rendered obligatory by the existence of a rule of law
CIVIL PROCEDURE requiring it.
CASE PRINCIPLES
1995-2006 CASES
1. G.R. No. 139325, April 12, 2005
PRISCILLA C. MIJARES, LORETTA ANN P. ROSALES,
HILDA B. NARCISO, SR. MARIANI DIMARANAN, SFIC,
and JOEL C. LAMANGAN in their behalf and on behalf of
the Class Plaintiffs in Class Action No. MDL 840, United
States District Court of Hawaii vs. HON. SANTIAGO
JAVIER RANADA, in his capacity as Presiding Judge of
Branch 137, Regional Trial Court, Makati City, and the
ESTATE OF FERDINAND E. MARCOS, through its court
appointed legal representatives in Class Action MDL
840, United States District Court of Hawaii, namely:
Imelda R. Marcos and Ferdinand Marcos, Jr.
There is an evident distinction between a foreign judgment
in an action in rem and one in personam. For an action in
rem, the foreign judgment is deemed conclusive upon the
title to the thing, while in an action in personam, the
foreign judgment is presumptive, and not conclusive, of a
right as between the parties and their successors in
interest by a subsequent title.
However, in both cases, the foreign judgment is
susceptible to impeachment in our local courts on the
grounds of:
1. Want of jurisdiction or notice to the party;
2. Collusion;
3. Fraud; or
4. Clear mistake of law or fact.
Thus, the party aggrieved by the foreign judgment is
entitled to defend against the enforcement of such decision
in the local forum. It is essential that there should be an
opportunity to challenge the foreign judgment, in order for
the court in this jurisdiction to properly determine its
efficacy.
There is no obligatory rule derived from treaties or
conventions that requires the Philippines to recognize
foreign judgments, or allow a procedure for the
enforcement thereof. However, generally accepted
principles of international law, by virtue of the
incorporation clause of the Constitution, form part of the
laws of the land even if they do not derive from treaty
obligations. The classical formulation in international law
sees those customary rules accepted as binding result from
the combination two elements: the established,
widespread, and consistent practice on the part of States;
and a psychological element known as the opinion juris sive
necessitates (opinion as to law or necessity). Implicit in the
latter element is a belief that the practice in question is
APRIL LYNN L. URSAL LLB-4
REMEDIAL LAW REVIEW I (S.Y. 2015-2016)
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2. G.R. No. 121510, November 23, 1995
FABIANA C. VDA. DE SALAZAR vs. COURT OF APPEALS,
PRIMITIVO NEPOMUCENO and EMERENCIANA
NEPOMUCENO
A party having died in an action that survives, the trial held
by the court without appearance of the deceased's legal
representative or substitution of heirs and the judgment
rendered after such trial, are null and void because the
court acquired no jurisdiction over the persons of the legal
representatives or of the heirs upon whom the trial and
the judgment would be binding. This general rule
notwithstanding, in denying petitioner's motion for
reconsideration, the Court of Appeals correctly ruled that
formal substitution of heirs is not necessary when the
heirs themselves voluntarily appeared, participated in the
case and presented evidence in defense of deceased
defendant.
Consequently, we rule that, as in the case at bench, the
defendant in an ejectment case having died before the
rendition by the trial court of its decision therein, its
failure to effectuate a formal substitution of heirs before its
rendition of judgment, does not invalidate such judgment
where the heirs themselves appeared before the trial
court, participated in the proceedings therein, and
presented evidence in defense of deceased defendant, it
undeniably being evident that the heirs themselves sought
their day in court and exercised their right to due process.
Respondent Court of Appeals also correctly ruled that
ejectment, being an action involving recovery of real
property, is a real action which as such, is not extinguished
by the defendant's death.
While it is true that a decision in an action for ejectment is
enforceable not only against the defendant himself but also
against members of his family, his relatives, and his privies
who derived their right of possession from the defendant
and his successors-in-interest, it had been established that
petitioner had, by her own acts, submitted to the
jurisdiction of the trial court. She is now estopped to deny
that she had been heard in defense of her deceased
husband in the proceedings therein.
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3. G.R. Nos. 142286-87. April 15, 2005
KOREA EXCHANGE BANK vs. HON. ROGELIO C.
GONZALES, in his capacity as Presiding Judge of Branch
50 of the Regional Trial Court of Pampanga, PHI-HAN
DEVELOPMENT, INC., LOURDES DE MESA MENDOZA,
MENELEO MENDOZA, ANTUSA DE MESA MAGNO,
FRANCISCO MAGNO, TEODORO DE MESA, FIRMO DE
MESA and MERCEDES DE MESA
A counterclaim, as now used and understood, includes
both set-off and recoupment and is broader than both; it
includes equitable demands and secures to the defendant
full relief which is a separate action at law and would have
secured him on the same state of facts being substantially a
cross-action by the defendant against the plaintiff.
A set-off (compensacion) is a money demand by the
defendant against the plaintiff arising upon contract and
constituting a debt independent of and unconnected with
the cause of actions set forth in the complaint, and may be
used to offset a plaintiff’s claim but not to recover
affirmatively. As in the case with recoupment, set-off may
be used to offset a plaintiff’s claim but not to recover
affirmatively. This is similar to the English rule which was
first authorized by an English statute in 1729.
A recoupment (reconvencion) differs from a counterclaim
(contrarreclamacion) in that, under a counterclaim, the
defendant may have an affirmative judgment where he is
able to prove a demand in excess of the plaintiff’s demand,
whereas in the case of recoupment, whatever the damages
proved by the defendant, they can go only to reduce or
extinguish the claim against him. Recoupment must arise
out of the contract or transaction upon which the plaintiff’s
claim is founded. Recoupment is of French origin and
means the "cutting back of the plaintiff’s claim by the
defendant." It thus implies an admission of the plaintiff’s
claim.
4. G.R. No. 102696, July 12, 2001
ALBERTO LOOYUKO, JUAN C. UY and ATTY. VICTORIA
CUYOS vs. COURT OF APPEALS, F.G.U. INSURANCE
CORPORATION and ANTONIO GUTANG, HEIRS and
SUCCESSORS-IN-INTEREST
The present Sec. 2 of this amended Rule (Rules of Court)
permits the filing of the motion to intervene at any time
before the rendition of the judgment in the case, in line
with the doctrine in Lichauco. The justification advanced
for this is that before judgment is rendered, the court, for
good cause shown, may still allow the introduction of
additional evidence and that is still within a liberal
interpretation of the period for trial. Also, since no
judgment has yet been rendered, the matter subject of the
intervention may still be readily resolved and integrated in
the judgment disposing of all claims in the case, and would
not require an overall reassessment of said claims as
APRIL LYNN L. URSAL LLB-4
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would be the case if the judgment had already been
rendered.
Intervention is merely collateral or accessory or ancillary
to the principal action, and not an independent
proceeding; it is an interlocutory proceeding dependent on
or subsidiary to the case between the original parties.
Where the main action ceases to exist, there is no pending
proceeding wherein the intervention may be based. Here,
there is no more pending principal action wherein the
Spouses Gutang and Looyuko et al. may intervene.
In exceptional cases, the Court has allowed intervention
notwithstanding the rendition of judgment by the trial
court. In Director of Lands vs. Court of Appeals, intervention
was allowed even when the petition for review of the
assailed judgment was already submitted for decision in
the Supreme Court.
It must be noted, however, that in both these cases, the
intervenors were indispensable parties. This is not so in
the case at bar.
5. G.R. No. 126258, July 8, 1999
TALSAN ENTERPRISES, INC., FRANCISCO P. SAN DIEGO,
VICTOR RAMOGA and BONIFACIO TALPLACIDO vs.
BALIWAG TRANSIT, INC. and ANGELES RAMOS
Under Section 13 of Rule 14 of the Revised Rules of Court,
if the defendant is a corporation organized under the laws
of the Philippines, such as private respondent Baliwag,
service of summons may be made on the president,
manager, secretary, cashier, agent, or any of its directors.
The affidavit of Ms. Cansino stating that she is not the
cashier of respondent Baliwag, but merely a cash receiving
clerk deserves scant consideration for being self-serving.
The Sheriff's Return certifying that summons were served
upon "the defendant Baliwag Transit, Inc. and Angelo
Ramos, thru Ms. Baby Cansino, cashier of Baliwag Transit,
who received the said court processes but refused to sign
the original summons at no. 199 Rizal Ave. Ext., Caloocan
City," is prima facie evidence of the fact that the person on
whom the summons was served was in fact the cashier of
the company. The affidavit of Ms. Cansino cannot
overcome the presumption that official duty had been
regularly performed, which presumption may be
overcome only by clear and convincing evidence.
Respondent Baliwag failed to overcome such presumption.
But even assuming that Ms. Cansino is not the cashier, as
respondent Baliwag claims, still, service upon her was
proper. Ms. Cansino is considered an agent of the company
authorized to receive court processes.
Consequently, service of summons on ordinary clerks,
private secretaries of corporate executives, retained
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counsel, officials who had charge or control of the
operations of the corporation, like Assistant General
Manager, and the corporation's Chief of Finance and
Administrative Officer, were considered proper. These
individuals were considered "agents" within the
contemplation of the rule.
6. G.R. No. 144581, July 5, 2002
SPOUSES ELANIO C. ONG vs. COURT OF APPEALS and
EMMA A. GARAMAY ONG, assisted by her husband
ROBERTO C. ONG
The distinction between the prohibition against forum
shopping and the certification requirement should by now
be too elementary to be misunderstood. To reiterate,
compliance with the certification against forum shopping
is separate from and independent of the avoidance of the
act of forum shopping itself. There is a difference in the
treatment between failure to comply with the
certification requirement and violation of the
prohibition against forum shopping not only in terms of
imposable sanctions but also in the manner of enforcing
them. The former constitutes sufficient cause for the
dismissal without prejudice of the complaint or initiatory
pleading upon motion and after hearing, while the latter is
a ground for summary dismissal thereof and for direct
contempt. The rule expressly requires that a certification
against forum shopping should be attached to or filed
simultaneously with the complaint or other initiatory
pleading regardless of whether forum shopping had in fact
been committed. Accordingly, in the instant case, the
dismissal of the complaint for unlawful detainer must
follow as a matter of course.
7. G.R. No. 138218, March 17, 2000
CLAUDIUS C. BARROSO vs. HONORABLE FRANCISCO S.
AMPIG, JR., in his capacity as Acting Judge of the RTC,
Br. 24, 11th Judicial Region, Koronadal, South
Cotabato, and DR. EMERICO V. ESCOBILLO
The Rules of Civil Procedure generally do not apply to
election cases. They apply only by analogy or in a
suppletory character and whenever practicable and
convenient. Election contests are subject to the COMELEC
Rules of Procedure. Rule 35 thereof governs election
contests involving elective municipal officials before the
Regional Trial Courts. Rule 35 does not require that the
petition contesting the election of any municipal official be
accompanied by a certification or any statement against
forum shopping.
8. A.C. No. 5957, February 4, 2003
WINNIE C. LUCENTE and ALICIA G. DOMINGO vs. ATTY.
CLETO L. EVANGELISTA, JR.
Contrary to respondent’s contentions, the complaint for
disbarment does not suffer from serious procedural
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defects that warrant its outright dismissal. Complainants
did not engage in forum shopping as defined in
Administrative Circular No. 28-91 when they filed the
instant case. Forum shopping applies only to judicial cases
or proceedings, not to disbarment proceedings.
9. G.R. No. 155236 July 8, 2005
DR. TERESITO V. ORBETA, ENGRACIA O. HONGCUAY,
DEOGRACIAS HONGCUAY, JESUSA VDA. DE ORBETA,
CORAZON VDA. DE PINILI, SEGUNDINA T. ORBETA,
ALFRED S. ORBETA, MARY ANN S. ORBETA, MARILYN S.
ORBETA, MAY LOIRDELIT S. ORBETA, ALAN S. ORBETA,
ALNASAR S. ORBETA, SHERWIN O. SISICAN, MARLON T.
ORBETA, EDGARDO ORBETA, MARIA LUISA LOCSIN,
SOFIE M. CASTRO, PAZ C. VABSILLERO, SALVADOR
CABALLERO, NICOLAS M. DE CASTRO, MA. CORAZON
MONSERRAT, and MANUEL MONSERRAT vs. PAUL B.
SENDIONG, herein Represented by his ATTORNEY-IN-
FACT MAE A. SENDIONG
To begin with, it is the height of sophistry to argue that res
judicata would bar a petition for annulment of judgment
whose, as in this case, prior judgment happens to be that
which is sought to be annulled. The petition for annulment
of judgment precisely challenges the validity of the "first
judgment," and to adopt petitioners’ argument would lead
to permanent preclusion of annulment of judgment as a
remedy. Significantly, the reverse is true for the rationale
underlying annulment of judgment is incongruent with the
concept of res judicata. Hence, the action for annulment of
judgment precludes the defense of res judicata. The
grounds for annulment of judgment are either lack of
jurisdiction or the presence of extrinsic fraud in the
rendition of the judgment sought to be annulled. On the
other hand, among the requisites of res judicata are
jurisdiction on the part of the court rendering the first
judgment over the parties and identity of causes of action
between the first and the second actions. Ineluctably, said
requisites are absent. The first judgment, in Civil Case No.
10173, pertains to the merits of the action for recovery of
possession, quieting of title, and recovery of damages,
whereas the cause of action in the petition for annulment
relates to the lack of jurisdiction that marred the rendition
of the first judgment.
10. G.R. No. 157391, July 15, 2005
LIMITLESS POTENTIALS, INC. vs. THE HON. REINATO G.
QUILALA, in his capacity as Presiding Judge of the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 57, City of Makati and The
ROMAN CATHOLIC ARCHBISHOP OF MANILA
The execution of the judgment pending appeal is proper
only if the judgment is in favor of the plaintiff and against
the defendant, and not vice versa.
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11. G.R. No. 153951, July 29, 2005
PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK vs. SANAO MARKETING
CORPORATION, SPOUSES AMADO A. SANAO and
SOLEDAD F. SANAO and SPOUSES WILLIAM (Willy) F.
SANAO and HELEN SANAO and the COURT OF APPEALS
A writ of possession is "a writ of execution employed to
enforce a judgment to recover the possession of land. It
commands the sheriff to enter the land and give
possession of it to the person entitled under the
judgment."
A writ of possession may be issued under the following
instances:
(1) in land registration proceedings under Section 17
of Act 496;
(2) in a judicial foreclosure, provided the debtor is in
possession of the mortgaged realty and no third
person, not a party to the foreclosure suit, had
intervened;
(3) in an extrajudicial foreclosure of a real estate
mortgage under Section 7 of Act No. 3135, as
amended by Act No. 4118; and
(4) in execution sales (last paragraph of Section 33,
Rule 39 of the Rules of Court).
The purchaser in a foreclosure sale may apply for a writ of
possession during the redemption period by filing an ex
parte motion under oath for that purpose in the
corresponding registration or cadastral proceeding in the
case of property covered by a Torrens title. Upon the filing
of such motion and the approval of the corresponding
bond, the law also in express terms directs the court to
issue the order for a writ of possession.
A writ of possession may also be issued after consolidation
of ownership of the property in the name of the purchaser.
It is settled that the buyer in a foreclosure sale becomes
the absolute owner of the property purchased if it is not
redeemed during the period of one year after the
registration of sale. As such, he is entitled to the possession
of the property and can demand it any time following the
consolidation of ownership in his name and the issuance of
a new transfer certificate of title. In such a case, the bond
required in Section 7 of Act No. 3135 is no longer
necessary. Possession of the land then becomes an
absolute right of the purchaser as confirmed owner. Upon
proper application and proof of title, the issuance of the
writ of possession becomes a ministerial duty of the court.
12. G.R. No. 163338, September 21, 2005
LUZON DEVELOPMENT BANK vs. BENEDICTO C.
CONQUILLA, CORNELIA C. CONQUILLA, DOROTEA C.
ORCINE and FELICIANO S. CONQUILLA
What transpired in the court below is akin to a judgment
on the pleadings. A judgment on the pleadings may be
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rendered by the court either on motion of the plaintiff or
motu proprio. Such judgment is based exclusively upon the
pleadings without introduction of evidence; therefore, it is
proper whenever it appears that there is no controverted
factual issue.
"Merits" has been defined as a matter of substance in law,
as distinguished from a matter of form; it refers to the real
or substantial grounds of action or defense, as contrasted
with some technical or collateral matter raised in the
course of the suit. A judgment is "on the merits" when it
amounts to a legal declaration of the respective rights and
duties of the parties, based upon the disclosed facts.
A ruling based on a motion to dismiss, without any trial on
the merits or formal presentation of evidence, can still be a
judgment on the merits.
13. A.M. No. P-04-1857, March 16, 2005
MERLINDA L. DAGOOC vs. ROBERTO A. ERLINA, Sheriff
IV, RTC, Branch 40, Tandag, Surigao del Sur
The law mandates that in the execution of a money
judgment, the judgment debtor shall pay either in cash,
certified bank check payable to the judgment obligee, or
any other form of payment acceptable to the latter.
Nowhere does the law mention promissory notes as a form
of payment. The only exception is when such form of
payment is acceptable to the judgment debtor. But it was
obviously not acceptable to complainant, otherwise she
would not have filed this case against respondent sheriff.
In fact, she objected to it because the promissory notes of
the defendants did not satisfy the money judgment in her
favor.
If the judgment debtor cannot pay all or part of the
obligation in cash, certified bank check or other mode of
payment acceptable to the judgment obligee, the money
judgment shall be satisfied by levying on the properties of
the judgment debtor.
14. G.R. No. 156021, September 23, 2005
CYNTHIA C. ALABAN, FRANCIS COLLADO, JOSE P.
COLLADO, JUDITH PROVIDO, CLARITA PROVIDO,
ALFREDO PROVIDO, MANUEL PROVIDO, JR., LORNA
DINA E. PROVIDO, SEVERO ARENGA, JR., SERGIO
ARENGA, EDUARDO ARENGA, CAROL ARENGA, RUTH
BABASA, NORMA HIJASTRO, DOLORES M. FLORES,
ANTONIO MARIN, JR., JOSE MARIN, SR., and MATHILDE
MARIN vs. COURT OF APPEALS and FRANCISCO H.
PROVIDO
An action for annulment of judgment is a remedy in law
independent of the case where the judgment sought to be
annulled was rendered. The purpose of such action is to
have the final and executory judgment set aside so that
there will be a renewal of litigation. It is resorted to in
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cases where the ordinary remedies of new trial, appeal,
petition for relief from judgment, or other appropriate
remedies are no longer available through no fault of the
petitioner, and is based on only two grounds: extrinsic
fraud, and lack of jurisdiction or denial of due process. A
person need not be a party to the judgment sought to be
annulled, and it is only essential that he can prove his
allegation that the judgment was obtained by the use of
fraud and collusion and he would be adversely affected
thereby.
An action to annul a final judgment on the ground of fraud
lies only if the fraud is extrinsic or collateral in character.
