negligence cases, namely: duty, breach, injury, and
EVIDENCE proximate causation.
CASE PRINCIPLES
1998-2008 CASES
1. G.R. No. 150762, January 20, 2006
COVERDALE ABARQUEZ, y EVANGELISTA vs. THE
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
Every person accused has the right to be presumed
innocent until the contrary is proven beyond reasonable
doubt. The presumption of innocence stands as a
fundamental principle of both constitutional and criminal
law. Thus, the prosecution has the burden of proving every
single fact establishing guilt. Every vestige of doubt having
a rational basis must be removed. The defense of the
accused, even if weak, is no reason to convict. Within this
framework, the prosecution must prove its case beyond
any hint of uncertainty. The defense need not even speak
at all. The presumption of innocence is more than
sufficient.
We apply in this case the equipoise rule. Where the
evidence on an issue of fact is in issue or there is doubt on
which side the evidence preponderates, the party having
the burden of proof loses.
The equipoise rule finds application if, as in this case, the
inculpatory facts and circumstances are capable of two or
more explanations, one of which is consistent with the
innocence of the accused and the other consistent with his
guilt, for then the evidence does not fulfill the test of moral
certainty, and does not suffice to produce a conviction.
Briefly stated, the needed quantum of proof to convict the
accused of the crime charged is found lacking.
2. G.R. No. 130547, October 3, 2000
LEAH ALESNA REYES, ROSE NAHDJA, JOHNNY, and
minors LLOYD and KRISTINE, all surnamed REYES,
represented by their mother, LEAH ALESNA REYES vs.
SISTERS OF MERCY HOSPITAL, SISTER ROSE PALACIO,
DR. MARVIE BLANES, and DR. MARLYN RICO
Petitioner’s action is for medical malpractice. This is a
particular form of negligence which consists in the failure
of a physician or surgeon to apply to his practice of
medicine that degree of care and skill which is ordinarily
employed by the profession generally, under similar
conditions, and in like surrounding circumstances. In order
to successfully pursue such a claim, a patient must prove
that the physician or surgeon either failed to do something
which a reasonably prudent physician or surgeon would
have done, or that he or she did something that a
reasonably prudent physician or surgeon would not have
done, and that the failure or action caused injury to the
patient. There are thus four elements involved in medical
APRIL LYNN L. URSAL LLB-4
REMEDIAL LAW REVIEW II (S.Y. 2015-2016)
UNIVERSITY OF CEBU – COLLEGE OF LAW
Although generally, expert medical testimony is relied
upon in malpractice suits to prove that a physician has
done a negligent act or that he has deviated from the
standard medical procedure, when the doctrine of res ipsa
loquitor is availed by the plaintiff, the need for expert
medical testimony is dispensed with because the injury
itself provides the proof of negligence. The reason is that
the general rule on the necessity of expert testimony
applies only to such matters clearly within the domain of
medical science, and not to matters that are within the
common knowledge of mankind which may be testified to
by anyone familiar with the facts.
Hence, in cases where the res ipsa loquitur is applicable,
the court is permitted to find a physician negligent upon
proper proof of injury to the patient, without the aid of
expert testimony, where the court from its fund of
common knowledge can determine the proper standard of
care. Where common knowledge and experience teach that
a resulting injury would not have occurred to the patient if
due care had been exercised, an inference of negligence
may be drawn giving rise to an application of the doctrine
of res ipsa loquitur without medical evidence, which is
ordinarily required to show not only what occurred but
how and why it occurred. When the doctrine is
appropriate, all that the patient must do is prove a nexus
between the particular act or omission complained of and
the injury sustained while under the custody and
management of the defendant without need to produce
expert medical testimony to establish the standard of care.
3. G.R. No. 146737, December 10, 2001
IN THE MATTER OF THE INTESTATE ESTATE OF THE
LATE JUAN "JHONNY" LOCSIN, SR., LUCY A. SOLINAP
(Daughter of the late Maria Locsin Araneta), the
successors of the late LOURDES C. LOCSIN, MANUEL C.
LOCSIN, ESTER LOCSIN JARANTILLA and the intestate
estate of the late JOSE C. LOCSIN, JR. vs. JUAN C. LOCSIN,
JR.
A birth certificate is a formidable piece of evidence
prescribed by both the Civil Code and Article 172 of the
Family Code for purposes of recognition and filiation.
However, birth certificate offers only prima facie evidence
of filiation and may be refuted by contrary evidence. Its
evidentiary worth cannot be sustained where there exists
strong, complete and conclusive proof of its falsity or
nullity.
In this case, respondent's Certificate of Live Birth No. 477
entered in the records of the Local Civil Registry (from
which Exhibit "D" was machine copied) has all the badges
of nullity. Without doubt, the authentic copy on file in that
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office was removed and substituted with a falsified
Certificate of Live Birth.
At this point, it bears stressing the provision of Section 23,
Rule 132 of the Revised Rules of Court that "(d)ocuments
consisting of entries in public records made in the
performance of a duty by a public officer are prima facie
evidence of the facts therein stated." In this case, the
glaring discrepancies between the two Certificates of Live
Birth (Exhibits "D" and "8") have overturned the
genuineness of Exhibit "D" entered in the Local Civil
Registry. What is authentic is Exhibit "8" recorded in the
Civil Registry General.
4. G.R. No. 123300, September 25, 1998
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. ELPIDIO DELMENDO
y URPIANO
Appellate courts accord the highest respect to the
assessment made by the trial court of the testimonies of
eyewitnesses. We have doctrinally held that the findings of
a trial court on the credibility of witnesses deserve great
weight, given the clear advantage of a trial judge over an
appellate magistrate in the appreciation of testimonial
evidence. It is judicially recognized that the trial court is in
the best position to assess the credibility of witnesses and
their testimonies because of their unique opportunity to
observe the witnesses firsthand and note their demeanor,
conduct and attitude under grueling examination. These
are the most significant factors in evaluating the sincerity
of witnesses and in unearthing the truth. Hence, except for
compelling reasons, we are logically bound by the trial
court's assessment of the credibility of witnesses.
An innocent person will at once naturally and emphatically
repel an accusation of crime, as a matter of self-
preservation, and as a precaution against prejudicing
himself. A person's silence, therefore, particularly when it
is persistent, may justify an inference that he is not
innocent. Thus, we have the general principle that when an
accused is silent when he should speak, in circumstances
where an innocent person so situated would have spoken,
on being accused of a crime, his silence and omission are
admissible in evidence against him. Accordingly, it has
been aptly said that silence may be assent as well as
consent, and may, where a direct and specific accusation of
crime is made, be regarded under some circumstances as a
quasi-confession.
Likewise, appellant's flight and his use of a different name
to hide his identity is a clear and positive indication of his
guilt. It is a well-entrenched doctrine that the flight of an
accused from the scene of the crime and his act of hiding
himself until he was arrested are circumstances highly
indicative of his guilt, for, as has long been wisely said, the
wicked flee even when no man pursueth but the righteous
are as bold as a lion.
APRIL LYNN L. URSAL LLB-4
REMEDIAL LAW REVIEW II (S.Y. 2015-2016)
UNIVERSITY OF CEBU – COLLEGE OF LAW
5. G.R. Nos. 132875-76, November 16, 2001
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. ROMEO G. JALOSJOS
It is settled that in cases of statutory rape, the age of the
victim may be proved by the presentation of her birth
certificate. In the case at bar, accused-appellant contends
that the birth certificate of Rosilyn should not have been
considered by the trial court because said birth certificate
has already been ordered cancelled and expunged from the
records by the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 38,
in Special Proceedings No. 97-81893, dated April 11, 1997.
However, it appears that the said decision has been
annulled and set aside by the Court of Appeals on June 10,
1999, in CA-G.R. SP No. 45289. The decision of the Court of
Appeals was appealed to this Court by petition for review,
docketed as G.R. No. 140305. Pending the final outcome of
that case, the decision of the Court of Appeals is presumed
valid and can be invoked as prima facie basis for holding
that Rosilyn was indeed eleven years old at the time she
was abused by accused-appellant.
However, even assuming the absence of a valid birth
certificate, there is sufficient and ample proof of the
complainant’s age in the records.
Rosilyn’s Baptismal Certificate can likewise serve as proof
of her age. In People v. Liban, we ruled that the birth
certificate, or in lieu thereof, any other documentary
evidence that can help establish the age of the victim, such
as the baptismal certificate, school records, and documents
of similar nature, can be presented.
And even assuming ex gratia argumenti that the birth and
baptismal certificates of Rosilyn are inadmissible to prove
her age, the Master List of Live Births and the Cord
Dressing Book of Dr. Jose Fabella Memorial Hospital where
Rosilyn was born are sufficient evidence to prove that her
date of birth was May 11, 1985. These documents are
considered entries in official records, admissible as prima
facie evidence of their contents and corroborative of
Rosilyn’s testimony as to her age.
In order for a book to classify as an official register and
admissible in evidence, it is not necessary that it be
required by an express statute to be kept, nor that the
nature of the office should render the book indispensable;
it is sufficient that it be directed by the proper authority to
be kept. Thus, official registers, though not required by
law, kept as convenient and appropriate modes of
discharging official duties, are admissible.
Entries in public or official books or records may be
proved by the production of the books or records
themselves or by a copy certified by the legal keeper
thereof. It is not necessary to show that the person making
the entry is unavailable by reason of death, absence, etc., in
order that the entry may be admissible in evidence, for his
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being excused from appearing in court in order that public
business be not deranged, is one of the reasons for this
exception to the hearsay rule.
