Journal of the British Society for Phenomenology

ISSN: 0007-1773 (Print) 2332-0486 (Online) Journal homepage: http://www.tandfonline.com/loi/rbsp20

The Structure of Consciousness According to

Xuanzang

Iso Kern

To cite this article: Iso Kern (1988) The Structure of Consciousness According to
Xuanzang, Journal of the British Society for Phenomenology, 19:3, 282-295, DOI:
10.1080/00071773.1988.11007874

To link to this article: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/00071773.1988.11007874

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 Journal of the British Society for Phenomenology, Vol. 19, No.3, October 1988

THE STRUCTURE OF CONSCIOUSNESS

ACCORDING TO XUANZANG
ISO KERN

§ 1. Historical Remarks
The famous Chinese Buddhist monk Xuanzang (600-664) presents in
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the second book of his treatise The Completion of Mere Consciousness 1 an

analysis of the general structure of consciousness. This analysis very
much deserves the attention of phenomenologists who were schooled by
the thought of Edmund Husser I. Xuanzang holds that all mental states-
cognition as. well as imagination, volition and feeling - are necessarily
structured by a fourfold division. This fourfold division consists of the
following four elements or "parts": an objectivating act, an objective
phenomenon, self-consciousness and consciousness of self-consciousness.
Xuanzang does not present this theory as his own discovery but as the
teaching of the Indian Buddhist epistemologist Dharmapala (530-561). 2
Whilst Xuanzang stayed in India (between 629 and 645) he attended, for
several years, the lectures of the old master Silabhadra at the University
of Nalanda - then the most important center of Buddhist learning in
India. Silabhadra for his part in his youth had been a pupil of Dharmapala.
When Xuanzang in his Completion of Mere Consciousness discusses dif-
ferent opinions, he always allies himself to Dharmapala's view, which he
considers to be the right one. But none of the works of Dharmapala have
survived in the original Sanskrit; and neither any of the few works of his
preserved in Chinese translation,3 nor any of the later Sanskrit sources,4
relate or refer to the theory of the fourfold structure of consciousness. It is
therefore only through the works of Xuanzang and his pupils that we know
of this theory.
The general theory of consciousness prevailing in the epistemological
line of the Yogacara or Vijiianavada-School in India was a threefold
division theory. This theory was established by Dignaga (c. 480-540}' in the
first chapter of his Pramiinasamuccaya. 6 It was further elaborated in the
third chapter of Dharmakirti's (c. 600-660) Pramiinaviirttika. 7 According
to this theory, consciousness consists of three "parts" (elements, factors):
objectivating act, objective phenomenon and self-consciousness. Xuanzang
was thoroughly familiar with the Pramiinasamuccaya by Dignaga. He had
studied it twice in Nalandas and a third time in Mahakosala under the
guidance of a Brahmin who knew it especially well. 9 In his Completion of
Mere Consciousness and in his Explanations of the Completion recorded by
Kuiji, Xuanzang quotes the threefold division theory of the Pramiina-
samuccaya, although he did not translate the work into Chinese. 10 The

282
 Pramiinaviirttika by Dharmaklrti was very successful in India and had,
after the eighth century in the academic teaching replaced Digmiga's
Pramiinasamuccaya on which it was based. However, it was not until the
present time 11 that it was translated into Chinese. Xuanzang, in his works,
never mentions Dharmaklrti who was his contemporary .12 When
Xuanzang stayed in India Dharmakirti had not yet reached his fame. It
was therefore the fourfold division theory of consciousness which prevailed
in the Yogacara or Vijnanavada (Wei-shi-zong) of China.
§ 2. Objectivating Act and Objective Phenomenon
, In presenting the fourfold division theory of consciousness Xuanzang
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first introduces a dichotomy: the part of the objectivating act (jian fen,
darsanabhiiga, 13 literally "the part of [the act of] looking"), and the part
of the objective phenomenon (xiang fen, nimittabhiiga, literally "the part
of the [objective] look"). 14 The objectivating act is characterised as a
function of discrimination (liao bie yong). Both parts have to do with
"outer things"- notwithstanding the fact that according to the idealistic
position of Xuanzang's Vijnanavada there are no things outside of cons-
ciousness. But the objective phenomenon looks as though it were an
external object and the objectivating act looks as though it were grasping
such an external object. 15 For this reason these two "parts" of conscious-
ness are called its "outer" parts (in opposition to its inner parts) (p. 18a4
(p. 132)).
The "part of looking" (the objectivating act) is identified by Xuanzang
with what in Chinese is called xing xiang. It corresponds to the Sanskrit
word iikiira (p. 16a8-9 (p. 124)). It is not easy to say what "xing xiang"
("iikiira") here exactly means. De La Vallee Poussin translates it by
"mode", "maniere d't~tre", 16 Frauwallner by "Erscheinungsform"Y
Different contemporary Chinese scholars understand it as either "mode
of activity" ,18 "state of activity" (huodong zhuangtai) 19 or "activity"
(huodong). 20 This understanding of the term as activity by the Chinese
scholars is supported by Kuiji's Commentary (see above, note 1) which
explains xing xiang as "realising at the look of the object itself' (xing yu
jing xiang) or as "realising the form of the object" (xing jing zhi xiang
zhuang). 21 This understanding of the term is also confirmed by the literal
meaning of the Chinese word and its corresponding term in Sanskrit: both
include a meaning of activity .22 Yet the main reason wherefore the
Chinese scholars understand "xing xiang" in this way is probably Xuan-
zang's identification of the objectivating act ("part of looking.') with the
referent of that expression. However, in itself the expression cannot
mean an act. This we can say for two reasons: First, if "xing xiang"
("iikiira") already in itself signifies an act of consciousness, Xuanzang's
statement identifying the objectivating act with the referent of that
expression would become a mere tautology. Second, Xuanzang explains
in the same context that according to the realistic point of view, which
holds that objects exist outside of (independent from) consciousness (a