Fraud is regarded as extrinsic where it prevents a party
from having a trial or from presenting his entire case to the
court, or where it operates upon matters pertaining not to
the judgment itself but to the manner in which it is
procured. The overriding consideration when extrinsic
fraud is alleged is that the fraudulent scheme of the
prevailing litigant prevented a party from having his day in
court.
15. G.R. No. 118292, April 14, 2004
HENRY L. MON vs. COURT OF APPEALS, HON.
LEOPOLDO SERRANO, JR., DEPARTMENT OF AGRARIAN
REFORM ADJUDICATION BOARD and SPOUSES LARRY
and JOVITA VELASCO
The settled rule in this jurisdiction is that a party cannot
change his theory of the case or his cause of action on
appeal. We have previously held that "courts of justice
have no jurisdiction or power to decide a question not in
issue." A judgment that goes outside the issues and
purports to adjudicate something on which the court did
not hear the parties, is not only irregular but also extra-
judicial and invalid. The rule rests on the fundamental
tenets of fair play. In the present case, the Court must stick
to the issue litigated in the DARAB and in the Court of
Appeals, which is whether petitioner has the right to eject
the Spouses Velasco from the land under RA 3844.
16. G.R. No. 146996, July 30, 2004
AURORA GUIANG vs. EVA T. CO, doing business under
the business name, ETC LENDING INVESTOR
It bears stressing that Rule 47 of the Rules of Civil
Procedure applies only to a petition to annul a judgment or
final order and resolution in civil actions, on the ground of
extrinsic fraud or lack of jurisdiction or due process. A final
order or resolution is one which is issued by a court which
disposes of the subject matter in its entirety or terminates
a particular proceeding or action, leaving nothing else to
be done but to enforce by execution what has been
determined by the court. The rule does not apply to an
action to annul the levy and sale at public auction of
petitioner's properties or the certificate of sale executed by
the deputy sheriff over said properties. Neither does it
APRIL LYNN L. URSAL LLB-4
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apply to an action to nullify a writ of execution because a
writ of execution is not a final order or resolution, but is
issued to carry out the mandate of the court in the
enforcement of a final order or of a judgment. It is a
judicial process to enforce a final order or judgment
against the losing party.
17. G.R. No. 131286, March 18, 2004
JOSE LAM vs. ADRIANA CHUA
Judgment for support does not become final. The right to
support is of such nature that its allowance is essentially
provisional; for during the entire period that a needy party
is entitled to support, his or her alimony may be modified
or altered, in accordance with his increased or decreased
needs, and with the means of the giver. It cannot be
regarded as subject to final determination.
It is also a general principle of law that a court cannot set
itself in motion, nor has it power to decide questions
except as presented by the parties in their pleadings.
Anything that is decided beyond them is coram non-judice
and void. Therefore where a court enters a judgment or
awards relief beyond the prayer of the complaint or the
scope of its allegations the excessive relief is not merely
irregular but is void for want of jurisdiction, and is open to
collateral attack.
The appellate court also ruled that a judgment of a court
upon a subject within its general jurisdiction, but which is
not brought before it by any statement or claim of the
parties, and is foreign to the issues submitted for its
determination, is a nullity.
18. G.R. No. 149335, July 1, 2003
EDILLO C. MONTEMAYOR vs. LUIS BUNDALIAN,
RONALDO B. ZAMORA, Executive Secretary, Office of
the President, AND GREGORIO R. VIGILAR, Secretary,
Department of Public Works and Highways (DPWH)
The doctrine of res judicata applies only to judicial or
quasi-judicial proceedings, not to the exercise of
administrative powers.
19. G.R. No. 164929, April 10, 2006
ERNELIZA Z. MAMARIL vs. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION
and DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION AND
COMMUNICATIONS
A pleading is verified by an affidavit that the affiant has
read the pleading and that the allegations therein are true
and correct of his personal knowledge or based on
authentic records.
A pleading required to be verified which contains a
verification based on "information and belief" or upon
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"knowledge, information, and belief," or lacks a proper
verification, shall be treated as an unsigned pleading.
On the other hand, the rule against forum shopping is
rooted in the principle that a party-litigant shall not be
allowed to pursue simultaneous remedies in different fora,
as this practice is detrimental to orderly judicial
procedure. The lack of certification against forum
shopping, unlike that of verification, is generally not
curable by the submission thereof after the filing of the
petition. The submission of a certificate against forum
shopping is thus deemed obligatory, albeit not
jurisdictional.
Failure to comply with the foregoing requirements (of
certification against forum shopping) shall not be curable
by mere amendment of the complaint or other initiatory
pleading but shall be cause for the dismissal of the case
without prejudice, unless otherwise provided, upon
motion and after hearing.
The rule on certification against forum shopping may,
however, be also relaxed on grounds of "substantial
compliance" or "special circumstance or compelling
reasons." The Court thus examined the records of the case
on hand to determine the existence of any circumstances
or compelling reasons which call for the relaxation of the
Rules but appreciated none in light of the following
discussion
20. G.R. No. 130974, August 16, 2006
MA. IMELDA M. MANOTOC vs. HONORABLE COURT OF
APPEALS and AGAPITA TRAJANO on behalf of the
Estate of ARCHIMEDES TRAJANO
The party relying on substituted service or the sheriff must
show that defendant cannot be served promptly or there is
impossibility of prompt service. Section 8, Rule 14
provides that the plaintiff or the sheriff is given a
"reasonable time" to serve the summons to the defendant
in person, but no specific time frame is mentioned.
"Reasonable time" is defined as "so much time as is
necessary under the circumstances for a reasonably
prudent and diligent man to do, conveniently, what the
contract or duty requires that should be done, having a
regard for the rights and possibility of loss, if any[,] to the
other party." Under the Rules, the service of summons has
no set period.
What then is a reasonable time for the sheriff to effect
a personal service in order to demonstrate
impossibility of prompt service?
 To the plaintiff, "reasonable time" means no
more than seven (7) days since an expeditious
processing of a complaint is what a plaintiff wants.
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 To the sheriff, "reasonable time" means 15 to 30
days because at the end of the month, it is a
practice for the branch clerk of court to require
the sheriff to submit a return of the summons
assigned to the sheriff for service. The Sheriff’s
Return provides data to the Clerk of Court, which
the clerk uses in the Monthly Report of Cases to be
submitted to the Office of the Court Administrator
within the first ten (10) days of the succeeding
month. Thus, one month from the issuance of
summons can be considered "reasonable time"
with regard to personal service on the defendant.
"Several attempts" means at least three (3) tries,
preferably on at least two different dates. In addition, the
sheriff must cite why such efforts were unsuccessful. It is
only then that impossibility of service can be confirmed or
accepted.
A person of suitable age and discretion is one who has
attained the age of full legal capacity (18 years old) and is
considered to have enough discernment to understand the
importance of a summons.
"Discretion" is defined as "the ability to make decisions
which represent a responsible choice and for which an
understanding of what is lawful, right or wise may be
presupposed". Thus, to be of sufficient discretion, such
person must know how to read and understand English to
comprehend the import of the summons, and fully realize
the need to deliver the summons and complaint to the
defendant at the earliest possible time for the person to
take appropriate action.
Thus, the person must have the "relation of confidence" to
the defendant, ensuring that the latter would receive or at
least be notified of the receipt of the summons.
21. G.R. No. 168384, August 18, 2006
CHARLES BERNARD H. REYES doing business under the
name and style CBH REYES ARCHITECTS vs. ANTONIO
YULO BALDE II, PAULINO M. NOTO and ERNESTO J.
BATTAD, SR., in their capacities as Arbitrators of the
CONSTRUCTION INDUSTRY ARBITRATION
COMMISSION, SPOUSES CESAR and CARMELITA ESQUIG
and ROSEMARIE PAPAS
The RTC has no jurisdiction over disputes involving
construction contracts. The proceedings before it are void.
Only the Construction Industry Arbitration Commission
(CIAC) has the jurisdiction over it. The parties involved are
bound by the arbitration clause rendered by CIAC.
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22. G.R. No. 159121, February 3, 2005
PAMPLONA PLANTATION COMPANY, INC. and/or JOSE
LUIS BONDOC vs. RODEL TINGHIL, MARYGLENN
SABIHON, ESTANISLAO BOBON, CARLITO TINGHIL,
BONIFACIO TINGHIL, NOLI TINGHIL, EDGAR TINGHIL,
ERNESTO ESTOMANTE, SALLY TOROY, BENIGNO
TINGHIL JR., ROSE ANN NAPAO, DIOSDADO TINGHIL,
ALBERTO TINGHIL, ANALIE TINGHIL, and ANTONIO
ESTOMANTE
The non-joinder of indispensable parties is not a ground
for the dismissal of an action. At any stage of a judicial
proceeding and/or at such times as are just, parties may be
added on the motion of a party or on the initiative of the
tribunal concerned. If the plaintiff refuses to implead an
indispensable party despite the order of the court, that
court may dismiss the complaint for the plaintiff’s failure
to comply with the order. The remedy is to implead the
non-party claimed to be indispensable..
23. G.R. No. 148208, December 15, 2004
CENTRAL BANK (now Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas)
EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION, INC. vs. BANGKO SENTRAL
NG PILIPINAS and the EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
Under most circumstances, the Court will exercise judicial
restraint in deciding questions of constitutionality,
recognizing the broad discretion given to Congress in
exercising its legislative power. Judicial scrutiny would be
based on the "rational basis" test, and the legislative
discretion would be given deferential treatment.
But if the challenge to the statute is premised on the denial
of a fundamental right, or the perpetuation of prejudice
against persons favored by the Constitution with special
protection, judicial scrutiny ought to be more strict. A
weak and watered down view would call for the abdication
of this Court's solemn duty to strike down any law
repugnant to the Constitution and the rights it enshrines.
This is true whether the actor committing the
unconstitutional act is a private person or the government
itself or one of its instrumentalities. Oppressive acts will be
struck down regardless of the character or nature of the
actor.
2007 CASES
1. G.R. No. 159595, January 23, 2007
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. LOURDES ABIERA
NILLAS
Rule 39, as invoked by the Republic, applies only to
ordinary civil actions, not to other or extraordinary
proceedings not expressly governed by the Rules of Civil
Procedure but by some other specific law or legal modality
such as land registration cases. Unlike in ordinary civil
actions governed by the Rules of Civil Procedure, the intent
APRIL LYNN L. URSAL LLB-4
REMEDIAL LAW REVIEW I (S.Y. 2015-2016)
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of land registration proceedings is to establish ownership
by a person of a parcel of land, consistent with the purpose
of such extraordinary proceedings to declare by judicial
fiat a status, condition or fact. Hence, upon the finality of a
decision adjudicating such ownership, no further step is
required to effectuate the decision and a ministerial duty
exists alike on the part of the land registration court to
order the issuance of, and the LRA to issue, the decree of
registration.
2. G.R. No. 162922, January 31, 2007
BANCO FILIPINO SAVINGS AND MORTGAGE BANK vs.
HON. AMALIK P. ESPINOSA, JR., Presiding Judge,
Municipal Trial Court in Iloilo City, Branch 2, and TALA
REALTY SERVICES CORPORATION
Even the writ of execution fell short of the requirement
under paragraph (e), Section 8 of Rule 39 of the Rules of
Court that it should "specifically state the amount of the
interest, costs, damages, rents, or profits due as of the date
of the issuance of the writ, aside from the principal
obligation under the judgment."
3. G.R. No. SP 143490, February 2, 2007
CHINA BANKING CORPORATION vs. DOLORES PADILLA
Failure to comply with the requirement that the petition
shall be accompanied by a certified true copy of the
resolutions, orders or any rulings subject thereof is a
sufficient ground for the dismissal of the petition.
A third-party complaint is actually a complaint
independent of, and separate and distinct from, the
plaintiff’s complaint. Were it not for the above rule, such
third-party complaint would have to be filed
independently and separately from the original complaint.
The purpose is to avoid circuitry of action and unnecessary
proliferation of lawsuits and of disposing expeditiously in
one litigation all the matters arising from one particular
set of facts.
Be that as it may, trial courts are not especially enjoined by
law to admit a third-party complaint. They are vested with
discretion to allow or disallow a party to an action to
implead an additional party. Thus, a defendant has no
vested right to file a third-party complaint.
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4. G.R. No. 142628, February 6, 2007
SPRINGFIELD DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, INC. and
HEIRS OF PETRA CAPISTRANO PIIT vs. HONORABLE
PRESIDING JUDGE OF REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF
MISAMIS ORIENTAL, BRANCH 40, CAGAYAN DE ORO
CITY, DEPARTMENT OF AGRARIAN REFORM
ADJUDICATION BOARD (DARAB), DAR REGION X
DIRECTOR, ROSALIO GAMULO, FORTUNATO TELEN,
EMERITA OLANGO, THERESA MONTUERTO, DOMINGO
H. CLAPERO, JOEL U. LIM, JENEMAIR U. POLLEY, FIDELA
U. POLLEY, JESUS BATUTAY, NICANOR UCAB, EMERIA
U. LIM, EMILITO CLAPERO, ANTONINA RIAS, AURILLIO
ROMULO, ERWIN P. CLAPERO, EVELITO CULANGO,
VILMA/CRUISINE ALONG, EFREN EMATA, GREGORIO
CABARIBAN, and SABINA CANTORANA
The rule is that where legislation provides for an appeal
from decisions of certain administrative bodies to the CA,
it means that such bodies are co-equal with the RTC, in
terms of rank and stature, and logically, beyond the control
of the latter.
Given that DARAB decisions are appealable to the CA, the
inevitable conclusion is that the DARAB is a co-equal body
with the RTC and its decisions are beyond the RTC's
control. The CA was therefore correct in sustaining the
RTC's dismissal of the petition for annulment of the
DARAB Decision dated October 5, 1995, as the RTC does
not have any jurisdiction to entertain the same.
5. G.R. No. 154877, March 27, 2007
JIN-JIN DELOS SANTOS vs. SPOUSES REYNATO D.
SARMIENTO and LENI C. SARMIENTO and IA-JAN
SARMIENTO REALTY, INC.
The cases over which HLURB has jurisdiction are those
arising from either unsound real estate business practices,
or claims for refund or other claims filed by subdivision lot
or condominium unit buyers against the project owner,
developer, dealer, broker or salesman, or demands for
specific performance of contractual and statutory
obligations filed by buyers of subdivision lots or
condominium units against the owner, developer, broker
or salesman.
In addition, these cases must involve a subdivision project,
subdivision lot, condominium project or condominium
unit.
The only instance that HLURB may take cognizance of a
case filed by the developer is when said case is instituted
as a compulsory counterclaim to a pending case filed
against it by the buyer or owner of a subdivision lot or
condominium unit.
To summarize, not every case involving buyers and sellers
of real estate may be filed with the HLURB. Its jurisdiction
APRIL LYNN L. URSAL LLB-4
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is limited to those cases filed by the buyer or owner of a
subdivision or condominium and based on any of the
causes of action enumerated under Section 1 of P.D. No.
1344, and which jurisdictional facts must be clearly alleged
in the complaint.
The regular courts, not the HLURB, have jurisdiction over
actions to enforce a contract to sell involving real property
which is not alleged nor established to be a subdivision or
condominium property.
6. G.R. No. 168088, April 3, 2007
SAN FERNANDO RURAL BANK, INC. vs. PAMPANGA
OMNIBUS DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION and
DOMINIC G. AQUINO
An order granting a writ of possession under Act No. 3135,
as amended, is of a different species. The latter order is
final, hence, appealable. Even if the trial court erred in
granting a petition for a writ of possession, such an error is
merely an error of judgment correctible by ordinary
appeal and not by a petition for a writ of certiorari. Such
writ cannot be legally used for any other purpose.
7. G.R. No. 147905, May 28, 2007
B. VAN ZUIDEN BROS., LTD. vs. GTVL MANUFACTURING
INDUSTRIES, INC.
An unlicensed foreign corporation doing business in the
Philippines cannot sue before Philippine courts. On the
other hand, an unlicensed foreign corporation not doing
business in the Philippines can sue before Philippine
courts.
An essential condition to be considered as "doing
business" in the Philippines is the actual performance of
specific commercial acts within the territory of the
Philippines for the plain reason that the Philippines has no
jurisdiction over commercial acts performed in foreign
territories.
To be doing or "transacting business in the Philippines" for
purposes of Section 133 of the Corporation Code, the
foreign corporation must actually transact business in the
Philippines, that is, perform specific business transactions
within the Philippine territory on a continuing basis in its
own name and for its own account. Actual transaction of
business within the Philippine territory is an essential
requisite for the Philippines to acquire jurisdiction over a
foreign corporation and thus require the foreign
corporation to secure a Philippine business license. If a
foreign corporation does not transact such kind of
business in the Philippines, even if it exports its products
to the Philippines, the Philippines has no jurisdiction to
require such foreign corporation to secure a Philippine
business license.
Page 8
Considering that petitioner is not doing business in the
Philippines, it does not need a license in order to initiate
and maintain a collection suit against respondent for the
unpaid balance of respondent’s purchases.
8. G.R. No. 142766, June 15, 2007
NARCISO AMOROSO vs. JUAN ALEGRE, JR.
Ownership is not the issue in a petition for reconstitution
of title. A reconstitution of title does not pass upon the
ownership of the land covered by the lost or destroyed
title.
In a petition for reconstitution of title, the only relief
sought is the issuance of a reconstituted title because the
reconstituting officer’s power is limited to granting or
denying a reconstituted title.
9. G.R. No. 169501, June 8, 2007
B.E. SAN DIEGO, INC. vs. ROSARIO T. ALZUL
The Rules on Civil Procedure explicitly require the
following to be appended to a petition for review:
1) Clearly legible duplicate original or a certified true
copy of the award, judgment, final order, or
resolution appealed from;
2) Certified true copies of such material portions of
the record referred to in the petition; and
3) Other supporting papers.
The rules on the different modes of appeal from the lower
courts or quasi-judicial agencies to the CA reveal that it is
only Rule 43 that specifically states that the material
portions to be appended to the petition should be certified
true copies.
Sec. 7 of Rule 43 does not prescribe outright rejection of
the petition if it is not accompanied by the required
documents but simply gives the discretion to the CA to
determine whether such breach constitutes a "sufficient
ground" for dismissal.
10. G.R. No. 159222, June 26, 2007
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and the HON. BRICIO
YGANA, Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court, Branch
153, Pasig City vs. RAFAEL BITANGA
There is no basis in law or the rules, therefore, to extend
the scope of Rule 47 (annulment of judgment) to criminal
cases.
11. G.R. No. 154988 , June 21, 2007
FELISA M. JARAVATA vs. MA. DIANA KAROLUS and
GRACE V. KUHAIL
The CA rightly held that the court a quo erred in rendering
a judgment by default against the defendants for refusal or
APRIL LYNN L. URSAL LLB-4
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UNIVERSITY OF CEBU – COLLEGE OF LAW
failure to answer written interrogatories, without first
requiring an application by the proponent to compel an
answer. This is the requisite procedure under Section 1 of
Rule 29 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.
12. A.M. No. P-07-2327, July 12, 2007
NENA GIMENA SOLWAY vs. ARIEL R. PASCASIO, Sheriff
III, MTCC, Branch 5, Olongapo City, MICHAEL P.