6. G.R. No. 139070, May 29, 2002
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. NOEL LEE
The rule is that the character or reputation of a party is
regarded as legally irrelevant in determining a
controversy, so that evidence relating thereto is not
admissible. Ordinarily, if the issues in the case were
allowed to be influenced by evidence of the character or
reputation of the parties, the trial would be apt to have the
aspects of a popularity contest rather than a factual
inquiry into the merits of the case. After all, the business of
the court is to try the case, and not the man; and a very bad
man may have a righteous cause. There are exceptions to
this rule however and Section 51, Rule 130 gives the
exceptions in both criminal and civil cases.
In criminal cases, sub-paragraph 1 of Section 51 of Rule
130 provides that the accused may prove his good moral
character which is pertinent to the moral trait involved in
the offense charged. When the accused presents proof of
his good moral character, this strengthens the
presumption of innocence, and where good character and
reputation are established, an inference arises that the
accused did not commit the crime charged. This view
proceeds from the theory that a person of good character
and high reputation is not likely to have committed the act
charged against him. Sub-paragraph 2 provides that the
prosecution may not prove the bad moral character of the
accused except only in rebuttal and when such evidence is
pertinent to the moral trait involved in the offense
charged. This is intended to avoid unfair prejudice to the
accused who might otherwise be convicted not because he
is guilty but because he is a person of bad character. The
offering of character evidence on his behalf is a privilege of
the defendant, and the prosecution cannot comment on the
failure of the defendant to produce such evidence. Once
the defendant raises the issue of his good character, the
prosecution may, in rebuttal, offer evidence of the
defendant’s bad character. Otherwise, a defendant, secure
from refutation, would have a license to unscrupulously
impose a false character upon the tribunal.
7. G.R. No. 162571, June 15, 2005
ARNEL L. AGUSTIN vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS AND
MINOR MARTIN JOSE PROLLAMANTE, REPRESENTED
BY HIS MOTHER/GUARDIAN FE ANGELA
PROLLAMANTE
In assessing the probative value of DNA evidence, courts
should consider, inter alia, the following factors: how the
samples were collected, how they were handled, the
possibility of contamination of the samples, the procedure
followed in analyzing the samples, whether proper
APRIL LYNN L. URSAL LLB-4
REMEDIAL LAW REVIEW II (S.Y. 2015-2016)
UNIVERSITY OF CEBU – COLLEGE OF LAW
standards and procedures were followed in conducting the
tests, and the qualification of the analyst who conducted
the tests.
Under Philippine law, evidence is relevant when it relates
directly to a fact in issue as to induce belief in its existence
or non-existence.
The kernel of the right against self-incrimination is not
against all compulsion, but against testimonial compulsion.
The right against self-incrimination is simply against the
legal process of extracting from the lips of the accused an
admission of guilt. It does not apply where the evidence
sought to be excluded is not an incrimination but as part of
object evidence.
For too long, illegitimate children have been marginalized
by fathers who choose to deny their existence. The
growing sophistication of DNA testing technology finally
provides a much needed equalizer for such ostracized and
abandoned progeny. We have long believed in the merits
of DNA testing and have repeatedly expressed as much in
the past. This case comes at a perfect time when DNA
testing has finally evolved into a dependable and
authoritative form of evidence gathering. We therefore
take this opportunity to forcefully reiterate our stand that
DNA testing is a valid means of determining paternity.
8. G.R. No. 153699, August 22, 2005
CIRSE FRANCISCO "CHOY" TORRALBA vs. PEOPLE OF
THE PHILIPPINES
It is generally held that sound recording is not
inadmissible because of its form where a proper
foundation has been laid to guarantee the genuineness of
the recording.
In our jurisdiction, it is a rudimentary rule of evidence
that before a tape recording is admissible in evidence
and given probative value, the following requisites
must first be established, to wit:
(1) a showing that the recording device was capable
of taking testimony;
(2) a showing that the operator of the device was
competent;
(3) establishment of the authenticity and correctness
of the recording;
(4) a showing that changes, additions, or deletions
have not been made;
(5) a showing of the manner of the preservation of
the recording;
(6) identification of the speakers; and
(7) a showing that the testimony elicited was
voluntarily made without any kind of inducement.
In his comprehensive book on evidence, our former
colleague, Justice Ricardo Francisco, wrote that "[e]vidence
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of a message or a speech by means of radio broadcast is
admissible as evidence when the identity of the speaker is
established either by the testimony of a witness who saw
him broadcast his message or speech, or by the witness’
recognition of the voice of the speaker."
9. G.R. No. 151040, October 6, 2005
ALLIED BANKING CORPORATION vs. CHENG YONG and
LILIA GAW
Under the parole evidence rule, the terms of a contract are
conclusive upon the parties and evidence which shall vary
a complete and enforceable agreement embodied in a
document is inadmissible.
The appellate court is correct in declaring that under the
parole evidence rule, when the parties have reduced their
agreement into writing, they are deemed to have intended
such written agreement to be the sole repository and
memorial of everything that they have agreed upon. All
their prior and contemporaneous agreements are deemed
to be merged in the written document so that, as between
them and their successors-in-interest, such writing
becomes exclusive evidence of the terms thereof and any
verbal agreement which tends to vary, alter or modify the
same is not admissible.
10. G.R. No. 143439, October 14, 2005
MAXIMO ALVAREZ vs. SUSAN RAMIREZ
During their marriage, neither the husband nor the wife
may testify for or against the other without the consent of
the affected spouse, except in a civil case by one against
the other, or in a criminal case for a crime committed by
one against the other or the latter’s direct descendants or
ascendants
The reasons given for the rule are:
1. There is identity of interests between husband
and wife;
2. If one were to testify for or against the other, there
is consequent danger of perjury;
3. The policy of the law is to guard the security and
confidences of private life, even at the risk of an
occasional failure of justice, and to prevent
domestic disunion and unhappiness; and
4. Where there is want of domestic tranquility there
is danger of punishing one spouse through the
hostile testimony of the other.
But like all other general rules, the marital disqualification
rule has its own exceptions, both in civil actions between
the spouses and in criminal cases for offenses committed
by one against the other. Like the rule itself, the exceptions
are backed by sound reasons which, in the excepted cases,
outweigh those in support of the general rule. For instance,
where the marital and domestic relations are so strained
APRIL LYNN L. URSAL LLB-4
REMEDIAL LAW REVIEW II (S.Y. 2015-2016)
UNIVERSITY OF CEBU – COLLEGE OF LAW
that there is no more harmony to be preserved nor peace
and tranquility which may be disturbed, the reason based
upon such harmony and tranquility fails. In such a case,
identity of interests disappears and the consequent danger
of perjury based on that identity is non-existent. Likewise,
in such a situation, the security and confidences of private
life, which the law aims at protecting, will be nothing but
ideals, which through their absence, merely leave a void in
the unhappy home.
11. G.R. No. 147039, January 27, 2006
DBP POOL OF ACCREDITED INSURANCE COMPANIES vs.
RADIO MINDANAO NETWORK, INC.
The Court will not disturb these factual findings absent
compelling or exceptional reasons. It should be stressed
that a review by certiorari under Rule 45 is a matter of
discretion. Under this mode of review, the jurisdiction of
the Court is limited to reviewing only errors of law, not of
fact.
Moreover, when supported by substantial evidence,
findings of fact of the trial court as affirmed by the CA are
conclusive and binding on the parties, which this Court will
not review unless there are exceptional circumstances.
There are no exceptional circumstances in this case that
would have impelled the Court to depart from the factual
findings of both the trial court and the CA.
A witness can testify only to those facts which he knows of
his personal knowledge, which means those facts which
are derived from his perception. A witness may not testify
as to what he merely learned from others either because
he was told or read or heard the same. Such testimony is
considered hearsay and may not be received as proof of
the truth of what he has learned. The hearsay rule is based
upon serious concerns about the trustworthiness and
reliability of hearsay evidence inasmuch as such evidence
are not given under oath or solemn affirmation and, more
importantly, have not been subjected to cross-examination
by opposing counsel to test the perception, memory,
veracity and articulateness of the out-of-court declarant or
actor upon whose reliability on which the worth of the out-
of-court statement depends.
Res gestae, as an exception to the hearsay rule, refers to
those exclamations and statements made by either the
participants, victims, or spectators to a crime immediately
before, during, or after the commission of the crime, when
the circumstances are such that the statements were made
as a spontaneous reaction or utterance inspired by the
excitement of the occasion and there was no opportunity
for the declarant to deliberate and to fabricate a false
statement.
The rule in res gestae applies when the declarant
himself did not testify and provided that the testimony
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of the witness who heard the declarant complies with
the following requisites:
(1) That the principal act, the res gestae, be a startling
occurrence;
(2) The statements were made before the declarant
had the time to contrive or devise a falsehood; and
(3) That the statements must concern the occurrence
in question and its immediate attending
circumstances.
Admissibility of evidence should not be equated with its
weight and sufficiency. Admissibility of evidence depends
on its relevance and competence, while the weight of
evidence pertains to evidence already admitted and its
tendency to convince and persuade.
12. G.R. No. 127857, June 20, 2006
PASTOR DE JESUS vs. HONORABLE COURT OF
APPEALS, RONALDO, ALICIA, FLORANTE, NELSON,
BELLAFLOR, MARIO, ARNOLFO, JOCELYN and
GODFREY, all surnamed DE JESUS, all represented by
RONALDO DE JESUS
It is not the function of this Court to analyze or weigh
evidence all over again, unless there is a showing that the
findings of the lower court are totally devoid of support or
are glaringly erroneous as to constitute palpable error or
grave abuse of discretion.