283
 presupposition not shared by Xuanzang), the xing xiang (iikiira) is the
representative look or image of an external object inside of consciousness
(p.l7a7 (p.127) ). From this point of view "xing xiang" cannot mean an
act of consciousness. I venture that "xing xiang (iikiira)" in our context
means that which in our consciousness makes an object appear. Its meaning
of activity consists in exactly this kind of "making". From the realistic
point of view, rejected by Xuanzang, it is an image or look within the
consciousness which makes an external object appear; that image there-
fore is the xing xiang(iikiira). However, according to the idealistic position
of Xuanzang, there is no object outside (independent) of consciousness.
The look or image (the objective phenomenon as a "part" of conscious-
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ness) which looks as if it were the look or image of an external object is the
object itself, and the part of consciousness which makes appear the
appearing object is the objectivating act. It is only for this reason that the
act of discrimination can be identified with the xing xiang (iikiira). 23
The fact that every consciousness necessarily includes in itself an
objective phenomenon (the part of the objective look) is proved by
Xuanzang with the following argument: "If the mind and all that belongs
to it did not have the character of its objective base (the intended object),
it would either be incapable of intentionally holding its own object, or
every consciousness would hold everything as its object, since its own
object would be like the others and the others like its own (p.17al-2
(p.l26)). The Commentary by Kuiji explains: "the own object would be
like the others, namely not intentionally held, or the other objects would
be like the own, namely likewise intentionally held" (pp.317c30-318al). In
other words, Xuanzang argues that if a given consciousness did not
include as its part an objective phenomenon it would be either conscious-
ness of nothing or consciousness of everything.
Xuanzang's argument for the part of the objectivating act is similar
to the argument above: "If the mind and all that belongs to it did not have
the character of holding intentionally, it would be like space incapable of
holding intentionally, or the space and other things would also hold
intentionally" (p.17a2-3 (p.l26)). In other words, if the mind did not
have the specific character of objectivating intentionality, it could not be
conscious of objects or, if this specific character were not required,
everything would be conscious of objects.
In the Commentary by Kuiji, Xuanzang remarks that the She tun,
i.e. the Mahiiyiinasamgraha by Asanga, and the philosopher Nanda both
defended a twofold division theory of consciousness (p.320b27, 320c21).
He means that these thinkers of the Vijiianavada conceived of conscious-
ness as necessarily constituted by the above mentioned two "parts".
Asanga was one of the founders of the Yogacara (or Vijiianavada) and
probably lived in the fourth century. Nanda must have lived in the sixth
century since he was the teacher of Jayasena who for his part was about
one-hundred years old when Xuanzang visited him in Nalanda. 24
As a matter of fact, in the second chapter of Asanga's Mahiiyiinasamgraha

284
 we find the idea that in every process of knowledge we have at the same
time two kinds of cognition (consciousness): a cognition of the objective
phenomenon (the cognition of the objective look: xiang shi, nimittavijnapti)
and a cognition of the objectivating act (the cognition of the act of
looking: jian shi, darsanavijnapti)25 Yet only the commentaries of the
Mahayanasamgraha by Vasubandhu and Asvabhava make it clear that
what is in question here are not two different cognitions but two "parts"
(elements: fen, bhilga) of the same cognition or consciousness. 26
Vasubandhu, the author of the first Commentary (the Bhashya), is,
according to the Chinese tradition, supposed to be Vasubandhu the
younger brother of Asanga, but he may be another Vasubandhu of a
much later date. 27 Asvabhava, the author of the second Commentary (the
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Upanibandhana), lived after Dignaga (c. 480-540), since he quotes

Dignaga's threefold division theory of consciousness. 28 Perhaps, Dignaga,
the founder of this theory, was also the first to clearly formulate that every
cognition comprehends in itself - not as different cognitions but as
"parts" (constituents) of the same consciousness- an objectivating act
and an objective phenomenon.
The arguments for the necessity of these two constituents in every
cognition presented by Dignaga are different from those presented by
Xuanzang: they originate in considerations on reflexive knowledge
(knowledge about knowledge). In the first chapter of his Pramana-
samuccaya, Dignaga seems to argue, first, that if a cognition had only one
form- be it the form of its object (the objective phenomenon) or the
form of itself (the objectivating act)- the reflexive cognition of that first
cognition would be either indistinguishable from the first cognition or it
would not include the object of the first cognition. 29 In other words, if a
cognition had only one "form", say A, the reflexive cognition of that
cognition having likewise only one form would be either of the same form
A- but then it would be indistinguishable from the first cognition- or it
would be a different form, say B, but then it could not include the object
of the first cognition. Only if a cognition (G) has the twofold structure,
say A1 (act )--+01 (objective phenomenon, the arrow indicates aboutness),
can a reflexive cognition (Cz) of the cognition C1, which for its part has a
twofold structure, be both different and include the objective pheno-
menon of the first cognition: it would have the form: Az~Oz. Oz being=
c = A1~o~, so that Az~Oz = Az~(A~~o~ ). 30
Dignaga presents a second argument along the same lines: When we
remember a cognition, for instance when we remember a perception, we
remember at the same time the object of that perception and the fact that
we perceived it. Cognition therefore includes the cognized object (the
objective phenomenon) and the act of cognition (the objectivating act). 31
§ 3. Self-consciousness (Self-awareness)
Xuanzang introduces the third "part" of consciousness by saying
that the two former parts (the part of the objective phenomenon and the

285
 part of the objectivating act) are based on and rely on a substance (suo yi
ziti, asraya) This base is the part of "self-attesting" or self-consciousness
0

(zizhengfen, svasamvittibhiiga, pp.l7al0-17bl (p.l28)).