UCLARAY, Sheriff III, MTCC-OCC-Olongapo City and
BENJAMIN M. TULIO, Sheriff III, MTCC-OCC-Olongapo
City
The Amicable Settlement reached by the parties before the
Barangay Lupon is susceptible to legal enforcement.
However, the Local Government Code mandates that it is
the Lupon itself which is tasked to enforce by execution
the amicable settlement or arbitration award within six (6)
months from the date of settlement. Upon the lapse of such
time, the settlement may only be enforced by filing an
action before the appropriate court (MTC).
13. G.R. No. 168484, July 12, 2007
LEAH M. NAZARENO, ET AL. vs. CITY OF DUMAGUETE,
represented by Hon. Mayor AGUSTIN R. PERDICES,
DOMINADOR DUMALAG, JR., ERLINDA TUMONGHA,
JOSEPHINE MAE FLORES, and ARACELI CAMPOS
Standing is a special concern in constitutional law because
in some cases, suits are brought not by parties who have
been personally injured by the operation of a law or by
official action taken, but by concerned citizens, taxpayers
or voters who actually sue in the public interest. Hence, the
question in standing is whether such parties have "alleged
such a personal stake in the outcome of the controversy as
to assure that concrete adverseness which sharpens the
presentation of issues upon which the court so largely
depends for illumination of difficult constitutional
questions."
On the other hand, the question as to "real party-in-
interest" is whether he is "the party who would be
benefited or injured by the judgment," or the "party
entitled to the avails of the suit." It is a concept in civil
procedure and is expressly defined in the Rules of Court.
14. G.R. No. 161179, August 7, 2007
NACE SUE P. BUAN vs. FRANCISCO T. MATUGAS
The power to reverse and set aside partakes of an
appellate jurisdiction which the CA does not have over
judgments of the Secretary of Justice exercising quasi-
judicial functions.
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15. G.R. No. 148206, August 24, 2007
SPOUSES EULOGIO MORALES and ROSALIA ARZADON
vs. SUBIC SHIPYARD & ENGINEERING, INC.
A petition for annulment of judgment is an extraordinary
action. By virtue of its exceptional character, the action is
restricted exclusively to the grounds specified in the
Rules, namely: extrinsic fraud and lack of jurisdiction. The
rationale for the restriction is to prevent the extraordinary
action from being used by a losing party to make a
complete farce of a duly promulgated decision that has
long become final and executory.
16. G.R. No. 156596, August 24, 2007
ADELAIDA INFANTE vs. ARAN BUILDERS, INC.
Where is the proper venue of the present action for
revival of judgment?
Section 6, Rule 39 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure
provides that after the lapse of five (5) years from entry of
judgment and before it is barred by the statute of
limitations, a final and executory judgment or order may
be enforced by action. The Rule does not specify in which
court the action for revival of judgment should be filed.
An action upon a judgment must be brought either in the
same court where said judgment was rendered or in the
place where the plaintiff or defendant resides, or in any
other place designated by the statutes which treat of the
venue of actions in general.
Thus, the proper venue depends on the determination of
whether the present action for revival of judgment is a real
action or a personal action. Applying the afore-quoted
rules on venue, if the action for revival of judgment affects
title to or possession of real property, or interest therein,
then it is a real action that must be filed with the court of
the place where the real property is located. If such action
does not fall under the category of real actions, it is then a
personal action that may be filed with the court of the
place where the plaintiff or defendant resides.
17. G.R. No. 155179, August 24, 2007
VICTORINO QUINAGORAN vs. COURT OF APPEALS and
THE HEIRS OF JUAN DE LA CRUZ
The doctrine on which the RTC anchored its denial of
petitioner's Motion to Dismiss, as affirmed by the CA -- that
all cases of recovery of possession or accion publiciana lies
with the regional trial courts regardless of the value of the
property -- no longer holds true.
As things now stand, a distinction must be made between
those properties the assessed value of which is
below P20,000.00, if outside Metro Manila; andP50,000.00,
if within.
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REMEDIAL LAW REVIEW I (S.Y. 2015-2016)
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Jurisdiction over an accion publiciana is vested in a court
of general jurisdiction. Specifically, the regional trial court
exercises exclusive original jurisdiction "in all civil actions
which involve x x x possession of real property." However,
if the assessed value of the real property involved does not
exceed P50,000.00 in Metro Manila, and P20,000.00
outside of Metro Manila, the municipal trial court exercises
jurisdiction over actions to recover possession of real
property.
18. G.R. No. 165963, September 3, 2007
SPOUSES NORBERTO OLIVEROS & ELVIRA OLIVEROS,
herein represented by her husband, NORBERTO
OLIVEROS & CABUYAO COMMERCIAL CENTER, INC. vs.
THE HONORABLE PRESIDING JUDGE, REGIONAL TRIAL
COURT, BRANCH 24, BIÑAN, LAGUNA and
METROPOLITAN BANK & TRUST COMPANY, INC.
As to the nature of a petition for a writ of possession, it is
well to state that the proceeding in a petition for a writ of
possession is ex parte and summary in nature. It is a
judicial proceeding brought for the benefit of one party
only and without notice by the court to any person adverse
of interest. It is a proceeding wherein relief is granted
without giving the person against whom the relief is
sought an opportunity to be heard.
By its very nature, an ex parte petition for issuance of a
writ of possession is a non-litigious proceeding authorized
under Act No. 3135 as amended.
The law does not require that a petition for a writ of
possession may be granted only after documentary and
testimonial evidence shall have been offered to and
admitted by the court. As long as a verified petition states
the facts sufficient to entitle the petitioner to the relief
requested, the court shall issue the writ prayed for. The
petitioner need not offer any documentary or testimonial
evidence for the court to grant the petition.
19. G.R. No. 166547, September 12, 2007
UMBRA M. TOMAWIS vs. ATTY. NORA M. TABAO-
CAUDANG
There is constructive service by registered mail only if
there is conclusive proof that a first notice was duly sent
by the postmaster to the addressee and that such first
notice had been delivered to and received by the
addressee. The best evidence to prove that notice was sent
would be a certification from the postmaster to the effect
that not only was notice issued or sent but also on how,
when and to whom the delivery was made. The mailman
may also testify that the notice was actually delivered.
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20. G.R. No. 149508, October 10, 2007
SPOUSES RICARDO and LEONILA DE LOS SANTOS vs.
MA. SOCORRO V. VDA. DE MANGUBAT, SPS.
PURIFICACION V. LINAO and DOMINGO LINAO,
BIENVENIDO G. VILLARENTE, SPS. CESAR G.
VILLARENTE and MARIA DE LUZ HALILI, and SPS. LILIA
V. MONTENEGRO and RUDY MONTENEGRO in their
individual capacities and as Heirs of JOSEFA R.
CABAGAT, represented by BIENVENIDO G.
VILLARENTE
What is Neypes Rule?
To standardize the appeal periods provided in the Rules
and to afford litigants fair opportunity to appeal their
cases, the Court deems it practical to allow a fresh period
of 15 days within which to file the notice of appeal in the
Regional Trial Court, counted from receipt of the order
dismissing a motion for a new trial or motion for
reconsideration.
To recapitulate, a party litigant may either file his notice of
appeal within 15 days from receipt of the Regional Trial
Court’s decision or file it within 15 days from receipt of the
order (the "final order") denying his motion for new trial
or motion for reconsideration. Obviously, the new 15-day
period may be availed of only if either motion is filed;
otherwise, the decision becomes final and executory after
the lapse of the original appeal period provided in Rule 41,
Section 3.
21. G.R. No. 175163, October 19, 2007
LAND BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. ASCOT HOLDINGS
AND EQUITIES, INC., CUBE FACTOR HOLDINGS, INC.,
SIERRA HOLDINGS & EQUITIES, INC. AND POL
HOLDINGS, INC.
The prohibited motion for reconsideration filed by the
petitioner with the trial court did not suspend the period
to appeal the RTC’s "Judgment.”
22. G.R. No. 156848, October 11, 2007
PIONEER INTERNATIONAL, LTD. vs. HON. TEOFILO
GUADIZ, JR., in his capacity as Presiding Judge of
Regional Trial Court, Branch 147, Makati City, and
ANTONIO D. TODARO
The doctrine of forum non-conveniens requires an
examination of the truthfulness of the allegations in the
complaint. Section 1, Rule 16 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure does not mention forum non-conveniens as a
ground for filing a motion to dismiss. The propriety of
dismissing a case based on forum non-conveniens requires
a factual determination; hence, it is more properly
considered a matter of defense. While it is within the
discretion of the trial court to abstain from assuming
jurisdiction on this ground, the trial court should do so
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only after vital facts are established to determine whether
special circumstances require the court’s desistance.
23. G.R. No. 157903, October 11, 2007
LAND BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. FEDERICO C.
SUNTAY, Represented by his Assignee, JOSEFINA
LUBRICA
The Special Agrarian Courts [the designated Regional Trial
Courts] shall have original and exclusive jurisdiction over
all petitions for the determination of just compensation to
landowners, and the prosecution of all criminal offenses
under this Act (R.A. No. 6657). The Rules of Court shall
apply to all proceedings before the Special Agrarian
Courts.
24. G.R. No. 157912, December 13, 2007
ALAN JOSEPH A. SHEKER vs. ESTATE OF ALICE O.
SHEKER, VICTORIA S. MEDINA-Administratrix
The certification of non-forum shopping is required only
for complaints and other initiatory pleadings. The RTC
erred in ruling that a contingent money claim against the
estate of a decedent is an initiatory pleading. In the present
case, the whole probate proceeding was initiated upon the
filing of the petition for allowance of the decedent's will.
A money claim is only an incidental matter in the main
action for the settlement of the decedent's estate; more so
if the claim is contingent since the claimant cannot even
institute a separate action for a mere contingent claim.
Hence, herein petitioner's contingent money claim, not
being an initiatory pleading, does not require a
certification against non-forum shopping.
2008 CASES
1. G.R. No. 143581, January 7, 2008
KOREA TECHNOLOGIES CO., LTD. vs. HON. ALBERTO A.
LERMA, in his capacity as Presiding Judge of Branch
256 of Regional Trial Court of Muntinlupa City, and
PACIFIC GENERAL STEEL MANUFACTURING
CORPORATION
Under Sec. 24 of R.A. No. 9285, the RTC does not have
jurisdiction over disputes that are properly the subject of
arbitration pursuant to an arbitration clause, and
mandates the referral to arbitration in such cases.
Foreign arbitral awards while mutually stipulated by the
parties in the arbitration clause to be final and binding are
not immediately enforceable or cannot be implemented
immediately. Sec. 35 of the UNCITRAL Model Law
stipulates the requirement for the arbitral award to be
recognized by a competent court for enforcement, which
court under Sec. 36 of the UNCITRAL Model Law may
refuse recognition or enforcement on the grounds
Page 11
provided for. RA 9285 incorporated these provisos to Secs.
42, 43, and 44 relative to Secs. 47 and 48.
It is now clear that foreign arbitral awards when
confirmed by the RTC are deemed not as a judgment of a
foreign court but as a foreign arbitral award, and when
confirmed, are enforced as final and executory decisions of
our courts of law.
Sec. 42 in relation to Sec. 45 of R.A. No. 9285 designated
and vested the RTC with specific authority and jurisdiction
to set aside, reject, or vacate a foreign arbitral award on
grounds provided under Art. 34(2) of the UNCITRAL
Model Law.
As a fundamental point, the pendency of arbitral
proceedings does not foreclose resort to the courts for
provisional reliefs. The Rules of the ICC, which governs the
parties’ arbitral dispute, allows the application of a party
to a judicial authority for interim or conservatory
measures.
2. G.R. No. 149313, January 22, 2008
JULITA ROMBAUA PANGANIBAN, PAQUITO ROMBAUA,
RUPERTO ROMBAUA, TERESITA ROMBAUA TELAJE
and LEONOR ROMBAUA OPIANA vs. JULITA S. OAMIL
The court in Civil Case No. 140-0-93 (specific performance
case) is not a partition court but one litigating an ordinary
civil case, and all evidence of alleged acts of ownership by
one co-owner should have been presented in the partition
case (Special Civil Action No. 340-0-86), there to be
threshed out in order that the partition court may arrive at
a just division of the property owned in common; it is not
for the trial court in the specific performance case to
properly appreciate. Being a court trying an ordinary civil
suit, the court in Civil Case No. 140-0-93 had no
jurisdiction to act as a partition court. Trial courts trying
an ordinary action cannot resolve to perform acts
pertaining to a special proceeding because it is subject to
specific prescribed rules.
3. G.R. No. 157966, January 31, 2008
EDDIE PACQUING, RODERICK CENTENO, JUANITO M.
GUERRA, CLARO DUPILAD, JR., LOUIE CENTENO, DAVID
REBLORA and RAYMUNDO ANDRADE vs. COCA-COLA
PHILIPPINES, INC
While the general rule is that the certificate of non-forum
shopping must be signed by all the plaintiffs in a case and
the signature of only one of them is insufficient, the Court
has stressed that the rules on forum shopping, which were
designed to promote and facilitate the orderly
administration of justice, should not be interpreted with
such absolute literalness as to subvert its own ultimate
and legitimate objective. Strict compliance with the
provision regarding the certificate of non-forum shopping
APRIL LYNN L. URSAL LLB-4
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UNIVERSITY OF CEBU – COLLEGE OF LAW
underscores its mandatory nature in that the certification
cannot be altogether dispensed with or its requirements
completely disregarded. It does not, however, prohibit
substantial compliance therewith under justifiable
circumstances, considering especially that although it is
obligatory, it is not jurisdictional.
In recent decisions, the Court has consistently held that
when all the petitioners share a common interest and
invoke a common cause of action or defense, the signature
of only one of them in the certification against forum
shopping substantially complies with the rules.
4. G.R. No. 160426, January 31, 2008
CAPITOLINA VIVERO NAPERE vs. AMANDO
BARBARONA and GERVACIA MONJAS BARBARONA
The Court has repeatedly declared that failure of the
counsel to comply with his duty to inform the court of the
death of his client, such that no substitution is effected, will
not invalidate the proceedings and the judgment rendered
thereon if the action survives the death of such party. The
trial court’s jurisdiction over the case subsists despite the
death of the party.
Mere failure to substitute a deceased party is not sufficient
ground to nullify a trial court’s decision. The party alleging
nullity must prove that there was an undeniable violation
of due process.
Strictly speaking, the rule on substitution by heirs is not a
matter of jurisdiction, but a requirement of due process.
The rule on substitution was crafted to protect every
party’s right to due process. It was designed to ensure that
the deceased party would continue to be properly
represented in the suit through his heirs or the duly
appointed legal representative of his estate. Moreover,
non-compliance with the Rules results in the denial of the
right to due process for the heirs who, though not duly
notified of the proceedings, would be substantially affected
by the decision rendered therein. Thus, it is only when
there is a denial of due process, as when the deceased is
not represented by any legal representative or heir, that
the court nullifies the trial proceedings and the resulting
judgment therein.
Formal substitution by heirs is not necessary when they
themselves voluntarily appear, participate in the case, and
present evidence in defense of the deceased. In such case,
there is really no violation of the right to due process. The
essence of due process is the reasonable opportunity to be
heard and to submit any evidence available in support of
one’s defense. When due process is not violated, as when
the right of the representative or heir is recognized and
protected, noncompliance or belated formal compliance
with the Rules cannot affect the validity of a promulgated
decision.
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5. G.R. No. 151413, February 13, 2008
CAGAYAN VALLEY DRUG CORPORATION vs.
COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE
With respect to an individual litigant, there is no question
that litigants must sign the sworn verification and
certification unless they execute a power of attorney
authorizing another person to sign it. With respect to a
juridical person, Sec. 4, Rule 7 on verification and Sec. 5,
Rule 7 on certification against forum shopping are silent as
to who the authorized signatory should be. Said rules do
not indicate if the submission of a board resolution
authorizing the officer or representative is necessary.
In sum, we have held that the following officials or
employees of the company can sign the verification
and certification without need of a board resolution:
(1) the Chairperson of the Board of Directors,
(2) the President of a corporation,
(3) the General Manager or Acting General Manager,
(4) Personnel Officer, and
(5) an Employment Specialist in a labor case.
We ruled that only individuals vested with authority by a
valid board resolution may sign the certificate of non-
forum shopping on behalf of a corporation. The action can
be dismissed if the certification was submitted
unaccompanied by proof of the signatory’s authority.
6. G.R. No. 154557, February 13, 2008
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. THE HONORABLE
COURT OF APPEALS, 12th DIVISION, RICO LIPAO, and
RICKSON LIPAO
The signature by the Solicitor General on the verification
and certification of non-forum shopping in a petition
before the CA or with this Court is substantial compliance
of the requirement under Sec. 4, Rule 7 of the 1997 Rules
of Civil Procedure, considering that the OSG is the legal
representative of the Government of the Republic of the
Philippines and its agencies and instrumentalities, more so
in a criminal case where the People or the State is the real
party-in-interest and is the aggrieved party.
7. G.R. No. 164403, March 4, 2008
COSMOS BOTTLING CORPORATION vs. PABLO
NAGRAMA, JR.
The doctrine of conclusive finality is defined as the
comity that courts extend to the executive branch and the
recognition of the expertise of administrative agencies in
dealing with particular questions of fact. Simply put, the
appellate court may defer to the factual findings of the
administrative agency due to comity.
However, the prevailing doctrine with respect to
administrative findings of fact has no conclusive finality.
APRIL LYNN L. URSAL LLB-4
REMEDIAL LAW REVIEW I (S.Y. 2015-2016)
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Rather, factual findings made by quasi-judicial and
administrative bodies when supported by substantial
evidence are accorded great respect and even finality by
the appellate courts.
The doctrine of conclusive finality and doctrine of great
respect and finality both apply to factual findings of
administrative agencies in the exercise of their quasi-
judicial function. The former has no evidentiary
requirement while the latter must be supported by
substantial evidence. The former is based on comity, the
latter is based on the doctrine that administrative agencies
possess specialized knowledge and expertise in their
respective fields. The former is not used in the Philippine
legal system while the latter is the established standard.
Neither the doctrine of conclusive finality nor the doctrine
of great respect and finality has direct application to the
case at bar. The CA did not simply review the decision of
the NLRC. The CA took cognizance of a special civil action
of certiorari. Verily, the CA did not per se review the facts
found or the law applied by the NLRC. The CA reviewed the
discretion of the NLRC.
8. A.M. No. P-08-2442, March 28, 2008
BONIFACIO OBRERO vs. ATTY. MA. VICTORIA A.
ACIDERA, Clerk of Court, Branch 13, Regional Trial
Court, Laoag City
Where the motion is directed to the clerk of court, not to
the parties, and merely states that the same is to be
submitted "for the resolution of the court upon receipt
thereof," such a motion is fatally defective. Any subsequent
action of the court thereon will not cure the flaw, for a
motion with a fatally defective notice is a "useless piece of
paper."
