Bhattacharya - 2020 - More Studies On The Cārvāka - Lokāyata

More Studies on the
Cérvéka/Lokéyata
More Studies on the
Cérvéka/Lokéyata
By
Ramkrishna Bhattacharya
Cambridge
Scholars
Publishing
More Studies onthe Garvaka/Lokayata
By Ramkrishna Bhattachaxya
This book firstpublished 2020
C ambridge Scholars Publishing
Lady StephensonLibrary,Newcastle upon Tyne, NE6 2PA, UK
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Copyright© 2020 by Bamkrishna Bhattacharya
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ISBN (10):1—5275—4082—0
ISBN (13): 978-1-5275-4082-8
For
Dr Krishna Del Toso
A close friend, an excellent collaborator, and a fellow-traveller
Copyright © 1920. Cambridge Scholars Publishing. All rights reserved. May not be reproduced in any form without permission from the publisher, except fair uses
permitted under U.S. or applicable copyright law.
CONTENTS
Preface ....................................................................................................... ix
Abbreviations ............................................................................................ xi
Chapter One................................................................................................ 1
Relevance of the Katha Upanisad to the Study of Materialism in India
Chapter Two ............................................................................................. 24

From Proto-m aterialism to Materialism
Chapter Three ........................................................................................... 40

The Pre-Carvfikas and the Carvakas
Chapter Four ............................................................................................. 49

Who are the lokdyatika brc’rhmanas?
Chapter Five ............................................................................................. 65

Pre-Carvaka Materialism in the Vasudevahimdf
Chapter Six ............................................................................................... 70

Materialism in the Old Tamil Epics: The Manime'kalai and the Nz'lakeéi
Chapter Seven........................................................................................... 79
Lokc'ryata and lokc'zyatika in the Mlindqvafiha
Chapter Eight ............................................................................................. 84

Lokayata andIts Derivatives in the Sad-dharma-pundarfka-sfitm
Chapter Nine............................................................................................. 90
Pre-Cfirvika Materialism in the Jfibfili Episode in the Vfilmr'ki Ramayana
Chapter Ten ............................................................................................ 109

The CirvikafLokfiyata and Greek Materialism
viii Contents
Chapter Eleven ....................................................................................... 117

Materialism : East and West
Chapter Twelve ...................................................................................... 124

The Base Text of the Garvakas and Its Commentaries
Chapter Thirteen ..................................................................................... 139

The Carvaka/Lokayata: Classification of Source Materials
Chapter Fourteen .................................................................................... 144

Commentators on the Carvdkasfltm
Chapter Fifteen ....................................................................................... 156

What the Carvakas Originally Meant
Chapter Sixteen ...................................................................................... 171

The Social Outlook of the Carvfika/Lokayata
Chapter Seventeen.................................................................................. 176

Two Obscure Sanskrit Words Related to the Carvaka: paficagupta
and kundakita
Chapter Eighteen .................................................................................... 181

Verses Attributed to Brhaspati in the Sarvadarianasamgraha
Chapter Nineteen.................................................................................... 197

Brhaspati and the Bfirhaspatyas
Chapter Twenty
Carvaka Miscellany I .............................................................................. 223

Cérvaka Miscellany II ............................................................................ 229
Carvaka Miscellany III........................................................................... 241
Bibliography ........................................................................................... 251

PREFACE
The book is a sequel to my Studies on the Carvfika/Lokfiyata (Firenze 2009;

London 2011). It is gratifying for any author to find his book on the
materialist systems in India well-received. In this work, materialism in India
has been treated not merely as a doctrine but in various stages of its
development both in north and south India. The first book has succeeded in
invoking interest among Indologists and researchers in the history of ideas.
Explorations in Tibetan material, not available either in Sanskrit or in any
other language, have been started in right earnest by Dr Krishna Del Toso,
the dedicatee of this book. He has done some pioneering work in this area
and widened the scope of further research.
It has been my attempt to bring to notice two major them es: the first is
to disabuse all students of philosophy of the notion that there has been one
and only one variety of materialist thought in India; secondly, the Carvaka
fragments reveal that the two main charges brought against materialism —
unbridled hedonism and rejection of inference per se as a means of
knowledge — are without any foundation.
Three chapters have been devoted to the commentators on the base text
of the Carvakas. This has so far been an unexplored area. I hope new
discoveries in this field of study will be made in the foreseeable future.
Brhaspati is widely believed to be the founder of the materialist system

in India. A detailed study of the role of this legendary figure as found in
various sources relating to materialism, however, made it clear that the
association of Brhaspati with the Carvaka/Lokayata is an invention of the
opponents of materialism. So the name, Barhaspatya, as a synonym for the
Carvaka or Lokayata does not stand either to reason or to fact. The Carvakas
never called themselves Barhaspatyas.
I would like to thank all editors and publishers of the scholarly journals
in which most of these chapters first appeared in slightly different forms.
Thanks are due to Amitava Bhattacharyya, Sourav Basak and Siddhartha
Dutta for preparing the press copy and helping me in all possible ways. My
friends, Mrinalkanti Gangopadhyaya, Sanjit Kurnar Sadhukhan, Sunish
x Preface
Kumar Deb, and, last but not least, Tirthankar Mitra also deserve kudos for
their assistance. I am much beholden to A. Mahaljngam, Chennai, for
providing me with an interlinear translation of several passages from the
Tamil epics.
Ramkrishna Bhattacharya
3 Mohanlal Street
Kolkata 700 004
lokayata_rkb@yahoo.com
29th September 2019
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS
ABORI Annals of the Bhandarkar Oriental Research Institute

AC Hemacandl‘a. Abhidhanacintamani
A—D Jayantabhatta. Agamadambara
A—LVr Jfifinas’rTbhadIa. Awalankavataravrtti
AN Anguttara Nikaya
A5; Pinini. Aflo‘idhyc‘iyl'
A Y VD Hemacandra. Anya-yoga-vyavaccheda- dvatrms'ika
B] S Brahmaj filasutta
BORI The Bhandarkar Oriental Research Institute
BrhadUp Brhadaranyaka Upanisad
BS Brahmasfitra
ChaUp Chandogya Upanigad
C/L Carvc'ika/Lokc'wata
DBhPu Devibhc‘igavata P urc'ina
DN nha N ikaya
EPU Eighteen Principal Upanisads
Gite? Bhagavadgz‘ta
GrBh Cakradhara. Granthibhanga
H V H arivams’a
JM Aryaéfira. Jatakamala
KA Kautili'ya Arthaéc'istra
KauUp Kaugitala' Upanigad
KathaUp Katha Upanigad
KenaUp Kena Upanigad
KhKhKh Srihar$a Khandanakhandakhaaya
KS Vfitsyfiyana. Kamasfitra
LBS Lokfiyatikabréihmana Sutta
LOS Lokayatika Sutta
LS Lankfivatéra Sfitra
xii List of Abbreviations
LV Lalitavistara
MaiUp Maitm'yam'ya Upanigad
Manu Manusmrtz’
MatPu Matsya Parana
1141311 Mahabharata
MLBD Motilal Banarsidass
MN Majjhima N ikdya
.MP Mlindapafiha
W Nfigfirjuna. Madhyamakaffistra
NC Sriharsa. Naisadhacarita
NA/I Jayantabhatta. Nydyamafijan'
NS Nydyasfitm
PC Krsnamis'ra. Prabodhacandrodaya
PNTA Pramdnanayatatz‘valokfilamkc‘tm
PPM Padma Purc'ma
PTS Pali Text Society
Pu Purina
PV DhaImakTIti Pramdnavc'zrttika
PVSV’I Aviddhakama. Praména—vfirttika—svopajfia—vrtti—fikd
Ram Vélmikz‘ Ramayana
RT Kahlana. Rdja—tamflginf
RV Rgveda
SatBr Satapatha Brdhmana
SB Satapatha Brdhmana
SDPS Sad-dharma—pundarika—sfitm
SDS Siyana—Midhava. Sawadaréanasafigmha
SDSam Saddars’anasamuccaya
SK Sfimkhyakfirikfi
SKa Haribhadra, Samarfiicca Kahd
SKS Sfltrakrtéfigasfitm
S—M Siyana—Mfidhava.
SMS Sarvamatasamgraha
SN Samyutta N ikdya
SPhS Simififia—phala—sutta
SveUp Svetc‘zsvatara Upanigad
More Studies on the CarvakafLokayata xiii
SPM Mallisena. Syc'ldvc'zdamafijarz‘

S VR Vfididevasfiri. Syédvddamtndkam
TairtiBr Taittin'ya Brdhm ana
TaittiSam Taittin'ya Samhita'
TRD Gunarzflna. Tarkamhasyadtjvikc‘z
TS Sfintaraksita. Tattvasafigraha
TSP Kamalas’ila. Tattvasafigrahapafijikfi
TSPC Hemacandra. Trigagfi-s'alfikd-puruga-carita
UBhPK Siddhargi. Upamiti-bhava—prapaficé-katha":
Vasu. Sanghadésagani Vicaka. Vasudevahimdf
VDMPu Vignudharmottara Mahdpurdna
VPu Vishnu Purdna
Vyoma Vyomaéiva. Vyomavafi
YS Hemacandra, Yogaéc'lstra
YTC Somadevasfiri. Yas’astilakacampfi
YO V Yogavc'zsigg‘ha Ramayana
CHAPTER ONE
RELEVANCE OF THE KATHA UPANISAD

TO THE STUDY OF lVlATERIALISM IN INDIA
The genesis of materialism in India has so far been viewed from two
mutually exclusive points of view. Erich Frauwallner (1997, vol. 2, 216 et
seq) and those who follow his approach prefer to locate it in the Jain and
Buddhist canonical texts, particularly in ‘Paesi (rajafifia) suttanta’ (‘The
Discourse of Governor/King Paesi”) (Franco and Preisendanz 1998, 179;
Franco 2011, 634). Frauwallner has even claimed Paesi to be ‘the first
materialist” (1997, vol. 2, 216). This is a glaring example of mistaking
fiction for fact. There is no evidence of the existence of a king or a provincial
governor called Paesi who had conducted some experiments to find out the
nature of the soul. 1 From the Prakrit version of the Paesi legend and some
1 In a review article of Bollée’s translation of the Jain Paesi legend, Piotr

Balcerowicz (2005) has thoroughly dealt the issue. Although the names and hence
the characters in the narratives in the Buddhist canonical work (‘The Discourse of
King Payasi’) and the two Iain secular works [Rayapasenaijja (‘Dialogue of King
Prasenajit’) and Haribhadra’s Samaraiccakaha, SKa (The Story of Samarddz‘tyafl
vary widely, the original story must have been the same. G. Tucci observes: ‘The
analogies which the Payasisuttanta shows to have with the Jaina Rayapaseniya and
some passages of Samaraiccakaha cannot be explained as mutual borrowings, but
rather as various derivations from real doctrines followed in ancient times’ (Tucci
1925 in Carvdka/Lokdyata (C/L), 389. See also Tucci 1923/1971, 109 et seq.) This
‘parable ’ was presumably manufactured with the express view of discrediting those
who did not believe in the immortality of the soul. This task is accomplished by a
Buddhist monk in the Buddhist Payasi duologue, and by a Iain monk in the two Iain
versions of the story. The dialogue between the king and a Buddhist or a Jain monk
is a well-known and ofi-used narrative device encountered in many later works, such
as Aryasfira’s Jatakamala (The Garland of Birth Stories), Somadeva’s long poem
dealing with various religious and philosophical issues from the Jain point o f View
(Yasastilaka-campfi, YTC), and the Jain scholar Hemacandra’s Trisasri-§alaka-
Parusa-Carita, TSPC (Lives ofSixiy Three Eminent Persons). The same device is
found even earlier in Sanghadasagani (sixth/seventh century CE)’s Vasudevahimdz‘,
Vasu. (The Wanderings of Vasudeva). For details see Chap. Five below.
2 Chapter One
other sources, Frauwallner and others further claim that materialism was
bornin royal circles (Frauwallner 1997, vol. 2, 216, Franco and Preisendanz
1998, 179). However, when they refer to Ajita Kesakambala, another
materialist thinker mentioned in greater details in another Buddhist
canonical text, ‘Samafifiaphala-sutta’, SPhS (‘The Discourse on the Fruits
of Being a Monk’) they do not seem to notice that Ajita practised
renunciation and asceticism to the extreme and had nothing to do with any
royal court or any prince (R. Bhattacharya 2009/2011, 21-32). Thereafter
Frauwallner and others come down several centuries later, to the Comm on
Era and explore the doctrine of the Carvakas or Lokayatas.
The period separating Ajita, the itinerant prophet, and Purandara, author
of both a base text and an auto-comm entary of the Carvakas, is generally
glided over or rather treated as a dark period or a tempora incognita.
Apparently the Tamil epic Manime'kalai (composed sometime between the
fourth and the seventh century) is unknown to many scholars, although
some authors had already drawn the attention of scholars to the
philosophical content in that epic.2 Manime'kalai is the most valuable link
to trace the development of materialism after Ajita and before Purandara.3
However, the narrative both in Pali and Prakrit highlights only one
aspect of materialist thought, namely, denial of the existence of any
immortal soul, and hence, of the doctrine of kannan and its consequence,
namely, rebirth. Therefore, it is not justified to treat the Paesi legend as a
true exposition of the materialist doctrine as a whole. It can at bestbe called
an early instance of proto-materialist thought in India,4 comparable in
certain respects to the Katha Upam’sad (KathaUp), which seems to have
been commissioned to serve the same purpose, namely, to combat proto-
materialist thought, although kann an is conspicuous in its absence in the
first chapter, the original form of the text (the second chapter with its three
sections modelled on the first is palpably a later addition, as suggested by
Max Muller and supported by Whitney (see below).
2 In canto 27, Manimékalai, the heroine of this epic, visits the representatives o f
several philosophical or religious schools —10gician (Nyaya), éaivite, Brahmavadjn,
Vaisnava, Vedist, Ajivika, Jain, Samkhya, Vaisesika, and Bhfitavadin (materialist)
— andlisten to their doctrines. Several literal English translations and a very readable
abridged paraphrase of this epic are available (see Bibliography).
3Not only materialism, but Ajivika fatalism (m'yativaida) too is represented in a novel
manner (Basham 1981, 239).
4 Frauwallner (1997, vol. 2, 221) himself admits: ‘Materialism gains for it an
importance from the moment only when it emergedin the form of a regular doctrine
and took up arms against the remaining philosophical schools.’
Relevance of the Katha Upanisad to the Study of Materialism in India 3
The other approach of tracing the rise of materialism in India was

initiated by Hermann Jacobi. He described Uddilaka Arum, a philosopher
mentioned in the Chc‘mdogya Upanigad (ChfiUp), as a hylozoist, and hence
a proto-materialist, and compared him with Thales of Miletus, a Presocratic
philosopher.5 Walter Ruben, a student of Jacobi, made a study of the thought
of Uddalaka Arum.“ Following his lead Debiprasad Chattopadhyaya made
a detailed study of the two prose Upanisads, the Chc‘mdogya and the
Erhadc'imnyaka respectively, to fix the dates of both materialism and
idealism. Uddalaka Aruni and Yajfiavalkya appeared as two major
representatives of the two trends.7
This paper seeks to highlight the importance of a metrical Upanisad, the
Katha (composed before or around the sixth century BCE) as a philosophical
text, for it contains evidence of the genesis of materialism. It clearly shows
that the point of difference between idealism and materialism in India
originally centred round the issue of the existence or non-existence of the
Other World (paraloka), that is, concerning ontology; other issues,
epistemological, ethical, etc. followed thereafter. Buddhist and Jain
canonical works also corroborate the same conclusion. The study of this
Upanisad has not been altogether neglected, but the bearing it has on the
rise of materialism and its opponents’ strategy to combat it has not received
the attention it deserves. No comparison of this Upanisad with later
brahmanical works (such as the Rama-ryana, Ram and the Mahabharata,
Mbh) has beenproperly attempted. Hence the text of the KathaUp deserves
a new look.
I
If philosophical speculations (as opposed to theological debates) in India
started With the search for the first cause (fa atkémna, the cause of the
universe) recorded in Svetc‘zs’vatam Upanigad ( ve Up) 1.2, another question

too arose or perhaps had already arisen by the fifth century BCE: is death the
end of humans or is there something beyond? Speculations regarding the
first cause had gradually given rise to several mutually exclusive claimants,
namely, Time (kdla), Own Being (svabhc'wa), Destiny or Necessity (m‘yati),
Chance (yadrcchc't), (Four or Five) Elements (bhfitc'mi), and Self or God
(purusa). These six are merely mentioned in the .SlveUp; elaborate
5 Hermann Jacobi 1922,146; 1923, l l e t seq.

5 Ruben 1962, 345-54. It has been reprinted in Joachim Heidrich and others (eds)
2002, 261-70. See also Lars Gdhler 2002, 77-84.
7 D. Chattopadhyaya 1985, 164-227, 1990, 59-88, and 1991 vol. 2, 89-148, followed
Rubenin this respect.
4 Chapter One
explanations or the details of any of them are absent.8 The speculation about
death, however, led to only two definite and clear-cut conclusions: one set
of people believed and declared that there are two worlds, this world
(ihaloka) and the other world (paraloka); another set of people denied the
existence of the second.9 This is the starting point of the struggle between
idealism and materialism in India, for the assertion of the Other World
necessitates the admission of existence of the extra-corporeal soul, which is
immortal, while the denial of the Other World automatically implies
rejection of this concept of the soul. This is but an oblique expression of the
matter-consciousness debate, whether consciousness can or cannot exist
without the substratum, matter.
The doubt concerning the existence of the Other World can be traced
back right to the KathaUp — an Upanisad almost certainly designed to
promote belief in life beyond this life. Quite appropriately Yama (Death),
the lord of the world of the deceased (pretaloka), is chosen to be the
mouthpiece of the orthodox (Eastika) brahmanical view. The KathaUp has
been subjected to thorough examination and the issues involved (doubt,
scepticism, the world of the dead, etc.) have been discussed from various
angles (for a select bibliography, see S. Bhattacharya 2000). Nevertheless it
merits a fresh study.
A few words about the text of the Katha Up first. Even a cursory reading
reveals that the first redaction ended with the first chapter (adhyc'zya) divided
into three sections (vallr‘) (1.1-3); the additional chapter divided similarly
into three sections (apparently modelled on the first) which follows in the
text that has been traditionally handed down to us is almost certainly a later
addition, grafted to the story. The whole work may be described as a
duologue (samvada) between Yama and Naciketas. KathaUp 1.3.l6ab in
fact refers to it as ‘the episode of Naciketas, proclaimed by Death,
everlasting’ (nficiketam upfikhyfinam mrtyuproktam sanétanam. WH.
Whitney’s translation 1890, 104).
8 The verse is interpreted in another way too. Some take the word yoni in 1b as
another name for prakrti. The number of claimants then will go up to seven. I prefer
to follow the view of commentators like (pseudo-)0afikara, followed by Friedrich
Max Muller in his translation (Sacred Books of the East, SBE, vol. 15, 232). Many
later sources record these and other, newer claimants; one of the most significant is
the all-enveloping idea of karman. For a list of some of the later claimants, see R.
Bhattacharya (2001 and 2012 Appendix). The list is not claimed to be exhaustive.
9 Yajfiavalkya in Brhadfiranyaka Upam'sad(BrhadUp) 4. 3.9 speaks of a third abode,
the abode of dream, svapnasthfina, which lies in-between this abode and the next.
But that is an illusory world and need not detain us.
Friedrich Max Muller noticed all this but said: ‘We have no means,
however, of determining its (so. KathaUp ’s) original form, nor should even
be justified in maintaining that the first Adhyaya ever existed by itself, and
that the second was added at a much later time’ (1884 xxiii). Whitney was
more categorical: ‘These last two verses (sc. 1316-17) are such as one
should expect to find at the end of a treatise, and we have a right to suppose
that the Upanishad originally closed here, the rest being a later extension’
(1890, l 04).
Even the first chapter may not be free from interpolations. Muller had
‘little doubt” that 1.1.16-18 ‘are later additions” (1884 xxv) and attempted
to justify his view. Whitney endorsed it as a ‘very plausible suggestion”,
pointing out that ‘the last part of [verse] 18 is the same with 12d, above”
(s'okdtigo modate svargaloke) (1890, 96). Ludwig Alsdorf has rightly
observed: ‘Evidently its (so. KathaUp”s) popularity has caused it to suffer
particularly badly from the hands of interpolators and copyists” (1950, 622).
The intrinsic probability of these additions however cannot be proved due
to the lack of manuscript support. The phalas’mti (‘recital of benefits,” as
J.L. Brockington 1984, 189 renders it) stanzas (16-17) at the end of 1.3
certainly sound like the finale as such stanzas do in other, later works such
as the Puranas and even in vmtakathc‘zs in modern Indian languages. The
stanzas in the KajhaUp run as follows:
The episode of Naciketas, proclaimed by Death, everlasting, the wise man

that has spoken and heard is happy in the Brahma-world.
Whoever may repeat aloud in the assembly of Brahrnans this highest
mysterious [episode], or, with devotion (prayatna), at the time of an
ancestral sacrifice, he is fitted for endlessness. (104)
Two aspects of the phalas’ruti are worth noting. The effect, we are told,
is that both the narrator and the listener of the tale of Naciketas are sure to
reach the Brahmaloka, the world of Brahman (Brahmi). In the Yajurvedic
tradition, the sacrificer (yajamc'ma) had to perform a sacrifice called
Somayaga and pile up a five-layered tortoise (-shaped) fire altar, Karma
Citi, either rectilinear or circular, consisting of 1000 bricks, in order to gain
this world after death (Baudkdyana S'rmutasflrtm 20.9 = Baudhc‘wana
Sulbasfitm 9. 1). In the Upanisadic era, it seems, the goal could be achieved
without much hassle just by listening to the story when it was being recited.
Secondly, recital or even listening to this episode is also effective in the
s’rc'zddha (rites for the ancestors) ceremony. The association of the episode
with Yama seems to have given rise to the legend of this additional benefit.
Whatsoever, this is the normal and expected conclusion of a didactic
tale. But that is not all. The KathaUp is worth studying for other reasons
6 Chapter One
too. One of which is its importance as a document of the confrontation

between reason and credo (to borrow from the title of a book by Walter
Ruben published in 1979) that led to the rise of materialism in ancient India.
II
Philosophical idealism (as opposed to ‘idealism’ in common parlance,
meaning ‘the practice of forming or pursuing ideals, especially unrealistically’,
as given in the Concise Oxford English Dictionary, COED 2011), in the
Upanisads has generally been traced back to Yajfiavalkya (particularly as
he is represented in the BrhadUp). Yajfiavalkya opens the way for
subjective idealism: the doctrine of mayo? (illusion), preached vigorously by
Sankara and his Advaita-Vedantin followers can very well claim
Yajfiavalkya as their original guru.1° The adversary before Yajfiavalkyawas
common-sense realism which, according to him, induces humans to rely
rather naively on sense perception and induces them to admit the result of
such perception to be real. In order to combat these ‘mistaken’ notions
Yajfiavalkya tries to convince Janaka that things perceived in real life are
no more real than those seen in dreams.
Doubt concerning the existence of an object am enable to sense
perception can be easily resolved. Either one accepts what one sees, hears,
etc. as real or one agrees with Yajfiavalkya that the visible world is as unreal
as things seen in a dream. But what to do with such notions as that of the
immortality of the soul or self (airman), its other-worldly existence after the
death of a human, etc? It cannot be verified by sense perception. This is
where Yama andNaciketas come in. What their duologue contains exhibits
a purely Indian development of idealism insofar as it asserts redeath
(punarmrgzu).11 Redeath also implies rebirth (punarjanma), not once, but
over and over again.
10 D. Chattopadhyaya in his last days was engaged in preparing a Bangla monograph

(unfinished) called Bhdmte Bhdvavdda Pmsange (On Idealism in India), a sequel
to his Bhérare Vastuvrida Pmsange (On Materialism in India). No fewer than eight
unfinished drafts of the sequel have recently been printed in a posthumously
published work (2011, 58-82). Four such drafis open with a flee translation of
BrhadUp 4. 3.9-13 where Yajfiavalkya speaks o f man’s third world, the dream abode
(73, 74, 78, 79).
‘1 Punarmrtyu, according to Sayana, is ‘the death that follows after the present
inevitable death’ (Muller 1884, xxii H1). The word occurs in Taittirfya Brdhmana,
TaittiBr 3.1.8, BrhadUp 1.5.2 and Jaiminfiza Upanisad 3.35.7. See Tucci 1971, 51-
52, Halbfass 1992, 291-92.
In the KathaUp, we find Naciketas spelling out his doubt (vicikitsd,

1.1.20) which however is not his alone. What Yama teaches him with much
reluctance (after failing to dissuade him from knowing ‘the supreme secret’
unknown even to the gods) is directed towards discrediting the unbelievers
whose existence apparently posed a threat to the theological-cum-
philosophical climate of the country. The KathaUp provides a document
recording the conflict between those who believed in the existence of the
Other World and those who firmly refused to do so in the early Upanisadic
times (roughly between the seventh and the fourth century BCE), before the
advent of the Buddha and Mahavira. Sankaracarya (eighth century) in his
commentary on this Upanisad takes fling at the vile arguers, kutcirkz‘kas and
the heretics, pc’imndins who vitiate the mind of the people (gloss on 2.3.12).
He refers to the astitvavddins and nfistikavddins: the first admit that the self,
atman exists and the second think that there is no self which is the root of
the world, nastijagato mfilamc‘ztmc'v. This shows that the two worlds, a‘stika
(affirm ativist) and ndstika (negativist) owe their origin to the KathaUp
1.1.20. The affirmation and negation are relatedto the existence of the Other
World. Only in later times, these pair of words were employed to suggest a
believer in and a defiler of the Veda (as stated in the Manusmrti, Mann.
(Code of Mann), 2.11), a theist and an atheist (the meaning is current even
today in modern Indian languages), etc.12
Why is the existence of the Other World so important to the author/s of
the Katha Up? The answer is provided by Jayantabhatta more than a
millennium and a half after the redaction of the KathaUp: ‘The reply to (the
objections against the admission of God raised by) the Bfirhaspatyas
[materialists],’ he writes. ‘would simply be the establishment of the other-
world’ (Nydyamafijarz‘, Ml/I 1982-84 Ahnika 3, 275', trans. in C/L 156).13 In
other words, once the existence of the Other World is established, the
materialists’ objections to the existence of God, etc. are automatically
refuted. Unless the Other World is admitted, the whole ethical system
involving merit (dharma) and demerit (adharma), reward and punishment,
hope for heaven and fear of hell, in short, everything related to God and His
arrangements made for hum an destiny cannot be established. It was not so
‘2 For some other meanings see R. Bhattacharya 2009/2011, 227-31 and 2009, 49-
56.
13 Objection is raised by a putative opponent as to why the production of earth, water,
etc. is not being explained by perceptible causes alone, and what is the use of
admitting an imperceptible cause, an agent in the form of God. Jayanta asserts that
there is no harm in doing so, for those who admit the Other World also admit an
imperceptible cause in the form of adrsya karman (unseen karman, i.e., merit and
demerit) too.
8 Chapter One
much the question of the priority of matter or consciousness that divided

ancient Indian speculators into two distinct camps; the principal issue was
whether the self can or cannot exist without the body.14
It is not that the issue of the prioritization of matter or consciousness had
never been raised in ancient India. In BrhadUp 2.4.12 and again at 4.5.12
Yajfiavalkya tells his wife MaitreyT of the materialists’ view: ‘Arising out
of these elements [earth, air, fire, water, and space] into them also one (sc.
the self) vanishes away. After death there is no consciousness’ (Trans. R.E.
Hum e), etebhyah bhfitebhyal’t samutthc‘zya tdnyevc'mu vinasi’yati |na
prelymafija ’stfti. Generations of writers, both Vedists and Jains, have made
the materialists quote this passage (several instances are provided in
Bronkhorst 2007, 155—56, 321). Such an unexpected declaration quite
naturally confuses MaitreyT; so her husband has to explain his purpose by
saying: ‘Lo, verily, I speak not bewilderment (moha). Sufficient, lo, verily,
is this for understanding’ (BrhadUp 2.4.12-13=4.5.13-14). But even here
too the issue is: what happens to the soul after the death of a human.
Jayantabhatta makes an interlocutor object to his statement that all precepts
based upon the Veda are considered valid. The putative opponent cites
BrhadUp 2.4.13 and says that the precepts of the Lokayatikas and others
[meaning all sorts of materialists] too would be valid then. In his reply
Iayanta says: ‘The Lokayata doctrine is based only upon such statements as
represent the viewpoint of the opponent (pfirvapaksavacana). Thus, there
are subsequent Brahmana statements replying (to the previous ones).’He
then cites the reply of Yajfiavalkya (4.5.14): ‘Well I am not preaching
ignorance. The self is indeed indestructible. It only has a connection with
the senses, ete.’ (NM, Ahnika 3, 387-88; trans. in C/L 157).
In the BrhadUp the metaphysical question of what is real and what is
not was followed by another question, namely, whether consciousness can
have an existence of its own without the body to contain it, and if so, what
happens to every individual consciousness after the death of the body. It is

no wonder that the independent existence of the self apart from the body
would be sought to be ‘proved’ by the perceptible example of the stalk that
can be separated from the mufija grass (KathaUp 2.3.17), an example
(udc'zharana) which has a parallel in the S’atapatha Brfihmana, S’atBr
4.3.3.16. The Buddha also employs the same example in the
‘Mahasakuladayisutta’ to suggest that the body and the self are not identical:
‘ this is the mufija grass, this is the fibre, . . . this is the sword, this is the
14 While discussing the theses nos. 5 and 6, K.N. Jayatilleke identifies the first with
the materialist school in India that identified the soul with the body, and relates the
second to the doctrine referred to both the Sfltrahtéfigasfitm, SKIS and the KathaUp
(1963/1980, 243, 246-7. See also 99-100 and 131-32).
sheath,’ ayam mufijo, ayam isikfi, . . . yam asi, ayam kosi . . .

(Majjhimanikdya, MN, part 2, 27.3.19, 250).
Oddly enough, the same example also occurs inthe Jain canonical work,
SKS 2.1.16. There it is a materialist who throws the challenge:
As a man draws a fibre from a stock [stalk] o f Mufiga grass and shows it
(you, saying): “Friend, this is the stock [stalk] and that is the fibre,” and
takes abone out of the flesh, or the seed o f amalaka [Emblica Myrobalanos]
from the palm of his hand . . . so nobody can show you the self and the body
separately . . . those who believe that there is and exists no self, speak the
truth. Those who say that the self is different fiom the body, are wrong.
(Trans. H. Jacobi, SBE, vol. 45/2, 340-41)15
In the KajhaUp, however, there is no reference to any creator-god in

relation to either the self or the Other World. As the two other heretical
(non-Vedic) schools, Buddhism and Jainism, evince, god is not essential to
the belief in the Other World and rebirth. Nor is the belief in the existence
of heaven and hell directly related to any belief in god/s. The idea of the
imperishable self and its repeated return can always be traced to every
human’s actions, karman. Meritorious actions beget heaven: inestirnable
actions, hell. The functioning of karman is just; bothreward andpunishment
are meted out in exact proportion to every human’s action. The doctrine
itself eschews the possibility of any accident, yadrccha; a rigid as-you—sow—
so—you—reap kind of causality governs this office. 15
It is in the second (added) chapter of the KathaUp that the idea of ‘in
accordance with one’s karman’, yathdkarma is first mooted (2.2.7). 17 The
15According to Jayatilleke, ‘The use of this example signifies the practice of jhana
or yoga since it was said that “one should draw out (atman) from ones own body,
like an arrow-shaft from a reed”. . . . Now in this Upanisad the atman is claimed to
be seen by these yogis as distant from the body as a result of the practice of yoga,
against which the Materialists argued . . . that this could not be objectively
demonstrated” (1963/ 1980, 246-47). Jayatilleke however admits: ”This is a
somewhat different argument from the one stated in the Brahmajala Sutta but both
these schools seem to be very similar in their outlook’ (ibid.).
1‘5 Cf. ‘Don’t delude yourself into thinking God can be cheated: where a man sows,
there he reaps: if he sows in the field of self-indulgence he will get a harvest of
corruption out of it; if he sows in the field of the Self he will get fiom it a harvest of
eternal life.’ Galatians 6:7 (The Jerusalem Bible). The office of karman, however, is
autonomous, independent o f god/s or any other higher authority such as Time or
Own Nature.
17 The term yathdkarma occurs only thrice in the principal Upanisads. In Kausftakz'
Upanisad (KauUp) 1.2 it is used inthe same, technical sense (‘And according to his
deeds and according to his knowledge he is born again here as a worm or an insect
10 Chapter One
concept of the Other World too consequently (but not initially) led to the
concept of heaven and hell as found in many other ancient civilizations. But
in India the belief in the existence of two such actual places is also
accompanied by the idea of karrnan. The twin concepts of rebirth and
redeath are closely allied to karman; the denial of the Other World is not
only a mark of stupidity but also fraught with dire consequences, as Yama
tells Naciketas (KathaUp 1.2.5-6).
The word karm an, we find in the Upanisads, has already acquired a new
signification distinct from what it meant in the Vedic culture, viz. yajfia,
ritual sacrifice.18 This development is rarely to be met within non-Indian
traditions. The idea of the Other World is found in all cultures, as is its
denial. Such beliefs and their denials mark, among other things, the
emergence of two opposite philosophical approaches called idealism and
materialism respectively. Nevertheless the concept of the Other World did
not lead either to the concept of rebirth and/or the doctrine of karman in any
other culture so far known to us. Yet it is odd that Yajfiavalkya refuses to
discuss in public the question where humans go after their death. He offers
Artabhaga, the sage who raised this question, to have a private discussion
away from the ears of all (ErhadUp 3.2.13—3.3.1). Maurice Winternitz was
astonished by this extraordinary confidentiality: ‘ This great doctrine of deed
[karman], later (especially in Buddhism) preached in all streets and by-lanes
is in the Upanisads still a great mystery’ (1981, vol.1, 239). The phrase,
‘great mystery,’ perhaps unintentionally, echoesparam guhyam mKtaUp
1.3.17 (cf. alsoparamam guhyam in SveUp 6.22).
The same is the case with the question of the condition of humans after
their death in the KarhaUp. Here too we find a similar secrecy concerning
the answer to resolve the doubt that assailed young Naciketas about what
happens after the death of a human. Yama at first firmly refuses to say
anything about this asti—na'sti' problem. He tries to dissuade Naciketas first
by offering him a valuable gift of the knowledge of a Fire and naming it
or as a fish, . . . as something else in different places.” Max Mfiller’s translation,

SBE, vol. 15); in BrhadUp 1.5.21 however yathdkama refers merely to the
mundane fimctions or organs of work in general.
18 Karrnan has also been used in Kena Upam‘sad (KenaUp) 4.8 and in other
Upanisads in this sense. In fact, originally karman and each and every derivative
fiom the root kr, such as kartr, kcirjya, krt, kriyci, etc. are all related to yajfiic practice.
Cf. Mbh, crit. ed., 12224.73, 12230.21. See R. Bhatlacharya 2002, 153-163.
after him (Naeiketa) .19 Finding Naciketas still insisting on receiving answer
to his question Yama wams him:
Even by the gods o f old hath it been doubted as to this; for it is not easily to
be understood; subtle (Emu) is that subject (?dhanna). Choose another boon,
O Naciketas; do not trouble me; let me off from that. (1.1.21)
It is also to be noted that the doctrine of karm an20 is not at all mentioned
in the first chapter of the KathaUp: the only issue is the assertion of the
Other World. The question of reward and punishment received by the dead
according to virtue (punya) and sin (papa) has no room in any of the first
three sections. It is only in the second chapter (almost certainly a later
addition) that we hear of the indwelling self either entering the womb for
acquiring bodies or following the ‘motionless’, sthanu (such as trees, etc,
according to Sankara) in accordance with one’s action and inconformity
with one’s knowledge (KathaUp 2.2.7). The word used for the self, dehz'n,
‘that which dwells in the body,’ has been identified as ‘a later coinage dating
from Ka[_tha] and §ve[tas’vatara] (2.14 — 3.18)’ in an editorial note to Katha
5.7=2.2.7 (Eighteen Principal Upanisads, EPU 24). Otherwise the first
chapter is quite unconcerned with karman and pays more attention to
re death, a fate destined for those who deny the existence of the Other World.
Yama teaches him ‘what bricks, or how many, or how’ (ya isfakc'i yavati'r va
yathc'i va) (KathaUp 1.3.15) are to be piled.21 Yet Naciketas’ refusal to be
satisfied with the unsought—for gift of the know-how of piling a Fire altar,
agm' (even though it is to be named after him) and his insistence on learning
the secrets of what happens after death also reveal a gradual shift from ritual
(karma) to pure knowledge (jfic‘ma).
‘9 Whitney notes that the derivation of naciketa from naciketas is ‘not quite
satisfactory’ (1890, 90); the name of the Fire should have been naciketasa. In any
case, there is no ‘acceptable etymology for either word” (91).
20 For an account of the origin and development of the doctrine of karman, see
Wilhelm Halbfass 1992, 291 etseq. He points out:
Only the Carvakas and other ‘rnaterialists’ appear as rigorous critics of its
(sc. the doctrine of karman and samsdra) basic premises that the belief in a
continued existence beyond that, in cycles o f death and birth, in the
retributive, ethically committed causality of our actions. For the materialists,
as far as they are known to us from the reports and references o f their
opponents, death, that is, the dissolution of our physical body, is the end.
There is no inherent power of retribution attached to our deeds (1992, 293).
21 It is worth noting that the word istakd occurs only twice in the Upanisads: once in
KathaUp 1.3.15 and once in MaiUp 6.33.
12 Chapter One
This Fire along with its name, Naciketa, has already been mentioned in
the TaittiBr (3.11.8). Patafij a1i in his Mahabhdsya chap.1 (Paspas’fiha,
Calcutta ed. 98, Poona ed. 39) refers to a line from this passage: ‘He who
arranges the Naciketa Fire and he who knows how to do it (gains such and
such rewards),’ yo ’gm' nc'zciketamcinute ya u cainamevam veda (T aittiBr,
part 3, 1237). The sole concem of the story of Naciketas and Yama in the
TaittiBr was the Naeiketa Agni and nothing else. Patafijali explains that the
performance (of this altar, cayana) along with the knowledge becomes
fruitful.22 The rules for piling the Naeiketa Agni are also laid down in
Baudhdyana Smutasfirtm 19.6.23
Sukumari Bhattacharji sums up the situation thus:
From the text it would seem that the fire was already called by his (so.
Naciketas’) name although Yarna expressly says that henceforth this fire
shall be named after Naciketas. However that may be, the mystic association
in the Taittirz’ya Brfihmana makes sense only in the perspective of this
episode in this Upanisad (sc. KathaUp). (vol. 2, 1986, 76)
III
The KathaUp nevertheless keeps a balance between sacrifice (yajfia) and
knowledge (jfic‘ma). In the fs’c‘z Upanisad (féc'iUp) there is an attempt to
combine both sacrifice and knowledge although Sankara in his comments
on féaUp, verse 2, claimed that the contradiction between the two is ‘as
unshakable as the mountain,’ parvatavad akampyam i.e., there can be no
22 For two translations of this section of the TaittiBr, see Mfiller (SBE, vol.15, xxi-
xxii) and Whitney (1890, 89-90) respectively. The time gap between the Taittirfya
Samhitd (TaittiSam) and the TaittiBr on the one hand and that between TaittiBr and
the KathaUp on the other must have been considerable, for there is no mention, not
even the slightest hint, of metempsychosis in the TairtiSam (Keith 1967, clxxii) and
the TaittiBr, whereas it occupies a focal position in the discourse of Yarna in the
Kama Up.
23 The details of this citi for the Naciketa caycma are given in Kulkarni 1987, 155.
Interestingly enough, along with some golden bricks two naturally perforated
(qyamcltmncl) pebbles are also recommended. Such golden bricks are also
mentioned in the Mbh (Asvamedhika Parvan, critical edition (crit. ed.) 90.30,
vulgate (vul) 88.31). But in the Sulbasfitras all bricks (except the naturally
perforated ones) are made of clay and burnt in kilns. The number of bricks in the
Ndciketa Agni is also far less than the citis mentioned in the Srautasfitras, such as
the Hawk altar (Sivenacitz'), Trough altar (Dronacz'ti), etc.: only seventy seven, 75
(clay bricks)+2 (naturally perforated pebbles), as opposed to a thousand bricks in
five layers, 200x 5, in other citis.
reconciliation of the two. In the KathaUp knowledge is not upheld over

ritual; Yama voluntarily offers Naciketas the mystery of a Fire which is
‘hidden in a cave’, nihitam guhdydm (1.1.14), i.e., as secret as the
knowledge of the Other World.“
Yet one cannot but feel a strong undercurrent of conflict between
knowledge and sacrificial rites in the KathaUp. The superiority of s’reya (lit.
more preferable; Olivelle 1998 renders it as ‘good’) over preya (lit. more
delectable; in Olivelle’s rendering ‘gratifying’) is asserted in no uncertain
terms in 1.2.1-3. Rammohun Roy, who was the first to translate the ‘Kuth-
opunishud of the Woor-Ved’ into both Bangla and Englishzseschewed all
euphemism and boldly rendered the words as ‘knowledge’ and ‘rites’
respectively. Thus, the verse,
anyadcchreyo’anyadutaivapreyas-teubhenc‘infirthepurusamsinftab|
tayobsreyaadadanasyasadhubhavati—rhfyate’rtddyaupreyovmfte || (1.2.1)
is translated by Roy as follows:
Knowledge of God which leads to absorption, is one thing; and rites, which
have fruition for their object, another: each of these producing different
consequences, holds out to man inducements to follow it. The man, who o f
these two chooses knowledge, is blessed; and he who, for the sake of
reward, 2‘5 practises rites is excluded from the enjoyment of eternal beatitude.
(vol.2, 1995, 28)
Yama himself admits:

I know that fiuition, acquirable by means of rites, is perishable; for nothing
eternal can be obtained through perishable means. Nomithstanding my
conviction of the destructible nature of fluition, I performed the worship of
24 Cf. Mbh, vul. 3.313.117c: dharmasya tattvam nihitam guhayam. . . . The verse has
been found to be a later insertion, and accordingly rejectedin the constituted text of
the crit. ed. (see Appendix I. Additional Passage 32 line 67 therein). Whether or not
the interpolator had Katha Up 1.1.14 in mind, the intertextuality between the two
passages is obvious.
25 Muller acknowledges Roy’s contribution in SEE, vol.15 Introduction, xxi and
more elaborately in his Hibbert Lectures: ‘It (so. the KarhaUp) was first introduced
to the knowledge of European scholars by Ram Mohun Roy, one of the most
enlightened benefactors of his own country and, it may still turn out, one of the most
enlightened benefactors of mankind’ (1878/1901, 332)
26 In a note to the Preface to his ‘Translation of the Ishopanishad/ One of the chapters
of the Yajur-Ved’ Ramrnohun Roy said: ‘Whenever any comment, upon which the
sense of the original depends, is added to the original it will be found written in
Italics’ (vol.2, 1995, 41).
14 Chapter One
the sacred fire, whereby I became possessed of this sovereignty of long

duration. (1.2.10. Roy, vol.2, 1995, 29)
It is also worth noting that there is no mention of any kind of knowledge

excepting that of the Naciketa Fire in the TaittiBr, which is quite different
from the mysterious knowledge that is applauded in the Upanisads. The
anecdote in the KaghaUp is to be understood as adding a new dimension to
the oldrite. In a sense what follows Yam a’ s granting this unsought—for boon
to Naciketas suggests a negation of the ritual aspect and a transition to the
new glorification of knowledge so often emphasized in the Upanisads.27
Apparently the debate, already current among the thinkers concerning
what happens to a person after death, called forth the composition of the
KathaUp. The issue that brought a rift between the promoters of knowledge
as opposed to those of sacrifice is only one aspect of the antagonism
between the ritualists and the gnostics (promoters of knowledge). There is
another aspect: those who believed in the existence of the Other World and
those who did not. The Katha Up is primarily concemed with the second
aspect. No doubt it draws on the TaittiBr story, but the difference between
the two is quite apparent. The TaittiBr is not at all concemed with
knowledge whereas the focus of the KathaUp is the ‘secret knowledge”
about the lot of humans after their death. The Naciketa Fire itself is treated
as a sort of consolation prize freely offered to Naciketas in order to dissuade
him from enquiring about the resolution of the doubt that troubled his mind,
and apparently not his alone but of many others. Naciketas accepts the
knowledge of the Naciketa Fire but steadfastly refuses to give up his desire
27 Cf. what R. E. Hume says about this strange mystification of knowledge:

KNOWLEDGE — not “much learning,” but the understanding of

metaphysical truths, was the irnpelling motive of the thinkers of the
Upanishads. Because of the theoretical importance of the knowledge in that
period o f speculative activity, and also because of the discrediting of the
popular polytheistic religionby philosophical reasoning, there took place in
India during the times of the Upanishads a movement similar to that which
produces ethics and a substitution of philosophic insight for traditional
morality. Knowledge was the one object of supreme value, irresistible means
of obtaining one’s ends. This idea of the worth and efficacy of knowledge is
expressed again and again throughout the Upanishad not only in connection
with philosophical speculation, but also in the practical affairs of life. So
frequent are the statements describing the invulnerability and omnipotence
of him who is possessed of this magic formula, that yo evam veda,‘he who
knows this,’ becomes the most frequently recurring phase in all the
Upanishads (1921, 38-39).
to know the answer that would satisfy him. The reworking of the Taittz‘Br
story thus helps to kill two birds with one stone: on the one hand it upholds
knowledge over ritual, and, at the same time, denounces those who deny the
existence of the Other World.
On the basis of available evidence it may be stated that the struggle
between idealism and materialism in ancient India ensued around the
question of existence of the Other World. Other issues, particularly the
epistemological and metaphysical ones, followed in due course. Right from
the Jabali episode in the Rim (crit. ed., Book 2 (Ayodhyakanda) canto 100',
vul., canto 108) down to the verses found at the end of Sayana-Madhava (S—
M)'s Sarva—dars‘ana—samgmha, SDS (Compendium of All Philosophies),
chap. 1, the denial of the Other World and hence the futility of performing
s'rdddha (rites for the ancestors) occupy the centre stage. The KafhaUp in
this respect stands as a milestone. Yama is no less an important figure than
Yajfiavalkya in the history of the rise of idealism in Indian philosophy. He
is an c‘zpta, a truly knowledgeable person, not just a god, but a god of the
dead, Lord of the world beyond this human world, and best fitted for
sermonizing on the existence of the Other World.
IV
Prajfiakaragupta in his commentary on DharmakTrti’s Pramdnava‘rttika
(PV) writes: “‘There is no Other World, nor any world here, no proof of the
Other World, no doubt, no transformation of the great elements, etc.” [All
this is] cognition only,’ 'mz paroloko nehaloko na paralokavfidhanam <-
Sfidhanam> na samdeho na mahfibhfitaparinatir ityfidi’
vijfic‘z<a>ptim§trakam eva (57). With reference to the first part of this
statement containing double negation,28 Eli Franco says, no doubt
inadvertently, ‘This is an allusion to the famous Carvaka saying: “This is
the world, there is no other” (ayam lokahpamm [parole] nfisti)’ (1997', 112
n35). However, ayam loko parah misti is not met with in any Cowaka
flagment so far known to us (For a collection of such fragments see R
Bhattacharya 2009/ 2011, 78-86). Actually the statement alludes to KathaUp
1.2.6:
28 It has been shown that the denial o f the existence of boththis world and the Other
World (as found in the SPhS, Dighanikfiya, DN (The Long Discourses, part 1,
2.4.21-23, 48-49) is just a turn of phrase signifying the loss of both pleasure
(abhyudawa) in this world and summum bonum (nihsreyasa) in the other. See R.
Bhattacharya 2009/2011, 49-50 andn24.
16 Chapter One
The transition does not show itself to the childish one, heedless, befooled
with the folly of wealth, thinking, ”this [is] the world; there is no other” —
again and again he comes under my control. (Emphasis added)
nasdmpardyahpmtibhdti bdlam pramdcfizantam vittamahen mfldham|

ayam loko nasti para itimc‘mz'punahpunar vas’am doadjzatemell
Yama assures the doubting Naciketas that a person holding such views
dies only to be reborn, to die again and again to be sent back to the earth; he
never attains emancipation (mukti, moksa) from the cycle of rebirth and
redeath.”
The sentence quoted from Prajfifikaragupta, however, is not derived
from the KathaUp. It simply echoes the words attributed to Ajita
Kesakambala in the Pali Buddhist canonical text, SPhS:
There is no (consequence to) aims-giving, sacrifice or oblation. A good or

bad action produces no result. This world does not exist; nor does the other
world. There is no mother, no father. There is no rebirth of beings after death.
(DN, part 1, 2.4.21-23. Ten Suttas, 83. Translation modified.)
natthi mahdrfija dinnam. natthi yittham. natthi hutam. natthi
sukatadukkatdnam kamménamphalam vipdko. natthi ayarn loko. natthi paro
loko. natthi mars. natthi pita. natthi sattd opapdtikci. (SPhS, DN, Part 1,
2.4.21-23; 48-49):
It should be noted that while introducing the doctrine of Kum Era

Kassapa in the ‘Payasiraj afifiasutta’ (DN) the opening words of this
discourse are quoted verbatim albeit in a different order: ‘There is no other-
world, there is no beings reborn other than from parents, there is no fruit of
deeds, well-done or ill done,’ natthiparo loko, natthi 5am? opapdtika‘, natthi
sukatadukkaténmn kamma'nam phalam vmdko (DN, part 2, 10.1.2, 236). In
some other Suttas too we find the same formula repeated (cg,
‘Apannakasutta’ MN, part 2, 1013-4, 78-79 and ‘Sandakasutta’ 114M part
2, 26.1.3, 213).
In fact, only this part of the proto-materialist doctrine is known and
referred to in the Tipitaka. Because of the total rejection of everything that
was considered sacred and beyond question, this doctrine was called “the
doctrine of annihilation’ ucchedavdda, as opposed to the brahmanical view
29 Whitney notes that the unworthy people do not go to hell, ‘(of which there is no
trace in the Hindu religion of this period), but to a repeated return to earthly
existence. Transmigration, then, is not the fate of all, but only o f the unworthy’
(1890, 92). It should, however, be noted that the heaven, svarga loka, with all its
splendour is mentioned in Katha 1.1.13 and in other Upanisads.
called ‘the doctrine of the eternal’ (sassatavada, Sanskrit (Skt.)

s’ds'vatavdda) in the Buddhist texts.
In their commentaries on Nagarjuna’s Madhyamakaéfistm, MS; 18.5-7,
Nagarjuna (second/third century) in his auto-commentary, and
Buddhapalita (fifth century), Bhavaviveka (fifthfsixth century), and
Candrakirti (sixth/seventh century) in their commentaries similarly quote
the words of Ajita without naming him or mentioning their source (1988-
89, Part 2, 60, 63-64, 66).
The ‘mistaken person’ in the KathaUp, however, does not echo Ajita’s
words. The denial of the Other World in the KafhaUp is preceded by an
assertion of the existence of this world (ihaloka) while Ajita, although
meaning the same, uses two negations instead of one. (for further
explanation see R. Bhattacharya 2009/2011, 45-54).
What is more interesting to note is that the Mbh too quotes the formula
in Ajita’s way: ‘Neither does this world exist nor the other’ (na‘yam [aka ’stz‘
mtpara iti, crit. ed. Book 12 (Santiparvan, The Book of Tranquillity), crit.
ed. 131.13, vul. 133.14) and identifies the holder of such aview as a nastika,
one who says that it (sc. the Other World) does not exist. The formula occurs
again in Mbh, crit. ed. 12.146.18, vul. 150.13 presented once again in Ajita’s
way (the second part is in the form of a rhetorical question): ‘This (world)
does not exist, where is the next?’ ndyamastipamh kutalz. The verse further
introduces the messengers of Yama and the special region called The Abode
of Death @amaksaya) where non-believers in the Other World are punished.
The same formula, m‘ryamasti parah kutalz, is repeated in Mbh, crit. ed.
12.275.12, vul. 287.13.
Not that this is the only way that the formula is stated. Elsewhere (e.g.,
Ram, crit. ed. 2.100.16, vul. 2.108.17, Jabal'i to Rama) we find a single
negation: ‘Accept the idea once and for all, high-minded prince, that there
exists no world to com e,’ SCI nastiparamityetat kum buddhim maha‘mate, or
a single affirmation: ‘This indeed is the greatest world; enjoy your

happiness there,’ ayam eva para lokas farms-It tvam sukhabhc‘zg bhava (The
Ram, Bengali version, 116.37, crit. ed. Appendix I. 27 line19). However,
the use of double negation is most conspicuous in Gftc'z 4.40:
The ignorant one, who is devoid of faith, and whose self is in doubt is
destroyed. For the person whose self is in doubt there is happiness neither in
this (world) nor in the other (world).
ajfiascfismddadhénaéca saméayfitmfi vinasfyati |

néyam loka’sti na paro na sukham saméayaunanahn
18 Chapter One
The phrasing, ‘this world . . . the other’, in KajhaUp 1.2.6 (also in SPhS
2.4.21) is to be noted well. The KaghaUp speaks of vicikitsc': (1.1.20,21,29)
and the Gite-z, of sams‘aya (4.40), both meaning the same, that is, ‘doubt’,
samdeha (sandeha), as m entioned by Prajfiakaragupta (quoted above). Thus
the two traditions, brahm anical andBuddhist, one found inthe KathaUp and
the other in SPhS, seem to converge in this respect (i.e., asserting the
existence of the Other World) and that is how they appear in the Mbh and
the Gftc‘z.
So long as people believed in the veracity of myths and legends, there
could be no room for doubt conceming what happens to humans after their
death. But once there is doubt regarding the tales of heaven and hell, or the
transmigration of the soul, philosophy begins. Doubt is the chief factor that
opens up the way to both positive sciences and philosophy. The transition
from myth to philosophy can indeed be marked by the rise of doubt.
Vatsyayana in his commentary onNS 1.1.23 explains the third form of doubt
which is due to ‘contradictory statements about the same object’,
Vipr‘atipatti. By way of example he refers to assertions which are mutually
exclusive. Thus,
There is an assertion: the self exists. And there is the other: the self does not
exist (aszfyfitmetyekam dars‘anam ndswfitmezyapamm). The coexistence of
existence and non-existence is impossible in the same locus [Cf. Aristotle’s
law o f the excluded middle. R. Bhattacharya]. Nor is there any ground (for
the listeners o f the two theses) proving either of the alternatives. In such a
circumstance the failure of ascertaining truth takes the form of doubt
(MIinalkanti Gangopadhyaya’s translation 1982, 34).
Naciketas suffered from this kind of vzpmtzpatti'.