Although this rule admits of several exceptions, none of the
exceptions is available in the instant case which gives us
reason to deviate from the rule. The courts a quo had
sufficient factual basis in holding that the questioned
signatures are spurious.
In any event, we are not convinced that the courts a quo
erred in declaring null and void the Deed of Sale. Generally,
a notarized document carries the evidentiary weight
conferred upon it with respect to its due execution, and
has in its favor the presumption of regularity. However,
this presumption is not absolute and may be rebutted by
clear and convincing evidence to the contrary.
It is true that the opinion of handwriting experts are not
necessarily binding upon the court, the expert’s function
being to place before the court data upon which the court
can form its own opinion. Handwriting experts are usually
helpful in the examination of forged documents because of
the technical procedure involved in analyzing them. But
resort to these experts is not mandatory or indispensable
to the examination or the comparison of handwriting. A
finding of forgery does not depend entirely on the
testimonies of handwriting experts, because the judge
must conduct an independent examination of the
questioned signature in order to arrive at a reasonable
conclusion as to its authenticity.
APRIL LYNN L. URSAL LLB-4
REMEDIAL LAW REVIEW II (S.Y. 2015-2016)
UNIVERSITY OF CEBU – COLLEGE OF LAW
It bears stressing that the trial court may validly determine
forgery from its own independent examination of the
documentary evidence at hand. This the trial court judge
can do without resorting to experts, especially when the
question involved is mere handwriting similarity or
dissimilarity, which can be determined by a visual
comparison of specimen of the questioned signatures with
those of currently existing ones. Section 22 of Rule 132 of
the Rules of Court explicitly authorizes the court, by itself,
to make a comparison of the disputed handwriting with
writings admitted or treated as genuine by the party
against whom the evidence is offered, or proved to be
genuine to the satisfaction of the judge.
13. G. R. No. 157064, August 7, 2006
BARCELON, ROXAS SECURITIES, INC. (now known as
UBP Securities, Inc.) vs. COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL
REVENUE
Jurisprudence is replete with cases holding that if the
taxpayer denies ever having received an assessment from
the BIR, it is incumbent upon the latter to prove by
competent evidence that such notice was indeed received
by the addressee. The onus probandi was shifted to
respondent to prove by contrary evidence that the
Petitioner received the assessment in the due course of
mail. The Supreme Court has consistently held that while a
mailed letter is deemed received by the addressee in the
course of mail, this is merely a disputable presumption
subject to controversion and a direct denial thereof shifts
the burden to the party favored by the presumption to
prove that the mailed letter was indeed received by the
addressee.
The facts to be proved to raise this presumption are:
(a) that the letter was properly addressed with postage
prepaid, and (b) that it was mailed. Once these facts are
proved, the presumption is that the letter was received by
the addressee as soon as it could have been transmitted to
him in the ordinary course of the mail. But if one of the
said facts fails to appear, the presumption does not lie.
Entries in official records made in the performance of his
duty by a public officer of the Philippines, or by a person in
the performance of a duty specially enjoined by law, are
prima facie evidence of the facts therein stated.
There are three requisites for admissibility under the
rule just mentioned:
(a) That the entry was made by a public officer, or by
another person specially enjoined by law to do so;
(b) That it was made by the public officer in the
performance of his duties, or by such other person
in the performance of a duty specially enjoined by
law; and
(c) That the public officer or other person had
sufficient knowledge of the facts by him stated,
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 which must have been acquired by him personally
or through official information.
14. G.R. No. 162037, August 7, 2006
HEIRS OF ENRIQUE DIAZ, Represented by AURORA T.
DIAZ vs. ELINOR A. VIRATA, In her capacity as the
Administratrix of the Estate of ANTENOR VIRATA
A certificate of title shall not be subject to collateral attack.
It cannot be altered, modified, or cancelled except in a
direct proceeding in accordance with law.
An action is deemed an attack on a title when the object of
the action or proceeding is to nullify the title, and thus
challenge the judgment pursuant to which the title was
decreed. The attack is direct when the object of the action
is to annul or set aside such judgment, or enjoin its
enforcement. On the other hand, the attack is indirect or
collateral when, in an action to obtain a different relief, an
attack on the judgment is nevertheless made as an incident
thereof.
Laches is defined as the failure to assert a right for an
unreasonable and unexplained length of time, warranting
a presumption that the party entitled to assert it has either
abandoned or declined to assert it. This equitable defense
is based upon grounds of public policy, which requires the
discouragement of stale claims for the peace of society.84
Indeed, while it is true that a Torrens Title is indefeasible
and imprescriptible, the registered landowner may lose his
right to recover the possession of his registered property
by reason of laches.
For laches to apply, it must be shown that there was lack of
knowledge or notice on the part of the defendant that
complainant would assert the right in which he bases his
suit.
15. G.R. No. 157906, November 2, 2006
JOAQUINITA P. CAPILI vs. SPS. DOMINADOR CARDAÑA
and ROSALITA CARDAÑA
The doctrine of res ipsa loquitur applies where:
(1) The accident was of such character as to warrant
an inference that it would not have happened
except for the defendant’s negligence;
(2) The accident must have been caused by an agency
or instrumentality within the exclusive
management or control of the person charged
with the negligence complained of; and
(3) The accident must not have been due to any
voluntary action or contribution on the part of the
person injured.
The effect of the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur is to warrant a
presumption or inference that the mere falling of the
branch of the dead and rotting tree which caused the death
APRIL LYNN L. URSAL LLB-4
REMEDIAL LAW REVIEW II (S.Y. 2015-2016)
UNIVERSITY OF CEBU – COLLEGE OF LAW
of respondents’ daughter was a result of petitioner’s
negligence, being in charge of the school.
As a rule of evidence, the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur is
peculiar to the law of negligence which recognizes that
prima facie negligence may be established without direct
proof and furnishes a substitute for specific proof of
negligence.
The procedural effect of the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur is
that petitioner’s negligence is presumed once respondents
established the requisites for the doctrine to apply. Once
respondents made out a prima facie case of all requisites,
the burden shifts to petitioner to explain. The presumption
or inference may be rebutted or overcome by other
evidence and, under appropriate circumstances a
disputable presumption, such as that of due care or
innocence, may outweigh the inference.
16. G.R. No. 152007, January 22, 2007
PROCOPIO TAPUROC, HEIRS OF ANTONIA EBE
(Deceased) represented by her children namely:
HEIRS OF CELEDONIA PUTONG, namely: FORTUNATO
ESCUDERO, TERESITA TABALDINA, CONCORDIO E.
NEBRIA, PEDRO ESCUDERO and LUISA PEDRERA;
HEIRS OF EUFEMIO PUTONG, namely: RICARDO
PUTONG and PORFERIA PUTONG; HEIRS OF GREGORIO
PUTONG, namely: ROSALIO PUTONG, PERSEVERANDA
LOPEZ, BERNARDO PUTONG and ROSALINDA OMAGAC;
HEIRS OF MARIANO PUTONG, namely: SERAPIA
DALHOG, TEODORA AYENG, MARCIANO PUTONG,
RESTITUTA LIQUIT, SERAPIA LUAY, FAUSTINO
PUTONG and SOFRONIA PATROLLA, ALL
REPRESENTED BY THEIR ATTORNEY-IN- FACT, AUREA
P. MERCIDOR vs. CARMELITA LOQUELLANO VDA. DE
MENDE and the HEIRS OF EVANS MENDE, namely: ERIC
MITCHEL, ERIC LYNDON, ERIC FERDINAND, JOSE ERIC
ERVIN and JENNIFER MILDRED, ALL SURNAMED
MENDE and the REGISTER OF DEEDS OF THE CITY OF
TAGBILARAN
The Court, in petitions for review of CA decisions under
Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, usually limits its inquiry only
to questions of law. Stated otherwise, it is not the function
of the Court to analyze and weigh all over again the
evidence or premises supportive of the factual holdings of
lower courts. The Court refrains from further scrutiny of
factual findings of trial courts, more so when those
findings are affirmed by the CA, as here. To do otherwise
would defeat the very essence of Rule 45 and would
convert the Court into a trier of facts, which it is not meant
to be.
As a rule, forgery cannot be presumed. It must be proved
by clear, positive and convincing evidence. Mere allegation
of forgery is not evidence and the burden of proof lies on
Page 6
the party alleging it. Here, the petitioners failed to
discharge their burden.
Moreover, the technical procedure utilized by handwriting
experts, while usually helpful in the examination of forged
documents, is not mandatory or indispensable to the
examination or comparison of handwritings.
17. G.R. No. 173309, January 23, 2007
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. FERDINAND
PASCUAL y BAUTISTA
There are instances where, although a witness may not
have actually seen the very act of commission of a crime,
he may still be able to positively identify a suspect or
accused as the perpetrator of a crime, as for instance when
the latter is the person or one of the persons last seen with
the victim immediately before and right after the
commission of the crime.
It is also important to emphasize that Adelaida
immediately called out to her son that her husband was
shot by Pascual and afterward narrated the incident to the
police again identifying Pascual as the assailant. These
circumstances, as the trial court correctly reckoned, are
part of the res gestae, having been made by Adelaida
immediately subsequent to the shooting.
18. G.R. No. 150157, January 25, 2007
MAURICIO MANLICLIC and PHILIPPINE RABBIT BUS
LINES, INC. vs. MODESTO CALAUNAN
For Section 47, Rule 130 (Testimony or Deposition at a
former proceeding) to apply, the following requisites
must be satisfied:
(a) The witness is dead or unable to testify;
(b) His testimony or deposition was given in a former
case or proceeding, judicial or administrative,
between the same parties or those representing
the same interests;
(c) The former case involved the same subject as that
in the present case, although on different causes of
action;
(d) The issue testified to by the witness in the former
trial is the same issue involved in the present case;
and
(e) The adverse party had an opportunity to cross-
examine the witness in the former case.