To comply with the requirement of notice, as part and
parcel of procedural due process, it is necessary that all
motions be addressed to all parties concerned. This is a
mandatory requirement, and the failure of the movant to
comply with this requisite is fatal. Accordingly, a clerk of
court who accepts the filing of a fatally defective motion
and submits the same to the judgment of the court is
equally guilty of violating a basic procedural requirement.
9. G.R. No. 158998, March 28, 2008
LIGAYA, CHARITO, PARALUMAN and EFREN, all
surnamed BIGLANG-AWA vs. PHILIPPINE TRUST
COMPANY
Interestingly, Section 3, Rule 10 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure amended the former rule in such manner that
the phrase "or that the cause of action or defense is
substantially altered" was stricken-off and not retained in
the new rules. The clear import of such amendment in
Section 3, Rule 10 is that under the new rules, "the
Page 13
amendment may (now) substantially alter the cause of
action or defense." This should only be true, however
when despite a substantial change or alteration in the
cause of action or defense, the amendments sought to be
made shall serve the higher interests of substantial justice,
and prevent delay and equally promote the laudable
objective of the rules which is to secure a "just, speedy and
inexpensive disposition of every action and proceeding."
10. G.R. No. L-21450, April 15, 1968
SERAFIN TIJAM, ET AL. vs. MAGDALENO SIBONGHANOY
alias GAVINO SIBONGHANOY and LUCIA BAGUIO,
MANILA SURETY AND FIDELITY CO., INC. (CEBU
BRANCH)
Laches, in a general sense is failure or neglect, for an
unreasonable and unexplained length of time, to do that
which, by exercising due diligence, could or should have
been done earlier; it is negligence or omission to assert a
right within a reasonable time, warranting a presumption
that the party entitled to assert it either has abandoned it
or declined to assert it.
The doctrine of laches or of "stale demands" is based
upon grounds of public policy which requires, for the
peace of society, the discouragement of stale claims and,
unlike the statute of limitations, is not a mere question of
time but is principally a question of the inequity or
unfairness of permitting a right or claim to be enforced or
asserted.
It has been held that a party cannot invoke the jurisdiction
of a court to sure affirmative relief against his opponent
and, after obtaining or failing to obtain such relief,
repudiate or question that same jurisdiction
Furthermore, it has also been held that after voluntarily
submitting a cause and encountering an adverse decision
on the merits, it is too late for the loser to question the
jurisdiction or power of the court.
11. G.R. No. 178266, July 21, 2008
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. SAMUEL and LORETA
VANZUELA
The three important requisites in order that a court
may acquire criminal jurisdiction are:
(1) The court must have jurisdiction over the subject
matter;
(2) The court must have jurisdiction over the
territory where the offense was committed; and
(3) The court must have jurisdiction over the person
of the accused.
In the instant case, the RTC failed to consider that what is
lodged before it is a criminal case for estafa involving an
alleged misappropriated amount of P80,000.00 -- a subject
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UNIVERSITY OF CEBU – COLLEGE OF LAW
matter over which the RTC clearly has jurisdiction.
Notably, while the RTC has criminal jurisdiction conferred
on it by law, the DARAB, on the other hand, has no
authority to try criminal cases at all.
For agrarian reform cases, jurisdiction is vested in the
Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR); more specifically,
in the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board
(DARAB).
Clearly, the law and the DARAB Rules are deafeningly
silent on the conferment of any criminal jurisdiction in
favor of the DARAB. It is worth stressing that even the
jurisdiction over the prosecution of criminal offenses in
violation of R.A. No. 6657 per se is lodged with the Special
Agrarian Courts (SACs) and not with the DARAB.
12. G.R. No. 147082, January 28, 2008
HEIRS OF MAURA SO, namely, YAN LAM LIM, JIMMY SO
LIM, and FERDINAND SO LIM vs. LUCILA JOMOC
OBLIOSCA, ELVIRA JOMOC GARDINAB, and HEIRS OF
ABUNDIA JOMOC BALALA, namely, ROSITA BALALA
ACENAS, EVANGELINE BALALA BAACLO, OLIVER
JOMOC BALALA, and PERLA BALALA CONDESA
Annulment of judgment is a recourse equitable in
character, allowed only in exceptional cases as where
there is no available or other adequate remedy. Thus, it
may not be invoked:
(1) Where the party has availed himself of the remedy
of new trial, appeal, petition for relief, or other
appropriate remedy and lost; or
(2) Where he has failed to avail himself of those
remedies through his own fault or negligence.
We, therefore, agree with the CA that the remedy of a
petition for annulment of judgment is no longer available
to petitioners since their predecessor-in-interest, Maura
So, had already availed herself of a petition for review on
certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.
13. G.R. No. 165416, January 22, 2008
OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN vs. FLORITA A. MASING
and JOCELYN A. TAYACTAC
We have ruled however that allowance or disallowance of
a motion for intervention rests on the sound discretion of
the court after consideration of the appropriate
circumstances. Rule 19 of the Rules of Court is a rule of
procedure whose object is to make the powers of the court
fully and completely available for justice. Its purpose is not
to hinder or delay but to facilitate and promote the
administration of justice. Thus, interventions have been
allowed even beyond the prescribed period in the Rule in
the higher interest of justice. Interventions have been
granted to afford indispensable parties, who have not been
impleaded, the right to be heard even after a decision has
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been rendered by the trial court, when the petition for
review of the judgment was already submitted for decision
before the Supreme Court, and even where the assailed
order has already become final and executory.
14. G.R. No. 162739, February 12, 2008
AMA COMPUTER COLLEGE-SANTIAGO CITY, INC. vs.
CHELLY P. NACINO, substituted by the Heirs of Chelly P.
Nacino
The decisions of the voluntary arbitrator under the Labor
Code are appealable to the Court of Appeals. The voluntary
arbitrator is a government instrumentality within the
contemplation of Section 9 of Batas Pambansa Blg. (BP)
129 which provides for the appellate jurisdiction of the
Court of Appeals. The decisions of the voluntary arbitrator
are akin to those of the Regional Trial Court, and,
therefore, should first be appealed to the Court of Appeals
before being elevated to this Court.
15. G.R. No. 174414, March 14, 2008
ELMER F. GOMEZ vs. MA. LITA A. MONTALBAN
As used in Section 1, Rule 38 of the Rules of Court (Petition
for Relief), “mistake" refers to mistake of fact, not of law,
which relates to the case. The word "mistake," which
grants relief from judgment, does not apply and was never
intended to apply to a judicial error which the court might
have committed in the trial. Such errors may be corrected
by means of an appeal.
16. G.R. No. 170049, March 14, 2008
GENEROSO A. JUABAN and FRANCIS M. ZOSA vs. RENE
ESPINA and CEBU DISCOVERY BAY PROPERTIES, INC.
Forum shopping as a ground for the dismissal of actions is
distinct and separate from the failure to submit a proper
Certificate against Forum Shopping. One need not be held
liable for forum shopping for his complaint to be dismissed
on the ground of an absence or a defect in the Certificate
against Forum Shopping. Conversely, one can be liable for
forum shopping regardless of the presence or absence of a
Certification against Forum Shopping. The presence of a
Certification in such a case would only have the effect of
making the person committing forum shopping
additionally liable for perjury.
17. G.R. No. 156421, April 14, 2008
HON. JOSE FERNADEZ, RTC of PASIG CITY, BR. 158 and
UNITED OVERSEAS BANK PHILS. vs. SPS. GREGORIO
ESPINOZA and JOJI GADOR-ESPINOZA
The RTC under which the application for the issuance of a
writ of possession over the subject property is pending
cannot defer the issuance of the said writ in view of the
pendency of an action for annulment of mortgage and
foreclosure sale. The judge with whom an application for a
APRIL LYNN L. URSAL LLB-4
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UNIVERSITY OF CEBU – COLLEGE OF LAW
writ of possession is filed need not look into the validity of
the mortgage or the manner of its foreclosure.
Any question regarding the validity of the mortgage or its
foreclosure cannot be a legal ground for the refusal to
issue a writ of possession. Regardless of whether or not
there is a pending suit for the annulment of the mortgage
or the foreclosure itself, the purchaser is entitled to a writ
of possession, without prejudice, of course, to the eventual
outcome of the pending annulment case.
18. G.R. No. 169370, April 14, 2008
EUSTACIO ATWEL, LUCIA PILPIL and MANUEL
MELGAZO vs. CONCEPCION PROGRESSIVE
ASSOCIATION, INC.
To determine whether a case involves an intra-
corporate controversy to be heard and decided by the
RTC, two elements must concur:
(1) The status or relationship of the parties and
(2) The nature of the question that is subject of their
controversy.
The first element requires that the controversy must
arise out of intra-corporate or partnership relations:
(a) Between any or all of the parties and the
corporation, partnership or association of which
they are stockholders, members or associates;
(b) Between any or all of them and the corporation,
partnership or association of which they are
stockholders, members or associates and
(c) Between such corporation, partnership or
association and the state insofar as it concerns
their individual franchises.
On the other hand, the second element requires that the
dispute among the parties be intrinsically connected with
the regulation of the corporation.
If the nature of the controversy involves matters that are
purely civil in character, necessarily, the case does not
involve an intra-corporate controversy.
2011 CASES
1. G.R. No. 169144, January 26, 2011
IN RE: IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION TO APPROVE
THE WILL OF RUPERTA PALAGANAS WITH PRAYER
FOR THE APPOINTMENT OF SPECIAL
ADMINISTRATOR, MANUEL MIGUEL PALAGANAS and
BENJAMIN GREGORIO PALAGANAS vs. ERNESTO
PALAGANAS
Our laws do not prohibit the probate of wills executed by
foreigners abroad although the same have not as yet been
probated and allowed in the countries of their execution. A
foreign will can be given legal effects in our jurisdiction.
Page 15
Article 816 of the Civil Code states that the will of an alien
who is abroad produces effect in the Philippines if made in
accordance with the formalities prescribed by the law of
the place where he resides, or according to the formalities
observed in his country.
Our rules require merely that the petition for the
allowance of a will must show, so far as known to the
petitioner:
(a) The jurisdictional facts;
(b) The names, ages, and residences of the heirs,
legatees, and devisees of the testator or decedent;
(c) The probable value and character of the property
of the estate;
(d) The name of the person for whom letters are
prayed; and
(e) If the will has not been delivered to the court, the
name of the person having custody of it.
Jurisdictional facts refer to the fact of death of the
decedent, his residence at the time of his death in the
province where the probate court is sitting, or if he is an
inhabitant of a foreign country, the estate he left in such
province.
The rules do not require proof that the foreign will has
already been allowed and probated in the country of its
execution.
2. G.R. No. 172879, February 2, 2011
ATTY. RICARDO B. BERMUDO vs. FERMINA TAYAG-
ROXAS
Atty. Bermudo points out that Roxas’ remedy for
contesting the RTC order of execution against her should
be an ordinary appeal to the CA. He invokes Section 1, Rule
109 of the Revised Rules of Court which enumerates the
orders or judgments in special proceedings from which
parties may appeal. One of these is an order or judgment
which settles the account of an executor or administrator.
The rationale behind this multi-appeal mode is to enable
the rest of the case to proceed in the event that a separate
and distinct issue is resolved by the court and held to be
final. But the earlier award in Atty. Bermudo’s favor did
not settle his account as administrator. Rather, it fixed his
attorney’s fees for the legal services he rendered in the suit
contesting Roxas’ right as sole heir. Consequently, Section
1 (d) of Rule 109 does not apply.
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REMEDIAL LAW REVIEW I (S.Y. 2015-2016)
UNIVERSITY OF CEBU – COLLEGE OF LAW
3. G.R. No. 176339, January 10, 2011
DO-ALL METALS INDUSTRIES, INC., SPS. DOMINGO LIM
and LELY KUNG LIM vs. SECURITY BANK CORP.,
TITOLAIDO E. PAYONGAYONG, EVYLENE C. SISON,
PHIL. INDUSTRIAL SECURITY AGENCY CORP. and GIL
SILOS
On the issue of jurisdiction, respondent Bank argues that
plaintiffs’ failure to pay the filing fees on their
supplemental complaint is fatal to their action. But what
the plaintiffs failed to pay was merely the filing fees for
their Supplemental Complaint. The RTC acquired
jurisdiction over plaintiffs’ action from the moment they
filed their original complaint accompanied by the payment
of the filing fees due on the same. The plaintiffs’ non-
payment of the additional filing fees due on their
additional claims did not divest the RTC of the jurisdiction
it already had over the case.
The Bank belittles the testimonies of the petitioners’
witnesses for having been presented ex parte before the
clerk of court. But the ex parte hearing, having been
properly authorized, cannot be assailed as less credible. It
was the Bank’s fault that it was unable to attend the
hearing. It cannot profit from its lack of diligence.
While the lease may have already lapsed, the Bank had no
business harassing and intimidating the Lims and their
employees. The RTC was therefore correct in adjudging
moral damages, exemplary damages, and attorney’s fees
against the Bank for the acts of their representatives and
building guards.
As to the damages that plaintiffs claim under their
supplemental complaint, their stand is that the RTC
committed no error in admitting the complaint even if they
had not paid the filing fees due on it since such fees
constituted a lien anyway on the judgment award. But this
after-judgment lien, which implies that payment depends
on a successful execution of the judgment, applies to cases
where the filing fees were incorrectly assessed or paid or
where the court has discretion to fix the amount of the
award. None of these circumstances obtain in this case.
Here, the supplemental complaint specified from the
beginning the actual damages that the plaintiffs sought
against the Bank. Still plaintiffs paid no filing fees on the
same. And, while petitioners claim that they were willing
to pay the additional fees, they gave no reason for their
omission nor offered to pay the same. They merely said
that they did not yet pay the fees because the RTC had not
assessed them for it. But a supplemental complaint is like
any complaint and the rule is that the filing fees due on a
complaint need to be paid upon its filing. The rules do not
require the court to make special assessments in cases of
supplemental complaints. To aggravate plaintiffs’
omission, although the Bank brought up the question of
their failure to pay additional filing fees in its motion for
Page 16
reconsideration, plaintiffs made no effort to make at least a
late payment before the case could be submitted for
decision, assuming of course that the prescription of their
action had not then set it in. Clearly, plaintiffs have no
excuse for their continuous failure to pay the fees they
owed the court. Consequently, the trial court should have
treated their Supplemental Complaint as not filed.
Plaintiffs of course point out that the Bank itself raised the
issue of non-payment of additional filing fees only after the
RTC had rendered its decision in the case. The implication
is that the Bank should be deemed to have waived its
objection to such omission. But it is not for a party to the
case or even for the trial court to waive the payment of the
additional filing fees due on the supplemental complaint.
Only the Supreme Court can grant exemptions to the
payment of the fees due the courts and these exemptions
are embodied in its rules.
4. G.R. No. 153690, February 15, 2011
DAVID LU vs. PATERNO LU YM, SR., PATERNO LU YM,
JR., VICTOR LU YM, JOHN LU YM, KELLY LU YM, and
LUDO & LUYM DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION
While it is true that the Lu Ym father and sons questioned
the admission of the aforesaid amended complaint before
this Court, the same was done only through an Urgent
Motion. Under the Rules of Court, the proper mode to
challenge such an order, which undoubtedly is
interlocutory, is through a special civil action for certiorari
under Rule 65. This procedural defect, therefore, bars the
Court from ruling on the propriety of such admission. We
cannot take cognizance of proceedings before the RTC
unless they are brought before us through the proper
mode of review. To be sure, the Urgent Motion cannot be a
substitute for the remedy of a special civil action for
certiorari. Consequently, the amended complaint admitted
by the RTC stands.
It is settled that courts do not entertain a moot question.
An issue becomes moot and academic when it ceases to
present a justiciable controversy, so that a declaration on
the issue would be of no practical use or value. This Court,
therefore, abstains from expressing its opinion in a case
where no legal relief is needed or called for.
It is true that we have held in a number of cases that the
moot and academic principle is not a magical formula that
can automatically dissuade the courts from resolving a
case. Courts will still decide cases otherwise, moot and
academic if: first, there is a grave violation of the
Constitution; second, the exceptional character of the
situation and the paramount public interest is involved;
third, when the constitutional issue raised requires
formulation of controlling principles to guide the bench,
the bar, and the public; and, fourth, the case is capable of
repetition yet evading review. However, not one of the
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enumerated exceptions obtains in the instant case. Thus, a
denial of the instant petition is warranted.
The RTC decision on the merits of the case gives this Court
more reasons to declare the mootness of the instant
petition. It must be recalled that the motion to lift the
receivership was filed before the RTC ancillary to the
principal action, and what was sought to be enjoined was
the hearing on that particular motion. With the decision on
the merits rendered by the RTC, albeit still on appeal, there
is nothing more to be enjoined. More importantly, the RTC
ordered that the receivers cease from performing their
functions and that a management committee be created.
Clearly, these supervening events mooted the petition.
Time and again, we have declared that a petition should be
denied for the sole reason that the act sought to be
enjoined is already fait accompli.
In the instant case, John and LLDC failed to satisfy the
above requisites. Except for their claim of nullity of the
RTC decision because of insufficient payment of docket
fees, no evidence was offered to establish the existence of a
clear and unmistakable right on their part that must be
protected, as well as the serious damage or irreparable
loss that they would suffer if the writ is not granted. It has
been consistently held that there is no power, the exercise
of which is more delicate, which requires greater caution,
deliberation and sound discretion, or more dangerous in a
doubtful case than the issuance of an injunction. It is the
strong arm of equity that should never be extended unless
to cases of great injury, where courts of law cannot afford
an adequate or commensurate remedy in damages. Every
court should remember that an injunction is a limitation
upon the freedom of action of the defendant and should
not be granted lightly or precipitately. It should be granted
only when the court is fully satisfied that the law permits it
and the emergency demands it.
A court acquires jurisdiction over a case only upon the
payment of the prescribed fees. The importance of filing
fees cannot be gainsaid for these are intended to take care
of court expenses in the handling of cases in terms of costs
of supplies, use of equipment, salaries and fringe benefits
of personnel, and others, computed as to man-hours used
in the handling of each case. Hence, the non-payment or
insufficient payment of docket fees can entail tremendous
losses to the government in general and to the judiciary in
particular.
The Court had, in the past, laid down the test in
determining whether the subject matter of an action is
incapable of pecuniary estimation by ascertaining the
nature of the principal action or remedy sought. If the
action is primarily for recovery of a sum of money, the
claim is considered capable of pecuniary estimation.
However, where the basic issue is something other
than the right to recover a sum of money, the money
Page 17
claim being only incidental to or merely a consequence
of, the principal relief sought, the action is incapable of
pecuniary estimation.
Well-established is the rule that after vigorously
participating in all stages of the case before the trial court
and even invoking the trial court’s authority in order to
ask for affirmative relief, John and LLDC are barred by
estoppel from challenging the trial court’s jurisdiction. If a
party invokes the jurisdiction of a court, he cannot
thereafter challenge the court’s jurisdiction in the same
case. To rule otherwise would amount to speculating on
the fortune of litigation, which is against the policy of the
Court. Thus, even if, indeed, the docket fees paid were
inadequate, this allegation having been raised for the first
time on appeal, should be disallowed.