Both the Upanisadic and the Buddhist traditions, however, evince the
existence of some people, large or small in number, who quite openly
doubted, if not altogether denied, the belief in the Other World, that is, the
existence of the self after the death of the body. This in its turn signifies
belief (credo) in the existence of the allegedly imperishable self that can and
does survive after the death of a hum an, independent and irrespective of the
body, and on the other side the denial of such an idea. A special word had
already been coined for the non-believers, namely, nastika. We learn from
the Kits’iké by Vamana and Jayfiditya that it is the existence of the Other
World that is affirmed and denied by two sets of people (comments on
Panini’s Asjfidhyfiyz', As; 4.4.60). Those who affirm so are known as cistika;
those who deny, ndstika. This was the original meaning of the terms, dstika
and nastika. It is in this sense that the words atthikavdda and natthikavdda
are used in the ‘Apannakasutta’ (MN, part 2, 10.1.5, 79-80) and the
‘Sandakasutta’ (ibidem, part 2, 26.1.13, 213). (For some other meanings see
R. Bhattacharya 2009/2011, 227-31 and 2009, 49-56).
Although the word nastikya, like another such word avaidz’ka, occurs
only once in the principal Upanisads, and in the same text (MaiUp 3.5 and
7.10), there is little room for doubt that the words c‘zstikya and nastiIg/a owe
their origin to the KathaUp. It is also significant that there is a reference to
Naciketas in MaiUp 7.9 (vicbzc‘zbhfivsitam naciketasam).3° The KathaUp is
definitely older than Pariini’s A}; In any case, Panini would not have
mentioned the words, astika, nfistika, and daisfika (As; 4.4.60), unless they
were already current in speech.
V
Whitney, Who edited and translated the KafhaUp with so much care, felt
rather disappointed at the conclusion of the Upanisad. He said:
[T]he crowning weakness of the whole treatise (sc. KathaUp) is that after all
it reaches no definite result; the revelation of Death amounts to nothing at
all, so far as concerns the main Subject as to which knowledge is sought. The
revelator manages to waste a chapter in commendations o f his young friend
for preferring spiritual knowledge to earthly blessings; and then he maunders
on from topic to topic, dropping now and then an allusion to matters o f
eschatology, but entering into no exposition, advancing no argument,
making no definite statement; there is neither beginning, middle, nor end in
what he says. (Introduction, 1890, 91)
In fact, what the KarhaUp ultimately seeks to establish is the importance

of word, s’abda or verbal testimony as an independent instrument of
cognition. In no other way can the existence of the Other World be
established. And who could be a better authority, dpta, to speak of what

happens after death than the Lord of the dead himself? One has either to
believe in Yam a’s words regarding rebirth or reject it as a mere fabrication.
If one follows the second course, he or she is destined to suffer successive
rebirths till he or she accepts Yama’s words as true. And that is where the
KaghaUp ends. Credo is posited as superior to perception, and reasoning is
dismissed as of no consequence (‘This doctrine (mati) is not to be obtained
by reasoning,’ misc? tarkena matirc‘xpaneya, 1.2.9). The word, testimony
would prevail over all.
3° There are allusions to Katha Up 1.2.1-2 in this section of the MaiUp; some lines
from KathaUp 1.2.4-5 too are quoted with a few variants (EPU, 356).
20 Chapter One
Thus the importance of the KathaUp as a document embodying the

conflict between idealism and materialism should not be overlooked or
rem ain underemphasized.
Appendix A
Naciketas in the Mbh and other works
The first part of the same frame narrative as employed in the TaittiBr and
the KathaUp is repeated to introduce a didactic tale in the Mbh, Anus’asana
Parvan (crit. ed,13.70, vul. 13.71).We have the same father, the same son
(although no longer calledNaciketas as in the KathaUp but named after the
Fire, Naciketa), the same sacrifice (yajfia), and the same old and famished
cows that his father, Ve'tj asravas was offering in the sacrifice — a sight that
had painedNaciketas (1.1.3). The only difference is that instead of the Fire
of the Brahmana and the Srautasfitra, or the resolution of the doubt assailing
Naciketas in the Upanisad, the Mbh story provides an occasion for extolling
the excellent results following from the gift of cows, godfina. What a fall
from the highly secret truth about the Other World to the glorification of
gifting well-fed cows! The quality of the cows that Vaj as'ravas was offering
seems to have provided the composer of this episode in the Mbh with a
frame narrative to extol the virtue of the gift of cows (gods-um).31
A variation of the Yam a-Naciketas episode in the KaihaUp is found in
the Varfiha Purc'ma (chaps.193-212). The episode, however, addresses no
philosophical issues whatsoever. Uddalaka instead of Vijas’ravas (as in
KaihaUp) is the father of Naciketas here; there is no sacrifice or rite for the
ancestors. Instead of that, the hell with all its features is the focus of the
duologue and the duologue-within—the-duologue. There is, however, no
praise for the gift of cows and Naciketas is not made to say anything about
it.
Praise for the gift of cows is found elsewhere too (e.g., Harivams’a (H V),
vul. edition, As’caryaparvan, chap. 4', crit. ed. 2: Appendix I13, 797-98 lines
517-85). But Naciketas is not invoked there.
3‘ For some other references to cows in the Mbh see Sorensen 1978, s.v. Naciketa
(references are to the vul.) and C. Sen 2005, 79-80 (references are to the crit. ed).
Appendix B
A plot device misunderstood?
There is a tendency to consider Ianaka, Uddalaka, Yajfiavalkya and other

persons mentioned in the Vedic, Upanisadic and Puranic literature as
historical figures and to treat the stories in which they appear as genuine
records of what actually happened once upon a time. But a close look at, for
instance, Janaka and Yajfivalkya as they appear in the SatBr and the
BrhadUp will be enough to disabuse any reader of this notion. It will also
convince him or her that the introduction of such characters is a mere story-
telling device. Such devices are employed to make the content appear more
interesting and convincing.
In S‘atBr 11.6.2.5 we find that king Ianaka knows more than any priest
about Agnihotra, a ritual central to the Vedic culture. On the contrary, in the
BrhadUp 2.7, 4.1-3, etc., Yajfiavalkya is the preceptor and Janaka, merely
a learner. There is thus a reversal of roles between the Ksatriya (warrior)
ruler and the Brahmana (priest) seer.
At the same time it should not be overlooked that the shift from the
karmakfinda (ritual section) to the jfifinakfinda (knowledge section) is
almost complete in the major Upanisads. The elevation of Yajfiavalkya to
the position of a guru, however, does not necessarily mean the dominance
of the Brahmana over the Ksatriya. There are still kings like Ajatas’atru
before whom the good Brahmana Gargya has to submit in all humility
(BrhadUp 2.1, KanUp 4). Ajatas’atru may very well be a figure invented for
the purpose of projecting a Ksatriya who is better equipped than a Brahmana
even in the area of knowledge. But all of them are fictive characters, not real
ones. They are not at all characters who can be located and dated in some
definite space and time. They belong instead to the timeless world of myths
and legends. They have been invented as dram atis personae in the stories or
dialogues to serve a definite purpose. In any case, the conflict between
idealism and materialism should not be viewed as a reflection of the
relationship between the Ksatriya ruler and the Brahmana priest, for in m ost
of the Upanisadic stories both sides indulge in the same kind of fantasy and
speculation. In the ChfiUp we meet a peculiar character, Raikva, who,
thougha Brahmana, is always found with a cart, and hence called sdyugavc?
Raikva (4.1.5). Cf. also the story of Svetaketu, Pravahana Iaivali, and
Gautama in ChdUp 53-10. The rdjanyabandhu is much more cognizant of
abstruse theories than the Brahmana.
D. Chattopadhyaya has dealt with Ksatriya—Brahmana relations in the
Upanisads elaborately (1985 chap. 8, particularly 192-95). In response to
22 Chapter One
the question raised by AB. Keith as to ‘why the whole Upanisarlic tradition
is brahm anical and yet why texts record actions of importance as regards
the doctrine by the princes of earth,’ Chattopadhyaya says:
But that is exactly the point. The fact that the legends attributing the
philosophy to the princes and kings were left thus to stand proves that the
Brahrnins did not find it derogatory to their dignity. Subsisting as they did
on the royal donors, the Brahmins could not indeed find it so. . . .We thus find
the same philosophy being preached in the Upanisads by the king A j atasatru
and by the priest Yajfiavalkya, and the more king Janaka was thrilled by
Yajfiavalkya’s free flight into the idealistic fantasies, the higher went the
amount of the material wealth given to him (1985, 195).
Such an interpretation is of course factually sound. But one must think

of kings and priests in general, not of a historical Aj atasatru or ahistorical
Gautama in the Upanisadic legends. Well-known names were employed
merely to create an ambience of verisimilitude. (See also Chattopadhyaya
1991, vol.2, 89-90)
Hermann Jacobi pointed out as early as 1922:
After all, the discussions as we read them in the Brh. A}, are not to be taken
as historical records, but the whole disputation is an invention of the author
after the model of a similar disputation on ritualistic items in the gatapatha
Brahmana. Therefore the general ideas embodied in this part of the Brh. Ar.
also must be considered to belong to the common stock of ideas current
during the Upanishad Period. (1970 reprint, 770)
Jayatilleke hits the nail on the head when he points out that ‘the
teachings ascribed to [Yajfiavalkya] in different places in the Upanisads do
not seem to be of a piece, consistent with each other. . . . The probable
explanation for this is that several incompatible doctrines were put in the
mouth of an outstanding teacher” [like Yajfiavalkya] (1963/1980, 40).
What has been said above applies to the Itihasas (primary epics) like the
Ram and the Mbh (including the H V) and the Pure—mas as well. One should
not expect to get even a glimpse of the social, economic, and political life
in any part of India at anyparticular point of time from these works, because
of constant accretions (sometimes also deletions) made in the texts century
after century. This is why P.L. Vaidya, who was associated with preparing
crit. ed.s of Itihasas throughout his life (besides editing other works in
Buddhist Sanskrit and Prakrit) once declared: ‘I . . . stick to my view that
works like the Mahabharata and the Puranas belong to a class of popular
literature styled as Bardic Poetry, and if at all, they may have a very thin
reference to contemporary life.’ (D1110, HV 1969 vol. 1, 4. Emphasis

added).
The way some scholars (not to speak of the devotees of Brahmanism in
all its known manifestations) speak of the gods and kings and seers who
appear in the sacred books of Hinduism reminds me of what has been said
of 1.] . Bachofen (1815-87), author of Das Mutterecht (1851):
This new but absolutely correct interpretation of the Oresteia is one

of the best and most beautiful passages in the whole book. But it
shows at the same time that Bachofen himself believes in the
Erinyes, Apollo and Athena at least as much as Aeschylus did in his
day; he, in fact, believes that in the Heroic Age of Greece they
perform ed the miracle of overthrowing mother right and replacing it
by father right. Clearly such a conception — which regards religion
as the decisive lever in world history — must finally end in sheer
mysticism. (Engels, n.d. 15)
CHAPTER Two
FROM PROTO-MATERIALISM TO MATERIALISM
Introduction
The course of philosophy all over the world did not follow a single pattern.
Yet it is interesting to note how the sixth/fifth century BCE threw up several
socio-political ideas and philosophical doctrines, both materialist and
idealist, in faraway places, unrelated and alm ost unbeknown to one another.
D.D. Kosambi, the mathematician—tumed—Indologist, once observed:
The sixth century BC. produced the philosophy of Confucius in China and
the sweeping reform of Zoroaster in Iran. In the middle of the Gangetic basin
there were many entirely new teachers of whom the Buddha was only one,
not the most popular in his own day. The rival doctrines are known mostly
through biased reports in hostile religious documents. However, Jainism still
survives in India, and traces its origins to founders before the Buddha. The
Ajivikas are known from Mysore inscriptions who have survived as late as
the fourteenth century AD. . . . Obviously, the simultaneous rise of so many
sects of considerable appeal and prominence in one narrow region implies
some social need that older doctrines could not satisfy. (1972, 97-98.
Diacritical marks supplied.)
What Kosambi did not In ention is a similar phenomenon in the west: the
rise of a considerable number of drinkers in and around Athens, mostly in
the surrounding islands of Hellas (Greece). They are collectively known as
the Presocratics. Barring a few like Pythagoras and the like, most of these
thinkers were materialists, or rather proto-materialists of some sort.1 George
Thomson has described them as ‘primitive materialists’ (1955, 158).
1 \Nltile studying Hegel’s Lectures on the History of Philosophy, vol. 2 and other
philosophical works in a library in Bern, Switzerland, Vladimir Ilych Lenin was
thrilled to learn of the Presocratics, particularly of Democritus and Heraclitus. See
Lenin 1961 passim. He copied down in his notebook a fiagment from Heraclitus
(30 Diels) which runs as follows: ‘The world, an entity out of everything, was
created by none of the gods or men, but was, is and will be eternally living fire,
regularly becoming ignited and regularly becoming extinguished . . . ’. Lenin added
From Proto-materialism to Materialism 25
Prom-materialism in India: The Buddhist Tradition
The term, proto—materialism, is employed to suggest the first inklings of an

incipient philosophical doctrine when the link with mythology is already
snapped but any systematization with a distinct ontology, epistemology,
metaphysics, ethics, etc. is yet to be achieved. In the Indian context, Ajita
Kesakambala (Ajita of the hair blanket) has been called a proto-m aterialist
(Kosambi 1975, 164). He was out to deny whatever was there to be denied.
The exposition of his own philosophical views, as found in the SPhS (DN)
consists of a series of negations:
0 King, there is no (consequence to) alms-giving, sacrifice or oblation. A

good or bad action produces no result. This world does not exist, nor does
the other world. There is no mother, no father. There is no rebirth of beings
after death. . . . (Ten Sum: 1987, 83, translation slightly modified.)
Besides this discourse which speaks of Ajita and five more itinerant
preachers, there is the ‘Paesi (rajafifia) suttanta’ in the Pali Buddhist
tradition which reveals the first appearance of the denier or negativist
(nfistika). This word came to signify, whether in the brahmanical or the
Buddhist or the Jain circles, heretics of any sort (in religious terms) and
heterodox thinkers or disbelievers (in philosophical contexts). Payasi,
however, echoes Ajita in only one respect, namely, the denial of the post-
mortem existence of a human’s spirit or soul, and consequently of rebirth:
Neither is there any other-world, nor are there beings reborn otherwise than
from parents, nor is there fruit of deeds, well done or ill done (trans. T. W.
Rhys Davids, C/L 10).
He is not content with making a simple declaration of denial ex cathedm

as did Ajita Keskambala; he is made to claim the validity of his statement

by conscious observation and experimentation (following the joint method
of agreement and difference). Ajita and Payasi are the two proto-
materialists2 found in the Buddhist canonical texts. Their words are quoted
and re-quoted throughout the corpus of the Buddha’s discourses (for
his comment in appreciation: ‘ A very good exposition of the principles of dialectical

materialism’ (1961, 349). For another translation of the fragment see Freeman
(1952, 26).
2 Frauwallner has mentioned two more names, Pfirana Kassapa and Kakuda
Katyayana, in the list of early materialists (German text, 1956, Band II, 300-02;
English trans., 1997, vol. 2, 219-21) but his View has not met with general approval.
26 Chapter Two
instance, in the MN, part 2, see ‘Apannakasuttarn’ 10.1.3,4, 1958, 78-79;

‘Sandakasuttam’ 26.1.3.12—23, ibidem, 213).
Prom-materialism in India: The Brahmanical Tradition
As to the brahmanical tradition, Uddalaka Aruni of the ChdUp represents

another aspect of proto-materialism, namely, the primacy of the body over
consciousness. His name has been recently suggested as the first scientist in
the world (Chattopadhyaya 1991, vol. 2, 89-148), who, before Thales of
Miletus, had affirm ed the basic materialist idea by proving experimentally
(again following the joint method of agreement and difference) that
consciousness cannot operate in a starving body (this view later came to be
known as ‘the doctrine of matter and consciousness’ (bhiita-caitanya-vfida)
and ‘the doctrine of the body and the spirit (as one)’ (dehc‘ztmavc‘zda).
This is how Uddalaka Arum teaches his son, Svetaketu how mind
depends upon the body:
"A man, my son, consists of sixteen parts. Do not eat for fifteen days, but
drink water at will. Breath is made of water; so it will not be cut off if one
drinks." §vetaketu did not eat for fifteen days. Then he came back to his
father and said: ”What shall I recite, sir? " "The Rg verses, the Yajus
formulas, and the Saman chants." " Sir, I just can’t remember them," he
replied. And his father said to him: "It is like this, son. Out o f a huge fire
that one has built, if there is left only a single ember the size of a firefly — by
means o f that the fire thereafter would not burn all that much. Likewise, son,
you are left with only one of your sixteen parts; by means of that at present
you don't remember the Vedas. " "Eat, and then you will learn from me." He
ate and then came back to his father. And he answered everything that his
father asked. And the father said to him: "It is like this, son. Out o f a huge
fire that one has built, if there is lefi only a single ember the size of a firefly
and if one were to cover it with straw and set it ablaze — by means of that,
the fire thereafter wouldburn very much. Likewise, son, you were lefi with
only one of your sixteen parts, and when you covered it with food, it was set
ablaze — by means of that you now remember the Vedas, for the mind, son,
is made up of food', breath, of water; and speech, of heat.” And he did,
indeed, learn it from him. (ChfiUp 6.7.1-6. Trans. Olivelle 1998, 251)
The parallel rise of proto—materialism in Greece and India are of course

purely accidental. But the figures of Uddfilaka Arum on the one hand and
Heraclitus on the other present us with certain insights into the growth and
development of philosophical systems them selves. It will be rewarding to
trace the course of materialism in ancient India from this point of view.
Intellectual Turmoil and the Rise of Prom-materialism

It is evident from available sources, notwithstanding their fragmentary
nature, that materialism does not presuppose any special social basis
congenial to or necessary for its birth. On the contrary, it was presumably
an intellectual turm oil in the sixth century BCE which threw up both idealism
and materialism, as in India so in Greece (See Chattopadhyaya 1991, vol. 2,
35—46, 71-8 8). It was the SecondUrbanization andmore importantly the use
of iron that brought a maj or change in the thenIndian society particularly in
the north. We read of no fewer than sixty-two heritical doctrines in the Pali
Tipitaka, The Three Baskets (‘Brahmajala-sutta' (‘BJS”), DN) as also inthe
MaiUp (7.8-10).
Theodore Stcherbatsky had noted long ago:
In VI-V century B.C., at the time immediately preceding the rise of

Buddhism, India was seething with philosophic speculation. A great variety
of views and systems was springing up and actively propgated among the
differenent classes of its population. Materialistic doctrines, denying every
survival of the individual after death and every retribution for his moral or
immoral deeds were widely spread. (Stcherbatsky 1927/2003, part II, 2)
S. Radhakrishnan provides the socio-political backdrop against which

the intellectual turmoil took place, at first with special reference to the
Upanisads:
It is to be noted that while the Upanisad thought developed in the western

part of the Gangetic tract, the east was not so much assimilating it as
acquiring it. The western speculations were not admitted in the eastern
valley without debate or discussion.
There were also political crises which unsettled men’s minds. Among
the small states which were being then established there were pretty
dissentions. Outside invaders disturbed the peace of the country. Loud
complaints were heard about the degeneracy o f the age, the lust of princes
and the greed ofmen. (Radhakrishnan 1980, vol. 1, 276)
The socio—political turmoil led inevitably to further intellectual turmoil:
The contradictions of the time appeared in conflicting systems, each of them

representing one phase of the spirit of the age. It is necessary for us to
distinguish in this period three different strata of thought, which are both
chronologically and logically successive: (1) The systems of revolt, such as
the Carvaka theory, Jainism and Buddhism (600 BC); (2) The theistic
reconstruction of the Bhagavadgita and the later Upanisads (500 BC); and
(3) The speculative development of the six systems (300 BC), which attained
28 Chapter Two
definiteness about the end of AD. 200 or so. (Radhakrishnan 1980, vol. 1,
276).
Some dates require modification; ‘Ce'u'vaka’ in this context is to be
understood to mean the earliest form of materialism, as the name is often
used figuratively to suggest any form of materialism at any time. Otherwise
Radhkrishnan’s observations are essentially sound.
In the brahmanical tradition, a sceptic note apropos the origin of the
world had already been struck in a late Rgvedic verse, the so-called
‘Nasadiya Sfikta’ (10.129: ‘Then even nothingness was not, nor existence .
. .’).3 The KaflmUp clearly voices the persistence of doubt (vicikjtsd 1.1.20)
regarding the state of hum ans after their death: young Naciketas asks Yam a:
“This doubt that [there is] in regard to a man that is deported — ‘he is,’ say
some; and ‘this one is not,’ say some . . (Trans. D. Whitney 1890, 96).
A more detailed exposition of proto—m aterialism in this respect, namely,
the non-existence of the Other World, is met with in the Vailmz’ki Ram, Book
2 (Ayodhya-kanda) (crit. ed., canto 100; vul. canto 108). Jabali, a
thoroughgoing negativist, tries to persuade Rama that all post-mortem rites
are futile, for nothing of one’s ancestor remains after his death (2.100.1-17.
For details see R. Bhattacharya 2015). The primacy of the body over
consciousness is asserted in the other epic, the MM (Book 12, Santiparvan
crit. ed., canto 211.22—28).
These were the two issues, the problems of death and rebirth, and the
priority of matter or consciousness, that divided the proto-materialists and
the proto-idealists in India long before the Comm onEra. All other questions
relating to epistemology, metaphysics, ethics, etc. arose later, presumably
in the early centuries of the Common Era. The development of philosophy
on this line, centering not only round the Other World but on rebirth as well,
is somewhat unique in the philosophical scenario of ancient India.
The Question of the First Cause (jagat—kfiragza)

Another question, namely, how the world came into being, too, arose
simultaneously in India and Greece. If God was not to be admitted as the
creator of the universe, how did it come into being? The Presocratic thinkers
differed among themselves in determining which one of the four elements
(earth, air, fire and water) was to be called the first cause (Thales opted for
water, Heraclitus for fire, Anaxim enes for air, etc). Their counterparts in
India thought of all the elements as one unit (with or without the fifth, space
3 For a translation of the whole hymn see Basham 1954, 247-48, reproduced in
Eliad61979,110-111.
or void, dka'ia or vyoma, added to them) as a claimant to that title. There

were other ‘competing causalities’ (Halbfass 1992, 291) too. The jveUp 1.2
records, besides the ‘elements’(bh12tani), five more of such claim ants to the
title of the first cause: Time, Own-being (svabhc'tva), Destiny, Accident
(yadrtchc'i), the (Primeval) Person (purusa, meaning God or the Spirit). At
least two of the doctrines, those of Time and Own-being, have been
recognized as materialistic (Bedekar 1961 passim). In the course of time
many more claimants to the title of the cause of the universe arose, of which
karma was the most important one. (For further details see Bhattacharya
2001, 19-13).
However, the rise of such key concepts that comprise the materialist
doctrine/doctrines — insofar as they can be identified and isolated — are
significant pointers to the ongoing clash of ideas between several systems
or quasi-systems of philosophy at a given period of history. The appearance
of new ideas also reflects, as Kosambi noted (see above), the inevitable
decay or hibernation of at least some of the old doctrines. The history of
materialism too contains more than one period of such decay or hibernation
and reappearance both in Greece and India. There was apparently no
continuation of Ajita Kesakambala’s brand of all-denying materialism.
Here I find myself in disagreement with Kosambi’s opinion that ‘[t]he
Lokayata school . . . seems to have taken a great deal from this Ajita . . .’
(1972, 104). There is not an iota of evidence to support the view that the
Carvaka, the best known system of materialism, owed anything to Ajita,
whose name is never mentioned in the brahmanical works, and the Carvélca
belongs very much to the brahmanical tradition. In all probability the
Can/aka doctrine emerged in or around the eighth century CE de novo,
borrowing nothing from Ajita. Even the elementalism (bhfitavddoy and
Lokayata, two materialist systems mentioned in the Tamil epic,
Manime'kalai (see below), each having its own distinct set of doctrines, were
in some respects similar but not identical. The similarity between all these
doctrines of old (pre-Carvaka) materialism (before the eighth century CE)
and new (Carvaka) materialism (eighth century CE and after) (For details
see Chap. Three below) is only to be expected, for they all start from the
same negative premises of denial of current religious and idealist views. In
other words, they emerged as representatives of anti-fideist, anti-Spiritualist
and anti-idealist ways of thinking. However, the doctrinal aspects of these
two communities were not simply revived as they had been before in the
sixth century BCE, without any change. At every stage of reappearance,
materialism adopted a new garb, retaining something of the past doctrines
sublated (pace Hegel) in the new but also having some novel elements
added to the new incarnation.
30 Chapter Two
Inventory of Sources for Studying Materialism in India

What are the sources for studying the course of development from proto-
materialism to materialism proper? A philosophical system in India implies
the existence of a base (mafia) text comprising a number of aphorisms
(sfitras), and at least one commentary (also sub-commentaries, if any). Most
of the systems, not just the orthodox six (sad-darianam), conform to this.
The sources for the study of materialism in India are as follows:
1. Proto—m aterialism in the Upanisads — Uddalaka Amni in the ChaUp

(c. sixth century BCE).
2. Proto—m aterialism in Tipitaka and other Buddhist semi-canonical
works, generally called ‘the doctrine of annihilation’ (ucchedavada),
documented in the ‘Payfisi Sutta’ and the SPhS, both in the DN (fifth
century BCE).
3. Proto-materialism in the Jain canonical works such as The SKS (fifth
century BCE) and paracanonical texts (such as the Nandi‘ Sfitra),
variously called bhfitavada, tajji'va-taccharfravada, etc.
4. Proto-materialism in the two epics, the Ram (Book 2) and the Mk
(Book 12 in particular), redacted between the fourth century BCE and
the fourth century CE.
The second phase witnessed the birth of full-fledged materialist

doctrines. The development is recorded in the following works:
5. Materialisms in the Manimékalai (between the fourth century and

the seventh century CE) and the Vasu. (sixth/sev enth century).
6. Materialisms in the non-philosophical texts: Vatsyayana’s work on
erotics, the Ka'masatra, KS (sixth century CE), Banabhatta’s romance,
the Ka‘damban' (sixth century CE), Sriharsa’s Naisadhacarita (NC),

The Life of Naisadha (thirteenth century CE), a secondary epic etc.
Finally, a unified system emerged that came to be known as

Barhaspatya, Nastika, Lokayata, and the Carvaka. Right from the eighth
century CE these names and a few more (such as bhfita—caitanya—vada,
dehatmavada, etc.) came to be used interchangeably in the works of the
opponents of materialism. The last known stage, which superseded all
previous ones, offered:
’7. The base text of the Carvakas, the Paumndam—sfitra and (most
probably) its auto-commentary, the Paurandam-vgtti‘ (in or around
eighth century CE). Both survive only in fragments (for details see R.
Bhattacharya 2009/2011, 83, 90).
8. Commentary on some earlier base text by Kambalas'vatara, and other
commentaries, besides Puranadara’s own, on the Paumndam-sfltm by
Bhavivikta (known by name only), Aviddhakarna, and
Udbhatabhatta (from seventh to tenth century CE), available only in
f ragm ents.
9. Doxographical and quasi-doxographical works, from Sari-darsana-
Samucccwa, SDS'am (A Compendium of Six Philosophies) by
Haribhadra (eighth century), The Tattvasamgraho, TS (Collection of
Principles) by Santaraksita (eighth century), etc. down to the SDS by
S—M, and other digests, all composed between the eighth century and
the eighteenth century.4
Materialism then is not a doctrine or a set of doctrines that appeared in

the same garb in India and Greece. The question of rebirth, although found
in Plato (see Phaedo 71c, 1997, 62) and most prominently in Pythagoras,
was never a mainstream doctrine in Greek philosophy. Nor was it a part of
the Greco-Rom an religion. However, in the Indian context, materialism first
appears as a denial of the idea of after-birth (pamjanma). This had both
philosophical and religious implications. Not only the Vedists but also the
Buddhists and the Iains (to name only the major religious sects) were firm
believers in rebirth in one form or the other. It was a credo, an article of
faith, with all of them. Thus materialism had to contend with all religious as
well as philosophical sects and groups, both theists and atheists (chiefly the
Buddhists and the Iains, for instance). In other words, as a negativist
doctrine as found in the exposition of Ajita Kesakambala’s preaching, the
deniers of the Other World and of rebirth were the main object of criticism
41 have consciously omitted several Buddhist, Jain and brahrnanical philosophical

texts or commentaries thereon. They are mostly designed to refute, or rather
denigrate, materialism. The authors are not averse to misrepresent, and even distort
the materialist doctrine in course of their exposition of the opponent’s view
(technically known as pawn-poked). For instances, see Chap. Twelve below). The
same caution is to be taken in relation to the poems and plays that either fully or
partly are ‘philosophical’ in orientation, such as Krsnamisra’s allegorical play, the
Prabodhacandrodcgm, PC (Rise ofMoon—like Intellect), Haribhadra’s Prakiit narrative,
the SKa, Jayantabhatta’s closet play, Agama— gbmbara, AID (The Tocsin of the Sacred
Text) and Siddharsi’s Upamiti-bhava—prapaficn—kathi UBhPlc (An Allegorical Tale
of the World), etc. Their accounts can be accepted only to a certain extent, but not in
toto. With more than a pinch of salt, so to say.
32 Chapter Two
and even the target of attack at every stage of philosophical battles.5 The
same is true of the Prakrit words ndhz'yavddf and natthiyavdz' (nastikavddi' in
Sanskrit) in Vasu (169.17 and 175.13 respectively). In Jain works too
nastika in its various Prakrit forms is an umbrella term to designate all
materialists, accidentalists and non-believers in ‘true religion.’
Mataialist Ontology
The basic doctrines of materialism, particularly its epistemology, took time
to develop. The first point we come across is, as stated above, its ontology,
namely, its opposition to the concept of life after this life. It also implies the
denial of rebirth, and of the doctrine of karma (karma). Thus the idea of
reward and retribution in the form of attaining heaven or being consigned
to hell, in accordance with one’s deeds in this world (that is, during one’s
earthly existence), is also rejected. This is indeed something unique in the
history of world philosophy. Philosophers, whether in Greece or in other
lands, had always mulled over the origin of all phenomena as did some
Indian philosophers. There was no unanimity of opinion among them.
Several such contending views are recorded in S‘veUp 1.2. But what happens
after death, is a question that concerns belief in (a) the existence of an
extracorporeal soul, (b) heaven and hell as actual places, and (c) adrya as
also karmaphala (the results of one’s deeds). These three are closely
associated with religious beliefs, not necessarily theistic. Both MTmamsa
and Buddhism are atheistic, nevertheless their belief systems encompass the
third item. Materialism, by denying all three, strips off the mystique of
death, thereby making all these redundant. The materialist ontology hits at
the root of all religious beliefs. Post-mortem rites are considered to be a
mere waste of energy and resources, and branded as utterly irrational (cf.
Jfibfili’s speech in the Ram 2.100), which corresponds to the views of both
Payasi and Ajita Kesakambala in the DN).

The first instance of rebutting proto—materialism is met with in the
KathaUp (600 BCE). Presumably the composition of this Upanisad was
commissioned in order to stem the tide of scepticism concerning the
immortality of the spirit. Who else but Yama, like Hades/Plutos 1n Greco-
Roman mythology, the lord of the abode of the dead (yamc'ilaya), could be
5 To the Buddhist philosophers of the Common Era, materialism me ant the doctrine
of annihilation (ucchedavdda) as enunciated by Ajita (and Payasi), which denies the
Other World and rebirth. See the commentanes of Bhavaviveka, Nagarjuna (auto-
commentary), Buddhapalita and Candrakirti onNagarjuna’ sMS" 18.6- 7, vol. 2, 1989,
63- 64, 67. Lokayata lS mentioned separately 111 a different context (ibid. on 16.1,
1989, vol. 2, 3, 153), most probably in the sense of disputatio.
abetter choice to sermonize on the question of life after death? The structure
of the Upanisad suggests definite closure at the end of Book I', the ‘recital
of benefits’ (phalas’mti) stanzas (1.3.16-17) assure great merits to both the
reader and the listener of the work. The whole of BookIIhas the appearance
of being a later addition, although there is no manuscript support in favour
of this conjecture yet.6
New Meanings of fistika and nfistika

The story of king Vena in the Visnu-Dharmottam—Mahc'ipurc'ma, VDMPu
(1.108) highlights the materialists’ denial of the post-mortem existence of
any extra-corporal soul or spirit. Medhatithi glosses on the word nastika in
the book of religious law, Manu 4.30 and 11.65 as one who denies the other-
world (m‘uti paralokafz) by referring to a line: ‘There are no such things as
given (in sacrifices), oblations, rites. . .’ , which is taken from the VDMP
(1108.19).
However, in some other cases (as in his glosses on Menu 2.11 and
4.163), Medhatithi and other commentators explain the word nastiIg/a,
nastikahood, as disbelief in (the infallibility, hence the authority of) the
Veda, or refusal to admit the status of the Veda as the ultimate verbal
testimony, the word of words. Thus it is found that the old pair, c‘zstika and
nastika, acquires in the course of time a new set of meanings, viz., the
adherer to the Veda and the non-adherer. This turned out to be the widely
accepted meanings of the pair in brahm anical philosophical literature. In
common parlance, however, the words later came to suggest the theist and
the atheist. However, God, in the philosophies in India in general, never
occupied an important place, at least not so important as the Veda. Even
though in earlier literature (for example, in the Mai Up) avaidika (7.10) and
nfistikya (3.5) suggest the non-Vedic and the denier of the Other World
and/or of the Veda respectively, it is only in the brahmanical philosophical

literature of the Common Era that astika and nfistika came to signify
respectively the believer in and the defiler of the Veda, and nothing else (Cf.
Mann 2.11: nastiko veda—nindakab).7 In the writings of the Buddhists and
5 See Max Miiller 1884, xxiii', Whitney 1890, 104. Miilller however, observed: ‘1
have little doubt, for instance, that the three verses 16—18, in the first Valli of the
Katha—Upanishad are latter additions, but I should not therefore venture to remove
them’ (1884, xxv). Whitney endorses this observation as a ‘very plausible
suggestion,’ adducing further evidence: ‘The last pride [quarter verse] of 18 is the
same with 12d, above . . .’ (note on1.1.18, 1890, 96).
7 I am indebted to Professor Mrinal Kanti Gangopadhyaya for drawing my attention
to this matter. It should be noted in this connection that the Smrtis and Purénas
34 Chapter Two
the .Tains, however, the earlier meaning of na‘stika (that is, the denier of the
Other World) persisted, for denial of the authority of the Veda meant
nothing to them, they themselves being opposed to the doctrine of the
inerrancy of the Veda. The new meaning affected them in no way
whatsoever. This new sense of nastika in later times thus came to signify
the materialists (more particularly the Carvaka/Lokayata) as well as the
Buddhists and the Jams, for both of them were considered to be heretical
and heterodox by the brahm anical authorities. The label was employed to
mean all heterodox popular cults, the so-called pasandins, some of whom
are mentioned in the Mai Up 7. 8.
Devotion to the Veda
This devotion to the Veda (vedabhakti) is indeed something unique in the

world. The Christian’s reverence for the Bible, ‘the Book of Books,’ or the
Muslim’s deference to the Qu’rfin is hardly comparable to this fidelity.
Bankim Chandra Chattopadhyaya (Chatterjee), the well-known litterateur
of nineteenth-century Bengal, was a devout Hindu in his own way. After a
phase of atheism in his early years (roughly speaking, till the mid-1870s) he
took a turn to become a devotee of Krsna (however, he never joined any of
the numerous sects and sub-sects of the Bengal Vaisnava—s). Nevertheless,
as in his irreverent youth so in his devout old age, he refused to accept the
exalted position of the Veda (see B. Chattopadhyaya 1973, 278, 1060 et
seq). The status of this Holy Writ was above every other text or object,
including God him self. In fact, one could deny the existence of God in India
and go scot free, without suffering any punishment or social ostracism, but
the denial of the infallibility of the Veda was viewed as a cardinal sin (for
the view of the canonical law books concerning the nastikas, see Kane 1973,
vol. 4, 15-16, 33-34). Thus two philosophical schools, Mimfimsa and
Samkhya, that denied the existence of God/gods, were admitted as assenters

or affirmativists (astikas), for they accepted the supreme authority of the
Veda as much as such systems as Nyfiya—Vais’esika and Yoga. On the other
hand, the Carvfikas, along with the Buddhists and the Jains and other
popular religious cults (the so-called Little Tradition), stood condemned
because of their refusal to fall in the line relating the Veda.
This esteem for the Veda is another aspect of the Indian scenario that
distinguishes it from all other philosophical systems and schools of the rest
of the world.
mostly use the word mistika, rarely Carvaka or Lokayata; only their commentators
employ the latter names.
Two Pre-C firvfika materialist schools
The Tamil epic, Manimékalai composed by Sithalai Sattanfir, has already

been mentioned (see above). It is a highly valuable document for the study
of philosophical system 5 of India in general and of m aterialism in particular,
although it has rarely been utilized either at home or abroad. It may be due
to the fact that it is written in old Tamil, not in Sanskrit. There are, however,
several English translations (at least three are known to me. See References
below) that provide a fascinating account of the philosophical systems
current in South India during the early centuries of the Common Era. Exact
dating of the epic as yet is not possible. All that can be said is that it was
composed sometime between the fourth century and the seventh century CE.
During her wanderings Princess Manimékalai, the heroine of the epic,
comes to meet the teachers of several philosophical systems. They are:
Lokfiyata, Bauddha, Samldrya, Nyaya, Vaisesika, andMimanisfi (27.78-80).
All the names are evidently borrowed from Sanskrit with minor but easily
recognizable phonetic variations.8 Even without knowing Tamil one can
read the passage transliterated in roman script and identify the systems with
ease. The names of the masters (aciriyar in Tamil, ficfirya in Sanskrit) are
also mentioned: Brhaspati, Tina (Buddha), Kapila, Aksapada, Kanada, and
Jaimini respectively (2781-82). Here too all the names can be understood
from the Tamil text, except perhaps Brhaspati, who is called Pirekarpati
(See Appendix). Here for the first time we also read of the instruments of
cognition (pramdnas) admitted by these schools (27.83-85). Thus we are
here given a glimpse of a particular juncture when the proto—materialist and
proto-idealist ideas have been redacted into more or less organized systems
after the second/third century CE, each having a name to distinguish it from
others. The names mostly refer to the essence of the doctrines, not to the
founders or the redactors, although their names are not forgotten altogether.
More interesting is the fact that the Tamil epic speaks of not one, but
two materialist schools, namely, bhfitavc‘zda (pita vita in Tamil) and
Lokayata. Bhfitavc‘zda, which is an exact synonym for materialism in
Sanskrit, is not altogether unknown, as it occurs in later times. Silanka
(ninth century CE), the Jain commentator, mentions this name in his
8 Some technical terms, however, are in Tamil While others retain their original
Sanskrit forms. See Appendix. The Tamil text (available on the net) and the English
translations by Krishnaswamy Aiyangar, Alain Danielou (with the collaboration of
T.V. Gopala Iyer), and Prema Nandakumar are worth consulting.
36 Chapter Two
commentary on the SKS (see glosses on 1.1.7. 1978, 10-11, also ibidem: 19,
‘five-elementalists and others,’ pafica—bhfita—vdafizddayab)?
The name of the second school, Lokayata, is well-known as a namesake
of Carvaka, although in the Pali and Sanskrit Buddhist tradition, lokc'zyata
invariably stands for disputatio, the science and art of disputation, not a
philosophical system (see Bhattacharya 2009/11, 189, 195-96; Franco 2011,
632-33). Yet right from the sixth century CE, Lokayata also means
materialism in the brahm anical tradition, as found in the Kamasfitm (KS),
Kc‘zdambarz', etc. (see Chap. Four, 60nl7 and Chap. Nine below, 90).
This is how the bhfitavfidin in the Manimékalai expounds the materialist
doctrines he adheres to and also distinguishes his views from Lokayata:
When fig leaves are macerated with sugar and other substances fermentation
takes place. This phenomenon is similar to consciousness and sensation,
which develop when certain elements are put together. Then, when these
elements separate and return to their individual state, consciousness
gradually vanishes, like the resonance of a dnimthat little by little fades, and
dies away.
By combining together, the various categories of element in which
consciousness is present give birth to living being, while inert elements, on
combining together, produce the various forms of inanimate matter. These
two categories work independently as regards their formation, duration, and
disappearance. Each living being is animated by a consciousness to which
its components give rise at the very moment of its coming into existence.
Such is the natural course of things. The other aspects of our doctrine
concerning the tattvas [principles], the world’s constituent parts, which I
could expound, are identical to the concepts of the Lokayatas, the pure
materialists.
Of the means of proof, only direct perception (pratyaksha) is acceptable.
All other means of knowledge, including deduction (anumana), must be
rejected. There exists no reality other than the one we perceive in the present
and the enjoyments we derive from it.

It is absurd to believe in the existence of another life in which we would
gather the finits of our deeds in this one. Our existence as well as our joys
and sorrows terminate with our life. (1"rans. A. Danielou and T. V. Gopala
lyer 1993, 140).
Thus before the arrival of the new materialism of the Carvakas (in or
around the eighth century CE) we have at least two pre-Cérvakamaterialist
9 Rahula Sanlcrityayana, it may be recalled, translated the term ‘scientific

materialism’ as vmjfidnika bhautikavcida. It is the title of one of his Hindi works
written during his incarceration at Hazaribag Jail for taking part in the anti-
irnperialist movement. See Sankrityayana 1974.
schools with their own ontology and epistemology. The Manimékalai forms
the link between proto-materialism and old materialism on the one hand,
and also between old materialism and new materialism on the other.10 The
significance of the Tamil epic in this respect cannot be overemphasized,
although it is little known even in the Indologic al circles of North India, not
to speak of the western students of non-western philosophy.
The Appearance of the Cdrvdkas

It is from the eighth century CE that we first come to hear the name, Carvfika,
often used in the plural. Apparently, carvdkc'rlr, ‘the Cérvfikas,’ refer
collectively to a new group of materialists. They were also the last of the
materialists to appear in India. After the twelfth century or thereabouts, all
materialists, whether they were Carvfikas or pre-Cfirvfikas, appear to have
disappeared from the face of the earth. Yet as long as they were there, they
were considered to be the chief antagonists to be fought tooth and nail by
all idealists and fideists. Not only did the adherents of Nyaya-Vais’esika,
Vedanta, and Mimamsa but also the Buddhists and the Iains (branded by
the braham anical philosophers as negativists as much as the materialists for
their non-adherence to the Veda) took up their pens to combat the m aterialist
view. In the course of their polem ics they did not care to distinguish between
the Carvakas and the non-Carvaka or the Pre-Carvaka materialists (see
Chap. Twelve below). Right from the eighth century then the name Carvaka
became the generic name for all materialists, whether they were Carvakas
or not. While referring to the materialists who spoke of five elements instead
of four (which the Carvakas did and hence known as bhfita—catusraya-
vadins), Gunaratna (sixteenth century CE) calls them ‘some sections of the
Carvfikas’ (cdrvc‘zkaz‘kadeéz'ya, 1914, 300). Most probably he drew all his
views concerning the materialists, including the existence of five—
elementalists (bhfita-paficaka-vadins), side by side with the four-

elementalists, from Silfinka (see above). In the great philosophical debates
that raged in India from the eighth century to the twelfth century, the
comm on enemy of all philosophical systems, whether orthodox (Vedist) or
heterodox (anti-lnon—Vedist) was the Carvaka/lokayata. The seminal
contribution made by the Carvakas was the partial recognition of inference
1° The points of difference between the two have been discussed below in Chap. Three,
48-49.
38 Chapter Two
as an instrument of cognition. The Pre-Carvfikas were staunch upholders of

perception as the one and only instrument; all other instruments were
denied. The Carvakas, however, declared that inferences based on
perception and verifiable by perception was acceptable to them as well.
However, all inferential conclusions based on verbal testimony, such as the
Vedas, and concerning preternatural objects such as God, heaven and hell,
the omniscient person, etc, were denied by them since they follow from
non-perceptible sources. Purandara made this clear in so many words (qtd.
Kamalas’Tla 1981, 528) and Udbhatabhatta, another commentator on the
base work, made a sharp distinction between the ‘probanses well-
established in the world” and those ‘established in the scriptures” (qtd.
Vfidideva Sfiri 1988, 265). In some other aspects too, there were points of
difference between the Carvakas and the Pre-Carvakas (for a detailed study
see below Chap. Three, 48-49). Otherwise all the schools were by and large
unanimous.
Summing Up
To sum up: materialism in India developed in a way quite different from
that of its western counterpart. The basic difference lies in the general
background: rebirth was never a part of the ‘world picture’ (I borrow this
term from BMW Tilliyard (l 963)’s The Elizabethan World Picture) ofthe
ancient Greeks, whereas it was the very plank of all idealist systems and
religious bodies in India, not only of the brahmanical religious sects but also
of the heretical and heterodox Buddhist and Jain systems. Coupled with the
doctrine of karm an, it formed an essential part of the world picture inherited
from the religious texts of these three communities, right from the sixth
century BCE and continues to be held by the largest part of the Indian
population even today. This is why in India both proto-m aterialism and its
modified and fuller form, the Cfirvaka/Lokayata, took a shape quite distinct
from its Greek counterpart. In a different context P.V. Kane observed: ‘The
theory of karma and the theory of transmigration of souls (of pre-existence
and post-existence) are inextricably mixed up inIndian thought from at least
the ancient times of the Upanisads’ (vol. 4, 1973, 39). This also reveals how
the world of notions and beliefs held by a community continues to affect the
human mind even after the world of myths is no longer in operation.
Appendix
Margime‘kalai 27.78—82. Interlinear translation:
pfifikurum ulékdyatamépautram
Systematic Lokayatam Bauddham
cfizikiyam naiydyikam vaicéfikam

Sankhyam Nyfiyam Vaisesikam
mfmdficakam rim camaya dciriyar

Mirnamsém systems founders
tampimkagpati cigagé kapilag

Respectively Brhaspati Jina Kapila
akkapcitag kandtag caimz‘gz‘

Aksapatha Kanadan Jaimini
Literal Translation:
These are the systems that accept logic:

Lokayata, Buddhism, the Samkhya.
Nyaya, Vaiéesika and Mirnamsa.
The teachers o f these six: Brhaspati,
Buddha, Kapila and Aksapada,
Kanada and Jaimini.
(Trans. Prema Nandakumar 1989, 149. Diacritical marks added.)
CHAPTER THREE
THE PRE-CARVAKAS AND THE CARVAKAS
The existence of more than one materialist school before the Carva'ka
(eighth century) has been admitted by modem scholars.1 They have used
different nomenclatures to denote the pre-Carvfika and Carvika materialist
systems. I prefer to use simpler names, ‘old materialism’ and ‘new
materialism’.2 Unlike them, however, I do not propose to confine the Pre-
Cfirvfika materialists to the period before the Common Era. My contention
is that such schools appeared even in the CommonEra and they existed side
by side for a long time.
The radical departure made by the new materialists (the Carvakas) was
most apparent in the field of epistemology: even though the ontology of the
old and the new materialists was similar, the partial acceptance of inference
as a valid means of knowledge marked off the new materialists from the old
ones. The sfitm work most probably redacted by Purandara seems to have
retained the old form of the aphorism: nénumanampramdnam, inference is
not an instrument of valid cognition. Purandara and following him
Aviddhakarna and Udbhatabhatta took pains to assert that inference based
on perception is perfectly admissible but an inference on the basis of verbal
testimony or authority was not.3 If we do not want to appear uncharitable to
Hemacandra and others who continued to ridicule the Carvakas for not
1 Frauwallner speaks of the oldest Materialisfic doctrines of Purana Kasyapa, Ajita

lKeéakambalin and Kakuda Katyayana (1997, vol. 2, 219) andthe Lokayata system
(1997, vol. 2, 221) (which Frauwallner believes ‘arose in pre-Christian period’ and
one Carvaka was its founder). Franco and Preisendanz call them ‘Early Materialists’
and “the Classical Materialistic Philosophy’ (sixth century) (1998, 179).
2 Marx distinguishes between ‘old materialism’ and ‘new materialism’ in his tenth
thesis on Feurbach (Marx and Engels n. d., 72). Similarly, Engels in his study of
Ludwig Feurbach branded the whole of pre-Marxian materialism as ‘old
materialism’ (n. d., 255).
3 For details see Chaps. Thirteen, Fourteen, and Fifteen below.
The Pre-Carvakas and the Carvakas 41
admitting inference as such,4 we must say that their understanding of ‘new

materialism ’ was faulty; they failed or more probably refused to distinguish
between the old and new approaches.
To most of the people materialism (some prefer to call it naturalism or
physicalism) in India means the Carvaka or what came to be known as its
namesake, Lokayata. Both the words are often used figuratively for
m aterialism in general without, however, any ulterior m otive, but as a matter
of habit.5 The origin of the Carvaka/Lokayata materialist system is thus
traced back to hoary antiquity,6 at the least to the first millennium BCE.7
There is enough evidence to prove that the Carvaka/Lokayata was not
the only system of materialism in India. Even if we exclude the early
inklings of materialist thought lurking in the Rgveda (RV) and some of the
Upanisads, and in the teachings of Ajita Keskambala as found in the DN,
there are several indications of the existence of several pre-Cirvika
philosophical schools that were for all intents and purposes fundamentally
materialistic, although there were some differences of opinion among them
(stated in clear terms in the Tamil epic Manimékalaz' 27272-73, to which I
shall soon revert) as there were different interpretations of certain sfltms
among the Carvakas themselves.8
Yet the fact is that we do not come across the name of Carvaka. in the
field of philosophy before the eighth century? Three other words, nastika,
lokc'zyata and bc‘zrhaspatya, were already current to designate materialism
although the same words, particularly nastika and lokc'iyata, were also used
in other senses too.10 By the eighth century, however, all these words have
become interchangeable in signification and so used in the works of several
4 Cf. Anya-yoga—vyavaccheda-dvdtriméikfi (AYVD), verse 20; sfidvfidamafijarf

(SI/M), 129', Vacaspatimisra, Bhfimatz’, on Brahmasfitm (BS) 3.3.53 in:

Cfirvfika/Lokfiyata (C/L) 242-43.
5 Speaking of the adherents of a different school of materialists, Gunaratna called
them carvakaikadeéfizfih, some sections o f the Carvakas (300). Sadananda Yati
speaks of several Carvakas professing sthfilaéarz’rfitmavfida, Indrz’yfitmavdda,
prfindtmavdda, and fitmavfida, sections 124-27, 70-72. Phanibhushana Tarkavagisa
endorses this view (1982, vol. 3, 69). More recently Bronkhorst speaks of a
materialist Carvaka (not the demon) in the MM: (2007, 309 et seq).
5 P.L. Vaidya even goes to the extent of saying that “the tenets of Lokayata school
are as old as humanity itself”! Ram, Ayodhyakanda, crit. ed. 703.
7 Sen 2005, 23.
8 See n3 above.
9 Jinendrabuddhi, 24: atha v5 carvfikampraWetaducyate. . . . For other references
see n11 below.
10 Bhattacharya 2009/2011, 187-92.
42 Chapter Three
Buddhist, Jain and brahmanical authors such as Karnalas'ila,11 Sflanka,12

Iayantabhatta13 and others. Hemacandra records all the four words as
synonymous in his lexicon, Abhidhanacintc‘zmani (AC), 3.526-27. Names
like dehdhnavc'rda, indrtyc‘ztmavdda, mana—c'ztmavdda, prfinfinnavdda,“ etc.
apparently refer to some pre-Carvaka systems of philosophy, for these
views are discussed separately, unconnected with the CarvakafLokayata.15
S-M, perhaps following Sankara, mentions dehc‘ztmavc'tda in SDS, Chap. 1
(6.53) to mean the Carvakas.
It needs to be emphasized that materialism in India, however, did not
begin with the Carvaka/Lokayata. On the other hand, it came as the
culmination of a long history of heterodoxy and the attempt to see nature
‘just as it is, without alien addition’ .15 There are several words in Sanskrit,
Pali and Prakrit that bear evidence to the existence of materialist outlooks,
if not of systems, before the Carvakas. We shall take up two such words
first.
Ndstika
The oldest word implying dissidence from the orthodox brahmanical view
of the world is of course nastika, the neinsager (to use a convenient word
once employed by Bertolt Brecht in his play Der Jasager und der
Neinsager, He who said yes and he who said no.) The KathaUp (sometime
after the fifth century BCE) is perhaps the first attempt to refute the heretical
“ See Haribhadra, SDSam, chap. 6. The chap. is devoted to the exposition of

Lokayata (lokdyatc? vadanty evam, etc. 80a), but in 85d we read: cdrvdkdb
pratipedire. See also Kamalasfla who, in his commentary, TSP, on TS , chapter 22,
entitled ‘Lokayataparflcsa’, uses the names Carvaka and Lokayata interchangeably.
See TSP, part II: 639, 649, 657, 663, 665, also part II: 520 (bdrhaspawddayah), 939
(lokdyatab) and 945 (lokcfizatam).
12 OnSKS, 1.1.1.6-8', 10-11', on 1.1.1.14; 15.
13 MM, part I: 9, 43, 154, 275, 387-88, etc.
14 gankara on BS, 1.1.1', sarfmm evdtmatei viparyayo lokfg'yatikdndm;
indriydpyevdtmetfndriya-caitanyavddfndm; manas‘caitanyavddin mana eveti.
(Vyomavatf, Vyoma, paIt 2, 126), bhfitacaitawavfidapaksa, NIl/I, part 7, 2:218, also
imfiiyacaz‘tamiapaksa (part 2, 219), yet another view which G. Shastri has called
‘manaécetenatvavcida’ (part 2, 219); Suresvara (Visvarfipa), 5.14-22', Yamuna, 19-
24; Sadananda Yati (Yogindra), 70—72; Sadananda Kasmiraka, Chap. 2 (each
chapter is called mudgarapmhdra), 101-02.
15 S. Radhakrishnan is of the opinion that what is common to all these views is that
‘the soul is only a natural phenomenon’ (1980, 280). Hiriyanna thought that such
views were variants of the Carvakas (1952, 26).
1‘5 Engels 1966, 198.
idea, namely, denial of the after-world, which characterized the idealists and
the materialists in India.
The word nc‘zstflqza, like another such word avaidi'ka, however, occurs
only once in the whole Upanisadic literature, and that too in a later text,
MaiUp, 3.5 and 7.10 respectively. We learn from Vamana and Jayfiditya,
commentators of Panini’s As; that it is the existence of the Other World that
is affirmed and denied by two sets of people; those who affirm are known
as c‘zstikas; those who deny, nc‘zstikas.” This was the original meaning of
these terms. Other meanings, such as the upholder and the denigrator of the
Veda,13 the theist and the atheist (current in modern Indian languages such
as Bangla, Hindi, Marathi, etc. even today), etc. came later.
The Jains explain the word somewhat differently: a nastika is one who
thinks that there is no virtue and vice, ndsti punyam pdpam itz' matimsya
nastikah. 19 To this Mallisena adds the denial of the after-world20 and
Gunaratna, the denial of the self: te (sc. ndstikfih) cajivapunyapdpddikam
mi! manyante. 21 The opposition is on ethical grounds rather than ontological.
Medhfitithi in his commentary on the Menu. explains the word nc'zstz'ka
in two senses: a denier of the after-world (paralokc'tpavc'rdin, gloss on 8.22)
and as one who hold the view that the Vedic doctrines are false
(vedapmmc‘mc'zkc‘mc'zm arthc‘mc‘tm mithyc‘ttvc‘tdhyavasayah, gloss on 4.163). It
may be pointed out that the first signification is directly connected with
ontology (the view rejecting the existence of the extra-corporal and
imperishable self distinguishes the materialists from the idealists) while the
second is more relevant to the domain of epistemology (whether s’abda,
verbal testimony, is to be admitted as a valid instrument of cognition, and if
so, if the Veda is to be admitted as the highest of such testimony). The
materialists are to be called nastika in the first sense only. In fact Budddhist
and Jain savants join their voice in condemning the materialists as nastikas
Whereas in the second sense the Buddhists and the Iains too are branded so.
lnboth senses, however, the approbatory nature of the word is obvious. Like
another such word, pagandin, it is loaded with an attitude of censure and
disapproval.
Nc‘zstika is the commonest word to suggest irreligious attitude. Whether
in the Mk 12.36.43 (crit. ed.) or Vatsyayana’s commentary on NS 1.1.2,
nastikya is used in this sense.22 But Vatsyayana also employs the word to
l7 Kdéikd on As; 4.4.60; 396.

‘8 A nastika is the defiler of the Veda, nfistiko vedanindakah, Mann, 2.11.
19AC auto-commentary 334.
20 SW 130.
2‘ Gunaratna 300.
22 See R. Bhattacharya 2009/2011, 227-31.
44 Chapter Three
mean materialism (on NS, 3.2.61', III.b60 in Ruben). Similarly the

Hahn/ava'dinatthiyavdi in the Sanghadasagani’s Vasu. (169, 275) and the
nfihiyava‘di' in Haribhadra’s SKa (164) is a materialist. Aryas’fira’s
Jc‘ztakamc'zlc‘z 23.57 employs the work nc‘zsti'ka to suggest a materialist or a
non-believer.
A passage from the Vasu, a Prakrit work written in the third century,
makes the position of some earlier natthiyavc‘zis (nastikavddins) clear:
jahd imdadhanu jahicchaé damsanfizam uppajjati, pupa vi jahicchaé

pavinassaé; evam na 1603' ettha sdrabhfib' atthi [mg koi'*]_jo sarfmpabheé i'
parabhavasamkdmf. (275.Emphasis added)
As the rainbow is seen accidentally and disappears accidentally again, so is

there no essence, [nothing] that goes through another birth to another body.
E. Frauwallner interprets a Carvaka sfitra 1.9, jalabudbudavaj jivfih,

‘Souls are like water bubbles’ (R. Bhattacharya 2009/2011, 79, 87) as a
denial of the rigorous law of retribution following from the power of good
and bad actions (1997, vol. 2, 222). This would make the Carvaka/Lokayatas
appear as accidentalists (yadrcchfivfidins). But E. Franco’s way of viewing
the simile as an expression of epiphenom enalism (Franco 1997, 99), in my
opinion, is more appropriate. The analogy has nothing to do with necessity
and accident. 23
Bh fitavdda
The presence of several groups of pre-Carvikamaterialists is testified by an

old Jain canonical work, the SKS (111-20, 2.1. 15-16). Silanka (ninth
century) in his commentary on the SKS employs the word bhfitavadin along
with Barhaspatya, Carvaka and Lokayatika (on SKS, 1.1.6-8; 10-11). He

identifies agent (in Sanskrit ekesdm) with the bhfltavadins and calls them
‘followers of the doctrine of Brhaspati’ (on SKS 1.1.7-8). He uses another
synonym, tajji'vatacchafiravfidin (on SKS 1.1.11-14; 13-14), ‘one who
holds that the spirit and the body are identical” as well as nastika (on SKS
1.1.14; 15). The SKS also refers to several other presumably materialist
schools that mostly spoke of five elements (117—8, 15, 20-25) instead of
23 It may be noted in this connection that the same simile was used in the SKS to
uphold the idealist view: ‘As for instance, a water-bubble is produced in water,
grows in water, is not separate from water, but is bound up in water: so all beings
have the Self for their cause and their object, they are produced by the Self, they are
intimately connected with the Self, they are bound up in the Self (1.2.1.26).
The Pre-Carvakas and the Carvékas 45
four (which the C§rvakas did). éflafika apparently did not attach any
importance to bhfitacatustayavc‘zda (four-elements doctrine) of the Carvakas
and identified even the bhfitapaficakavddins (mentioned in SKS 1.1.7)24 at
first with the Carvakas and then as bhfitavddins and Barhaspatyas! Silanka’s
identification of many of the opponents of the Jain creed, however, is not
always convincing. In his comments on the same text, 2.1.20 he him self is
uncertain about the identity of ‘the second man’ and proposes two
altematives: either the Laukayitakas or the Samkhyas. He uses all the names
of materialists current in his time — Carvaka, nastika, Barhaspatya,
bhfitavc’tdin (also paficabhfitavéafizfiafizfih and more elaborately as
paficabhfitdstitvddivfidmah (on SKS 1.1.20—25', 19), and Laukayatikas
(besides tajjivataccharz'ravddins) — interchangeably, as many others such as
Kamalas’Tla and Jayantabhatta do (see above).
We do not know whether materialism appeared in south India (as
recorded in Manimékalai) quite independent of the developments in the
north. Whatever the case may be, there can be little doubt that materialism
in course of time gained adherents even in faraway Kashmir. 25 In or around
the eighth century one such school came to be known as the Carvaka. Partial
acceptance of the validity of inference was their hallmark. They
distinguishedthemselves from the bhfitavc‘tdm’ns and other earlier materialists
by declaring their view regarding inference in no uncertain terms. Yet a host
of their opponents, whether they were brahm anical, Buddhist or Iain,
continued to criticize them for not admitting inference at all as an instrurn ent
of cognition.
Who are the bhutavadins? In the list of rival claimants for the first cause
(jagatkarana) given in the $veUp, 1.2, bhutcmi (the elements), along with
time, svabhava (own nature), niyati (destiny) and others are mentioned
There is no way to prove that bhutavada was a direct descendent of the
doctrine of bhata‘ni. We first read of the bhfitavc‘zdins in the Manimékalai
(composed between the third and the seventh century CE) who in many
respects resemble the lokc'zyatikas. The bhfitavc‘zdin, however, says that on
doctrinal points they have some differences with the Lokayatas. This Tamil
epic does not mention the Carvakas, but does refer to the Lokayatas. A
bhfltavddin is made to declare the basic doctrine of the system he adheres to
in the following terms:
24 safiti pamca mahabbhfiyd ihamege simdhiyd | pudhavf Lit: teu vd vim

figfisapamcamd || Some profess (the exclusive belief in) the five gross elements:
earth, water, fire, air and space. Mbh 12267.4 also mentions ‘five great elements’
(mahébhfltdnipaficeti) in relation to a similar, if not the same, doctrine.
25 Udbhata who composed a rather unusual commentary on the Ccirvcikasfitm (now
lost) was a Kashmirian as was his arch opponent, Jayanta, author of the NM.
46 Chapter Three
When aathi ('2) flowers, sugar and the rest

Are mixed, wine is made. Life too appears
By the mixing of elements, vanishes
When they separate as sounds from a drum.
Conscious elements produce life within
And unconscious one produces the body
Each appearing through their elements.
This is the truth. Words different from this
And other facts are from Materialists [Lokayatas].
Sense perception is valid. Inference
Is false. This birth and its effect conclude
Now. Talk of other birth is falsity. (27265-76; 154 25
The words of the bhfitavfidz‘n have been paraphrased by a late medieval

commentator in the following way:
When certain flowers and jaggery are boiled together, liquor is born which
produced intoxication. Just as when elements combine, consciousness
arises. Consciousness dissolves with the dissolutions of the elements
composing them like the disintegration of sound. Elements combine to
produce living Bhfitas and from them other living Bhfitas will be born. Life
and consciousness are synonymous. From non-living Bhfltas consisting of
two or more elements rise non-living Bhfltas o f the same type. Lokayata is
a variant of this system that agrees in fundamental with this system.
Observation is the method by knowledge is obtained. Inferential thinking is
illusion. This worldly life is real. Its effect is experienced in this life only.
The theory that we enjoy the fruits of our action in our next birth or in
another world is false. 27
So far as the Marrime'kalai is concerned, the number of elements
admitted by the bhfitavddins is not specified; hence there is no way of
26 In another translation (or rather a prose adaptation), the distinction between the
bhfltavfidins and the laukfiyatikas are somewhat differently explained:
The Bhfita-vcidz‘s hold that the worldis formed out of the five elements alone,
without any divine intervention. We agree with the Lokayata, the sage said,
andbelieve that when the elements combined together, amaterial and a spirit
come into existence. That is all. We believe that perception alone is our:
means of knowledge and nothing else. We recognise only one birth and we
know that our joys and pains end on earth with this one life (Holmstorm
1996, chap. 20, 170).
27 This paraphrase has beentranslated into English by Vanamamalai (1973, 36). The
commentator filrther says that there were three such schools: Bhutavada, Lokayata
and Sarvaka (meaning Cars/aka?) (Vanamamalai 1973, 36). If so, the commentator
must have flourished after the eighth century, for the name, Carvaka, as has been
said before, does not occur in the context of philosophy before then
ascertaining whether the bhfitavddins spoke of five or four elements. The

first statement regarding the rise of consciousness is very much similar to
the Cari/aka aphorism: ‘As the power of intoxication (arises or is
manifested) from the constituent parts of the wine (such as flour, water and
molasses).’28 The rejection of rebirth is a basic materialist position which
can be traced back to much earlier sources.29
The bhfitavddin in the Tamil epic, however, rejects inference as such,
declaring it to be false. On the other hand, the Carvakas, as it has been
pointed out time and again,30 do admit inference in all worldly affairs.
The Old and the New Materialism: Points of Difiference

In view of all this the new materialists (Carvakas) may be distinguished
from the old materialists of all sorts in the following respects:
a) Instead of five elements (including a‘ka‘fa or woma, space) as their

principle (tattva), the Carvakas spoke of four, excluding space,31
presumably because it was not amenable to sense-perception.
b) The bkfitavc‘zdins believed in two kinds of matter: lifeless and living.
Life originates from living matter, the body from the lifeless. The
Carvaka/Lokayatas did not believe in such duality; to them all
beings/entities were made of the same four basic elem ents.32
c) There was another domain in which the two differed more radically.
Some of the Pre-Cfirvaka materialists were accidentalists
Ozadrcchc‘zvadins); they did not believe in causality. On the other
hand, the Carvfikas appear to have endorsed causality;33 they adopted
28 See R. Bhattacharya 2009/2011, fragment 1. 5', 79, 87.