It is elementary that an objection shall be made at the time
when an alleged inadmissible document is offered in
evidence; otherwise, the objection shall be treated as
waived, since the right to object is merely a privilege which
the party may waive. Thus, a failure to except to the
evidence because it does not conform to the statute is a
waiver of the provisions of the law. Even assuming ex
gratia argumenti that these documents are inadmissible
APRIL LYNN L. URSAL LLB-4
REMEDIAL LAW REVIEW II (S.Y. 2015-2016)
UNIVERSITY OF CEBU – COLLEGE OF LAW
for being hearsay, but on account of failure to object
thereto, the same may be admitted and considered as
sufficient to prove the facts therein asserted. Hearsay
evidence alone may be insufficient to establish a fact in a
suit but, when no objection is made thereto, it is, like any
other evidence, to be considered and given the importance
it deserves.
19. G.R. No. 156183, February 28, 2007
NICASIO I. ALCANTARA vs. VICENTE C. PONCE and the
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
It is a settled principle in this jurisdiction that statements
made in the course of judicial proceedings are absolutely
privileged. This absolute privilege remains regardless of
the defamatory tenor and the presence of malice if the
same are relevant, pertinent or material to the cause in
hand or subject of the inquiry. The lone requirement
imposed to maintain the cloak of absolute privilege is the
test of relevancy. (Doctrine of Absolute Privilege)
Since the newsletter was presented during the preliminary
investigation, it was vested with a privileged character.
It is hornbook learning that the actions and utterances in
judicial proceedings so far as the actual participants
therein are concerned and preliminary steps leading to
judicial action of an official nature have been given
absolute privilege. Of particular interest are proceedings
leading up to prosecutions or attempted prosecutions for
crime xxx [A] written charge or information filed with the
prosecutor or the court is not libelous although proved to
be false and unfounded. Furthermore, the information
given to a prosecutor by a private person for the purpose
of initiating a prosecution is protected by the same cloak of
immunity and cannot be used as a basis for an action for
defamation.
The one obstacle that those pleading the defense of
privileged communication must hurdle is the test of
relevancy. Under this test, a matter alleged in the course
of the proceedings need not be in every case material to
the issues presented but should be legitimately related to
the issues or be so pertinent to the controversy that it may
become the subject of inquiry in the course of trial.
20. G.R. No. 170491, April 4, 2007
NATIONAL POWER CORPORATION vs. HON. RAMON G.
CODILLA, JR., Presiding Judge, RTC of Cebu, Br. 19,
BANGPAI SHIPPING COMPANY, and WALLEM
SHIPPING, INCORPORATED
An "electronic document" refers to information or the
representation of information, data, figures, symbols or
other models of written expression, described or however
represented, by which a right is established or an
obligation extinguished, or by which a fact may be proved
Page 7
and affirmed, which is received, recorded, transmitted,
stored, processed, retrieved or produced electronically. It
includes digitally signed documents and any printout,
readable by sight or other means which accurately reflects
the electronic data message or electronic document.
The rules use the word "information" to define an
electronic document received, recorded, transmitted,
stored, processed, retrieved or produced electronically.
This would suggest that an electronic document is relevant
only in terms of the information contained therein, similar
to any other document which is presented in evidence as
proof of its contents. However, what differentiates an
electronic document from a paper-based document is the
manner by which the information is processed; clearly, the
information contained in an electronic document is
received, recorded, transmitted, stored, processed,
retrieved or produced electronically.
A perusal of the information contained in the photocopies
submitted by petitioner will reveal that not all of the
contents therein, such as the signatures of the persons who
purportedly signed the documents, may be recorded or
produced electronically. By no stretch of the imagination
can a person’s signature affixed manually be considered as
information electronically received, recorded, transmitted,
stored, processed, retrieved or produced. Hence, the
argument of petitioner that since these paper printouts
were produced through an electronic process, then these
photocopies are electronic documents as defined in the
Rules on Electronic Evidence is obviously an erroneous, if
not preposterous, interpretation of the law. Having thus
declared that the offered photocopies are not tantamount
to electronic documents, it is consequential that the same
may not be considered as the functional equivalent of their
original as decreed in the law.
When the original document has been lost or destroyed, or
cannot be produced in court, the offeror, upon proof of its
execution or existence and the cause of its unavailability
without bad faith on his part, may prove its contents by a
copy, or by a recital of its contents in some authentic
document, or by the testimony of witnesses in the order
stated. The offeror of secondary evidence is burdened
to prove the predicates thereof:
(a) The loss or destruction of the original without bad
faith on the part of the proponent/offeror which
can be shown by circumstantial evidence of
routine practices of destruction of documents;
(b) The proponent must prove by a fair
preponderance of evidence as to raise a
reasonable inference of the loss or destruction of
the original copy; and
(c) It must be shown that a diligent and bona fide but
unsuccessful search has been made for the
document in the proper place or places.
APRIL LYNN L. URSAL LLB-4
REMEDIAL LAW REVIEW II (S.Y. 2015-2016)
UNIVERSITY OF CEBU – COLLEGE OF LAW
However, in the case at bar, though petitioner insisted in
offering the photocopies as documentary evidence, it failed
to establish that such offer was made in accordance with
the exceptions as enumerated under the above-quoted
rule. Accordingly, we find no error in the Order of the court
a quo denying admissibility of the photocopies offered by
petitioner as documentary evidence.
21. G.R. No. 155483, April 27, 2007
HEIRS OF PEDRO PASAG, represented by EUFREMIO
PASAG; HEIRS OF MARIA PASAG, represented by
EPIFANIA LUMAGUI; HEIRS OF JUANITA PASAG,
represented by ASUNCION ORTIOLA; HEIRS OF ISIDRO
PASAG, represented by VIRGINIA P. MENDOZA; HEIRS
OF BASILIO PASAG, represented by MILAGROSA P.
NABOR; and HEIRS OF FORTUNATA PASAG,
represented by FLORENTINA S. MEMBRERE vs. SPS.
LORENZO and FLORENTINA PAROCHA, PRISCILLA P.
ABELLERA, and MARIA VILORIA PASAG
The Rules of Court provides that "the court shall consider
no evidence which has not been formally offered." A formal
offer is necessary because judges are mandated to rest
their findings of facts and their judgment only and strictly
upon the evidence offered by the parties at the trial. Its
function is to enable the trial judge to know the purpose or
purposes for which the proponent is presenting the
evidence. On the other hand, this allows opposing parties
to examine the evidence and object to its admissibility.
Moreover, it facilitates review as the appellate court will
not be required to review documents not previously
scrutinized by the trial court.
The formal offer of one’s evidence is deemed waived after
failing to submit it within a considerable period of time.
No evidence shall be allowed to be presented and offered
during the trial in support of a party’s evidence-in-chief
other than those that had been identified below and pre-
marked during the pre-trial. Any other evidence not
indicated or listed below shall be considered waived by the
parties. However, the Court, in its discretion, may allow
introduction of additional evidence in the following
cases:
(a) Those to be used on cross-examination or re-
cross-examination for impeachment purposes;
(b) Those presented on re-direct examination to
explain or supplement the answers of a witness
during the cross-examination;
(c) Those to be utilized for rebuttal or sur-rebuttal
purposes; and
(d) Those not available during the pre-trial
proceedings despite due diligence on the part of
the party offering the same.
It is apparent from the foregoing provision that both
parties should obtain, gather, collate, and list all their
Page 8
respective pieces of evidence–– whether testimonial,
documentary, or object––even prior to the preliminary
conference before the clerk of court or at the latest before
the scheduled pre-trial conference. Otherwise, pieces of
evidence not identified or marked during the pre-trial
proceedings are deemed waived and rendered inutile. The
parties should strictly adhere to the principle of "laying
one’s cards on the table." In the light of these issuances and
in order to obviate interminable delay in case processing,
the parties and lawyers should closely conform to the
requirement that the offer of evidence must be done orally
on the day scheduled for the presentation of the last
witness.
2007-2008 CASES
1. G.R. No. 173612, March 26, 2008
DOMINADOR MALANA and RODEL TIAGA vs. PEOPLE
OF THE PHILIPPINES
This rule provides that where the evidence of the parties in
a criminal case is evenly balanced, the constitutional
presumption of innocence should tilt the scales in favor of
the accused. There is, therefore, no equipoise if the
evidence is not evenly balanced. Said rule is not applicable
in the case before us because the evidence here presented
is not equally weighty. The equipoise rule cannot be
invoked where the evidence of the prosecution is
overwhelming.
Against the direct, positive and convincing evidence for the
prosecution, appellants could only offer denials and
uncorroborated alibi. It is elementary that alibi and denial
are outweighed by positive identification that is
categorical, consistent and untainted by any ill motive on
the part of the eyewitness testifying on the matter. Alibi
and denial, if not substantiated by clear and convincing
evidence, are negative and self-serving evidence
undeserving of weight in law. The prosecution witnesses
positively identified appellants as two of the perpetrators
of the crime. It is incumbent upon appellants to prove that
they were at another place when the felony was
committed, and that it was physically impossible for them
to have been at the scene of the crime at the time it was
committed. This they failed to prove.
2. G.R. No. 158788, April 30, 2008
ELY AGUSTIN vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
A material matter is the main fact which is the subject of
inquiry or any circumstance which tends to prove that fact
or any fact or circumstance which tends to corroborate or
strengthen the testimony relative to the subject of inquiry
or which legitimately affects the credit of any witness who
testifies.