5. G.R. Nos. 171947-48, February 15, 2011
METROPOLITAN MANILA DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY,
DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENT AND NATURAL
RESOURCES, DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION, CULTURE
AND SPORTS,1 DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH,
DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE, DEPARTMENT OF
PUBLIC WORKS AND HIGHWAYS, DEPARTMENT OF
BUDGET AND MANAGEMENT, PHILIPPINE COAST
GUARD, PHILIPPINE NATIONAL POLICE MARITIME
GROUP, and DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR AND
LOCAL GOVERNMENT vs. CONCERNED RESIDENTS OF
MANILA BAY, ET AL.
The case is now in the execution phase of the final and
executory December 18, 2008 Decision. The Manila Bay
Advisory Committee was created to receive and evaluate
the quarterly progressive reports on the activities
undertaken by the agencies in accordance with said
decision and to monitor the execution phase. In the
absence of specific completion periods, the Committee
recommended that time frames be set for the agencies to
perform their assigned tasks. This may be viewed as an
encroachment over the powers and functions of the
Executive Branch headed by the President of the
Philippines. This view is misplaced. The issuance of
subsequent resolutions by the Court is simply an exercise
of judicial power under Art. VIII of the Constitution,
because the execution of the Decision is but an integral
part of the adjudicative function of the Court. None of the
agencies ever questioned the power of the Court to
implement the December 18, 2008 Decision nor has any of
them raised the alleged encroachment by the Court over
executive functions. While additional activities are
required of the agencies like submission of plans of action,
data or status reports, these directives are but part and
parcel of the execution stage of a final decision under Rule
39 of the Rules of Court.
The submission of periodic reports is sanctioned by Secs. 7
and 8, Rule 8 of the Rules of Procedure for Environmental
APRIL LYNN L. URSAL LLB-4
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cases: Sec. 7. Judgment.––If warranted, the court shall
grant the privilege of the writ of continuing mandamus
requiring respondent to perform an act or series of acts
until the judgment is fully satisfied and to grant such other
reliefs as may be warranted resulting from the wrongful or
illegal acts of the respondent. The court shall require the
respondent to submit periodic reports detailing the
progress and execution of the judgment, and the court
may, by itself or through a commissioner or the
appropriate government agency, evaluate and monitor
compliance. The petitioner may submit its comments or
observations on the execution of the judgment. Sec. 8.
Return of the writ.—The periodic reports submitted by the
respondent detailing compliance with the judgment shall
be contained in partial returns of the writ. Upon full
satisfaction of the judgment, a final return of the writ shall
be made to the court by the respondent. If the court finds
that the judgment has been fully implemented, the
satisfaction of judgment shall be entered in the court
docket. (Emphasis supplied.) With the final and executory
judgment in MMDA, the writ of continuing mandamus
issued in MMDA means that until petitioner-agencies have
shown full compliance with the Court’s orders, the Court
exercises continuing jurisdiction over them until full
execution of the judgment
6. G.R. No. 181201, February 21, 2011
UNIVERSITY OF MINDANAO, INC., DR. GUILLERMO P.
TORRES, JR., ATTY. VICTOR NICASIO P. TORRES, NANCY
C. TE ENG FO, FE AZUCENA MARCELINO, EVANGELINE F.
MAGALLANES, CARMENCITA E. VIDAMO, CARMICHAEL
E. VIDAMO, ANTONIO M. PILPIL, SATURNINO
PETALCORIN, REYNALDO M. PETALCORIN, LILIAN M.
PETALCORIN-CASTILLO, MARY ANN M. PETALCORIN-
RAS, VITALIANO MALAYO, JR., NERI FILIPINAS,
NATIVIDAD MIRANDA, ANTONIO N. FERRER, JR. vs.
PHILIPPINE DEPOSIT INSURANCE CORPORATION
The denial of a motion to dismiss or to quash, being
interlocutory, cannot be questioned by certiorari. It cannot
be the subject of appeal, until a final judgment or order is
rendered. An interlocutory order may be assailed by
certiorari or prohibition only when it is shown that the
court acted without or in excess of jurisdiction or with
grave abuse of discretion. However, this Court generally
frowns upon this remedial measure as regards
interlocutory orders. To tolerate the practice of allowing
interlocutory orders to be the subject of review by
certiorari will not only delay the administration of justice,
but will also unduly burden the courts.
By grave abuse of discretion is meant capricious and
whimsical exercise of judgment as is equivalent to lack of
jurisdiction. Mere abuse of discretion is not enough. It
must be grave abuse of discretion as when the power is
exercised in an arbitrary or despotic manner by reason of
passion or personal hostility, and must be so patent and so
Page 18
gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or to a
virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined or to act at all
in contemplation of law.”
The findings of the CA that the PDIC substantially complied
with the requirements for an appeal must be respected.
There can be no grave abuse of discretion attributed to it
more so since the grounds for dismissing an appeal under
Section 1 of Rule 50 of the Rules of Court are discretionary
upon the CA. This can be gleaned from the very language of
the Rules which uses the word may instead of shall. In De
Leon vs. Court of Appeals, 383 SCRA 216 (2002), we held
that Section 1, Rule 50, which provides specific grounds for
dismissal of appeal, manifestly “confers a power and does
not impose a duty. Moreover, it is directory, not
mandatory.” With the exception of Section 1(b), the
grounds for the dismissal of an appeal are directory and
not mandatory, and it is not the ministerial duty of the
court to dismiss the appeal. Based on the RTC’s findings as
well as its own independent assessment of the PDIC’s
appeal, it was discretionary on the CA whether or not to
dismiss the appeal. In ruling to accept the PDIC’s appeal,
such action does not constitute capricious and whimsical
exercise of judgment as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction.
In sum, this Court finds that the CA did not act with grave
abuse of discretion when it denied petitioners motion to
dismiss. In the absence of abuse of discretion,
interlocutory orders such as a motion to dismiss are not
the proper subject of a petition for certiorari. Time and
again, this Court has ruled that dismissal of appeals on
purely technical grounds is not encouraged. The rules of
procedure ought not to be applied in a very rigid and
technical sense, for they have been adopted to help secure,
not override, substantial justice. Judicial action must be
guided by the principle that a party-litigant should be
given the fullest opportunity to establish the merits of his
complaint or defense rather than for him to lose life,
liberty, honor or property on technicalities. When a rigid
application of the rules tends to frustrate rather than
promote substantial justice, this Court is empowered to
suspend their operation.
7. G.R. No. 192217, March 2, 2011
DANILO L. PAREL vs. HEIRS OF SIMEON PRUDENCIO
Unjustified delay in the enforcement of a judgment sets at
naught the role of courts in disposing justiciable
controversies with finality. Once a judgment becomes final
and executory, all the issues between the parties are
deemed resolved and laid to rest. All that remains is the
execution of the decision which is a matter of right.
APRIL LYNN L. URSAL LLB-4
REMEDIAL LAW REVIEW I (S.Y. 2015-2016)
UNIVERSITY OF CEBU – COLLEGE OF LAW
Banaga vs. Majaducon, 494 SCRA 153 (2006), however,
enumerates the instances where a writ of execution
may be appealed:
1) The writ of execution varies the judgment;
2) There has been a change in the situation of the
parties making execution inequitable or unjust;
3) Execution is sought to be enforced against
property exempt from execution;
4) It appears that the controversy has never been
subject to the judgment of the court;
5) The terms of the judgment are not clear enough
and there remains room for interpretation
thereof; or
6) It appears that the writ of execution has been
improvidently issued, or that it is defective in
substance, or is issued against the wrong party, or
that the judgment debt has been paid or otherwise
satisfied, or the writ was issued without authority.
The Court ruled in Mejia vs. Gabayan, 455 SCRA 499, 512
(2005): x x x The inherent power of the court carries with
it the right to determine every question of fact and law
which may be involved in the execution. The court may
stay or suspend the execution of its judgment if warranted
by the higher interest of justice. It has the authority to
cause a modification of the decision when it becomes
imperative in the higher interest of justice or when
supervening events warrant it. The court is also vested
with inherent power to stay the enforcement of its
decision based on antecedent facts which show fraud in its
rendition or want of jurisdiction of the trial court apparent
on the record.
There are exceptions that have been previously
considered by the Court as meriting a relaxation of the
rules in order to serve substantial justice. These are:
(1) Matters of life, liberty, honor or property;
(2) The existence of special or compelling
circumstances;
(3) The merits of the case;
(4) A cause not entirely attributable to the fault or
negligence of the party favored by the suspension
of the rules;
(5) A lack of any showing that the review sought is
merely frivolous and dilatory; and
(6) The other party will not be unjustly prejudiced
thereby.
8. G.R. No. 160736, March 23, 2011
AIR ADS INCORPORATED vs. TAGUM AGRICULTURAL
DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION (TADECO)
Section 5, Rule 7 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure,
defines the effect of the failure to comply with the
requirements for the certification against forum
shopping, viz.: x x x The first sentence of the second
paragraph expressly provides that the dismissal of a
Page 19
petition due to failure to comply with the requirements
therein is without prejudice unless otherwise provided by
the court. Accordingly, the plaintiff or petitioner is not
precluded from filing a similar action in order to rectify the
defect in the certification w here the court states in its
order that the action is dismissed due to such defect,
unless the court directs that the dismissal is with
prejudice, in which case the plaintiff is barred from filing a
similar action by res judicata. In the context of the
aforequoted rule, the dismissal of CA-G.R. SP No. 73418,
being without any qualification, was a dismissal without
prejudice, plainly indicating that Air Ads could not be
barred from filing the second petition.
Indeed, Air Ads’ options to correct its dire situation
included the refiling, for, although the Rules of Court
declares that the failure to comply with the requirements
of Section 5 of Rule 7 shall not be cured by amendment,
nowhere does the rule prohibit the filing of a similar
complaint or pleading following the dismissal without
qualification of the earlier one.
Air Ads’ urging that the filing of the substitute third party
complaint effectively superseded the third party complaint
impleading it as third party defendant ostensibly harks
back to Section 8 of Rule 10 of the Rules of Court, which
states that the amended pleading supersedes the pleading
that it amends. However, the substitution of the third party
complaint could not produce the effect that an amendment
of an existing pleading produces. Under Section I, Rule 10,
of the Rules of Court, an amendment is done by adding or
striking out an allegation or the name of any party, or by
correcting a mistake in the name of a party or a mistaken
or inadequate allegation or description in any other
respect. A perusal of the original and the substitute third
party complaints shows that their averments are
substantially the same; and that the substitute third party
complaint did not strike out any allegation of the prior one.
9. G.R. No. 151369, March 23, 2011
ANITA MONASTERIO-PE and the SPOUSES ROMULO
TAN and EDITHA PE-TAN vs. JOSE JUAN TONG, herein
represented by his Attorney-in-Fact, JOSE Y. ONG
It bears emphasis that in a petition for review on certiorari
under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, only questions of law
may be raised by the parties and passed upon by this
Court. It is a settled rule that in the exercise of this Court’s
power of review, it does not inquire into the sufficiency of
the evidence presented, consistent with the rule that this
Court is not a trier of facts. In the instant case, a perusal of
the errors assigned by petitioners would readily show that
they are raising factual issues the resolution of which
requires the examination of evidence. Certainly, issues
which are being raised in the present petition, such as the
questions of whether the issue of physical possession is
already included as one of the issues in a case earlier filed
APRIL LYNN L. URSAL LLB-4
REMEDIAL LAW REVIEW I (S.Y. 2015-2016)
UNIVERSITY OF CEBU – COLLEGE OF LAW
by petitioner Anita and her husband, as well as whether
respondent complied with the law and rules on barangay
conciliation, are factual in nature. Moreover, the appeal
under Rule 45 of the said Rules contemplates that the RTC
rendered the judgment, final order or resolution acting in
its original jurisdiction. In the present case, the assailed
Decision and Order of the RTC were issued in the exercise
of its appellate jurisdiction. Thus, petitioners pursued the
wrong mode of appeal when they filed the present petition
for review on certiorari with this Court. Instead, they
should have filed a petition for review with the CA
pursuant to the provisions of Section 1, Rule 42 of the
Rules of Court.
It is true that the first paragraph of Section 5, Rule 7 of the
Rules of Court, requires that the certification should be
signed by the “petitioner or principal party” himself. The
rationale behind this is because only the petitioner himself
has actual knowledge of whether or not he has initiated
similar actions or proceedings in different courts or
agencies. However, the rationale does not apply where, as
in this case, it is the attorney-in-fact who instituted the
action. Such circumstance constitutes reasonable cause to
allow the attorney-in-fact to personally sign the Certificate
of Non-Forum Shopping. Indeed, the settled rule is that the
execution of the certification against forum shopping by
the attorney-in-fact is not a violation of the requirement
that the parties must personally sign the same. The
attorney-in-fact, who has authority to file, and who
actually filed the complaint as the representative of the
plaintiff, is a party to the ejectment suit. In fact, Section 1,
Rule 70 of the Rules of Court includes the representative of
the owner in an ejectment suit as one of the parties
authorized to institute the proceedings. In the present
case, there is no dispute that Ong is respondent’s attorney-
in-fact. Hence, the Court finds that there has been
substantial compliance with the rules proscribing forum
shopping.
In any case, it can be inferred from the judgments of this
Court in the two aforementioned cases that respondent, as
owner of the subject lots, is entitled to the possession
thereof. Settled is the rule that the right of possession is a
necessary incident of ownership. Petitioners, on the other
hand, are consequently barred from claiming that they
have the right to possess the disputed parcels of land,
because their alleged right is predicated solely on their
claim of ownership, which is already effectively debunked
by the decisions of this Court affirming the validity of the
deeds of sale transferring ownership of the subject
properties to respondent.
Respondent alleged in his complaint that petitioners
occupied the subject property by his mere tolerance. While
tolerance is lawful, such possession becomes illegal upon
demand to vacate by the owner and the possessor by
tolerance refuses to comply with such demand.
Page 20
Respondent sent petitioners a demand letter dated
December 1, 1999 to vacate the subject property, but
petitioners did not comply with the demand. A person who
occupies the land of another at the latter’s tolerance or
permission, without any contract between them, is
necessarily bound by an implied promise that he will
vacate upon demand, failing which a summary action for
ejectment is the proper remedy against him. Under Section
1, Rule 70 of the Rules of Court, the one-year period within
which a complaint for unlawful detainer can be filed
should be counted from the date of demand, because only
upon the lapse of that period does the possession become
unlawful. Respondent filed the ejectment case against
petitioners on March 29, 2000, which was less than a year
from December 1, 1999, the date of formal demand. Hence,
it is clear that the action was filed within the one-year
period prescribed for filing an ejectment or unlawful
detainer case.
Article 1498 of the Civil Code provides that when the sale
is made through a public instrument, the execution thereof
shall be equivalent to the delivery of the thing which is the
object of the contract, if from the deed the contrary does
not appear or cannot clearly be inferred. In the instant
case, petitioners failed to present any evidence to show
that they had no intention of delivering the subject lots to
respondent when they executed the said deed of sale.
Hence, petitioners’ execution of the deed of sale is
tantamount to a delivery of the subject lots to respondent.
The fact that petitioners remained in possession of the
disputed properties does not prove that there was no
delivery, because as found by the lower courts, such
possession is only by respondent’s mere tolerance.
10. G.R. No. 169895, March 23, 2011
ISAGANI M. YAMBOT, LETTY JIMENEZ-MAGSANOC,
JOSE MA. D. NOLASCO, ARTEMIO T. ENGRACIA, JR. and
VOLT CONTRERAS vs. Hon. ARTEMIO TUQUERO in his
capacity as Secretary of Justice, and ESCOLASTICO U.
CRUZ, JR.
Similar to the present case, in Advincula, respondents
Amando and Isagani Ocampo filed a Petition for Certiorari
and Prohibition with the Court of Appeals questioning the
Resolution of the Secretary of Justice which had earlier led
to the filing of Informations against them in court. The
Court of Appeals granted the Petition and set aside the
Resolution of the Secretary of Justice. In reversing the
Decision of the Court of Appeals, we applied the rule that
certiorari, being an extraordinary writ, cannot be resorted
to when other remedies are available. The Court observed
that respondents had other remedies available to them,
such as the filing of a Motion to Quash the Information
under Rule 117 of the Rules of Court, or allowing the trial
to proceed where they could either file a demurrer to
evidence or present their evidence to disprove the charges
against them. At the outset, it should be made clear that
APRIL LYNN L. URSAL LLB-4
REMEDIAL LAW REVIEW I (S.Y. 2015-2016)
UNIVERSITY OF CEBU – COLLEGE OF LAW
the Court is not abandoning the foregoing ruling in
Advincula. However, Advincula cannot be read to
completely disallow the institution of certiorari
proceedings against the Secretary of Justice’s
determination of probable cause when the criminal
information has already been filed in court. Under
exceptional circumstances, a petition for certiorari
assailing the resolution of the Secretary of Justice
(involving an appeal of the prosecutor’s ruling on probable
cause) may be allowed, notwithstanding the filing of an
information with the trial court.
Libel is defined as a public and malicious imputation of a
crime, or of a vice or defect, real or imaginary, or any act,
omission, condition, status or circumstance tending to
discredit or cause the dishonor or contempt of a natural or
juridical person, or to blacken the memory of one who is
dead.
Consequently, the following elements constitute libel:
(a) Imputation of a discreditable act or condition to
another;
(b) Publication of the imputation;
(c) Identity of the person defamed; and,
(d) Existence of malice.
The glaring absence of maliciousness in the assailed
portion of the news article subject of this case negates the
existence of probable cause that libel has been committed
by the PDI staff.
A newspaper should not be held to account to a point of
suppression for honest mistakes, or imperfection in the
choice of words. While, indeed, the allegation of
inappropriate sexual advances in an appeal of a contempt
ruling does not turn such case into one for sexual
harassment, we agree with petitioners’ proposition that
the subject news article’s author, not having any legal
training, cannot be expected to make the fine distinction
between a sexual harassment suit and a suit where there
was an allegation of sexual harassment. In fact, three other
newspapers reporting the same incident committed the
same mistake: the Manila Times article was headlined
“Judge in sex case now in physical injury rap”; the
Philippine Star article described Judge Cruz as “(a) Makati
judge who was previously charged with sexual harassment
by a lady prosecutor”; and the Manila Standard Article
referred to him as “(a) Makati judge who was reportedly
charged with sexual harassment by a lady fiscal.” The
questioned portion of the news article, while unfortunately
not quite accurate, on its own, is insufficient to establish
the element of malice in libel cases. We have held that
malice connotes ill will or spite and speaks not in
response to duty but merely to injure the reputation of the
person defamed, and implies an intention to do ulterior
and unjustifiable harm. Malice is present when it is shown
that the author of the libelous remarks made such remarks
Page 21
with knowledge that it was false or with reckless disregard
as to the truth or falsity thereof.