29 The KathaUp (c. fifih century BCE), as said before, is perhaps the first attempt to
refute the heretical idea, namely, denial of the after-world. There is, however, no
reference to hell in the Katha Up (as Whitney (1890, 92) so perceptively noted); the
deniers of the after-world are forced to repeated redeath and subsequent rebirth on
earth. It is in MM: 12.146.18 (crit. ed; 1215013 in the vul.) that we read of the
abode o f Yama (yamaksaya) where the messengers of Yama (yamadflms) bring back
the deniers o f the Other World; such sinners have to stay there for a while before
they are sent back to earth. The elaborate picture of hell with its eighty four pits
(kung’as) developed later, mainly inthe Puranas.
30 S. Mookerjee (1935, 368—69), SN. Dasgupta (1975, vol. 3, 539), Gangopadhyaya
(1984, 32, 55 n1, 56 n4, 66 n51), D. Chattopadhyaya (1989, 52) and Chap. Ten
below.
3‘ R. Bhattacharya 2009/2011, aphorism 1.2; 78, 86.
32 R. Bhattacharya 2009/2011, aphorisms 1.1-3; 78-79, 86.
33 See SDS 12.102-13. 105.
48 Chapter Three
the doctrine of svabhfiva—as-causality rather than the opposite one,

namely, svabhdva—as—accident. 34
60 The Cari/alias admitted the validity of inference insofar as it was
confined to the material and perceptible world (hence verifiable), not
extended to the invisible and unverifiable areas, such as the
imperishable soul, god, omniscient persons (admitted by the
Buddhists and the Iains as well), the outcome of performing
sacrifices called apfirva (as claimed by the Mimfimsakas), etc.,35
while some of the old materialists rejected inference as such as an
instrument of cognition, and clung to perception alone.
34 For a study of the doctrine of svabhfiva, see R. Bhattacharya 2012.

35 For sources see R. Bhattacharya 2009/2011, 57-58, and see below Chap. Ten, 111-
112.
CHAPTER FOUR
WHO ARE THE LOKA'YA TIKA BMHMANAS?
The Tipitaka is a grand portrait gallery, abounding with various characters,

male and fem ale, kings and commoners, philosophers and enquirers. Most
of them are given local habitations and names. But some are introduced
simply by some epithets or descriptions. The loka'yatika brdhmana is a case
in point. Altogether three such persons appear in the Nikayas. There is a
‘Lokfiyatika—suttam’ (LoS) in the Samyutta Nikdya (SN) [1248 (PTS ed.
1975—1999, vol. 2, 77)] in which we meet one, and a ‘Lokfiyatika—brfihmana-
suttam’ (LBS) in the Afiguttam Nikiya (AN) [9.4.7.1 (PTS ed. 1979-1995,
vol. 4, 428)] in which we meet two of them. Their identity has always been
somewhat problematic, the word lokdyatika in Pali being rather obscure.
Nevertheless, one point is certain: Whatever it may mean, it does not mean
materialism as it does in classical Sanskrit. Lokayata, from which lokdyatika
is derived, occurs, according to Piya Tan (2010, 27), fourteen times in the
Tipitaka:
Lokfiyatika
Sutta lokc'zyatika (“cosmologist”?) SN 12.48/2:77
Lokfiyatika
Brahmana
Sutta lokciytika' brfihmand AN 9.38/42428

Mahasila
list (to be DN 1.26/1:1 l,
avoided) lokt‘ryata...tiracchc'ma,vijj€t, etc 2. 60/1 :69 etc.
Ambattha
Minava lokfiyatamahépurisalakkhana DN3 . 3/1 :8 8
Sonadanda lok’c‘gzatamahc‘rpurisalakkhana DN 4. 5/1:114,
Brahmana 13/1:120,15/1:121,
20a/1:123
Kfitadanta
Brahmana Lokdyatmn ahaivurisalakkhana DN5 . 6/1 :130
Purohita DN 5.14/1:138,
Bribmana lokdyatamahdpurisalakkhana 17b/ 1:141
50 Chapter Four
Assalayana
Minava lokdyatamahdpurisalakkhana MN 93.3/22147
Asava Sutta lokdyatamahdpurz‘sa/akkhana AN 6.58/1: 163
Dam
Kammika
Sutta lokfiyatamahapurisalakkhana AN 6.59/1: 166
Dona
Brfihmana lokdyatamahfipurisalakkhana AN 5.192/32223
Sela Sutta lokdyatamahdpurisalakkhana SN 3.7/p105
Udana 3.9/32 (’2);
Sippa Sutta [okayata sippa UA 205
Vinaya lokc'zyate sc'zradassavz' CV 5.33.2 = V 2:139
The list is by no means exhaustive, for there are at least five more to be
found in the Tipitaka that refer, directly or indirectly, to Zokdyata. KC.
Chattopadhyaya (1975, 143) mentions the following:1
‘BJS” DN 1.1
SPhS DN 1.47
Janussoni Sutta AN 3.59
Vinaya Tiracchana-vijj a Cullavagga,5.17
Vinaya Chabaggiya— Pacittiyafi. 18(1)
bhikkhuv atthu
Lokayata (sastra) is mentioned along with the Vedas, grammar, and the
study of the marks of a superman (mahc‘zpurisalakkhana) in several Suttas. 2
What is meant by Lokayata: various suggestions

It is now generally admitted that Lokayata along with the Mahapurisalakkhana

was a subject of study of the Brahmanas, theoretically of all the three twice—
bom (dvija) vamas. It is also agreed that Lokayata was not anti-Vedic;
neither in the Kaufili'ya Arthar’astm (KA) nor in the Tipitaka there is even
the remotest hint of its being so. On the other hand, it was quite a respectable
1 KC. Chattopadhyaya (1975, 27-28), however, does not mention most of the
sources noted by Piya Tan (2010, 27). Tan (2010, 27) too refers to some other Sfitras
that have some bearing on the issue.
2 Notably in W (1958) 91. Brahméyusutta (2.5.1), 93. Assalayanasutta (1958)
(2.5.3), and 10, and Sarngarava-sutta (1958) (2.5.10). More examples are provided
by Jayatilleke (1963/1980, 46-57, 69, etc).
Who are the lokc‘qyatika brakmanas? 51
subject of study, along with Samkhya and Yoga (whatever they might mean
in Kantilya’s times). Nevertheless, as yet there is no unanimity regarding
which discipline Lokayata represents. Widely different conjectures have
been and are still being made.3 Rudolf Otto Franke (qtd. Rhys Davids and
Stede, ‘lokayata’, q.v.) proposed ‘logisch beweisende Naturerklarung’
(logically proven explanation of nature); T.W. Rhys Davids (1921-25/1975,
S. v. loko) apparently approved of it. However, he thought Natare-lore’ to
be more appropriate.‘ He andWilliam Stede (1921-25/1975, s. v. loko) took
this to be the first meaning, and ‘sophistry, casuistry,’ the second.5
3 For all references see Rhys Davids and Stede, Pali English Dictionary (1921-25),
s.v. loko. Jayatilleke (1963/1980, 49) is wrong in saying that ‘Prof. [T. W.] Rhys
Davids and afier him all the scholars who discuss the meaning of lokayata- missed
both passages in the Nikayas which could have given some information about the
subject-matter of lokayata-, one occurring in the Samyutta Nikaya (11.77) and the
other in the Anguttara Nikaya (IV.428).’ Rhys Davids for some strange reasons did
miss both these in his pioneering study (1899). But he and William Stede did not
subsequently ‘miss’ the first; although their interpretation leaves much to be desired.
In the Patti-English Dictionary they have dealt elaborately (as much as possible, or
even perhaps more than is warranted or generally afforded within the scope o f a
lexicon) with the two meanings of lakciyata, namely, Nature-lore and sophistry.
Jayatilleke (1963/ 1980, 50 n1) further complains that Malalasekera (1971, s.v.
Lokdyata) has ignored the problem of the meaning of lokdyata altogether, despite
the fact that he quotes from the SN in his article on ‘Lokayatika Brahmana‘ in his
Dictionary of Pali Proper Names. It is true that Malalasekera leaves the second
source, LBS (24NIV.428), totally out of consideration, but that is a case of justifiable
omission. There is nothing on the surface inthis Sutta to help us comprehend what
lokayata or Zakayatika stands for. Other translators and writers too have not fared
better in Jayatilleke’s view.
4 P. Tan (2010, 29 n17) has explained that ‘lore’ here stands for ‘traditional
knowledge, usu[ally] one handed down from previous teachers or traditions’. K. C.

Chattopadhyaya (1975, 152) endorses Rhys Davids’s interpretation. The word
nature-lore, however, has been misprinted in his essay as ‘mature lore’.
5 The entries of lakayata and lokayatika in this dictionary are reproduced below for
ready reference:
[Lok]-ayata what pertains to the ordinary view (of the world) common or
popular philosophy, or as Rhys Davids (Dal. 1.171) puts it: “name of a
branch of Brahman learning, probably Nature-lore”; later worked into a
quasi system of “casuistry, sophistry.” Franke, Digha trsl" 19, trslS as
“logisch beweisende Naturerklarung”. . . ’
[Lok]-ayatika (Brahmana) one who holds the View of lokayata or popular
philosophy SII.77 (trsaS. 53: a Brahmana “wise in world-lore”); Miln
178; J V1486 (na seve lokayatikam; expl“l as “anattha—nissitam... vitanda—
sallapam lokayatika-vadam na seveyya,” thus more like “sophistry” or
casuistry).
52 Chapter Four
Some other meanings proposed by the translators of various canonical

and paracanonical texts are: metaphysics (Hare 1935, 287), world-lore,
world-wisdom (Mrs. Rhys Davids (SN) 1922, 53).“ Accordingly, a
lokc‘zyatika would mean ‘[one] skilled in metaphysics’ and ‘[one] wise in
world-lore’ or ‘a world-wise [Brahmana]’ respectively (Mrs. Rhys Davids
(SN) 1922, 53). More recently two other meanings of lokc'tyata have been
offered: cosmology (Jayatilleke 1963/1980, 51, Bhikkhu Bodhi (2000), 764
nl28, Thanissaro Bhikkhu (2013) SN 12.48, and speculation (P. Tan 2010,
28).7
Let us review the meanings one by one. As to Nature—lore G. Tucci
(1923/1971, 73, and 1925, reprinted in C/L 389-90) pointed out long ago
that loka in P511 signifies the world, as in devaloka (the world of gods),
martyaloka (the world of mortals), etc.', loka, he further points out, means
the people, public, as in lokaydtm't (way of the world), lokaprasiddha
(accepted by all), lokolrti (proverb), lokavada (common opinion),
lokavis’mta (famous in the world), etc. So neither Franke’s nor T.W. Rhys
Davids’s rendering reflects the original sense of lokc'ryata.
Jayatilleke (1963/ 1980, 49) refers to Tucci’s objection and proposes the
meaning ‘cosmos’ instead of ‘nature’. He is perhaps prompted by a passage
in the ‘LoS’ with four points of debate called lokc'ryata, and by another
passage in the Lahkavatarasfitra LS (Nanjio, 1923, 176-79) which deals
with thirty one theses beginning with sarvam (lit. all things or everything)
(55).5 He thinks the Nikayas also confirm this meaning (1963/1980, 55, 60).
More recently Eli Franco (2011, vol. 3, 633 c012) rejects both ‘nature-lore’
and ‘cosmos’, for cosmos ‘has a particular connotation of good order and
orderly arrangement, which is absent in loka... ’. Therefore, Franco (2011
vol. 3, 633 col.2) elects ‘to keep the neutral word “world.” ’ However, in
his view, ‘lokdyata in the early sources such as the Buddhist canon, the
Arthasc'zstra, the Mahabharata, and so forth refers to (a thesis about) the
world as well as the science that deals with such theses in a dialectical
context’. (Emphasis added).
5 Misquoted by Jayatilleke (1963/1980, 50) as ‘worldly—lore’. Anyway ‘world-lore’

is merely a literal rendering of the two constituent words of the compound, loka- and
-flyata, but it does not help us comprehend the sense intended by the author.
7 I have the impression that Tan (2010) does not reject “cosmology” altogether. Just
because he considers ‘cosmology’ and“cosmologist” for lokdyata and lokayatika to
be too technical in the given contexts, he proposes to render them as ‘speculation’
and ‘speculator’ instead.
8 The LS passage is obviously derived from the ‘LoS’ (SN 1959 vol. 2, 77). The only
difference between the two is that instead of only four lokiyatas, “points of debate,”
mentioned in ‘LoS’, the LS passage refers to no fewer than thirty one.
Who are the lokfiyatz'ka brfihmanas? 53
Loka'yata in the LS (Nanjio 1923, 176-79) was rendered in English as

‘materialism’ by D.T. Suzuki (1956, 152-55). Iayatilleke objected to this
mistranslation (1963/1980, 51-53). However, old understandings, or rather
samskaras, die hard. As late as 1996 KH. Golzio repeated the same blunder
in his German translation of the same text (1996, 181-82) and for this reason
has rightly been censured by Franco (2011, vol. IX, 633 col. 1).
So the two meanings of lokc'zyata, Nature-lore and materialism, can be
safely dispensed with. It is now generally admitted that this lokc'zyata in the
Buddhist canons has nothing to do with materialism (known since the eighth
century as the Carvaka), and although the context in which the word occurs
in Buddhist, Jain and brahm anical works ‘do not allow an exact
determination of the word, the meaning of materialism or materialist is
nowhere apparent’ (Franco 2011, vol. IX, 630 c012); KC. Chattopadhyaya
(1975, 152-153), probably following M. Winternitz, declares that loka'yata
‘was probably a precursor of the Vais’esika system of thought. It was not a
system of atheism, of identification of the self with the boafiz andof the denial
of the authority of the Vedas, which are the basic tenets of the later Lokfiyata
0r Cari/aka systems ’ (Emphasis added). P. Tan (2010, 28), referring to Rhys
Davids, too says: ‘These early occurrences of tokc‘ryata do not seem to reflect
any reference to the materialistic philosophy of Carvaka, which is
apparently later’. In any case, in the whole of Psli literature, the name for
materialism is invariably acchedavada, ‘the doctrine of annihilation,’ not
Lokayata or anything else.
In spite of all this, Lokfiyata in the Common Era was the name of a
materialist school which is noted, most probably for the first time, in the
Tamil epic, Manimékalai 27.78, 149 (composed between the fourth and the
sixth/sev enth century by the Buddhist scholar-poet, STthalai Sattanar). There
was another materialist school current in southIndia (if not all over the sub-
continent) called bhfitavada (lit. elementalism, an exact rendering of
‘m aterialism ’ )9
On the basis of available evidence only this much can be definitely said
that by the eighth century the word lokc'zyata has become synonymous with
the Carvaka. By that time this system was also called Earhaspatya and
Nastika (for sources, etc. see above Chap. Three, 43-48). But long before
the appearance of the Carvakas there were at least two materialist schools
in south India. These two had some differences between themselves, but
neither of them can definitely be called a direct descendant of Ajita
Kesakambala’s doctrine of annihilation: several centuries intervene
9 For bhfltavada see Basham 1981, 200. Manimékalat also mentions this name
(27.264; 153. For a study of pre-Carvaka materialism see above Chap. Three, 41-
49).
54 Chapter Four
between ucchedavdda on the one hand and bhfitavfida and Lokayata on the
other. Lokayata and its derivatives in Buddhist literature, whether in P511 or
in Sanskrit, have nothing to do with this later development. Whatever
lokc‘zyata may mean in early Buddhist canonical works, it is definitely not
materialism.
It is, however, certain that the lokc‘ryatika brc‘zhmanas in the P511Buddhist
canons were fond of raising questions which the Buddha would dismiss as
‘unexplained’ or ‘undecided,’ avyc‘rkata (Sanskrit avyc‘rkrta), as noted by
Tucci (1925, 65). In the ‘Culamalunkya-sutta’ (MN 63) the Buddha had
called such questions as ‘Is this world eternal?’ ‘Has the world an end?” etc.
awakata. He only considered the Four Noble Truths to be properly
explained. He urged the son of Malm'ikya to accept the unexplained as
unexplained and the explained as explained. Perhaps this is why the Buddha
did not approve of idle talks and metaphysical speculations.10 And for this
very reason he seems to have disliked those who indulged in futile
speculations (see Appendix A below). Another passage in the same Sutta
bears testimony to his disapproval, although the word lokc‘gmtika has not
been employed in either of the two instances.
Lokrfyam in the Jain tradition

So much for the Pali tradition. Relying exclusively on Pall sources, we may
say that lokc'zyata originally had one and only one sense, namely, disputatio,
the art and science of disputation (see R. Bhattacharya 2009/2011, 187-92).
Rhys Davids, who had proposed a different meaning first, viz., Nature-lore,
and/or popular philosophy, too admitted this meaning in case of the MP in
the PTS Dictionary (sv. Zokéyata). It has been shown that this meaning
holds true for the two Mahayani Buddhist Sanskrit works,
Sdrdfilakamfivadfina—Sfin'a, SKA (Diwa‘wadfina) and the Sad-dharma—
pundarfka-sfitm, SDPS (See R. Bhattacharya 2009/2011, 193—96 and

20120).
Now to other, non-P511 sources. The first occurrence of Anviksiki and
Lokayata in Sanskrit is met with inKA 1.2.1 and 10. Anviksiki is one of the
subjects of leaming, viafycis; and includes Samkhya, Yoga, and Lokayata
(1.2.10). There is no unanimity of opinion concerning the signification of
Anviksiki in this particular context — the science of reasoning, philosophy,
10 See the ‘BJS”, DN,1.1.22: ‘. ..desultory chat, speculations aboutland and sea, [24]
talk about being and non-being, [25] the ascetic Gotarna refrains from such
conversation.’ . . . nénattakatham lokakkho‘wikam samuddakkhc‘qyz‘kam
itibhavdbhavakatham. Iti v5 itievarfipdya...pa;ivimto sumano gotamo"ti.
Who are the lokc‘qyatz'ka brfikmanas? 55
or logical philosophy or what (See n3 above). Although later commentators

wrongly identify this Lokayata with the Carvaka/Lokayata system, the
earliest commentary in Malayalam glosses it as ‘the Nyayas’astra
propounded by Brahmagargya’ (or Brahman and Gargya), lokc'zyatam
nyc‘gzas’astam brahmagc‘zrgyoktam (adapted in T. Ganapati Sastri’s Sanskrit
commentary on the K34 (1924, part 1, 27). This evidently was a pre-Gautama
system of logic. So the connection of Lokayata with arguments is
presum able. Lokayata(sas11a) is mentioned along with the Vedas, grammar,
and the study of the marks of a superman (mahapurisalaksana) in several
Suttas in the Nikayas (see the chart above).
Very much like the Buddhist canonical and paracanonical works,11 some
Jain works too record more or less similar curriculum of studies (for the
Brahmanas and/or the princes). They comprise, besides the three or four
Vedas and their six ancillary texts called Vedangas, and such secular
subjects as arithmetic, music, poetry, drama and stories, a number of
philosophical systems as well. In the Vasu., we read of Mimamse't, Samkha
(Samkhya), Loyiya, Loyiyatiya, Satthitainta (Sasthitantra), etc. (24).” The
Anuyogadvc'tmsfitmm (Arm) mentions Loyiyayam (1999 ed. 5mm 49, 91).
It also mentions Vaisesiyarn, Buddhavayanarn, Vesiyam, Kavilam,
Loyiyayam, Satthitamtam, Madharam, etc. (ibid.; 1968 ed. sfitm 72', 29).
Namdisfittam sfitra 67 too has a similar list of subjects under the head of
mithyc‘u’mta works, beginning with the Bharata (Mbh) and the Ram:
Kanakasaptatih, Vais’esika, Buddhavaeanam, Vais’ikam, Kfipilam,
Lokfiyatam, Sastitantram, Matharam (nos. 10-17) (1924 ed. sfitra 42 f. 193b;
1997 ed, 113).“
The position of Lokayata in the syllabus may suggest that it stands for a
system of philosophy, not disputatio, teaching the art and the science of
11 E.g. the ‘Brahmayusutta’MN(l 958) 2:41.1.1; 382, 41.2.9; 390', ‘Selasutta’ (1958)
2:423; 397', ‘Assalayanasutta’ (1958) 2:43.1.1', 403', ‘Cankisutta’ (1958) 2:49.113;
429‘, ‘Sangaravasutta’ (1958) 2:50.11, 482 (all in theMN) and paracanonical works
like Milindpafiho, MP (1986) 1.10, 1.23, 4.3, 4.26, and Lalitavistara (1877)
chap.12, 179.
‘2 Jamkhedkar (1984, 78-79) writes, ‘Loyayatiyavada (lokfiyatikaaddaf [sic],
instead of ‘Loyayatiya’ as in the printed text (24). The Vow, middle section (first
part) [majjhimakhando (padamo bhago)] contains more names, some of which are
not easy to identify: samikkhamtavdda, kanaga, satiari, mdsurakkha-sikkha,
vesisita, yovayof.... (24). For a general survey of the Jain system of education, see
D.C. Dasgupta (1942/1999) passim.
13 Attempts have been made to identify the names with little success. Vaisika, for
instance, has been explained as a book of erotics (kdmaédstm). It has been called
sn‘z'veda (Veda related to women) in the commentary on the SKS (Namdz' 1997 ed.,
‘Bhfimika’, 20).
56 Chapter Four
disputation (vitandd-va'da-sdstm), as in the P511 and Buddhist Sanskrit

tradition. The haphazard manner in which the subjects of study are
enumerated — philosophical systems along with various other subjects
related to philosophy, set side by side — coupled with the uncertainty of
reading14 renders the task of identifying their subjects and their contents
doubly difficult, if not impossible, at the present state of our knowledge.
Secondly, comparison with Sanskrit texts, however, has led to happy
results: for example, the syllabus for studies of Brahmana boys found in the
Upanisads (particularly the Brhadc‘zmnyaka and the Chandogya) has shed
welcome light on the meaning of the P511 word, lokdyatam (Iayatilleke
1963/1980, 47). The parallel columns of subjects found in the Chandogya
list, Sankara’s commentary thereon and the P511 equivalents occurring in the
DN are illuminating. It is almost certain that Lokayatarn was nothing but
Vikovikyani (Chandogya), explained by Sankara as Tarkas’astram.
Then why did some later commentators go against the older
commentators who glossed Lokayata as vitanda—(vc'zda) -sattha? Iayatilleke
(1963/1980, 48) accounted for this misinterpretation as follows: ‘The fact
that when Pali commentaries came to be written Lokayata — exclusively
meant Materialism is perhaps an added reason’.
The lokfiyatika brahmanas in the Ramayana

What about the identity of the lokéyatika brfihmanas then? Apart from the
characteristics mentioned above (disputation for disputation’s sake) it can
be asserted with certitude that they did not belong to the Buddha’s Order
(Samgha). In the LB S, two lokc‘zyatika brfihmanas were so impressed by the
Buddha’s reply to their queries that they decided to join the Buddhist Order.
In the ‘LoS’ too the lone lokfiyatika requested the Buddha to consider him
as a lay follower of his Order. In other words, the lokdyatika bréhmanas

obviously belonged to the brahm anical fold, as expected.
It so happens that there is a mention of the lokdyatika brfihmanas in the
Ram, Ayodhyfikfinda (crit. ed., vol. 2, 94.32, vul., 100.28), which throws
light on the issue. John Muir (See Ci 354-58) and TW. Rhys Davids (C/L
372) and others had already noticed the passage, but no—one paid it the
attention it deserves. KC. Chattopadhyaya (1975, 150-151) was convinced
that the whole passage was an interpolation. In fact, the passage, although
‘4 For instance, the mss of the Namdi. mention several names to denote one subject:
Abhitamasuraksam, Hambhimasurukkam, Bhibhasfiksma and thésurutta (1997
ed, ‘Bhfimika’, 20. See alsoAnu. 1999 ed, 91 and Nandi 1968 ed, [44].
found in all recensions, is alm ost certainly a later addition.15 In spite of its
dubious authenticity, two verses (crit. ed., vol. 2, 9432-33, vul., 10028-29),
even though interpolated after the fourth century, still contains an indication
of what the lokc'zyatika brahmanas meant in the early centuries of the
Common Era, long after they were first mentioned in the Pali Suttas. It may
be noted that the word lokc‘ryatika occurs only once, not just in the
Ayodhyakanda, but in the whole of the Ram. The passage indicates another
characteristic of the lokc'zyatika brc‘zhmanas: in addition to their fondness for
disputation, they did not care for the religious law books, i.e., the
Grhyasfitras and the Smrti texts.
Let us take a look at the context as found in the constituted text of the
Ram. When Bharata goes to the Citrakfita Mountain with the intention of
bringing Rama back to Ayodhya, there is a report of the conversation
between the two princes. Rama advises Bharata:
Don’t you serve the lokfiyatz‘ka bréhmanas, for they are experts in doing
harm, are puerile and consider themselves to be learned (which they are not).
km‘cima lokc‘gyatikfin brdhmanfims trim sevase | ,

anarthakus‘ald by ere halal: papditamdninab || (Grit ed, vol. 2, 94.32, vul,
100.28)
The other reason why the lokdyatika brahmanas are suspect is given in
the next verse:
15 While editing the Mbh, Sabhaparvan, Frankhn Edgerton noted that Mbh 2.5.7ff
had parallels in the Rdm 2.100 in the Bombay ed. (= 2.109 in the Gorresio ed.).
‘About 37 stanzas are parallel stanzas of our chap.’ (Mbh, crit. ed., vol. 2, 489). On
the basis of intrinsic evidence and other grounds P.L. Vaidya, editor of the Ram,
Ayodhya—kanda (crit. ed 1962), too, comes to the same conclusion:
To me, the entire set of stanzas beginning with [kas‘cit] except the first
[94.4], is out ofplace.... Compare, in this context, Mbh. 257-99.... These
questions there cover some 93 stanzas in the constituted text and about 100
or more in the Vul.. Our Critical Text [of the Ram] contains just 56 stanzas
against 73 in the V111. and a few less in Gorresio. Professor Edgerton has
given a note inhis Addenda et Corrigenda, to Sabhaparvan pp. 489-491. He
says there that about 37 stanzas of Ramayana have their parallels in the Mbh
2.5. 1 think there is clearly an imitation here of the Mbh., where the
questions are justified on more than one ground, while there is a good deal
of absurdity in them in the Ramayana on emotional ground. . . . We may have
been justified in ignoring them altogether, but our MSS. authorities are
uniform inkeeping at least 56 of the stanzas. (Note ocim, crit. ed., 2.94 =
vul. 2.100; 702).
58 Chapter Four
Even though there are principal religious law-books,

these dimwits having recourse to sophistical intelligence talk fraud.
dhannaéfistresu mukhyesu vidyamfinesu durbudhfi |

buddhz‘m finvfksikfmprfipya nimrtham pravadanti re ||
(crit. ed., vol. 2, 94.33, vul., 100.29)
What does lokfiyatika mean in the Ramayana?

Commentators and translators of the Ram have taken the word lokfiyatika in
this passage (crit ed., vol. 2, 94.32—33, vul., 100.28-29) to mean:
1) A follower of the Carvfika doctrine (Rama, Tilaka comm. (1983))

2) The Can/films and the Buddhists, etc. (Sivasahfiya, .S‘iromani comm.
(1983))
3) The nfistikas, that is, the Buddhists and the Cfirvfikas (Govindarfija,
Bhfisana comm. (1983))
4) The followers of Carvaka doctrine (Lokanatha Cakravartfi,
Manoharé comm. (1932-41))
5) Loquacious in (expounding) the science of Carvfika, cfirvfika—éfistm-
vfivadflka“ (Srimfidhavayogin, Amrtakataka comm. (1965))
6) Atheist (Gorresio (1851), M. N. Dutt (1892), Makhanlal Sen (1976))
7) Materialist (H. P. Shastri (1976), Sheldon Pollock (1986))
All of them, I am afraid, missed the mark. Phanibhushana Tarkavagisa

(1981, vol. I, xiv-xv) has demonstrated that Zokdyata in ancient times meant
Nyz'rya as well, and two kinds of haitukas (reasoners) are mentioned in
orthodox brahmanical works: the first, those who adhered to the Veda
(hence astika), and the second, who did not (hence na'sz‘ika) (1981, vol. I,
xv-xvi). These lokdyatika brfihmanas, as Rama describes them, are

basically argumentative by nature and apparently disinterested in the
ordinances laid down in the canonical law books (dharmas’c'rstms), i.e., such
samhitc‘zs as the Code ocmu and others ordained by other law-m akers. But
there is nothing to show that the lokfiyatika bréhmanas followed a well-
formulated philosophical system with its own ontology and epistemology.
In the Mk too there are, as E. Washbum Hopkins (1910/1993, 86) puts it,
‘ [a]ny number of these unbelievers who deny everything there is to deny”.
Unlike Ajita Kesakambala, however, they had nothing to assert Ajita at
‘6 Cf. ‘The loquacious men, possessed of great learning, roam all over the earth. . . .,’
camnti vasudhcim krtsndm vdvadflkfi bahuémtfih. Mbh 12.19.24cd, in both crit. ed.
and vul.
Who are the lokfiyatz'ka brfikmanas? 59
least declared quite unambiguously, ‘Nothing exists after death’ (SPhS, DN

(1958) 1: 2421-23; 48-49; Ten Suttas (1987), 83. Translation modified).
This is why he is justly regarded as a proto-m aterialist (as Kosambi
1956/1975, 164, brands him).
Moreover, the word lokc‘ryata and its derivatives do not appear in
Sanskritbefore the sixth century (as in Vatsyayana’s KS) to signify any anti-
religious system of philosophy. Such a characteristic is first encountered in
Bana’s Kc‘rdambarf (sixth century).17 In the REM and the Mk, and the MN
and AN Suttas mentioned above, as well as in the Vasu. we always come
across the omnibus term nfistika (natthika or nahiyavadf) to mean such an
outlook. But it is not associated with the Lokayatas or Laukayatikas before
the sixth century, by the time when Lokayatahad already appeared in south
India as a rival materialist doctrine of bhfitavdda (as described in
Manime'kalai (1989), 27.272-76). The word nfistika itself is very old', Panini
refers to it in his As; (1989) along with its antonym, dstika, and another
word, claim/ca, a fatalist (asti—m'tsti—distam marl/1, 4.4.60).
Lokdyata in Pfili 75 materialism

Let us then review the question of the lokdyatikas in the light of what has
been stated above. Many scholars of the last two centuries, not unlike the
latter-day commentators and sub-comm entators of the Pali canonical works,
seem to have been under the impression that the word lokfiyata, whether in
Pali or in Prakrit or Sanskrit, could have one and only one meaning, viz,
materialism. T. W. Rhys Davids (C/L 369, 373), however, had shown as
early as 1899 that Lokayata in P511 stands for a respectable subject to be
learnt by every prince and every Brahmana (C/L 369, 373). The same holds
true for KA 1.2.10 (see R. Bhattacharya 2009/2011, 131-36). Jayatilleke
(1963/1980, 69) too had asserted this. More recently Eli Franco (2011, vol.
3, 633, col.2) has reviewed the issue and rejected the view that lokdyata in
the Pali tradition could ever mean ‘materialism’.
In spite of all this, eminent scholars have discovered materialism
whenever and wherever there is reference to Lokayata, whether in P511 or
17 InVatsyayana (fourth century)’s KS (n. d.) six aphorisms, 1225-30, are followed
by the statement: ‘ So (said) the Laukayatikas,’ in” laukfiyatikfih. However, the
aphorisms are more in the nature of popular maxims, Zaukika nyciyas, or, as the
Jayamangalci commentary on the KS says, ‘idioms well known (or established) in the
world (or, among the people),’ lokapmsiddhi (see R Bhattacharya 2009/2011, 94-95).
Banabhatta (1950, 513) employs a simile in Kddambarf which, however, reflects on
the heretical nature of the Lokayatikas: ‘As the science of the Lokayatika is to one
who has no taste for religion. . . ,’ . . . lokdyatikaviafizayevddharmaruceb....
60 Chapter Four
Prakrit or Sanskrit. However, others who agreed with Rhys Davids in

refusing this wrong identification have failed to offer a commonly accepted
rendering of lokc'zyata and lokc‘gmtika. The other terms preferred by P511
scholars today, ‘cosmology’ and ‘cosmologist’ (as used by Thanissaro
Bhikkhu (2013) AN 9.38 in his translation of the AN) are not beyond
question. The comm on factor found in all descriptions, both in Pali and
Sanskrit texts, viz, disputatiousness, is not reflected in any of the
renderings, whether in the works of the PTS translators or in others’. Rhys
Davids and Stede (1921-25/1975, s.vv. lokayata, lokayatika), in spite of
their first preference for ‘common or popular philosophy’, or ‘Nature—lore’,
admit that in the MP (1880/1986, 178) and the ‘Vidhura—pandita—jataka’
(Jdtaka 6.486) lokc'zyata is ‘more like “sophistry” or “casuistry’”. The
statement is true for the MP, but quite off the mark in relation to Jdtaka
(1896) 6.486, as we shall soon see.
What made some scholars to take the word loka, the first part of the
compound lokc‘zyata, to mean ‘the world,’ while others had taken it to mean
‘the people’ (hence understanding Joke-[yam as ’popular philosophy’)? I
think it was the four questions concerning sabbam, ‘All’ (or everything)
raised by the lokc‘ryata brc'zhmana in the LS. As against this preoccupation
with the All, we may counter pose the question put to the Buddha by the
two lokc'gzatika brfihmanas in the LBS. Their question has less to do with
the world; on the contrary, it concerns the relative merits of two other
teachers contemporaneous with the Buddha. Now, it is this propensity to
ask odd questions, and engaging themselves in fruitless discussions and
arguments regarding inconsequential m atters that the Zokéyatz’ka brahmanas
came to be recognized as enemies of both brahmanical religion as also of
the saddhanna, Good Law. The lokfiyatz‘ka brc‘zhmanas mentioned by Rfima
in his conversation with Bharata may very well be the free—thinkers of
ancient times, unaffected by the books of religious law. But it will be wrong
to call them ‘materialists’. In the given context a lokc'zyatika brahmana can

only mean a disputant pure and simple, often a person indulging in
disputation for disputation’s sake (as he is found to do in the commentaries
on the P511 canonical works). In short, borrowing from the title of Amartya
K . Sen (2005)’s collection of essays, we may call the lokc‘ryatika brc'ihmana
the prototype of the ‘argumentative Indian’.
It is this second characteristic of the lokc‘zyatika brfihmanas, namely,
their fondness for senseless disputation, which seems to preponderate over
the sense of Nature-lore or cosmology or even speculation, if suchmeanings
were ever current at all. Moreover, most of the Pali dictionaries and
commentaries and sub-commentaries take lokfiyata to mean ‘the art and
science of disputation,’ vitanda-(vc‘zda)-sattham. It is therefore suggested
that this should also be the meaning applicable in case of the loka'yatika
brfihmanas in the ‘LoS’ and the LBS as well. The questions they raised too
apparently sprang from their love of disputation. Hence, by applying
Occam’s razor, we may take the term lokc‘gvatika brdhmana inboth P511 and
Sanskrit uniformly to represent a ‘disputatious Brahmana’.
Signification oflokayatika in the J ataka

There is another, non-technical, signification of lokfwal‘ika in the ‘ Vidhura—
pandita jfitaka’ (Jc'ttaka (1896) XII.8, text vol. VI. 486). It is not unrelated
to the form er (viz., disputatious); rather it reinforces the censorious attitude
towards the lokc‘zyatika found in other texts. It refers to a Brahman-a who
indulges in ‘vain conversation’ (Jc‘ztaka, ed. Cowell 1907/1973, vol. 2, 139),
or ‘frivolous or captious discussion’ (as given in the PTS Dictionary s.v.
vitandc‘z, but not s.v. lokfiyata or lokc‘zyatika, although both lokdyata and
vitandd are admitted to be synonymous).
Rhys Davids (CE 372) has made much of a passage in the text as also
the commentary on the ‘Vidhura—pandita jataka’: mi save lokc‘ryatikmh,
n’etam pafific‘zyo vaddhanam, which he translates as ‘Follow not the
Lokayata [NB the text has lokcbzatikam, not Joke-Warm] that works not for
progress in merit’. The commentary, however, says: anattha—
nissitam...vitanda—5all@am lokdyatika—vc'tdam no seveyya. The context
however does not warrant taking lokdyatika in a technical sense in this
instance. The advice concerns the conduct of a righteous person: it has
nothing to do with logic or philosophy. This is a model case of a trusting
reader (in this instance, Rhys Davids) being misled by a careless
commentator. The commentator looked at the word Zokfiyatikam, and,
without bothering to consider the context, immediately displayed his
knowledge concerning lokfiyatika and vitandd, all out of context.
What is the context of this advice? King Pimnaka asks Vidhura—pandita

four questions. The first is: ‘How shall be a prosperous life to him who lives
as a householder in his own house’ (vasamé gahatthassa sakam gharam
khemc‘z vatti katham asset)? To which Vidhura-pandita replies: ‘Let him not
have a wife in common with another, let him not eat a dainty meal alone, let
him not deal in lokdyatikam, for this increases not wisdom.’ (...na seve
lokcbiatikam n ’etam pafific‘ryo vaddhanam....). The answer is an exhortation
to the avoidance of adultery, selfishness, etc. lokdyatikam here can never
mean casuistry or sophistry (an instance of tautology preferred by Rhys
Davids) as noted in the PTS Dictionary s.v. lokc‘zyatika in the MP (‘thus more
like “sophistry” or casuistry’). EB. Cowell (1907/1973, vol. 2, 139)’s
62 Chapter Four
rendering of not save Iokfiyatikam, ‘ [L]et him not deal in vain conversation ’,
suits the context much better.
It may be noted that the PTS Dictionary too provides a meaning of
vitandc'r (but not of lokc'zyatika) as ‘tricky disputation, frivolous, captious
discussion’. And as to vitandc‘z, we are advised to look up lokc‘ryata, for they
are for all practical purposes synonymous. Moreover, most of the Pali
dictionaries and commentaries and sub-commentaries take lokc'zyata to mean
‘the art and science of disputation, vitanda-(vc‘zda)-sattham. The passage in
the Ramayana 2.93 speaks of the same characteristic of the lokc'zyatika
brfihmanas, viz. disputatiousness, their arguments being fraught with ‘vain
conversation”, as does the ‘Vidhura—pandita jataka’.
Th e upsh 01‘
The upshot of the whole discussion is then: both lokdyata and lokc'zyatz’ka
refer to a subject of study, viz. disputation as well as a disputant. The other
meaning given in the PTS dictionary, ‘common or popular philosophy’, or
Nature-lore’, and by applying Occam’s razor the other ones employed by
translators (metaphysics, speculation, cosmology, etc.) and their derivatives
should be dispensed with. Once and for all it should be declared that
‘disputatious’ is the only meaning applicable in case of the lokc‘zyatika
brc‘zhmanas.
Why did Jayatilleke and Tan speak of cosmos/the cosmologist‘? Even
Franco (2011, vol. 3, 633 column 2) did not reject the meaning of ‘world’.
In his view, ‘lokayata in the early sources such as the Buddhist canon, the
Arthafic‘tstra, the Mahabharata and so forth refers to (a thesis about) the
world as well as the science that deals with such theses in a dialectical
context”. It is perhaps the repeated reference to sabbam found in several
canonical and para-canonical works that led them to this conclusion.

However, the reference to ‘everything’ is often coupled with examples of
crude casuistry. While explaining lokakkhdyikfi, Buddhaghosa explains:
Foolish talk according to the Lokayata, that is the Vitanda [lokdyam-

vitanda—salldpa—kathd], such as: “By whom was this world created? By such
a one. A crow is white from the whiteness of his own; cranes are red from
the redness of their blood.” (cited by Rhys Davids in C/L 371).
In the Saddanfti too we have the same kind of juxtaposition:

Who are the lokfiyatz'ka brfikmanas? 63
Now the Lokayata is the book of the unbelievers full of such useless
disputations as the following: “All is impure; all is not impure; the crow is
white, the crane is black and for this reason or for that...” (idem, 371-72)
The issue or the point of dispute is not important; the lokc'zyatika

brdhmanas were prepared to take any side, depending on the one taken by
the opponent/other disputant. The questions they raised — whatever that
might be, highly serious or utterly trivial — too apparently sprang from their
love of disputation. Inmy opinion, instead of casuistry and/or sophistry, the
word disputation, disputatiousness and other derivatives from the root
‘dispute’ are to be preferred in translating lokfiyata and its derivatives in
Pali. Hence, we may take lokfiyatika brc‘zhmana in both Pali and Sanskrit
uniformly as meaning ‘disputatious brfihmana’.
Appendix A
A passage from the ‘BJS” (DN) provides some examples of several points
of disputes (called lokayata in the LS):
"Whereas some ascetics and Brahmins remain addicted to disputation such
as:
‘You don't understand this doctrine and discipline —1 do!’

"How could you understand this doctrine and discipline?"
‘Your way is all wrong — mine is right! ’
"I am consistent — you aren't! "
‘You said last what you should have said first, and you said first what you
should have said last! ’
"What you took so long to think up has been refilted! ”
‘Your argument has been overthrown, you're defeated!’
"Go on, save your doctrine — get out of that if you can! "
The ascetic Gotama refrains from such disputation."

(The Long Discourses (1987), 71)
Appendix B
Vitandc‘z is one of the categories (padc'irthas) in the Nyc'iyasfitm, NS (1.2.3,
4.2.50—51). NS 1.2.3 states: ‘This (scil. jalpa, debating manoeuvre,
mentioned in 1.2.2) becomes vitandc'r (destructive criticism) when the
“opponent has no care for establishing any thesis of his own”, ’sa
pratzpaksa-sthfipanfi-hfno vitandc‘z.
NS 4.2.50-51 says: ‘jalpa and vitandé are (to be employed) for
protecting the ascertainm ent of truth, just as fences with thorny branches are
64 Chapter Four
constructed to protect the seedling coming out of the seed,’

tattvddhyavasdya—samraksandrtham jabavitande, bz'ja-pmroha-
sammkjandrtham kanjaka-éc‘tkhc‘wamnavat.
The last sfitm states: ‘One may start a debate “by attacking” (the
opponent) with the help of both (inning and vitandc‘z),’ tc‘zbhya‘m vigrhya
kathanam.
The position of the vaitandr'ka can be inferred from NS 2.1.8-11 which
is refuted in 2112-20, also in 5118-20. Sriharsa (1914) throughout his
book Khandana—khanda—khaajza (KhKhKh) refutes others’ views without
establishing his own, as does Jayaras’ibhatta (1940/1987) in his
Tattvopaplavasimha (this feature is overlooked by some scholars who brand
him as a Carvfika of some other kind). These two works are the classic
examples of vitandd.
However, other than the name vitandd, there seems to be nothing in
comm on between the use of the word in Buddhist P511 and Sanskrit literature
and the NS. Any attempt to relate them would be tenuous and an exercise in
wish-fulfilment.
It may be recalled that jalpa (debating manoeuvre) is ‘a kind of
disputation (overbearing reply and disputed rejoinder)’ (NS 12.2, etc). It is
a technical term but in comm on parlance, i.e., in a non-technical sense, it
stands for ‘talk, speech, discourse... chatter, gossip,’ (Monier-Williams
(1899/2000), 5.12. jalpa), as does lokdyata in Pili.
CHAPTER FIVE
PRE-CARVAKA MATERIALISM
IN THE VASUDEVAHIMDf
Longish conversations between a king and his ministers have often been
employed as a device for introducing philosophical discourses in ancient
Indian narratives. Both Buddhist and Jain authors resorted to this device.
We come across such dialogues in the Pali Payasi Suttanta, Prakrit
Rayapasenazjja, Aryasfira’s Jatakamald, Haribhadra’s SKa (Book 3),
Somadeva’s YTC and Hemacandra’s TSPC. The same device is found in
Sanghadfisagarii (sixth/seventh century)’s Vasu. Along with other
philosophical systems such as Samkhya and Yoga, materialism is also
expounded in the Vasu., though not elaborately. The term used to designate
the materialist is nfihiyavfidf and natthiyavfif. In spite of its brevity, the
exposition of the doctrine is of interest to the students of the history of
materialism. Strangely enough, a god called Cittacfila is made to argue a
kind of nastikya to Khemamkara, a king. Unfortunately, nothing at all is
said about Cittacfila’s propositions; we are only told that Khemamkara
defeated him in argument and Cittacfila was converted to Jainism.l
Jamkhedkar is of the opinion that ‘[p]robab1y the use of the word nastika in
this connection was meant to signify a non-believer in the Iain doctrines.’2
A short exposition of materialism is found in the section on king
Kurucamda. He is called a man lacking in both character and religion

(nissflo nivvao'). His view is as follows:
findWasamdgmnametmm purisakappami mafiamgasamavfié mayasambhava

iva, m1 etto parabhavasamkamanas’flo atthi, rm sukaya—dukkayaphalam
deva—nem-ié'su koi‘ anubhavat‘. 3
1 Vasu. 329.
2 Jamkhedkar 1984, 184.
3 Vasu. 169.
66 Chapter Five
The soul is made of the combination of the senses like the production o f
wine by the combination of its ingredients; there is no soul that
transmigrates to another birth; the fruits o f good and evil deeds, such as
heaven and hell, are felt to be non-existent.
Such a view is as old as the fifth century BCE. Ajita Kesakambala, a

senior contemporary of the Buddha, preached the same doctrine. lain
canonical works such as the SKS also contain refutation of this view.4 Here
is a sirnile, or rather inference by analogy, of several diverse ingredients
having no intoxicating power of their own and yet producing an intoxicating
drink because of a special combination (parinamavis’esah).5 It is also found
in an oft-quoted Carva'ka aphorism, kinvddibhyo madm’aktivat, ‘As the power
of intoxication (arises or is manifested) from the constituent parts of wine
(such as flour, water and molasses)’.6
A more detailed account of materialism is expounded by Harimamsfl, a

minister of king Dukkha, king of Paitthana. He says:
natthz‘ sarz'ravairitto cuppa mime: kot‘, m1 punpa—pfivam, m1 ya farm

phalfinubhfigfkoi} m1ya narayri, 1w devaloyd, suimettam eyam £11."
There is no such thing as the soul outside the body, no merit and demerit,
none (i.e. soul) which enjoys their fruits, no hell for men, no heaven — all
this is mere hearsay.
Asaggivo claims, bahuso amham viiilc't riddhi sf: avassa kenat'

punnaphalenamajjiyc‘z, tam iyc‘mim pi dfinam vc‘z samapa-mfihana-kivandpa
pai'cchfimo, sz‘lamvfi kfilam uddissa karemu tavam va tti. tato ne
paraloyahz‘yam bhavissa‘z' tti, ‘I have endowed great wealth, which must be
the result of some merit, so gifts to the s’ramana-s, Brahm ins and others will
now be of good for the after—world.’

To this replies Harimamsfi:
4 For a detailed discussion, see R. Bhattacharya 2009/2011, 33-44.

5 NM, chap. 7, 201. The Buddhists also used this word in a different context. The
Sautrantikas objected to the Sarvastivadin view of the way the summing was
subjected to perpetual flux and ‘invented the principal of parinémavis‘esa in order to
account for the rise and disappearance of the dharmas in the individual ’s flow of
consciousness.’ Johnston 1937/1974, 33.
5 Can/aka aphorisrn, 1.5. R. Bhattacharya 2009/2011, 79, 87.
7 Vasu. 275. The extracts that follow are quoted fiom the same source.
Pre-Carva‘ka Materialism in the Vasua’evahimdz‘ 67
sfimi! natthi jfvo jassa paraloé hiyam maggljfaf. jaf bhave dehavat'ritto
niggacchamto sarfnid uvalabhejja saflno pamjaréfi vd. evam ginhaha —
pamcanham mahdbhfiyfinam kof samjago manussasannib‘ uppajjatti, jattha
jfvasannft loyassa aviydnayassa. jahft imdadhanu jahicchfié damsanfyam
uppajjati, pupa vi jahicchrjépavinassaé‘; evam m1 kot‘ ettha sdmbhfld atthi
[*na koi‘*] jo sarfrapabheé parabhavasamkfimf. nu ya pdvam m:
punnaphalam pamdiéhim narayabhayam devaloya— sokkham ca vanniyam.
tam muyaha paraloga heflm tam pattiyaha ‘natthi dehavairitto fivo
paricchaymaéna’ tti.
0 lord! There is no soul which transmigrates to the Other World. If there

were such an extracorporeal soul moving out, it could be ascertained as a
bird out of the cage. Know this — what ignorant people call the soul is
produced out of a combination of five elements to form human beings. As
the rainbow is seen accidentally and disappears accidentally again, so is
there no essence, [nothing] that goes through another birth to another body.
There is no result of merit and demerit, no fear o f hell and pleasure in heaven
as described by the pedants. By thinking critically one can find that there is
no soul outside the body.
Several points in this passage are worth noting. First, Harimamsfl speaks
of five elements combining to produce the human body. The Carvakas,
however, admitted only four elements, namely, earth, air, fire and water. A
well-known Carvaka aphorism delimits the number unequivocally:
prthivyfipastejovdyuriti tattvc‘mi, Earth, water, fire and. air are the principles,
nothing elses It is however known that there was at least one pre-Cfirvaka
materialist school in India which spoke of five elements instead of four.
Harim amsfi apparently be1ongs to this school?
The second, reference is made to jahz‘cchfi (Skt. yaa’rcchfi), ‘accident’,
rather than to svabhdva, ‘own being’ or ‘inherent nature’, as S-M (SDS,
Chap. 1) and others have done in their exposition of the Carvaka. Since the
materialists of India are known to us mostly through the accounts given by

their opponents, not in the words of the materialists themselves, it is not
possible to decide whether Vasu. represents the actual position of the
materialists or merely follows a tradition already existent. The problem is
compounded by the fact that the word, svabhc‘zva, is taken to mean absence
of causality in the MM and other sources, but no mention is made of
yadrcchc't in the same context. 10 Apparently to many writers svabhc‘rva and
yadrcchc'z became synonymous.
8 Can/aka aphorism, 1.2. R. Bhattacharya 2009/2011, 78, '86.

9 For a detailed study, see R. Bhattacharya 2009/2011, 33-44.
10 See R. Bhattacharya 1998-99 and 2006.
68 Chapter Five
Third, two examples (drstdnta) are provided: (a) the bird and the cage,
and (b) the rainbow. In the SKS too such analogies are employed by a
putative materialist:
As a man draws a sword from the scabbard and shows it (you, saying):
“Friend, this is the sword, and that is the scabbard,” so nobody can draw (the
soul from the body) and show it (you, saying): “This is the soul and that is
the body.” As a man draws a fibre from a stalk o f Mufija grass and shows it
(you, saying): “Friend, this is the stalk, and that is the fibre,” or takes a bone
out of the flesh, or the seed of Amalaka [Emblica Myrobalanos] from the
palm of his hand or a particle of fresh butter out of coagulated milk, and
shows you boththings separately; or as he presses oil from the seed of Atasi
[Linum Usitatissimum], and shows the oil and oil-cake separately or as he
presses the juice from the sugar-cane and shows the juice and the molasses
separately, so nobody can show you the soul and the body separately. The
same applies also when fire is churned from Arani-wood. Those who believe
that there is and exists no soul, speak the truth. Those who say that the soul
is different from the body are wrong. (2. 1. 16)
Incidentally, the SKS also refers to a man who claims that everything
consists of five elements (2. 1. 20-23), not four. Such bhfitapaficakavfidins
have also been mentioned earlier in the same text (1.1.7-9).
Seven Cari/aka aphorisms are cited in the eélafikfivatfimvrtti (qtd. by
Namai 1976, 38 n1), one of which contains a similar analogy,
mayfimcandrakavat, ‘As the eye in the peacock’s tail”.11 This suggests a
belief in the natural origin of every phenomenon, denying thereby the
existence of any Creator. Vasu., however, opts for a very different set of
analogies to establish the primacy of perception and at the same time
favours accidentalism. Sanghadasagani calls the latter doctrine yadrcchd,
not svabhdva, as a sage does in the Mbh.12 As far as the other aspects of
materialism are concerned, Vasu. does not differ in any significant detail
from bhfitavéda as expounded in the Manimékalai (Chap. 20).13
On the basis of the above discussion it can be asseited that Vasu.
contains some of the basic tenets of pre-Cfirvfika materialism in India. As to
the relation of materialism to causality and accident, it is not possible at the
present stage of our knowledge to say whether Sanghadasagani was right in
his exposition or not. That the proto-materialists preached the doctrine of '
akriydvdda (inactivism) is, however, well-attested.14
11 Carvaka aphorism, 11.2. R. Bhattacharya 2009/2011, 79, 87.