APRIL LYNN L. URSAL LLB-4
REMEDIAL LAW REVIEW II (S.Y. 2015-2016)
UNIVERSITY OF CEBU – COLLEGE OF LAW
While the lone defense of the accused that he was the
victim of a frame-up is easily fabricated, this claim
assumes importance when faced with the rather shaky
nature of the prosecution evidence. It is well to remember
that the prosecution must rely, not on the weakness of the
defense evidence, but rather on its own proof which must
be strong enough to convince this Court that the prisoner
in the dock deserves to be punished. The constitutional
presumption is that the accused is innocent even if his
defense is weak as long as the prosecution is not strong
enough to convict him.
The glaring contradictory testimonies of the prosecution
witnesses generate serious doubt as to whether a firearm
was really found in the house of petitioner. The
prosecution utterly failed to discharge its burden of
proving that petitioner is guilty of illegal possession of
firearms beyond reasonable doubt. The constitutional
presumption of innocence of petitioner has not been
demolished and therefore petitioner should be acquitted of
the crime he was with.
3. G.R. No. 159585, April 22, 2008
AMANDO A. PONTAOE and DR. ALEJANDRO G.
PONTAOE vs. TEODORA A. PONTAOE and EDUARDO A.
PONTAOE
As to the argument that handwriting experts should have
been employed, handwriting experts are usually helpful in
the examination of forged documents because of the
technical procedure involved in analyzing them, but resort
to these experts is not mandatory or indispensable to the
examination or the comparison of handwritings. A finding
of forgery does not depend entirely on the testimonies of
handwriting experts, because the judge must conduct an
examination of the questioned signature in order to arrive
at a reasonable conclusion as to its authenticity. The
opinions of handwriting experts are not binding upon
courts, especially when the question involved is mere
handwriting similarity or dissimilarity, which can be
determined by a visual comparison of specimens of the
questioned signatures with those of the currently existing
ones. Moreover, Section 22 of Rule 132 of the Rules of
Court likewise explicitly authorizes the court, by itself, to
make a comparison of the disputed handwriting "with
writings admitted or treated as genuine by the party
against whom the evidence is offered, or proved to be
genuine to the satisfaction of the judge."
Page 9
4. G.R. No. 173192, April 14, 2008
ROSENDO BACALSO, RODRIGO BACALSO, MARCILIANA
B. DOBLAS, TEROLIO BACALSO, ALIPIO BACALSO, JR.,
MARIO BACALSO, WILLIAM BACALSO, ALIPIO BACALSO
III and CRISTITA B. BAÑES vs. MAXIMO PADIGOS,
FLAVIANO MABUYO, GAUDENCIO PADIGOS, DOMINGO
PADIGOS, VICTORIA P. ABARQUEZ, LILIA P. GABISON,
TIMOTEO PADIGOS, PERFECTO PADIGOS, PRISCA
SALARDA, FLORA GUINTO, BENITA TEMPLA, SOTERO
PADIGOS, ANDRES PADIGOS, EMILIO PADIGOS,
DEMETRIO PADIGOS, JR., WENCESLAO PADIGOS, NELLY
PADIGOS, EXPEDITO PADIGOS, HENRY PADIGOS and
ENRIQUE P. MALAZARTE
Expert opinions are not ordinarily conclusive. They are
generally regarded as purely advisory in character. The
courts may place whatever weight they choose upon and
may reject them, if they find them inconsistent with the
facts in the case or otherwise unreasonable. When faced
with conflicting expert opinions, courts give more weight
and credence to that which is more complete, thorough,
and scientific.
The value of the opinion of a handwriting expert depends
not upon his mere statements of whether a writing is
genuine or false, but upon the assistance he may afford in
pointing out distinguishing marks, characteristics and
discrepancies in and between genuine and false specimens
of writing which would ordinarily escape notice or
detection from an unpracticed observer.
5. G.R. No. 160855, April 16, 2008
CONCEPCION CHUA GAW vs. SUY BEN CHUA and FELISA
CHUA
The delineation of a piece of evidence as part of the
evidence of one party or the other is only significant in
determining whether the party on whose shoulders lies
the burden of proof was able to meet the quantum of
evidence needed to discharge the burden. In civil cases,
that burden devolves upon the plaintiff who must establish
her case by preponderance of evidence. The rule is that the
plaintiff must rely on the strength of his own evidence and
not upon the weakness of the defendant’s evidence. Thus,
it barely matters who with a piece of evidence is credited.
In the end, the court will have to consider the entirety of
the evidence presented by both parties. Preponderance of
evidence is then determined by considering all the facts
and circumstances of the case, culled from the evidence,
regardless of who actually presented it.
That the witness is the adverse party does not necessarily
mean that the calling party will not be bound by the
former’s testimony. The fact remains that it was at his
instance that his adversary was put on the witness stand.
Unlike an ordinary witness, the calling party may impeach
an adverse witness in all respects as if he had been called
APRIL LYNN L. URSAL LLB-4
REMEDIAL LAW REVIEW II (S.Y. 2015-2016)
UNIVERSITY OF CEBU – COLLEGE OF LAW
by the adverse party, except by evidence of his bad
character. Under a rule permitting the impeachment of an
adverse witness, although the calling party does not vouch
for the witness’ veracity, he is nonetheless bound by his
testimony if it is not contradicted or remains unrebutted.
A party who calls his adversary as a witness is, therefore,
not bound by the latter’s testimony only in the sense that
he may contradict him by introducing other evidence to
prove a state of facts contrary to what the witness testifies
on. A rule that provides that the party calling an adverse
witness shall not be bound by his testimony does not mean
that such testimony may not be given its proper weight,
but merely that the calling party shall not be precluded
from rebutting his testimony or from impeaching him.
This, the petitioner failed to do.
The notarization of a private document converts it into a
public document, and makes it admissible in court without
further proof of its authenticity. It is entitled to full faith
and credit upon its face. A notarized document carries
evidentiary weight as to its due execution, and documents
acknowledged before a notary public have in their favor
the presumption of regularity. Such a document must be
given full force and effect absent a strong, complete and
conclusive proof of its falsity or nullity on account of some
flaws or defects recognized by law. A public document
executed and attested through the intervention of a notary
public is, generally, evidence of the facts therein express in
clear unequivocal manner.
The "best evidence rule" as encapsulated in Rule 130,
Section 3, of the Revised Rules of Civil Procedure applies
only when the content of such document is the subject of
the inquiry. Where the issue is only as to whether such
document was actually executed, or exists, or on the
circumstances relevant to or surrounding its execution, the
best evidence rule does not apply and testimonial evidence
is admissible. Any other substitutionary evidence is
likewise admissible without need to account for the
original. Moreover, production of the original may be
dispensed with, in the trial court’s discretion, whenever
the opponent does not bona fide dispute the contents of
the document and no other useful purpose will be served
by requiring production.
An agreement or the contract between the parties is the
formal expression of the parties’ rights, duties and
obligations. It is the best evidence of the intention of the
parties. The parties’ intention is to be deciphered from the
language used in the contract, not from the unilateral post
facto assertions of one of the parties, or of third parties
who are strangers to the contract. Thus, when the terms of
an agreement have been reduced to writing, it is deemed
to contain all the terms agreed upon and there can be,
between the parties and their successors in interest, no
Page 10
evidence of such terms other than the contents of the
written agreement.
6. G.R. No. 157177, February 11, 2008
BANK OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS vs. JESUSA P.
REYES and CONRADO B. REYES
It is a basic rule in evidence that each party to a case must
prove his own affirmative allegations by the degree of
evidence required by law. In civil cases, the party having
the burden of proof must establish his case by
preponderance of evidence, or that evidence which is of
greater weight or is more convincing than that which is in
opposition to it. It does not mean absolute truth; rather, it
means that the testimony of one side is more believable
than that of the other side, and that the probability of truth
is on one side than on the other.
For a better perspective on the calibration of the evidence
on hand, it must first be stressed that the judge who had
heard and seen the witnesses testify was not the same
judge who penned the decision. Thus, not having heard the
testimonies himself, the trial judge or the appellate court
would not be in a better position than this Court to assess
the credibility of witnesses on the basis of their demeanor.
Physical evidence is a mute but eloquent manifestation of
truth, and it ranks high in our hierarchy of trustworthy
evidence. We have, on many occasions, relied principally
upon physical evidence in ascertaining the truth. Where
the physical evidence on record runs counter to the
testimonial evidence of the prosecution witnesses, we
consistently rule that the physical evidence should prevail.
7. G.R. No. 159240, February 4, 2008
GREGORIO SILOT, JR. vs. ESTRELLA DE LA ROSA
Well-entrenched is the rule that the client is bound by the
mistakes arising from negligence of his own counsel. The
only exception to this rule is, as the Court of Appeals itself
cited in its decision, when the negligence is so gross that
the client is deprived of his day in court.
Judicial admissions are frequently those of counsel or of
the attorney of record, who is, for the purpose of the trial,
the agent of his client. When such admissions are made […]
for the purpose of dispensing with proof of some fact, […]
they bind the client, whether made during, or even after,
the trial
Judicial admissions do not require proof and may not be
contradicted in the absence of a prior showing that the
admissions had been made through palpable mistake.
APRIL LYNN L. URSAL LLB-4
REMEDIAL LAW REVIEW II (S.Y. 2015-2016)
UNIVERSITY OF CEBU – COLLEGE OF LAW
8. G.R. No. 157766, July 12, 2007
ERNESTO L. SALAS vs. STA. MESA MARKET
CORPORATION and the HEIRS OF PRIMITIVO E.