In Borjal vs. Court of Appeals, 301 SCRA 1 (1999), we held
that “[a] newspaper especially one national in reach and
coverage, should be free to report on events and
developments in which the public has a legitimate interest
with minimum fear of being hauled to court by one group
or another on criminal or civil charges for libel, so long as
the newspaper respects and keeps within the standards of
morality and civility prevailing within the general
community.” Like fair commentaries on matters of
public interest, fair reports on the same should thus be
included under the protective mantle of privileged
communications, and should not be subjected to
microscopic examination to discover grounds of malice or
falsity. The concept of privileged communication is
implicit in the constitutionally protected freedom of the
press, which would be threatened when criminal suits are
unscrupulously leveled by persons wishing to silence the
media on account of unfounded claims of inaccuracies in
news reports.
11. G.R. No. 192877, March 23, 2011
SPOUSES HERMES P. OCHOA and ARACELI D. OCHOA vs.
CHINA BANKING CORPORATION
The extrajudicial foreclosure sale of a real estate mortgage
is governed by Act No. 3135, as amended by Act No. 4118,
otherwise known as “An Act to Regulate the Sale of
Property Under Special Powers Inserted In or Annexed to
Real-Estate Mortgages.” Sections 1 and 2 thereof clearly
state: Section 1. When a sale is made under a special power
inserted in or attached to any real-estate mortgage
hereafter made as security for the payment of money or
the fulfillment of any other obligation, the provisions of the
following sections shall govern as to the manner in which
the sale and redemption shall be effected, whether or not
provision for the same is made in the power. Sec. 2. Said
sale cannot be made legally outside of the province in
which the property sold is situated; and in case the place
within said province in which the sale is to be made is the
subject of stipulation, such sale shall be made in said place
or in the municipal building of the municipality in which
the property or part thereof is situated. The case at bar
involves petitioners’ mortgaged real property located in
Parañaque City over which respondent bank was granted a
special power to foreclose extrajudicially. Thus, by express
provision of Section 2, the sale can only be made in
Parañaque City.
The exclusive venue of Makati City, as stipulated by the
parties and sanctioned by Section 4, Rule 4 of the Rules of
Court, cannot be made to apply to the Petition for
Extrajudicial Foreclosure filed by respondent bank
because the provisions of Rule 4 pertain to venue of
actions, which an extrajudicial foreclosure is not. Pertinent
APRIL LYNN L. URSAL LLB-4
REMEDIAL LAW REVIEW I (S.Y. 2015-2016)
UNIVERSITY OF CEBU – COLLEGE OF LAW
are the following disquisitions in Supena vs. De la Rosa:
Section 1, Rule 2 [of the Rules of Court] defines an action in
this wise: “Action means an ordinary suit in a court of
justice, by which one party prosecutes another for the
enforcement or protection of a right, or the prevention or
redress of a wrong.” Hagans vs. Wislizenus does not depart
from this definition when it states that “[A]n action is a
formal demand of one’s legal rights in a court of justice in
the manner prescribed by the court or by the law. x x x.” It
is clear that the determinative or operative fact which
converts a claim into an “action or suit” is the filing of
the same with a “court of justice.” Filed elsewhere, as with
some other body or office not a court of justice, the claim
may not be categorized under either term. Unlike an
action, an extrajudicial foreclosure of real estate
mortgage is initiated by filing a petition not with any court
of justice but with the office of the sheriff of the province
where the sale is to be made. By no stretch of the
imagination can the office of the sheriff come under the
category of a court of justice. And as aptly observed by the
complainant, if ever the executive judge comes into the
picture, it is only because he exercises administrative
supervision over the sheriff. But this administrative
supervision, however, does not change the fact that
extrajudicial foreclosures are not judicial proceedings,
actions or suits.
With respect to the venue of extrajudicial foreclosure sales,
Act No. 3135, as amended, applies, it being a special law
dealing particularly with extrajudicial foreclosure sales of
real estate mortgages, and not the general provisions of
the Rules of Court on Venue of Actions. Consequently, the
stipulated exclusive venue of Makati City is relevant only
to actions arising from or related to the mortgage, such as
petitioners’ complaint for Annulment of Foreclosure, Sale,
and Damages.
12. G.R. Nos. 184461-62, May 31, 2011
LT. COL. ROGELIO BOAC, LT. COL. FELIPE ANOTADO
AND LT. FRANCIS MIRABELLE SAMSON vs. ERLINDA T.
CADAPAN AND CONCEPCION E. EMPEÑO
The Court takes judicial notice of its Decision in the just
cited Secretary of National Defense vs. Manalo, 568 SCRA 1
(2008), which assessed the account of Manalo to be a
candid and forthright narrative of his and his brother
Reynaldo’s abduction by the military in 2006; and of the
corroborative testimonies, in the same case, of Manalo’s
brother Reynaldo and a forensic specialist, as well as
Manalo’s graphic description of the detention area. There
is thus no compelling reason for the Court, in the present
case, to disturb its appreciation in Manalo’s testimony. The
outright denial of petitioners Lt. Col. Boac, et al. thus
crumbles.
Petitioners finally point out that the parents of Sherlyn and
Karen do not have the requisite standing to file the amparo
Page 22
petition on behalf of Merino. They call attention to the fact
that in the amparo petition, the parents of Sherlyn and
Karen merely indicated that they were “concerned with
Manuel Merino” as basis for filing the petition on his
behalf. Section 2 of the Rule on the Writ of Amparo
provides: The petition may be filed by the aggrieved
party or by any qualified person or entity in the
following order: (a) Any member of the immediate family,
namely: the spouse, children and parents of the aggrieved
party; (b) Any ascendant, descendant or collateral relative
of the aggrieved party within the fourth civil degree of
consanguinity or affinity, in default of those mentioned in
the preceding paragraph; or (c) Any concerned citizen,
organization, association or institution, if there is no
known member of the immediate family or relative of the
aggrieved party. Indeed, the parents of Sherlyn and Karen
failed to allege that there were no known members of the
immediate family or relatives of Merino. The exclusive and
successive order mandated by the above-quoted provision
must be followed. The order of priority is not without
reason—“to prevent the indiscriminate and groundless
filing of petitions for amparo which may even prejudice
the right to life, liberty or security of the aggrieved party.”
The Court notes that the parents of Sherlyn and Karen also
filed the petition for habeas corpus on Merino’s behalf. No
objection was raised therein for, in a habeas corpus
proceeding, any person may apply for the writ on behalf of
the aggrieved party. It is thus only with respect to the
amparo petition that the parents of Sherlyn and Karen are
precluded from filing the application on Merino’s behalf as
they are not authorized parties under the Rule.
The Court finds the appellate court’s dismissal of the
petitions against then President Arroyo well-taken, owing
to her immunity from suit at the time the habeas corpus
and amparo petitions were filed. Settled is the doctrine
that the President, during his tenure of office or actual
incumbency, may not be sued in any civil or criminal case,
and there is no need to provide for it in the Constitution or
law. It will degrade the dignity of the high office of the
President, the Head of State, if he can be dragged into court
litigations while serving as such. Furthermore, it is
important that he be freed from any form of harassment,
hindrance or distraction to enable him to fully attend to
the performance of his official duties and functions. Unlike
the legislative and judicial branch, only one constitutes the
executive branch and anything which impairs his
usefulness in the discharge of the many great and
important duties imposed upon him by the Constitution
necessarily impairs the operation of the Government. x x x
Parenthetically, the petitions are bereft of any allegation
that then President Arroyo permitted, condoned or
performed any wrongdoing against the three missing
persons.
APRIL LYNN L. URSAL LLB-4
REMEDIAL LAW REVIEW I (S.Y. 2015-2016)
UNIVERSITY OF CEBU – COLLEGE OF LAW
Rubrico vs. Macapagal Arroyo, 613 SCRA 233 (2010),
expounded on the concept of command responsibility as
follows: The evolution of the command responsibility
doctrine finds its context in the development of laws of
war and armed combats. According to Fr. Bernas,
“command responsibility,” in its simplest terms, means
the “responsibility of commanders for crimes committed
by subordinate members of the armed forces or other
persons subject to their control in international wars or
domestic conflict.” In this sense, command responsibility is
properly a form of criminal complicity. The Hague
Conventions of 1907 adopted the doctrine of command
responsibility, foreshadowing the present-day precept of
holding a superior accountable for the atrocities
committed by his subordinates should he be remiss in his
duty of control over them. As then formulated, command
responsibility is “an omission mode of individual criminal
liability,” whereby the superior is made responsible for
crimes committed by his subordinates for failing to
prevent or punish the perpetrators (as opposed to crimes
he ordered). It bears stressing that command
responsibility is properly a form of criminal complicity,
and thus a substantive rule that points to criminal or
administrative liability.
An amparo proceeding is not criminal in nature nor does
it ascertain the criminal liability of individuals or entities
involved. Neither does it partake of a civil or
administrative suit. Rather, it is a remedial measure
designed to direct specified courses of action to
government agencies to safeguard the constitutional right
to life, liberty and security of aggrieved individuals. Thus
Razon Jr. vs. Tagitis, 606 SCRA 598 (2009), enlightens: [An
amparo proceeding] does not determine guilt nor
pinpoint criminal culpability for the disappearance
[threats thereof or extrajudicial killings]; it determines
responsibility, or at least accountability, for the enforced
disappearance…for purposes of imposing the appropriate
remedies to address the disappearance…
Tagitis defines what constitutes “responsibility” and
“accountability,” viz.: x x x. Responsibility refers to the
extent the actors have been established by substantial
evidence to have participated in whatever way, by action
or omission, in an enforced disappearance, as a measure of
the remedies this Court shall craft, among them, the
directive to file the appropriate criminal and civil cases
against the responsible parties in the proper courts.
Accountability, on the other hand, refers to the measure
of remedies that should be addressed to those who
exhibited involvement in the enforced disappearance
without bringing the level of their complicity to the level of
responsibility defined above; or who are imputed with
knowledge relating to the enforced disappearance and
who carry the burden of disclosure; or those who carry,
but have failed to discharge, the burden of extraordinary
diligence in the investigation of the enforced
Page 23
disappearance. In all these cases, the issuance of the Writ
of Amparo is justified by our primary goal of addressing
the disappearance, so that the life of the victim is
preserved and his liberty and security are restored.
Rubrico categorically denies the application of command
responsibility in amparo cases to determine criminal
liability. The Court maintains its adherence to this
pronouncement as far as amparo cases are concerned.
Rubrico, however, recognizes a preliminary yet limited
application of command responsibility in amparo cases to
instances of determining the responsible or accountable
individuals or entities that are duty-bound to abate any
transgression on the life, liberty or security of the
aggrieved party. If command responsibility were to be
invoked and applied to these proceedings, it should, at
most, be only to determine the author who, at the first
instance, is accountable for, and has the duty to address,
the disappearance and harassments complained of, so as to
enable the Court to devise remedial measures that may be
appropriate under the premises to protect rights covered
by the writ of amparo. As intimated earlier, however, the
determination should not be pursued to fix criminal
liability on respondents preparatory to criminal
prosecution, or as a prelude to administrative disciplinary
proceedings under existing administrative issuances, if
there be any. In other words, command responsibility may
be loosely applied in amparo cases in order to identify
those accountable individuals that have the power to
effectively implement whatever processes an amparo
court would issue. In such application, the amparo court
does not impute criminal responsibility but merely
pinpoint the superiors it considers to be in the best
position to protect the rights of the aggrieved party.
The legislature came up with Republic Act No. 9851 (RA
9851) to include command responsibility as a form of
criminal complicity in crimes against international
humanitarian law, genocide and other crimes. RA 9851 is
thus the substantive law that definitively imputes criminal
liability to those superiors who, despite their position, still
fail to take all necessary and reasonable measures within
their power to prevent or repress the commission of illegal
acts or to submit these matters to the competent
authorities for investigation and prosecution.
The Court finds that the appellate court erred when it did
not specifically name the respondents that it found to be
responsible for the abduction and continued detention of
Sherlyn, Karen and Merino. For, from the records, it
appears that the responsible and accountable individuals
are Lt. Col. Anotado, Lt. Mirabelle, Gen. Palparan, Lt. Col.
Boac, Arnel Enriquez and Donald Caigas. They should thus
be made to comply with the September 17, 2008 Decision
of the appellate court to IMMEDIATELY RELEASE Sherlyn,
Karen and Merino. The petitions against Generals Esperon,
Razon and Tolentino should be dismissed for lack of merit
APRIL LYNN L. URSAL LLB-4
REMEDIAL LAW REVIEW I (S.Y. 2015-2016)
UNIVERSITY OF CEBU – COLLEGE OF LAW
as there is no showing that they were even remotely
accountable and responsible for the abduction and
continued detention of Sherlyn, Karen and Merino.
Contrary to the ruling of the appellate court, there is no
need to file a motion for execution for an amparo or
habeas corpus decision. Since the right to life, liberty and
security of a person is at stake, the proceedings should not
be delayed and execution of any decision thereon must be
expedited as soon as possible since any form of delay, even
for a day, may jeopardize the very rights that these writs
seek to immediately protect.
The Solicitor General’s argument that the Rules of Court
supplement the Rule on the Writ of Amparo is misplaced.
The Rules of Court only find suppletory application in an
amparo proceeding if the Rules strengthen, rather than
weaken, the procedural efficacy of the writ. As it is, the
Rule dispenses with dilatory motions in view of the
urgency in securing the life, liberty or security of the
aggrieved party. Suffice it to state that a motion for
execution is inconsistent with the extraordinary and
expeditious remedy being offered by an amparo
proceeding.
The appellate court erred in ruling that its directive to
immediately release Sherlyn, Karen and Merino was not
automatically executory. For that would defeat the very
purpose of having summary proceedings in amparo
petitions. Summary proceedings, it bears emphasis, are
immediately executory without prejudice to further
appeals that may be taken therefrom.
13. G.R. No. 177130, June 7, 2011
HON. EDUARDO ERMITA in his official capacity as THE
EXECUTIVE SECRETARY vs. HON. JENNY LIND R.
ALDECOA-DELORINO, Presiding Judge, Branch 137,
Regional Trial Court, Makati City, ASSOCIATION OF
PETROCHEMICAL MANUFACTURERS OF THE
PHILIPPINES, representing JG Summit Petrochemical
Corporation, et al.
Holy Spirit Homeowners’ Association vs. Defensor, 497 SCRA
581 (2006), expounds on prohibition as a remedy to assail
executive issuances: A petition for prohibition is also not
the proper remedy to assail an IRR issued in the exercise of
a quasi-legislative function. Prohibition is an extraordinary
writ directed against any tribunal, corporation, board,
officer or person, whether exercising judicial, quasi-
judicial or ministerial functions, ordering said entity or
person to desist from further proceedings when said
proceedings are without or in excess of said entity’s or
person’s jurisdiction, or are accompanied with grave abuse
of discretion, and there is no appeal or any other plain,
speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of
law. Prohibition lies against judicial or ministerial
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functions, but not against legislative or quasi-legislative
functions.
Ordinarily, certiorari as a special civil action will not lie
unless a motion for reconsideration is first filed before the
respondent tribunal, to allow it an opportunity to correct
its assigned errors. This rule, however, is not without
exceptions.
The rule is, however, circumscribed by well-defined
exceptions, such as:
(a) Where the order is a patent nullity, as where the
court a quo had no jurisdiction;
(b) Where the questions raised in the certiorari
proceeding have been duly raised and passed
upon by the lower court, or are the same as those
raised and passed upon in the lower court;
(c) Where there is an urgent necessity for the
resolution of the question and any further delay
would prejudice the interests of the government
or of the petitioner or the subject matter of the
action is perishable;
(d) Where, under the circumstances, a motion for
reconsideration would be useless;
(e) Where petitioner was deprived of due process and
there is extreme urgency for relief;
(f) (f) where, in a criminal case, relief from an order
of arrest is urgent and the granting of such relief
by the trial court is improbable;
(g) Where the proceedings in the lower court are a
nullity for lack of due process;
(h) Where the proceedings were ex parte, or in which
the petitioner had no opportunity to object; and
(i) Where the issue raised is one purely of law or
where public interest is involved.
It is well to emphasize that the grant or denial of a writ of
preliminary injunction in a pending case rests on the
sound discretion of the court taking cognizance thereof. In
the present case, however, where it is the Government
which is being enjoined from implementing an issuance
which enjoys the presumption of validity, such discretion
must be exercised with utmost caution.
Indeed, a writ of preliminary injunction is issued precisely
to prevent threatened or continuous irremediable injury to
some of the parties before their claims can be thoroughly
studied or adjudicated—to preserve the status quo until
the merits of the case can be heard fully. Still, even if it is a
temporary and ancillary remedy, its issuance should not be
trifled with, and an applicant must convincingly show its
entitlement to the relief.
It is thus ineluctable that for it to be entitled to the writ,
the APMP must show that it has a clear and unmistakable
right that is violated and that there is an urgent necessity
for its issuance. That APMP had cause of action and the
APRIL LYNN L. URSAL LLB-4
REMEDIAL LAW REVIEW I (S.Y. 2015-2016)
UNIVERSITY OF CEBU – COLLEGE OF LAW
standing to interpose the action for prohibition did not
ipso facto call for the grant of injunctive relief in its favor
without it proving its entitlement thereto.
Contrary to public respondent’s ruling, APMP failed to
adduce any evidence to prove that it had a clear and
unmistakable right which was or would be violated by the
enforcement of E.O. 486. The filing of the petition at the
court a quo was anchored on APMP and its members’ fear
of loss or reduction of their income once E.O. 486 is
implemented and imported plastic and similar products
flood the domestic market due to reduced tariff rates. As
correctly posited by petitioner, APMP was seeking
protection over “future economic benefits” which, at best,
it had an inchoate right to. More importantly, tariff
protection is not a right, but a privilege granted by the
government and, therefore, APMP cannot claim redress for
alleged violation thereof.
Respecting the element of “irreparable injury,” the
landmark case of Social Security Commission vs. Bayona, 5
SCRA 126 (1962), teaches: Damages are irreparable within
the meaning of the rule relative to the issuance of
injunction where there is no standard by which their
amount can be measured with reasonable accuracy (Crouc
vs. Central Labor Council, 83 ALR, 193). “An irreparable
injury which a court of equity will enjoin includes that
degree of wrong of a repeated and continuing kind which
produce hurt, inconvenience, or damage that can be
estimated only by conjecture, and not by any accurate
standard of measurement” (Phipps vs. Rogue River Valley
Canal Co., 7 ALR, 741). An irreparable injury to authorize
an injunction consists of “a serious charge of, or is
destructive to, the property it affects, either physically or
in the character in which it has been held and enjoined, or
when the property has some peculiar quality or use, so
that its pecuniary value will not fairly recompense the
owner of the loss thereof.”
14. G.R. No. 167391, June 8, 2011
PHIL-VILLE DEVELOPMENT AND HOUSING
CORPORATION vs. MAXIMO BONIFACIO, CEFERINO R.