The idea that the objective phenomenon and the objectivating act
need a base to rely on is clearly expressed in Kuiji's Commentary. There
Xuanzang says: "Objective phenomenon and objectivating act, if separ-
ated one from the other, could not be two clearly different substances in
themselves. If these two parts had no common base, they would neces-
sarily be separated. Yet these parts are only two elements (fa, dharma),
like the mind and what belongs to it, they are not different substances but
rather two faculties (gong neng). They therefore need a substance, a base
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on which they rely and which must be distinguished from them. When the
two functions (yong) arise, they do so in virtue of this substance."
Xuanzang adds immediately: "And therefore it is said [in the Cheng wei
shi lun] that the own [common] substance of the objective phenomenon
and the objectivating act- called the thing itself (shi, dravya)- is the
part of self-attesting (self-consciousness)" (p.318cl2-17). I shall now quote
a later passage from the Commentary by Kuiji. Here, Xuanzang again
says substantially the same thing but formulates it in the inverse way. It
may therefore further our understanding of this crucial thought: "If there
were no part of self-attesting (self-consciousness), the part of the objective
phenomenon and the part of the objectivating act would have nothing to
rely on. Thereby we would get two substances, [i.e.] objects outside the
mind. As it is said that there is a [common] base [of these two parts], there
are thus no objects separated from the mind and thereby there is one
unique substance" (p.319a28-b2).
Xuanzang argues that the objective phenomenon and the objecti-
vating act are not two independent things but rather two "functions"
which are necessarily linked. As a duality they need a common base, a
"tertium", in which they are linked and of which they are functions.
Xuanzang presents self-consciousness as the only possible candidate for
this unifying base. He seems to insinuate that only in self-consciousness
are objective phenomenon and objectivating act linked, or more accu-
rately, that self-consciousness is the one consciousness of the difference
(duality) between the objectivating activity and its objective phenomenon.
This idea already seems to be expressed by the following formula of
Dignaga's Pramiinasamuccaya: "the cognizing of oneself as [possessing)
these two appearances or the self-cognition (self-consciousness:
svasamvitti)" .32 Since self-consciousness embraces the objectivating act
and the objective phenomenon, Xuanzang considers it to be the guarantor
for the fact that the objective phenomenon, the appearing object, is not a
thing outside the mind or separated from the mind. If we overlook
self-consciousness, we fall into the opinion of realism which holds that the
appearing objects are things outside the mind and that mind and objects
are two different substances.
In the Commentary by Kuiji the part of "self-attesting" (self-con-

286
 sciousness) is repeatedly called "the part of the own substance" (zi ti fen:
pp.318c19, 21, 25; 319a26). In the Fo dijinglun, which is possibly, like the
Cheng wei shi fun, an original work of Xuanzang,33 this third part is
characterized by the expression "attesting the own substance" (zheng zi
ti). 34 Hence, self-consciousness is here considered to be the consciousness
of the own substantial unity in the functional difference between the
objectivating act and its corresponding objective phenomenon.
As an argument that in fact consciousness includes the part of
self-consciousness, Xuanzang points to recollection (p.l7bl-2 (p.J28);
Commentary, pp.318c24-319a6): We do not only remember an objective
phenomenon, e.g. yesterday's fireworks on the hill south of the city, but
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also the fact that we have seen it. We cannot remember an objective
phenomenon we have not experienced before; likewise we could not
remember our experience of that phenomenon, our perceiving it (the
objectivating act), unless we had been conscious of that perceiving. "If a
state of mind had not at the time intentionally held itself (zi yuan), how
could the mind later remember that state which exists no more?" (Com-
mentary, p.317c27-28), Xuanzang stresses the point that this self-cons-
ciousness is not a second objectivating act (objectivating the first) and
that correspondingly what is "intentionally held" in self-consciousness as
such is not a second objective phenomenon. It is in the same objectivating
act that we are immediately conscious of that act (xian liang, pratyaksha)
(pp.317c28-29; 320a2-5; Fo di jing lun, p.302a27). As Dignaga already
pointed out, if we were to consider self-consciousness to be a second
objectivating act directed on the first one, we would get into an infinite
regress. 35 In Kuiji's Commentary Xuanzang says that a consciousness
which is the objective phenomenon of an objectivating act can only be
either the consciousness of another sentient being or of the own cons-
ciousness at a different time (p.320a3-4 ). The own actual consciousness is
never an objective phenomenon of an objectivating act but always
immediately self-consciousness. In our phenomenological language we
may say that the "part of self-attesting" here at stake is not reflective
consciousness (reflection in its full sense as a specific act) which is neces-
sarily a second act directed on a first, different one, but pre-reflective
consciousness which is the immediate awareness of what we are actually
doing and thus a constitutive aspect of our intentional acts.
Xuanzang uses further expressions to characterize the "part of self-
attesting" (self-consciousness), such as "holding intentionally itself' (zi
yuan) (Commentary, pp.318c19; 318c27; 319b28) and "intentional re-
flection"" (fan yuan) (pp.318c21; 319c3; 319c27). As I pointed out, this
intentionality in self-consciousness is not a consciousness about an object,
it is not an objectivating act.
Xuanzang states that it was Dignaga in his Pramiinasmuccaya who
first established this theory of self-consciousness by introducing the "part
of self-attesting" and that he also used the argument of recollection to
sustain it. 36 Dignaga established this theory on the one hand in opposition