DOMINGO
Whether a document is public or private is relevant in
determining its admissibility as evidence. Public
documents are admissible in evidence even without
further proof of their due execution and genuineness. On
the other hand, private documents are inadmissible in
evidence unless they are properly authenticated.
During authentication in court, a witness positively
testifies that a document presented as evidence is genuine
and has been duly executed or that the document is
neither spurious nor counterfeit nor executed by mistake
or under duress.
While there is no fixed criterion as to what constitutes
competent evidence to establish the authenticity of a
private document, the best proof available must be
presented.
2011-2014 CASES
1. G.R. No. 193966, February 19, 2014
DESIGN SOURCES INTERNATIONAL INC. and KENNETH
SY vs. LOURDES L. ERISTINGCOL
Excluding future witnesses from the courtroom at the time
another witness is testifying, or ordering that these
witnesses be kept separate from one another, is primarily
to prevent them from conversing with one another. The
purpose is to ensure that the witnesses testify to the truth
by preventing them from being influenced by the
testimonies of the others. In other words, this measure is
meant to prevent connivance or collusion among
witnesses. The efficacy of excluding or separating
witnesses has long been recognized as a means of
discouraging fabrication, inaccuracy, and collusion.
However, without any motion from the opposing party or
order from the court, there is nothing in the rules that
prohibits a witness from hearing the testimonies of other
witnesses.
Without any prior order or at least a motion for exclusion
from any of the parties, a court cannot simply allow or
disallow the presentation of a witness solely on the ground
that the latter heard the testimony of another witness. It is
the responsibility of respondent's counsel to protect the
interest of his client during the presentation of other
witnesses.
Respondent is bound by the acts of her counsel, including
mistakes in the realm of procedural techniques. The
exception to the said rule does not apply herein,
Page 11
considering that there is no showing that she was thereby
deprived of due process.
2. G.R. No. 173540, January 22, 2014
PEREGRINA MACUA VDA. DE AVENIDO vs. TECLA
HOYBIA AVENIDO
While a marriage certificate is considered the primary
evidence of a marital union, it is not regarded as the sole
and exclusive evidence of marriage. Jurisprudence teaches
that the fact of marriage may be proven by relevant
evidence other than the marriage certificate. Hence, even a
person’s birth certificate may be recognized as competent
evidence of the marriage between his parents.
Evidence of the execution of a document is, in the last
analysis, necessarily collateral or primary. It generally
consists of parol testimony or extrinsic papers. Even when
the document is actually produced, its authenticity is not
necessarily, if at all, determined from its face or recital of
its contents but by parol evidence. At the most, failure to
produce the document, when available, to establish its
execution may effect the weight of the evidence presented
but not the admissibility of such evidence.
Truly, the execution of a document may be proven by the
parties themselves, by the swearing officer, by witnesses
who saw and recognized the signatures of the parties; or
even by those to whom the parties have previously
narrated the execution thereof. The Court has also held
that "the loss may be shown by any person who knows the
fact of its loss, or by anyone who has made, in the
judgment of the court, a sufficient examination in the place
or places where the document or papers of similar
character are usually kept by the person in whose custody
the document lost was, and has been unable to find it; or
who has made any other investigation which is sufficient
to satisfy the court that the instrument has indeed been
lost."
Marriage may be proven by any competent and relevant
evidence. The testimony by one of the parties to the
marriage or by one of the witnesses to the marriage has
been held to be admissible to prove the fact of marriage.
The person who officiated at the solemnization is also
competent to testify as an eyewitness to the fact of
marriage.
3. G.R. No. 185145, February 5, 2014
SPOUSES VICENTE AFULUGENCIA and LETICIA
AFULUGENCIA vs. METROPOLITAN BANK & TRUST CO.
and EMMANUEL L. ORTEGA, Clerk of Court, Regional
Trial Court and Ex-Officio Sheriff, Province of Bulacan
As a rule, in civil cases, the procedure of calling the adverse
party to the witness stand is not allowed, unless written
interrogatories are first served upon the latter.
APRIL LYNN L. URSAL LLB-4
REMEDIAL LAW REVIEW II (S.Y. 2015-2016)
UNIVERSITY OF CEBU – COLLEGE OF LAW
One of the purposes of the above rule is to prevent fishing
expeditions and needless delays; it is there to maintain
order and facilitate the conduct of trial. It will be presumed
that a party who does not serve written interrogatories on
the adverse party beforehand will most likely be unable to
elicit facts useful to its case if it later opts to call the
adverse party to the witness stand as its witness. Instead,
the process could be treated as a fishing expedition or an
attempt at delaying the proceedings; it produces no
significant result that a prior written interrogatories might
bring.
Besides, since the calling party is deemed bound by the
adverse party’s testimony, compelling the adverse party to
take the witness stand may result in the calling party
damaging its own case. Otherwise stated, if a party cannot
elicit facts or information useful to its case through the
facility of written interrogatories or other mode of
discovery, then the calling of the adverse party to the
witness stand could only serve to weaken its own case as a
result of the calling party’s being bound by the adverse
party’s testimony, which may only be worthless and
instead detrimental to the calling party’s cause.
Another reason for the rule is that by requiring prior
written interrogatories, the court may limit the inquiry to
what is relevant, and thus prevent the calling party from
straying or harassing the adverse party when it takes the
latter to the stand.
Thus, the rule not only protects the adverse party from
unwarranted surprises or harassment; it likewise prevents
the calling party from conducting a fishing expedition or
bungling its own case. Using its own judgment and
discretion, the court can hold its own in resolving a
dispute, and need not bear witness to the parties
perpetrating unfair court practices such as fishing for
evidence, badgering, or altogether ruining their own cases.
Ultimately, such unnecessary processes can only constitute
a waste of the court’s precious time, if not pointless
entertainment.
4. G.R. No. 179786, July 24, 2013
JOSIELENE LARA CHAN vs. JOHNNY T. CHAN
The physician-patient privileged communication rule
essentially means that a physician who gets information
while professionally attending a patient cannot in a civil
case be examined without the patient’s consent as to any
facts which would blacken the latter’s reputation. This rule
is intended to encourage the patient to open up to the
physician, relate to him the history of his ailment, and give
him access to his body, enabling the physician to make a
correct diagnosis of that ailment and provide the
appropriate cure. Any fear that a physician could be
compelled in the future to come to court and narrate all
that had transpired between him and the patient might
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prompt the latter to clam up, thus putting his own health
at great risk.
Section 36, Rule 132, states that objections to evidence
must be made after the offer of such evidence for
admission in court.
Josielene of course claims that the hospital records subject
of this case are not privileged since it is the "testimonial"
evidence of the physician that may be regarded as
privileged. Section 24(c) of Rule 130 states that the
physician "cannot in a civil case, without the consent of the
patient, be examined" regarding their professional
conversation. The privilege, says Josielene, does not cover
the hospital records, but only the examination of the
physician at the trial.
To allow, however, the disclosure during discovery
procedure of the hospital records—the results of tests that
the physician ordered, the diagnosis of the patient’s illness,
and the advice or treatment he gave him—would be to
allow access to evidence that is inadmissible without the
patient’s consent. Physician memorializes all these
information in the patient’s records. Disclosing them
would be the equivalent of compelling the physician to
testify on privileged matters he gained while dealing with
the patient, without the latter’s prior consent.
5. G.R. No. 157943, September 4, 2013
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. GILBERT REYES
WAGAS
In every criminal prosecution, however, the identity of the
offender, like the crime itself, must be established by proof
beyond reasonable doubt.
Verily, it is only fair that the caller be reliably identified
first before a telephone communication is accorded
probative weight. The identity of the caller may be
established by direct or circumstantial evidence. According
to one ruling of the Kansas Supreme Court:
Communications by telephone are admissible in evidence
where they are relevant to the fact or facts in issue, and
admissibility is governed by the same rules of evidence
concerning face-to-face conversations except the party
against whom the conversations are sought to be used
must ordinarily be identified. It is not necessary that the
witness be able, at the time of the conversation, to identify
the person with whom the conversation was had, provided
subsequent identification is proved by direct or
circumstantial evidence somewhere in the development of
the case. The mere statement of his identity by the party
calling is not in itself sufficient proof of such identity, in the
absence of corroborating circumstances so as to render the
conversation admissible. However, circumstances
preceding or following the conversation may serve to
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sufficiently identify the caller. The completeness of the
identification goes to the weight of the evidence rather
than its admissibility, and the responsibility lies in the first
instance with the district court to determine within its
sound discretion whether the threshold of admissibility
has been met.
It is a fundamental rule in criminal procedure that the
State carries the onus probandi in establishing the guilt of
the accused beyond a reasonable doubt, as a consequence
of the tenet ei incumbit probation, qui dicit, non qui negat,
which means that he who asserts, not he who denies, must
prove, and as a means of respecting the presumption of
innocence in favor of the man or woman on the dock for a
crime. Accordingly, the State has the burden of proof to
show: (1) the correct identification of the author of a
crime, and (2) the actuality of the commission of the
offense with the participation of the accused. All these
facts must be proved by the State beyond reasonable
doubt on the strength of its evidence and without solace
from the weakness of the defense. That the defense the
accused puts up may be weak is inconsequential if, in the
first place, the State has failed to discharge the onus of his
identity and culpability. The presumption of innocence
dictates that it is for the Prosecution to demonstrate the
guilt and not for the accused to establish innocence.
Indeed, the accused, being presumed innocent, carries no
burden of proof on his or her shoulders. For this reason,
the first duty of the Prosecution is not to prove the crime
but to prove the identity of the criminal. For even if the
commission of the crime can be established, without
competent proof of the identity of the accused beyond
reasonable doubt, there can be no conviction.