BONIFACIO, APOLONIO B. TAN, BENITA B. CAINA,
CRISPINA B. PASCUAL, ROSALIA B. DE GRACIA,
TERESITA S. DORONIA, CHRISTINA GOCO AND
ARSENIO C. BONIFACIO, in their capacity as the
surviving heirs of the late ELEUTERIA RIVERA VDA. DE
BONIFACIO
Quieting of title is a common law remedy for the removal
of any cloud upon, doubt, or uncertainty affecting title to
real property. Whenever there is a cloud on title to real
property or any interest in real property by reason of any
instrument, record, claim, encumbrance, or proceeding
that is apparently valid or effective, but is, in truth and in
fact, invalid, ineffective, voidable, or unenforceable, and
may be prejudicial to said title, an action may be brought
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to remove such cloud or to quiet the title. In such action,
the competent court is tasked to determine the respective
rights of the complainant and the other claimants, not only
to place things in their proper places, and make the
claimant, who has no rights to said immovable, respect and
not disturb the one so entitled, but also for the benefit of
both, so that whoever has the right will see every cloud of
doubt over the property dissipated, and he can thereafter
fearlessly introduce any desired improvements, as well as
use, and even abuse the property.
Significantly, an action to quiet title is characterized as a
proceeding quasi in rem. In an action quasi in rem, an
individual is named a defendant and the purpose of the
proceeding is to subject his interests to the obligation or
loan burdening the property. Actions quasi in rem deal
with the status, ownership or liability of a particular
property but which are intended to operate on these
questions only as between the particular parties to the
proceedings and not to ascertain or cut off the rights or
interests of all possible claimants. The judgment therein is
binding only upon the parties who joined in the action.
An action for declaratory relief presupposes that there
has been no actual breach of the instruments involved or
of the rights arising thereunder. Since the purpose of an
action for declaratory relief is to secure an authoritative
statement of the rights and obligations of the parties under
a statute, deed, or contract for their guidance in the
enforcement thereof, or compliance therewith, and not to
settle issues arising from an alleged breach thereof, it may
be entertained before the breach or violation of the statute,
deed or contract to which it refers. A petition for
declaratory relief gives a practical remedy for ending
controversies that have not reached the state where
another relief is immediately available; and supplies the
need for a form of action that will set controversies at rest
before they lead to a repudiation of obligations, an
invasion of rights, and a commission of wrongs.
In the present case, petitioner filed a complaint for
quieting of title after it was served a notice to vacate but
before it could be dispossessed of the subject properties.
Notably, the Court of Appeals, in CA-G.R. SP No. 43034, had
earlier set aside the Order which granted partial partition
in favor of Eleuteria Rivera and the Writ of Possession
issued pursuant thereto. And although petitioner’s
complaint is captioned as Quieting of Title and Damages,
all that petitioner prayed for, is for the court to uphold the
validity of its titles as against that of respondents’. This is
consistent with the nature of the relief in an action for
declaratory relief where the judgment in the case can be
carried into effect without requiring the parties to pay
damages or to perform any act. Thus, while petitioner was
not able to demonstrate that respondents’ TCT No. C-
314537 in the name of Eleuteria Rivera constitutes a cloud
over its title, it has nevertheless successfully established
APRIL LYNN L. URSAL LLB-4
REMEDIAL LAW REVIEW I (S.Y. 2015-2016)
UNIVERSITY OF CEBU – COLLEGE OF LAW
its ownership over the subject properties and the validity
of its titles which entitles it to declaratory relief.
15. G.R. No. 190710, June 6, 2011
JESSE U. LUCAS vs. JESUS S. LUCAS
Primarily, we emphasize that the assailed Orders of the
trial court were orders denying respondent’s motion to
dismiss the petition for illegitimate filiation. An order
denying a motion to dismiss is an interlocutory order
which neither terminates nor finally disposes of a case, as
it leaves something to be done by the court before the case
is finally decided on the merits. As such, the general rule is
that the denial of a motion to dismiss cannot be questioned
in a special civil action for certiorari, which is a remedy
designed to correct errors of jurisdiction and not errors of
judgment. Neither can a denial of a motion to dismiss be
the subject of an appeal unless and until a final judgment
or order is rendered. In a number of cases, the court has
granted the extraordinary remedy of certiorari on the
denial of the motion to dismiss but only when it has been
tainted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction. In the present case, we discern no
grave abuse of discretion on the part of the trial court in
denying the motion to dismiss.
An action in personam is lodged against a person based on
personal liability; an action in rem is directed against the
thing itself instead of the person; while an action quasi in
rem names a person as defendant, but its object is to
subject that person’s interest in a property to a
corresponding lien or obligation. A petition directed
against the “thing” itself or the res, which concerns the
status of a person, like a petition for adoption, annulment
of marriage, or correction of entries in the birth certificate,
is an action in rem. In an action in personam, jurisdiction
over the person of the defendant is necessary for the court
to validly try and decide the case. In a proceeding in rem or
quasi in rem, jurisdiction over the person of the defendant
is not a prerequisite to confer jurisdiction on the court,
provided that the latter has jurisdiction over the res.
Jurisdiction over the res is acquired either: (a) by the
seizure of the property under legal process, whereby it is
brought into actual custody of the law, or (b) as a result of
the institution of legal proceedings, in which the power of
the court is recognized and made effective.
The herein petition to establish illegitimate filiation is an
action in rem. By the simple filing of the petition to
establish illegitimate filiation before the RTC, which
undoubtedly had jurisdiction over the subject matter of
the petition, the latter thereby acquired jurisdiction over
the case. An in rem proceeding is validated essentially
through publication. Publication is notice to the whole
world that the proceeding has for its object to bar
indefinitely all who might be minded to make an objection
of any sort to the right sought to be established. Through
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publication, all interested parties are deemed notified of
the petition. If at all, service of summons or notice is made
to the defendant, it is not for the purpose of vesting the
court with jurisdiction, but merely for satisfying the due
process requirements. This is but proper in order to afford
the person concerned the opportunity to protect his
interest if he so chooses. Hence, failure to serve summons
will not deprive the court of its jurisdiction to try and
decide the case. In such a case, the lack of summons may
be excused where it is determined that the adverse party
had, in fact, the opportunity to file his opposition, as in this
case. We find that the due process requirement with
respect to respondent has been satisfied, considering that
he has participated in the proceedings in this case and he
has the opportunity to file his opposition to the petition to
establish filiation.
To address respondent’s contention that the petition
should have been adversarial in form, we further hold that
the herein petition to establish filiation was sufficient in
form. It was indeed adversarial in nature despite its
caption which lacked the name of a defendant, the failure
to implead respondent as defendant, and the non-service
of summons upon respondent. A proceeding is adversarial
where the party seeking relief has given legal warning to
the other party and afforded the latter an opportunity to
contest it. In this petition—classified as an action in rem—
the notice requirement for an adversarial proceeding was
likewise satisfied by the publication of the petition and the
giving of notice to the Solicitor General, as directed by the
trial court.
The petition to establish filiation is sufficient in substance.
It satisfies Section 1, Rule 8 of the Rules of Court, which
requires the complaint to contain a plain, concise, and
direct statement of the ultimate facts upon which the
plaintiff bases his claim. A fact is essential if it cannot be
stricken out without leaving the statement of the cause of
action inadequate.
A complaint states a cause of action when it contains
the following elements:
(1) The legal right of plaintiff,
(2) The correlative obligation of the defendant, and
(3) The act or omission of the defendant in violation
of said legal right.
16. G.R. No. 170575, June 8, 2011
Spouses MANUEL and FLORENTINA DEL ROSARIO vs.
GERRY ROXAS FOUNDATION, Inc.
“A judicial admission is one so made in pleadings filed or
in the progress of a trial as to dispense with the
introduction of evidence otherwise necessary to dispense
with some rules of practice necessary to be observed and
complied with.” Correspondingly, “facts alleged in the
complaint are deemed admissions of the plaintiff and
APRIL LYNN L. URSAL LLB-4
REMEDIAL LAW REVIEW I (S.Y. 2015-2016)
UNIVERSITY OF CEBU – COLLEGE OF LAW
binding upon him.” “The allegations, statements or
admissions contained in a pleading are conclusive as
against the pleader.”
“Stealth,’ on the other hand, is defined as any secret, sly,
or clandestine act to avoid discovery and to gain entrance
into or remain within residence of another without
permission,” while strategy connotes the employment of
machinations or artifices to gain possession of the subject
property. The CA found that based on the petitioners’
allegations in their complaint, “respondent’s entry on the
land of the petitioners was by stealth x x x.” However,
stealth as defined requires a clandestine character which is
not availing in the instant case as the entry of the
respondent into the property appears to be with the
knowledge of the petitioners as shown by petitioners’
allegation in their complaint that “[c]onsidering the
personalities behind the defendant foundation and
considering further that it is plaintiff’s nephew, then the
vice-mayor, and now the Mayor of the City of Roxas
Antonio A. del Rosario, although without any legal or
contractual right, who transacted with the foundation,
plaintiffs did not interfere with the activities of the
foundation using their property.” To this Court’s mind, this
allegation if true, also illustrates strategy.
17. G.R. No. 192649, June 22, 2011
HOME GUARANTY CORPORATION vs. R-II BUILDERS
INC. and NATIONAL HOUSING AUTHORITY
The record shows that, with the raffle of R-II Builders’
complaint before Branch 24 of the Manila RTC and said
court’s grant of the application for temporary restraining
order incorporated therein, HGC sought a preliminary
hearing of its affirmative defenses which included, among
other grounds, lack of jurisdiction and improper venue. It
appears that, at said preliminary hearing, it was
established that R-II Builders’ complaint did not involve an
intra-corporate dispute and that, even if it is, venue was
improperly laid since none of the parties maintained its
principal office in Manila. While it is true, therefore, that R-
II Builders had no hand in the raffling of the case, it cannot
be gainsaid that Branch 24 of the RTC Manila had no
jurisdiction over the case. Rather than ordering the
dismissal of the complaint, however, said court issued the
2 January 2008 order erroneously ordering the re-raffle of
the case. In Atwel vs. Concepcion Progressive Association,
Inc., 551 SCRA 272 (2008), and Reyes vs. Hon. Regional Trial
Court of Makati, Branch 142, 561 SCRA 593 (2008), which
involved SCCs trying and/or deciding cases which were
found to be civil in nature, this Court significantly ordered
the dismissal of the complaint for lack of jurisdiction
instead of simply directing the re-raffle of the case to
another branch.
Even then, the question of the Manila RTC’s jurisdiction
over the case is tied up with R-II Builder’s payment of the
Page 27
correct docket fees which should be paid in full upon the
filing of the pleading or other application which initiates
an action or proceeding. While it is, consequently, true that
jurisdiction, once acquired, cannot be easily ousted, it is
equally settled that a court acquires jurisdiction over a
case only upon the payment of the prescribed filing and
docket fees. Already implicit from the filing of the
complaint in the City of Manila where the realties
comprising the Asset Pool are located, the fact that the case
is a real action is evident from the allegations of R-II
Builders’ original Complaint, Amended and Supplemental
Complaint and Second Amended Complaint which not only
sought the nullification of the DAC in favor of HGC but,
more importantly, prayed for the transfer of possession of
and/or control of the properties in the Asset Pool. Its
current protestations to the contrary notwithstanding, no
less than R-II Builders in its opposition to HGC’s motion to
dismiss—admitted that the case is a real action as it affects
title to or possession of real property or an interest
therein. Having only paid docket fees corresponding to an
action where the subject matter is incapable of pecuniary
estimation, R-II Builders cannot expediently claim that
jurisdiction over the case had already attached.
In De Leon vs. Court of Appeals, 278 SCRA 94 (1998), this
Court had, of course, ruled that a case for rescission or
annulment of contract is not susceptible of pecuniary
estimation although it may eventually result in the
recovery of real property. Taking into consideration the
allegations and the nature of the relief sought in the
complaint in the subsequent case of Serrano vs. Delica, 465
SCRA 82 (2005), however, this Court determined the
existence of a real action and ordered the payment of the
appropriate docket fees for a complaint for cancellation of
sale which prayed for both permanent and preliminary
injunction aimed at the restoration of possession of the
land in litigation is a real action. In discounting the
apparent conflict in said rulings, the Court went on to rule
as follows in Ruby Shelter Builders and Realty Development
Corporation vs. Hon. Pablo C, Formaran, 578 SCRA 283
(2009), to wit: The Court x x x does not perceive a
contradiction between Serrano and the Spouses De Leon.
The Court calls attention to the following statement in
Spouses De Leon: “A review of the jurisprudence of this
Court indicates that in determining whether an action is
one the subject matter of which is not capable of pecuniary
estimation, this Court has adopted the criterion of first
ascertaining the nature of the principal action or remedy
sought.” Necessarily, the determination must be done on a
case-to-case basis, depending on the facts and
circumstances of each. What petitioner conveniently
ignores is that in Spouses De Leon, the action therein that
private respondents instituted before the RTC was “solely
for annulment or rescission” of the contract of sale over a
real property. There appeared to be no transfer of title or
possession to the adverse party x x x.
APRIL LYNN L. URSAL LLB-4
REMEDIAL LAW REVIEW I (S.Y. 2015-2016)
UNIVERSITY OF CEBU – COLLEGE OF LAW
In obvious evasion of said directive to pay the correct
docket fees, however, R-II Builders withdrew its Amended
and Supplemental Complaint and, in lieu thereof, filed its
Second Amended Complaint which, while deleting its
causes of action for accounting and conveyance of title to
and/or possession of the entire Asset Pool, nevertheless
prayed for its appointment as Receiver of the properties
comprising the same. In the landmark case of Manchester
Development Corporation vs. Court of Appeals, 149 SCRA
562 (1987), this Court ruled that jurisdiction over any case
is acquired only upon the payment of the prescribed
docket fee which is both mandatory and jurisdictional.
Although it is true that the Manchester Rule does not apply
despite insufficient filing fees when there is no intent to
defraud the government, R-II Builders’ evident bad faith
should clearly foreclose the relaxation of said rule.
18. G.R. No. 184253, July 6, 2011
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, through the
PHILIPPINE NAVY, represented by CAPT. RUFO R.
VILLANUEVA, substituted by CAPT. PANCRACIO O.
ALFONSO, and now by CAPT. BENEDICTO G. SANCEDA
PN vs. CPO MAGDALENO PERALTA PN (Ret.), CPO
ROMEO ESTALLO PN (Ret.), CPO ERNESTO RAQUION
PN (Ret.), MSGT SALVADOR RAGAS PM (Ret.), MSGT
DOMINGO MALACAT PM (Ret.), MSGT CONSTANTINO
CANONIGO PM (Ret.), and AMELIA MANGUBAT
Petitioner argues that a judicial action is not necessary to
evict respondents and intervenors from the leased military
quarters because their contracts of lease have long
expired. Petitioner adds that the contracts of lease
specifically authorized petitioner to extrajudicially take
over the possession of the leased military quarters after
the expiration of their contracts. Contractual stipulations
empowering the lessor to repossess the leased property
extrajudicially from a lessee whose lease has expired have
been held to be valid. Being the law between the parties,
they must be respected.
In Viray vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, 198 SCRA 786
(1991), we pointed out that there is considerable authority
in American law upholding the validity of stipulations
authorizing the use of “all necessary force” or “reasonable
force” in making re-entry upon the expiration of the lease.
We stated: Although the authorities are not in entire
accord, the better view seems to be, even in jurisdictions
adopting the view that the landlord cannot forcibly eject a
tenant who wrongfully holds without incurring civil
liability, that nevertheless, where a lease provides that if
the tenant holds over after the expiration of his term, the
landlord may enter and take possession of the premises,
using all necessary force to obtain the actual possession
thereof, and that such entry should not be regarded as
trespass, be sued for as such, or in any wise be considered
unlawful, the landlord may forcibly expel the tenant upon
the termination of the tenancy, using no more force than
Page 28
necessary, and will not be liable to the tenant therefor,
such a condition in a lease being valid.
Since respondents and intervenors agreed to abide by the
foregoing regulations of the military facility, judicial action
is no longer necessary to evict respondents and
intervenors from the military quarters. Respondents and
intervenors authorized petitioner to extrajudicially take
over the possession of the leased military housing quarters
after their retirement. This is also in line with the policy of
the Armed Forces of the Philippines and the Philippine
Navy to provide military quarters for the exclusive use of
military personnel who are in the active service.
19. G.R. No. 183711, July 5, 2011
EDITA T. BURGOS vs. PRESIDENT GLORIA
MACAPAGAL-ARROYO, GEN. HERMOGENES ESPERON,
JR., LT. GEN. ROMEO P. TOLENTINO, MAJ. GEN. JUANITO
GOMEZ, MAJ. GEN. DELFIN BANGIT, LT. COL. NOEL
CLEMENT, LT. COL. MELQUIADES FELICIANO,
DIRECTOR GENERAL OSCAR CALDERON
After reviewing the evidence in the present case, the CA
findings and our findings in our June 22, 2010 Resolution
heretofore mentioned, including the recent CHR findings
that Lt. Harry A. Baliaga, Jr., (Lt. Baliaga) of the 56th
Infantry Battalion, 7th Infantry Division, Philippine Army
is one of the abductors of Jonas, we resolve to hold in
abeyance our ruling on the merits in the Amparo aspect of
the present case and refer this case back to the CA in order
to allow Lt. Baliaga and the present Amparo respondents
to file their respective Comments on the CHR Report
within a non-extendible period of fifteen (15) days from
receipt of this Resolution. The CA shall continue with the
hearing of the Amparo petition in light of the evidence
previously submitted, the proceedings it already
conducted and the subsequent developments in this case,
particularly the CHR Report. Thereafter, the CA shall rule
on the merits of the Amparo petition. For this purpose, we
order that Lt. Baliaga be impleaded as a party to the
Amparo petition (CA-G.R. SP No. 00008-WA). This
directive to implead Lt. Baliaga is without prejudice to
similar directives we may issue with respect to others
whose identities and participation may be disclosed in
future investigations.
Section 16 of the Rule on the Writ of Amparo provides that
any person who otherwise disobeys or resists a lawful
process or order of the court may be punished for
contempt, viz.: SEC. 16. Contempt.—The court, justice or
judge may order the respondent who refuses to make a
return, or who makes a false return, or any person who
otherwise disobeys or resists a lawful process or order of
the court to be punished for contempt. The contemnor may
be imprisoned or imposed a fine. Acting on the CHR’s
recommendation and based on the above considerations,
we resolve to require General Roa of TJAG, AFP, and the
APRIL LYNN L. URSAL LLB-4
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UNIVERSITY OF CEBU – COLLEGE OF LAW
Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel, JI, AFP, at the time of
our June 22, 2010 Resolution, and then incumbent Chief of
Staff, AFP, to show cause and explain, within a non-
extendible period of fifteen (15) days from receipt of this
Resolution, why they should not be held in contempt of
this Court for defying our June 22, 2010 Resolution.
In light of the new evidence obtained by the CHR,
particularly the Cabintoy evidence that positively
identified Lt. Baliaga as one of the direct perpetrators in
the abduction of Jonas and in the interest of justice, we
resolve to set aside the CA’s dismissal of the habeas corpus
petition and issue anew the writ of habeas corpus
returnable to the Presiding Justice of the CA who shall
immediately refer the writ to the same CA division that
decided the habeas corpus petition (CA-GR SP No. 99839).