12 Vas'u. 275.
13 For further details, see R. Bhattacharya 2009/2011, 33-44.
14 This point has been elaborately discussed in R. Bhattacharya 2007a.
Pre-Cérva‘ka Materialism in the Vasudevahimdz‘ 69
One question that needs to be asked in more general terms is: How far
should we be justified in accepting the evidence of creative writing as
reliable in connection with the study of philosophy? Poets and dramatists
ofien tend to caricature the philosophers they dislike. Think of Aristophanes’
portrayal of Socrates in his play, The Clouds or Krsnamis’ra’s wilful
misrepresentation of the Buddhist and Jain monks in the PC. Jayantabhatta
too does so in his play, A]? There is no doubt that Sar'rghadfisagani was
interested in philosophy and devoted considerable space to philosophical
debates in the Vasu. Nevertheless, the way he presents a master of Yoga
(iogcicariya) makes one doubt his acumen in this field. The Yoga teacher is
made to expound, not the Yoga doctrine, but the fundamentals of
bhfitapaficakavdda, namely, five elements are at the root of everything
including consciousness, all the senses go back to their elements after the
death of the body, and the soul cannot be separated from the body itself.
Even the analogy of the constituents of wine producing the power of
intoxication is repeated.15 How could a Yoga teacher, meeting Vasudeva
while the latter was speaking of the antiquity of the art of archery, get into
such a discussion and expound the natthiyavc'fi view is, to say the least,
baffling. The veracity of Sar'rghadfisagani’s expositions of different
philosophical systems prevalent in his time is thus not beyond doubt.
15 Vasu., 202-203.
CHAPTER SIX
MATERIALISM IN THE OLD TAMIL EPICS:

THEMMMKALAIAND THE NILAKESI
North-South Divide
The story of Agastya, a north Indian sage, crossing the Vindhya hills and
visiting south India (never to return), is well known. It has given rise to a
proverb, Agastya—yc'ztrc‘z in Bangla and maybe in other north Indian
languages. Like all legends it is without date. So, it has been interpreted as
an allegory of the ingress of the north to the south, or, as a recent historian
has said, ‘evidence of Aryan speakers’ movement towards the south’
(Karashima 2014, 26). From about the third century BCE, religions that were
born in north India spread to the south. Interestingly enough, two heterodox
religions, Jainism and Buddhism, were first to reach the Deccan and further
south; the brahmanical religion (Vedist) was to reach these regions later.
There are enough archaeological findings to suggest so. The most
conspicuous of the north Indian religions was Buddhism, though
traditionally Jain migration is said to have started as early as the time of
King Candragupta Maurya (fourth century BCE although Piotr Balcerowicz
tells me in a personal communication that there is absolutely no evidence,
whether archaeological or historical, in this regard).
The reflection of both Buddhism and Jainism is found in old Tamil

literature. There are several long narrative poems that seek to establish the
superiority of either Buddhism or Jainism. The brahm anic al religion did not
find roots in the south before the first century BCE. Consequently, in the
Common Era we find specimens of works belonging to these three religions,
written not in Sanskrit, but in Tamil.
Historians of Tamil literature or of Indian literature as a whole (one such
ambitious work is Das 2005)1 seldom, if at all, mention the fact that the
polemics in the Manimékalai, the Nilakéci, and similar works contain strong
1 Das, however, made a blunder by calling the Nflakéci a ‘Buddhist work . . . which
was written as repartee against this Buddhist poem,’ 2005, 80.
Materialism in the Old Tamil Epics 71
denunciation of several philosophical systems that came from the north to

the south. Nowadays tolerance is projected as the hallmark of Indian culture.
Contrary to this notion, there seems to have been no love lost between the
Indian philosophical systems and Jainism as well as Buddhism in the south.
Apparently, Buddhism and Jainism were both imported in their original
northern garb. Nevertheless, in the course of time, south India produced
most eminent Buddhist logicians, such as Dinnaga (c 480-540 CE). The Jains
too in their turn gave birth to such theologians and philosophers as
Kundakunda (first century BCE), who earned all-India fame in the Comm on
Era.
Tamil Literature: Its Antiquity and Variety

It is to be kept in mind that ‘Tamil can claim one of the longest unbroken
literary tradition of any of the world’s living languages’ (Zvelebil 1974, 2).
Jean Filliozat (1983, 97-107) provides an account of the rich narrative
tradition in Tamil. What is noteworthy is that, besides entertaining their
audience with interesting stories, the narratives are also highly tendemious:
they indulge in undisguised propaganda in favour of their respective
religious andphilosophical systems. No counterpart of these narratives is to
be found in the north. Historians of Tamil literature have called them
‘epics’, although they do not conform to either the Sanskrit criteria laid
down in the books of poetics and rhetoric nor judged by European standards.
As Zvelebil has explained:
To express this terrninologically, we may say that Tamil epic texts are not
itihfisas, i.e. large narrative poems (large in character, in events, in setting,
in effect) of the traditional heroic past, but rather longer or shorter
mahfikfivyas. . . . They are very different from each other and, strictly
speaking, some of them should hardly be called epics in the narrower and
more technical sense at all. But they are not as radically different from the
accepted concept of the epic as, say, Dante’s Divine Comedy which has also
been called an epic. (Zvelebil 1974, 16).
Philosophical Debates in the Epics

The Manime'kalai (i 550 CE) is called an epic in the Tamil tradition. So is
the N flakéci (i 950 CE). The first is the story of the wanderings of a Buddhist
lady ascetic calledManimékalai. It is said to reflect ‘alm ost exactly the ideas
of Dinnaga, the founder of Buddhist logic’ (Zvelebil 1974, 141). Among
other things the epic Manimékalai contains the first known list of sat-tarkf,
six systems of philosophy based on argument: Lokayata, Buddhism,
72 Chapter Six
Samkhya, Nyaya, Vais’esika, and Mirnamsa (2778-80). Instead of the

fistika/na'stika division of the philosophical systems (based on the
brahm anical criterion of adhering or not adhering to the Veda),2 here is a
secular division of systems founded, on the one hand, on argument and the
other (presumably) on faith. Manimékalai, the heroine, enquires of the basic
tenets of all philosophical systems — Samkhya, Mimamsa, etc. — and finds
all of them wanting in substance. In the debates, Buddhism ultimately
proves to be the victor over all Veda-abiding systems as also Jainism and
materialism with its two schools, Bhfirtavada3 and Lokayata (27272-73).
The Manimékalai then, besides its other merits, is the earliest work of
doxography (collection of views of ancient philosophical schools, now lost).
The earliest doxographical work in Sanskrit so far known to us is SDSam
by a Jain savant, Haribhadra, which was composed in the eighth century CE,
long after the Manime'kalai. The Nilakéci, too, is a doxographical work of
some importance, for it records several doctrinal aspects of southern
Buddhism, probably not to be found anywhere else. The inclusion of the
Aiikas is also significant (see below). No other heterodox view that was
current in the Buddha’s lifetime is mentioned. All of them seem to have
become extinct in the Common Era.
With the passage of time, religious and philosophical systems that had
their origin in the north travelled to the south. It has already been mentioned
that Jainism perhaps came first (fourth century BCE), followed closely by
Buddhism (third century BCE); brahmanism with its emphasis on
varnc‘rs’rama-dharma was late to arrive (first century BCE). The A—cfirakkévai
‘belongs to the Brahmanical school and is a digest of ideas from the
dharmasastra’ (Subbarayalu 2014, 46). There is also a Jain work called
Silappatikdmm, also spelt Cilappatikdmm (The Lay of the Anklet) (c450
CE) by Ilangovadigal, supposed to be a Chera prince. ‘Unlike the
2 There was a parallel tradition of employing these two antonyrns in terms of

admitting or not admitting the Other World. When the Buddhists and the Jains
employed these terms (as in Bantaraksita, TS, Chap.22 verse 1870, néstikatci-
Haribhadra, SDSam, verse 78, dstikavfidinah; Hemacandra, AYVD, verse 20,
ndstikasya) they mean precisely this, not the adherence or non-adherence to the
Veda. Brahrnanical writers, however, include the Buddhists, the Jains and the
materialists in their category of ndstika, that is, non-adherents to the Veda. For
further details see R. Bhattacharya 2009/2011, 165—167.
3 Bhutavada is not recorded in the Abhidhanas, but the name occurs in Silanka’s
Sanskrit commentary on SKS (The Book Composed against [Heretical] Sfitras)
1.1.1.8, 1978, 10, as a synonym of Barhaspatya-mata, the doctrine of Brhaspati. I
am indebted to my friend, Piotr Balcerovicz for providing the English rendering of
the name of this Jain canonical work.
Silappatikfimm [a Jain kdvya], the Manimékalai [a Budddhist kc'tvya] is

quite outspoken in religious propagation and underlines the fact that there
were lots of polemical disputes and discussions developing among
adherence of rival religions’ (Subbarayalu 2014, 46-47)
The Jains, however, were not to be leftbehind: the author of the Nflakéci,
although a Jain and hence tolerant by conviction, spares no religion or
philosophical system. In the last part of the work (section IV chaps l-lO,
136-336), Nilakéci, the Jain nun, deals with no fewer than ten doctrines: l .
Dharma Urai (Tammavumi, exposition of the [Jaina] dharma), 2.
Kundalakéci-vada (the doctrine of Kuntalakéci, i.e., the Buddhist doctrine
preached by a lady Buddhist ascetic bearing that name), 3. Arka-candra—
Vida (another Buddhist doctrine), 4. Mokkala-Vada (the doctrine of
Mokkalay, Pali Moggallana, Sanskrit Maudgalyayana, refers to the
Buddhist doctrine of momentariness, ksanikavfida), 5. Buddha-Vida, 6.
Aiika—vada (doctrine of the Ajivikas, a heterodox sect, now extinct), 7.
Sanikhya-vada, 8. Vais’esika—vada, 9. Veda-Vida (MTmarnsa), and 10.
Bhuta-vada (Pfltavc‘ztam, materialism).
Referring to (and apparently agreeing with) the view of Chakravarti,
Filliozat writes:
It has been observed by the editor, A. Chakravarti, who contributes a detailed

introduction to the work, that the major non-Jaina schools of philosophy.
§ankara, the éaiva and Vaisnava Saints, Nayanmar and Alvar, are not
mentioned in the work. Chakravarti thinks that this is because they did not
yet exist as opponents of the Jaina doctrine, so that the polemical work
Nflakéci must belong to the period before their emergence. This may place
the composition of the Mlakécz' in the 5th or 6th centuries’ (Filliozat 1983,
105).
Modem scholars, however, prefer to date the work much later (tenth
century CE. See Zvelebil 1974, 139).
Materialist Views Expounded in the Epics

What is most noteworthy is the mention of bhfitavc‘zda in both the epics. The
Manimékalai refers to another materialist school called Lokayata (27.272-
273). Curiously enough, the Nflake'ci does not mention Lokayata at all; it
speaks of bhfitavdda alone.4
4 Caveat: Appaswami Chakravarti Nayanar in his translation of the Mlakéci 4.10

often uses such expressions as ‘the Lokayata teacher’ (1936, 322) or ‘the Chfirvfika
teacher’ (thrice on 1936, 335, twice on 1936, 336). But the text (checked and
74 Chapter Six
The doctrinal aspect of materialism (of the pre-Carvaka kind) is more or

less the same in both the epics: unlike the Carvakas, earlier materialists in
India relied on one instrument of cognition only, namely, perception, while
the Carvakas admitted the validity of inference up to a certain extent (insofar
as it was based on and/or was verifiable by perception). There are other
differences between the pre-Carvakas and the Carvakas, which can be
discerned from later evidence (for details see above Chap. Three).
The Manimékalai contains the first ever description of Lokayata as a
philosophical system, not a mere s’c‘tstra of disputation. In the Pali and
Sanskrit Buddhist tradition disputatio is the only meaning of Lokayata. The
Manimékalai refers to no book of disputation but specifically mentions
Lokayata as a separate school of materialism, quite distinct from bhfitavdda.
The arrival of the philosophical systems along with the religious cults must
have taken a considerable period of time and the acceptance of the names
of the founding fathers of both philosophical systems and religious cults,
too, called for a slow but steady process involving at least several decades,
if not one or even two centuries. What surprises an unwary reader is the
militant forms of both Buddhism and Jainism in the south. The brahm anical
systems too came under fire: both in the Manimékalai and the Nilakéci, a
number of chapters or parts of them are devoted to both the exposition and
the refutation of Samkhya and Mimamsa, not to speak of materialism which
is called Bhutavada in the two epics. The author provides a summary version
of the doctrine of Bhfitavada (see 48 above).
Bhutavada, however, was not the only materialist doctrine current in the
south. There was another school distinct from it. The rival doctrine was
called Lokfiyata.5
The words of the Bhfitavadi have been paraphrased by a late medieval
When certain flowers and jaggery are boiled together, liquor is bom which
produced intoxication. Just as when elements combine, consciousness
arises. Consciousness dissolves with the dissolutions of the elements
composing them like the disintegration of sound. Elements combine to
produce living Bhfitas and from them other living Bhfitas will be born. Life
confirmed by my fiiend, A. Mahalingam) invariably refers to pfltavfitam and

pfitavdn‘. Similarly, a quotation from Shakespeare’s Hamlet is inserted in the
translation (1936, 336), which is naturally not to be found in the original. Barring
these, Chakravarti’s translation, I am assured, is fairly faithful to the Tamil text.
5 Miyamoto Jo is wrong to suggest that ‘ [w]hen this putavati told the doctrine of his
own sect to the heroine, he mentioned the name of his sect as Lokayatas’ (2007,
1131), for the Bhutavadi clearly distinguishes his school from that of the Lokayatas
(see 48 above).
and consciousness are synonymous. From non-living Bhflms consisting of

two or more elements rise non-living Bhutas of the same type. Lokayata is
a variant of this system that agrees in fundamental with this system.
Observation is the method by knowledge is obtained. Inferential thinking is
illusion. This worldly life is real. lts effect is experienced in this life only.
The theory that we enjoy the fiuits of our action in our next birth or in
another world is false. (Quoted and translated by Vanarnarnalai 1973, 36).
When Nilakéci meets Pis’acaka, a Bhutavadin, the sirnile of the

intoxicating power arising from non-intoxicant elements is repeated (stanza
858 English trans. 1936, 321), without, however, any mention of Lokayata
or any other materialist school excepting Bhutavada. The continuation of
the simile is to be found in the Sanskrit base text in the form of an aphorism
(sfitm): kinvddibhyomadas‘aktivat, as the power of intoxication (arises or is
manifested) from the constituent parts of the wine (such as flour, water and
molasses).6 The Vasu., a Jain Prakrit work composed in the sixth/seventh
century, also employs the same comparison (169).
This is how the doctrine of Bhfitavada is reproduced in the Nilakécr‘:
Neelakesi afier condemning Védavada, meets on her way the teacher of

materialistic school, otherwise called Bhfitavada. She thinks it worth her
while to expose the error and inadequacy of this materialistic school. Hence
she enters into a debate with this teacher of Bhfitavada, named Pisacaka.
Evidently he is a teacher attached to the court o f King Madanajit; hence the
discussion is held in the royal assembly. Pisacaka, the teacher of
materialism, first explains his system. “We do not recognise the subtle
distinction of qualities and substances. For us, the ultimate reals are the five
Bhfitas; all activities in the world must be traced to this five Bhfitas. These
are permanent and real; Fire, Earth, Water, Air and Space are the five
ultimate elements of the universe. Out o f these are evolved respectively,
Eyes, Nose, Tongue, Body and Ears; and out of these five sense organs, arise
respectively, Colour, Odour, Taste, Touch and Sound. Just as the

intoxicating drink is obtained by a combination o f five things, flour, jaggery,
etc. so also by the combination o f these five elements are obtained
intelligence, feeling of pleasure and pain and so on, which characteristics
increase with the increase of five elements, and disappear with the
disintegration of the five elements. When the five elements thus get
disintegrated, the qualities of intelligence and feeling completely disappear
without leaving any residue. The fimdamental reals in the world are these
five elements and every activity must be traced to the efficacy of these, but
clever fellows with the gifi: o f the gab go about prattling about the existence
of the so-called J'iva and their doctrine is accepted by the ignorant masses.
5 Aphorism 1.5. See R Bhattacharya 2009/2011, 79, 87.

76 Chapter Six
Except sheer verbiage there is nothing corresponding to the word Jiva in

reality. There never was in existence in the past anything besides these five
elements. Even at present reality consists o f these five and in future also
these five alone will continue to exist. To postulate an entity besides these
five is the result of sheer ignorance as to the nature of the ultimate reality;
and the Lokayata teacher has expounded his system.” (4.10. stanzas 854-
860. English trans. 1936, 3321-22.)7
A Tibetan Parallel
The Manimékalai and the Nilakéci, are thus both polemical and
doxographical in nature. The refutation of materialism is not always logical
in approach. Manimékalai, for example, does not bother to argue against the
bhfitavadins’ denial of rebirth, for she believed that she could rem ember her
previous births:
‘Though they [the materialists] are not right, I shall not dispute.”
As she knew of her births, she laughed at him (27278-279).
Nilakéci, in order to disprove the bhutavadin’s contention, reproduces

the spirit of his mother and thereby converts him to Jainism, her own
doctrine (4.10. stanzas 887-894. English trans. 1936, 335-336). Thus, there
is lack of sophistication and apredominance of popular beliefs in ghosts and
reminiscence of previous births in both the epics. It reminds us of what a
Tibetan Buddhist monk did in order to prove that rebirth is true. This is how
Taranatha describes the story:
In the east, in Varendra, there lived a pandita who attained the vision o f arya
Avalokites’vara. He entered into a debate with a firthika Lokayata teacher.
He defeated his (firthika’s) views no doubt; yet [the firthika claimed] that
arguments depended on the intellect and hence one with inner intellect
gained victory. [So he said;]
“There is no direct evidence for anterior and posterior existence. So I do
not admit this.’
Being thus told, he kept the king and others as witnesses and said, ‘I am
going to be reborn. Put a mark on my forehead.”
He placed on his forehead a mark o f vermilion cut deep into the flesh.
Putting a pearl into his mouth he (the pandita) died on the spot.
His corpse was kept in a covered copper vessel and it was sealed by the
king.
According to his promise to be reborn as the son of a ksatrz‘yapandita
called Visesaka, a son with auspicious mark was born to the latter. His
7 See n3 above. There is no mention of Lokayata in the text.

forehead was found to have the mark of vermilion and within his mouth was
found the pearl. On being examined by the king and others, the dead body
of the pandita was found to have no mark of vermilion on the forehead and
the place where the pearl was kept was found empty. It is said that the same
firthika then came to believe in past and present existence. (1990, 199-200;
reproduced in C/L 343).
Two points are of interest. One, the anterior and the posterior existence
of the soul is considered to be the proof of rebirth. Although, the Buddhist
conception of momentariness (ksanikatc‘z) is not the sam e as the brahm anic a1
belief in the existence of an eternal soul, undying and unchangeable in spite
of its residence in different mortal animal bodies, the need for establishing
rebirthIn ade the writers opt for the sam e kind of tale. The tale would provide
ocular proof of the existence of rebirth. $fiharsa in his NC offers a similar
incident in support of the validity of rebirth. Indra chastises Kali as follows:
Why dost thou not believe the stories, known to the people of various lands,
of spirits begging for the performance o f Gayasraddha [post—mortem rite to
be performed at a Visnu temple at Gaya] for them, entering into some one’s
body? (17.90)
Why dost thou not believe the true stories of the other world, which people,
taken away by the messengers of Yama owing to a confilsion of names,
relate on their return to the world? (17.91; 255)
The words put by Taranatha on the mouth of the tfrthika — arguments

depended on the intellect, and hence one with keener intellect gained victory
— are reminiscent of $riharsa’s bon mot: vyc‘zkhyfibuddhivalc‘zpeksé,
interpretation depends upon the force of intelligence (NC 17.51).
The two specimens of the exposition of materialism as prevalent in south
India, however, do not really add anything new to what has so far been
known from Sanskrit, Pali and Prakrit sources. What is to be noted in the
Nilakéci is the absence of the name of Lokayata, which, however, is
mentioned as a separate materialist doctrine in the Manimékalai several
centuries before. More intriguing is the total absence of the name of
Carvaka, although this last known school of materialists had already
flourished at least two centuries before the composition of the Nilakéci.
However, the evidence provided by the two epics is not without interest.
For one thing, both of them embody the doctrine of pre-Carvaka
materialism. Instead of the four elements admitted by the Carvakas, the
bhfitavfidins of the Manimékalai and the Nilakéci speak of five. Second,
both assert the position of ‘old materialism’ (for the distinction between ‘old
materialism’ and ‘new materialism’ see above Chap. Three, 41 and n2):
perception and perception alone is the only means of right cognition. As to
78 Chapter Six
the denial of inference, etc. as well as the Other World and such like notions,
the accounts are unanimous and uncompromising in their approaches. The
value of all this is not to be trifled with, since they reveal the development
of materialism in the south of India in opposition to not only other
brahm anical systems but also against Jainism and Buddhism. The
philosophical scenario was far from peaceful, for every system was out to
defend itself, and refute others.
CHAPTER SEVEN
LOKA'YA TA AND LOKA‘YA TIM

IN THEMILINDAPANH4
Lokayata is generally known as a synonym of the Carvfika materialist

system which made its appearance in or a little before the eighth century.
Yet in earlier Buddhist Pali and Sanskrit literature lokc‘zyata stands for
anything but materialism. The first meaning of lokc‘zyata given in the PTS
Dictionary is as follows: ‘what pertains to the ordinary view (of the world),
common or popular philosophy, or as Rhys Davids (Dial. 1.171) puts it:
“name of a branch of Brahman leaming, probably Nature-lore”.’ When we
come to the first-century Buddhist paracanonical work, MP, The Questions
of [Milinda (the Greek king Menander), this meaning is so inappropriate in
the given context that it is not even worth considering. Rhys Davids and
Stede in the same dictionary, therefore, offer a second meaning for the MP:
‘later worked into a quasi system of “casuistry, sophistry.” ’
Before going into the details of the lokfiyata, some attention is to be paid
to the enumeration of the subjects Milinda was made to leam:
Safikhyayogfi fifiya-vesesikdganitam gandhabbam tikicchd catubbedfi

purring? itihdsd jotz‘sam mfiyé hetu mantané yuddham Chanda samudcfi'
vacanenaekfinavfsati. (M’P text 4)
Many were the arts and sciences he knew — holy tradition and secular law;
the Sfinkhya, Yoga, Nyaya, and Vaiseshika systems of philosophy,
arithmetic; music; medicine; the four Vedas, the Puranas, and the Itihasas;
astronomy, magic, causation, and spells; the art of war; poetiy',
conveyancing —in a wordthe whole nineteen(MP trans. 1.[3].9, p.6. original
spelling retained).
The Pali and Buddhist Sanskrit word for causation is hem, literally
‘cause’. Trenckner wrote ‘logic (?)’ (qtd. MP trans. 6 n1). There is no
reference to Lokayata here, only hem, most probably the shortened form of
hetuviaj/d, ‘the science of causation’. In the Lalitavistam, L V it is indeed
called so (hetuviafizd), one of the ninety-six subjects studied by Bodhisattva
80 Chapter Seven
(Chap. 12, 179, translated as ‘logic’, 147). It is to be noted, however, that

lokdyata as a subject of study, whether in the sense of materialism (or the
Carvaka system in particular), is conspicuous in its absence here.
In the first occurrence of the word lokdyata in the MP we are told:
(i) so rigid bhassappavadako lokfiyatavitandajana salldpappavattana

komhalo (1MP text 4)
[T]he king [Milinda], Who was fond of wordy disputation, and eager for
discussion with casuists, sophists, and gently of that sort. . . .’ (MP transl I.
[41- 10, 7)
The compound, lokdyata-vitandajmasallfina is rather problematic, for
lokdyata is generally explained as vitanda(v&da)-sattha (Skt.
vitandds’dsma), the science of disputation itself. The two words, loka'yata
and vitanda‘, are for all intents and purposes synonymous (for several
instances, see R. Bhattacharya 2009/2011, 186-91). A lokc'zyatika has been
explained as ‘one versed in the science of Vitanda, Lokayata’, lokc‘ryatiko ti
vitandasatthe lokdyate kaia—paridayo (commentary on SN IV.287, qtd.
Jayatilleke 1963/1980, 50). Here too the juxtaposition of vitandasattha and
lokc'zyata suggests mere pleonasm, not two diffizrent disciplines. Why then
refer to them separately? Neither the editor nor the commentator or
translators of the MP offer any explanation. Rhys Davids in the note to his
translation of the MP does nothing more than explain them as ‘Lokfiyatas
and Vitana’as’ and refer to several passages in the Tipitaka, their
commentaries, and some Jain and brahmanical sources known at his time.
The two words, sophistry and casuistry, are used as synonyms for Zokfiyata
in the PTS Dictionary. But in this instance both are employed to suggest
respectively lokc‘zyata and vitandc‘i. Vitandfi in the PTS Dictionary is defined
as follows:
(t). [cp. Epic Sk. [Sanskrit] vitanda, e.g. Mbh 2, 1310; 7, 3022] tricky
disputation, frivolous or captions discussion; in cpds. [compounds]
vitalgdao: Ovada sophistry SrnA 447', DA 1.247; Wadi]: a sophist, arguer
DhsA 3 (so read for vidaddha)‘, VbhA 9, 51, 319, 459. See lnkfiyata.
Apparently lokfiyata and vitanda(-sattha) are treated as referring to the

same subject of study. Then why juxtapose them as if they refer to two
different disciplines? The only explanationI can offer is that it is a case of
tautology. Two synonymous words are set side by side with the sole view
to emphasizing the nature of the persons Milinda liked to keep company
with.
Lokfiyata and lokfiyatz‘ka in the Milina’apafiho 81
In another passage in the MP (text, 10) we read of Nigasena:
(ii) Padako vegyfikarano lokfiyatamahfipurimlakkhanew anavayo cfihosi.
He became a philologist and grammarian and skilled alike in casuistry and

inthe knowledge of the bodilymarks that foreshadow the greatness of a man
(trans. I.[10].22, 17).
This juxtaposition of lokfiyata and mahdpurisa—Ialdchana (marks of a

superman) is often met with in the Nikfiyas. For instance:
Ambattha
Minava 10k’dyatamahdpurisalakkhana DN 3.3/1:8 8
Sonadanda DN 4.5/1:114,
Brahmana 10k’dyatamahdpurisalakkhana 13/1 2120,15/1:121,
20a/1:123
Kfitadanta DN5.6/1:130
Brahmana lokfiyatamahfipurisalakkhana
Purohita DN5.14/1:138,
Brahmana lokéyatamahfipurisalakkhana 17b/1 :141
Assalayana
Manava Zokdyatamahdpurisalakkhana MN 93.3/2: 147
Asava Sutta Iokdyatamahdpurisalakkhana AN 6.58/1: 163
Dam Kammika
Sutta lokc'zyatamahc‘tpurisalakkhana AN 6.59/1: 166
Dona Brahmana lokcbzatamahc‘zpurisalakkhana AN 5192/3223

Sela Sutta lokc'gzatamahc‘tpurisalakkhana SN 3.7/p105
(qtd. from ‘LB 3; Tan, p.27)
In this instance both are subjects of study of the Brahmanas as well as
the Ksatriya or ruler/warrior caste. How far the courses of study mentioned
in these Buddhist and Jain works reflect actual conditions is difficult to
decide. In all probability, they are mere enumerations of all the arts and
crafts (kalés) and the subjects of leaning (viajzés) cultivated by the teachers
and learners of different times, not by the members of any particular caste
(vama), but by all. The Vedas were of course the precinct of the Brahmanas
alone. It is clearly stated so in the MP: ‘[T]he business of the Brahmins and
their sons is concerned with the Rig-veda, etc.’, brdhmana mc'mavakdndm
82 Chapter Seven
Imbbedam... (text 178', trans. IV, 3, 26, 247).1

The third and the last instance is not mentioned in the Indexes of the MP
and seems to have escaped the notice of earlier scholars, although Rhys
Davids in his translation of the ‘BJS’ (DN) refers to this passage in the MP
(22 n4), asserting that the meaning, materialism, ‘is impossible in the
context’ Or perhaps the long list of subjects to be studied by the Brahmanas
(comparable to the one given in the LV, chap.l2, 179 (text), 147 (trans),
comprising no fewer than ninety-six subjects!) does not seem to merit any
attention. The curriculum covers almost every subject under the sun; it is
quite impossible for a student to master all of them in his life-time. The
Brahmanas and their sons are expected to learn, we are told (text 178),
besides the three Vedas and their six ancillary texts (V edangas), etc.:
(iii) ...jotz'sam lokfiyatikam sficakkam mfgacakkam...
...a1ithmetic, casuistry, the interpretation of the omens to be drawn from

dogs, and deer,... (trans. IV.3.26, 147-48)
The only point of interest is that, instead of lokdyatam, as in (ii), the

name of the subject is here called I 0 k a y a t i k a m. The PTS Dictionary
does not record this meaning. It refers to ‘Miln 178’ in relation to the only
meaning given, namely, ‘one who holds the view of lokayata or popular
philosophy.’ This is not the sense in which the word has been employed in
(iii). lokciyatika is used here in the sense of lokciyatika—vdda, not ”védin.
Jayatilleke’s gloss on lokdyatika as ‘one who studies lokdyata or one who
belongs to a lokdyata school’ (507), too does not correspond to the sense of
the word in (iii).
Let us go back to the ‘Lokayatas’ and ‘Vitandas’ of Rhys Davids (7 nl).
In the Index of Proper Names Rhys Davids explains both as ‘a sect so called’
(identical?), both referring to (i). A look at the text and the context in which
the words occur makes it clear that, when followed by jam, the terms mean
some persons, or rather groups of persons, who had not only studied and
specialized in the subject but also made it the sole vocation of their life.
Such a person has been called lokc‘ryata—pc‘zthaka, ‘reader of Lokayata’, in
the commentary on AN IV. 200 (qtd. Jayatilleke 1963/1980, 50). They would
pick up arguments on metaphysical questions (as in the ‘LS’) as well as on
the merits of the teachings of other masters besides the Buddha (as in the
1 I fail to understand Why Rhys Davids said that ‘casuistry [is] no branch of
education’ (MP trans, Index of Subjects, 311) when it is clearly mentioned to be so
in this passage and elsewhere. For Jain sources enumerating their syllabus and
educational method, see D.C. Dasgupta 1999 passim.
Lokfiyata and lokfiyatz‘ka in the Mlz'na’apafiho 83
‘LBS’). Hence they came to be known as [oka'yata (also its derivative,

Iokdyatika, as in the ‘LS’, ‘LB 8’ and other sources). If the commentators of
the Pali canonical texts are to be believed, these people also indulged in
disputing for disputation’s sake, such as, proving that the crow is white, the
crane is black, and similar inane matters (Rhys Davids in CAD 371-72).
In short then, the word, lokc‘gzatika is used in the MP to mean both a
subject of study and a person who indulges in it, its dedicated and practising
adherent.
CHAPTER EIGHT
LOKAYATA AND ITS DERIVATIVES

IN THE SAD-DHARAM—PWDARfKA-SUTRA
If one sets upon oneself the task of translating the SDPS, a first-century CE
Sanskrit Mahfiyfini Buddhist text, into a modern Indian language, one will
face no problem with the word Zokfiyata. It is current in all and can be
retained in translation without bothering to explain what Zokfiyata means.1
But translating it into a European language would prove to be difficult, for
the reader would not know the word and so some equivalent would have to
be provided. But what would be the right equivalent in the context of the
SDPS? The word lokc‘ryata and its derivatives occur thrice in this work.
Burnouf and Kern in their French and English translations respectively
somewhat differ in their understanding. Let us look at the passages one by
one.
1. anyesu stirresu no kiwi cinta lokfiyatail' anyatarais'ca S'éstraih/

bills-ma etddrs'a bhonti gocarcis/tfimstvam vivarjitva prakc'zs'ayer idam/Z
(Tokyo ed. 94; Calcutta ed. 72; Darbhanga ed. 70; v. 1. in line 1: no
kadc'ipi aims-z).
Il ne faut jamais penser a d’ autres Sfitras, ni a d’autres livres d’une

science vulgaire, car 06 sont la des objets bons pour les ignorants, évite
de tels livres et explique ce Sfitra. (Bumouf 1852, 142).
Never mind other Sfitras nor the books in which aprofanephilosophy is

taught; such books are fit for the foolish, avoid them and preach this
811113.. (Kern 1884, 97).
1 I have seen only the Hindi and Nepali translations of the SDPS. Both retain
lokdyata on all occasions.
Lokayata and Its Derivatives in the Sad-dhamapundarfka—smm 85
2. yadd ca mafijus'rfr bodhisattvo maha‘sattvo. . .na ca

lokayatamantradharakin na lokayatikan sevate m1 bhajate m1
paryupfiste, mi ca taih sc'zrdham samstavam karoti.
(Tokyo ed. 236; Calcutta ed. 180-81; Darbhanga ed. 166; v.1. in line 1:
lokdyata—mantm-pc‘rmgc‘m).
. . . un Bodhisattva Mahasattva. . . ne recherche pas les Lokc‘gvatikas qui

lisent les Tantras ole leur secte. qu’il ne les honore pas, qu’il n’ entratient
aucun commece avec eux. . . (Burnouf 1852, 168).
A Bodhisattva Mahfisattva [is firm in his conduct and proper sphere]

when he does not serve, nor court, nor wait upon. . .adepts at worldly
spells, and votaries of a worldly philosophy, nor keep any intercourse
with them. . . . (Kern 1884, 262-63).
3. . . . no. ca tesc‘tm (kulaputrdném) lokfiyate rucir bhavisyanti no!

kc'tvyapmsrtc‘th sattva‘s test-rm abhimcitc'z bhaviyanti ha nrttalcé mt malls?
narllakc'i mt soundikaur. . . .
(Tokyo ed. 389; Calcutta ed. 311-12; Darbhanga ed. 266-67).
Ils (scil. les fils on les filles de familles qui retiendront le nom du
Bodhisattva Mahasattva Samantabhadra) n’éprouveront pas de plaisir,
dans la doctrine des Lokdyatas; les homm es livrés a la poesie ne leur
plaisont pas, la danseurs, les musicians, les dutters 1e vendeurs de
viande. . . (Burnouf 1852, 280).
They (the young men of good family who shall cherish the name of the
Bodhisattva Mahasattva Samantabhadra) . . . will have no pleasure in
worldly philosophy; no persons fondly addicted to poetry will please
them; no dancers, athletes, vendors of meat . . . (Kern 1884, 43 8).
As regards (l), Burnouf takes lokc'zyatai'h s’c‘zstmi'h to mean ‘books of a

vulgar (popular) science’; Kern, ‘books in which a profane philosophy is
taught’. Apparently neither of them attached any technical sense to the
lokc‘zyata-sc'istm-s (in plural), so the first occurrence of this word is not noted
in their Indexes.
Regarding (2), however, Burnouf in a note (1852, 409) says that the
Lokéiyatikas refers to the followers of ‘the atheistic doctrine of the
Cfirvfikas.’ He adds that in Pali lokc‘zyata signifies ‘histoire fabuleuse,
roman’ and cites Moggale'ma’s Abhidhc‘mappadipiké (as edited by Clough)
as his source.
86 Chapter Eight
This drew a retort from Rhys Davids:
Burnouf(168) reads tantras (instead of mantms), no doubt wrongly, and has

a curious blunder in his note on the passage (409). He says Lokayata means
in Pali ‘fabulous history, romance”: and quotes as its authority, the passage
. . . from the Abhidhdna Padfpz‘ka, in which Lokayatarn is simply explained
as vimpdasattham. This last expression cannot possibly mean anything o f
that sort (1899, vol. 1, 169-70 n.4).
Rhys Davids is right. But Rev. Benjamin Clough is to be blamed fOr

misleading Burnouf. Clough, in his notes on the line in the
Abhidhdnqvpadrpikd
(vitanda‘sattham vzjfieyam yam tam) lokc‘tyatam (iti) (2.8)
glosses lokfiyatam as ‘Fabulous Story’ (marginal notes on 13). Bumouf did

not notice that Clough and Tolfrey (who translated ‘Pali Grammar and Pali
Vocabulary’ in Clough), had mistaken ‘Fabulous Story” and elsewhere
“Fabulous History” as English equivalents for lokdyatam (instead of
vitandasattham, science of disputation), perhaps because fikhyfiyikfi and
kathci soon follow inthe dictionary (2.9; 1.113ab, 19 in Varanasi ed.) What
is more to be regretted is that, Burnouf, misled by Clough and Tolfrey, in
his tum misled Bohtlingk and Roth who in their Sanskrit— Wo'rterbuch gave
these two meanings of lokc‘zyata (in Pali): eine erfurdene Geschichte, Roman
(rendered into Germ an from Burnouf”s French version). 2
Bumouf proposed (409) that ‘the Lokayatikas of our Lotus ’ may suggest
‘the authors or readers of similar works in which the passions and affairs of
the world form the principal subject.’ Apparently he had in his mind the
wrong meaning given in Clough. Kern steered clear of Clough but called
the Lokayatikas ‘the Sadducees or Epicureans of India’ (263 n2. See also
438 n), equating them with the Carvakas who appeared much later. (DD.
Shastri too glosses lokdyatam as cfirvfikas’fisn'a (19) although Moggalana
mentions nothing of this sort).
The fact is that in the Pali commentaries and dictionaries, lokfiyatam is
always glossed as vitandasattham, the science of disputation. In other
Buddhist Sanskrit works (e.g., the LS), it means ‘points (or issues) of
dispute”.2 The Buddha, as is well—known, did not approve of the sophists.
2 Jayatilleke (1963/1980, 51-54) has discussed the matter in detail, pointing out
Suzuki’s error in translating lokc‘qyata in the LS as ‘materialism’. It may also be
mentioned that a modern dictionary of classical Sanskrit, the Sabdakatj‘mdmma,
glosses lokéyatam, besides Cdrvdkas‘cistram, as tarkabhedah.
Lokayata and Its Derivatives in the Sad-dhamajaundarfka-sfltm 87
So it is no wonder that both in (2) and (3), the Lokayatikas are looked down
upon and viewed on a par with those who followed despicable professions
(according to the Buddha). In all the three instances Loke'tyata-s'astras and
lokdyatikas mean books of logical disputation (vitanda) and masters of this
art, not the Barhaspatya/Cfirvaka/Lokayata philosophical system and its
adherents. The ways Burnouf and Kern render these words are beside the
mark.
But a crux still remains in case of (2). What could lokc‘ryata—mantra—
dhamkan mean? Burnouf’s rendering (tantra in place of mantra) is not
supported by other mss. Debiprasad Chattopadhyaya (1969, 110) strongly
objected to Kern's rendering of Iokdyatamantra as ‘worldly spells” as also
to Rhys Davids’s rendering as ‘mystic verses” (1969, 169). Vaidya explains
loka'yata as ‘a popular philosophy’ (1960, 296) which leaves the basic
question unanswered: Is lokdyata to be taken to mean ‘the science of
disputation’ or a materialist philosophical system?
The Abhidhanappadtjnika places lokc'zyatam in the Giravaggo, along with
vdnf, vakya, amenditam, vedo, vedangas, itihaso, nighandu, kefubham, katha,
vuttanto, pafivakya, etc. Each of these words refers to a subject of study, not
to any philosophical system. The SDPS creates another problem by placing
the word -mantra after lokc'zyata— and separately mentioning lokc'zyatikan
immediately after it. The word mantra is invariably associated with magic
and religious practices (sacrificial or otherwise). On the other hand,
Lokfiyata, whether taken to mean disputatio, a subject of study, or
materialism, is secular and has nothing to do with magic or religion.
How to solve this problem?
The word Zokfiyata both in Pali and Buddhist Sanskrit is generally used
as substantive to mean disputatio. It is attested by the Suttas in the Tipitaka
as well as the SKA (in DA). The emendations made by Cowell and Neil,
Mukhopadhyaya, and Vaidya in the latter text clearly show that in all cases
of its occurrence lokc'zyata is to be taken as a brahmanical subject of study

along with the Vedas, Upanisads, Vyakararia, Kaitabha, Padamimarnsa,
Mahapurusalaksaria, Bhfisyapravacana, etc.3 Such lists of subjects both for
Brahmanas and princes are often mentioned in the Upanisads and Pali,
Prakrit and Buddhist Sanskrit works.4 To cite one example: chandasi v5
wakarane v5 lokc'ryate vs": padamfmc'tmsc‘tyam v51 (DA, Darbhanga ed. 330.
Cf. also 318, 319, 328).
3 For a fuller discussion, see R. Bhattacharya 2009/2011, Chap. XVII, 193-96.

4 For a comparison of the curriculums found in the ChaUp and the Tipitaka, see
Jayatilleke 1963/1980, 47-48. See also Rhys Davids 1890, 7 n1 that mentions other
sources. For Jain works referring to such curriculums, see D.C. Dasgupta 1999, 5,
27, 67.
88 Chapter Eight
In view of this, I think the only solution is to em end the text, not on the
basis of further ms evidence but by such evidence as are found in other Pali
and Buddhist Sanskrit texts. Since [okayatarn in all available sources stands
for the science for disputation, there is no reason why it should mean
something else in this instance. In the MP (4), the king is described as ‘fond
of wordy disputation and eager for discussion with casuists, sophists, and
gentry of that sort’ (so 7'5!l bhassappavc'idako lokdyata—vitanda—
janasallc'ipappavattakotfihalo). Similarly Mlinda is ‘skilled alike in
casuistry and in the knowledge of the bodily marks that foreshadow the
greatness of a man” (. . .lokayata-mahapurisalakkhanesu anavayo ahosi,
10). As Rhys Davids has noted: ‘The above are the stock phrases for the
leaming of a scholarly Brahman . . .’ (1890, 22 n3). However, there is no
other mention of the compound, lokayatamantra or loka'yatatantra in Pali
or Buddhist Sanskrit except the SDPS.
What seems to have happened is this: the scribe has mistakenly written
the word loka'yatamantradharaka'n in place of lokayatgzajfiamanaadharakan
(or -paragan), and without noticing his own error went on copying.
What is the basis of this em endation‘? It is as follows: Lokayata,
Yajfiamantra, and Mahapurusalaksana are found mentioned in Buddhist
literature while enumerating the curriculum for a Brahm ana or a prince, as
in the DA (SKA):
lokayate yajfiamantre mahfipurusalaksane nisnato niskanksoh (Darbhanga

ed. 318)
lokayatayajfiamanflamahapumsalaksanesuparagah (ibid. 319).
In Pali too we have hetu and mantana (causation and spells) side by side
in the MP (3) as well as lokayata and mahapurisalaksana similarly
juxtaposed (10). Neither Burnouf nor Kem nor Rhys Davids remembered
all this at the time of studying the passage in the SDPS and readily accepted
the association of -mantra with [okayata-, apparently forgetting the stock
formula, lokfiyata—yajfiamantra—mahapurusalaksana. Unfortunately the copy
that contained this faulty reading (omission of yajfia- before -mantra) was
copied and recopied over and over again and thus the scribal error remained
undetected, even unsuspected, and consequently the reading continued to
confuse generations of scholars and readers.
The sentence in the SDPS under discussion would thus mean: ‘A
Bodhisattva Mahasattva [is firm in his conduct and proper sphere] when he
does not serve, nor court, nor wait upon . . . (adepts at) the science of
disputation (Lokayata) and those who retain in their memory the sacrificial
spells (or incantations) (yajfiamantra) as well as disputants (lokayatikan)
Lokayata and Its Derivatives in the Sad-dhama—pundarika—sfltm 89
nor keep any intercourse with them.’ The lokdyatikas are mentioned
separately, presumably because they had not only studied the
Lokfiyatas'fistra but used to practise it as well.
CHAPTER NINE
PRE-CARVAKA MATERIALISM IN THE JABALI

EPISODE IN THE VJLMKIRJMYANA
Occurrence of the names of philosophical systems in non-philosophical

writings is not always surprising. I am not thinking of such closet plays as
Jayantabhatta’s AD or Krsnmisra’s allegorical play, PC or Madhava’s
Sarikamvijaya which have philosophical debates as their theme. Nor do I
mean a secondary epic like Sfiharsa’s NC, in which Munamsa, non-dualist
Vedanta, and Nyaya are satirized (17.60-61, 74, 75). I mean rather such
works as the KS, a work of erotics, or tanyéloka—Locana, a commentary
on a work of poetics (for details see below Chap. Twenty, 225-226), or
Kalhana’s annals of the kings of Kashmir, Rajatamfigim' (4.345), and the
like. The name of Lokayata is not expected in a romance like Banabhatta’s
Kadambarf. Yet in the course of a series of similes the Lokfiyatikas are
brought in; we find them again in a strange kind of ascetics’ grove
(tapovana) rubbing shoulders with the adherents of several philosophical
systems, both orthodox and heterodox, living in peaceful co-existence and
arguing to their heart’s content (see Appendix A below).
Similarly there are anonymous floating verses both praising and blaming
the pundits of Nyaya and Mimfimsfi (Subhfisita-raIna-bhc‘mdfigc‘zra 44-45).
A besotted lover in the Amaruéataka, who could think of nothing else but
his beloved, finds her everywhere, and wonders: “All things in the world are
she, she, she, she; what non—dualist doctrine is this?’ (so? so? so? so? jagati
sakale k0 ’yam advaitavédal’t, Amaruéataka, verse 102', 69).
A more intriguing situation is created when the basic doctrines of a
philosophical system are stated in so many words in a poem or a play. But
the name of the system remains undisclosed, one would think, quite
unnecessarily. Any informed reader of the NC would understand who the
anonymous member of Kali’s army is: he must be a materialist whom the
gods denounce (17.37 et seq and 17.84 et seq). Yet Carvfika is never
Pre-Carvaka Materialism in the Jabali Episode in the Vfilmi'kiRamayana 91
mentioned.l There are also other works in which no name is mentioned at

all, but any infonn ed reader would understand that a materialist is the butt
of attack.
Instances of such veiled representation of the dars’anas are found both
in the two primary epics, the Ram and the MM although no names are
named. The Jabali episode inthe Ram, Ayodhyakanda (cantos 100-01 inthe
crit. ed., cantos 108-09 in the vul.) 2 has often been mentioned as such a
source. Both the commentators and the translators have ahn ost universally
used the name Carvaka to the doctrine that Jabali preaches in the Ram,
Ayodhyfikanda. However, it is historically inaccurate. The Carvakas did not
appear on the scene before the eighth century, while the Ram had been
redacted between 400 BCE and 400 CE, before the redaction of the Mbh.
But then the appellations Carvaka and Lokayata had been widely
employed as a namesake of materialism in India even in pre-modem times.
At least from the eighth century onwards, the terms, Barhaspatya, Carvaka,
Lokayata, and Nastika were treated as synonymous (see n4 below). As to
the Rim the commentaries on vul. 100.38 and Bvl (Bengali version),
109.29 and 116.22, 44, use any of the last three names to indicate the same
person and the doctrine he preaches. Many modern scholars (e.g. Jacobi
1893, 161) and translators have followed suit.3
1 Handiqui renders 17.92 as follows: ‘The god of fire blazed in anger and said,
rebuking Carvaka...’ (1956, 255) and 17.95 as ‘...as if strung by the Carvaka’s
utterance’ (ibidem). But the text does not mention Carvaka in either of the verses.
However, it refers to Lokayata in the second. Narayana, the zealous commentator,
explains the vocative re as re cdrvcika nfca, ‘O the lowly/mean Carvaka’ in the first
instance and Lokayata as nastikddhama, ‘the worst of the negativists,’ in the second.
2 The text commented on by Rama in his Tilaka commentary (which agrees with S
(the southern recension) has been generally accepted as representing the vul.
(Balakanda, crit. ed., Supplementary Introduction, IV). I have used the Parimal
edition(1983) which contains, besides Tilaka, two more commentaries, Simmani by
8ivasahf1ya, and Bhflsana by Govindaraja. I have also consulted Manoharfi by
Lokanatha Cakravartfi, and Amrtakataka by Madhavayogin. They all gloss nastika
as carvcika in their explications o f Rama’s speech equating the nfistika with the
Buddhist and the thief (vul. 109.34; crit. ed. additional passage 2241* lines 13-16).
Modem translators have followed them.
Unfortunately I had no access to the commentary by Ramanrija, referred to by
Phanibhushana Tarkavagisa (1981—85, vol. I, xiv). Rainanuja, Tarkavagisa reports,
mentions two kinds of Lokayatikas, fistika and ndstika, and distinguishes between
the followers of Nyaya and those of the Carvaka accordingly. Tarkavagisa concurs
with the view that in ancient times Nyaya too was known as Lokayata (1981-85, vol.
I, xv).
3 E.g. Gorresio, Bv 109.29 ‘Brahmani atei’ 1844, 401', M.N. Dutt, vul. 100.38
‘atheistical Brahmanas’ 1892, 455 and, crit. ed. 94.32 ‘bmhmans who are materialists,’
92 Chapter Nine
It will, however, be improper to think that any mention or allusion to

early materialist doctrine/s found in narratives or even canonical works of
the Buddhists and the Jams always refer to what is now called the
Carvaka/Lokayata; it may refer to any Pre-Carvakamaterialist view or even
early Samkhya. Concerning the colloquy on cosmogony in the Bhrgu—
Bharadvaja duologue (MM 12. 180. 1l -l 8), NTlakantha says that Bharadvaja
by adopting (lit. positioning himself on) the Lokayata doctrine raises this
objection (lokc'iyatamate sthitvc‘z dissipati). Apparently NTlakantha did not
distinguish between the two materialism 5, one embodied in Samkhya, the
other in Carvaka. Not only Nilakantha but Dahlmam, too, calls Bharadvaja
a materialist (Die Sdmkhya Philosophie, S. l93ff, mentioned in the Mbh,
Sintiparvan, crit. ed, 2157 col. 2). SK. Belvalkar, prejudiced as he was
against materialism, summarily dismisses this identification by saying:
‘[T]he question of Bharadvaja is pitched on a much higher key than that of
for lokc‘gyatz‘kfin brfihmanfin. In his note on 101.29, Pollock (1986) always writes
‘Carvaka’: “‘A Buddhist [or the Buddha, buddhah] is like a thief; and know that a
Cairwika is (like) a Buddhist” [tathcigatm so Cm] (2241*.14—15; this is apparently
the only occurrence of the word buddha in the Ram tradition). Iabali thereafter
responds (2249* = 2241*.21-26) with the denial that he is a Ccirvfika, and declares
that he only spoke as he did to winRama over.”
However, the interpolated passage has nfistika, not Carve—aka:
yathfi hi comb sa tathfihi buddhastathdgatam nastikamatra viddhi |

tasmfitda’hi yak éalgiatamah prajfinfimsanastikenébhimukho budhab 532:?! |
(vul. 109.34; crit. ed Additional Passage 2241* lines 13-16)
Iabali too in his reply uses the word mistika only, and no such word as Carvaka
or Lokayata:
m1 nistikfinfim vacanam bravfmyaham m1nastiko’ham m1 ca nfisti kimcanal

samfksya kfilampunarc‘ts‘tiko’bhavam bhaveya kalepunareva nastikah|
m: cdpi kdlo ’yam updgatah s’anair yathd mayd nastikavfig udfritd |
nivarmnfirtham lava rdma kfiranch‘prasddandrtham ca mayaz'tad udfritaml
(vul. 10938-39, crit. ed. Additional Passage 2241* lines 21-26 and 2241
(B)*-)
1 do not speak the language of nastikas nor am I a nfistika, nor is it true that
there is naught beyond this world! Suiting the occasion, I assume at times
the role of a nastika and at others that of a nfistika! It seemed to me the time
had come to assume the language of a nastika, O Rama, in order to persuade
thee to return. It was for the purpose of conciliating thee that I made this
declaration! (H.P. Shastri’s trans. (modified), 417. Shastri indiscriminately
writes ‘unbeliever’ and ‘atheist’ for ndstika).
a mere Carvaka. . ..’ (ibidem). Presumably Belvalkar, like many others

before and after him, employs the name Carvaka figuratively (synecdoche,
an individual for the class) to suggest any materialist, Samkhya or Lokayata
or Cart/aka, indiscriminately, irrespective of the time from when the names
are found in philosophical literature. Apparently, Nflakntha too could not
think of any other variety of materialism than the Carvaka/Lokayata
although the so-called epic Samkhya can always claim such a title.
Madhavayogin, a more perceptive commentator of the Rim, has pointed out
that ‘no revealed or traditional text is it shown that liberation is secured
through logical knowledge, “dialectical reasoning”; all logicians (including
Paficas’ikha, one of the founders of the Sdmkhya system of philosophy) are
materialists, and even those who accept the word of the vedas do so
selectively, and deny that the soul is pure consciousness, non-different from
Brahmi, and so on.’ (cited by Pollock (1986) in a note on his translation of
the Ram crit. ed. 94.33. For the original see Ram 1965, 342).
In what follows I propose to offer some reflections on the Jabsli episode
which to all medieval commentators and, since the westem scholars got
acquainted with the Ram, has been instantly recognized as a representation
of materialism (Muir 1862). The only materialist doctrine that they knew of
was Carvaka/Lokayata/BErhaspatyafNastika (as communicated by HT.
Colebrooke 1837 and HH. Wilson 1828), and so Jabsli’s preaching was
automatically identified by them with Carvaka’s.
The name of Carvaka in the philosophical context (whichnaturally excludes

the demon Carvfika mentioned inthe Mbh (crit. ed. 12.39.23-47, vul. Chaps.
38-39), as noted above, does not occur before the eighth century CE.4
Lokfiyata in early Buddhist Pali and Sanskrit, and Prakrit sources stands for
disputatio, the science and art of disputation, vitatanda(vc‘zda)sattham,
vitandc‘réastra (R. Bhattacharya 2009/2011, 187-96; and see below Chap.
4 Jinendl‘abuddhi 24: atha v5 cdwflkam praWetaducyate....HaIibhadra’s SDSam,

Chap. 6 is devoted to the exposition of Lokayata (lokfiyatci vadamy evam, etc. ‘The
Lokayatas say as follows,’ v. 80a), butinv. 85d we read: cdrvdkdhpmtipedire ‘The
Ca‘rvakas contended”. See also Kamalasila who, in his commentary (Pafijikfi) on
gantaraksita’s TS, Chap. 22 entitled ‘The Examination of the Lokayata System,’
Lokflyataparfksd, uses the names Ca‘rvaka and Lokayata interchangeably. See TSP
11: 639, 649, 657, 663, 665, also 11: 520, 939 and 945. Jayantabhatta also treats the
four names, Barhaspatya, Carvaka, Lokayata, and ndstika, as synonymous. See NM
1: 9, 43, 102-03, 275, 387-88, etc. Hemacandra, AC 3. 526-27, too mentions the four
as the names of the adherents of the same philosophical system.
The Slabdakalpadmma too treats these four as paryfiya words, similar in
meaning.
94 Chapter Nine
Eighteen, 183-198). In the course of time this name also came to denote
m aterialist philosophy. Lokayata as the name of a philosophical system with
Brhaspati as its teacher is first found in the Tamil epic Manimékalai
(composed betweenthe fourth and the seventh century), 27.78-80, 264, 273.
This Lokayata is to be distinguished from vitandc'wc'rdaéc‘zstm. The
Manimékalai also contains a brief exposition of a doctrine called bhfitavc‘zda,
a term which is the exact Sanskrit and Tamil rendering of ‘m aterialism’.5
The text of the Rim had been redacted before all this. The Jabali episode
thus represents the views of a pre-Cérvaka materialist, or rather a proto-
materialist (as we shall presently see), largely similar but not in all respects
identical to a Carvaka. For one thing, the episode contains only one aspect
of the ontology of old materialism (see above Chap. Three, 41), viz. there is
no life after death. Jabali is absolutely silent about all other aspects of
materialism, especially its epistemology.
Another point to be noted in Jabali’s exhortation to Rama is the rejection
of all religious law-books as authority. In no uncertain terms he denies the
validity of such books. In this respect he very much resembles the lokayatika
brahmana against whom Rama cautioned Bharata in Ram (Ayodhyakanda
crit. ed. 94.32, vul. 100.28).
Such a representation is not unexpected. Jabali speaks only as much as
is relevant to the given context; there was no occasion to deliver a thorough
discourse on the tenets of materialism as a whole. The episode thus contains
apartial representation of the doctrine. Despite this limitation, an in—depth
study of the episode is worth attempting.
Barring some casual mention in the Balakfinda, Book 1 of the epic (crit.
ed.11.6b and 68.4b), Jfibfili’s name appears only thrice in the
Ayodhyakinda, Book 2 (crit. ed. 61.2d, 100.1a and 105.2b). Almost every
time he is attributed such epithets as mahfiyas’a ‘of great fame’,
brfihmanottama “an excellent Brahmin’, etc. There is no allusion to this
episode or to Jabali elsewhere in the whole epic. However, the episode

deserves a close study as much as Ajita Kesakambala’s teachings recorded
in the ‘SPhS’ (in l) and elsewhere in the Buddhist canonical texts do (e.g.,
‘Payasi (rajafifia) suttam’ (DN vol. II: 10.1.2; 236), ‘Apannakasuttam’ (ll/LN
2: 10.1.3, 4; 78-79), and ‘Sandakasuttam’ (MN 2: 26.1.3; 213).
This is how Jabali, one of the king’s counsellors, asks Rama to forget all
about his promise of going to and staying in the forest for fourteen years
made to his father, Daéaratha. Jfibfili urges him to get back to the capital,
Ayodhyfi in order to hold the reign of the state:
5Mam'mékalai 27265-277; 153-54. The bhfltavfidjn in the Manime'kalai, however,

distinguishes himself from the Lokayatas, who are said to be materialists belonging
to a different school (27272-73; 154).
Pre-Carvaka Materialism in the Jabali Episode in the Vfilmz'kiRamayana 95
As righteous Rama was consoling Bharata, a prominent brahman named

Jabali addressed him in words at variance with righteousness: “Come now,
Raghava, you must not entertain such nonsensical ideas like the commonest
of men, and you a noble-minded manin distress. What man is kin to anyone,
what profit has anyone in anyone else? A person is born alone, and all alone
he must die. And thus, Rama, the man who feels attachment thinking, ‘This
is my mother, this my father,’ should be regarded as a madman, for in truth
no one belongs to anyone. A man traveling from village to village will spend
the night somewhere and next day leave the place where he stopped and
continue on — in the same way, Kikutstha, his father and mother, his home
andwealth are mere stopping places for a man. The wise feel no attachment
to them. You must not, best of men, abdicate the kingship o f your fathers
and embark upon this unwise course, painful, rocky and filll of thorns.
Consecrate yourself in prosperous Ayodhya; the city is waiting for you,
wearing her single braid o f hair. Indulge in priceless royal pleasures and
enjoy yourself in Ayodhya, prince, like Sakra [Indra, the lord of the gods] in
his heaven. Daéaratha was nobody to you, and you were nobody to him. The
king was one person, you another. So do as I am urging. The king has gone
where he had to go; such is the course all mortals follow. You are merely
deluding yourself The menl grieve for, and I grieve for no one else, are all
who place ‘righteousness’ above what brings them profit. They find only
sorrow in this world, and at death their lot is annihilation just the same.
People here busy themselves because ‘It is the Eighth Day,6 the rite for the
ancestors.” But just look at the waste of food — what really is a dead man
going to eat? And if something one person eats here could fill the belly of
someone else, one could simply offer .Slraddha for a traveler, and he would
need no provisions for the road. It was only as a charm to secure themselves
donations that cunning men composed those books that tell us, ‘Sacrifice,
give alms, sanctify yourself, practice asceticism, renounce.’ Accept the idea
once and for all, high—minded prince, that there exists no world to come.
Address yourself to what can be perceived and turn your back on What
cannot. Give precedence to these ideas of the wise, with which the whole
world concurs. Be appeased by Bharata and accept the kingship. (100.1-17.
Trans. Sheldon Pollock, 1986)
éévdsayantam bharatamjdbdlirbrflhmanottamah |
uvdca rdmam dhamajfiam dhamdpetamidam wreak || 1”
sddhu rdghava md bhfitt‘e buddhirevam nimrthakfl I
prfikrtasya narasyeva a‘rya buddhestapasvfnah [I 2“
kah kasya pumsa bandhuh kimfipyam kasya kena cit |
yadekojéyatejantureka eva vinaéyati || 3“
GAsrakd. The word refers to the eighth tithz' in every month after the full moon day,
but, as usual, the law-books for domestic rites (Grhyasfitras) differ. See Moghe 2000,
487. For filrther details, Kane 1968-1977, vol. 4, 353-60.
96 Chapter Nine
tasma‘nmdtépitd cetz' nima wgieta yo numb |

unmatta iva sajfieyo nfisti kéciddhi kasya cit || 4|]
yathc‘t grdmdntaram gacchannarah kaé citkva cidvaset |
utsrjya ca tamfivcisam pratisthetdpare Iaham‘ || 5“
evameva manusydpfim pitd mats? grham vast; |
dvfisamfltmm kdkutstha safiante mitm safianfih || 6”
pitifyam rcy'yam samutsyya m ndrhati narormma I
fisthdtum kdpatham duhkham visamam bahukamakam || 7“
samrddhdydmayodhydydmfltmdnamabhisecaya|
ekavepfdhard hi tvdm Hagarz’sampmtfksate || 8”
rcjjabhogdnanubhavanmahfirhflnpfirthivdtmajal
vihara Wamayodhydyfim yathc? s’akmstrivistape || 9“
na re kaéciddaéaratahstvam ca Iasya m1 kaé mm |
anyo rife? tvamanyas‘ca tasmfitkum yaducyate || 10”
gatah sa nrpatistatra gamma/am yatra tena vai |
pravrttiresci marlyflnfim tvam m mithyé vihanyase [I 11“
arthadharmaparfi ye ye tdmstdfis‘ocfimi netarfin |
te hi dubkhamihaprdpya vinais'am pretya bhejire || 12”
astakfipitrdaivagzamigzqyam pmsrtojanam
annasyopadravam pas’ya mrto hi kimaéisyati || 13”
yadi bhuktamihdnyena dehumanyasya gacchati |
dacfizdtpravasatah s‘rfiddham m1 tamathyas‘anam bhavet || 14“
ddnasamvananfi hyete granthci medhdvibhih krtdh |
yajasva dehi dfksasva tapastapyasva santyaja || 15“
St]! na’stipammizfyeva kuru buddhim mahfimate |
praWaksam yattadfitist‘hapamksam prsthatah kuru || 16||
satdm buddhim pumskrlya sarvalokanidarfiinfm |
rdjyam tvampratigrhm’sva bhamtenapmsfiditah || 17“
The number of verses in the crit. ed. (100. 1-17) is one less than the vul.
(108. 1—18).Verse 11 in the vul. (see n6 below) is the only one that is found
to be interpolated (crit. ed. Additional Passage 2239*). In the Bengali