287
 to the non-Buddhist Schools of the Naiyayikas and the Vaiseshikas.
According to these Schools, cognition (consciousness) of an object is
unconscious of itself. By itself it is as unconscious as a stone. 37 It is only by
another, subsequent cognition, which through the medium of the inner
sense organ takes the first one as its object, that this first cognition can be
apprehended. 38 This view was also shared by the Hlnayana-School of the
Sarvastivadins. 39 Xuanzang says in the Commentary that the Small
Vehicle does not recognise the part of self-consciousness because, accor-
ding to it, cognition or consciousness does not "intentionally reflect", just
like the knife cannot cut itself (p.318c21-22). Another simile or paradigm
used by the defenders of the view that consciousness of an object is not
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self-conscious, was the pointing finger which points to other things but
never to itself.40 The adherents of the opposite view, namely that cognition
is self-cognizing (the Sautrantikas and Yogacaras) also used a simile: the
lamp not only illuminates other (surrounding) things but also itself. 41 The
use of this simile as well as the idea of self-cognizing were not inventions
of Dignaga. His own contribution was rather the formulation of that idea
by his theory of the three parts. On the other side, Dignaga's theory is
also opposed to that of the Samkhyas. Like the previous Schools, the
Samkhyas hold that the act of cognition which they consider to evolve
from matter is unconscious in itself. But according to them, it is not by a
subsequent act of cognition that the first may become conscious, but by an
entity of a higher order, by an immaterial self or soul (purusha). This self is
a separate, eternal, unchanging, non-acting substance. It alone is self-
conscious and as a witness (sakshin) illuminates the intentional acts to
which it seems to be attached. After the time of Dignaga, these ideas were
taken over by the very influential Vedanta of Sankara, yet with the
difference that the witnessing self is no more considered to be an indi-
vidual soul among others but as the universal self (iitman). In opposition
to this kind of theory, self-consciousness is for Dignaga already granted
on the level of the conditioned and ever changing objectivating acts.
Concluding his exposition of the threefold division theory of con-
sciousness Xuanzang quotes, in Chinese translation, the tenth verse from
the first chapter of Dignaga's Pramiinasamuccaya. In that verse the part
of the objective phenomenon is called "the form which resembles the
object" and is characterised as what in measurement is measured (suo
liang, prameya). The part of the objectivating act is called "the form of
grasping" (neng, qu, grahiika)42 and is characterised as that which
measures or the means by which one measures (neng liang, pramiina).
The part of self-attesting (self-consciousness) finally, is described as the
result of measurement (liang guo, pramiinaphala) (p.17b5-8 (p.l31)). Of
course, "measuring" here stands for "cognizing". In the Commentary by
Kuiji, Xuanzang explains this characterisation in the following terms:
"Just as when we measure something with a yardstick, the thing is what is
measured, the yardstick is what measures (the means of measurement)
and the knowledge of the thereby resulting number (jie shu zhi) is the

288
 result of measurement. When the mind and what belongs to it measures
(cognizes) objects, it is necessarily also like that." (p.319a27-29).
It is worthwhile noting, by the way, that in this text the objectivating
act is compared with the yardstick, the means of measurement. This fits
well with our understanding of "xing xiang" ("iikiira") as "that which
makes appear". The objectivating act was before identified with that xing
xiang (s. above p.283), and it is now characterised as the means of meas-
urement or as that which measures. In other words, it is that which makes
appear the "measure" (determination, qualification) of the object.
Yet more important and rather amazing is the characterisation of the
part of self-consciousness as the result of the measurement (cognizing).
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The word we translate by result is the Chinese guo (Sanskrit phala),

literally it means "fruit" and can also be translated by "effect" in relation to
"cause". Above, self-consciousness was considered to be the "substance"
of consciousness in virtue of which the two functions, the objective pheno-
menon and the objectivating act, arise (s. above pp.285-6). in that under-
standing, self-consciousness rather seemed to be the cause of measurement
However, also in that understanding self-consciousness was not consid-
ered to be a cause separate from its effects. It was rather considered to be
the consciousness ofthe underlying unity ofthe two "functions" (s. above
p.286). In our present context, the Commentary by Kuiji explains the
concept of "result" or "fruit" (guo) as follows: "What is the meaning of
"result" (guo)? It means the fulfilled cause (cheng man yin) ... If that
which measures (neng liang) had no result, what would be the use of
measuring the object?" (p.319b6-7). According to this line ofthought self-
consciousness is not a "part" of consciousness but the whole thing itself:
consciousness or cognition in its completion- perhaps we may say in its
telos or entelecheia: "the knowledge of the resulting number".
These two descriptions of self-consciousness (as consciousness of the
underlying unity of objectivating act and of objective phenomenon on the
one hand, and as resulting cognition on the other hand) are perhaps
linked with two different conceptions of consciousness. Digmiga stresses
the fact, that the resulting cognition (pramiinaphala) does not differ from
the means of cognition (pramiina). 43 At the end of the karika quoted by
Xuanzang (s. above p.288), he says that prameya (object of cognition),
pramiina and pramiinaphala are not separate from one another. 44 Mr.
Hattori, in his English translation of the first chapter of the Pramiina-
samuccaya summarizes Digniiga's position as follows: "For Digniiga,
there is only the one fact of sva-samvitti [self-consciousness]: this cognitive
phenomenon itself is not differentiated into subject and object or into act
and result. His belief is based upon the vijniipti-miitra theory of the
Yogiiciiras, according to whom, such expressions as iitman, dharma, and
the like, which are supposed to denote the subject and the object, are
mere metaphors (upaciira) ... They maintain, there is neither subject nor
object: these are products of the imagination (parikalpita, utprekshita).
By attaining (parinishpanna) detachment from the imaginary subject and