For this purpose, we also order that Lt. Baliaga be
impleaded as a party to the habeas corpus petition and
require him—together with the incumbent Chief of Staff,
AFP; the incumbent Commanding General, Philippine
Army; and the Commanding Officer of the 56th IB at the
time of the disappearance of Jonas, Lt. Col. Feliciano—to
produce the person of Jonas and to show cause why he
should not be released from detention.
In Montenegro vs. Montenegro, 431 SCRA 415 (2004), we
explained the types and nature of contempt, as follows:
Contempt of court involves the doing of an act, or the
failure to do an act, in such a manner as to create an affront
to the court and the sovereign dignity with which it is
clothed. It is defined as “disobedience to the court by
acting in opposition to its authority, justice and dignity.”
The power to punish contempt is inherent in all courts,
because it is essential to the preservation of order in
judicial proceedings, and to the enforcement of judgments,
orders and mandates of the courts; and, consequently, to
the due administration of justice. x x x Contempt, whether
direct or indirect, may be civil or criminal depending on
the nature and effect of the contemptuous act. Criminal
contempt is “conduct directed against the authority and
dignity of the court or a judge acting judicially; it is an act
obstructing the administration of justice which tends to
bring the court into disrepute or disrespect.” On the other
hand, civil contempt is the failure to do something ordered
to be done by a court or a judge for the benefit of the
opposing party therein and is therefore, an offense against
the party in whose behalf the violated order was made. If
the purpose is to punish, then it is criminal in nature; but if
to compensate, then it is civil. [emphasis supplied] We
agree with the CA that indirect contempt is the
appropriate characterization of the charge filed by the
petitioner against the respondents and that the charge is
criminal in nature. Evidently, the charge of filing a false
return constitutes improper conduct that serves no other
purpose but to mislead, impede and obstruct the
administration of justice by the Court. In People vs. Godoy,
243 SCRA 64 (1995), which the CA cited, we specifically
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held that under paragraph (d) of Section 3, Rule 71 of the
Rules of Court, any improper conduct tending, directly or
indirectly, to impede, obstruct or degrade the
administration of justice constitutes criminal contempt.
20. G.R. No. 168251, July 27, 2011
JESUS M. MONTEMAYOR vs. VICENTE D. MILLORA
At the outset, it should be stressed that the October 27,
1999 Decision of the RTC is already final and executory.
Hence, it can no longer be the subject of an appeal.
Consequently, Jesus is bound by the decision and can no
longer impugn the same. Indeed, well-settled is the rule
that a decision that has attained finality can no longer be
modified even if the modification is meant to correct
erroneous conclusions of fact or law.
To stress, the October 27, 1999 Decision of the RTC has
already attained finality. “Such definitive judgment is no
longer subject to change, revision, amendment or reversal.
Upon finality of the judgment, the Court loses its
jurisdiction to amend, modify or alter the same. Except for
correction of clerical errors or the making of nunc pro tunc
entries which cause no prejudice to any party, or where
the judgment is void, the judgment can neither be
amended nor altered after it has become final and
executory. This is the principle of immutability of final
judgment.”
A debt is liquidated when its existence and amount are
determined. It is not necessary that it be admitted by the
debtor. Nor is it necessary that the credit appear in a final
judgment in order that it can be considered as liquidated;
it is enough that its exact amount is known. And a debt is
considered liquidated, not only when it is expressed
already in definite figures which do not require
verification, but also when the determination of the exact
amount depends only on a simple arithmetical operation.
21. G.R. No. 155849, August 31, 2011
LORENZO SHIPPING CORPORATION, OCEANIC
CONTAINER LINES, INC., SOLID SHIPPING LINES
CORPORATION, SULPICIO LINES, INC., ET AL. vs.
DISTRIBUTION MANAGEMENT ASSOCIATION OF THE
PHILIPPINES, LORENZO CINCO, and CORA CURAY
Contempt of court is of two kinds, namely: direct
contempt, which is committed in the presence of or so near
the judge as to obstruct him in the administration of
justice; and constructive or indirect contempt, which
consists of willful disobedience of the lawful process or
order of the court.
The punishment for the first is generally summary and
immediate, and no process or evidence is necessary
because the act is committed in facie curiae. The inherent
power of courts to punish contempt of court committed in
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REMEDIAL LAW REVIEW I (S.Y. 2015-2016)
UNIVERSITY OF CEBU – COLLEGE OF LAW
the presence of the courts without further proof of facts
and without aid of a trial is not open to question,
considering that this power is essential to preserve their
authority and to prevent the administration of justice from
falling into disrepute; such summary conviction and
punishment accord with due process of law. There is
authority for the view, however, that an act, to constitute
direct contempt punishable by summary proceeding, need
not be committed in the immediate presence of the court,
if it tends to obstruct justice or to interfere with the
actions of the court in the courtroom itself. Also,
contemptuous acts committed out of the presence of the
court, if admitted by the contemnor in open court, may be
punished summarily as a direct contempt, although it is
advisable to proceed by requiring the person charged to
appear and show cause why he should not be punished
when the judge is without personal knowledge of the
misbehavior and is informed of it only by a confession of
the contemnor or by testimony under oath of other
persons. In contrast, the second usually requires
proceedings less summary than the first. The proceedings
for the punishment of the contumacious act committed
outside the personal knowledge of the judge generally
need the observance of all the elements of due process of
law, that is, notice, written charges, and an opportunity to
deny and to defend such charges before guilt is adjudged
and sentence imposed.
The word summary with respect to the punishment for
contempt refers not to the timing of the action with
reference to the offense but to the procedure that
dispenses with the formality, delay, and digression that
result from the issuance of process, service of complaint
and answer, holding hearings, taking evidence, listening to
arguments, awaiting briefs, submission of findings, and all
that goes with a conventional court trial.
The court may proceed upon its own knowledge of the
facts without further proof and without issue or trial in
any form to punish a contempt committed directly under
its eye or within its view. But there must be adequate facts
to support a summary order for contempt in the presence
of the court. The exercise of the summary power to
imprison for contempt is a delicate one and care is needed
to avoid arbitrary or oppressive conclusions. The reason
for the extraordinary power to punish criminal contempt
in summary proceedings is that the necessities of the
administration of justice require such summary dealing
with obstructions to it, being a mode of vindicating the
majesty of the law, in its active manifestation, against
obstruction and outrage.
Proceedings for contempt are sui generis, in nature
criminal, but may be resorted to in civil as well as criminal
actions, and independently of any action. They are of two
classes, the criminal or punitive, and the civil or remedial.
A criminal contempt consists in conduct that is directed
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against the authority and dignity of a court or of a judge
acting judicially, as in unlawfully assailing or discrediting
the authority and dignity of the court or judge, or in doing
a duly forbidden act. A civil contempt consists in the
failure to do something ordered to be done by a court or
judge in a civil case for the benefit of the opposing party
therein. It is at times difficult to determine whether the
proceedings are civil or criminal. In general, the character
of the contempt of whether it is criminal or civil is
determined by the nature of the contempt involved,
regardless of the cause in which the contempt arose, and
by the relief sought or dominant purpose. The proceedings
are to be regarded as criminal when the purpose is
primarily punishment, and civil when the purpose is
primarily compensatory or remedial. Where the dominant
purpose is to enforce compliance with an order of a court
for the benefit of a party in whose favor the order runs, the
contempt is civil; where the dominant purpose is to
vindicate the dignity and authority of the court, and to
protect the interests of the general public, the contempt is
criminal. Indeed, the criminal proceedings vindicate the
dignity of the courts, but the civil proceedings protect,
preserve, and enforce the rights of private parties and
compel obedience to orders, judgments and decrees made
to enforce such rights.
The test for criticizing a judge’s decision is, therefore,
whether or not the criticism is bona fide or done in good
faith, and does not spill over the walls of decency and
propriety. Viewed through the prism of the test, the Sea
Transport Update was not disrespectful, abusive, or
slanderous, and did not spill over the walls of decency and
propriety. Thereby, the respondents were not guilty of
indirect contempt of court. In this regard, then, we need to
remind that the power to punish for contempt of court is
exercised on the preservative and not on the vindictive
principle, and only occasionally should a court invoke its
inherent power in order to retain that respect without
which the administration of justice must falter or fail. As
judges we ought to exercise our power to punish contempt
judiciously and sparingly, with utmost restraint, and with
the end in view of utilizing the power for the correction
and preservation of the dignity of the Court, not for
retaliation or vindictiveness.
22. G.R. No. 159051, September 21, 2011
MAGLANA RICE AND CORN MILL, INC., and RAMON P.
DAO vs. ANNIE L. TAN and her husband MANUEL TAN
The issue is obviously a factual one because it requires the
ascertainment of which driver was negligent. As such, the
appeal fails, for a petition for review on certiorari,
pursuant to Section 1, Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, “shall
raise only questions of law, which must be distinctly set
forth.” A question, to be one of law, must not involve an
examination of the probative value of the evidence
presented by the litigants or any of them. Indeed, there is a
APRIL LYNN L. URSAL LLB-4
REMEDIAL LAW REVIEW I (S.Y. 2015-2016)
UNIVERSITY OF CEBU – COLLEGE OF LAW
question of law in a given case when the doubt or
difference arises as to what the law is on certain state of
facts; there is a question of fact when the doubt or
difference arises as to the truth or falsehood of alleged
facts.
Although the Court has recognized several exceptions
to the limitation of an appeal by certiorari to only
questions of law, including:
(a) When the findings are grounded entirely on
speculation, surmises or conjectures;
(b) When the inference made is manifestly mistaken,
absurd or impossible;
(c) When there is grave abuse of discretion;
(d) When the judgment is based on a
misapprehension of facts;
(e) When the findings of facts are conflicting;
(f) When in making its findings the court of appeals
went beyond the issues of the case, or its findings
are contrary to the admissions of both the
appellant and the appellee;
(g) When the findings are contrary to those of the
trial court;
(h) When the findings are conclusions without
citation of specific evidence on which they are
based;
(i) When the facts set forth in the petition as well as
in the petitioner’s main and reply briefs are not
disputed by the respondent;
(j) When the findings of fact are premised on the
supposed absence of evidence and contradicted
by the evidence on record; and
(k) When the court of appeals manifestly overlooked
certain relevant facts not disputed by the parties,
which, if properly considered, would justify a
different conclusion, this appeal does not come
under the exceptions.
A frivolous appeal is one where no error can be brought
before the appellate court, or whose result is obvious and
the arguments of error are totally bereft of merit, or which
is prosecuted in bad faith, or which is contrary to
established law and unsupported by a reasoned, colorable
argument for change. It is frivolous, too, when it does not
present any justiciable question, or is one so readily
recognizable as devoid of merit on the face of the record
that there is little, if any, prospect that it can succeed. A
losing party has no right to prosecute a frivolous appeal,
because he and his counsel are not relieved from the
obligation to demonstrate persuasively even when appeal
is a matter of right the substantial and reversible errors
committed during the trial.
Corpus Juris Secundum explains the concept of costs of suit
thusly: Costs are certain allowances authorized by statute
or court rule to reimburse the successful party for
expenses incurred in prosecuting or defending an action or
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special proceedings. They are in the nature of incidental
damages allowed to indemnify a party against the expense
of successfully asserting his rights in court. The theory on
which they are allowed to a plaintiff is that the default of
defendant made it necessary to sue him, and to a
defendant, that plaintiff sued him without cause.
23. G.R. No. 188072, October 19, 2011
EMERITA M. DE GUZMAN vs. ANTONIO M. TUMOLVA
There is no doubt that De Guzman incurred damages as a
result of the collapse of the perimeter fence. The
Contractor is clearly guilty of negligence and, therefore,
liable for the damages caused. x x x As the Court finds no
compelling reason to deviate from this factual finding by
the CIAC, as affirmed by the CA. It is settled that findings of
fact of quasi-judicial bodies, which have acquired expertise
because their jurisdiction is confined to specific matters,
are generally accorded not only respect, but also finality,
especially when affirmed by the CA. In particular, factual
findings of construction arbitrators are final and
conclusive and not reviewable by this Court on appeal.
CIAC’s award of actual damages, however, is indeed not
proper under the circumstances as there is no concrete
evidence to support the plea. In determining actual
damages, one cannot rely on mere assertions, speculations,
conjectures or guesswork, but must depend on competent
proof and on the best evidence obtainable regarding
specific facts that could afford some basis for measuring
compensatory or actual damages.
Nevertheless, De Guzman is indeed entitled to temperate
damages as provided under Article 2224 of the Civil Code
for the loss she suffered. When pecuniary loss has been
suffered but the amount cannot, from the nature of the
case, be proven with certainty, temperate damages may be
recovered. Temperate damages may be allowed in cases
where from the nature of the case, definite proof of
pecuniary loss cannot be adduced, although the court is
convinced that the aggrieved party suffered some
pecuniary loss. Undoubtedly, De Guzman suffered
pecuniary loss brought about by the collapse of the
perimeter fence by reason of the Contractor’s negligence
and failure to comply with the specifications. As she failed
to prove the exact amount of damage with certainty as
required by law, the CA was correct in awarding temperate
damages, in lieu of actual damages.
The award of moral damages must be anchored on a clear
showing that she actually experienced mental anguish,
besmirched reputation, sleepless nights, wounded feelings,
or similar injury. There could not have been a better
witness to this experience than De Guzman herself. Her
testimony, however, did not provide specific details of the
suffering she allegedly went through after the fence
collapsed while she was miles away in the United States.
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As the CA aptly observed, “the testimony of the OWNER as
to her worry for the safety of the children in the orphanage
is insufficient to establish entitlement thereto.” Since an
award of moral damages is predicated on a categorical
showing by the claimant that she actually experienced
emotional and mental sufferings, it must be disallowed
absent any evidence thereon.
24. G.R. No. 193479, October 19, 2011
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. BERNARD G. MIRTO
The duty to collect payments is imposed on accused-
appellant because of his position as Branch Manager.
Because of this employer-employee relationship, he cannot
be considered an agent of UCC and is not covered by the
Civil Code provisions on agency. Money received by an
employee in behalf of his or her employer is considered to
be only in the material possession of the employee.
25. G.R. No. 186050, December 13, 2011
ARTHUR BALAO, WINSTON BALAO, NONETTE BALAO,
JONILYN BALAO-STRUGAR and BEVERLY LONGID vs.
GLORIA MACAPAGAL-ARROYO, EDUARDO ERMITA,
GILBERTO TEODORO, RONALDO PUNO, NORBERTO
GONZALES, Gen. ALEXANDER YANO, Gen. JESUS
VERZOSA, Brig. Gen. REYNALDO MAPAGU, Lt. P/Dir.
EDGARDO DOROMAL, Maj. Gen. ISAGANI CACHUELA,
Commanding Officer of the AFP-ISU based in Baguio
City, PSS EUGENE MARTIN and several JOHN DOES
The Rule on the Writ of Amparo was promulgated on
October 24, 2007 amidst rising incidence of “extralegal
killings” and “enforced disappearances.” It was formulated
in the exercise of this Court’s expanded rule-making power
for the protection and enforcement of constitutional rights
enshrined in the 1987 Constitution, albeit limited to these
two situations. “Extralegal killings” refer to killings
committed without due process of law, i.e., without legal
safeguards or judicial proceedings. On the other hand,
“enforced disappearances” are attended by the following
characteristics: an arrest, detention, or abduction of a
person by a government official or organized groups or
private individuals acting with the direct or indirect
acquiescence of the government; the refusal of the State to
disclose the fate or whereabouts of the person concerned
or a refusal to acknowledge the deprivation of liberty
which places such person outside the protection of law.
We hold that such documented practice of targeting
activists in the military’s counter-insurgency program by
itself does not fulfill the evidentiary standard provided in
the Amparo Rule to establish an enforced disappearance.
In the case of Roxas vs. Macapagal-Arroyo, 630 SCRA 211
(2010), the Court noted that the similarity between the
circumstances attending a particular case of abduction
with those surrounding previous instances of enforced
disappearances does not, necessarily, carry sufficient
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weight to prove that the government orchestrated such
abduction. Accordingly, the trial court in this case cannot
simply infer government involvement in the abduction of
James from past similar incidents in which the victims also
worked or affiliated with the CPA and other left-leaning
groups.
Subsequently, we have clarified that the inapplicability of
the doctrine of command responsibility in an amparo
proceeding does not, by any measure, preclude impleading
military or police commanders on the ground that the
complained acts in the petition were committed with their
direct or indirect acquiescence. Commanders may
therefore be impleaded—not actually on the basis of
command responsibility—but rather on the ground of
their responsibility, or at least accountability.
In Razon, Jr. vs. Tagitis, 606 SCRA 598 (2009), the Court
defined responsibility and accountability as these terms
are applied to amparo proceedings, as follows: x x x
Responsibility refers to the extent the actors have been
established by substantial evidence to have participated in
whatever way, by action or omission, in an enforced
disappearance, as a measure of the remedies this Court
shall craft, among them, the directive to file the
appropriate criminal and civil cases against the
responsible parties in the proper courts. Accountability,
on the other hand, refers to the measure of remedies that
should be addressed to those who exhibited involvement
in the enforced disappearance without bringing the level of
their complicity to the level of responsibility defined
above; or who are imputed with knowledge relating to the
enforced disappearance and who carry the burden of
disclosure; or those who carry, but have failed to
discharge, the burden of extraordinary diligence in the
investigation of the enforced disappearance. x x x.
investigation of extra-judicial killings and enforced
disappearance cases.
As to the matter of dropping President Arroyo as party-
respondent, though not raised in the petitions, we hold
that the trial court clearly erred in holding that
presidential immunity cannot be properly invoked in an
amparo proceeding. As president, then President Arroyo
was enjoying immunity from suit when the petition for a
writ of amparo was filed. Moreover, the petition is bereft of
any allegation as to what specific presidential act or
omission violated or threatened to violate petitioners’
protected rights.
An inspection order is an interim relief designed to give
support or strengthen the claim of a petitioner in an
amparo petition, in order to aid the court before making a
decision. A basic requirement before an amparo court may
grant an inspection order is that the place to be inspected
is reasonably determinable from the allegations of the
party seeking the order. In this case, the issuance of
inspection order was properly denied since the petitioners
specified several military and police establishments based
merely on the allegation that the testimonies of victims
and witnesses in previous incidents of similar abductions
involving activists disclosed that those premises were used
as detention centers.

In view of the foregoing evidentiary gaps, respondents

clearly failed to discharge their burden of extraordinary
diligence in the investigation of James’s abduction. Such
ineffective investigation extant in the records of this case
prevents us from completely exonerating the respondents
from allegations of accountability for James’
disappearance. The reports submitted by the PNP Regional
Office, Task Force Balao and Baguio City Police Station do
not contain meaningful results or details on the depth and
extent of the investigation made. In Razon, Jr. vs. Tagitis,
606 SCRA 598 (2009), the Court observed that such reports
of top police officials indicating the personnel and units
they directed to investigate can never constitute
exhaustive and meaningful investigation, or equal detailed
investigative reports of the activities undertaken to search
for the victim. In the same case we stressed that the
standard of diligence required—the duty of public officials
and employees to observe extraordinary diligence—called
for extraordinary measures expected in the protection of
constitutional rights and in the consequent handling and

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