(Gaudiya) version (hereafter Bv) there are many more additional verses
(116.4-11 and 28-39. See crit. ed. Appendix 27). But the readings of all the
recensions and versions need not detain us here at this stage.
Jfibfili’s speech is a lucid exposition of the basics of the materialist view
concerning life and death of humans. The contention is clear and
unambiguous: there is no Other World (paraloka), therefore it is useless to
perform rites for the ancestors (s’rciddha); no credence is to be given to the
gmnthas, that is, the Dharrns’astras, which urge people to pay gifts (to the
Brahmaria priests), perform Vedic sacrifices (yajfias), advocate renunciation,
etc. Such things are nonsensical and serve no purpose. Why is Das’aratha
not to be considered as having any relation to Rama (as stated in verses 3-
Pre-Carvaka Materialism in the Jabali Episode in the Vfilmr'kiRamayana 97
4)? The answer is provided in verses 4-6.7 The denunciation of offering

gifts, performing yajfias, etc. also resembles Ajita’s words:
0 King, there is no (consequence to) alrns-giving, sacrifice or oblation A

good or bad action produces no result. This world does not exist, nor does
the other world. There is no mother, no father. There is no rebirth of beings
after death. In this world, there are no samanas [Shamanas] or brahmanas
established in the Noble Path and accomplished in good practice, who,
through direct knowledge (that is magga insight) acquired by their own
efforts, can expound on this world and the other world. This being is but a
compound of the four great primary elements; after death, the earth-element
(or element of extension) returns and goes back to the body of the earth, the
water-element (or element of cohesion) returns and goes back to the body of
water, the fire-element (or element of thermal energy) returns and goes back
to the body of fire, and the air-element (or element of motion) returns and
goes back to the body of air, while the mental faculties pass on into space.
The four pall-bearers and the bier (constituting the fifth) carry the corpse.
The remains of the dead can be seen up to the cemetery where bare bones
lie graying like the colour of the pigeons. All alms-giving ends in ashes.
Fools prescribe alms-giving', and some assert that there is such a thing as
merit in alrns-giving', but their words are empty, false and nonsensical. Both
the fool and the wise are annihilated and destroyed after death and
dissolution of their bodies. Nothing exists after death. (T en 8mm: 83,
translation slightly modified).
Natthi mahfircjja dinnam. Natthi yi;;ham.Natthi hutam. Natthi

sukatadukkafénam kammcinam phalam vipdka. Natthi ayam laka. Natthi
para laka. Natthi mdt§.Natthi pité. Natthi sattfi apapdtikd. Natthi lake
samanabréhmané sammaggatd sammdpafipanné ye imafica lakam parafica
Iakam sayam abhififié sacchikatvd pavedenti. Cdtummahébhfltika ayam
purisa yadfi kdlam karati, paghavf paghavikfiyam anupeti anupagacchati.
A_pa dpakfiyam armpeti anupagacchati.Teja tejakdyam anupeti
anupagacchatiflfiya vfiyakéyam anupeti anupagacchati, Ezkcisam induyfini

samkamanti. Jsama'zpaficamc‘rpurisfi matam ddfiya gacchanti. YElva cilahanci
padcini pafifidyami. Képatakdni arthfni bhavanti. Bhasmamd fihutiya.
dattupafifiattam yadidam ddnam. tesam tuccham muse? vilfipa ye keci
atthikavddam vadanti. Bdle ca pandite ca kfiyassa bhedd ucchijjami
vinassanti m1 hontiparammarand”ti. (‘SPhS’ 2.4.21—23. DN 1: 48-49)
7 The additional verse in the vul. (108.11) explains the answer further: ‘The father
is [supplies] but the seed of an offspring; the sperm and blood combine in awoman
during her fertile period to bring about the birth of a person’ (crit. ed. 2239*. Pollock
(1986)’s translation). It is perhaps in this sense that Ajita Kesakambala, a proto-
materialist of the Buddha’s time, used to preach: ‘There is no mother, no father’,
natthi mats? natthz‘pz‘tfi. See his speech quoted below.
98 Chapter Nine
It should be noted that while introducing the doctrine of Kurnfira

Kassapa in the ‘Pfiyasirajafifiasutta’ (DNH210. 1. 2', 236) the opening words
of this very discourse are quoted verbatim albeit in a different order: natthi
paro loko, natthi sattc‘z opapc‘ttikc'z, natthr' sukag‘adukkag‘c'mam kammdnam
phalam vipc‘zko. In fact, this is the only proto-materialist doctrine that is
known and referred to in the Tipitaka and because of the total rejection of
everything that was considered sacred and beyond question by the
Buddhists. Hence it was called ucchedavc'rda, the doctrine of annihilation.
Ajita’s view concerning the Other World is also quoted almost verbatim
in the commentaries on Négfirjuna’s MS:
mistyamlokah misfitpara lokah, Misti sukrtaduskrtfinfim karmana‘mphalam,

nasti vipdkah, ndstz' sattvfindm upapdduka iti. .. Bhavaviveka on 18.5, 2: 60.
nfistyamlokah, mim‘ para lokah, svattvfindmupapédako nfisti, in”...
Nagfirjuna on MS’ 18.6, vol. 2, 63.
nfislyam loko, nfisti paraloko, nfisti sukrtaduskrténdm karmanfim
phalavipiiko, misti sattva upapdduka iti... Candrakirti, on 18.6, 2; 64.
yadayam loko nfisti, paraloko misti, svattvc‘mfimupapfidako nfistiityddi...
Buddhapalita on 18.7, vol. 2, 66.
Similar views are expressedby a na‘stika (not identified by any name but
definitely a Pre-Carvaka materialist) in Mink Santiparvan 211.22-28.The
denunciation of sacrificial acts, involving oblations, paying fees to the
priests, etc, mentioned in the first part of Ajita’s speech, is echoed in the
words of the heretical king Vena in the 1.108.19: ‘There is (no consequence
to) offering gifts, oblations, rites, nor are there gods and sages’, nastz' dattam
hutam cestam na dew? rsayo na ca. Medhfitithi probably refers to a part of
this line in his commentary on Manu 3.150: mm dattam nfisn‘ hutam, and
adds: ‘there is no other-world’, nfistipamlokah (vol. 2, 160). Explaining the
word ‘reasoner’, haituka in Mann 4.30 Medhatithi repeats the clauses in

reverse order: Misti paralokah Misti dattam misti hurtam... (vol. 2, 315).
Similarly nastikya inManu 11.65 is glossed by him as nfisti paraloko misti
dattam igzficflzabhiniveéah (vol. 6, 62).
This is how Ajita’s words appear and reappear in diverse works and in
unexpected places, for prior to the appearance of the Carvikas with their
sharply defined epistemology, Ajita’s doctrine of annihilation, ucchedavc‘zda
was the most well-known exposition of proto-materialistic ontology. Aj ita,
however, covers a wider ground than Jabfili does in his exhortation to Rama.
He also describes what happens to the elements which make the body of
humans. Jfibali says nothing about it.
Rama does not offer a point-by-point reply to Jabfili’s advice but expatiates
on the duties of a warrior (ksatriya) and the righteousness expected of him,
the importance of keeping words given to one’s father, etc. He focuses on
what an editor of the Ram has rightly described as ‘praise of truth’
sazyapms’amsc‘z (Madras ed. 1958, 283); Gaspare Gorresio, the Italian editor
and translator of Ram Bv, also calls this canto (118 in his ed.) lode del vero
(1851, 132).
It has been noted before that although one aspect of the materialist
ontology (viz. nothing remains of a hum an after her/his death) is presented
by Jabali, there is no reference to its epistemology which, since the eighth
century CE, became the chief point of controversy between the Carvakas and
all other Vedist schools. The words praijyakga andparoksa (crit. ed. 100.16
vul. 108.17) are apparently used to suggest what is immediately obtainable
and what is not. They do not carry any technical significance relating to
sense perception and inference (anumdna), word or verbal testimony
(s’abda), or any other instrument of cognition (prams-ma) as used in the
philosophical texts in India. Among the commentators only Rama (Tilaka)
glosses parokya as inference, verbal testimony, etc., anumc‘mas’abdddi
gamyam', others remain true to the context: pmtyaksa is happiness (in
enjoying) the kingdom, rc‘zjyasukham (Sivasahaya), while paroksa suggests
effects to be gained by complying with the words given to father, etc.,
sukhaphalakam pitrvacanapanpc'llanfidikam (Govindarfija). The Pre-
Carvaka materialists, it is also known from other Buddhist and Jain
sources,8 did not believe in the existence of heaven and hell; they considered
all religious rites, particularly rites for the ancestors, to be futile. This view
is forcefully reiterated by Jabali. Echoes of his words will be heard in the
closing verses of S-M’s fourteenth-century epitome, SDS, chap.1', 13.110—
15.132. Some of them, particularly verses 3-4, 6, and 8-10, are similar to
the anti-Vedic stanzas known at Patafrjali’s time (second century BCE) as
‘wild songs,’ pramattagfta, as opposed to the pro-Vedic bhrfija (See below

Chap. Twenty 230-233).
It should, however, be kept in mind that the rules of s’rc‘zddha in an
authoritative Smrti like the Mcmu involve, as in some other sacrificial rites,
offering flesh to the departed ancestors (3.268) and because of this alone
such rites were anathema to both the Iains and the Buddhists.9
s E.g., Manimékalai, SKS and its commentaries, Vasu., etc. For details see R.
Bhattacharya 2009/2011, 33-44, see above Chap. Five, 67-71.
9 Cf. S W 69; DA 321, verses 22-28. For filrther details see R. Bhattacharya
2009/2011, 213-18. One verse cited in the SDS (13.14-15) that is attributed to
Brhaspati by S-M is in fact similar to a verse found in Wu Vangavasi ed. 3.18.26.
But it is not a materialist but the demons, mums converted to the Jain and Buddhist
100 Chapter Nine
Significantly enough, Jabali says nothing definite about the grounds for
rejecting and ridiculing Vedic rules for the performance of s’réddha. Nor
does he speak even once of the departing self (611mm) which is credited by
the immaterialists with the power of existing/surviving without any
substratum, that is, the mortal body, because the self is imperishable.
Jabali’s opposition to post-m ortem rites stems from the philosophical
conviction that there being no Other World, no heaven and hell,10 and hence,
no reward and punishment after one’s death for one’s deeds during one’s
life-tim e, such rites are futile and meaningless.
There is thus a vital difference between the Jains and the Buddhists on
the one hand and the materialists on the other in their rejection of performing
rites for the ancestors according to the Smrtis. The former objected to the
offering of animal flesh for the consumption of the ancestors: their
opposition to s’raddha was based on the doctrine of non-injury (ahimsd).
There was no philosophical foundation; the objection was purely religious.
On the other hand, the materialists’ satire on érc'tddha follows from their
ontology which knows death to be the end of life, with nothing to follow.
This point has been missed again and again by even the most meticulous
scholars. Sadananda Kas’miraka in his Advaita-bmhma—siddhi Chap. 2
(chapters are called mudgampmhc‘zms, hitting with a club) in which he
demolishes the Carvaka to his satisfaction, quoted (100-01) four verses
(with some variants) from the Vignu Parana, VPu (Kalikata Vangavasi ed.,
3.18.24-27, Bombay ed. 1910, 3.18.26—29). Probably this misled both HH.
Wilson (1840/1980, 492 n7) and John Muir (C/L 353-54) to think that the
said verses ‘represent the sentiments of Vrhaspati’s school’ (although
whether Wilson and/or Muir were influenced by the ABS is not definitely
known). Many other scholars in the last two centuries have followed their
footsteps. Everyone of them, however, overlooked the obvious fact that
these verses are placed in the mouths of demons (asuras), not any
materialists. The demons were seduced by a Jain monk and a Buddhist

preacher who were none but Mayamoha, a personification of illusion-cum-
faiths who say so. No mention is made of Brhaspati or any materialist in the VPu.
See below Chap. Eighteen, 183-186.
10 Whitney (1890) observes that according to the KaghaUp the unworthy people do
not go to hell ‘(of which there is no trace in the Hindu religion of this period), but to
a repeated return to earthly existence [as stated by Yama in KathaUp 1.2.6d].
Transmigration, then, is not the fate of all, but only of the unworthy“ (92). It should,
however, be noted that heaven, svargaloka and the Fire leading to the heaven,
svargya agnz’ are mentioned in KathaUp 1.1.12-14, 19 as also in other Upanisads.
See EPU, Index to words and clauses.
delusion created by Visnu to help the gods overcome their adversaries, the
demons. (For further details see below Chap. Eighteen).
Franco and Preisendanz maintain that ‘Lokayata ontology seems to be

largely subordinated to the school’s ethical agenda’ (1998, VI: 179).
Furthenn ore, they are of the opinion that ‘[t]he main aim of all theories of
elements and consciousness is to deny rebirth and thereby to destroy the
cornerstone of Brahmanical, Buddhist and Jaina socio—religious and ethical
ideals that presuppose karmic retribution over many lives’ (1998, Vl:179-
80). This view is later repeated inFranco 1997, 142.
All philosophical system-builders, I contend, first decide on their
ontology; everything else — not only ethics, but also epistemology,
metaphysics, etc. — is formed accordingly, not the other way round. The
issue of fixing which instruments of cognition are acceptable is determined
by the answer to the question: which instruments would suit and best
promote the ontology of the system concemed.
The Rc‘zm passage, it should be noted, is absolutely silent about both
karm an and rebirth. Whenever Rama in his speech refers to karm an (as in
vul. 109.28) he means duty, kartavya (of a son to his father) and nothing
else. On the other hand, Jabali focuses on the falsehood contained in the
religious texts11 that urge people to donate liberally to the Brahmanas,
perform sacrifices, consecrate them selves, and give themselves up to
asceticism and renunciation (crit. ed. 100.15, vul. 108.16). Ajita
Kesakambala, too declared so, equally unambiguously (see above).
Ajita, however, denied the twin doctrine of karman and rebirth
categorically: ‘A good or bad action produces no result’, natthi
sukaradukkalfinfim kammc‘mc‘zm phalam vipc‘zko, and ‘There is no rebirth of
beings after death’, natthz’ sattfi upapdtikc‘z. These two vital issues are not
mentioned in Jabali’s speech. The other exhortation, ‘Accept the idea once
and for all, high-minded prince, that there exists no world to com e,’ sa misti
pamm ityet kuru buddhim mahdmate (crit. ed. 100.16, vul. 108.17), is
significant, for it unequivocally denies the Other World as Ajita too had said
natthiparo loko.12 Jabali’s position represents that of the denier of the Other
1‘ CIit. ed. 100.15ab vul. 108.16ab. Commentators differ in their opinions as to

which books are meant. Rama glosses granthélz as ‘books such as the Veda and
others’ (i.e., similar sacred texts), vedfldayo granthdlz. éivasahaya and Govindaraja
mention only books related to gifts and yajfia, i.e., Ghryasfitras and Smrti texts, not
the Veda (vul., 992). In any case, no secular book could be meant.
12Ajita Kesakarnbala in his characteristic way, however, said: ‘This world does not
exist, nor does the Other World’ (DN 1: 48, Ten Suttas 83), which has caused much
confusion: was Ajita Kesakambala a nihilist or a materialist? An attempt has been
102 Chapter Nine
World as mentioned by Naciketas in his prayer to Yam a: ‘some say, “He

(so. the man who is departed) is” and some say, “He is not”,’astiti eke
ndyamastiti’ caike (KathaUp, 1.1.20. Whitney’s translation). The story of
King Pae si (Payasi) inBuddhist and Jainworks13 and the story of King Bena
in the 1.108 were planned with the sole aim of depicting the materialists as
deniers of the Other World. As in the KaflraUp so in the Ram there is no
other issue or doubt, either ontological or epistemological, but this: what
happens to humans after death.
One point is clear: the conflict between idealism and materialism in
India began with this question, viz. whether or not there is the Other World.
Such issues as the reality of the world (denied by Yajfiavalkya in BrhadUp
4.3.10), the primacy of matter or of consciousness, which instruments of
cognition are to be regarded as valid, etc, were raised later.14
In view of all this, it is better to describe both Ajita (most probably a
historical character, in any case a legendary one) and Jabali (a fictive figure)
as ‘proto-materialists’. They do represent materialist views but of a
materialism that was yet to be system atized. It is, we may say, materialism
in the making. 15 There was as yet no clear-cut epistemology; its metaphysics
made to show that such a double negation is a mere turn of phrase found both in
Sanskrit and modern Indian languages (such as Bangla) for emphasizing an idea.
See R. Bhattacharya 2009/2011, 45-54.
13For details see R. Bhattacharya 2009/2011, 22—24. Erich Frauwallner 1997, II: 216—
219, and perhaps following him Franco and Preisendanz 1998, VI: 179, have taken
this fictitious narrative as a real-life story. All of them overlook the fact that the same
narrative contains variations in the names of the interlocutors: in the Pali legend it
is Kassapa, a Buddhist monk and in the Pralcrit legend, Kesi, a Jain monk. In
Haribhadra’s reworking of the legend, SKa 163-81, the debate is betweenPingakesa,
a follower of a minister (not the king himself) and Vijayasirnha, a Jain monk. Such
imaginary conversations are invented by the authors who have an axe to grind. The
purpose is to extol their respective religious and philosophical systems at the
expense of materialism or any other system opposed to theirs.
‘4 The second meaning o f nastika, the defiler of the Veda, vedanindaka, as given in
Mam 2.11, seems to have its origin in the MaiUp. It contains not only an intriguing
word, avaia'ika, non-Vedic (7.10), a word that is unique in the Upanisads, but also
an injunction: ‘Hence, what is set forth in the Vedas — that is true! Upon what is told
in the Vedas — upon that wise men live their life. Therefore a Brahman (brdhmana)
should not study what is non-Vedic.’ (7.10. Hume’s translation).
15 Frauwallner believed in the story of Paesi as ‘a lively picture of an old Indian
Materialist on the King’s throne. And Paesi was certainly not the only one of its
kind’ (1997, vol. II, 218-219). Paesi thus becomes a type, not just anindividual. In
spite o f this generalisation, he admitted: ‘ [B]ut however interesting and
characteristic such accounts are, they can rarely claim a place o f the same kind in a
history of Indian philosophy. Materialism gains for it an importance from the
too was in a rudimentary state. At first, most probably in the sixth/fifth

century BCE, the so-called heretical or anti-Establishment ideas occurred to
individual thinkers like Ajita Kesakambala and the like in different parts of
India and at different times, quite independent of and unbeknown to one
another. It is only after the fourth century CE that we hear of the adherents
of two such schools, bhfitavc‘rdm’ns and Laukayatikas in the Tamil epic,
Manime'kalai (27264-277 and 26.78). Prior to that, the anti-paraloka and
anti-Vedic ideas might have been current among a section of the people too.
Their doubts and denials find expression in late Vedic and Upanisadic texts
(for some instances see Sarup 1984, 78-81, Radhakrishnan andMoore 1957,
34-36, 227 nl, Del T050 2012, 138-141). As A. Barth observed long ago:
It is, therefore, not surprising that in the course of those idle barren
discussions [found in Vedic texts] rugged good sense has at times had its
revenge, and that to such day-dreams it has been able to reply with
scepticism, scoffing, and cynical negation. . . .Inthe Brahamanas the question
is sometimes asked if there really is another life [TS 6.1.1.1; KathaUp
1.1.20]; and the old scholiast Yaska...finds himself obliged to refute the
opinion of teachers of much more ancient date than himself, who had
pronounced the Veda to be a tissue of nonsense [Nimkta 1.15.16]. This
vulgar [i.e., popular] scepticism, which must not be confounded with the
speculative negations of the Sfinkhya and Buddhism, whose sneering
attitude contrasts so forcibly with the timorous spirit of the modern Hindus
appears to have reached at one time a goodly number of adherents. The most
ancient designation we find appliedto them is that of Nastika. . .. (1980, 85)
Even after the sudden and inexplicable disappearance of the Carvakas in

or around the twelfth century, such ideas were not altogether lost. Richard
Garbe once acutely observed (and, significantly enough, Radhakrishnan,
who had no sympathy for materialism, quoted Garbe’s words in his Indian
Philosophy 1923, vol. I, 278):
Several vestiges show that even in Pre-Buddhistic India proclaimers of

purely materialistic doctrines appeared; and there is no doubt that those
doctrines had even afterwards, as they have Io-day, numerous secret
followers. (1899, 25. Emphasis added.)
moment only when it emerged in the form of a regular doctrine and took up arms
against the remaining philosophical schools’ (1997, vol. II, 219).
104 Chapter Nine
Jabali’s speech is one such specimen that has come down to us, thanks
to some interpolators and later the redactors of the Ram in several versions
and recensions.
One last problem: Could the Jabali episode be an interpolation or was it a

part of the Ur-Ra‘m‘? Hermann Jacobi firmly believed that all the verses in
the section beginning with vul. 107.17 and ending with 111.11 is an
insertion and Vasistha’s speech in 110 is an insertion within an insertion,
einen Eimchub in ez’nen Eimchub (1893, 89 n1, English trans. 1960, 68
n24). Camille Bulcke wholeheartedly endorses this view (1993, 306). So
does IL. Brockington (1984, 333 n14).
Walter Ruben, on the other hand, claim ed that the episode was a part of
the original poem, since all the mss of all the versions that form the basis of
the archetype contain it (1965, 460). He declared confidently: ‘[T]he poet
brings the materialist Jabali in a pre-planned manner’ (1965, 461). The
constituted text of the crit. ed. supports Ruben’s contention. Nevertheless,
the haphazard pattern of redaction of the verses in the available mss and the
large number of additional verses and passages in different versions still
point to an earlier stage of the ‘fluid text’ 16 (before the archetype of the Ram
mss was shaped). Most probably there was no intervening episode/s
between Rama’s departure from Ayodhya and his entrance to the forest of
Dandaka. But it is a mere conjecture. At the present stage of textual
scholarship, the Jabali episode is definitely a part of the Ram but an addition
that was In ade in the secondstage of redaction, as Brockington has proposed
(1984, 329, 333-334). It is possible that the episode was first introduced
only with a view to glorifying Ramabut with no intention of vilifying Jabali.
Interpolators utilized the story either to strengthen the hands of Jabali (as in
“5 This name was coinedby Sukthankar, the general editor of the crit. ed. of the Mbh
96, 104 = Prolegomena 75, 82. However, as Franklin Edgerton (XXXVI) and
Kosambi (1948/2000, 2) complained, he never definedit. The idea, however, is quite
clear: the swarm (or mantra) literature, i.e. the Vedic Sarnhitas, Brahmanas,
Aranyakas, and, to a certain extent, the Upanisads have a fixed text, remainn
unchanged for millermia, whereas the same literature (so named by Ketkar, see
Karve 2007, 4-5), such as the ltihasas (primary epics) and the Pure—arias continuously
grow ‘not only upwards and downwards but also laterally, like the Nyagrodha tree,
growing on all sides’ (ABORI11, 262 = Sukthanakar 228), insertions being made at
different times andplaces by all sorts of mm (bard)s and scribes. Katre has identified
the fluid text with the Amorphous (text), ‘shapeless, anomalous, unorganized,
applied to a text which is not fixed; such a text is also called a fluid text. In general
it refers to such popular texts like the epics and the puranas which already exist in
different versions at different places before being reduced to wriu'ng’ (1941, 88).
Bv Calcutta ed. 11628-39) or, conversely, to denigrate him by making

Rama abuse him in the strongest conceivable term 5, comparing him with a
thief and a nc'zstika, and most anachronistically equating both of them with
the Buddha, i.e. a Buddhist (vul. 109.34a-d = crit. ed. Additional Passage
2241*13-16). An interpolator even made Jabali confess to his being a
shameless time-server, becoming an astika or a nastika as circumstances
demanded (vul. 10938-39, crit. ed. Additional Passage 2241*21-26). Since
the publication of the crit. ed. of the Ayodhyakanda in 1962 all this has been
found to be later interpolations and consequently excised from the
constituted text (see crit. ed. editor’s note, 703).Yet the character of Jabali
and his discourse had their own appeal. R.C. Dutt in his very brief
abridgement of the Ram retains the episode (Book II Section V) but omits
the passage in which Jabs-111 confesses to be a rank opportunist.
Some ‘netizens’ contend either for or against Jabs-111 on the intemet (see
‘atheism,’ ‘Javali ramayana,’ and other related items). Apparently all of
them are blissfully ignorant of the very existence of the crit. ed. Such
persons, however, need not be taken seriously, for both parties are working
on the basis of the vul., and that too read in English translation only.
One word more about what Jacobi called an insertion within the
insertion. Vasistha’s speech in crit. ed. 102 = vul. 110 is not without a
purpose. He says:
Jabali likewise understands the true course of this world. He only said these
things in his desire to dissuade you.
jfibrilir apijénfte Zakasychjya gatdgatim ||

nivartqyitu kdmastu tvfimetadvfikyam abravft | (I cd-Zab)
His opening words are meant to persuade not only Rama but also the
readers that Jabali did not really mean what he said; it was a mere subterfuge
to bring Rama back to Ayodhyfi. Why does Vasistha say so after Jabali’s
frank confession to his being an opportunist (as in the vul.)? This anomaly
is retained in the constituted text too. Jabali keeps absolutely mum after
Rama’s strong condemnation in the constituted text. A long speech is then
delivered by Vasistha on, of all things, cosm ogony and the genealogy of the
Iksvakus which is found both in the vul. and the crit. ed., and continues
down to the end of the canto. It is so out of place that one cannot but have a
feeling that this canto was designed to take the readers’ mind away from the
heretical speech of Jabali, whether spoken in eamest or not. This
interpolation-within—an—interpolation thus takes the tale back to the
glorification of righteous Rama, who does not fall prey to any temptation or
tolerate heresy. Ruben thinks that ‘Vahifiki introduces Jabali at this place as
106 Chapter Nine
a sort of tempter’ (1965, 464) and compares him to the seducer in the
Das’akumdmcarita, Chap. 8 (1965, 465) and concludes: ‘It thus becomes
clear that Rama accuses Jfibfili of speaking only to please him, which means
he speaks as a lackey, flatterer and tempter and as such Rama is not
supposed to keep his word and accept the kingdom’ (1965, 465).
The solution of all such problems concerning interpolations in the Ram
calls for Higher Criticism. But it would take us away to a wholly different
area and demand another study of an altogether dissimilar nature. I earnestly
hope that such a project would be taken up and executed on the basis of
more and bettermss collected from all regions of India, including Kamataka
and Odisha (see Brockington 1989-90, 80).
Pre-Carvaka Materialism in the Jabali Episode in the Vfilmz'kiRamayana 107
Appendix A
Lokc'ayata in non-philosophical texts
In Vatsyayana (fourth century)’s KS six aphorisms 1.2.25—30 are followed

by the statement “So (said) the Laukayatikas,’ iti laukfiyatikfih. However,
the aphorisms are more in the nature of popular maxims, laukika nyfiya, or,
as the Jayamafigalfi commentary says, idioms well known in the world (or,
among the people), lokapmsiddhi. For a detailed analysis see R.
Bhattacharya 2009/2011, 94-95.
Banabhatta (sixth century) in Kadambafi uses a simile: “As the science
of the Lokfiyatika is to one, who has no taste for religion,’ lokdyatika-
viajzayevddharma—mceh (513). This agrees well with Rama’s view of the
loka'yatika brdhmana (Ram crit. ed. Ayodhyakanda 94.32 = vul. 100.38),
but the very next verse (crit. ed. 94.33 = vul. 100.39) seems to indicate a
reasoner, haituka, or better still, a casuist or a sophist, rather than a
materialist or an atheist, as the word lokc'zyata means in all Pali and Sanskrit
Buddhist works and dictionaries (see R. Bhattacharya 2009/2011, 191).
In Banabhatta’s Harsacarita (356), however, the Lokfiyatikas appear in
an ascetics’ grove, tapovana, among a number of religious communities
such as the various sects of the Buddhists, the Jains and the Maskarins, as
also the adherents of some philosophical schools such as the Kfipilas
(Samkhya), the Kanadas (V ais’esika), etc. This kind of peaceful co-existence
seems to have been modelled on a similar description found in Mbh, crit.
ed., Adiparvan 64.37: ”The words of the chief Lokayatikas resounding on
all sides,’ lokdyatikamukhyaisca samantdd anundditam. This line is
reproduced verbatim in HV, Bhavisyaparvan vul. 67.30 (omitted as
interpolated in the crit. ed.). Cowell and Thomas in their notes to their
translation of the Harsacarita explain the Lokayatikas as ‘an atheistic
school’ (1986, 236 n4). Apparently they did not wonder why the
Lokayatikas would be present in the grove along with the Jains and the
Buddhists as well as such a motley crowd comprising the assayers of metals,
students of the legal institutes, and adepts in grammar. All of them revel in
continuous disputes and this grove provides them with the opportunity to
indulge in ceaseless debates. Such a picture is too good to be true. As Rhys
Davids observes:
We cannot, unfortlmately, draw any certain conclusion as to whether or not

there were actually any Lokayatikas living in Bana’s time. In expanding
previous descriptions of the concourse of hermits in the forest he may be
merely including in his list all the sorts of such people he had ever heard or
read of. (C/L 373)
108 Chapter Nine
Appendix B
Astika and nastika
HP. Shastri in his translation of Ram vul. canto 108 and elsewhere has used
‘m an of faith’ for astika, and ‘unbeliever’ and ‘atheist’ for nfistika. The
meanings of these two words have always been somewhat problematic.
They are originally personal nouns (as evidenced by A5; 4.4.60: asti nfisti
disgam matil’t) used to suggest totally different persons (and then, also views,
when used as adjective) in different contexts at different times. The pair
could mean (i) a believer and a non-believer in the Other World, (ii) one
who abides by the Veda and one who does not (as in Manu 2.11), (iii) a
theist and an atheist, and many more (See R. Bhattacharya 2009/2011, 227-
231, and 2009, 49-50). Hence it is highly probable that in the Ram the words
are used in the first sense, which is most probably their original meaning
(Cf. Jayaditya and Varnana, Km‘ikc? on A5; 4.4.60). In any case the question
of theism or belief in Vedic rituals was never raised in Jabali’s speech, only
the issue of the Other World featured most prominently (see crit. ed. 100.16,
vul. 108.17), as it did inNaciketas’ prayer to Yama inKafhaUp 1.1.20: ‘this
doubt (viciktsfi) that [there is] in regard to a man that is departed —“he is,”
say some; and “this one is not,” say some... .’ (W'D. Whitney (1890)’s
translation), ye yamprete vicikitsfi manusye ‘stftyeke ndyam astl'ti mike. The
KajhaUp passage may very well be the source for the word pair. In any case,
asti is the present indicative form of Vas, “to be’, in the thirdperson singular
and its negative is na asti, turned into nasti according to the rules of sound
liaison (sandhi).
CHAPTER TEN
THE CARVAKA/LOKAYATA
AND GREEK MATERIALISM
What is Materialism?
Materialism is a much misunderstood word, not only in the case of common

people but of the students of philosophy as well. Before proceeding to
details, it is necessary to understand what, in the philosophical context,
materialism stands for.
George Stack has recently defined materialism as follows:
Materialism is a set o f theories which holds that all entities and processes
are composed of—or are reducible to—matter, material forces or physical
processes. All events and facts are explainable, actually or in principle, in
terms o f body, material objects or dynamic material changes or movements.I
Keith Campbell enumerates three basic tenets of materialism:
1) Everything that is, is material.

2) Everything can be explained on the basis of laws involving only the
antecedent physical conditions.
3) There is a cause for every event.2
Campbell also cautions the naive reader that metaphysical materialism

does not entail the psychological disposition to pursue money and tangible
goods despite the popular use of ‘materialistic’ to describe this interest3
1 George Stack 1998, 170.

2 Keith Campbell 1972, 179.
3 Keith Campbell 1972, 179.
l 10 Chapter Ten
Th e Indian Context
Those who have had their initiation in philosophy through the Western
tradition feel baffled when they encounter the Indian scenario. Instead of
individual philosophers, they find a number of philosophical schools.
Despite certain basic similarities in their approaches, they contend against
one another regarding several issues that are quite alien to the Western
tradition. Belief in rebirth is, for example, axiomatic to nearly all the Indian
schools, be it brahm anical, Jain or Buddhist. Their sole aim is to find a way
to escape from the cycle of birth, death and rebirth. This is what is meant by
mukti, moksa or nirvana. Whether subjective idealist or realist, theist or
atheist, adhering to the doctrine of the inerrancy of the Vedas or not, each
of these schools believed that it alone could provide a way to freedom from
all earthly sufferings.
However, there was one philosophical school which did not start from
the premise that dars’ana was moksasfisna, the science of deliverance or
freedom. The very concept of freedom and whatever it entailed were objects
of ridicule to this school called the Carvaka or Lokayata.
The Cfirvdkas and the Presocratics
Unlike the other schools of philosophy in India, the Carvakas resemble the
early prom-materialist tradition of philosophy in ancient Greece. Both the
Presocratic proto-materialist philosophers and the Carvakas started from the
premise of four elements as constituting the whole world. Matter to them
was primary; consciousness could not exist without a material substratum.
The presence of God or gods was irrelevant to them. They intended to view
the world in terms of nature in its various manifestations. This kind of
approach was so unique that the materialists, both in India and Greece, had
to suffer misrepresentation in the hands of their opponents, deliberate or not.

The problem of understanding materialism is bedevilled by the fact that
the original writings of the Indian and the Greek materialists are available
only in fragments, quoted or paraphrased in the works of their opponents
and others. Despite this limitation it is still possible to reconstruct, with
some degree of certainty, the philosophical position of the Carvakas, as
similar attempts have been made in case of their Greek counterparts.
In what follows we shall try to trace the development of materialism in
ancient India.
The CarvakafLokayata and Greek Materialism 111
Some Common Misrepresentations Examined

(a) Did the Carvdkas Refuse to Admit Inference?
In the Indian philosophical context, besides the issues of rebirth, after—life

and the Other World, the instruments of cognition (pramana) are considered
to be of seminal importance. The Carvakas are generally branded as a
philosophical school that accepted perception as the only means of
knowledge. But there are enough evidence to show that, in addition to
perception, the Carvakas also admitted inference as a valid means of
cognition in so far as it was based on perception and hence verifiable by
perception. As to verbal testimony, analogy and other instruments of
cognition accepted by various schools, the Carvfikas refused to accept them.
We shall now delineate on this issue.
All college textbooks and most of the popular digests and handbooks of
Indian philosophy describe the Carr/alias as pramc‘maikavédin, i.e., they
recogmze no other instrument of cognition except one, viz., perception.
Vacaspatimis'ra (ninthj’tenth century) satirizes the Carvfika in the following
way:
Moreover, even beasts, with a View to obtaining the beneficial and avoiding
the harmful, move towards a field green with soft, fresh grass and leave one
full of dried grass and thorns. The Nastika, not knowing what would lead to
his own good or what wouldlead him into harm, is more beastly than a beast.
In this matter (of determining a thing as desirable and undesirable), which is
the basis o f an effort for obtainrnent (pravrtti) or an effort for avoidance
(nivrtti), and can only be known by inference, perception is not capable of
doing anything.4
Many other brahmanical and Jain philosophers have similarly condemned

the Carvfikas as taking a one—pramana position, pramanaikavédins But such a

branding is not only wrong but betrays some design as well. Let us take the
following instance. Some instances of such misrepresentations and
deliberate distortions have already been provided before (see R Bhattacharya
2009/2011, Chaps. IV and VIII). A few more instances refuting the common
misrepresentation of the Carvaka view of inference are given below.
Ratnaprabha, a Jain philosopher, too, seems to echo Purandara when he
writes:
4BhfimatfonBS, 33.53. See C/L 243.

l 12 Chapter Ten
The Carvakas, however, contend that they admit inferences that are of
practical utility, such as the inference of fire from smoke, and deny only
those which deal with such supernatural matters as the heaven, the unseen
power (apfirva) which generates fruits in a next birth of acts done in a present
life, etc. etc.5
Gunaratna, another Jain philosopher, repeats the same view:
The Carvakas admit the validity of inference which tend to facilitate the
daily activities of the people (loka-ydtrfi-nirvaham-pmvanam), such as the
inference of fire from smoke, etc., but they never admit the validity o f
extraordinary inferences which seek to establish the heaven, merit and
demerit, etc.6
Last but not least, Sukhlalji Sanghvi, the eminent Iain scholar, prefers to
follow this view. The Carvaka, according to him, belongs to the side which
accepts the dominance of the senses (indriyc‘zdhipatya-paksa) as opposed to
those who reject the senses (in favour of the mind or the self), those who
admit the dominance of both the senses and the mind (or the self), and those
who admit only the dominance of the Vedas.7
In fact, the distinction made between two kinds of inference — one
confined to the ways of the world (laukika), and the other relying on the
scriptures (s'c'rstmsiddha) or on the supra-sensual — is the lasting contribution
of the Carvakas to Indian Logic. It is a sad commentary on the state of
scholarship that the true Carvaka View regarding inference has all along
been distorted and wilfully misrepresented. Is it too much to expect that the
writers of the twenty-first century will take note of these discoveries (not all
of them very recent) and put an end to caricaturing the Cam/aka position?
They should realize what S. Radhakrishnan, no friend of materialism, said
long ago in relation to the verses at the end of SDS, Chap. 1: ‘A philosophy
professed seriously for centuries could not have been of the coarse kind that
it is here reported to be.’8
(1)) Were the Cdrvdkas Sensualists?
All that has been said above is enough to dispel the notion that the Carvakas
were a happy-go—lucky lot and their sole aim in life was sensual gratification.
5 Commentary on Vadidevasfiri’s Pramfina-naya-tattvfilokdlamkfira. Hari Satya

Bhattacharya’s trans. (modified) 1967, 504.
6 Gunaratna 1986, 306; C/L 273 (translation modified).
7 Sanghvi 1987, 23-24.
8 Radhakrishnan 1980, 283.
Had it been so, all their opponents would not have dealt with them so
seriously. The Carvakas, of course, did not believe in the Other World and
were not credulous enough to believe in the existence of two separate places
called heaven and hell. So the opponents of the Carvaka have portrayed
them as immoral people preaching ‘eat, drink and be merry, for tomorrow
we die’. But none of the opponents quotes a single sfitm in support of such
representation. Serious scholars like M Hiriyanna and others noted long
ago that such a (mis)representation has all the characteristics of a caricature
(see R. Bhattacharya 2009/2011, Chap. IX).
Let us re-examine the sources on the basis of which the Carvfikas have
been branded as unrestrained hedonists. The only ‘evidence’ that is cited is
a verse found in the SDS:
yc'ivaflfvet sukham fivedmam krfvc'i ghrtam pibet /

bhasmfbhfitasya dehaaya punar figamanam kutahfl
While life remains, let a man live happily, let him feed on ghee even though
he runs in debt;
when once the body becomes ashes, how can it ever return again?
The same verse, however, is quoted in no fewer than thirteen sources

both before and after the SDS and almost everywhere the second hemistich
of the first line reads nfisti mrtyor agocamh (nothing is beyond the scope of
death) (for a detailed discussion see R. Bhattacharya 2009/2011, Chap.
XDi). Whatever other variants there may be, nowhere does the second
hemistich of the first line reads mam krtvd ghrtam pibet, excepting in the
SDS. More interesting is the fact that S-M himself quotes this verse twice in
the same chapter, once at the beginning and again at the end. In the first
instance he too quotes the second hemistich as nfisti mrtyor agocamh!
There is no evidence to show that the verse under discussion originated

from among the Carvakas. It is first found inthe VDMPu (108. 18-19). Here,
too, the second hemistich reads mini mrtyor agocamh. The verse is
attributed to King Bena who, both in this Purina and elsewhere, is
represented as a king who did not believe in the Other World. So he never
cared to conform to the traditional duties of a devout person. There is no
mention of any such term as Carvika or Lokfiyata in this context. In fact,
most of the verses that are attributed to Brhaspati by S—M and others are of
doubtful authenticity (for details see below Chaps. Eighteen and Nineteen
passim).
Whatever be the authenticity of the ydq‘fivet verse, the fact rem ains that
this very verse has been generally taken to be the quintessence of the
Carvfika philosophy. But what the verse says in its original form is pretty
l 14 Chapter Ten
simple. The message is quite clear: Since there is no rebirth, there is no use
of practising austerity; death will overpower everyone anyway.
Let us look at the matter from another angle. Jayantabhatta has no soft
spot for the Carvakas. He controverts at some length the Carvakas regarding
the acceptance of inference as an instrument of cognition in his
philosophical work, Nil/L However, he refuses to accept the view that the
Carvakas prescribed any hedonistic doctrine. He rather believes that the
Lokayata ‘is only the assertion of the vaitandika (representing merely the
destructive criticism of others); it is not really a body of precepts.’9
A putative opponent is said to object: ‘But then there it has been
(positively) prescribed: “Live in pleasure as long as you live”.’ Jayanta
brushes aside this objection. ‘No,’ he says, ‘the fact being naturally
established, a prescription in this regard becomes useless.’1° In other words,
the verse, according to Jayanta, does not contain any prescription at all.
It is also to be noted that other philosophers who have crossed swords
with the Carvfikas have concentrated solely on epistemological questions.
We may mention the names of Sankaracarya, Santaraksita. and
Prabhficandra who find fault with the Carvaka doctrine on both
epistemological and metaphysical grounds, nevertheless not even once do
they call it hedonistic or anything of that sort. There is no denying the fact
that the Carvakas did not abide by the Vedas, nor did they believe in the
doctrine of rebirth and karman; they also refused to accept any statement
based on inference unless it was supported by or based on perception. All
these objections have been raised and contested from the brahm anical,
Buddhist and Jain points of View. But in the philosophical works no charge
involving moral depravity has been levelled against them. It seems that a
facile equation was made by the custodians of orthodoxy between the denial
of the Other World and indulgence in sensual gratification.
Such an equation is also met with in ancient Greece. Epicurus (341-270
BCE) lived an austere life, as did Ajita Kesakambala.11 Yet Epicurus was
maligned as a glutton in subsequent Greek and Roman literature. Two
modern English words, ‘Epicure’ and ‘Epicurean’, stand for ‘a person who
takes particular pleasure in fine food and drink’ (as given in the COED
2011).
But did Epicurus not preach that pleasure was the highest good? Most
certainly he did. But by ‘pleasure’ he meant intellectual pleasure. In a letter
to Menoeceus he made his position amply clear:
9 Jayantabhatta 1982, 388.

1° Iayantabhatta 1982, 388.
11 See R. Bhattacharya 200912011, Chap. 111.
So when we say that pleasure is the end, we do not mean the pleasures o f the
dissipated and those that consist in having a good time, as some out of
ignorance and disagreement or refusal to understand suppose we do, but
freedom from pain in the body and from disturbance in the soul. For what
produces the pleasant life is not continuous drinking and parties or pederasty
or womanizing or the enjoyment of fish and the other dishes of an expensive
table, but sober re asoning which tracks down the causes of every choice and
avoidance and which banishes the opinions that beset souls with the greatest
confusion. 12
If, in spite of such crystal clear exposition, the Epicurean view of

pleasure could be so much distorted, what could the Carvakas do? Not a
single fragment of the Carvaka sources contains any reference to pleasure
or what the founders of that system meant by pleasure. Yet, thanks to some
poets and playwrights and the writers of popular digests of philosophy (both
ancient and modem), the word, Carvfika, has become synonymous with
sensualism. Generations of men and women have been victims of this
malign campaign. It is high time that we get rid of such a misconception.
Conclusion
What comes out of the above is pretty clear: the Cirvfikas were
uncompromising materialists, caring nothing for religion of any sort, be it
brahrnanical, Jain or Buddhist. They refused to go beyond nature and
rejected everything called ‘supernatural’. They made fun of asceticism,
priestcraft, rituals and glorification of gift (da‘na) to the Brahmanas. The
system betrays a very early origin, since it is firmly rooted in the concept
of four basic elements (bhritas, viz, earth, air, fire and water). But one
cannot fail to notice the keen observation implicit in their philosophical
speculations. Referring to aphorism, ‘As the power of intoxication (arises

or is manifested) from the constituent parts of the wine (such as flour, water
and molasses),’ BK. Matilal remarks, ‘This empirical methodology might
have been the precursor of scientific thought in India.’ 13
The Carvakas did not believe in the caste (vama) system in which
respect they are at one with the Buddhists as they are in their rejection of
the infallibility of the Veda. More importantly, they were gifted logicians,
well versed in the technicalities of Nyaya. At the same time, they knew how
slippery was the path of argumentation, which started from certain axioms
‘2 Long and Sedley1987, vol. 1, 114.

13 Matilal 1987, V01. 3, 165.
l 16 Chapter Ten
concerning some concepts not verifiable by perception (e.g., heaven and

hell, God, etc.). All these made them targets of attack of all other
philosophical schools, more particularly of the followers of Nyaya
(including Vaisesika), Mimamsa and Vedanta among the Vedists, the
Yogacara and Madhyam aka Buddhists, and the Jams. The denial of heaven
and hell was misconstrued to suggest that the Carvakas were addicted to
sensual pleasure and hence thoroughly immoral in their attitude to life. Their
insistence on perception as the only viable instrument of cognition was
distorted to mean they were so stupid as to deny the validity of inference as
such. And, last but not least, they were projected as naive and rather
infantile, not worthy of consideration by serious philosophers.14 Although
some modern writers, in spite of their affiliation to one idealist system or
the other, doubted the veracity of such representation, the authors of
textbooks and popular digests of Indian philosophy persist in the same game
of maligning the Carvakas, as their counterparts in Europe did in slandering
Epicurus. How much is ignorance of primary sources to be blamed, and how
much ideological opposition, is worth pondering.
‘4 Jayantabhatta derisively calls the Carvakas vardka, ‘wretched’ in NM Ahnika 3.

Part I, 229. Hemacandra (1926) also employs this derogatory word against the
Carvékas in Yogaédstra (YSD 2. 38. f. 96b.
CHAPTER ELEVEN
MATERIALISM:
EAST AND WEST
Since H.T. Colebrooke discovered and spoke on the ‘undisguised

materialism ’ of a philosophical school in India (Lecture delivered at a public
meeting at the Royal Asiatic Society on 3 February 1827), one of which was
the Cfirvfika (1837, 402—405), there has been a persistent question: Who
were the Carvfikas (mostly referredto inPlural)?1 They have been generally
branded as ‘materialists’. More and more fragments of their works have
come to light but the ‘brand name”, Carvaka has come to say. It is now clear
that there were several non-conformists, both in north and south India, who
were against the concept of the Other World (and by implication rebirth and
karmic retribution) and did not accept the Veda as an infallible source and
means of knowledge. Hence, they were also critical of the performance of
sacrifices (yajfia) and the observance of post-mortem rites for the ancestors
(s’rc'tddha). Such people, whether as isolated individuals or organized in
groups, existed at least from the time of the Buddha and continued to
flourish mostly in the eight century CE and after. It is now certain that the
Carvékas were the last of the materialists to appear in India. There were
similar groups before them but their works have not survived. The
disappearance of the Carvékas after the twelfth century CE or so is a mystery
that remains to be solved. It is an established fact, however, that the

Carvfikas had a base text on which several commentaries had been written.
Unfortunately none of them has come down to us.
So, it is only to be expected that the Carvfikas and their views will
continue to be questioned. As there is no complete work that can be safely
ascribed to them, speculations have been rife as to their philosophical
l Colebrooke misunderstood a passage in Hemacandra’s AC 3526-27 and took all

the three synonyms of the Barhaspatyas for the names of two different schools,
namely, those of the Barhaspatyas or Nastikas, and the Carvakas or Laukayatikas.
See R. Bhattacharya 2009/2011, 163 n3.
l 18 Chapter Eleven
affiliation.2 Right from Louis de la Vallée Poussin (1915) down to Pradeep

Gokhale (2013) and, more recently Johannes Bronkhorst (2016), some
scholars have denied that the Cari/akas are at all to be called ‘materialists’.
In a recent article Bronkhorst has suggested that locating the Carvakas in
the category of philosophical materialism, misrepresents the true content of
these schools (meaning, besides the Carvaka, the L(au)okayatikas and
particular, who have spoken of the Garvakas as materialists. According to
Gokhale, there was no philosophical school called the Carvaka or Lokayata;
the names refer to freethinkers, hostile to all religions (2015, viii).
Keeping in mind the adage that all comparisons are odious let us re—view
the matter of idealism and materialism in India on the basis of available
evidence, however scanty they may be.3
To the Marixists the locus classicus concerning this issue is Frederick
Engels’s formulation in his Ludwig Feurbach and the End of Classical
German Philosophy:
The great basic question of all philosophy, especially o f modern philosophy,

is that concerning the relation of thinking and being. From the very early
times when men . . . came to believe that their thinking and sensation were
not activities o f their bodies, but of a distinct soul which inhabits the body
andleaves it at death. . . .
The question o f the position of thinking in relation to being, a question
which, by the way, had played a great part also in the scholasticism in the
Middle Ages, the question, which is primary, spirit or nature — that question,
in relation to the Church was sharpened into this: “Did God create the world
or has the world been in existence?”
These two expressions, idealism and materialism, primarily signify
nothing more than this; and here also they are not used in any other sense
(Extracted in Selsam and Martel 1987, 47-48).
This theory of ‘two great camps’ was, however, modified by VI. Lenin.
He recognized ‘those intermediate between these two, wavering between
2 Iayarasi’s Tativopaplavasimha (TUS), although claimed by some as belonging to

the Carve—11:21 school, is the work o f a non-materialist sceptic, positively interested in
demolishn the pdkhandas (heretics) as is evident from the concluding part of his
work. He was neither a non-materialist carve—aka, nor a Madhyamaka or a non-dualist
Advaitin (as some have claimed), but the founder/propagator of a separate school,
Tattvopaplavavada. See Gangopadhyaya 1998, [xiii].
3 Cf. Amita Chatterjee’s sagacious observation: ‘[I]n importing these labels (sc.
Materialism, moral naturalism, etc.) from Westem philosophy to the classical Indian
philosophical systems, one needs to exercise caution because the concepts of nature,
science, scientific method, etc. do not smoothly converge in two theoretical
traditions’ (2013, online edition. Downloaded on 10.27.2017).
Materialism: East andWest 119
them (sc. Idealism and materialism) as the line of Hume in modern

philosophy, calling this line “agnosticism” and declaring Kantianism to be
a variety of agnosticism’ (1972, 13).
Later still, Georg Lukacs proposed ‘a different polarity,’ namely, ‘the
struggle between rational and irrational philosophy’ (1983, 101).
Be that as it may, the first recorded occurrence of ‘materialism’ in
English, presumably borrowed from French, dates from the mid-eighteenth
century (as noted in the OxfordEnglish Dictionary). Idealism, the opposite
of materialism, too is not found in English before the late eighteenth
century. Other senses of these terms appear even later, in the nineteenth
century only.
The system s of philosophy that can be branded so, however, existed long
before the names were coined. The terms have acquired different
significations in philosophy and common parlance. Both the names were
first used in the philosophical context; other senses followed. A clear
distinction between the vulgar and technical senses of these two words is to
be maintained.
Thus even before the names were coined, materialism as a philosophical
system had emerged both in Greece and India. A few lines from Plato’s
Laws that describe philosophical idealism as allied to fideism may not be
out of place here. An Athenian says to Clinias:
No mortal can ever attain a truly religious outlook without risk of relapse
unless he grasps the two doctrines we’re now discussing: first, that the soul
is far older than any created thing, and that it is immortal and controls the
entire world of matter; and second (a doctrine we’ve expounded often
enough before) that reason is the supreme power among the heavenly bodies.
(12.967c-d, 1997; 1615)
Several centuries after this, Anatole France expounded the difference

between the two camps, idealism and materialism, in a humorous vein:
We formed ourselves into two opposing camps, One camp maintained that
before there were apples there was the Apple; that before there were
popinjayas there was popinjay; that before there were lewd and greedy
monks there was the Monk, Lewdness and Greed; that before there were feet
and before there were posteriors in this world the kick in the posterior must
have had existence for all eternity in the bosom of idea of God. The other
camp replied that, on the contrary, apples gave man the idea of the apple;
popinjay the idea of the popinjay; monks the idea of the monk, greed and
lewdness, and that the kick in the posterior existed only after having been
duly given and received. The players grew heated and came to fisticuffs. I
was an adherent of the second party, which satisfied my reason better, and
120 Chapter Eleven
which was, in fact, condemned by the Council o f Soissons. (1924, Chap.

XX, 199-200)
Some Presocrratic philosophers in Greece (Thales, Democritus,

Anaximenes, Heraclitus and others) delved deeper. They admitted not only
the materiality of the world but also sought to pinpoint the elements that
constitute this materiality. Some spoke of water, some of air, some of earth,
and some of fire. Some others spoke of all four. There is a Carvaka aphorism
which echoes the last idea:
prthivydpastejovfiyur itz‘ tattvdm‘, Earth, water, fire and air are the principles,
nothing else. (R. Bhattacharya 2009/201 l, 78, 86)
The word iti is decisive. It excludes all possibility of a fifth element,

material or otherwise. Bronkhorst, however, does not think of this aphorism
to be central to the Carvaka philosophy. He considers another aphorism.
‘There is no other world because of the absence of any other-worldly being
(i.e., the transmigrating self)”, paralokino tfivfit paralokfibhdrvah, to be
‘[t]he most often cited sutra in this connection” (2016, 46). Actually, it has
been found quoted in eight sources only (R. Bhattacharya 2009/2011, 80)
whereas the earlier one,prthivyfipastejovdyur iti tattvcini, is found quoted in
no fewer than twenty sources (R. Bhattacharya 2009/2011, 78).
This, however, need not be taken as an evidence of the primacy of
elements to be better known and more often quoted of referred to than any
other aphorism. Bronkhorst believes that ‘the materialist construction serves
the ultirn ate aim of rejecting rebirth andkarmic retribution, more than a love
of materialism per se.’ (2016, 46)
There is no denying that the opposition to the Other World is a salient
feature of materialism in India. The very concept of karman and rebirth are
alien to the mainstream western tradition. Yet it is also to be remembered

that the rejection of the Other World was considered a heresy in the
European Middle Ages. Dante, for example, places Epicurus in hell because
he and his followers ‘make the soul die with the body,” Suo cimitero da
questa part8 hanno/ con Epicure tutti suoi seguaci/ aka I ’anima col corpo
mofiafanno (Inferno, Canto 10.13-15).
If we confine ourselves exclusively to Sanskrit, Pali, and Prakrit
sources, it may give an unsuspecting reader the impression that the Other
World was of prime importance in the materialist tradition in India. But
recourse to older Tamil sources make it clear that ‘matter’ was as much
important, if not more, in the south Indian tradition. The Manime'kalai
(sixth/seventh century CE) contains a passage that mentions not one, but two
schools of materialism: Bhfitavfida and Lokfiyata. The form er is the exact
Materialism: East and West 1 21
rendering of ‘materialism’. The passage in the Manimékalar’ expounding his

docrine by a Bhutavadin has already been quoted (48 above).
The Bhutavadin also mentions his difference with the Lokayatas (see 48
above).
The words of the Bhfitavadin have been paraphrased by a late medieval
When certain flowers and juggery are boiled together, liquor is born which
produces intoxication. Just as when elements combine, consciousness arises.
Consciousness dissolves with the dissolutions o f the elements composing
them like the disintegration of sound. Elements combine to produce living
Bhfltas and from them other living Bhfltas will be born. Life and
consciousness are synonymous. From non—living Bhfitas consisting of two
or more elements in fimdamental with this system. Observation is the
method by which knowledge is obtained Inferntial thinking is illusion. This
worldly life is real. Its effect is experienced inthis life only. The theory that
we enjoy the fruits of our actionin our nextbirth or in another worldis false.
(Quoted and translated by N. Vanarnamalai 1973, 36).
The second source for the study of materialism in south India is the
Nflakéci (tenth century CE. See Zvelebil 1974, 139). It refers to Bhutavfida
only, not to Lokayata. The relevant passage is given below:
Neelakesi afier condemning Védavada, meets on her way the teacher of

materialistic school, otherwise called Bhfitavada. She thinks I worth her
while to expose the error and inadequacy of this materialistic school. Hence
she enters into a debate with this teacher of Bhfitavada, named Pisacaka.
Evidently he is a teacher attached to the court of King Madanjit; hence the
discussion is held in the royal assembly. Pisacaka, the teacher of
materialism, first explains his system. “We do not recognise the subtle
distinction of qualities and substances. For us, the ultimate reals are the five
Bhfitas‘, all activities in the world must be traced to this five Bhfitas. These
are permanent and real; Fire, Earth, Water, Air and Space are the five
ultimate elements of the universe. Out o f these are evolved respectively,
Eyes, Nose, Tongue, Body and Ears; and out of these five sense organs, arise
respectively, Colour, Odour, Taste, Touch and Sound. Just as the
intoxicating drink is obtained by a combination of five things flour, juggery
etc. so also by the combination o f these five elements are obtained
intelligence, feeling of pleasure and pain and so on, which characteristics
increase with the increase of five elements, and disappear with the
disintegration of the five elements. When the five elements thus get
disintegrated, the qualities of intelligence and feeling completely disappear
without leaving any residue. The fundamental reals in the world are these
five elements and every activity must be trace to the efficacy of these, but
clever fellows with the gifi: of the gab go about prattling about the existence
122 Chapter Eleven
of the so-called Jiva [soul] and their doctrine is accepted by the ignorant
masses. Except sheer verbiage there is nothing corresponding to the word
Jiva in reality. There never was in existence in the past anything besides
these five elements. Even at present reality consists of these five and in
future also these five alone will continue to exist. To postulate an entity
besides these five is the result of sheer ignorance as to the nature of the
ultimate reality’ and the Lokayata teacher has expounded his system.” (4.10.
Stanzas 854—860. English trans. 321—22)4
When Nilakéci meets Pis'acaka, a Bhutavadin, the simile of the

intoxicating power arising from non-intoxicant elements is repeated (stanza
858 English trans. 321), without, however, any mention of Lokayata or any
other materialist system excepting Bhfitavada. The continuation of the
simile is to be found in the Sanskrit base text in the form of an aphorism
(sfltm): ‘As the power of intoxication (arises or is manifested) from the
constituent parts of wine (such as flour, water and molasses)’ (Aphorism
I.5. See R. Bhattacharya 2009/2011, 79, 87), kinvddibhyo madas’aktivat.
Safighadasaganivacaka’s Vam, a Jain Prakrit work composed in the
sixthfseventh century, also employs the same analogy (169).
Thus, matter in the sense of five elements (earth, air, fire, water, and
space) was central to the south Indian tradition as in the pre-Carvaka
materialist tradition in the north. The Carvakas who flourished in or arOLmd
the eighth century CE spoke of four elements instead of five (For further
details, see above Chap. Three). Thus a parallelism can be drawn between
the Greek Presocratic materialist philosophers and the Carvakas in this
respect.
Now to a vexed issue: what is matter? Howard Selsam andHarry Martel

have provided a succinct answer to this question:
Matter is simply the name for what exists objectively, with the one proviso
that mind, thought, consciousness are its products. All further questions as
to the nature o f matter, its structure or composition, the relation of mass,
energy, space, time, etc., are not primarily philosophical, but are to be
resolved by the natural sciences themselves (1987, 45).
In spite of widely different concepts of matter in both we stern and Indian

traditions, materialism as a doctrine holds its distinct position in the history
of philosophy in both. It may appear rather strange that materialism did not
flourish in the ancient world except in Greece and India. But this kind of
mompromising attitude to the creator God/gods, immortality of the soul,
4 For a caveat, see above Chap. Six, 74-75 n4.