6. G.R. No. 174461, September 11, 2013
LETICIA I. KUMMER vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
The inconsistencies between the testimony of a witness in
open court, on one hand, and the statements in his sworn
affidavit, on the other hand, referring only to minor and
collateral matters, do not affect his credibility and the
veracity and weight of his testimony as they do not touch
upon the commission of the crime itself. Slight
contradictions, in fact, even serve to strengthen the
credibility of the witnesses, as these may be considered as
badges of truth rather than indicia of bad faith; they tend
to prove that their testimonies have not been rehearsed.
Nor are such inconsistencies, and even improbabilities,
unusual, for no person has perfect faculties of senses or
recall.
The rule is settled that the validity of a judgment is not
rendered erroneous solely because the judge who heard
the case was not the same judge who rendered the
decision. In fact, it is not necessary for the validity of a
judgment that the judge who penned the decision should
actually hear the case in its entirety, for he can merely rely
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on the transcribed stenographic notes taken during the
trial as the basis for his decision.
At any rate, we find it noteworthy that the lack or absence
of motive for committing the crime does not preclude
conviction where there are reliable witnesses who fully
and satisfactorily identified the petitioner as the
perpetrator of the felony, such as in this case.
The chemistry report showing a positive result of the
paraffin test is a public document. As a public document,
the rule on authentication does not apply. It is admissible
in evidence without further proof of its due execution and
genuineness; the person who made the report need not be
presented in court to identify, describe and testify how the
report was conducted. Moreover, documents consisting of
entries in public records made in the performance of a
duty by a public officer are prima facie evidence of the
facts stated therein.
On the issue of the normal process versus the actual
process conducted during the test raised by the petitioner,
suffice it to say that in the absence of proof to the contrary,
it is presumed that the forensic chemist who conducted
the report observed the regular procedure. Stated
otherwise, the courts will not presume irregularity or
negligence in the performance of one’s duties unless facts
are shown dictating a contrary conclusion. The
presumption of regularity in favor of the forensic chemist
compels us to reject the petitioner’s contention that an
explanation has to be given on how the actual process was
conducted. Since the petitioner presented no evidence of
fabrication or irregularity, we presume that the standard
operating procedure has been observed.
7. G.R. No. 197813, September 25, 2013
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. EDWIN IBANEZ y
ALBANTE and ALFREDO (FREDDIE) NULLA y IBANEZ
Well-entrenched in jurisprudence is that the trial court's
evaluation of the testimony of a witness is accorded the
highest respect because of its direct opportunity to
observe the witnesses on the stand and to determine if
they are telling the truth or not. This opportunity enables
the trial judge to detect better that thin line between fact
and prevarication that will determine the guilt or
innocence of the accused. That line may not be discernible
from a mere reading of the impersonal record by the
reviewing court. Thus, the trial judge's evaluation of the
competence and credibility of a witness will not be
disturbed on review, unless it is clear from the records that
his judgment is erroneous.
With exceptions provided in the Rules of Court, all persons
who can perceive, and perceiving, can make known their
perception to others, may be witnesses. That is even
buttressed by the Rule on Examination of a Child Witness
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which specifies that every child is presumed qualified to be
a witness. To rebut this presumption, the burden of proof
lies on the party challenging the child's competence. Only
when substantial doubt exists regarding the ability of the
child to perceive, remember, communicate, distinguish
truth from falsehood, or appreciate the duty to tell the
truth in court will the court, motu proprio or on motion of a
party, conduct a competency examination of a child. Thus,
petitioners’ flimsy objections on Rachel’s lack of education
and inability to read and tell time carry no weight and
cannot overcome the clear and convincing testimony of
Rachel as to who killed her father.
8. G.R. No. 188395, November 20, 2013
HEIRS OF THE LATE FELIX M. BUCTON, namely:
NICANORA G. BUCTON, ERLINDA BUCTON-EBLAMO,
AGNES BUCTON-LUGOD, WILMA BUCTON-YRAY and
DON G. BUCTON vs. SPOUSES GONZALO and TRINIDAD
GO
As a rule, forgery cannot be presumed and must be proved
by clear, positive and convincing evidence and the burden
of proof lies on the party alleging forgery. The best
evidence of a forged signature in the instrument is the
instrument itself reflecting the alleged forged signature.
The fact of forgery can only be established by comparison
between the alleged forged signature and the authentic
and genuine signature of the person whose signature is
theorized upon to have been forged.
While it is true that a notarized document carries the
evidentiary weight conferred upon it with respect to its
due execution, and has in its favor the presumption of
regularity, this presumption, however, is not absolute. It
may be rebutted by clear and convincing evidence to the
contrary.
9. G.R. No. 177407, February 9, 2011
RICO ROMMEL ATIENZA vs. BOARD OF MEDICINE and
EDITHA SIOSON
It is well-settled that the rules of evidence are not strictly
applied in proceedings before administrative bodies.
Admissibility of evidence refers to the question of whether
or not the circumstance (or evidence) is to be considered
at all. On the other hand, the probative value of evidence
refers to the question of whether or not it proves an issue.
Unquestionably, the rules of evidence are merely the
means for ascertaining the truth respecting a matter of
fact. Thus, they likewise provide for some facts which are
established and need not be proved, such as those covered
by judicial notice, both mandatory and discretionary. Laws
of nature involving the physical sciences, specifically
biology, include the structural make-up and composition of
living things such as human beings. In this case, we may
Page 14
take judicial notice that Editha’s kidneys before, and at the
time of, her operation, as with most human beings, were in
their proper anatomical locations.
10. G.R. No. 185454, March 23, 2011
STAR TWO (SPV-AMC), INC. vs. HOWARD KO, MIN MIN
SEE KO, JIMMY ONG, and GRACE NG ONG
Indeed, courts cannot consider evidence which has not
been formally offered because parties are required to
inform the courts of the purpose of introducing their
respective exhibits to assist the latter in ruling on their
admissibility in case an objection thereto is made. Without
a formal offer of evidence, courts are constrained to take
no notice of the evidence even if it has been marked and
identified.
This rule, however, admits of an exception, provided that
the evidence has been identified by testimony duly
recorded and that it has been incorporated in the records
of the case.
In this case, the subject pieces of evidence were presented
in support of respondents’ motion for reconsideration of
the denial of their motion to dismiss. A hearing was set for
the reception of their evidence, but petitioner failed to
attend the same. The pieces of evidence were thus
identified, marked in evidence, and incorporated in the
records of the case. Clearly, the trial court correctly
admitted and considered the evidence of respondents
warranting the dismissal of their case.
11. G.R. No. 189647, February 6, 2012
NANCY T. LORZANO vs. JUAN TABAYAG, JR.
Primarily, Section 1, Rule 45 of the Rules of Court
categorically states that the petition filed shall raise only
questions of law, which must be distinctly set forth. A
question of law arises when there is doubt as to what the
law is on a certain state of facts, while there is a question
of fact when the doubt arises as to the truth or falsity of the
alleged facts. For a question to be one of law, the same
must not involve an examination of the probative value of
the evidence presented by the litigants or any of them. The
resolution of the issue must rest solely on what the law
provides on the given set of circumstances. Once it is clear
that the issue invites a review of the evidence presented,
the question posed is one of fact.
In any case, the CA aptly ruled that a handwriting expert is
not indispensable to prove that the signature of Tabayag in
the questioned deed of sale was indeed a forgery. It is true
that the opinion of handwriting experts are not necessarily
binding upon the court, the expert’s function being to place
before the court data upon which the court can form its
own opinion. Handwriting experts are usually helpful in
the examination of forged documents because of the
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technical procedure involved in analyzing them. But resort
to these experts is not mandatory or indispensable to the
examination or the comparison of handwriting. A finding
of forgery does not depend entirely on the testimonies of
handwriting experts, because the judge must conduct an
independent examination of the questioned signature in
order to arrive at a reasonable conclusion as to its
authenticity.
The fact that petitioner was able to secure a title in her
name did not operate to vest ownership upon her of the
subject land. Registration of a piece of land under the
Torrens System does not create or vest title, because it is
not a mode of acquiring ownership. A certificate of title is
merely an evidence of ownership or title over the
particular property described therein. It cannot be used to
protect a usurper from the true owner; nor can it be used
as a shield for the commission of fraud; neither does it
permit one to enrich himself at the expense of others. Its
issuance in favor of a particular person does not foreclose
the possibility that the real property may be co-owned
with persons not named in the certificate, or that it may be
held in trust for another person by the registered owner.
12. G. R. No. 171701, February 8, 2012
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. MA. IMELDA "IMEE"
R. MARCOS-MANOTOC, FERDINAND "BONGBONG" R.
MARCOS, JR., GREGORIO MA. ARANETA III, IRENE R.
MARCOS-ARANETA, YEUNG CHUN FAN, YEUNG CHUN
HO, YEUNG CHUN KAM, and PANTRANCO EMPLOYEES
ASSOCIATION (PEA)-PTGWO
It is petitioner’s burden to prove the allegations in its
Complaint. For relief to be granted, the operative act on
how and in what manner the Marcos siblings participated
in and/or benefitted from the acts of the Marcos couple
must be clearly shown through a preponderance of
evidence. Should petitioner fail to discharge this burden,
the Court is constrained and is left with no choice but to
uphold the Demurrer to Evidence filed by respondents.
First, petitioner does not deny that what should be proved
are the contents of the documents themselves. It is
imperative, therefore, to submit the original documents
that could prove petitioner’s allegations.