289
 object, a man comes to realize the state of pure consciousness ( vigiiiipti-
miitra), in which there is no differentiation between subject and object ...
With this theory of vijiipti-miitra as background, Digmiga considers
that the undifferentiated fact of sva-samvitti [self-consciousness) is meta-
phorically differentiated into pramiina and prameya. " 45 I think that
Xuanzang would not have agreed with Mr. Hattori's interpretation of
Digniiga's doctrine, because this interpretation is precisely the under-
standing Xuanzang attributes to Sthiramati (c.Sl0-570)46 whom he
criticizes. Sthiramati was a somewhat older contemporary of Dharmapiila.
His field of activity was not in Niilandii but in Valabhl(in Kathiavar, West
India) and he represented in theY ogiiciira a line different from the one to
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which Xuanzang belonged. In the eighth book of his Cheng wei shi tun
Xuanzang writes that according to Sthiramati the worldly mind, substan-
tially one, seems (si) to arise as a duality: as the duality of the objectivating
act and of the objective phenomenon. "Yet these two parts exist [according
to Sthiramati] only as a matter of opinion (qing) but do not exist in truth
(li). These two characters are said to be imaginary (bian ji suo zhi,
parikalpita)" (pp.l7bl0-18al (pp.522-3)). In the Commentary by Kuiji,
Xuanzang remarks that Sthiramati recognized (as real) only one part of
consciousness, namely the part of self-consciousness (pp.317cl-2; 320c20).
Xuanzang himself followed another understanding of Digniiga's
threefold division theory, he followed the interpretation of Dharmapiila.
Xuanzang says that, according to Dharmapiila, objectivating act and
objective phenomenon arise by real conditions and are thus, like self-
consciousness, conditioned realities (yi ta qi, paratantra). Only on the
base of this real duality, imagination (a function of the intellect) conceives
false notions of existence and non-existence (for instance the false notion
of independent objects outside of consciousness) and the like (VIII,
p.l8a3-5 (p.523)).
Let us return to the two descriptions of self-consciousness from
which we started. Xuanzang is far from rejecting the description of
self-consciousness as the resulting cognition. Yet he understands this
description through the other description: i.e., the underlying substantial
unity of the functional difference between the objective phenomenon and
objectivating act. Only this second description of self-consciousness
allows him to state that there is a real difference between the three parts,
notwithstanding their unity. He translates the final sentence of the above
quoted kiirikii, in which Digniiga says that prameya, pramiina and
pramiinaphala are not separate (different), by the following formula:
"These three are not different in substance (ci san ti wu bie)" (p.l7b8
(p.131)). And the Commentary by Kuiji remarks upon the whole verse:
"The objective phenomenon is merely (wei) what is measured, the objec-
tivating act is what measures, and self-consciousness is the result of
measurement . . . Now, these three kinds are substantially one con-
sciousness (ci san zhong ti shi yi shi). Since [the objective phenomenon]
is not separate from consciousness, one speaks of 'merely' (wei [shi],

290
 [vijnapti] matra). The faculties (gong neng) are different, therefore one
speaks of 'three [parts]'" (p.319a3-6).
The link between these two descriptions of self-consciousness relies
for Xuanzang certainly on his understanding of the "result (of cognition)"
as the fulfilled cause (s. above p.289). The concept of cause can be linked
with the concept of substance, and so the fulfilled cause, the actualized
cognition, can be understood as the conscious unity (substance) of the
fully actualized difference between the object and the objectivating act.
§ 4. Consciousness of Self-consciousness (Awareness of Self-awareness)
After discussing the "third part" (self-consciousness, self-awareness)
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Xuanzang continues: "If we analyse subtly, there are necessarily four

parts, three as above and moreover a fourth part: the part which attests
self-attesting" (p.l7b9-10 (p.132)). 47 The Commentary by Kuiji remarks:
"Only since Dharmapala this [fourth part] was established. That is very
necessary by reason ... But most of the Sutras and Sastras mention only
three parts" (p.319b16-17).
The fourth part of course is not considered to be an additional part
outside the third (just as self-consciousness is not outside the objectivating
act and its object) but it is supposed to be the result of a more accurate
analysis of self-consciousness. "The fourth part enters into the part of
self-attesting" (p.l8b4 (p.134)), "because real substance is only one"
(Commentary, p.320b 24-25).
Both the third and the fourth part are called "internal" (or "immanent")
(p .18a4 (p .132)) ,48 "because they attest the own substance"(Commentary,
p.320b11-12), whereas the objectivating act and the objective pheno-
menon are called "external" (or "transcendent" (p.l8a4 (p.132)),48
because the objectivating act holds intentionally an object, which seems
to be externaL( Commentary, pp.319c20; 320bll; cf. above p. 283). Since
the third and the fourth part grasp their own substance, they are both
always immediate awareness or self-evidence (xian liang, pratyaksha)
(p.l8a7 (p.133); Commentary, p.320a25-26), whereas the objectivating
act may also be indirect cognition (bi liang, anumiina) or even erroneous
(p.l8a5 (p.l33) ).
What are the reasons for this doubling of self-consciousness?
Xuanzang gives two arguments. The first one is this: "If the fourth part
did not exist, what then would attest the third part? All parts of the mind
are alike, they all are necessarily attested" (p.17b9-10 (p.l32)). In the
Commentary by Kuiji, Xuanzang argues that self-consciousness cannot
be attested by an objectivating act, since "the objectivating act holds
intentionally something as being external, whereas the substance of
consciousness is not external" (p.319c20-21). "An objectivating act is
intentionally directed towards something outside (foreign) and is not
really self-reflexive (bu de fan yuan); a fourth part has therefore to be
established" (p.319c28-29). The mind which appears through the medium
of an objectivating act, i.e. the mind as objective phenomenon, "is not