Materialism: East andWest 123
rebirth and karmic retribution (the last one found in India only) and similar
notions are found in the works of many writers. The struggle between reason
and faith has been a standing feature in the history of world philosophy.
Even if we leave aside such questions as whether materialism was always
allied to the downtrodden people,5 the fact remains that idealism had and
still has its affinity with fideism and blind faith, whereas materialism has
always been free from religion. Both the ontological and epistemological
approaches of the pre-Carvaka and the Carvaka materialists in India are
similar to the ancient Greek tradition. The only exception, of course, is the
belief in rebirth which was not a part of the mainstream European tradition.
Materialism developed in India right from the sixth/fifth century BCE in the
preachings of Ajita Kesakambala, a senior contemporary of the Buddha,
found in the ‘SPhS’ (DN) and in the teachings of Uddalaka Arum in the
ChaUp.6 Matter was focal in both, as it was in the ancient and modem
westem tradition.
5 This idea, that the Carvaka daréana was an ancient IndianDalit philosophy, mooted
in India by K.P. Rao in 1997 (see Bronkhorst 2016, 46 n9) is definitely not true,
neither in the Indian nor in the European context. As Marx had shown, ‘Indeed, the
men and women of the court o f Charles II, Bolingbroke, the Walpoles, Hume,
Gibbon, and Charles Fox, are names which all suggest a prevalent unbelief in
religious dogmas, and a general adhesion to the philosophy of that age (so.
materialism) on the part of the upper classes, statesmen, and politicians o f England.
This may be called, by way o f distinction, the era of aristocratic revolt against
ecclesiastical authority’ (1854, extracted in: Selsam and Martel 1987, 240.
Emphasis added). Engels also pointed out that ‘With Hobbes it (so. materialism)
stepped on the stage as a defender of royal prerogative and omnipotence; it called
upon absolute monarchy to keep down that puer robustus sed malitiosus [robust but
malicious boy], to wit, the people. Similarly, with the successes of Hobbes, with
Bolingbroke, Shafiesbury, etc., the new deistic form of materialism remained an
aristocratic, esoteric doctrine. . . .’ (Engels 1976, 441. Emphasis added.)
5 For further details, see R. Bhattacharya 2009/2011, 45-54 and C/L 59-87.
CHAPTER TWELVE
THE BASE TEXT OF THE CARVAKAS

AND ITS COMMENTARIES
I
The base texts of most of the philosophical systems of ancient India are in
the form of a collection of aphorisms (sfitras). The aphorisms are as a rule
very brief and terse, even to the point of being incomprehensible. The task
of the guru was to make his pupils understand what was in the mind of the
author/redactor of the sfitms. The base text was meant to be committed to
memory, not to be consulted as and when necessary. Hence, the shorter the
better. Since the extreme brevity was meant for facilitating leaming by
heart, there is a maxim: ‘Grammarians rejoice over the saving of (even) the
length of half a short vowel as much as over the birth of a son,’ ardhamfitrc‘:
lfighavena putrotsavam manyante varyc'tkaram'th.1 The Kalpasfilras,
ancillary works of Vedic ritual literature and more importantly the ancient
grammatical work, the As; of Panini were the models of composing such
brief aphorisms. The custom was followed by the founding fathers and/or
redactors of the philosophical systems.
Brevity may be the soul of wit but it entails a fundamental problem: for
the sake of terseness the aphorisms were sometimes composed in the form
of incomplete sentences without verbs. Sometimes just a word was

considered sufficient to form an aphorism. The task of the guru was to fill
in the gaps by supplying the missing words (technically known as
adhyc'thc'im, supplying). All gurus did not agree on the right adhyc'ihc'im.
There is a Carvaka aphorism (1.4): tebhyas’caitanyam, ‘Consciousness out
of these’ .2 From a preceding aphorism (1.2) it is to be understood that the
word tebhyah, ‘out of these’, refers to the four elements, namely, earth,
water, fire and air. But does consciousness arise (anew) or is it merely
manifested (as if it was pre-existing)? Two anonymous commentators
1 Nagesabhatta (1960/1962), 122.

2 R. Bhattacharya 2009/2011, 79, 87.
The Base Text of the Carvakas and Its Commentaries 125
offered two such adhydhfims, utpaafyate and abhivyajyate. Later writers

merely repeat the alternatives or opt for either one or the other.3 Similarly
one guru would suggest one explanation; another guru, something else.
Such difference of opinion inevitably led to confusion. The student was
expected to accept either or both as equally probable.4 In any case, book
learning, that is, learning from written commentaries, was not considered to
be a proper substitute for learning from the mouth of a guru (gummukhr‘
viable-z). As Rangaswami Aiyangar says:
Reliance on a book for elucidation was therefore held as likely not only to
mislead but to convey wrong impressions of [the] authentic doctrine. This is
why we find in smrti literature, even in ages in which documents and
writings came to be the mainstay of judicial decisions, denunciations of
dependence on books, side by side with praise of gifts of purénas as among
the donations of most sanctity. Devanna Bhatta (thirteen century) quotes the
authority of Narada for including dependence on books along with women,
gambling, addiction to the stage, idleness and sleep among the impediments
to the acquisition o f knowledge. Madhava also quotes Narada to show that
‘what is learnt from books, and not from the teacher, will not shine in the
assembly of the learned“. The familiar denunciation of the sale (vikraya) of
knowledge is aimed as much at teaching under contract for a fee as at the
sale of the books which will supersede the teacher. The result of the
prejudice was twofold: first, improvement of the memory to make its
retentiveness greater; and secondly, to make citation in books aim at the
utmost accuracy to escape the familiar charge.5
Yet commentaries and sub-comm entaries began to appear to meet the

need of the students who could not find any guru to guide them through the
maze of the base text. Even though a poor substitute, the commentary
literature ultimately turned out to be the most viable means of understanding of
the philosophical systems. S. Dasgupta, however, notes:
[T]he Sanskrit style of the most of the commentaries is so condensed and

different from literary Sanskrit, and aims so much at precision and brevity,
leading to the use of technical words current in the diverse systems, that a
study of these becomes often impossible without the aid of an expert
preceptor. . . .5
3 Kamalafila 11: 633-634. For firrther details see R. Bhattacharya 2009/2011, 121
n49.
4 For such an instance, when commentators retain both explanations as two equally
valid alternatives, see R. Bhattacharya 200910.011, 159-60.
5 Aiyangar [1941], 10.
5 Dasgupta 1922/1975, vol. 1, 67.
126 Chapter Twelve
Thus, in spite of the written commentary, oral exposition by a guru

cannot be dispensed with. We are back to square one.
Commentaries and sub-commentaries, however, served one important
purpose. As early as 1805 HT Colebrooke noted:
It is a received and well grounded opinion of the learned in India, that

no book is altogether safe from changes and interpolations until it have been
comrnente d: but when once a gloss has been published, no fabrication could
afterwards succeed; because the perpetual commentary notices every
passage, and, in general, explains every word. (. . .)
The genuineness of the commentaries, again, is secured by a crowd of
commentators, whose works expound every passage in the original gloss;
and whose annotations are again interpreted by others.7
Nevertheless there is no denying the fact that different systems of Indian

philosophy developed and grew out of the expositions, commentaries and
sub-commentaries composed by the adherents of the systems. When the
authors of such secondary works are written by the professed adherents of
the respective systems, they become a part of the tradition. But such works
would have to digress to at least some areas that might very well have been
totally alien to the sfin’akam/s, the originator/s or the original
system atizer/s.
Moreover, it is well known that commentaries or sub—commentaries are
sometimes written to defend a system of philosophy which has been attacked
by some exponents of another antagonistic system. Uddyotakara’s Vfirttika to
the NS is a case in point. The Vdrttika was basically a work of defence
against the objections to Gautama raised by the Buddhist philosophers,
specially Dinnaga and Vasubandhu, and also Nagarjuna. Such an apologia
is bound to introduce new matters and invent novel interpretations of the
original sfitras. 8
7 Colebrooke 1977, 98-99.

8 The situation is similar to what happened in the grammatical tradition. Kshitish
Chandra Chatterji has put it succinctly:
It would appear that it took several centuries for Panini’s grammar to

establish itself and that even at the time of Patafijali grammarians belonging
to other schools tried their level best to point out errors of omission and
commission in the grammar of Panini. Patafijali had to meet the objections
put forward by these captious critics and for this purpose he had often to turn
and twist the rules ofPanini. This is why in some cases we remain in doubt
as to the hue views of Patafijali, his words conveying the impression that
Another sort of problem crops up when the expositor or commentator

does not belong to the system he is elucidating, yet for reasons best known
to him he composes a commentary on the base text. When a versatile scholar
like Vacaspatimis’ra, the sarvatantmsvatantm (independent) expositor, writes
comm entaries on the Samkhyakc‘zrikc‘z (SK) or the Vedantasfitm or other base
texts, he does not represent the tradition of any of the systems; he relies
wholly on his personal understanding and perhaps what he had learnt from
his gurus. How much reliance is to be placed on his exposition? We know
of at least two commentators on the Cc‘zrvc'tkasfitm, Aviddhakarna and
Udbhatabhatta, whose works are permeated with the Nyaya-Vais’esika
terminology. Their names are known from other sources as belonging to the
Nyaya tradition? There is no way to ascertain whether they were Carvakas
themselves or merely assumed the role of being so. Will it be wise to accept
their interpretations as reflecting the mainstream View of the Carvakas?
All the same, commentaries are useful aids to the understanding of all
sorts of texts, not merely philosophical ones. D.D. Kosambi is not alone in
grumbling that no good Sanskrit text can be interpreted without a
commentary.10 A variety of commentaries, from the brief fippanf to the
elaborate bhc‘xsya, with many varieties of glosses and interpretations, such
as anutcmtra, avacfimf, Cami, paficikc't (pafijikc't), vyc'tkhyc'ma, vc'trttika, vrtti,
etc. lying in between, made their presence felt in the corpus of Indian
philosophical literature.11
The same base text generates a number of commentaries and even sub-
commentaries. As it is to be expected, the commentators do not agree among
themselves, and sometimes they erect new hurdles by introducing matters
not found in the sfitras them selves. Vatsyayana, for example, in the
introductory sentence of his comments onNS 4.2.18 mentions a mysterious
person whom he calls anupalambhika. Neither he nor any sub-commentator
such as Uddyotakara or Udayana bothered to explain exactly who or what
kind of a person is meant by this strange appellation. Widely divergent

identifications have beenmade but unanimity or even near-unanimity is still
a far cry.12
they are merely intended to silence his antagonist. (Chatterji 1972, vii).
Emphasis added.
9 For a detailed analysis, see Chaps. Thirteen, Fourteen and Fifteen below.
10 Kosambi 1956/1975, 284.
‘1 For a general discussion on Sanskrit commentaries with special reference to
philosophical works see the two essays by Jonardon Ganeri (2012) and Karin
Preisezdanz (2008) respectively. See also Chaps. Thirteen and Fourteen below.
12 For further details see R. Bhattacharya 200713, 13-18.
128 Chapter Twelve
The Nyaya and the Vedanta systems have the largest number of
commentarial apparatus. It is rather odd that in spite of there being so many
explanatory materials for these systems, or perhaps because of it, some
cruxes in the base texts cannot still be resolved. Plurality of interpretations
confuses rather than convinces the learner about the true intention of the
sfitmkc'im, composer of the aphorisms. Too many cooks spoil the broth,
sometimes irredeemably. To take an example: what is meant by
akasmi’katva (accident) in the NS 4.1.22-24? Does it signify the absence of
the material cause (upc‘zdc‘makfimna) or of the instrumental cause
(nimittakamna) or of both? Vatsyayana, the first known commentator of the
NS (but writing many centuries after the redaction of the base text) explains
the opponent’s thesis as ‘effects have material causes only, but no efficient
cause’. However, later commentators such as Varddhamina Upfidhyaya and
others take the sfitm to mean that ‘an effect has no invariable or fixed
(m‘yata) cause,’ thereby eliminating both material and instrumental causes.
In the interpretation of Vatsyayana and Uddyotakara dkasmikarva =
yadrcchc'i (chance). According to Varddhamana and Varadaraja, however,
aliensmikatva = avyutpanna (non-derivable). 13 A new learner consequently is
free to choose either of the two interpretations, but the earlier one is more
probable.
The problem arises because some ultras are too brief to suggest
indubitably one or the other interpretation; without the help of the
commentator/s one cannot form any opinion from the words of the text
itself. And the irreconcilable difference in the two interpretations offered by
earlier and later commentators makes the task more difficult. There are also
other factors, such as partisan approach (due to affiliation to particular
schools), factional quarrel, etc. which vitiate some commentaries. We need
not go into all the details here. It is wise to follow the sage advice: don’t
rely exclusively on the commentator. One should initially try to make out
the intention of the sfitmkc‘zra from the words of the aphorisms themselves,
but when the words are of dubious signification or open to more than one
interpretation, help from the commentators has to be sought. And even then
it is not obligatory to accept the view of the commentator who is as much
fallible as we are. Uncritical acceptance of whatever a commentary says is
inadvisable, but at the same time total rejection of the commentaries is
equally impracticable. In any case, a student at first should try to make the
most of the literal meaning of the aphorisms wherever possible and then
turn to the commentaries and other aids (such as, secondary works,
expositions, etc).
13 Tarkavagisa’s elucidation of NS 4.1.22 in: Gangopadhyaya 1973, 27-31.

Even this golden rule of following the middle course — paying due
attention to both the base text and the commentary (or commentaries) but
not accepting any of them uncritically — does not solve all problems. A
commentator, one would naturally expect, should be faithful to the author;
he must not say anything that the author did not mean or could not have
meant. Such a fond expectation is often belied by the commentaries. A
commentator is seldom satisfied with merely providing glosses. He adds to
or modifies or qualifies the statements of the author. And all this is
recognized to be the duty of the commentator. He is expected to clarify what
is rather opaque in the text, supply whatever the author of the sfitras had
forgotten to provide and even what he failed to notice! 14 The problem is that
every commentator on a philosophical text is himself a philosopher of a sort
who is sometimes tempted to rewrite the contents of the base work by
elaborating certain points which are not at all mentioned or even hinted at
in the extremely concise sfitms. There should be a permanent caveat for the
students of Indian philosophy: Beware of the commentator! Never cease to
ask yourself: is he being faithful to the intention of the author or using the
base text as a peg to hang his own speculations on? Blind acceptance of the
commentator’s interpretation, whoever and however exalted he may be, is
not to be recommended under any circumstances. 15 At the same time, some
aphorisms are so obscure that one is at a loss without a commentary. And
there is no denying that some explanations are indeed illuminating. The crux
of the matter is: when to abide by the literal meaning of an aphorism and
when to follow the interpretation given in a commentary. Everything
depends on the judicious choice on the part of the student of Indian
philosophy.
1“ Cf.
yad vismrtam adjrstam v6 sfitrakdrepa tat sphugam |

vydkhydkfim vmvftyevam tenfidrstam ca bhcisjyakrt || Haradatta 1965, 9.
15 Dasgupta (1922/1975, 462 nl) provides an excellent example from Sankara’s
commentary on Gite? 14.3: ‘mama yom'r mahad brahma tasmin garbham dadhflmy
aham. . . . Sankara surreptitiously introduces the word mdyd between mama and yarn”
and changes the whole meaning.’
To take another example: Vatsyayana in his comments on NS 1.1.1 writes:
‘ . . .The inference (anumcina) which is not contradicted by perception (pragzaksa)
and scripture (cigama) is called anvfksd, that is, knowing over again (arm, literally
“after”) of that which is already known (iksita) by perception and scripture. . .the
inference which is contradicted by either perception or scripture is pseudo-nyfiya.’
(Trans. Gangopadhyaya (1982, 4). Emphasis added). The repeated addition of
scripture is totally unwarranted, for NS 1.1.5 states that inference is to be preceded
by perception (tat(sc.pmtyaksa)pflrvakam), and nothing else. The preceding sfitra
defines perception Without mentioning scripture at all.
130 Chapter Twelve
II
I apologize to learned readers for this disproportionately long proemium.
They certainly know all this from their own experience. Like them I too had
to pay a price — a very heavy one at that — for placing absolute trust on the
words of the base texts on some occasions as well as for relying blindly on
the commentaries on others. Nevertheless, before getting into the
problematic of this paper, I found such an exordium necessary to the enquiry
into the question: How many instruments of cognition (pramana) did the
materialists in India admit?
When we set ourselves to study the rise and development of materialism in

India, we are confronted with an overriding problem, that of paucity of
materials. This is very much unlike studying some idealist systems such as
Vedanta, where the opposite is the case. As to materialism, all we have are,
besides a few scattered verses of doubtful origin and unknown authorship,
very few fragments, quotations and paraphrases of certain aphorisms and
short extracts from commentaries, all found in works seeking to refute
materialism. 16 It is common knowledge that there was no continuous chain
linking the materialists in India from the days of Ajita Kesakambala
(sixth/fifth century BCE) down to the advent of the Carvakas (c. eighth
century CE).
From whatever little evidence we possess it is, however, evident that
there were more than one materialist school long before the appearance of
the Carva'kas. In certain earlier and later works a more general term, nastika
(as in Panini, 4.4.60: asti nfisti distam matih, from which the words dstika,
ndstika and daistika are derived)17 or ndhiyavddz' or natthiyavddi'
(negativist) is employed to suggest some pre-Cfirvaka materialists.18 But we
have no evidence that they had a common base text and each materialist
thinker had enough adherents to form his own school. It is probable that one
or some of them might have spoken of five elements as well (as in 1MB}:
12.2674 and the SKS 1.1.1.1-20). Gunaratna in fact refers to ‘another kind
of Carvakas,’ cc‘zrvc‘rkaikadefiyc‘zh, who spoke of five elements instead of
‘5 For a collection of such fiagments see R. Bhattacharya 2009/2011, 78—86 (text),

86-92 (translation).
17 By nastika, at first only the denier of the Other World was meant (as explained by
the commentators o f Panini, 4.4.60: asti nasti distam matih, from which the words
cistika, ndstika and daistika are derived. See R. Bhattacharya 2009/2011, 227-228.
See also Aryasfira, 23.57.
‘8 As in Haribhadra, SKa 164, Sanghadasaganivacaka 169, 275.
four (300), but apparently he employs the name Carvaka as a kind of ‘brand
name’ for all materialists, past and present
In or around the sixth century CE we come across a group of philosophers
called the Lo(au)kayatikas. This group is not at all like its namesake, which
was known at least as early as the fifth century BCE in Buddhist literature.
The members of the older group used to indulge in disputation for
disputation’s sake and because of this irksome habit incurred the
disapproval of the Buddha. 19 The new Laukayatikas of the Common Era are
knownto have beenrabidly opposed to religion (in Banabhatta, Kc‘zdambarz':
513: Iokdyatika viabzayevc’zdharmaruceh). By the eighth century CE however
the word crirvcika appears as synonymous with the new Lokayata school.20
Yet another name, Barhaspatya (related to Brhaspati, the preceptor of
the gods), came to be associated with the Carvaka/Lokayata. The story was
derived from some Puranic tales, particularly those found in the VPu, 3.18
and copied out in the Padmapurc‘ma (PPu), Srstikhanda, chapter 13. So all
the four names, Barhaspatya, Carr/aka, Lokayata and Nastika came to
signify the same materialist school. Hemacandra in his lexicon (AC)
provides three synonyms for Barhaspatya: Nastika, Carvaka and
Laukayatika (3525-27).
There seems to have been another school of materialists in south India.
Its existence is recorded in the Tamil epics, the Manime'kalai and the
Nilakeci (Neelakesr’). They called their system Enlzm‘avc‘zda.21 The presence
of several groups of pre-Carvaka materialists is also testified by an old Iain
canonical work, the SKS (1.1.1.1-20). Many of them (if not all) were
bhfitapaficakavc‘zdins, holding that the number of elements was five, not four
(as the Carvakas did).22 Bhfitavada and the Lokayata doctrine had much in
common but, as a Bhutavadin in the the Manime'kalai, 27:273-274 says,
there were some differences too. To mention one: the Bhutavadjns believed
‘9 For references see KC. Chattopadhyaya 1975, 143-148.

20 See Haribhadra, SDSam, Chap. 6. The chapter is devoted to the exposition of
Lokayata (lokfiyatd vadanty evam, etc. (80a), but in 85d we read: cfirvfikfih
pmtqaedire. See also Kamalasila who, in his commentary on a chapter in
gantaraksita’s TS entitled ‘Lckayatapafiksa’, uses the names Carvaka and Lokayata
interchangeably as if they were synonymous. See TSP, II: 639, 649, 657, 663, 665,
also 11: 520, 939 and 945.
21 See Vanamamalai 1973, 26, 36-38. Also Ilanko Digal and Sattanar (Prema
Nandakumar (1989, 153-54 (27. 264-276)); Laksmi Holmstorm (1996, 170).
22 Sflafika in his comments on SKS 1.1.1.20 calls thempaficabhfltavdajzdajzdh (five-
elementalists and others), and more elaborately paficabhfitfistitvfidivadino lokab
(those people who speak of the existence of the five eleents) (19). Earlier he has
explained ekesém (1.1.1.7) as bhfltavcidindm but identifies them as followers of the
Barhaspatya doctrine.
132 Chapter Twelve
in two kinds of matter: lifeless and living; life originates from living matter,
the body from the lifeless. The Lokayatas did not think so.23
A problem arises when some writers adhering to the pro-Vedic systems
(fistikas) set out to criticize the Carvakas but make no distinction between
the Pre-Carvakas and the Carvakas. So much so that they either rely on a
particular commentary at the expense of the base text or disregard the
existing commentaries of the Carvc‘zkasfitm altogether. Sometimes they
resort exclusively to the base text and on other occasions follow a
commentary but err in making the wrong choice. Some of them mistake a
particular comm entator’s personal view to be the mainstream view,
disregarding the words of the aphorisms; some others stick to the words of
the aphorisms, ignoring the commentaries. I shall give two examples to
show how the opponents of materialism misrepresented the Carvfika view
concerning the instrument of cognition by shifting their grounds rather
injudiciously from the aphorism to a commentary or vice versa.
III
Iayantabhatta, a luminary of the Nyaya-Vais’esika school (ninth century CE)
was a domicile inKashmir although he was a Gauda brahamana by origin.
His exegetical work AM contains stringent attacks against the Carvakas.
Speaking of the instruments of cognition, Jayanta at one place says: ‘the
Carvakas say that there is only one kind of pramc'ma, which is perception
(prafizaksa).’24 Jayanta assures his readers that he would establish the
validity of inference (anumc'ma) which the Carvakas allegedly do not admit
as a pramfina.
Apparently Jayanta is here going by the Cart/aka aphorism: ‘Perception
indeed is the (only) instrument of cognition. ’ 25 So far so good. Had this been
the only example of going by the literal meaning of an aphorism, we could
have dispensed with Jayanta. After all, he takes the words of the aphorism
as they appear in the base text and stands firmly on its basis. But very soon
he changes his track and instead of the sfltm work takes his stand on a
commentary, presumably the Tattvavrtti written by his fellow Kashm irian,
Udbhatabhatta. Jayanta does not name him anywhere in his work but refers
to him in various indirect and ironieal ways and refers to Udbhata’s view
thrice in successive pages. 25
23 Vanamamalai 1973, 38.

24 NM 1:43. Translation in: C/L 154.
25 111.1. R. Bhattachaiya 2009/2011, 80, 87; for variant readings see 60 n23.
2" Cakradhara, author of the Granthibhar‘rga (GrBh), a commentary on the NM,
identifies the person’s referred to in such ways (susz‘ksz‘ta and dhflrta) as Udbhata
After referring to the alleged one-prama'na position of the Carvakas

(quoted above), Jayanta writes: ‘The Carvakas, the well-learned ones
(sus‘z‘ksita), say that it is really impossible to specifically state the number of
pramfma—s. ’ 27
In another instance Jayanta complains that the Carvaka, the cunning one
(dhfirta), does not explain the principle (tattva) but merely expatiates on
‘the impossibility of making a specific rule regarding the number and
definition of pramdna and prameya (the object of cognition)’.28 It is no
longer the number ofpramdnas but those of prameyas as well.
On yet another occasion Jayanta derides the Carvakas by saying: ‘The
nfistikas, not having enough intelligence to determine the power of the
pramdnas have been clamouring in vain that in the case ofpramdnas, there
is no specific rule as to the number?”
The same kind of contempt is manifest again on the same page: ‘By
declaring before the assembly of the leamed that tattva is nothing but the
impossibility of determining (the true nature of pramfina and prameya),
they (so. the Carvakas) have only revealed their dull headedness.’30
It is to be noted that Jayanta does not ridicule Udbhata alone or even
those who allegedly adhere to his views for holding this agnostic position
regarding the number of prams-mas andprameyas. In the first two instances
he does so, but in the last two he condemns the Carvakas as a whole, not a
section of them or a particular individual.
The charge is not true, for it goes against the statement made earlier by
Jayanta himself that the Carvakas admit one pramfina only, as the sfitm
says. Even though we have to work on the basis of very few Carvaka
fragments, we at least know that Udbhata in some respects differed from the
ancient (cirantana) Cari/alias“ and Cakradhara himself tells us as does
Vadidevasfiri that Udbhata sought to explain some sfitras in quite
unconventional and novel ways.32 Therefore, Udbhata’s view conceming
and others (1:52, 100). Cakradhara is corroborated by Vadidevasfiri who quotes at

length from Udbhata’s commentary on several occasions and provides the title of
the work (Tattvavrtti) as well (265). Tammvrtti (270) in all probability is arnisprint.
See R. Bhattacharya 2009/2011, Comrns. 11, 13. 81—82, 89).
27 NM 1:52. Trans. in: C/L 154.
28 NM1:100. Trans. in: C/L 155.
29 NM1:101. Trans. in: C/L 156.
30[Wt/11:101. Trans. in: C/L 156.
31 W 11:257.
32 Calqadhara 1:100, Cf. Vadidevasfiri (764): ‘This respectable veterantwice-bom is
revealing to us a novel way of answering criticism.’ (Comm. 15. R. Bhattacharya
2009/2011, 82, S9).
134 Chapter Twelve
the number of pramana and prameya should not be taken as the opinion
generally held by all na'stikas or Carvakas, past and present.
Moreover, Udbhata’s view flatly contradicts the sfitm which specifies
that the principle is earth, air, fire and water and nothing else (iii) (I2).33
Udbhata himself was aware of his departure from the old way of
interpretation. He tried to reinterpret the word iti in the text in a tortuous
way by saying that here iti does not denote the end but is illustrative.“
Jayanta then is not consistent in representing the opponent’s view
(pfirvapaksa). He knew full well that the Carvakas interpreted the sfitm in
a very different way than the wording suggests. At least three
commentators, Purandara, Aviddhakarna and Udbhata, took pains to point
out that although they did not consider inference to be an independent
instrument of cognition, they did not reject inference as such. Only such
inferences as are drawn from scriptures or unverifiable sources are rejected
by them; inferences established in everyday life and verifiable by sense
perception is admitted by them.35 Jayanta in fact paraphrased the view of
those whom he calls ‘the better educated ones’ (suitksitatarc‘thffi as follows:
Indeed who will deny the validity of inference when one infers fire from
smoke and so on; ordinary people ascertain the probandurn by such
inferences though they may not be pestered by the logicians.
However, inferences that seek to prove a self, God, an omniscient being and
the other-world and so on, are not considered valid by those who know the
real nature of things.
Simple-minded people cannot derive the knowledge of probandum by such
inferences so long as their mind is not vitiated by cunning logicians. 37
By refusing to abide by the commentator’s interpretation of the sfitm

concerning the partial validity of inference but by generalizing the same
commentator’s purely personal opinion about the impossibility of
33 R. Bhattacharya 2009/2011, 78, 86.

34 Vadidevasfiri (1087). R. Bhattacharya 2009/2011, Comrns. 16. 82, 89-90.
Cakradhara too points out in relation to other sfltms that Udbhata’s explanations go
against the conventionally proposed ones. R. Bhattacharya 2009/2011, Comm. 8.
81, 88, WI: 100, 257-58.
35 R. Bhattachaya 2009/2011, 81-82, 88—90, Comms. 3, 12, 18.
35 Unfortunately Cakradhara does not identify these persons as he did in case of the
well-educated Carvakas and the cunning Carvaka (see n23 above). The use of plural
may be ironically honorific. On the basis of the extract quoted by Vadidevasfiri
(Comms. 12. 81-82, 88. 265-66) we may safely conclude that this person cannot but
be Udbhata.
37 W12184. R. Bhattacharya 2009/2011, 86, 92, verses 18-20.
The Base Text of the Carvakas and Its Commentaries I35
determining the number ofpramana andprameya to be the original Carvaka

view, Jayanta merely betrays his personal antipathy to Udbhata inparticular
and the Cari/alias in general. He would at one point go by the literal m eaning
of a sfitm in the base text but at another point accept the commentator’s
view rather than what the sfitm says. No doubt the commentator (U dbhata
in this case) provides an opportunity to an opponent of his system by
resorting to a far-fetched interpretation; and Jayanta makes full use of it.
Instead of bringing the charge of sfin‘abhafiga, going against the aphorism
(which Udbhata definitely does while interpreting iti in the Carvaka
fragment 1.2), he refers to the view as if it represents the true position of the
Carvakas. On another occasion he refers to the sfitra itself just because it
suits him and on yet other occasions he conveniently forgets the sfitra and
picks up Udbhata alone. If he believed that a particular commentator’s View
properly reflected the intention of the sfitmkdm, why did he suppress the
same commentator’s interpretation of a vital 3mm (III. I, discussed above)
and stuck to the letters of it instead?
IV
Hemacandra, the Iain savant (twelfth century CE) in his Anya-yoga-
vyavaccheda—dvfttrméikd (AYVD) also criticizes the nastika (heterodox)
view solely on the ground that it does not admit inference as a valid
instrument of cognition (verse 20). Mallisena (thirteenth century) in his
SW, a commentary on the AYVD, identifies this nc‘zstika with the Carvaka.
Rightly so, for the two words are synonymous (see above). Mallisena then
explains the point as follows: the Carvakas accept only perception to be the
sole instrument of cognition; hence they do not accept anything else, not
even inference, as a means of valid knowledge.38
We have already seen that this is a common charge brought against the
Carvakas by many of their opponents, both Vedists (brahmanical, such as

Jayanta) and non-Vedists (the Jain Hemacandra in this instance. See also
Kamalas’fla, II. 520, but see also II: 528 quoted below). In fact the point that
the Carvakas accepted nothing but perception as pramana is so widely —
almost universally— believed by so many authorities both ancient and
modem, that it may appear to be an exercise in futility to question the
veracity of this oft-repeated objection. Yet the fact is that long before
Hemacandra wrote this, Purandara, a Carvaka philosopher (fl. eighth
century CE) whose name is connected with both the base text of the
Carvaka/Lokayata system of philosophy as well as with a short commentary
38 For a detailed study of SVM, Chapt. 20, see R. Bhattacharya 2009/2011, 167-168.
136 Chapter Twelve
(vrtti) on it,39 had clearly stated: ‘The Carvakas, too, admit of such an
inference as is well-known in the world, but that which is called inference
[by some], transgressing the worldly way, is prohibited [by them].”‘0
Purandara was not alone in asserting this view. Aviddhakarna (not later
than the eighth century), another commentator on the Cdrvdkasfitra, also
declared: ‘It is true that inference is admitted by us as a source of
knowledge, because it is found to be so in general practice; (but what we
only point out is that) the definition of an inferential mark is illogical.’41
And, last but not least, Udbhata, the last known commentator on the
Cdrvdlmsfitro, who in some other respects was rather atypical in his
interpretation of certain Carvaka aphorisms (see above), states the Carvaka.
position vis-a-vis inference more elaborately:
Failure of concomitance is not seen even in the case of probonses well-

establishedin the world; so also it is not noticedin the case of theprobonses
established in the scripture; so, on the basis of the quality characterized by
“non-perception of failure of concomitance” being common to them, the
probanses established in the scriptures are admitted as being gamako. It is
because of this that inference is secondary. Now the knowledge of non-
failure of concomitance in respect of worldly probonses is instrumental in
bringing about the knowledge of the probondum. But that is not there in the
concept ofprobonses established by the scriptures. So it is not proper that
non-perceptible things should be known with the help of these. Hence it is
said that the ascertainment of things is difficult to attain by dint of
inference.42
The position of the Carvakas is perfectly clear. They do not admit

inference as an independent instrument of cognition on a par with
perception, but at the same time they do admit the limited validity of
inference insofar as it is confined to the material world which is perceivable
and verifiable by sense experience. It is in this sense that Udbhata in

response to some opponentmakes a distinction between ‘incapable reasons’
and ‘capable reasons.’43 Jayanta certainly knew all this. Hence he makes a
‘better educated ones’ declare this in clear terms (as quoted above).
Given the incredible mobility of mss from Kashmir to Kerala and the
custom of getting such mss speedily copied in various local scripts from
39 See R. Bhattacharya 2009/2011, 67.

40 As quotedby Kamalasilain TSP, II: 528 (on T5: Chap. 18, verse 1481. Comm. 18
in: R. Bhattacharya 2009/2011, 82, 90.
41 R. Bhattacharya 2009/2011, Comm. 3.81, 88.
42 R. Bhattacharya 2009/2011, Comm. 1281-82, 88.
43 R. Bhat'tachal‘ya 2009/2011, Comm. 14.82, 89.
garada to Nagafi to Malayalam, it is inconceivable that Hemacandra

(respectfully called the ‘omniscient one of the Kali era,’ kalikdlasarvajfia
by the Jains) did not know any of these. Ratnaprabha (fourteenth century),
another Jain scholar, echoes the view of the three Cc‘zrvcikasfitm
commentators mentioned above:
The Carvakas, however, contend that they admit inferences which are of
practical utility, such as the inference of fire from smoke, and deny only
those which deal with such supematural matters as the heaven, the unseen
power (apfirva) which generates in a next birth fruits of acts done in a present
life, etc. etc.44
Gunaratna (fifteenth century), yet another Jain commentator, also

repeats all this 45 as do the anonymous author of the Avacfirni to the SDSam
(1969, 508) and another digest—writer of a small, anonymous and undated
work called the Sarvamatasamgraha, SMS (15).46
Hemacandra and Mallisena do not shift their position from the base text
to the commentary (as Jayanta does) intheir criticism of the carvakas. They
err in completely ignoring the commentaries and thereby, like many others
before and after them, misrepresent the Carvaka view of inference. In fact,
as has been shown time again by other scholars before, partial acceptance
of inference distinguished the Carvakas (among other things) from the
earlier materialists, some of whom might have held one-pramazra position
as alleged by their opponents.“ Very much like Jayanta, he too conveniently
avoids mentioning the view of the ‘better educated Carvakas’ in this regard.
One last word. Why did Jayanta and Hemacandra, two stalwarts in the field
of Indian philosophy, make such injudicious choice between the base text
44 Vadidevasfiri 1967, 540.

45 Tarkamhasyadfpika (TRD) on SDSam, verse 83, 306.13-15‘, C/L 273.
45 R. Bhattacharya 2009/2011, 58.
47 Whether all pre-Carvaka materialists too held such a one-pramdna position is
open to fiirther enquiry. A passage in the Mk mentions three pramctnas, namely,
perception confirmedin the world (lokatah sidddhampmtyalcsam), doctrines having
the Veda to support them, and the practice of eminent persons, sisras (13.1479).
Dandekar has noticed that inference is absent in the list but suggests that presumably
inference is understood to have been included in perception (crit. ed.
Anusasanaparvan, ‘Notes’, 1119). This would suggest that inference was required
to be confined to this world only and not to be derived from the Veda, etc. to prove
the existence of supernatural objects. Cf. NS 1.5: tad (sc. praQ/alcsam)-pflrvakam).
See alsoMbh 12. 211. 26-27 where reasoned-out truth (krtdnta) is called nothing but
perception. See below Chap. Fourteen.
138 Chapter Twelve
and the commentary? It will be insulting them to say that they did not know
or understand the actual position of the Carvakas in regard to inference. Yet
to say that these savants deliberately distorted their opponent’s view will be
equally ungenerous. Then why?
The only explanationI may venture to offer is that their desire to trounce
their opponent blurred their vision and made them recourse to the shortest
and easiest way. By damning the Carvakas as ‘wretched’ (vars-11m) and
undeserving of any serious discussion,48 both chose to portray them as
simpletons, which they were not. Jigi'sc‘z (desire to conquer) is the greatest
enemy of objectivity, as a learned friend of mine is fond of saying.
48 NM, 1:299; Hemacandra, YS, 2.38, f.96b. Silaflka (19) also uses this insulting word
to denigrate ndstikas who speak of five elements (on SKS 1.1.1.21).
CHAPTER THIRTEEN
THE CARVAKA/LOKAYATA:
CLASSIFICATION OF SOURCE MATERIALS
Very much like the Presocratic philosophical works, the basic texts of the
Carvfika system are lost. Only a few fragments —passages of varying length
— have come down to us. Even then all of them are not genuine, as they
seem to offer contrary points of view. Earlier scholars from HT.
Colebrooke down to D.R. Shastri and Mamoru Namai collected some
fragments and presented ‘them in ways they deem ed fit.1 A closer analysis
reveals that all the fragments are not of the same nature: some are aphorisms
proper and a few are merely popular verses purportedly airing the Carvaka
view on life and death. More interestingly, there are a number of passages
that appear to be more or less verbatim quotations from more than one
commentary on the lost Cfiwcikasfin'a.
So far the names of five commentators are known: Aviddhakarna,
Udbhatabhatta (Bhattodbhata), Kambalaévatara, Purandara and Bhfivivikta.
Six more fragments seem to have been extracted from some anonymous
commentary or commentaries. In my paper I propose to discuss the
difference in the attitude of the commentators to some of the Carvika
aphorisms.
The Cari/rake, apparently developed along the line of the other
philosophical systems of India. The commentary and sub-commentary

tradition is not always consistent in every respect. The commentators and
sub-comm entators sometimes manipulated the aphorisms to suggest what
1 For an account o f critical surveys in the field of Carvaka studies, see Bhattacharya,
Ramkrishna. Carvaka Fragments: A New Collection. Journal of Indian Philosophy,
Vol. 30 No. 6, December 2002, 597—640. [Reprinted in Indian Philosophy, ed.
Jonardon Ganeri, vol 1 Part 5. Milton Park, Abingdon: Routledge/Taylor & Francis
Group, 2016] included, with revisions and corrections, in 2009/2011, 69-104. All
the fragments referred to in this paper are to be found in the aforesaid article with
full reference to the sources. Interested readers are requested to consult the same for
further information.
140 Chapter Thirteen
they would like them to mean. It is therefore necessary to take note of the
Carvika/Lokayatika philosophers known to us.
The names of three Cari/aka philosophers are given in Santaraksita's TS
and Kamalas’ila's Tattva—samgraha—pafijikc‘z (TSP): Aviddhakarna,
Kambalfis’vatara, and Purandara. Purandara’s vrtti (gloss), apparently on the
collection of the sfitms, is mentioned in a Prakrit work, Pupphadanta
(Puspadanta) ’s Mahc'rpurfina and two Sanskrit works, Anantavirya’s Siddhi—
vinificaya—fikd and Vidirijasfiri’s Nycbza-viniéccwa-vivarana. It Should be
noted that Santaraksita and Kamalasila were Buddhists while Pupphadanta
and the other two were Jains.
The name of Aviddhakarna is also found in the Nydya—vinis’cqya—
vivamna, Siddhi—viniicaya—fikd and Pramdnavdrttika—svopajfia—vrtti—flkd
(PVSVI) by Karnakagomin. The name of his commentary is also given by
Kamalas’ila: Tattvafikd. All that can be said about these three commentators
is that they must have flourished in or before the eighth century.
Cakradhara in his GrBh commentary on .Tayantabhatta’s Nil/I mentions the
fourth name, Bhavivikta, whom he describes as a cirantana-cc‘zrvc'tka, an
ancient (= traditional) Carvaka. He may have written his commentary even
before Kambalas'vatara and Purandara. Unfortunately no extract from his
work has been quoted by Cakradhara.
The fifth and so far the last commentator we know of is Udbhatabhatta,
also mentioned as Bhattodbhata. This Udbhata might be identical with the
rhetorician from Kashmir. Kalhana in his Rajatamfiginf, 4.495 mentions a
minister bearmg the same name. [There are many other names ending with
-_ta in this history of Kashmir: Ramata (5.29), Varnata C?) (6.944), Senata,
Ksemata, Bappata, and Udbhata (all in 7.482)]. The name of Udbhata’s
comm entary was Tantravrtti (Tattvavrtti?) As regards Kambalas’vatara and
Purandara, all that can be said is that they belonged to the eighth century or
before. As to Udbhata, if all the Udbhatas were the same, we may fix the
time at the ninth century. His name occurs in Syfidvfida-mmdkam (SVR)

and GrBh. Vadidevasfiri respectfully refers to him as ‘ a venerable old twice-
born’ (jarad-dvzj’anmc‘t—mahc‘mubhc‘wah) Considerably long extracts from
Udbhata’s commentary are quoted as the opponent’s view (prirvcpaksa) by
Cakradhara and Vfididevasfiri. Cakradhara sets all speculation at rest by
clearly stating that both suéiksita, ‘well educated’ and cc‘zrvc‘rkadhfirta,
‘cunning Carvaka’ in Jayanta’s work mean Udbhata (and his followers?)
From Kamalasfla we know that there were at least two commentaries (if
not more) on the Carvc‘rkasfitm in or before the eighth century. The
commentators explained one sfitra (tebhayaé caitanyam) in two different
ways. Cakradhara mentions Bhfivivikta as one among many of the
The Cérvéka/Lokayata: Classification of Source Materials 141
traditional Carvfikas. So the number of commentators may have been more

than five that we have so far been able to ascertain.
The fragments of the commentaries mostly refer to five aphorisms,
namely, athc‘ztastatrvam vyc‘zkhydsyc'zmah, ‘we shall now explain the
principle’ ; prthivyc‘zpastejovc‘zyuriti tatrvc‘mi, ‘earth, water, fire and air are the
principles, nothing else’; tebhyas’caitanyam, ‘consciousness (arises or is
manifested) out of these’; prafizaham (ekam) eva pramc'mam, ‘perception
indeed is the (only) means of right knowledge’; and pramdnasydgaunatvc‘zd
mums-mad arthanis’cayo durlabhah, ‘since the means of right knowledge is
to be non—secondary, it is difficult to ascertain an object by means of
inference’.
The sfitm, kayad (or s’arl‘rdd) eva, ‘From the body itself,’ is more
cryptic than the similar aphorism, tebhyas’caitanyam. Even before
Kamalas’ila, there were two schools of commentators: one supplying the
adhyc'zhdm, upajdyate, ‘is bom’, the other opting for abhiwajyate, ‘is
manifested’.2 Other writers while controverting the Carvakas preferred
either of the two, some mention both.
How many instruments of cognition did the Carvakas accept as valid?
Being materialists, they had to uphold perception. But does it mean that they
excluded every other instrument of cognition as invalid? Kamalasila has
quoted a sentence apparently taken from Purandara’s Vrtti which runs as
follows: ‘ The Carvakas, too, admit of such an inference as is well known in
the world, but that which is called inference [by some] transgressing the
worldly way is prohibited [by the Carvakasy It would seem that the
Carvékas accepted perception as the only valid means of knowledge
because it was direct, unmediated and hence non-secondary, as the proper
instrument of cognition should be. Inference on the other hand is dependent
on perception, and so is regarded as secondary. The distinction made by the
Carvékas between utpannapmtm’ (inferential cognition acquiredby one seIf)
and upc‘zayapmfiti (inferential cognition to be acquired on somebody else’s

advice), mentioned by Jayantabhatta, is the lasting contribution of the
Carvakas to the study of Logic, especially in relation to the nature of
inference.
Absolutely nothing is known about Kambalfis’vatara and Purandara.
The names of Aviddhakarna and Bhavivikta are also found in Nyaya
literature. But at the present state of our knowledge we cannot say, as Eli
Franco writes, whether they were ‘Carvfikas who converted to Nyfiya or
Naiyfiyikas who converted to the Loke'tyata.’3 Franco is also of the opinion
2 See TSP, verses 1857-58.

3 E11 Franco 1997, 142.
142 Chapter Thirteen
that ‘the possibility of their having introduced Vais’esika categories into the
Carvaka school is certainly not unimaginable’. Yet it is to be noted that
Cakradhara mentions him as belonging to the traditional line of the
Carvakas. It was Udbhata, as both Cakradhara and Vadidevasfiri say, who
went for strange innovations.
Of all the commentators known to us, Udbhata deserves more notice than
others. While the other commentators seem to have followed the literal
meaning of the aphorisms (so far as can be gathered from the available
fragments, admittedly inadequate to form any definite opinion), Udbhata
was indeed a ‘revisionist' among the materialists. Let me quote a few of his
remarks as reproduced by Vadidevasfiri:
While explicating the two aphorisms in the Lokdyatasmras, ‘We shall now
explain the principle’ and ‘Earth, water, fire and air (are the principles)’, he
(so. Udbhata) described it in another way, forsaking the conventional
interpretation. In the first aphorism, the term, tartva, tells the impossibility
of laying down any fixed number and essential characteristics of the sources
of knowledge and objects of knowledge. The second aphorism, too, is
explained by him as referring to the objects o f knowledge. The word, in” in
the (aphorism), ‘The earth, water, fire and air iti’ indicates also the
possibility of similar objects o f knowledge other than the earth, etc. Such is
his view.
The word, iti, does not denote the end, (but) it is illustrative. There are
other principles such as consciousness, sound, pleasure, pain, desire,
aversion, efforts, impression and others. There are also prior non—existence
of the earth, etc., posterior non-existence, and mutual difference which are
quite apparent and distinct (from the principles, viz., earth, etc.).
This goes against the very grain of the Cari/aka approach.

Like Aviddhakarna, Udbhata too was an accomplished logician. He
could and did use the technical terms of Nyaya to justify the orthodox
Carvaka position. However, he succeeded more in obfuscating than
expounding the significance of the aphorisms. Here is an example (the least
opaque of the fragments related to logic):
The one who framed the definition [of mumfina as prdmdna] aimed at
brevity o f expression, but not only because of this does inference become
secondary. Andif they were to define the characteristics of probans [sfidhya
i.e., inferable property, such as ‘fire’] as attributes o f the thing which is a
part of the probandurn [hetu, reason, such as ‘smoke’], there would be no
secondary significance even in the definition.
It is probable that Jayantabhatta had Udbhata in In ind When he said, ‘The

Carvfikas, the well-learned ones, say that it is really impossible to
The Cérvéka/Lokayata: Classification of Source Materials 143
specifically state the number of the instruments of cognition.’ Given

Udbhata’s refusal to delimit the number of the objects of cognition (see
above), it is only one step further to deny any definite number of the
instruments of cognition.
In fact, in one instance Udbhata seems to verge on pure idealism. He
says, ‘ [Tlhere is an unseen property of the elements, the particular nature of
the elements that constitute the body, which brings about the experience of
diverse pleasures and pains.’
Udbhata’s penchant for novelty is most apparent in his interpretation of
the word bhfitebhyah. He does not take it in the ablative case denoted by the
fifth declension (a view followed by the earlier Carvfikas like Bhavivikta
and others), but suggests that it is a case of radarthye caturthz'. The aphorism
would then mean: ‘Consciousness is for (the sake of) the elements;
consciousness is independent and aids the physical elements which
constitute the body.’ The separation of consciousness from the body is
closer to idealism than materialism.
Although the available extracts from the commentaries are pitifully few,
we may still venture to suggest that all the commentators of the
Carvc‘zkasfitm flourished long after the redaction of the sfitm work. Whether
Purandara was the first redactor as also the first commentator cannot be
ascertained. But the difference in opinion regarding the adhyc'rhc'rm in
relation to an aphorism basic to the Carvaka doctrine (tebhyas’caitanyam)
shows that there was a school of commentators which believed in the
immanence of consciousness in the body itself. Apparently it did not treat
consciousness as an epiphenom enon as suggested by the sfitra,
jalabudbudavajjz'vfih, ‘souls are like water bubbles.’ But the way in which
Udbhata offers his interpretation of the well-known aphorisms exhibits a
marked break from the tradition. It may even be argued that he was only
manipulating the Carvaka aphorisms to propound a philosophy of his own.
What, however, unites Purandara, Aviddhakarna and Udbhata is their

staunch defence of the primacy of perception. No other philosophical
system except Carvakaf Lokayata seeks to classify the prams-mas into two
categories, primary (agauna) and secondary (gauna) that is, any other
instrument of cognition except perception is a pramana only in the
metaphorical sense. Those who believe in the validity of more than one
instrument of cognition treat all of them on a par: inference or word is as
valid as perception. The Carvfikas alone treat perception as basic to
acquiring knowledge and inference is to be admitted when and only when it
is based on and preceded by perception. This is how anumfina is defined in
NS, 1.5.
CHAPTER FOURTEEN
COMMENTATORS ON THE CERV/IKASUTM
A recent essay by Karin Preisendanz (2008) set me thinking about the

commentary tradition of the Cdrvdkasfitm. In spite of the fact that the mala-
text is lost, we have a number of fragments of the commentaries written by
no fewer than four commentators, namely, Kambalfis’vatara, Purandara,
Aviddhakarna, and Udbhata (R Bhattacharya 2009/2011, 65-68). The
existence of other commentators too has been suggested (TS 22. 1858, II:
634), of whom only one name is mentioned elsewhere: Bhe‘wivikta (GrEh
II: 257). Unfortunately no extract from his work is quoted anywhere. It is
interesting to note that there is a reference to Pauramdanya vitti in addition
to the Paumndamm 5121mm (Pupphadanta, 2018.9). We also read of
Purandara as an author of a work on the Cmaka doctrine (a marginal note
in a ms qtd. in Gune 1923, 42).
From the thirty fragments so far collected we gather that Bhattodbhata
or Udbhatabhatta was known as a commentator who differed from the
traditional Carvakas and broke new grounds in explaining some of the
aphorisms (GrBh I: 100', SVR 764). Purandara too is claim ed to have
deviated from his predecessor/s, for he admitted a particular kind of
inference, such as is well-known in the world (or better still, well-
established in the world, lokapmsiddham anumdnam) (TSP II: 528).
Kamalas’fla while quoting Purandara’s words (apparently verbatim) adds a

tu, ‘but’ (or ‘however’) before the reporting verb, thereby giving birth to an
opinion that the Carvikas before Purandara accepted only one instrument of
cognition, namely, perception, while Purandara includes such inference as
depended on perception and well known in everyday practice (Franco and
Preisendanz 1998, 180 coll).
This is open to question, as will be shown later. At present suffice it to
say that while some critics call the Carvfikaspramanaikavadins, professing
the validity of one and only one instrument of cognition (perception), they
quote Bhartrthari’s lgzapadz'ya, 1.32-34 in support of their contention (R.
Bhattacharya 2009/2011, 117). This is downright absurd, for Bhartrhari
considered scripture, dgama, to be the only valid instrument of cognition
whereas the Carvfikas had nothing to do with it. In the long history of Indian
Commentators on the Cfirvfikasfitra 145
philosophy Bhartrhari alone held a rigid one-pramana position. All others

admitted two, three or four pramdnas. The position of the Carvikas was
nearer the Buddhists (who admitted both perception and inference) than any
other philosophical system. But in order to brand the Carvakas as
pramc‘znaikavc‘zdins they were made to appear as one with Bhartrhari. Even
though the commentators of the Cc‘zrvc'rkasfitm had some differences among
themselves concerning the interpretation of some aphorisms, they seem to
have been unanimous in regard to the number of prams-mas to be admitted
It was perception and inference based on perception. Only in this sense they
were pramdnaikavédins. Here we have to grasp the 15115c rather than the
literal meaning of eka.
How do we know that? This is where the passages (fragments) from the
commentaries of Aviddhakarna (PVSV'I l9) and Purandara (TSP II: 528)
quoted by their opponents prove indispensable. Both of them interpret the
aphorism, ‘Perception is the (only) instrument of cognition’ (III.1) in this
sense (For details see R. Bhattacharya 2009/2011, Comms. 3, 4, 18; 88-90).
Udbhata too denied the status of inference as primary and defended the view
of the sfitmkc‘zm by adducing further reason (Comms. 11-13).
What is further to be noted is that, unlike other systems of philosophy,
the Carvaka/Lokayata did not accord equal value to perception and
inference. Inference, they said, must be grounded on perception first, so it
was of secondary kind (gauge). The Nyaya school did not disagree with the
view that inference is preceded by perception. However, they claim ed that
inference was nevertheless on a par with perception or word or comparison.
The Carvakas however claimed that perception was not only
pramanajyesrha, the foremost of the pramc‘mas, but also the only primary
means. Inference etc. in order to be valid had to be based on perception first.
Hence, they were secondary, orpromising:in the secondary sense of the word.
This is the proper understanding of the Cari/aka position and is supported
by many Jain writers (For details, see R. Bhattacharya 2009/2011, 5’?-

63,114-17). Vaeaspatimis’ra disparages the Carvakas by calling them worst
than the beast, for they could not make inferential judgement on the basis
of actual experience (t'rmati') on BS 3.3.53-4, 852). This is nothing but
calumny, for the Carvaka materialists accepted laukika anumc‘ma as valid.
This is found in the commentaries as well as admitted by some of their
opponents (see R. Bhattacharya 2009/2011, 57-58).
Let us turn to Udbhata again. He was well-versed in Nyaya terminology
and employed them profusely (SVR 265, 270, 764). But what is remarkable
is that he had a penchant for explaining aphorisms in a radically novel way.
His interpretation was based on the inbuilt ambiguity of certain words inthe
sfitms, such as itz' and teblgzah (GrBh I: 100, II: 257-58; Sir/R 1087).
146 Chapter Fourteen
Consequently his glosses make the Cdrvdkasfitm appear as a kind of a

parallel Nyaya text. Moreover some of his interpretations render the
Carvaka view as almost bordering on immaterialism, if not idealism proper
(GrBh II: 257, 262). What has been said about SH. Butcher’s Aristotle ’3
Theory of Poetry and Fine Art may very well apply to Udbhata’s
commentary: ‘[Butcher] uses Aristotle as a peg on which to hang rather
vague and Lin-Aristotelian speculations’ (Hardy 1958, 8).
The question is: once we know, as Jayantabhatta, Vadidevasfiri and
Cakradhara also knew (GrBh I: 100, II: 257-58; SI/R1087), that Udbhata
was intent upon interpreting the Carvaka in the light of his personal
understanding, not following the original tradition, and even consciously
going against it, how much credence is to be given to his work as a true
exposition of the Carvaka system? There is every reason to believe that he
had hammered out a philosophical system of his own but instead of writing
a new film work, with or without an auto-commentary, as Purandara (see
above) presumably did, he had manipulated the Carvaka aphorisms to
represent his singularly distinct point of view. Should we classify his
commentary as ‘creative’ (Preisendanz 2008, 609-611)?
It should be borne in mind that Jayantabhatta and Vadidevasfiri
controvert the Carvaka view accepting Udbhata’s commentary as the
exposition of materialism in India. Iayanta refers to Udbhata sarcastically
as ‘the well-learned Carvakas’ (honorific plural or meaning Udbhata and his
followers) (W I: 52, II: 257). More derisively he calls him ‘the cunning
Carvaka’ (Ml/1I: 100). Thanks to Cakradhara we now know that instead of
two different persons (as some scholars used to believe) Jayanta was
referring to one and the same person, namely, Udbhata, once calling him
‘the well-learned Carvakas’ and then ‘the cunning Carvaka’. It is to be noted
that in spite of his occasional deviations from the ‘orthodox’ Carvfika
position, Udbhata is still regarded by Iayanta and others as a Carvaka.
However, there is an allusion to one unidentified ascetic (tapasvin) in

W I: 101, who may be Udbhata or some other person. Is it also an instance
of sarcasm, so typical of Iayanta’s style? The sufiiqitatarc‘zh (AM I: 184),
‘the better-leamed ones’, however, probably refer to some other
materialists. The change in the degree of comparison may not be without
significance. They may allude to those who adhered to the Paumndarfiza—
vrtti rather than the Tattvafikc'i, the commentary written by Udbhata.
Although Iayanta and Hemacandra, the Jain savant, do not hesitate to
call the Carvakas varaka ‘Wretched’ (W I: 9; YS 2.38), Vfididevasfiri,
another Jain scholar, mentions Udbhata as ‘the respectable veteran twice-
born’ (SVR 764). Vadidevasfiri was aware of both the traditional view about
the Carvfika/Lokfiyata (of Bhavivikta and others) as well as the
unconventional view of Udbhata (SI/R 764). However, like Iayanta,

Vfididevasfiri quotes extensively from Udbhata’s commentary knowing full
well that he was a maverick in the Cari/aka tradition.
Paucity of extracts from Udbhata’s commentary and lack of evidence
regarding his identity, particularly the time he flourished, compel us to stop
at this point without offering any conclusion. Chattopadhyaya and
Gangopadhyaya (C/L 155), following Gaurinatha Shastri, identify Udbhata
with the Sabhapati of King Jayapida of Kashmir (regnal years 779-813 CE),
as mentioned in the Rdjatarafigim' (5.495). That would make Udbhata the
philosopher identical with Udbhata the rhetorician. However, there is
absolutely no evidence, intemal or external, to justify such a conclusion.
The names ending in —_ta (Mammata, Rudrata, etc.) appear to suggest
Kashmirian origin. There are several names of this nature in Kalhana’s
chronicle of the kings of Kashmir (See 140 above). But there is no harm in
having three or at least two Udbhatas instead of one. After all we hear of
two more Udbhatas (New Catalogus Catalogorum II: 341). In any case, one
point is certain: Udbhata does not represent the mainstream Carvaka
tradition. By taking him as the true representative of the materialist doctrine
Jayanta has successfully left the traditional Carvakas out of consideration,
excepting once when he writes that ‘the Carvakas say that there is only one
kind of prams-ma, which is perception’ (AM I: 43). However, after a few
pages he writes: ‘The well-learned Carvakas say that it is really impossible
to specifically state the number of pramana’ (NM I: 52). This goes flatly
against the words of the sfitra (111.1) which says: pratyaksam (ekam) eva
pramfinam, ?erception indeed is the (only) means of right knowledge’.
Jayanta was aware of the ancient Carvakas like Bhavivikta and others
(as was Cakradhara, his faithful commentator (GrBh II: 257)). Jayanta’s
refutation of the Carvaka, however, is by and large beside the point. He was
controverting Udbhata’s views, not the traditional views of the Carvakas.
In this sense we may say that Udbhata’s commentary was creative in its
own way but at the same time unreliable in reconstructing the original
Carvaka position. Udbhata is relevant only in relation to Iayanta and
Vfididevasfiri but totally irrelevant in connection with the Carvaka
philosophy as such. Udbhata is out and out a ‘revisionist’ or more probably
a Naiyayika who wears a Carvéka hat (as my friend, Prof. Prabal Kurnar
Sen suggests) and interprets the Carvfika/Lokayata in the most non-
Cfirvaka-like way conceivable (see GrBh T1: 262). I would, however, avoid
the expression, ‘progressive Carvaka’ used by Esther A. Solomon (1977-
78, 990), for Udbhata appears to have digressed from the original, monist
materialist position, taking a dualist position concerning the body-
consciousness relation. Moreover, he seems to verge on the idealist side in
his explication of an aphorism (see R. Bhattacharya 2009/2011, 68, 88-90).