Thus, the photocopied documents are in violation Rule
130, Sec. 3 of the Rules of Court, otherwise known as the
best evidence rule, which mandates that the evidence must
be the original document itself.
The rule is that if the writings have subscribing witnesses
to them, they must be proved by those witnesses.
In the case of writings, subscribed by witnesses, if all
are dead, the proof of one of their hands is sufficient to
establish the deed:
Page 15
  where an original is lost, a copy may be admitted;
 if no copy, then a proof by witnesses who have
heard the deed, and yet it is a thing the law abhors
to admit the memory of man for evidence.
Basic is the rule that, while affidavits may be considered as
public documents if they are acknowledged before a
notary public, these Affidavits are still classified as hearsay
evidence. The reason for this rule is that they are not
generally prepared by the affiant, but by another one who
uses his or her own language in writing the affiant's
statements, parts of which may thus be either omitted or
misunderstood by the one writing them. Moreover, the
adverse party is deprived of the opportunity to cross-
examine the affiants. For this reason, affidavits are
generally rejected for being hearsay, unless the affiants
themselves are placed on the witness stand to testify
thereon.
In order that secondary evidence may be admissible,
there must be proof by satisfactory evidence of:
(1) Due execution of the original;
(2) Loss, destruction or unavailability of all such
originals; and
(3) Reasonable diligence and good faith in the search
for or attempt to produce the original.
13. G.R. No. 183622, February 8, 2012
MEROPE ENRIQUEZ VDA. DE CATALAN vs. LOUELLA A.
CATALAN-LEE
Before a foreign judgment is given presumptive
evidentiary value, the document must first be presented
and admitted in evidence. A divorce obtained abroad is
proven by the divorce decree itself. Indeed the best
evidence of a judgment is the judgment itself. The decree
purports to be a written act or record of an act of an
official body or tribunal of a foreign country.
Under Sections 24 and 25 of Rule 132, on the other
hand, a writing or document may be proven as a public
or official record of a foreign country by either:
(1) An official publication or
(2) A copy thereof attested by the officer having legal
custody of the document.
If the record is not kept in the Philippines, such copy
must be:
(a) Accompanied by a certificate issued by the proper
diplomatic or consular officer in the Philippine
foreign service stationed in the foreign country in
which the record is kept and
(b) Authenticated by the seal of his office.
The burden of proof lies with the "party who alleges the
existence of a fact or thing necessary in the prosecution or
defense of an action." In civil cases, plaintiffs have the
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burden of proving the material allegations of the complaint
when those are denied by the answer; and defendants
have the burden of proving the material allegations in their
answer when they introduce new matters. Since the
divorce was a defense raised by respondent, the burden of
proving the pertinent Australian law validating it falls
squarely upon him.
It is well-settled in our jurisdiction that our courts cannot
take judicial notice of foreign laws. Like any other facts,
they must be alleged and proved. Australian marital laws
are not among those matters that judges are supposed to
know by reason of their judicial function. The power of
judicial notice must be exercised with caution, and every
reasonable doubt upon the subject should be resolved in
the negative.
14. G.R. No. 187926, February 15, 2012
Dr. EMMANUEL JARCIA, Jr. and Dr. MARILOU BASTAN
vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
This doctrine of res ipsa loquitur means "Where the
thing which causes injury is shown to be under the
management of the defendant, and the accident is such as
in the ordinary course of things does not happen if those
who have the management use proper care, it affords
reasonable evidence, in the absence of an explanation by
the defendant, that the accident arose from want of care."
Res ipsa loquitur is a rule of evidence whereby negligence
of the alleged wrongdoer may be inferred from the mere
fact that the accident happened provided the character of
the accident and circumstances attending it lead
reasonably to belief that in the absence of negligence it
would not have occurred and that thing which caused
injury is shown to have been under the management and
control of the alleged wrongdoer. Under this doctrine, the
happening of an injury permits an inference of negligence
where plaintiff produces substantial evidence that the
injury was caused by an agency or instrumentality under
the exclusive control and management of defendant, and
that the occurrence was such that in the ordinary course of
things would not happen if reasonable care had been used.
The doctrine of res ipsa loquitur as a rule of evidence is
unusual to the law of negligence which recognizes that
prima facie negligence may be established without direct
proof and furnishes a substitute for specific proof of
negligence. The doctrine, however, is not a rule of
substantive law, but merely a mode of proof or a mere
procedural convenience. The rule, when applicable to the
facts and circumstances of a given case, is not meant to and
does not dispense with the requirement of proof of
culpable negligence on the party charged. It merely
determines and regulates what shall be prima facie
evidence thereof and helps the plaintiff in proving a breach
of the duty. The doctrine can be invoked when and only
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when, under the circumstances involved, direct evidence is
absent and not readily available.
The requisites for the application of the doctrine of res
ipsa loquitur are:
(1) The accident was of a kind which does not
ordinarily occur unless someone is negligent;
(2) The instrumentality or agency which caused the
injury was under the exclusive control of the
person in charge; and
(3) The injury suffered must not have been due to any
voluntary action or contribution of the person
injured.
15. G.R. No. 173476, February 22, 2012
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. RODRIGO
SALAFRANCA y BELLO
A dying declaration, although generally inadmissible
as evidence due to its hearsay character, may
nonetheless be admitted when the following requisites
concur, namely:
(a) That the declaration must concern the cause and
surrounding circumstances of the declarant’s
death;
(b) That at the time the declaration is made, the
declarant is under a consciousness of an
impending death;
(c) That the declarant is competent as a witness; and
(d) That the declaration is offered in a criminal case
for homicide, murder, or parricide, in which the
declarant is a victim.
A declaration or an utterance is deemed as part of the
res gestae and thus admissible in evidence as an
exception to the hearsay rule when the following
requisites concur, to wit:
(a) The principal act, the res gestae, is a startling
occurrence;
(b) The statements are made before the declarant
had time to contrive or devise; and
(c) The statements must concern the occurrence in
question and its immediately attending
circumstances.
The term res gestae has been defined as "those
circumstances which are the undesigned incidents of a
particular litigated act and which are admissible when
illustrative of such act." In a general way, res gestae refers
to the circumstances, facts, and declarations that grow out
of the main fact and serve to illustrate its character and are
so spontaneous and contemporaneous with the main fact
as to exclude the idea of deliberation and fabrication. The
rule on res gestae encompasses the exclamations and
statements made by either the participants, victims, or
spectators to a crime immediately before, during, or
immediately after the commission of the crime when the
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circumstances are such that the statements were made as
a spontaneous reaction or utterance inspired by the
excitement of the occasion and there was no opportunity
for the declarant to deliberate and to fabricate a false
statement. The test of admissibility of evidence as a part of
the res gestae is, therefore, whether the act, declaration, or
exclamation is so intimately interwoven or connected with
the principal fact or event that it characterizes as to be
regarded as a part of the transaction itself, and also
whether it clearly negatives any premeditation or purpose
to manufacture testimony.
16. G.R. No. 185527, July 18, 2012
HARRY L. GO, TONNY NGO, JERRY NGO AND JANE GO vs.
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and HIGHDONE
COMPANY, LTD., ET AL.
The examination of witnesses must be done orally before a
judge in open court. This is true especially in criminal
cases where the Constitution secures to the accused his
right to a public trial and to meet the witnesses against
him face to face. The requirement is the "safest and most
satisfactory method of investigating facts" as it enables the
judge to test the witness' credibility through his manner
and deportment while testifying. It is not without
exceptions, however, as the Rules of Court recognizes the
conditional examination of witnesses and the use of their
depositions as testimonial evidence in lieu of direct court
testimony.
While we recognize the prosecution's right to preserve the
testimony of its witness in order to prove its case, we
cannot disregard the rules which are designed mainly for
the protection of the accused's constitutional rights. The
giving of testimony during trial is the general rule. The
conditional examination of a witness outside of the trial is
only an exception, and as such, calls for a strict
construction of the rules.
"The main and essential purpose of requiring a witness to
appear and testify orally at a trial is to secure for the
adverse party the opportunity of cross-examination. "The
opponent", according to an eminent authority, "demands
confrontation, not for the idle purpose of gazing upon the
witness, or of being gazed upon by him, but for the
purpose of cross examination which cannot be had except
by the direct and personal putting of questions and
obtaining immediate answers." There is also the advantage
of the witness before the judge, and it is this – it enables
the judge as trier of facts "to obtain the elusive and
incommunicable evidence of a witness' deportment while
testifying, and a certain subjective moral effect is produced
upon the witness. It is only when the witness testifies
orally that the judge may have a true idea of his
countenance, manner and expression, which may confirm
or detract from the weight of his testimony. Certainly, the
physical condition of the witness will reveal his capacity
Page 17
for accurate observation and memory, and his deportment
and physiognomy will reveal clues to his character. These
can only be observed by the judge if the witness testifies
orally in court. x x x"

The right of confrontation, on the other hand, is held

to apply specifically to criminal proceedings and to
have a twofold purpose:
(1) To afford the accused an opportunity to test the
testimony of witnesses by cross-examination, and
(2) To allow the judge to observe the deportment of
witnesses.

The constitutional requirement "insures that the witness

will give his testimony under oath, thus deterring lying by
the threat of perjury charge; it forces the witness to submit
to cross-examination, a valuable instrument in exposing
falsehood and bringing out the truth; and it enables the
court to observe the demeanor of the witness and assess
his credibility."

As the right of confrontation is intended "to secure the

accused in the right to be tried as far as facts provable by
witnesses as meet him face to face at the trial who give
their testimony in his presence, and give to the accused an
opportunity of cross-examination," it is properly viewed as
a guarantee against the use of unreliable testimony in
criminal trials.

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