291
 the substance of the actual intentionality (subjectivity), but another mind
or the [own] mind at a different time" (p.320a2-4; s. above p.287).
Xuanzang's second argument for a fourth part of consciousness runs
as follows: "If the fourth part did not exist, the part of self-attesting would
have no result (guo, phala). Yet all means of cognition (neng liang,
pramiina) necessarily have a result" (p.l8al (p.132)). Self-consciousness
is here considered to be a means of cognition which leads to a result (has a
"fruit"). In a manner analogous to the first argument, Xuanzang holds
that this result cannot be found in an objectivating act, "because an
objectivating act may be erroneous" (p.l8a2 (p.132)). An objectivating
act, being transcendent ("holding intentionally something external") is
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"indeterminate" (bu ding) (Commentary, p.320a16-17): it may be right

or wrong, it may be immediate or mediate cognition (p.l8a5 (p.133)). On
the other hand, the result of self-consciousness, attesting its own substance,
is "determinate" (Commentary, p.319c15-16): it is necessarily immediate
awareness, self-evidence (xian liang, pratyaksha) (p.l8a3 (p.132)).
"Immediate awareness is the own substance of the mind ... Mediate
cognition and error, these two kinds do not attest substance; how could
they be the result of immediate awareness (i.e. of self-consciousness)?"
(Commentary, p.319c6-7).
If the third part has to be attested by a fourth one and if the former
leads necessarily to the latter as to its "fruit", would then the same
argument not also have to be applied to the fourth, so that we get a fifth
one, and so on? Xuanzang is aware of this difficulty. He considers an
infinite regress as a failure (p.l8a8 (pp.133-4)) and avoids it saying that it is
the third part which attests the fourth (p.18a6). So "in [the realm of]
intentional holding and of the intentionally held, there are always only
four parts, there is neither decrease nor increase and there is consequently
no infinite regress" (Commentary, p.320a26-27).
Here Xuanzang faces a new difficulty: If the third part (self-cons-
ciousness) attests the fourth (awareness of self-consciousness), what is
then the result of this immediate "reflexion "? At first sight it would seem
that the fourth part cannot be this result, just as the objectivating act is
not the result, when it is intentionally held (attested) by self-consciousness.
Xuanzang answers: "It is [nonetheless] the intentionally held fourth part,
which is here the result: the result is the fourth part holding intentionally
(attesting) the third [the result is awareness of self-consciousness]. The
pattern is here the same, the functions are necessarily like that. If one
established still more [parts], one runs into the infinite regress. Only in
this manner is a limited number of parts sufficient." (Commentary,
p.320a7-ll).
If we try to make sense of these discussions, the former question
reappears: Why double self-consciousness? If the third and the fourth
part attest one another and are mutually the result of each other, why
then not simply say: Self-consciousness attests itself, it has its cognitive
fruit in itself? Is the doubling of self-consciousness only a way of expressing

292
 this circularity of self-consciousness? Or is this doubling the mere con-
sequence of some conceptual presupposition: "act" and "fruit", "cause"
and "effect", notwithstanding their unity, have always to be differentiated?
However, if we look at the texts more closely, self-awareness and
awareness of self-awareness are not mere doubles: Self-awareness (the
third part) is awareness of the objectivating act and of the fourth part
(awareness of self-awareness), whereas the fourth part is simply awareness
of the third part. The fourth part is not awareness of the objectivating act;
this would be "superfluous", since the objectivating act is already inten-
tionally held by the third part (p.18a6-7 (p.133)). "In the forward direction,
the third part holds intentionally the second [the objectivating act] and
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backwards, it holds intentionally the fourth. In the forward direction the