In this sense he was a reformist or revisionist.
Objections may be raised at this point: was not the CarvakafLokayata,
like Nyaya and Samkhya, open to development, adopting itself to more
advanced standards of philosophical reasoning and concepts? Why should
it be considered absolutely monolithic over the centuries?
My answer is this: in case of Nyaya or Samkhya we do have evidence
of development made by their adherents, or at least those who claimed to be
their adherents for the time being. In case of the Carvaka/Lokayata the case
is different. Aviddhakarna and Udbhata were basically Naiyayikas. Even if
they were converted to the Carvaka/Lokayata, they brought the whole
baggage of Nyaya—Vais’esika terminology when they composed their
commentaries on the Cdrvdkasfitm. Such instances are not uncommon even
in modem times. Without accepting the Carvika/Lokayata views as a whole,
expositions, not altogether unsympathetic, have been written by traditional
Sanskrit scholars. For instance, Pandit Ananta Kum ar Bhattacharyya wrote
such an exposition of the Carvaka/Lokayata in 1365 Bengali era (1958-59
CE). An English translation of his essay has been provided by
Chattopadhyaya and Gangopadhyaya (C/L 452-73). More recently, in 1984
Acarya Badarinatha Sukla, form er Vice-Chancellor, Sampurnanand
Sanskrit University, Varanasi, defended dehc‘ztmavc‘zda, following the
method of Nyaya (121-34). He even extolled dehc'itmavc‘zda as an
appropriate philosophy for contemporary life.
These developments are of course quite interesting but whether they
mark any significant ‘growth’ is, I am afraid, a matter of opinion. They do
not help us reconstruct the original Carvfika/Lokayata or any other
materialist doctrine that had flourished in India right from the Buddha’s
time or even before. That is what we need first. We need more hard facts.
Exploration of Tibetan sources is a desideratum. Such new material alone
can throw more, if not new, light on materialism inlndia through the ages.
Reverting to the other comm entators on the Carvc‘zkasfitm, it may be said
that Aviddhakarna, like Udbhata, attempted to interpret the Carvaka
aphorisms from the Nyaya-Vais’esika point of view, perhaps without being
converted to the Carvaka. Since it is not possible at the present state of our
knowledge to determine whether they were Carvakas converted to Nyaya or
Naiyayikas converted to Lokayata , as Eli Franco (1997, 142) says, my
suggestion — they simply adopted the Carvfika position while writing their
commentaries without being converted to the Carvfika— may be taken as a
third alternative.
In this connection Franco mentions (1997, 142) the name of Bhfivivikta
along with Aviddhakarna, for both of them are known to have written
Carvaka and Nyaya works. However, there is nothing to show that

Bhavivikta, like Udbhata, went for a novel line of interpreting the
Cdrva'kasfiz‘ra. This is why Cakradhara calls him one of the ancient masters
of the traditional Carvakas, cirantanacc'trvc‘zkc‘zcc‘zrya (GrBh II: 257),
following Jayanta’s own description. Iayanta also notes the dualist position
adopted by Udbhata as against the traditional, monist one which did not
believe in the independent existence of the spirit (Nil/I II: 257).
If we care to notice the plural number employed by Kamalas'fla (TSP H:
633) as well as Cakradhara (GrBh II: 257) in regard to the vrttikfims of the
Carvdkasfitm (now lost), we may legitimately think of more than five
commentators of the mfila text whose names so far are known to us.
Apparently some followed the conventional approach and adhered to the
mainstream tradition, while Udbhata and his followers proposed to advance
an altemative line of dualist materialism, as bome out by GrBh Tl: 257-58,
262. All of them, however, stuck to the basic premise: inference cannot be
accepted as an independent instrument of cognition, although such
inferences as are verified and verifiable by perception may be admitted.
Solomon does not accept Mahendra Kum ar Jain’s view that there were two
Aviddhakarnas, one a Naiyayika and the other a Carvaka (1971, 23). It is
possible that, like Vacaspatimis'ra, both Aviddhakarna and Bhavivikta
composed two separate commentaries on the Cdrvc'rkasfltm without being
converted to the Carvaka. Since there is no hard fact either for accepting or
for denying such a hypothesis, both the possibilities — one Aviddhakarna and
one Bhavivikta or two Aviddhakarnas and two Bhaviviktas — remain open. It
is however worth noting that Aviddhakama, like Udbhata, is admitted as a
Cari/aka in Nyc‘zya—viniscaya-vivarana 11:101, not merely as an author of a
Nyaya text.
Solomon is of the view that both Aviddhakarna and Udbhata belong to
a section of thinkers who while firmly adhering to the doctrines of the Nyaya
school, saw some affinity of the school with the Lokayata school inasmuch
as nothing is said in the Nydya-sfltm about God, creation of the world,
heaven [,] hell, etc. They perhaps wrote commentaries on the sfirras of the
Lokayata interpreting them in a new light and making their views more
cogent and acceptable, so that the Lokayata couldhave a better philosophical
status. Bhavivikta, Udbhata and perhaps even Aviddhakarna belonged to
such a group and so were ridiculed as ‘Cz'mntana Cdrvcika’ or
‘Par[a]malok6yammmanya’ perhaps by the Carvakas, as also by Nyaya
philosophers who marched with the times and admitted the reality of heaven,
etc., in their own philosophical system. This also explains why their views
are hardly given any importance in the orthodox line of thinkers of the Nyaya
school, Whereas the Buddhists respect their clearheadedness. Evenif looking
to the expressions used we consider them as Carvakas, we would have to
admit that they tried to liberalise and re-interpret the orthodox Carvaka
doctrines, but remained faithful to the Nyaya doctrines in their commentaries
on Nyaya works. I am inclined to regard them as primarily Nyaya thinkers
(—they are referred to by gantaraksita and others among them—) who tried to
bring the Lokayata concepts closer [to Nyaya?], and to make them a little
more philosophical (1973, 4: 11- 12).
While such a possibility cannot be ruled out, I have only one comment
to offer: Cakradhara clearly contrasts Bhavivikta with Udbhata: the form er
alone is called a cirantanacérvfika while the latter’s innovative
interpretation is noted both by Cakradhara (GrBh II: 257-5 8) and
Vfididevasfiri (SVR 764) as going against the tradition, yathds’rutdrtha
(GrBh 12100). (In the last sentence quoted from Solomon, we must read
Kamalas’ila instead of Santaraksita, who alludes to Kambalas'vatara alone,
while Kamalas’fla refers in addition to Aviddhakarna and Purandara (TSP
521, 528-29). Bhavivikta is mentioned by Cakradhara only once (GrBh
H2257); no passage has been quoted from his work.
It is also to be noted that the commentators always had their rival
philosophical systems in mind which sought to find fault with such
materialist premises as consciousness can be present when and only when
there is a body. Kambalas'vatara, for example, explains that the word ‘body’
here is to be taken as one endowed with the five breaths, Prana, Apana, etc.
(TS 22. 1863, II: 635). In other words, cognition is produced from the body
inhabited or governed by the five breaths, i.e., a living body, not a corpse.
Such a clarification may have been necessitated by some opponent’s
resorting to jalpa, or chala, or vitandd in this context. Purandara and others
too may have been constrained to explain their view of inference over and
over again because of the same reason: to counteract the caricature so often
resorted to by their opponents, such as Vacaspatimis’ra (see above).
The term parinc'zmavis’esah is found in several sources (see R.

Bhattacharya (2009/2011, 182 n20) but it is not clear whether there was an
aphorism to this effect. It is probable that while explicating aphorism I.4
(‘Their combination (so. of the four elements) is called the “body”, “sense”
and “object” ’), some commentators used this term to disabuse all (specially
anti-materialists) of the notion (or to guard against actual or possible
misinterpretation?) that any combination of the elements could give rise to
consciousness in a body. He pointed out that only ‘a specific kind of
transformation’ could do so.
Speaking of the dominance of the senses in the materialist system,
Sukhlal Sanghavi elucidates that the statement thatpramc'ma depends on the
senses does not mean that the Carvakas refuse suchprama'nas as inference
or word which are used every day and established everywhere; the Carvaka
calls itself pmtgmksmndtmvddin — indnyapmtyaksamdtmvddin in the sense

that inference, word, etc. are not laukikapmmdnas since their validity is not
ascertainable without the information provided by sense perception. If,
however, some jfic‘mavyc‘zpc‘zm, not contradicted by sense perception, is
calledprams-ma, the Carvaka has no objection to it (1941/1987, 13-14). He
had spoken of this before too (1939, 4 = 1961, 4) and his opinion is
corroborated by Vadidevasfiri (S VR 265-66), Ratnaprabha
(Pramfinanayatattvalokc'tlamkfim (PNTA) 640), GunaIatna (TRD 306) and
the anonymous author of the SMS (15). In short, acceptance of laukika
anumfina or lokapmsiddha hetu or lokapratfti, according to Sukhlalji, has
been a part of the Carvaka epistemology since its very inception. Purandara
was not forced to introduce it in the wake of DhannakTIti’s appearance (as
some modern scholars believe).
Objection may be raised again: How do you know that? The answer is
simple: This has been the view of all materialists in ancient India, even
before the Carvikas appeared in the scene. A passage in the Mbh crit.
ed.l2.211.26—27 (vul. 21827-28) makes a materialist declare:
pratyaksam hyetayor mfilam Iqrtdntaitihyayor api/

pmzfyakse kyfigamo ’bhirmab krtcimo vd m1 kimcanafl
yam: tatrfinumfine ’sti krtam bhdvayate ’pi vci/
anyo jfvab sarfmsya ndstikdnfim mate smrtabfl
The conclusion based on inference and tradition — both are rooted in

perception. Perception and testimony (what we are told to believe in) are
identical; reasoned-out truth (=inference) too is nothing else but perception.
It is proved everywhere that the body exists. What the dstikas think —
that there is a soul without the body — is not (proved).
The terminology is different: inference is called krtdnta, perception,

krta. The last line of the second verse is tricky: it does not mean what
Nflakantha and the early translators took it to be for the faulty reading in the
mss at their disposal. It should not be understood as “what the nfistikas
think”, but as fistikfinfim mate na smrtala (Belvalkar has rightly shown this
in his notes (on Mbh crit. ed. 12.211.26-27); otherwise the line would read
like one of those proverbial vycisakfijas.
Extreme brevity of the sfitms badly requires elaboration and fixing the
exact collocation of technical terms employed in the mftla text. This left a
very wide scope for the commentators to fix the collocation of words as they
understood them or chose to mean. Udbhata in this respect surpasses all his
predecessors. He anticipates Humpty-Dumpty: in or tebhyah should mean
just what he would choose them to mean, ‘neither more nor less’ (Carroll
1970, Chap. 6, 269): iti should be taken as illustrative, not denoting the end;
tebhyah (or bhfitebhyah) should mean ‘for them’, not ‘from them ’ (Comms.
8-10, 16). Whether Aviddhakarna, Kambalas’vatara and Purandara also
followed the same line is not known. On the contrary, Bhavivikta and others
seem to have followed the traditional track without twisting the familiar and
obvious meanings of the words employed in the 5mm.
.1ayanta and Vfididevasfiri in their polemics against the Carvaka
sometimes target the mainstream views of the old Garvakas and at other
times, the unconventional interpretations of Udbhata, not always caring to
distinguish between the two. This again is not unprecedented. They wished
to score points over the materialists by hook or by crook. As polemicists
they have every right to do so. But we, as readers should be aware where
they were targeting the sfltmkdra and where the vrttikdra. Such shifting of
target, however, works as a hindrance to the proper understanding of the
original Carvaka position.
From the available evidence it is clear that these commentators of the
Cc‘zrvc'rkasfitra were unanimous in one point, namely, primacy of perception
which includes admittance of such laukika inference as is preceded and
hence can be tested by repeated observations. In this respect both
Aviddkarna and Udbhata were in agreement with Purandara (PVSVI l9,
GrBh 265-66). A s is well-known, one of the differences between the
Carvaka and other philosophical systems, whether orthodox (astika) or
heterodox (nastika), hinges on the following point: how many instruments
of cognition are to be admitted as valid. The unanimity of the three
commentators seems to point out that, in spite of other differences of
opinion (for example, how many principles (tattvas) are to be admitted etc,
(GrBh 1:57-58 etc), all three commentators, Purandara, Aviddhakarna and
Udbhata, were prepared to admit lokaprasiddha anumfina (inference well
established in the world) (TSP 11:528. Cf. PVSVT 19, SVR 265—66) and
distinguished between utpanncpmfitz’ (the kind of inference in which the

inferential cognition can be acquired by oneself, such as fire from smoke)
and umc'zaj/apmfiti (the kind of inference in case of which the inferential
cognition is to be acquired [on somebody else’s advice], such as the self,
God, an omniscient being, the other world, etc.) (W I: 184). Sukhlal
Sangahvi has very pertinently described the Carvaka as belonging to
indriyédhrpatyapaksa (1941/1987, 23), a system inwhich the sense organs
are dominant and inference, etc. must pass the test of being verified through
perception first. The word (s’abda or aptavc‘tlgza) would also be acceptable
when and only when it is amenable to perceptual verification.
We should also note that one point of difference in the interpretation of
a basic Cari/aka aphorism was already there even before Purandara and
Udbhata. While commenting on the aphorism, tebhyas’ caitanym there was

already some difference of opinion: the one group supplied the missing verb
(adhyéhdra) ‘is born’ (mpaayate / jc'zyate), the other, ‘is manifested’
(abhivyajyate) (TS-TSP II: 634-35). The former apparently stuck to the
classical materialist position of monistic materialism: no matter, no
consciousness. The second group, on the other hand, was dualist, assuming
that consciousness inheres in matter but in an unmanifested state. Both
groups, however, apparently admitted that tebhyah is to mean ‘from them’,
not ‘for them’, as Udbhata claimed (GrBh 1:257).
Although Santaraksita mentioned only one Carvaka philosopher by
name, Kambalas’vatara (TS 22. 1863, II: 635), he was aware of these two
schools of interpretation of the Cdrvdkasfitra as is evident from TS 22.1858
(H: 634). Kamalas’Tla names two more commentators: Aviddhakarna and
Purandara, and refers to the two aforesaid approaches by opaque words,
‘some commentators’, kecit vrttikc'zrdh and ‘ some others’, anye (TSP II: 633-
34). Unfortunately there is no way of knowing as yet whether he refers to
two individual commentators or several ones belonging to two commentary
traditions. Even though we know the views of Aviddhakarna and Udbhata
concerning other issues, no fragment relating to this particular aphorism has
come down to us.
Conclusion
In spite of the meagre material available, it is evident that (1) not unlike the
other systems, there is a lack of uniformity in the commentary tradition of
the Cc‘zrvfikasfitra, (2) not all commentators were committed monistic
materialists, at least one, namely, Udbhata, was a dualist, and (3) in course
of time Nyaya—Vaisesika terminology, such as gamya, gamaka, etc., quite
foreign to the traditional Carvaka, has been introduced into the Carvaka
system.
The third observation requires some elucidation. After explaining
umannapratz'ti and umécbzapmfiti, Jayanta makes the “more learned ones’
(euphemism used ironically to suggest some Carvikas) say:
Indeed, who will deny the validity of inference when one infers fire from
smoke and so on; for even ordinary people ascertain the probandum by such
inferences, though they may not be pestered by the logicians.
Simple minded people cannot derive the knowledge o f the probandum
by such inferences, so long as their mindis not vitiatedby cunning logicians
(NM I: 184. Emphasis added).
If ‘the more learned ones’ refer to Udbhata and his followers (as do the
other two bantering terms ‘the cunning Cirvfika’ and ‘the well-learned
Carvakas’) we are faced with a problem. Udbhata himself was prone to
employ many technical terms of Nyaya, logic. Yet he cavils against cunning
logicians (vitatc‘zrkikas)! Apparently Jayanta is not quoting verbatim from
any commentary on the Cc‘zrvc'zkasfitm. He is merely paraphrasing (in verse)
the view of a section of the Carvakas. This would mean that ‘the better
leamed ones’ were opposed to the logic-chopping of other philosophical
systems, presumably non-materialistic, who would admit all sorts of
inference, laukika as well as alaukika (derived from scripture or apti) as
valid instruments of cognition, on a par with perception. Thus ‘the better
learned ones”, I presume, should refer to some commentators other than
Udbhata or Aviddhakarna, most probably to Purandara who admitted
limited validity of inference insofar as it was based directly on perception.
The contrast made between the old Carvfikas and the new seems to have to
do with the monistic and dualistic position regarding the existence of the
spirit.
The dozen or so commentators of the BS were all intent on expounding
their widely different systems of philosophy, idealist and realist, monist and
dualist, by using the same millet-text. The Carvaka commentators too held
different opinions conceniing the number of tatz‘vas andpramc'mas, and the
nature of consciousness (whether it inheres in the four elements or arises
out of them), but all used the same mafia-text to further their views. Not
unlike the Vedantins, the latter too had to resort to weird and fanciful
interpretations (kasiakalpam'i), preferring the far-fetched to the familiar, and
made optimum exploitation of the brevity of the sfitras. It is a pity that the
commentary of Bhavivikta, the ancient (traditional) Cari/aka, is lost. In the
absence of his work, the Cari/aka system is now understood in the light of
the views of some late commentators who had blatantly deviated from the
mainstream view in some, though not all, vital respects.
Appendix
Esther A. Solomon writes: ‘Looking to the attractive names of the other
ficaryas (e.g. Uddyotakara, Bhasarvafij a, Bhavivikta and the like), one can
confidently say that “Aviddhakarna” is a nickname signifying “one whose
ears are not pierced (or split)”’ (1970, 35). She proceeds to identify
Aviddhakarna as a kfinphfifc-l yogin, a ‘junior contemporary and the direct
disciple of Jalandharapa, and to have lived in the later part of the sixth
century or in the early part of the seventh century’ (1970, 38). In a
subsequent article Solomon modifiedher view, for piercing the ears was not
an exclusive rite of the Natha community; it was a part of the religious

ceremony for initiation among the Buddhists and the .Tains too. She admits:
‘Muttering some select mantra in the ears of the disciple who is to be
initiated is also a practice found in many religious sects’ (1971, 24).
Hence she concludes, ‘Aviddhakarna would thus mean one whose ears
were not pierced, or assaulted with right and wrong words of any guru or
philosopher; that is to say, a self-made man’ (1971, 24). The alternative
suggestion is intriguing, reminiscent of Diogenes Laertius’ interpretation of
a saying of Heraclitus, edizésamén emeo‘uton, ‘I searched by myself (Fr.
101 (Bywater, Diels)). Diogenes took it to mean: ‘He (5c. Heraclitus)
studied under no one but searched, as he says, for himself, and he learned
everything from himself’ (qtd. in Barnes 1986, xviii). This may not be what
Heraclitus himself meant, but such an interpretation was current. Solomon,
however, prefers the literal meaning of the name and asserts: ‘[S]ince our
Aviddhakarna belongs to the Nyaya school we feel that he was one of the
direct pupils of Jalandharpa who did not observe this practice of having the
ears split’ (1971, 24).
Such a hypotheses is strengthened by what is said of the Naiyayika and
the Vaisesika by Gunaratna: the former is a devotee of Siva; the latter, a
Pas'upata ( TRD 515-6). One Nyaya-Vais'esika philosopher, Bhasarvaj fia ()7.
860-920) of Kashmir, was a member of the Pas’upata sect. D.R. Sarma
informs us that the prefix 5115- is common to the names of the members of
this sect (1934, 163-65). Bhasarvajfia is said to have held certain views
‘characteristic of the Pasupata despite their evident divergence from Nyaya’
(Potter 1995, vol. 2, 399).
Frankly, I do not know what to make out of all this. The use of
nicknames, not in creative writing but in philosophical literature, must be
rare. Moreover it inevitably raises the question: why should philosophers
them selves adopt nicknames? Yet several names related to light, beginning
with 5115-, must have some significance. Then there is the name
Kambalas’vatara, which makes no sense at all, as Franco (1997, 103) notes
in despair. All of them cannot be real names such as Udayana, Kumarila,
Salikanatha, and the like.
CHAPTER FIFTEEN
WHAT THE CARVAKAS ORIGINALLY MEANT
Reconstructing and interpreting ancient texts: two views

Recently there has been a controversy on the task of a m odem commentator
on an ancient text. Michael LaFrague declared quite unambiguously:
I believe that either one is trying as best as one can to reconstruct What the
Daode Jing meant to its original authors and audience or one is not. If one is
not, there is no basis for placing any limits to what can be considered a
legitimate interpretation (qtd. Goldin 2008, 750).
Paul R. Goldin has taken exception to this attitude. He writes:
While it is praiseworthy . . . to remind readers that authors and audiences o f

the past did not necessarily share our modern world-view, one cannot deny
that twentieth-century critics such as Gadamer, Ricoueur and Derrida —
whose Hermeneutics LaFrague freely grants are opposed to his own —
compellingly demonstrated the limitations of a narrowly historicist
approach. (Goldin 2008, 750)
Goldin admits that ‘historically inform ed reading’ has its merits and can
be defended. Nevertheless, in his view, it cannot be contended that
‘reconstructing the author’s original intent is the modern reader’s only

legitimate concern.” He controverts LaFrague by pointing out:
Texts that survive through the ages do so because people continually find
new meanings inthem. Texts that die, by contrast, are ones that have to be
read as though we are all living in the third century B. C. (Goldin 2008, 750)
Goldin further seeks to refute LaFrague’s view by the following

observation:
The weakness of the argument is apparent if one tries to apply it to

jurisprudence. Lawyers would hardly agree that the only two alternatives in
constitutional law are to reconstruct the constitution as it would have been
What the Carvakas Originally Meant 157
understood by its original authors and audience, or to disavow any limits to

What can be considered a legitimate interpretation. (Goldin 2008, 750)
This difference of opinion obviously has its bearings on ancient texts

other than the Daode Jing. I find it particularly relevant to the field of my
study, the Carvaka/Lokayata materialist system of philosophy, which
flourished in ancient India and totally disappeared with all its literature after
the twelfth century. The whole system has to be reconstructed on the basis
of fragments, found quoted or paraphrased in the works of its opponents.
The task of reconstruction is made all the more difficult by the fact that its
opponents did not always follow the rules of fair play. Quite deliberately
they distorted and misinterpreted the views of the Carvakas (for example,
their stand on inference). In spite of this, attempts made by scholars in the
last two centuries have resulted in a tentative reconstruction of the system
in broad outline (R. Bhattacharya 2009/20] 1, 69-104).
Let me declare at the outset that I agree with LaFrague about the task of
a reconstructor and am totally out of sympathy with postmodernist
hermeneutics which is avowedly a-historical. The case of jurisprudence
cited by Goldin is beside the point. No maker of a country’s constitution can
foresee all later developments. Some clauses have to be reinterpreted and
even suitably am ended to keep pace with the changing times. The case of
an ancient philosophical text is altogether different. It may very well be so
that it had a considerable number of adherents in the past but is now as dead
as a dodo. It is also evident that not all adherents stuck to the original
intention of the author and some reinterpreted the words of the base text to
suit their own taste or to incorporate new elements quite alien to the system.
Yet it is necessary to know first what the system was originally like, that is,
what it meant to its author(s) and its audience at the time it had been first
systematized. Then and only then we can judge where (and if possible,
when) some later adherents turned away from the intent of the author(s) or
redactor(s). This of course cannot and should not be the only legitimate
concern. Later developments, too, have to be taken into consideration. But
unless and until the original intent is fairly well understood, the study of
later developments cannot be truly fruitful.
The Indianphilosophical tradition: an overview

In the Indian tradition the base texts of some systems of philosophy are first
composed in the form of a collection of aphorisms (sfitras). The aphorisms
are brief and terse to the point of being incomprehensible without some
explanation provided by a guru or, in his absence, by a commentary written
either by the author himself or herself (auto—commentary) or by some later
158 Chapter Fifie en
author who is not necessarily an adherent to the system.1

Over the course of time further commentaries and sub-commentaries
and, in some cases, independent works purporting to elucidate the basic
ideas of the philosophical system (such as Jayantabhatta’s NM) come to be
written. The views of the opponents too are sought to be refuted in these
works. This is how a vast literature consisting of explanatory material is
created. The Nyaya system, for instance, has four such chief commentaries
and sub-commentaries by four different authors writing in widely separated
times. The non-dualist Vedanta system, initiated by Sankaracarya, similarly
gave rise to a commentary tradition that continued for centuries. Other
systems of Vedanta (dualist, non-dualist, modified non-dualist, both dualist
and non-dualist, etc.) also offer a large number of secondary works, all
claiming to be rooted in the base text, the BS by Badarayana. Mimamsa,
Vais’esika and Yoga systems too belong to this text-commentary continuum
tradition.
The Carvaka/Lokayata too developed along the same line. It had a base
text on which more than five commentaries were written. The base text is
sometimes called the Barhaspatya-mirtra.2 We also read of a Paumndaram
sfitmm and a Paummdan'yavitti, presumably referring to the aphorisms of
Purandara and his auto-commentary (R. Bhattacharya 2009/2011, 109-11).
1 Vacaspatimisra composed commentaries on the base texts of Nyaya, Samkhya,

Vedanta, etc. Most probably he was a non-dualist Vedantin but he is credited with
being independent o f all systems (sarva-Ianma-svatantra), for he is reputed to have
interpretedthe base texts faithfully Without introducing his own views. How far it is
true needs fiirther verification, since it is difficult, if not impossible, to be absolutely
neutral in philosophical questions.
2 Both D.R. Shastri (1944, 1959) and Mamoru Namai (1976) have called their
respective collections of aphorisms ‘Barhaspatya (sfitram)’, following the Paranic

tradition of considering Brhaspati, the guru of the gods, as the eponymous founder
of the doctrine. Jayantabhatjta has indeed used the name Barhaspatyasfitram once
(NM, part 2, 196). Elsewhere too there are references to brhaspateh sfitrcini, ‘the
aphorisms of Brhaspati’ (see R. Bhattacharya 2009/2011, 106 for details). The name
‘Lokfiyata—Sfitra’ occurring in lha’s translation o f the TSP (part 2, 893) is not
supported by the Sanskrit text (22.1871 in Baroda ed), which has sfitram only, not
‘Lokayata-Sfitra’. However, Calcradhara has once called it so (GrBh part 1, 100).
But there are reasons to believe that the materialists in India such as Purandara called
themselves Carvakas (TSP part2, 528. For a detailed discussion see R. Bhattacharya
2009/2011, 76-77). All writers since the eighth century CE, when referring to
materialism, indiscriminately employ all the three names and many more, some
more fanciful than others (such as bhfltamdtmtattvavfida (Malayagirisuri) and
mahfibhfltadbhfltacaimnyavédamata (Prajfiakaragupta), both qtd. in Franco 1997,
274 and n3).
Whether Purandara recast the old base text of a now lost work or redacted
the base text itself for the first time is not known. Did he add new
aphorisms? Again we do not know. It is highly probable that he was the first
to employ the name Carvaka to mean a system that was previously known
as Lokayata in early Tamil epics, such as the Manimékalai (incidentally,
these Tamil works and their commentaries, largely neglected so far, testify
to the existence of two other materialist schools besides Lokayata in
southem India, namely, bhfitavadins and the Sarvakas. Vanamamalai 1973,
36). In any case, excerpts from all these works, both aphorisms and
commentaries, are found in the works of other philosophers, mostly
followers of non-dualist Vedanta, Nyaya and two non-Vedic systems,
Yogacara Buddhism and Jainism. Since the base text and all the
commentaries are lost, the views of the Carvaka/Lokayata have to be
reconstructed on the basis of these available fragments. It is not possible at
the present state of our knowledge to determine how many aphorisms there
originally were. Only a few that were at the centre of controversy are found
quoted over and over again. It is almost certain that they were all takenmore
or less verbatim from the base text.
Over and above these two sources (aphorisms and commentaries
thereon), quite a number of epigrams, purporting to contain the
Carvaka/Lokayata view, have been cited in several philosophical digests.
The best known of them is the SDS (A compendium of all philosophies). It
is possible that not all of these satirical verses originated in the Carvaka
circles. Some of them seem to have Buddhist and Jain origins. In so far as
the anti-Vedic attitude is concerned, the Cfirvakas were regarded by the
Vedists to be at one with these two religious-cum -philosophical schools.
Nobody will deny that a successful philosophical system cannot remain
the same, exactly as intended by its original proponent and understood by
his original audience. New interpretations are bound to arise, particularly
when the system has to face criticism from the followers of other systems.
The commentators of the base text of the Carvaka/Lokayata had to take into
account the criticism levelled against their system by its opponents. The
fragments of the commentaries of the base text exhibit how the
commentators tried to defend the basic materialist position by means of
arguments and examples. Most of the fragments appear to be verbatim
quotations from the commentaries of Aviddhakarna, Udbhatabhatta and
Purandara. Thus, although the number of the aphorisms and the fragments
from the lost commentaries are regrettably few, the fundamental ontological
and epistemological positions of the Carvfika/Lokayata are fairly well
documented. At least some conclusions can be drawn from the available
fragments.
The ontology and epistemology of the C firvdka/Lokdyata

What are the ontological and epistemological positions of the
Carvaka/Lokayata? They may be stated as follows: The whole of the
material world, including the human body, is made of four basic elements,
namely, earth, air, fire and water, there can be no consciousness without the
living body, the spirit has no extracorporeal existence and, far from being
imperishable, it perishes with the death of the body. As a natural corollary
to this ontological position, all religious acts, worship of the gods, paying
obeisance to Brahmana priests, performance of post-mortem rites, etc. are
considered absolutely futile.
The epistemological position clearly supports this ontology. Perception
is admitted to be the only valid means of knowledge. Inference, in so far as
it is based on religious scriptures alone, is rejected out of hand because the
scriptures are not based on perception but on revelation, not am enable to
verification by the senses, and thus tend to promote irrational faith in the
after-life (rebirth) and the after-world (heaven and hell), God, and the
omniscient being (like the Buddha or Mahavira). In short, the Carvaka
system appeared in the Indian philosophical scene as materialismus
militans, strongly objecting to and opposing all religious dogmas (not just
Vedism but Buddhism and Jainism as well). Its epistemology was fashioned
to match its ontology, which consisted of a series of negations. The
insistence on empirical verification is the hallmark of this system. In fact
one has a feeling that the Carvakas first provided the epistemology to the
ontology already current in India at least from the Buddha’s time, when
Ajita Kesakambala had come out with his proto—materialistic ideas.
Commentaries on the Carvakasfitra

The question is: Do the commentators of the base text, whether or not they
adhered to materialism, always reflect the intention of the author/redactor?
The aphorisms in the base text, we must admit, are not self-explanatory;
their brevity stands in the way of any satisfactory understanding.
Fortunately, however, there are some aphorisms, the literal meaning of
which is fairly transparent. When a commentator goes beyond the literal
meaning of these aphorisms and tries to extract some other significance by
resorting to grammatical and lexical acrobatics, there is every reason to
suspect that he is not being true to the intention of the author/redactor. In
most of the cases, however, the intention of the aphorism and its
interpretations given in the commentaries are at one, although new instances
and further arguments are provided to defend or to elucidate the position of

the base text.
Invariance in intention and interpretation

Here is an example. There are two aphorisms: (l) ‘Perception indeed is the
(only) means of right knowledge’, and (2) ‘Since the means of right
knowledge is to be non-secondary (agauna), it is difficult to ascertain an
object by means of inference’ (R. Bhattacharya 2009/2011, ITI.l-2. 80, 87).
This has led to a notion that the Carvakas believed in one and only one
instrument of cognition, namely, sense perception, while other schools
admitted inference, word (verbal testimony), comparison, etc. in addition to
perception. This gave rise to the obvious criticism that by denying inference,
the Carvakas proved themselves to be utterly naive and unfit to be called
logicians (cf NM I, 9, Vacaspatimisra, Bhfimatz' on BS, 3.3.53; C/L 154,
243).
Did the Carvakas really hold such a view? A fragment from the
commentary by Purandara has often been cited to disabuse the critics of this
notion.3 Purandara said: ‘The Carvakas too admit of such an inference as is
well known in the world, but that which is called inference [by some],
transgressing the worldly way, is prohibited [by them]’ (qtd. TSP 2, 528).
Purandara was not the only one to explain the aphorism in this way.
Aviddhakarna, another commentator, also said: ‘It is true that inference is
admitted by us as a source of knowledge, because it is found to be so in
general practice; (what we only point out is that) the definition of a
inferential mark is illogical’ (qtd. PVSVZ" 19). He further explained: ‘A
source of knowledge means an instrument which produces an awareness of
an object not (already) cognized and therefore, is not a source of knowledge,
because it is not an instrument for producing a definite awareness of an
object’ (ibid). Udbhatabhatta too said so and distinguished between the (l)
probanses well established in the world (lokaprasidhha—hetu) and (2)
probanses established in the scriptures (tantrasiddha—hetu) (qtd. SVR 266).
He resorted to the Nyaya-Vais’esika terminology to establish why inference
is to be regarded as secondary.
3 S. Mookerjee (1935, 368-69), S.N. Dasgupta (1975, vol. 3, 539) and others (for
instance, Gangopadhyaya 1984, 32, 55 ml, 56 n4, 66 n51, and D. Chattopadhyaya
1989, 52) drew attention to this significant passage from time to time, which
however was completely ignored or overlooked by many modem scholars, as by
ancient authors. They continued to ascribe the one-pramdna position to the Carvakas
(more appropriate to Bhartrhari, who considered cigama (scripture) to be the one and
only valid means of knowledge. See R. Bhattacharya 2009/2011, 117-18, 152).
Some anonymous commentator4 further distinguished between two

kinds of inferential cognition: (1) ‘some in case of which the inferential
cognition can be acquired by oneself (unyanna-pmfiti) and (2) ‘some in
case of which the inferential cognition is to be acquired on somebody else’s
advice’ (upc‘zcbza—pmtiti) (MM, part 1, 184). He thereby suggests that the
first kind is valid, the second is not.
Did all these commentators then desert the original position of the base
text? Some modern scholars indeed think so (Frauwallner (trans) 1997, 2,
225, Franco 1991, 159, and Franco-Preisendanz 1998, 180). They postulate
that the commentators who appeared in the wake of Dharmakirti were
forced to turn away from the original position of the Carvakas, and the
admission of inference in howsoever limited a way is a pointer to this
‘Abkehr’ (Frauwallner’s word 1997, vol. 2, 308). What is proposed is that
this acceptance of inference was a later development, not exactly consistent
with the intention of the original author and his audience.
It can, however, be demonstrated that such a view is not well founded.
When the philosophers of other schools speak of inference, word,
comparison, etc., they never deny that perception is the foremost (jyegrha)
of all instruments of cognition (cf. MM, part I, 164). What they indeed
assert is that inference, etc. are all independent means of knowledge, on a
par with perception, not subservient to it: co-ordinate, not subordinate.
Yet, as the NS (1.1.5) declares, inference has to be preceded by perception.
Hence, inference not based on perception cannot be admitted. Vatsyayana
in his commentary on the very first Nyfiya aphorism (1.1.1) added
‘scripture’ to ‘perception’ (prabzakségmfis’ritam anumfinam, so? ’nvfksfi,
pratyaksc‘tgamc‘zbhyc‘zmz'ksitasyc‘mvz‘ksanam anvz‘ksfi), which is unwarranted
and amounts to interpolation pure and simple. The base text never speaks of
scripture in connection with inference; it mentions perception alone. The
independent status of perception is an admitted fact in all realist
philosophical systems. So, when the Carvakas denied the status of inference
as an independent means of knowledge, they ipso facto did not reject all
kinds of inference but accepted only such inference as was found true in
everyday practice (lokavyavahc‘zm). Thus, in the Carvaka conception
perception includes both what is sensually apprehended and inference based
4 Jayantabhatta ascribed this view to ‘the more leamed ones” (NM, part I, 184). The
use of plural may not be honorific but satirical. The identity of this commentator (or
commentators) is not known. Cakradhara, however, mentions that by ‘cunning
Carvaka’ and the ‘learned ones’ Jayanta meant Udbhatabhatta (GrBh, 1, 52, 100).
Most probably the designation, ‘more learned ones,’ refers to some commentator(s)
other than Udbhata, signified by the use of the comparative degree. It may mean
Purandara and his followers.
on such apprehension. Only such inferences as derived from the scripture,

Veda and Smrti, are not admitted. Therefore, all the four commentators,
Purandara, Aviddhakarna, Udbhata and the anonymous one, were not
deserting the original stand of the base text by admitting inference of a
particular sort but only explicating the view of the base text on inference in
relation to perception. Other non-Garvaka authors too were aware of this,5
as this was the view of earlier, pre-Carvaka Indian materialists too.
How do we know all this? A passage in the Mbh, gantiparvan (crit. ed.
211.26; vul. 218.27) says:
The conclusion based on inference and tradition — both are rooted in

perception. Perception and testimony (what we are told to believe in) are
identical; reasoned— out truth (=inference) too is nothing but perception. 5
In the Anusasanaparvan too (147.9) three instruments of cognition are

mentioned: (a) direct perception confirmed by the world (lokatah siddham
pmtyaksam), (b) doctrines propoundedby the scriptures, and (c) the practice
of eminent people (5351a). Dandekar, the editor of this parvan, observes:
‘Presumably, anumana is to be understood to have been included in
pratyaksa’ (crit. ed., 1119).
It was only later, when the philosophical debates between the Vedists
and the non-Vedists (the Buddhists and the Jains in particular) were raging,
that the question of inference as an independent means of knowledge along
with word (scripture) assumed a focal position. Both Vatsyayana and
Jayantabhatta spent much of their time and energy to establish the
independent status of inference (cf. C/L 76ff and l28ff). Inference in fact is
the chief, if not the sole, concern of the NS itself.
Therefore, the explication of the two Carvaka aphorisms (NS, 111,1-2)
made by the commentators merely reiterates and reinforces the position of
the ancient Indian m aterialists, both pre-Carvaka and the Carvaka/Lokayata

The commentators, regardless of their differences of opinion concerning
other issues, are unanimous in this regard: they do not admit the independent
status of inference as a means of knowledge, and at the same time they
clearly state that inference based on perception is definitely admissible and
is actually admitted by the Carvakas. Once we understand this, much of the
5 Gunaratna (TRD on SDSam, verse 83), Ramaprabha (on PNTA 540. See chapter
Ten above), and the anonymous authors of Avacfimi (on SDSam, v. 83) and SMS
(15) (R. Bhattacharya 2009/2011, 116-17, 168) quite unambiguously refer to this
interpretation
5 Bronkhorst translates this verse somewhat differently (2007, 310) but his
interpretation too refers to direct perception as the root of all true knowledge.
lampoon and derisive remarks of its opponents such as Hemacandra (cf.

A YVD, verse 20) and others tum out to be mere calumny.
When commentators differ

So far, so good. The position of the Carvaka/Lokayata vis-a-vis inference is
made crystal clear by the commentators. The problem arises when the same
set of commentators differ in their interpretations of certain aphorisms.
Udbhata’s interpretation of the aphorism, ‘Earth, water, fire and air are
the principles, nothing else (in) (R. Bhattacharya 2009/2011, 12, 80) is a
case in point. The word iti denotes the end.7 Since the Carvakas accept only
these four elements, not ‘space’ (dkds’a) as the fifth, as some earlier
materialists (cf. R. Bhattacharya 2009/2011, 33-41 for sources) and many
others did, they are called four-elementalists (bkfita—catustaya—vfidins) as
opposed to the five-elem entalists (bhfita-paficaka-va'dins). Udbhata,
however, claim ed that it was impossible to lay down any fixed number and
essential characteristic of the sources of knowledge (MMI, 52), and objects
of knowledge too are more than four: ‘the word, iti, in the (aphorism),
“earth, water, fire and air iti ” indicates also the possibility of similar objects
of knowledge, other than the earth, etc.” (qtd. GrBh, part 1, 100).
Vadidevasfiri quotes more extensively from Udbhata’s commentary:
The word, iti, does not denote the end (but) it is illustrative. There are other
principles such as consciousness, sound, pleasure, pain, desire, aversion,
effort, impression and others (SVR 1087).
Not satisfied with these categories, Udbhata further writes: ‘There are
also prior non-existence of the earth, etc., posterior non-existence, the
mutual difference which are quite apparent and distinct (from the principles,
viz., earth, etc.)’ (qtd. SVR 1087).

Cakradhara clearly stated that Udbhata was here forsaking the
conventional interpretation (yathc‘zimtc‘zrtha—tyc‘tgena) (GrBh, part 1,100).
Apparently Udbhata was referring to issues that are well known to the
Nyaya-Vais’esikas. He knew full well that iti cannot be equated to igzfidi
(etc). Yet he attempted to fit the Carvaka aphorism into the Nyaya-
Vaisesika frame.
7 Explaining KA 1.2.10 (sémkhyam yoga lokfiyatam cetya‘nvfksikf) Jacobi says:

‘According to Kautilya the essence o f philosophy lies in systematic investigation
and logical demonstration; in his judgement these conditions are satisfied only (iti)
by Sanikhya, Yoga and Lokayata’ (1918, 102).
This may be considered ingenious, as is his defence of the Carvaka

position of viewing inference as secondary (see above). But there is nothing
to show that the Carvakas ever thought in terms of Nyaya-Vais'esika
categories. Udbhata does not adduce any new argument in support of his
novel explication (as he does in relation to inference). On the contrary, he
flies in the face of the accepted meaning of iti and, maybe with the best of
intentions, introduces Nyaya-Vais’esika categories which are quite alien to
the original Carvaka/Lokayata.
All this does show marks of what is sometimes viewed as ‘growth’ or
‘radical innovation”, but at the same time it exhibits alien addition as well. 8
The Cfirvfika view an inference in the SDS

It is well known that all the Carvaka/Lokayata works, the base text and the
commentaries, had disappeared from India before the SDS was composed.
Not a single verbatim quotation from any Carvaka work is found in the
whole of the SDS, not even a single name (excepting that of Brhaspati).
Whatever the author of the first chapter of the SDS (S-Mhim self or someone
else) knew about the system was not based on his reading but most probably
on what he had heard from his guru. (It may be added in parentheses that in
ancient India gummukhaviajzc'z was sine qua mm; no amount of reading
would be considered a fitting substitute for it. See Aiyangar [1941], 10. Cf.
Jha’s regret 1937-39, vol. I, x). Moreover, it is doubtful whether the guru
himself had ever glanced at an authentic Carvaka work. Apparently there
was a gum-Eisyaparamparc‘t (a continuum from preceptors to disciples) and
that was the only source to learn anything about the Cart/aka. Yet a very
cogent argument is found in the SDS (7-10; C/L 250-51) to justify the
Carvaka position regarding the admissibility of perception alone as a valid
instrument of cognition, rejecting summarily the claims of all others
(inference, word, comparison, and upadhi or absence of a condition).
8 Karin Preisendanz apparently does not consider such alien additions to be of much
significance. She classifies commentaries into two kinds: i) creative, ii)
philosophically unproductive (2008, 609-11). In her usage Udbhata would be
considered creative in the sense of being ‘philosophically productive’. But as both
Cakradhara and Vadidevasmi noted (see below), Udbhata was known to be an
innovator and hence was contrasted to Bhavivikta who apparently remained true to
the spirit o f the base text (GrBh 2, 257-258). Udbhata was not treated on a par with
Bhavivikta and others, since he did not represent the views of the ancient (cirantana)
Carvaka teachers. Similarly, when Solomon calls Udbhata a ‘progressive Carvaka’
(1977-78, 990) she implicitly admits that he did not adhere strictly to the original
stand of the school.
Nevertheless it will not be advisable to accept the passage in the SDS as

a statement reflecting the genuine Carvika/Lokayata view. The reason is
this: there is no supporting evidence in favour of such a representation.
Since no authority is mentioned, the passage should be taken as a
formulation made by the leamed author of the SDS, not by a Carvaka. This
is an instance in which the view of the digest-m aker is not to be admitted
because of the lack of any corroborative evidence.
Moreover, no mention is made in the SDS of the limited validity of
inference, as Purandara and others have unequivocally declared (see above).
This is another reason why the passage, like the so-called Lokayata
aphorisms in the KS 1226-30, is unacceptable (see R. Bhattacharya
2009/2011, 94-95).
Contradictory interpretations offered by commentators

Now we come to an example of contradictory explanations. After stating
that the principle is the four elements and that their combination is called
the body, sense and object, the base text says, probably in the very next
aphorism, tebhyas’ (that is, bhfitebhyas’) caitanyam (R. Bhattacharya
2009/2011, 1.2-4; 80). Literally it appears to mean: ‘From them (the
elements), consciousness.’ As is evident, there is no supplementary verb to
complete the sentence (technically called adhyc'ihc'im). What was in the mind
of the redactor/s of the base text can only be guessed. Two different
suggestions were made by two commentators. One (anonymous) said: the
missing verb should be ‘is born’; the other (again anonymous) proposed ‘is
manifested’ (TS v. 1858, TSP 2, 633-34). The two proposals are
contradictory, for, if the first is admitted, the second cannot be true and vice
versa. The first would assert that there can be no consciousness prior to the
existence of a living human body. The second, on the other hand, would
suggest that consciousness is already existent, apart from and quite

independent of the human body; it is manifested when the human body is
formed and born. The second proposal then would mean desertion of the
monistic materialist position traditionally ascribed to the Carvakas.
This is not all. Udbhata, writing at least a century or so after these two
anonymous commentators, reopened the issue by challenging the common
understanding of the word tebhyah as ‘from these’, taken in the sense of
ablative case (fifth declension). In Sanskrit tebhyah can mean ‘for these’ as
well. Preferring the second meaning, Udbhata explained the aphorism as: it
What the Carvékas Originally Meant 167
is for the sake of the four elements that consciousness comes into being.9
He did not concern himself with the missing verb but sought to establish a
dualist view that consciousness existed apart from and even prior to matter.
He had apparently taken his cue from the second interpretation (or it may
have been derived from Samkhya) and explained this aphorism as follows:
‘Consciousness is for (the sake of) elements; consciousness is independent
and aids the physical elements which constitute the body’ (qtd. GrBh 2,
257).
Udbhata’s interpretation is not grammatically invalid. There is indeed a
rule in Katyayana’s Vdrttika (on As; 1.4.44) that provides for the use of the
fourth declension to suggest purpose or intent (radarthye caturthz' vdcyd,
Vasu. 352). But by saying that consciousness is independent of the four
elements that constitute the human body Udbhata leaves the door open to a
non-materialist position. The Carvaka position was essentially monistic: no
body, no consciousness. Even if we take Udbhata to be a dualistic
materialist, it clearly involves desertion of the original Cari/aka position.
All this does show signs of growth, but at the same time it exhibits a
tendency to move away from the original doctrine. Quite appropriately,
therefore, Cakradhara contrasts Udbhata with Bhavivikta and other ancient
Carvaka teachers (GrBh 2, 257). Unlike them, Udbhata did not uphold the
old, traditionally accepted position. On another occasion, too, Cakradhara
notes that Udbhata forsook the conventional interpretation (GrBh l, 100).
Vadidevasfiri too writes, ‘This respectable veteran twice born (sc.
Udbhata) is revealing to us a novel way of answering criticism.’ (SVR 764).
Here the assertion made by LaFrague is of seminal importance. Surely
the redactor(s) of the base text could not have m eant all three interpretations
when he/they framed the aphorism. Since we have no way of knowing the
author’s mind, we must go for a reasonable conjecture. If he had the second
or the third interpretation in mind, the very basis of the Carvfika/Lokayata
doctrine would be compromised. The first two aphorisms clearly state the
primacy of the four elements as the principle (tattva). If consciousness were
the principle or one of the principles, the second aphorism would have said
9 This second position is reminiscent of Sri Aurobindo’s realist but anti-materialist

stand regarding matter vis-a—vis consciousness. Unlike the non-dualist Vedantins
like §ankara he admitted this world to be real but added:
[T]here is a course of life and consciousness originally alien to Matter which
has yet enteredinto an occupied Matter, —perhaps from another world. From
whence, otherwise, can it have come. . .nothing can evolve out o f Matter
which is not therein already contained. (2001, 96-97).
Sri Aurobindo does not accept the dualist position of Samkhya either, nor does
he regard Sankara’s theory of illusion as valid (2001, 11).
so instead of naming all the four elements individually and stopping there
with a decisive word, iti. So the second and the third interpretations of the
third aphorism are unacceptable. What led the second and the third
interpreters to defy the spirit of the first three aphorisms is not known to us.
But one point is evident: the aphorisms could mean, both to the author and
to his audience, only what the first interpretation says. The second and the
third interpretations definitely suggest different lines of development away
from the intention of the author.
Conclusion
Development and growth are only to be expected of all philosophical

systems that continue to exist over the centuries. Thus we have the
development of Sarnkhya, which becomes allied to Yoga and becomes a
syncretic theistic system. The same story is repeated when the atheistic
Nyaya merges with Vaisesika and becom es a theistic system. Such syncretic
doctrines doubtless reflect development and growth. Nevertheless, they are
not to be identified with the original Samkhya or the original Nyaya or the
original Vais’esika. When we speak of development and growth, which are
admittedly inevitable, we should not turn a blind eye to the fact that later
works often move away from the original position of the system. It is not
the case that all forms of development and growth necessarily reflect the
original intention of the author.
The critics of the Carvaka/Lokayata, we have seen, knew only too well
that Udbhata had taken a position that was quite different from the original
one. Are we to call this development? When new facts and arguments are
proposed to affirm the contention of the base text in order to reassert its
validity, as viewed by its later adherents or explicators, such events may
very well be called development. On the other hand, when quite novel but
contrary positions are proposed, presumably to support the contention of the
aphorisms in a different way, the event cannot but be called inconsistency.
Such inconsistencies may gain currency over the course of time and become
a part of the tradition of this or that system, but they evince inconsistency
all the same.
This happened to Nyaya, Mimamsa and other systems. The BS in fact
has beeninterpreted in a dozen different ways by its commentators, so much
so that it is impossible to assert what Bfidarayana, to whom the authorship
of the base text is attributed, had in mind. Yet it cannot be denied that he
must have had something in his mind which the commentators in their zeal
to establish their own philosophical systems have more than once misused,
sometimes going against the position he held. After all Badarayana could
not have been a dualist, a non-dualist, a modified non-dualist, a realist, a

subjective idealist, etc. all at the same time! It is therefore futile to think of
the Vedanta doctrine. We have several Vedanta doctrines. That is all.
Vedanta is of course an extreme case. But Nyaya, Mimamsa and the
Carvaka systems also exhibit several different approaches, not all of which
can be considered consistent with the view of the original authors and their
audiences. In order to study these systems, instead of concentrating solely
on the doctrine, a historicist approach is essential in order to trace their
developments and note where and how some commentators moved away
from the original position. Whenever there is a sign of any forced
explanation, inconsistent with grammar and conventional use, it has to be
taken as a case of inconsistency. The more the commentator tries to hold
fast to the words of the aphorism but interprets them by doing violence to
these two criteria (grammar and conventional use), the more certain it is that
he is moving away from the original position. Udbhata’s interpretations of
iti and tebhyah are cases in point. Polemicists like .Tayantabhatta may not
distinguish between the original position and the new position, but a student
of philosophy cannot afford not to do so. Having no axe to grind either in
defence or refutation of any system,10 one should first ascertain, as best as
one can, what the doctrine meant to its author and its audience, and then
proceed to study the development of the system over the ages. No other
approach can do justice to the systems of philosophy inIndia that flourished
and continued to hold sway over one or the other section of the people for
several centuries.
Let me reiterate: there is no gainsaying that some changes are inevitable
in any system of philosophy because of its constant interface with other
system s. But we should not view all such changes on a par with one another.
Doctrinal or religious bias should not make us forget that in pre-modern
India a master of philosophy was supposed to be a master of all
philosophical systems, living or dead, the Carvaka/Lokayata, not excepted.
10 No less a savant than Louis de la Vallee Poussin, because of his idealist mindset,
calls materialists ‘philosophers without philosophy’ (ERE, vol. 8:494). Speaking o f
the parable of the Wolfs Footprint (SDSam, v.81), he writes: ‘A man who wanted
to convert — let us say “pervert” — a woman to his materialist opinion . . .’ (ibid). All
this in an encyclopedia article!
To cite another example, nearer home: B. Bhattacharya proposed to identify
Kambalasvatara of the TS with the Kambalasvatara mentionedin the Safigftfilaka on
the following ground: ‘It is not at all strange that a member of a materialist sect
should devote himself to music; disbelieving in transmigration of soul or in a future
life the cultivation of pleasure in this life should seem logical and entirely proper’
(1926, xxxviii).
Consider, for instance, the praise of Vyomas’iva (or Vyomas’ambhu or

Vyomes’a) in the Ranode stone inscription (Epigrqvhia Indica l, 358) in
which Vyomas’iva is eulogized as lokdyate sadgurur bbuddho buddhamate
jinoktigu jinah, Sadguru (Brhaspati) in the Lokayata, the Buddha in the
doctrine of the Buddha, and Jina (Mahavira) in the sayings of the Jina (line
37). Had it been otherwise, the authors of philosophical digests and
compendia from Haribhadra (eighth century) down to Cimanabhatta
(nineteenth century) would not have included in their works all systems,
both orthodox and heterodox, known to them.
CHAPTER SIXTEEN
THE SOCIAL OUTLOOK

OF THE CARVAKA/LOKAYATA
The CErvfika/Lokfiyata school of philosophy flourished in India in or around

the eighth century CE and was a living system till the twelfth or thirteenth
century. Thereafter it seems to have vanished into the blue, without leaving
any trace whatsoever. It was the most uncompromising philosophical
system that ever appeared in India. It refused to accept the notions of after-
life, heaven and hell, rebirth, any creator God, and the infallibility of the
sacred texts (the Vedas in particular). Its sharp satire against all this is often
reminiscent of the French Enlightenment writers. In short, it was a
materialist or physicalist system through and through. All idealist schools
of India, particularly Vedanta, MTmfirnsa and Nyaya among the orthodox
(astika) system s, and the Buddhist and the Jain among the heterodox
(Marika) ones, tried their best to refute the Carvéka/Lokiyata views.
Unfortunately, all the Carvfika/Lokfiyata works — the basic texts (a collection
of aphorism s, sfitras) and its commentaries and sub-commentaries — are lost.
All that we have are fragments quoted or paraphrased by their opponents.
Attempts have been made to reconstruct the basic tenets of the system on
the basis of such a pitifully few specimens.1
It is not easy to say what the Carvakas really meant. The case is similar
to that of many of the Presocratics whose works have come down to us in

similar conditions. However, it is known that the views of the Carvfikas have
been distorted and wilfully misrepresented by those who were not only
idealists and Vedic fideists, but also strong supporters of status quo ante in
their socio-economic outlook.
Materialism in India did not begin with the Carvaka/Lokayata. There
were inklings of pre-Carvfika materialist thoughts as well as of genuine
scepticism, sensualism, etc. in much older works. Like the Carvikas, some
earlier thinkers, right from the Vedic times down to the days of the Buddha
and Mahfivira (sixth/fifth century BCE) and even after, asserted the primacy
1 R. Bhattacharya 2009/2011, 69- 104.

172 Chapter Sixteen
of matter (consisting of five basic elements, namely, earth, air, fire, water
and space) over consciousness, futility of performing religious rituals, and
of offering gifts (dc-ma) to Brahmanas. The Carvaka/Lokayata seems to have
absorbed all such views that had originated before its times and turned out
to be the vigorous ‘negative arni’.2
Attempts have been made to reconstruct the epistemology of the
Carvaka/Lokayata system by assiduously collecting the fragments of the
5mm work and its several commentaries as found quoted or paraphrased by
its opponents. But no serious attempt has so far been undertaken to
reconstruct its social outlook. It appears from the works of Krsnamis’ra and
Sfiharsa, two Vedantin philosopher—poets, that the Carvakas were opposed
to caste (vama) and gender discriminations. Since we are forced to
reconstruct the whole of the Carvaka/Lokayata on the basis of the evidence
provided by its opponents, of course with due care taken regarding the
possibility of misrepresentation, and because both the authors mentioned
above have been already utilized by the scholars and historians of Indian
philosophy, it is at least probable that their presentation of the social outlook
of the Carvakas may not be far from the truth.
The Carvakas against Caste and Gender Discriminations

Let us now see what these two opponents of the Carvaka/Lokayata make it
say regarding caste and women.
In Krsnamis’ra’s (eleventh century) allegorical play, PC, Mahfimoha
(Great Delusion), an avowed m aterialist, declares:
tulyatve vapusam mukhdajzavawavair varnakramab kfdréo...| 2.18ab
If the bodies are alike in their different parts, the mouth, etc., howr canthere
be a hierarchy of castes?
A heretic in Sr'iharsa’s (twelfth century) NC throws a challenge to the

forces of status quo ante:
saddhir vams’a afizayl" éuddhaupitrowadekas’ah |

tadanantakuladopadadosajatirasti ka H 17.40
frsyaya raksato narfrdhikulasthitidambhikan |

smarfindhatvfivis‘ese ’pi tatha nammaralcsatah H 17.42
2 Cowell 1862, 382.

The Social Outlook of the Carvaka/Lokayata 173
trnfinfva ghmfivfidfin vidhflmwa vadhfimnu |

tavfipi tédréasyaiva kfi cimm janavaficami I] 17.58
Since purity of caste is possible only in the case of purity on each side of
both families of the grandparents, what caste is pure by the purity of limitless
generations?
Fie on those who boast of family dignity! They hold womenin check out of
jealousy; but do not likewise restrain men, though the blindness of passion
is common to both!
Spurn all censorious statements about women as not worth a straw. Why
dost thou constantly cheat people when thou> too, art as bad as women?
Both the authors intended to depict the Carvakas as heretics and non-
believers. Defiance of the caste system was considered a heretical idea and
hence fit for censure.
Is there any truth in labelling the Gawakas as opposed to the caste
system ? I think there is. Two oft-quoted genuine aphorisms attributed to the
Carvakas say that the hum an body is a combination of four natural elem ents,
namely, earth, air, fire and water (I. 2-3).3 Apparently the Carvakas gave no
credence to the late Vedic idea that the Brahmanas, Rajanyas (warriors),
Vais’yas (traders and agriculturists), and Sfidras (manual workers) were
different parts of the supreme being calledpurusa (Ev 10.90.11-12):
yatpumsam viadadhuh, katidhfi vi akalpayan?

mukham kim asya? kau bdhu? kc? firflpfidfi ucyete?
brrihmano ‘sya mukham dsfd, bfihu réjaniah kn‘ah;

Lin? tadasya yad vais‘yahpadbhydm sfldro ajfiyata.
When they divided Purusa, into how many parts did they dispose him?
What (did) his mouth (become)? What are his two arms, his two thighs, his
two feet called?
His mouth was the Brahaman [Brahamana], his two arms were made the
warrior, his two thighs the Vaisya; from his two feet the Sudra was born.4
This was a convenient way of explaining why the hierarchy of castes

was bound to be accepted and observed in social life. The law books insist
on the preservation and continuation of the caste system. The Carvakas
3 R. Bhattacharya 2009/2011, 78-79 and 86.

4 Macdonell 1978, 200-201.
174 Chapter Sixteen
cared nothing for Manu, the chief of the law givers. They did not consider
either the words of the Vedas or of Manu to be an acceptable means of
cognition (S-M in Joshi (ed), 8). Hence it is quite probable that the
Carvakas had no faith in the so—called divine origin of castes and did not
observe caste rules in social life. A verse attributed to the Carvakas runs as
follows:
m1 svarga nflpavargo vfi naivfitmfipflralaukikah I

naiva vamdsmmédfnfim kriydscaphaladdyikdh ||
There is no heaven, no final liberation, nor any soul in another world.

