law in this jurisdiction on December 1, 1888. Upon the transfer of sovereignty from
Spain to the United States and later on from the United States to the Republic of the Philippines, Article
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14 of this Code of Commerce must be deemed to have been abrogated because where there is change
of sovereignty, the political laws of the former sovereign, whether compatible or not with those of the new
sovereign, are automatically abrogated, unless they are expressly re-enacted by affirmative act of the
new sovereign.

7. There appears no enabling or affirmative act that continued the effectivity of the aforestated provision
of the Code of Commerce after the change of sovereignty from Spain to the United States and then to
the Republic of the Philippines. Consequently, Article 14 of the Code of Commerce has no legal and
binding effect and cannot apply to Judge Asuncion.

8. While municipal laws of the newly acquired territory not in conflict with the laws of the new sovereign
continue in force without the express assent or affirmative act of the conqueror, the political laws do not.
However, such political laws of the prior sovereignty as are not in conflict with the constitution or
institutions of the new sovereign, may be continued in force if the conqueror shall so declare by
affirmative act of the commander-in-chief during the war, or by Congress in time of peace (Roa vs.
Collector of Customs)

7. It is a general principle of the public law that on acquisition of territory the previous political relations of
the ceded region are totally abrogated

Judiciary not prohibited from engaging in lawful business or profession

8. Section 3(h) of Republic Act No. 3019 or the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, provides that public
officers are deemed to be enaged in corrupt practices by “directly or indirectly having financial or
pecuniary interest in any business, contract or transaction in connection with which he intervenes or
takes part in his official capacity, or in which he is prohibited by the Constitution or by any law from
having any interest."

9. Judge Asuncion cannot be held liable under the said provision because there is no showing that he
participated or intervened in his official capacity in the business or transactions of the Traders
Manufacturing and Fishing Industries, Inc. The business of the corporation has obviously no relation or
connection with his judicial office.

10. It is not enough to be a public official to be subject to this crime: it is necessary that by reason of his
office, he has to intervene in said contracts or transactions; and, hence, the official who intervenes in
contracts or transactions which have no relation to his office cannot commit this crime.

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11. There is no existing law expressly prohibiting members of the Judiciary from engaging or having
interest in any lawful business.

12. The Civil Service Act of 1959 (R.A. No. 2260) and the Civil Service Rules promulgated thereunder,
particularly Section 12 of Rule XVIII, do not apply to the members of the Judiciary. Being a member of
the Judiciary, Asuncion is covered by Republic Act No. 296 or the Judiciary Act of 1948 and by Section 7,
Article X, 1973 Constitution.

13. The Judiciary Act of 1948 does not contain any prohibition to that effect. As a matter of fact, under
Section 77 of said law, municipal judges may engage in teaching or other vocation not involving the
practice of law after office hours but with the permission of the district judge concerned.

Judicial Ethics

14. While the Judge did not violate Article 1491 of the New Civil Code in acquiring by purchase a portion
of Lot 1184-E which was in litigation in his court, it was, however, improper for him to have acquired the
same. He should be reminded of Canon 3 of the Canons of Judicial Ethics which requires that: "A
judge's official conduct should be free from the appearance of impropriety, and his personal behavior,
not only upon the bench and in the performance of judicial duties, but also in his everyday life, should be
beyond reproach."

15. One who occupies an exalted position in the judiciary has the duty and responsibility of maintaining
the faith and trust of the citizenry in the courts of justice, so that not only must he be truly honest and just,
but his actuations must be such as not give cause for doubt and mistrust in the uprightness of his
administration of justice. Even if respondent honestly believed that Lot 1184-E was no longer in litigation
in his court and that he was purchasing it from a third person and not from the parties to the litigation, he
should nonetheless have refrained from buying it for himself and transferring it to a corporation in which
he and his wife were financially involved, to avoid possible suspicion that his acquisition was related in
one way or another to his official actuations in the civil case.

16. Moreover, while the actuation of Judge Asuncion in engaging in private business by joining the
Traders Manufacturing and Fishing Industries, Inc. as a stockholder and a ranking officer, is not violative
of the provisions of the Code of Commerce nor the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act nor the Civil
Service Rules, it was nevertheless improper in light of Canon 25 of the Canons of Judicial Ethics
which states that “A judge should abstain from making personal investments in enterprises which are apt
to be involved in litigation in his court; and, after his accession to the bench, he should not retain such
investments previously made, longer than a period sufficient to enable him to dispose of them without
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serious loss. It is desirable that he should, so far as reasonably possible, refrain from all relations which
would normally tend to arouse the suspicion that such relations warp or bias his judgment, or prevent his
impartial attitude of mind in the administration of his judicial duties”

17. With respect to the allegation that the Judge is guilty of fraternizing with Dominador Arigpa Tan to
the extent of permitting his wife to be a godmother of Mr. Tan's child at baptism, that fact even if true did
not render him guilty of violating any canon of judicial ethics as long as his friendly relations with
Dominador A. Tan and family did not influence his official actuations as a judge where said persons were
concerned. If a Judge has social relations, that in itself would not constitute a ground for disciplinary
action unless it be clearly shown that his social relations beclouded his official actuations with bias and
partiality in favor of his friends"

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