fourth part holds intentionally the third; why then not also the second? It
does not hold intentionally the second, because that would be useless. If we
were to admit that, we would commit the error of multiplying intentional
holding .... Each [part of] intentional holding has its determinate role, and
thus limitation is possible ... " (Commentary, p.320a18-23). The "fourth
part" stands thus for nothing else than for the awareness of self-con-
sciousness, whereas the "third part" means primarily the self-awareness
of the objectivating act.
Final Remark
On the occasion of the 50th anniversary of his death, I dedicate this
report to the memory of Edmund Husser!. I hope he would have appre-
ciated it as a testimony to the human universality of phenomenological
problems, and I express my gratitude for his philosophical labour which
makes thoughts of past and foreign cultures alive and opens communication
with them.
University of Bern
References
I. The Chinese title of this work is Cheng wei shi lun. It was translated into French by the
Belgian scholar Louis de La Vallee Poussin (Viiiiiptimiitratiisiddhi. La siddhi de
Xiuan-tsang, Paris 1928 and 1929) and into English by the Hongkong Chinese Wei Tat
(Doctrine of Mere-Consciousness by the Triptaka-Master Hsuan Tsang, Hongkong
1973). A German version of the section on which the following presentation is based,
is included in E. Frauwallner's Die Philosophie des Buddhismus, Berlin 1969 (third
edition). There is also a Commentary to this work, written by Xuanzang's pupil Kuiji
(632-682): Recorded explanations of the "Cheng wei shi lun" (Cheng wei shi lun shu ji).
This Commentary records Xuanzang's own explanations of his work. It is not yet
translated into any Western language.
2. Date according to E. Frauwallner, Landmarks in the History of Indian Logic, WZKSO 5
(1961), p.l32 f. (KieineSchriften, 1982, p.854f.).
3. His commentery to Aryadeva's Catuhsakata (T.30, Nr. 1571), his commentary to
Vasubandhu's Vimsatikii (T.31, nr. 1591) and his commentary to Digmiga's Alam-
banapariksha (T.31. Nr. 1625). About the authorship of the Fo di jing /un, s. below
note 33.
4. Masaaki Hattori, Digniiga. On Perception, Cambridge, Mass. 1968, p.l07.
5. E. Frauwallner, I.e .. pp.l35-7 (pp.857-9). Dharrnapala was a grand-pupil of Dignaga
(Hattori, I.e., pp.2. 5).
6. Hattori, I.e., pp.28-31.
7. Cf. T. Vetter. Erkenntnisprobleme bei Dharmakirti, Vienna 1964, pp.71-77.
8. T.50, nr.2053 (Biography of Xuanzang by Huili and Yanzong). p.239al.

293
 9. I.e., p.24ib!Of.
10. He translated two smaller works by Digmiga, the Alambanapariksha (T.31, nr.l624)
and the Nyiiyamukha (T.32, nr. 1628). However these two works are not concerned
with the threefold division theory of consciousness. The Pramiinasamuccaya was later
translated into Chinese by Yijing (635-713), but this translation was lost in the
persecution of Buddhism in the ninth century.
II. Translated by the scholar monk Fazun and published by the Buddhist Association of
China in 1981.
12. E. Frauwallner, Landmarks . .. , p.l37f. (p.859f.).
13. Between brackets are quoted the Chinese expressions and following them sometimes
the corresponding Sanskrit terms.
14. II, p.16b7f. (p.l25). I quote the Cheng wei shi lun in the edition of the Jinling kejing chu
(Nanjing 1896) and the Cheng wei shi lunshuji (Commentary by Kuiji) according to the
edition of the Taisho (T.43, nr.1~30, p.229 f.). The additional numbers between
brackets after the quotation of the Cheng wei shi lun refer to the French translation of
this work by de La Vallee Poussin.
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15. I translate by "looks as though it were" the Chinese word si (resemble, similar).
16. I.e., p.124. He says that the general meaning of "iikiira" is aspect. This is also the
translation of that word in another context by E. Lamotte (La Somme du Grand
Vehicule d'Asanga, T.2, p.99).
17. I.e., p.17.
18. Mr. Wei Tat in his translation of the Cheng wei shi lun, p.l37.
19. Mr. Tian Guanglie from the Jinling kejing chu in Nanjing (oral communication).
20. Mr. Guo Yuanxing from the Buddhist Association in Beijing (oral communication).
21. p.315b27-29; cf. p.3!8c9- 10.
22. The word xing in the expression xing xiang means walk, do, perform; iikiira has as root
kr, meaning activity.
23. Even from the idealistic point of view of Xuanzang an objective phenomenon in
consciousness (a xiang fen, nimittabhiiga) may be called, in specific cases, axing xiang
(iikiira). This is the case when an objective phenomenon represents ("makes appear")
another element of consciousness: e.g., the objective phenomenon in sense perception
"makes appear" our subconscious world (the world of the eighth consciousness or
storehouse consciousness), or our objective phenomena of other minds represent
these other minds. In these cases the immediate or own object (qin suo yuan yuan)
relies on a mediate or forei~n object (shu suo yuan yuan) and is called "the shadow
image" of the latter. The objective phenomenon may also be called xing xiang (iikiira)
with respect to the fact that cognition and its accompanying mental states, such as
affection, volition and so on, have an identical objective base, but represent it through
different (cognitive, affective, volitional) aspects. These facts are referred to in the
Commentary by Kuiji: "There are two kinds of xing xiang (iikiira). The first is the
objectivating act as pointed out in the present text [Cheng wei shi /un II, p.l6b). All
kinds of consciousness and what belongs to it have this xing xiang, they have it
necessarily together with their objects. In the·second place, the objective phenomenon
shadow image (ying xiang xiang fen) is also called xing xiang (iikiira). Consciousness
sometimes has it, sometimes not, it depends on the object. So our treatise [the Cheng
wei shi fun) in its section on the objective base condition (suo yuan yuan, iilambanaprat-
yaya) speaks about two kinds of oblective bases [namely the tmmediate or own and the
mediate or foreign: VII, 19b4-20]. And the Yogiiciirabhumisiistra speaks about a
common objective base (tong yi suo yuan). The present text [II, 16b) discusses only
what is necessarily true for every consciousness or what is different in respect to the
Small Vehicle [the realists), since the shadow image asxing xiang (iikiira) is also taught
by the Small Vehicle. But this is only a preliminary exJ>Ianation, omitting the second
sense [of "xing xiang"]. How can it be said [in II, 17a8-9] that the eighth consciousness
and its five accompanying mental states [i.e. touch, sensation, thought, idea, volition]
have a common objective base but not a common xing xiang? This shows that we need
two explanations [of the term xing xiang (iikiira)]. The idea of the shadow image as
xing xiang (iikiira) is derived from the Pramiinasmuccaya (by Digmiga]." (p.317b20-
27).
24. Cf. the Commentary by Kuiji, p.23lc26-27, and the Biography of Xuanzang, T.50,
nr.2053, p.244a. D. Shimaii notes as life dates of Nanda the years 450-530 (Matt!riaux
pour /'etude du systeme Vijniiptimiitra, parS. Levi. Paris, 1932, p.20). Considering that
Nanda was the teacher of Jayasena, a fact also recognized by Shimaji, those dates seem
to be too early.

294
 25. T.31, nr.I594, pp.I36cl4-137all (E. Lamotte, La Somme du Grand Yehicufe
d'Asanga, p. 99-103).
26. T.31, nr.I597, p.339c2-6, and nr.I598, p.40Ic5-II (E. Lamotte, I.e., pp.99-IOO).
These commentaries, like the Mahiiyiinasamgraha itself, are not preserved in their
Sanskrit originals but only in Chinese and Tibetan translations. On Asanga 's theory of
these two know ledges cf. E. Frauwallner, Die Phifosophie des Buddhismus, pp.329-30
and 338-9.
27. Cf. E. Frauwallner, On the date of the Buddhist Master of the Law Vasubandhu,
Rome, 1951.
28. T.31, nr. 1598, p.415b28-29. Cf. M. Hattori, Digniiga. On Perception, p.5.
29. I follow in the above interpretation mainly the translation by E. Frauwallner (Die
Philosophie des Buddhismus, p.393) and not that by M. Hattori (Digniiga. On
Perception, pp.29-30, notes 70 and 71). Hattori sees in this text two completely
different arguments. However, for the construction of the second argument, he has to
interpolate between brackets nearly the half of its text. Moreover, the second argument
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is for me unintelligible and includes the rather awkward idea, that subsequent cogni-
tions ofthe same object (e.g. continuous perceptionsofthe white paper before me) are
reflexive cognitions of the preceding cognitions.
30. For the use of such formulae I am indebted to Mr. Hattori, I.e., p.30, notes70and 71.
31. Hattori, I.e., p.30.
32. Hattori, I.e., 1?.28, vritti to kiirikii 9.
33. This is the opmion of Mr. Guo Yuanxing, Beijing, to whom I am indebted for much
advice. Xuanzang _Eresents himself only as the translator and indicates as the author
''Qinguang Pusa (Boddhisattva Bandhuprabha) and others". Exactly in the same
manner he presents himself only as the translator of his own work, Cheng wei shi fun
and indicates as its author "Hufa Pusa (Boddhisattva Dharmapala) and others".
Bandhuprabha is supposed to be a pupil of Dharmapala (Paul Demieville, Repertoire
du Canon Bouddhique Sino-Japonais, 1978 (second edition, p.276) or of Silabadhra
(Lii Cheng, History of Buddhism in India (in Chinese), p.209), probably for the reason
that the Fo di jing fun defends Dharmapala's and Silabadhra's (Silabadhra is Dhar-
mapala's pupil) fourfold division theory of consciousness. Bandhuprabha is completely
unknown in Indian sources. The Fo di jing fun (in Chinese) is the sole existing text
which is ascribed to him. By ascribing his own works to others, Xuanzang indicated the
sources of his inspiration. In the Tibetan Canon there is a work with an analogous title
but with a different content and ascribed to Silabadhra. Yet the doctrines of the two
works are similar (cf. Lii Cheng, I.e., p.209).
34. T.33, nr.I530, p.303a26: cf. p.303b8.
35. Hattori, I.e., p.30, kiirikii II and vritti.
36. Fo di jing fun, p.~03a27, Com~~n~ary to the Cheng wei shi fun by Kuiji, p.319a5-6,
22-23. Cf. Hatton, I.e .• p.30, kartka II and vrtttl.
37. Th. Stcherbatsky, Buddhist Logic l, p.l65.
38. Th. Stcherbatsky, I.e. p.I65; Hattori, I.e., p. 101.
39. de La Vallee Poussin, I.e., p.l29.
40. Fo di jing fun, p.303a29. This simile was also used by Vacasparti Misra (ninth century)
in his Nyayavarttika-Tiitparyatika (quoted by de La Vallee Poussin, I.e., p. 130).
41. Commentary by Kuiji, p.32Ial9-24; Fo dijing fun, p.303bl-7.
42. The Fo di jing fun expresses the objectivating act by the formula "the part of grasping
(neng gu fen, griihaka) and not by "the part of looking" (jian fen). Correspondingly the
part of the objective phenomenon ("the part of the objective look") is called "the part
of the grasped" (suo qufen, griihya) (p.303bll-12).
43. Pramiinasmuccaya l, vritti to kiirikii 8 (Hattori, p.28).
44. Hattori, I.e., p. 29 (kiirikii 10).
45. Hattori, I.e., p.I06.
46. Frauwallner, Landmarks . .. pp. 136-7 (pp.858-9).
47. Parallel text in the Fo dijing fun, p.303bl3-14.
48. Parallel text in the Fo dijing fun, p.303bl5.

295