Nor do the actions ofthefour castes, orders, etcproduce any real efi‘ect.5
As to the defence of women and treating them as equal to men, the

Carvakas apparently were very much anti-sexist. They did not believe, as
Manu did, that women in general were basically untrustworthy, were not
entitled to study the Vedas, and were never to eam freedom but should
always be under their fathers’, husbands’ and sons’ protection and
surveillance (Menu 9.10-20). The Carvakas’ defence of the equality of the
sexes quite logically follows from their basic anti-s’fistric stance. Being
freethinkers, they could also very well be free from all prejudices against
women that are rampant in the law books of ancient India. They did not
admit word (s'abda), that is, verbal testimony as a valid instrument of
cognition (prams-11m), and so were not bound to accept what the
brahrn anical law books declared as something sacrosanct. This is why S-
M could make them say: dhfimadhfimadhvajayoravinfibhfivo ’stiti
vacanamc‘ztre mcmvfidivadvis'vdsfibhdvficca, ‘ . . . there is no more reason for
believing on another’ 5 word that smoke and fire are connected, than for our
receiving the ipse elixir of Manu, &c.’6
One word more. Eli Franco once suggested perceptively: ‘[A]ll the
Lokayatikas were fighting for... was ultimately to found social and political
institutions independently of religious dogma... ’.7 He might have had in his
mind Frauwallner’s view that materialism in India was created for the
Realpolitikers. I do not think so, as I have shown elsewhere.8 I would,
however, heartily agree with Franco’s suggestion. The Carvakas did have a
vision of an ideal society in which organised religion would have no room,
and there would be no caste and gender discrirninations. Their approach was
5 S—M in Ioshi 1981, 12. Emphasis added.

6 S-M in Joshi 1981, 9.
7 Franco 1991, 160.
8 R. Bhattaeharya 2009/2011, 21-32.
The Social Outlook of the Carvéka/Lokayata 175
thoroughly rational and they denounced such diseriminations as

impediments to founding a society based on equality of rights and
opportunities. In this sense their social outlook was essentially democratic.
CHAPTER SEVENTEEN
Two OBSCURE SANSKRIT WORDS

RELATED TO THE CARVAKA:
PANCA GUPTA AND KUNDAKI'TA
Hemacandra, known to the Jains as ‘the omniscient one of the Kali era’
(kalz‘kfila—sarvajfia), mentions three synonyms for bdrhaspatya in his AC:
nastika, carve-1kg and lauka‘yatika (3.526d — 527a). Yet in his Anekc'zrtha—
samgraha there is another synonym for ca'zrvc‘zkadaréana: paficagupta
(4.119d). It is rather strange that this word is not given in the first work.
It is stranger still that this intriguing word, paficagupta (also
paficdfigagupta and paficagfidha), originally a synonym for kacchapa,
tortoise, should also mean the Cmaka. Yet several Sanskrit kos’as, lexicons
of substantives, compiled between the twelfth century and the seventeen,
mention both the significations. Although the other four synonyms of the
Indian materialist system mentioned above are widely found in Sanskrit
philosophical and even non-philosophical literature (such as the PC and the
NC) right from the early centuries of CE, not a single use of paficagupta in
this sense, to the best of my knowledge, and of other scholars more
knowledgeable than me, is found anywhere.
One of the problems of Sanskrit kos‘as is the occurrence of quite a
number of words and/or certain significations which are not encountered in

any text, whether literary or scientific, that has come down to us. One such
instance is the second signification of paficagupta. Among the modern
Sanskrit dictionaries the multi-volume Sabda—kahm—dmma records the
second signification on the basis of the Medinfkoéa (Sabdavarga, ta-
catuskam, verse 210); so do Bohtlingk and Roth (referring to the
Trikc‘zndaéesa 3.3.171), Wilson (but Bauddha instead of Carvékal),
Tarkavacaspati (Vizcaspatya, but not in the Sabda—Stoma-mahfinidhi),
Monier-Williams, and Apte. Girisacandra Nyayaratna too mentions this
signification in his very short Sanskrit—Bangla dictionary, Sabdasc‘zm.
Apparently they followed the tradition of including this signification on the
strength of its occurrence in such kos’as, besides the two mentioned above,
as the Vis‘vapmkfis‘a (204), the Nénfirthatilaka (Anekdrthatilaka) (4.130), the
Two Obscure Sanskrit Words Related to the Omaha: 177
paficagupta and kundakfga
S’abdamtna-samanvaya-kosa (163 line 1), and the S‘abdamtnfivalz‘ (225).

The Bangla encyclopedia, Vis’vakos’a, compiled by Nagendranath Vasu
and the Bangla-Bangla dictionary, Vafigiya gabdakoéa by Haricarana
Vandyopadhyaya also record both the significations without offering any
instance of actual use. The Pfimnacandm Odin-z t'rsc'zkosa too mentions
both the significations (5.11. pafica gupta (sic)).
It is however noteworthy that some of the more well-known and oft-
consulted Sanskrit kos’as of earlier times, such as the Amarakoéa, the
Haldyudhakoéa and the gfiévatakoéa have no entry of paficagupta at all,
whether to signify a tortoise or the Carvaka. Apparently the word was not
widely current at the time of their compilation. The Vay‘ayanfikosa (4.1.50)
has paficagupta as one of the several synonyms for kflrma, turtle, but does
not refer to the Carvika. This also suggests that paficagupta in the latter
sense was notr known before the twelfth century.
Why paficagupta signifies the tortoise is readily understandable.
Bohtlingk and Roth as also Monier-Williams gloss the word as ‘covered or
protected in a fivefold manner, a tortoise (as drawing in its 4 feet and head;
cf. paficc‘tflga—g°).’
Which five parts of the Carvaka are similarly covered or protected
cannot even be guessed. In any case, speculation is useless unless at least
one actual occurrence can be cited. What is to be noted is that the word
carvc'rka in the sense of a philosophical system as well as its followers is not
encountered before the eighth century CE when it is first employed as a
namesake of Lokayata, both referring to the same materialist system (as in
the TSP, glosses on Chap. 22 passim, and SDSam, verse 85). The earliest
occurrence of cc‘zrvfika is found in the Mbh (Adiparvan 2.63, Salyaparvan
63.38, Santiparvan 39.22-47 passim) where it is the name of a friend of
Duryodhana. Carvaka there is actually a demon disguised as a bhiksu,
holding three staves. He is however not a materialist but one who had
perform ed penance (tapas) in the Krta era and managed to procure a boon
from Brahmi himself. Carvaka is portrayed here as a defiler of the
Brahm anas and consequently is burnt to ashes by the Brahm anas
themselves, not by igniting his body with actual fire but by their angry
outburst, humkc‘zm (Santi 39.35). We know from a fragment attributed to
Purandara in TSP 2, 528 (on TS, Chap. 18 verse 1481 = Bha 18 in R.
Bhattacharya 2009/2011, 82, 90) that the followers of a materialist school
used to call themselves Carvakas. Probably they had selected this name, or
rather nickname, from the Mbh. What is common to the name of the
philosophical system and the character in the epic is their anti-Brahmana
attitude, nothing else.
178 Chapter Seventeen
Lokayata in the sense of a materialist system was current at least from

the sixth century CE. However, in earlier Buddhist literature, both Pali and
Sanskrit, lokdyata invariably suggests vitandasattham, vitandfiéfisa’a, the
science of disputation (R. Bhattacharya 2009/2011, 187-91). But in later
literature, whether Buddhist, brahmanical or Jain, Lokayata stands for a
school of materialism, distinct, however, from another similar materialist
school called bhfitavc'ida (doctrine of the elements) as recorded in the Tamil
epic, Manime'kalai (27.78, 273; 149,154) composed not later than the
seventh century. So, Joke-{yam had already two significations by the
sixth/seventh century CE, if not a little earlier.
Moreover, there was a third name, Barhaspatya, the system enunciated
by Brhaspati, the guru of the gods, to delude the demons. The legend is
found in the Purinas as a namesake of the Carvaka/Lokayata. The
Manimékalai too refers to Brhaspati as the teacher of Lokayata (27. 80', 149).
The base text, the sfitra—work of this system, has been referred to as the
Bc'zrhaspazj/asfitra in the NM (2, 196). Cakradhara, the commentator on the
MM, once uses the name Lokc'zyatasfitm (part 1, 100).
Besides these three names, we come across several others signifying the
same system: dehc‘ttmavc'zda, bhfitacaitanyavc'tda, bhfitacatugtcwavc-zda, and
some more fanciful ones coined by its adversaries, such as
bhfltmm'm‘atattvavfida and make-ti:hfitodbhavacaitanyavfida (cited by Franco
1997, 274 and n3). Silanka, the Jain philosopher, uses another term, tajji'va-
tacchari'ravc'zda, for materialism (SKS‘Vrtti', 13-14, 185). Probably no other
philosophical system has so many designations. But nowhere is paficagupta
found as a synonym for the Calvaka.
The question then is: from where did the lexicographers learn that this
word, over and above signifying the tortoise, was another name (or
nickname) of Carvfika philosophy?
As yet we are not in a position to answer this question, not even
conjecturally. What, however, is to be noted is that the second signification

of paficagupta is not found in any major lexicon that was compiled before
the twelfth century. It is possible that one kos’akc'im noticed this word in an
obscure and not very well-known text written either by a Carvaka or by
some antagonist of materialism in or a little before the twelfth century. Later
kos’akc'ims simply copied the additional signification from this kos’a, and
others in the centuries that followed merely recopied it without bothering
about the original source. Modern lexicographers (nineteenth century
onwards) have faithfully recorded the second signification out of the belief
that since earlier kos’akfiras had noted it, there must have been some
example(s) of the use of the word in this sense in one work or another that
Two Obscure Sanskrit Words Related to the Cawaka: 179
paficagupta andkundakfia
has unfortunately not survived. In other words, they retained the second
signification out of belief, not knowledge.
Of the two possibilities mentioned above — the word occurs in a Carvaka
work or a work of its opponent — the latter appears to be more probable. The
reason is that there is another polysem ous word, kundakita (lit. a worm in a
pit, also signifying a person conversant with (or versed in) the instruction of
the Carvaka, cc‘zrvc‘rka—vacandbhrjfia—pumsa, or something to this effect) in
some twelfth-century kos’as (see below), but not in earlier ones such as the
Amarakos’a and the Halcbmdhakofa. The Slabda-kalpa-dmma, the
Vacaspatya, the Sanskrit— Warterbuch and A Sanskrit English Dictionary of
Monier—Williams faithfully record this word too, which, however, has not
been encountered in any known Sanskrit text, whether philosophical or
otherwise. The Trikdndas‘esa (fdntah, 3.920d) records two more
significations of kundakita beside the literal one: a fomicator, and the son
of a Brahmana woman bom of a param our, pums’acale kundakita—syaj
jdra‘ccabrdhmam'sute; there is no mention of ca‘rvdka—vacanc‘zbhy'fia-
purusa. The Anekc‘zrthasamgmha (4.61b-d) records three significations:
jdmtah vivmpntre ’dhave (.7) dfisyc-is'cc'trva'koktivis‘dmde, an illegitimate son
of a Brahmana woman while her husband is alive, son of a female slave,
and an expert in the instructions of the Carvaka. The Medim'kos'a
(ffintavarga, 59cd-60ab) has cfirvc‘zka—vacanc'ibhiffia—pumsa as the first
meaning, followed by patita—brc‘zhmanzjnutm (fallen son of a Brahmana
woman) and dart-kamuka (desirous of a female slave). The Vis’vaprakfiéa
(ta-catuskam, 57) too has the same set of three, only replacingpatita- of the
Medinz'kos’a Withjfiraja-. The Pfimnacandra 0dr?! t‘zshc‘zkosha records no
fewer than five significations; in addition to ‘A follower of the Chan/aka
Doctrine’ it has ‘Atheist’ too. We may note here in passing that Bohtlingk
and Roth as well as Monier—Williams record all three significations given in
the kos'as, although their renderings of carvdkokti-viifirada/cfirvfika—
vacanc‘zbhzjfia-pumsa as ‘ein gelehrter Kfirvaka’ (a learned Carvaka) and ‘a

follower of the Carvaka philosophy’ respectively, are too free. Kandakita
does not refer specifically to a Carvaka but merely to a Carvaka expert or
specialist.
What could kundakita mean in the context of philosophy? The Sabda—
karma-drama explains: kunde namrlzzimnde 5thital’t kite! iva cdrvc'zhzsamsrsg‘atvc'zt,
like an insect residing in the pit of hell, because of association with the
Carvfika. The Vacaspatya glosses: kunde yonikunde kitaiva vicdras'urg/atvc‘zt,
like an insect residing in the womb due to lack of judgment. The fabda—
kalpa—druma too mentions yonikunde kita iva, but not vicfircts'unyatvc‘zt, in
parentheses after patita-brahamam'puttm and refers to the Medinz‘kos’a as
the source of all, as does the Vc‘zcaspatya. But the latter mentionspatita— and
180 Chapter Seventeen
jamja-brdhmam'puttra separately while the form er refers to patita- only.

Apparently Taranatha Tarkavacaspati had consulted both the Medinfkos‘a
and the Vis‘vapmkfis‘a. Either way kundakita is to be taken as a term of abuse
(‘insect’ often suggests contempt), whether applied to an adulterine — both
kunda and gola have unsavoury associations in Smrti literature — or a
Carvaka expert. Hence, if the two words, paficagupta and kundakita, were
found in and taken from the some work (which is not improbable) to be
included in the kos’as, the work must have been anti-materialistic.
There is also a third possibility: both paficagupta and kundakita are
‘ghost words” like H.T. Colebrooke’s lokdyotana which was nevertheless
admitted, albeit with some reservation, by Bohtlingk and Roth, Monier-
Williams, andEdgerton in their respective lexic ons, although no Indian kos‘a
ever records it, nor is it found in any Sanskrit work whatsoever ( for details
see R. Bhattacharya 2009/2011, 193-200). It was all a mistake on
Colebrooke’s part perpetuated by modern lexicographers. The overriding
problem is that an actual use is yet to be discovered and no rationale for
using paficagupta to signify the Carvaka philosophy, and kundakita, a
person versed in the Carvaka philosophy, can even be inferred from the
compounds themselves. Yet the occurrence of these two words in some
twelfth-century kos‘as seems to suggest that they have been found in a text
that has not come down to us.
CHAPTER EIGHTEEN
VERSES ATTRIBUTED TO BRHASPATI

IN THE SAR VADARSANASAMGRAHA
S—M in his SDS concludes his exposition of the Carvfika system of

philosophy by quoting eleven and a half verses. He introduces the set by a
sentence: tad etat sarvam brhaspatim'zpyuktam (13.109), ‘All this has been
said by Brhaspati.’ The seventh is found in VDMPu 1.108. 18cd—l 9ab and
quite a number of earlier works; the tenth is found in some later ones. The
sources for verses 2, 3 and 4 have been traced to several works, those for
verses 1, 5, 6, 8, 9 and 11 are yet to be identified (R. Bhattacharya
2009/2011, 84-85). We are here concerned with one of these verses, viz.,
verse 3 (13.114-15) which runs as follows:
pas‘us‘cen nihatah svargamyyotistome gamisyati |

svapitci yajamdnena farm tasmfin m1 himsyate N
If a beast slain in the Jyotistoma rite will itself go to heaven,

Why then does not the sacrificer forthwith offer his own father? (E.B.
Cowell’s translation)
This is presumably taken from the VPu 18.26 and quoted with minor
variants.1
The VPu version reads:
nihamsye pafimyajfie svargaprdptir yadz‘syte |

svapitd yajamdnem kinnu tasmcin m1 hanyate ||
1 There is of course another probability: both the verses are taken from some oral
source. Nevertheless, the similarity between the two readings is unmistakable. The
VPu being the older of the two, it is permissible to conjecture that it records the early
version of the same verse. Abhyankar in his Vyakhya of the SDS (13) quotes Wu
3.18.26-27 presumably from another edition; the couple of verses are numbered
3.18.85 (sic). He also quotes Wu 3.18.24-25 (14); the reference given is 3.18.82-
83. The earlier reference then should be 3.18.84-85.
182 Chapter Eighteen
If an animal slaughtered in religious worship is thereby raised to heaven,

would it not be expedient for a man who institutes a sacrifice to kill his own
father for a victim? (H .H. ‘eson’s translation)
Another such verse in the SDS (verse 5', 14.118—19)) echoes Wu, 18.29.
The questionis: Has verse 3 got anything to do with Brhaspati, the eponymous
founder of the materialist CarvakafLokayata system of philosophy? In the
VPu it is the demons, who, deluded by Mayamoha, ‘Illusion—cum-Delusion’
(personified), in the guise of a Digambara I ain and a Buddhist monk, say
this, not Brhaspati. In fact, he makes no appearance in this story at all. Then
why does S-M attribute this verse to Brhaspati?
In order to answer this question we have to tackle another question first:
Has the name Brhaspati any significance in the given context? E.B. Cowell
apparently did not think so; he translated the introductory sentence as ‘Thus
it has been said’ (C/L 253). But the omitted name does matter. Brhaspati is
here chosen as the author of all these verses because they are, from the
brahm anical point of view, heretical in nature. Similar verses are attributed
to the Puranic Brhaspati, who, in the Wu and other Purinas, is made
responsible for dissuading the demons from the path of righteousness by
imparting “wicked doctrines’ to them on two different occasions. This, I
presume, led to a trend of attributing all such verses satirizing Vedic rites,
particularly post-m ortem rites, to Brhaspati and the Barhaspatyas, the
followers of Brhaspati, also known later as the Carvakas.
Let us examine the matter in some detail.
The Role of taspati

In a note on a passage (3.18.24-29) in his translation of the VPu, H.H.
Wilson (1840) points out, ‘We have in these passages, no doubt, allusions
to the Vérhaspatyas, or followers of Vrhaspati, who seem to have been

numerous andbold at some period anterior to the 14th century’ (1840/1980,
492 n7).2 In a long essay John Muir (1862) too treats VPu 3.18.14-26 as a
representation of the Carvaka view (C/L 353-54). G. Tucci (1926/1971)
mentions the VPu in connection with his study of different Brhaspatis (82
n4). DR Shastri in his studies on the Carvaka often refers to VPu 3.18
2 Wilson in this note also referred to his essay, ‘ Sketch of the Religious Sects of the
Hindus’ published in AsiatickResearches 16:5 (1828) for fiirther information. The
second part of the essay was published in AsiatickResearches 17 (1832). The whole
is to be foundin Wilson’s Works, vol. 1 (London 1862) ‘with minor alterations and
others’, ed. Ernst R. Rost. It was also reprinted posthumously several times as a
separate book.
Verses Attributed to Brhaspati in the Sarvadarsanasamgmha 183
(1928, 15', 1982, 22, 55, 83, 87, 165-66; C/L, 403). So do SarvanandPathak
(1965/1990, 162-64) and Ananda Jha (1969/1983, 429-432). KK. Mittal
includes the VPu in his list of sources for information regarding Lokfiyata
(1974, 25), althoughhe does not make any use of it. Bishnupada Bhattacharya
was of the opinion that Brhaspati propagated the nc‘zstika view in order to
deceive the asums (demons) and referred to Wilson’s translation of the VPu
3.18 in support of his contention (1 840/1980, 3 n1). Panchanana Bhattacharya
Shastri has rightly objected to this statement, pointing out that nothing of
the sort is found there (1394 BS, ca). There is indeed no mention of
Brhaspati in the VPu. However, Bhattacharya Shastri, following D.R.
Shastri (1928), reproduces relevant passages both from the VPu 3.18 and
the PPu Srstikhanda 13.319-34, 336-38 at the end of his book (1394 BS,
103-05).
Surendranath Dasgupta does not refer to this particular chapter of the
VPu, but in his discussion on Lokayata, Nfistika and Carvika mentions VPu
1629-31 in which ‘certain people are alluded to who did not believe in the
efficacy of the performance of sacrifices and spoke against the Vedas and
the sacrifices... ’ (1975, vol. 3, 530).
In spite of this old and generally accepted notion that VPu 3.18 contains
Cari/aka views, this paper proposes to show that the verses in the VPu do
not represent the materialist view; on the other hand, they refer to the views
of the Jains and the Buddhists who, not unlike the Carvakas, did not believe
either in the authority of the Veda or in the efficacy of performing sacrifice
(yajfia) and all that followed from it (such as, offering gifts to the
Brahmanas, daksim‘z, etc). This is why these two religious sects were
branded by the Vedists as heretical, although they were as much opposed to
materialism as the Vedists. It should be borne in mind that ever since the
sixth/fifth century BCE proto-materialists like Ajita Kesakambala were not
the only opponents of the Vedic religion; there were others to do so then
and long after. We read of many such critics, sceptics and downright
scorners of Vedic orthodoxy in later sections of the Vedic literature (Sarup
1920-27/1984, 71-80; Del Toso 2012, 138-141). The opposition came from
diverse sources but so far as the Purinas are concerned, the Iains and in a
less degree the Buddhists were the chief targets of their attack, not the
Carvakas (Dandekar 1993, 752). Therefore the attribution of any verse from
KPH 3.18 to Brhaspati or the Carvékas is unwarranted.
Let us look at the VPu story first. It runs as follows. The demons had
occupied the three worlds and the gods were being denied of the portion of
the offerings that was due to them. Engaged as the gods were in the duties
of their respective orders (want), and following the paths prescribed by the
Veda, as also practising penance (tapas), they were incapable of killing their
enemies. So they prayed to Visnu (Hari) and asked for his help. He produced
Mayamoha, ‘Illusion-cum-Delusion’ and told the gods that the newly
created person would delude the demons who, having been turned away
from the Vedic path, are liable to be killed; in fact, whoever goes against
the Veda, be they gods or demons or any other, are liable to be killed by
Visnu for the preservation of the world. Visnu advised the gods to proceed
without fear with Mayamoha in front of them. Mayamoha would be of
benefit to them.
Mayanoha then came to the demons who were practising penance on
the banks of the Narmada. He appeared before them first as an unclad twice-
bom with his head shaven and carrying a peacock’s feather. Gently he asked
them why they were practising penance. Was it for gaining any fruit in this
world or in the other? The demons replied that they aspired for the latter. ‘If
you desire liberation (mukti),’ said Mayamoha, ‘I shall teach you the duties
that would open the door of liberation. There is nothing beyond or superior
to them.’ He then taught them in various ways, supplemented by many
arguments, the non-Vedic tenets of pluralism (anekc'mtavc'zda), so much so
that the demons were persuaded to give up the doctrine of the three Vedas
(Wayfdhama).
This led to the conversion of many demons. Mayamoha then reappeared
in scarlet garments and, assuming a benevolent aspect, taught the demons
in a sweet and gentle voice the tenets of Buddhism. As a result other demons
too were deluded and began to speak ill of the Vedas, yajfias and
Brahmanas. They started to question the practice of slaughtering anirnals in
sacrifices and the use of performing s’rfiddha by offering food to the
deceased ancestors. Mfiyfimoha then told them: ‘First, then, let it be
determined what may be (rationally) believed by mankind, and then you
Will find that felicity may be expected from my instructions. The words of
authority do not, mighty Asuras, fall from heaven: the text that has reason
is alone to be acknowledged by me, and by such as you are.’ (1828-29)

Ultimately, ‘By such and similar lessons the Daityas were perverted, so
that not one of them admitted the authority of the Vedas.’ (18.30)
The gods found the demons now as a soft target, since they had strayed
from the Vedic path. The battle was renewed and the demons were
annihilated. (1831-32)
There is no reference, direct or oblique, to Brhaspati or any Earhaspatya
or Carvaka, but only to the Jain and the Buddhist. Yet Cowell, Muir and
many others3 have discovered materialism in this passage. It is therefore
3 D.R. Shastri inhis summarizedversion of the War story goes to the extent of saying
that ‘[a]t his (so. Indra’s) prayer, Mayamoha was created who preached to the
Verses Attributed to Brhaspati in the Sarvadars‘anasamgmha 185
necessary to trace back the root of the VPu story to its original source, the
MaiUp. Brhaspati plays a significant role in the rivalry between the gods
and demons there.
The Identig; ofhaspati

First, a few words about Brhaspati, the supposed founder of the materialist
doctrine. The name Barhaspatya is associated with Lokayata, and later with
the Carvaka. In Sanskrit philosophical literature it is a kind of generic name
for materialism. The other name, Lokayata, is used as synonymous with it
even before the eighth century when the Carvfikas make their appearance in
the philosophical scene. However, references to the nastikas, the
Bfirhaspatyas, the bhfitavdz‘ns and the Lokfiyata/Lokfiyatmas are found
before the eighth century.4 In the Tamil epic Manimékalaz‘ (composed
between the fourth and the seventh century), it is said that Brhaspati is the
preceptor of the Lokayata system (27.80), one of the six systems which
accept Logic.5 The other five are Buddhism, Samkhya, Nyaya, Vais’esika
and MTmamsa (27.77-79). Strangely enough, although one bhfitava'din is
made to expound the doctrine of his school to Manimekalai and to explain
in which particular respects his school differs from Lokayata (2726-77),
nothing is said about the founder of bhfitavc‘zda. A few words about
Brhaspati and the Barhaspatyas are therefore called for.
We hear of several Brhaspatis in the Rv and the Upanisads, as also of an
Arthas’cistm of Brhaspati, now lost but mentioned in K24 1.2.4 (also Us'anas
(Sukra) 1.2.6. See Kangle 1972, vol. 3, 6-10). There was a Brhaspatismrti,
many fragments of which have been collected.6 But it is only the Brhaspati
mentioned in the MaiUp, 7.9-10 and the Purfinas (such as the PPu, Matsya
demons the pernicious doctrines of Brhaspati . . .’ (C/L 403), although there is no

mention of Brhaspati in the War.
4 See Kamalasila TSP II, 520, Iayantabhatta W I, 40-41, 275', §ilanka on SKS
1.1.1.6', 9 and Hemacandra, A C 3.526-27. It is in Haribhadra’s SDSam, verse 85d,
Kamalasila’s TSP, II, 639, 649, 657, 663, 665 and Jinendrabuddhi’s Visdldmalavatf
Pramdnasamuccqyafikd, 24 (atha vs? cdrvdkah praWetaducyate) that we first come
across the name (or nickname) Carvaka as the representative of a school of
materialist philosophy. For further details see above Chap. Three, 41-48.
5 For further details regarding the division of the Indian philosophical systems on
the basis of adhering to logic or not, see Gerschhiemer 2007, 239-258. This
admirable survey, however, misses the Manimékalai.
5 See Jolly and Aiyangar. This Brhaspati, however, has nothing to do with
materialism. He is a great admirer o f Manu and, like the Brhaspati mentioned in
Mbh, Aranyakaparvan, 33, is thoroughly orthodoxinhis views. See R. Bhattacharya
2009/2011, 26.
Pum‘na (MatPu), Devibhfigavata Purfina (DBhPu), givmnahfipurdna

(Sh‘vaPu) and Liftgapurfina (LifigaPu) who is relevant to this discussion.
When Jayaras'i (125) and Sfiharsa (15) refer to him, they call him sumgum,
preceptor of the gods. The name of Brhaspati then did not originate in the
philosophical circles but owes its origin to the MaiUp and the Purinas. The
relevant passage in the MaiUp runs as follows:
Verily Brhaspati became Sukra, and for the security of Indra created this
ignorance (aviafizfi) for the destruction of the Asuras.
By this [ignorance] men declare that the inauspicious is auspicious and
that the auspicious is inauspicious. They say that there should be attention
to law (dharma) which is destructive of the Veda and other scriptures
(s’éstm). Hence one should not attend to this [teaching]. It is false. It is like
a barren woman. Mere pleasure is the fruit thereof, as also one who deviates
from the proper course. It should not be entered upon. (7.9) (R.E. Hume’s
translation)
The Maiqv then quotes verses from £65, Katha andMundaka Upcmisads
(with slight variations). All this subterfuge adopted by Brhaspati is meant
for deceiving the demons. The MaiUp further says:
Verily, the gods and the devils (Asuras), being desirous of the Self (Atman),
came into the presence of Brahma. They did obeisance to him and said: “Sir,
we are desirous of the Self (Airman). So, do you tell us.”
Then, meditating long, he thought to himself: ‘VeIily, these devils are
desirous of a Self (Arman) different [from the true one].’ Therefore a very
different doctrine was told to them.
Upon that fools here live their life with intense attachment, destroying
the saving raft and praising what is false. They see the false as if it were true,
as in jugglery.
Hence, what is set forth in the Vedas — that is true! Upon what is told in
the Vedas — upon that wise men live their life. Therefore a Brahman
(bra‘hmam) should not study what is non-Vedic. This should be the purpose.
(7.10)
This is apparently the source for the terse version of the story in MatPu
24.43-49. The same story occurs in an expanded form in the VPu 3.18
(narrated above), and then re-adapted more elaborately inDBhPu 4.13-15.7
7 The chapter- and verse-numbers refer to the Vangavasi ed. The numbers of both
differ from that of Anandashram and other editions. According to RC. Hazra
(1940/ 1987, 122), Vangavasi ‘is often more faithful’ to the reading of the mss than
Anandashram.
Verses Attributed to Brhaspati in the Sarvadaréanasamgmha 187
The longest version is found in the PPu, Srsti, 13.314-381, which, Hazra
(1940/1987, 25) says, is derived from the three Purinas mentioned above.
To these sources that retell the story may be added two much later works:
SlimPu, Rudrasamhita, Yuddhakanda, Chaps.1-5 and LifigaPu, Part 1, chap.
71.8 They all tell slightly different versions of the same story?
The names of Brhaspati and éukra, the gurus of the gods and the demons
respectively, and Brhaspati’s assumption of the form of Sukra for the
security of Indra, the king of the gods, the declaration of the infallibility of
the Veda, and finally Brahmfi’s role in misleading the demons are all there
in the Mai Up. However, it is worth noting that the background of the war
between the gods and the demons (as mentioned in the VPu) is conspicuous
in its absence. The moot point is viajzd (knowledge) alone. Brhaspati him self
creates aviafizd (ignorance) in order to assist the gods; but he does not have
to resort to any higher god like Visnu, nor does Visnu decide to help
Brhaspati suo motu and create Mayarnoha10 as told in the Wu and later in
the PPu. The Mai Up in its turn takes its cue from several earlier Upanisads
(particularly the KathaUp) and highlights the concept of what is negatively
called avaidika, non-Vedic, a word related to a similar word, nastiIg/a,
negativity. Both the words occur once only in the eighteen principal
Upanisads, and interestingly enough in the same Upanisad, MaiUp, 7.10
and 3.5 respectively.
Dating the Puranas is a near impossible task. Hazra, however,
conjectures by sifting both internal and external evidence that the VPu was
compiled between 100 and 350, more probably between 275 and 325,
VDMPu, between 400 and 500, the PPu (Srsti), not earlier than 0.650, the
MatPu, between 650 and 1250, and the DBhPu, between 950 and 1200
(1940/1987, 24-25, 32, 40, 45', 1958-63, vol. 2, 343, 345). However, Hazra
suspects the two chapters that relate the story of the battle between the gods
and demons in the 14% (3.17—18) to be interpolations; they were added, he
believes, to the text sometime after 350, at least not before 500 (1940/1987,
25; 1972, (1)).
It is stated in the MatPu, 24.43-49 that the sons of king Raji stole the
kingdom of Indra along with his wealth and the portion of sacrifice (yajfia)
due to him. Indra approaches Vaeaspati (Brhaspati), who performed the
8 The speech of Vena in the VDMPM, 108.12—39 has many similarities with the
preaching of Mayamoha and the demons (after their conversion to the Jain and the
Buddhist doctrines) in the Wu 3.18.
9 For an overview see, besides Hazra’s works, Choudhury 1954-55, 234-57. For a
detailed study of the S'z'vaPu and the LifigaPzJ, see Dandekar 1993, 737-41.
1° Cf. moha inMaiUlp, 7.8, and the verb, mohaycimfisa inMatPu, 24.47-48. Cf. also
Mayapurusa in the SivaPu and the LifigaPu.
Paistika sacrifice and succeeded in deluding the sons of Raji by adopting

the non-Vedic religion of Tina. Finding them endowed with the non-Vedic
doctrine of sophistry (hetuvc'zdasamanvita), Sakra (Indra) killed them with
his thunder.
Instead of the demons and the gods here we have the sons of Raji and
Indra, but the heretical doctrine of Jainism (but not of Buddhism) is common
to both the accounts. Brhaspati with all his wile is introduced in the story
for the first time.
There is not a single hint of any Carvaka or any of its known nam esakes,
such as Barhaspatya, bhfitavadin or Lo(Lau)kayatika, not even nastika (an
omnibus term to cover the adherents of all anti-Vedic views) in the VPu
story, although both the Digambara Jain carrying all his characteristic marks
and the Buddhist with his blood red garment are unmistakably present.11
The VPu story is recast and retold with some variations in the PPu, Srsti.,
Chap. 13. There too only the Jain and the Buddhist monks (digambam and
raktdmbara respectively) are made to appear, not any Carvaka. Moreover,
the story inthe VPu does not mention Brhaspati even once. Brhaspati is also
absent in the .SlivaPu and the LifigaPu accounts, although there is a
Mayapurusa. In some other Purinas like GamdaPu 1.32 Visnu himself
becomes the embodiment of Jina’s son called Buddha. In AgniPu, 16.1-4
we are told that Suddhodana’s son himself beguiled the demons to become
Buddhists and then Arhatas (Choudhury 1954-55, 240). There is no mention
of Brhaspati in these two Puranas; only in MatPu, 24.43-49 and DBhPu,
4.13-15, Brhaspati has some role to play. Dandekar has noted: ‘The agency
through which the heretical thought and practices were insidiously instilled
among the demons is said to have been either the Mayapurusa alone
[$ivaPu, LifigaPu and Wu], or Brhaspati alone [Dtu and MatPu], or
Brhaspati and the Mayapurusa jointly [PPu Srsti 13.223.27]’ (1993, 747).
Brhaspati is not invariably present in all the versions of the story.
Then why did some scholars discover a Barhaspatya/Carvakamaterialist

in the War story? I think S—M is responsible for creating the impression that
the satire against the Vedas, Vedic rituals and the performance of s’rc‘zddha,
etc. are part of the Carvaka/Lokayata doctrine alone. But the fact is that,
besides some reasoners, sceptics, and followers of non-Vedic cults
(mentioned in graphic detail in the MaiUp 7.8), both the Buddhists and the
Jains were as much opposed to all this as were the materialists. Throughout
the SDS, Chap. 1, entitled ‘Carvakadarsanam’, S—M uses the names,
‘1 While describing the Kali era the VéyuPu (58,59) and the BrahméndaPu
(2.32.59b-60a) too speak of the Jains and the Buddhists in the same way: ‘With
white teeth, eyes brought under control, heads shaved and red clothes on, the Sfidras
will perform religious deeds.’ Qtd. in Hazra 1940/1987, 210.
Carvika, nastika and Brhaspatimata interchangeably (2.13-22', also

dehfitmavdda, 3.53). Similar verses are attributed to the Puranic Brhaspati,
who, in the sources mentioned above, is made responsible for dissuading
the demons from the path of righteousness by imparting ‘wicked doctrines’
to them on different occasions. Before the discovery of other sources,
doxographical or polemical, the SDS (the first fascicule of the editio
princeps published by the Bibliotheca Indica of the Asiatic Society of
Bengal and edited by Iswarachandara Vidyasagara came out in 1853) was
the earliest known and quite for some time the only source for learning about
the Carvaka/Lokayata. Hence, S—M’s exposition of the system acquired a
kind of authoritative status which it does not really deserve. The account
given in the SDS does not contain any reference to any authentic text of the
Carvikas (apparently because the sfitm work and all its commentaries were
lost by the fourteenth century, when S—M composed his epitome of all
philosophies), whereas in all other chapters he quotes profusely from the
authoritative works of the systems. Only in Chap. 1 he seems to represent
the doctrine on the basis of what he had leamt from his gurus. Some of the
arguments he develops (for example, why inference is not to be admitted as
a valid instrument of cognition) seems to have been manufactured by him,
not leamed from any genuine text. Now we know that such a blanket
rejection of inference was not the true Carvaka doctrine; it did accomm odate
inference to a limited extent in relation to worldly matters, when some
inference was based on perception, not on verbal testimony. The Carvakas
made a clear distinction between the Zokapmsiddha hem (probanses well-
established in the world) and the tantrasz’ddha hetu (probanses established
in the scripture), and on this basis rejected such supernatura1 notions, such
as God, heaven and hell, omniscient being, etc. This view was known to
others both before and after S—M (for examples, see above Chap. Ten, 110-
116). S—M, however, does not mention this vital point which distinguishes
the Carvakas from the old materialists (see above Chap. Three passim).
Despite such shortcomings, S-M’s account acquired and still has the
reputation of being an infallible source for leaming about the Carvaka
system. As Wilhehn Halbfass says, ‘While the interest in this work (so. SDS)
has decreased as the primary sources have become increasingly available, it
has still attracted the interest of more recent scholars’ (1988, 350).
S-M closes his account with eleven and a half epigrams. Earlier in this
chapter he called them abhanaka (5.49), ‘proverb’ or lokagc‘rthfi (2.17),
‘verse orally transmitted to the people’. They proved to be highly attractive
and intriguing, so much so that Haraprasad Shastri (1925) says: ‘The
versified portion of the account of the Can/aka I soon made my own’ (C/L
378). These verses are in the nature of what Patafij ali (Mahabhc‘rsya, Chap.1
(Paspas’dhnika). Calcutta ed. 18, Poona ed. 13) and éabara (Mimdmsfisfitm
110, 159) derisively callprmnattagita, ‘stanza sung through thoughtlessness’.12
The word is found in the Kc‘zéikfivrtti on 145162.149 along with sim ilar words
such as suptalapita, unmattapralapita and vipannamta (Kc‘zs‘ikd 428).
Literally pramattagfta would mean ‘sung while intoxicated’ (Katre 1987,
751) or as Bohtlingk and Roth gloss, unachtsam gesangen, sung
inattentively. The word, however, is used in a special sense in Patafij ali’s
Maho'rbhc‘zsya. Abhyankar and Shukla translate it as ‘(a verse) recited by a
dunce’ (Poona ed. 13). It stands for any epigram which is anti-Vedic or
critical of the Vedic religion, as opposed to the pro—Vedic ones that are
called bhrdja (Calcutta ed. 17, Poona ed. 13). It may be noted in passing
that Sankarficirya criticizes Sugata (the Buddha) in the following terms:
‘Moreover, Sugata exposed his own incoherence in talk (asambaddha-
pmldpitvam) when he instructed the three mutually contradictory theories
of the existence of external objects, existence of consciousness, and absolute
nihilism . . . ’ (BSBhdsya on 2.2.32).
Patafijali fortunately quotes such a pramattagz'ta satirizing ritual
drinking of wine in sacrifices:
yad udumbamvarndnfim ghafinfim mandalam mahat I

pfmm m2 gamyet svargam kim tar kratugatam nayet [|
When a large number of udumbara—coloured (i.e., red, made of copper) jars

when drunk do not lead to heaven, how can wine drunk (in a small quantity)
in this sacrifice [viz. Sautrémani] do so? (Trans. K. C. Chatterjee, Calcutta
ed., 18)
Patafij ali considers all such verses apramana, not authoritative;

apramattagitas or bhrcijas alone are to be considered authoritative by the
followers of the Vedic religion. The Jains and the Buddhists condemned
drinking of wine even in yajfias and were opposed to all Vedic rites that
involved animal sacrifice. Such practices went against their doctrine of non-
injury (ahimsa).13 Both the sects refused to swear by the Vedas and did not
‘2 m caitat pramattagitam inmktam. gabara on Mmfimsfisfltm, 2.2.26; pramattagitam

tatrabhavatfim ityavagamyate; m1 caitanyflkhyam, on ibidem, 3.1.17.
13 Nagesa in his Laghumafijusfl mentions the Sautramani sacrifice in which drinking
wine was prescribed (see Appendix A below) and calls the epigram quoted by
Patafijali a buddhaéloka, a stanza composed by Buddha (qtd. in the Mahébhfigya,
Calcutta ed. 19)! Bhattojidiksita says that such verses are known as pramattagz'ta
because of their anti-Vedic and anti-smrtz' nature (qtd. inthe Mahabhfisya, Poona ed.
13). Bhartrhari calls the stanza in question as having been sung by the revered author
Verses Attributed to Brhaspati in the Sarvadaréanasamgmha 191
consider these texts to be the highest verbal testimony (salads!) Stephen A.

Phillips has observed:
Buddhists and some others appear to be motivated to deny pramana status

to testimony because appeal to testimony is used to justify what they see as
objectionable religious theses. Similarly the Carvaka materialist denies
inference apparently out o f fear of its power to prove the existence of
spiritual entities such as God or the soul (1998, vol. 5,280).
But such epistemological issues are not germane to the Wu story or

similar stories found in other Purinas. It is the strict adherence to the Vedic
religious path that is sought to be defended; the story of the battle between
the gods and the demons is introduced to drive home the lesson that the
demons were finally routed because they had renounced the Veda under the
influence of a Jain and a Buddhist, who are but ‘Illusion—cum-Delusion’
created by Visnu with the express purpose of defeating the demons and
restoring to the gods the due portion of offerings meant for them. The long
discourse that follows the Mayamoha story in the VPu (1834-103), deals
with the nagna, “the nude one’ (the digmnbam Jain again), the pagandin
(heretic), haituka (reasoner), etc. The passage makes it abundantly clear that
the issues at stake are: (a) the social system firmly rooted in maintaining the
rights and duties of the four castes and the four stages of life as laid down
in the Dharmas’astras (vama—fis’mma—dharma), (b) performance of Vedic
rituals, and (0) performance of s’rfiddha in which flesh or different animals
are to be offered to the manes and consumed by the guests, as laid down in
the Dhannas’astras (such as Manu 3.268, mentioned by Mallisena in his
SVM 64; he also quotes one verse (65) found in the PPu 13.323 without
mentioning the source). 14 All this refers to social and religious matters, not
philosophical.
The Jains and the Buddhists in one way or the other did believe in the
after-world15 but it is the practice of flesh-eating in yajfias and s’rc'iddhas that
is vehemently objected to in the verses at the end of the SDS (vv. 3, 4, 11
(13. 114- 17; 15.130-32)). So it may be legitimately conjectured that most of
the verses that are attributed to Brhaspati by S—M were originally composed
by the lains and the Buddhists. In relation to the closing verses in the SDS,
chap. 1, both Cowell (1874-75, 16 n20) and Max Muller (1878/1901, 145)
through thoughtlessness (asamfihimcetasah) (qtd. in the Mahabhfisya, Calcutta ed.

18).
‘4 Mathara also quotes this verse in his Vrttz' on SK, 2. For further details see R
Bhattacharya 2009/2011, 216 n15.
15 For a detailed study see Franco 1997,passim.
refer to Eugene Burnouf 5 Introduction d l ’hi'stoire du Buddhism Indien (1944,

209) which contains a translation of a passage from the ,Sldrdfilalcarndvaddna
(in DA), challenging the special status of the Brahmanas, and criticizing
animal sacrifice, flesh eating, etc (See n19 below).
There is also another possibility: the brahm anical authors of the Puranas
themselves composed these verses in order to represent the heretical views
of the Iains and the Buddhists. S-M collected them from various sources
(the VPu not excluded), probably both oral and written, and reproduced
them at the end of his exposition of the Carvaka system.
The verses that denounce flesh-eating, offering flesh to the dead in
special yajfiic rituals involving animal sacrifice (W. 3-6, 9, 111/2) are more
appropriate to the Buddhists with their creed of non—injury (ahimsd) as also
the Iains with their practice of strict vegetarianism and vow of celibacy.
Some of the other verses ridicule the Vedas (2, particularly 2ab, 10, 11,
particularly llcd). Only verse 1 (which denies heaven, final liberation, the
soul in the Other World, actions of the four castes, orders, etc), v.7 (the
well-known ydvajji'vam sukham jivet verse in a distorted form)16 and v.8
(denying the Other World) refer exclusively to the materialist view. Others
satirizing asceticism and priesthood (2, 9, 10, 11) and, most importantly,
making fun of the ceremony for the dead (5-8) could have come from
Buddhist and/or Jain sources.17 Yet S—M claims that all the verses in the last
section of the SDS are composed by Brhaspati, although in the War and
other Purinas two and only two heretical sects, namely, the Buddhists and
the Iains, but not the materialists, are the targets of attack.
This quite naturally would give rise to another question: Why did S—M
attribute these verses to Brhaspati? The reason, I presume, is that the
original reading of v.2 ended with this pdda: jiviketi brhaspatih, as found
elsewhere (R. Bhattacharya 2009/2011, 84, 207-211) and as quoted by S-M
himself in the earlier part of the same chapter (5.50-51). He selected some
other verses from the Puranas and other sources, both oral and written, and
decided to attribute all of them, either in their original or in somewhat
altered forms, to the alleged founder of the Carvaka philosophy, without
bothering to consider that the verses intheir sources are attributed to demons
and others, not always to Brhaspati.
The objection against the Buddhists and the Jains in the Purinas is
purely on religious grounds; they are attacked for holding views opposed to
‘5 For a full discussion of the reading o f this verse and its variants see R.
Bhattacharya 2009/2011, 201-206. For the reading of two other verses quoted in the
SDS (verses 2 and 4), see ibid. 207-211 and 213-218.
17 For further details see R. Bhattacharya 2009/2011, 84-85. Parallels of many of the
verses are foundiam 2.100.2-17 (crit. ed.) and other works.
Vedic ritualism. No philosophical issues, particularly epistemological

questions, that led to a long polemical warfare from the eighth century to
the twelfth century between the Vedists, the Jains and the Buddhists on the
one hand and the materialists on the other, are to be found in the Puranas.
In fact, the verses in the SDS appear as somewhat of an anti-clim ax: after
such a scholarly and technical discussion about the reason why inference
cannot be admitted as a valid instrument of cognition (981-13108), the
verses that follow introduce a lighter note.18
RN. Dandekar notes that the Jains were the chief adversary in other
Puranas too; their authors did not know much about the Buddhists and could
not distinguish between the Jains and the Carvakas; so much so that they
even attributed the view that ‘Perception is the only means of cognition’ to
the Iains (1993, 752). More specifically he states:
It is, indeed, difficult to isolate Lokayata elements in the heretical teachings

as set forthin the Puranas. It is not unlikely that the authors have mistakenly
included among the Jain (and the Buddhist) tenets some views which can be
regarded as being manifestly Lokayata (752).19
The objection against the Buddhists and the Jains as also against the
materialists is purely on religio-ritualistic grounds; these communities are
attacked for holding views opposed to Vedic rites and going against the
Smrtis. Hence ‘sheer materialism’ is to be expected only ‘to a very small
extent,’ as Dandekar says (1993, 747). Lokayata was not a rival religious
sect, but a philosophical system. It was as much opposed to brahmanism as
to Jainism and Buddhism. From the brahm anical point of view, both the
Buddhists and the Jains are as much ndstikas as the materialists insofar as
they did not accept the Vedas as an infallible instrument of cognition. But
18 It is also worth noting that only two verses at the end of the SDS (verses 1 and 7)
assert, whether affirmatively or negatively, a philosophical View; the rest are satires
on Vedic rituals, particularly animal sacrifice and s‘rfiddha. The PPM, Srsti 13 is a
veritable storehouse of many such satirical epigrams (so-calledpmmattagfms) and,
like the verses in the WM 3.18, they represent the views of the Jains and the
Buddhists (as understood by the Vedists), not of the materialists. For the Buddhists’
views on eating of flesh as prescribed by the Brahmanas, see DA, 321, particularly
verses 20—28 (=Sardfilakarndvadflna, 18-19). Some of them closely resemble the
verses at the end of SIDS, Chap.1.
19 The same kind of ignorance is to be found in Cirafijivasarman’s campfi,
Vidvanmada-tarafiginz’ (eighteenth century). He too confuses the three heretical
doctrines and attributes one’s views on the other. See Haraprsad Shastri 1984, vol.
3, 33-45 and Deshpande [1992], 178.
the presence of the dehdtmavddins, whether old or new,20 in the Puranas is

hardly noticeable. In the vast Puranic literature the name of Carvaka occurs
once only in the DBhPu (12.8.4) and that too among those religious sects
that have no respect for the Veda.21 The VDMPu contains the words
lokc‘zyaia and lokcbjatikdvcilgza) (1108.6, 8) as the PPu Srsti. in an
intriguing passage mentions Lokayatikas’astra (Vangavasi ed. 13.292 =
Anandashram ed. 13.297). In the PPu, Uttarakhanda (Vangavasi ed. 236.2-
5 = Anandashram ed. 26366-69) Siva tells Parvafi that, induced by him,
Kanfida, Gautama, Kapila and Dhisana (= Brhaspati) have propounded their
objectionable systems. R.C. Hazra, to whom we owe very detailed and
intensive studies in the Purinas and the Upapuranas, does not mention any
other occurrence of Barhaspatya, Carvaka or Lokayata by name in the
Purinas and the Upapuranas.22
Conclusion
From the above discussion one point is clear: the VPu story has nothing to
do with the m aterialists of India, whether the Pre-Carvakas or the Carvakas;
the I ains and the Buddhists are the target of attack. S-M, by placing these
satirical epigrams either in their original or in altered forms, and attributing
them all to Brhaspati, has mixed up the views of all sorts of nc‘zstikas,
particularly the Iains and the Buddhists, with the Carvakas and thereby
succeeded in deceiving generations of readers and misleading even the best
of scholars.23
2° For a study of old (Pre-Carvaka) materialism and new (Carvaka) materialism, see
Chapter three above.
2‘ The list mentions the following sects: Vaisnava, Ganapatya (worshippers o f

Ganapati or Ganesa), Kapalika, Cinemargarata (a kind of Tantrika), Digarnbara
(Jain), Bauddha and Carve—aka. The galcta bias against these sects is only too evident.
The Carvakas are included because they were as much ncisiikas (in all senses of the
term, viz, denier o f the Other World, anfi-Vedic stance, atheism, etc.) as the
Buddhists and the Jains.
22I suspect that even by Carvaka and Lokayata the redactors of the Puranas meant
the ncistikas, i.e., the Pre-Carvaka atheists and anti-religious preachers, in general
(about whom we read in many places of the Mbh).
23 The uncritical acceptance of the view that the verses at the end of SDS, Chap.1
represent the authentic Carvaka position is still rampant. So much so that Eli Franco
has recently reproduced them in an encyclopedia article (2011, 635-36), although he
himself is convinced that ‘[t]he quoted verses contain mainly criticism of Brahrnans
and sacrifices and partly known from other sources; they do not contain anything
specifically materialist’ (2011, 635. Emphasis added).
Verses Attributed to Brhaspati in the Sarvaa’ars‘anasamgmha 195
Appendix A
Use ofIntoxicatingDrink: in the Sautrdmani Sacrifice
Sautrfimani is one of the seven Haviryajfias in which the gods are offered
intoxicating drinks prepared from various ingredients. The remnant of the
intoxicating drinks (after it has been offered to the gods) is to be drunk by
the Brahm anas. It is also expected to be drunk by a personhired for drinking
or else it was poured on an ant-hill.
The Sautramarfi is performedby one who has drunk too much Soma (an
intoxicating drink highly praised in the Rv or at the end of the Rajasfiya
sacrifice. Indra had once drunk too much and was cured by performing
Sautrémani. Performance of Sautrémani makes a son free from his debt to
his mother. The sacrifice is to be performed for a Brahmana who desires
prosperity or for a king who has been driven out from his kingdom or for
one who has no cattle.24
Appendix B
EatingFlesh in the érc'zddha
When Jabali speaks derisively of s’rc'zddha inREzm 2.100, he speaks as a free-

thinker and a non-believer but he is well within the brahm anical frame. His
slighting of the ceremony is based on ontological grounds: since there is no
Other World where one’s ancestors would reside, performance of any rite
to feed them is utterly absurd. It is on the same ground that at the end of
SDS, chap. 1 some verses (4, 5 and 9) either challenge or ridicule the
s’rdddha rites. In the Wu and the PPu, however, it is the nature of thefood
oflered to the ancestors during the s’rdddha which is at issue. According to
the A—pastamba Dharmasfitra, beef offerings satisfy the ancestors for a year;
the flesh of a bull satisfies them for more than a year; and the satisfaction is
endless if a rhinoceros is offered. Eating of flesh at the s’rc‘zddha ceremony
is obligatory. Even a yati (holy man) may be offered flesh. If he refuses to
eat it, he dwells in hell for as many years as the number of hairs on the body
of the animal whose flesh is offered to him (pace the Vas’r’sjha Dharmasfitra).
24 Adapted from Moghe 2000, 312. For further details and sources see Kane 1968/77,
vol. 2/2, 1224-28.
If a Brahmaua is invited by a Ksatriya or a Vais’ya he too will be obliged to

eat it. 25
25 Adapted from Moghe 2000, 490. For filrther details and sources, see Kane, v01.
2/2, 772-82 and vol.4, 422-25.
CHAPTER NINETEEN
BRHASPATI AND THE BARHASPATYAS
taspati and His Relation to Materialism

The first question to settle is: which Brhaspati? There are several Brhaspatis
in ancient Indian tradition. One is an author of an Arthaéastra (now lost, but
mentioned in KA 1.2.4), another is an author of a Dharmaéfistra (although
the full text is lost, a sizeable number of fragments is available), and there
is yet another Brhaspati mentioned in the Mbh, who was appointed by
Drupada, the king of Paficala, to teach NTti (polity) to his sons (Mbh,
Aranyakaparvan 33.56: nftim brhaspati—proktam). No, we are not going to
speak of any of them. We are concerned here with that Brhaspati whose
name is associated with the origin of materialist philosophy in India. One of
the many names for materialism in Sanskrit is Bfirhaspatya (mata), the
Earhaspatya view. The word is a derivative of Brhaspati, who is generally
represented as the preceptor of the gods, devaguru. The namesakes of
Brhaspati are also used to denote the same person (there are no fewer than
29 names of Brhaspati, according to the Sanskrit lexicon, Sabdakalpadmma,
SJ}. brhaspati). In PPu, Uttara-khanda, 236.5 (Vangavasi ed. = Anandashram
ed. 263.69) he is called Dhisana; Krsnamisra in his allegorical play, PC,
calls him Vacaspati (Act II, 40); Sriharsa in his philosophical treatise,
KhKhKh, 15 and Jayaras’i in his polemical work, TUS, 125, call him
Suraguru, the preceptor of the gods. How could such a pillar of the
Establishment be the founder of a heretical doctrine like materialism? He
should surely be on the side of the gods, not of the demons. The question
struck F. Max Muller too, but the stories in the MaiUp and other sources
(see below) convinced him that the divine chaplain preached materialism
only in order to delude the demons (1899/1971, 96). Yet, in some of the
Purfinic accounts (but by no means all), Brhaspati and the demons are shown
together. Thereby hangs a tale. Let us follow the trail as found in the Purfinas
and other sources, all respectable and brahmanical in origin and 1pm facto
eminently orthodox and conformist in all respects.
198 Chapter Nineteen
The View of the Demons, asura-mata

Before going to that story, let us have an ‘aside’. Sankara and following him
some other non—dualist Vedantins, such as Amandagiri, Dhanapati,
Nflakantha, Madhusudana, Sfidhara and Hanum at, gloss ‘the view of the
demons” (asuras) mentioned in Gite—z 7.8 as those of the Lokayatikas.
Lokayata is one of the several names for materialism (for other names see
above Chap. Three, 41—48). Sankara’s identification prompted SN.
Dasgupta to search for the origin of the asuras. He discovered them in
Sumer: ‘We thus know that the lokdyata views were very old, probably as
early as the Vedas or still earlier, being current among the Sumerian people
of pre—Aryan times’ (1940/1975, vol. 3, 531). G. Tucci, on the other hand,
refused to endorse this View (1925, 40). Debiprasad Chattopadhyaya, though
not agreeing with Dasgupta, entitles the first chapter of his Loka'yata,
‘Asura-view’ (1959, 14). KC. Chattopadhyaya criticized Dasgupta quite
harshly for offering such a View (1975, 153-154 n42). He also notes that
‘D.P. Chattopadhyaya has been misled by Prof. Dasgupta in his Loka'yata
and he has assumed that the Lokc‘ryata system was the philosophy of the
Asura people’ (ibid. 154 n42). However, Dasgupta’ s conclusion is so absurd
on the face of it that it does notmerit any discussion (For further details, see
below Chap. Twenty, 240-244).
To resume the original narrative: What made Sankara associate
Lokfiyata with the asuras, which no other commentator on the Gita, except
the non-dualist Vedantins, does? The answer can be found by following the
story of the deception of the demons occurring in the Upanisads and more
particularly in the Purinas.
Brhaspati and lSlukra: Two Rival Gums

The association of materialism with the demons is first found in Mai Up 7.9:
Brihaspati, having become §ulcra, created this false knowledge for the
security of Indra, and the ruin of the Asuras. Through it they point to what
is auspicious as being inauspicious, and say that one must ponder the
injurious character of the scriptures like the Veda etc. Hence one must not
learn that knowledge, else it is like a barren woman: its fruit is near
concupiscence; even one who has fallen away from his proper conduct must
not embrace it.
Thus the text says: “Widely opposed and differently directed are what
are known as knowledge and ignorance . . . ” (Van Buitenen’s trans.)
Brhaspati and the Barhaspatyas 199
The alliance of Indra with Brhaspati may even be traced back to RV,
8.96.15. Indra with Brhaspati as his ally is praised for having overcome the
godless people. The similarity between the Rv passage and the MaiUp one,
however, may also be purely fortuitous.
Two Stories in the Matsya Purina

In the MatPu there are two accounts involvingIndra, Brhaspati and the sons
of Raji, collectively called the Raj eyas (Chaps. 24 and 47). The Rajeyas had
grown so powerful as to usurp the power of Indra, the king of the gods. In
order to assist Indra, Brhaspati performs a sacrifice called Paistika and
deludes the Rajeyas with jina-dharma, the Jain religion. Once they were
alienated from the Veda and dharma as also got addicted to rationalism
(hetuvc‘zda, 2424-48), Indra overcame them with his thunder:
gatvdtha mohayamésa rajiiputrdn brhaspatih |

jinadharmam samasthaya vedabahyam sa vedavz't ||
vedatrqyfparibhmsgdmé cakdm dhisahddhipah |
vedabdhyfinpary'fiéya hetuvadasamanvitan I] MatPu 2447-48
In the second account we are told that Indra himself sends his daughter,
Jayanfi to Sukra and directs Brhaspati to the demons (47.183). No details of
what Brhaspati taught the demons are stated. We only learn that §ukra
cursed the demons and left them (47.204).
The two stories are variations of the original story found in the HV (see
below). The setup is the same: the only difference is that one has the
demons, the other, the Re'tjeyas. Otherwise, the theme of delusion by means
of a non-Vedic religious doctrine is common to both.
The Yogavasistha and the Matsya Purina

In the Yogavfisisfha Ramayana (Y0 V), Uttarabhaga Chap. 101, too, there is a
reference to the followers of Brhaspati who claimed that the Other World does
not exist (na viajzate para Joke bérhaspatyasya yasyatu, 101.3). Ananda
Bodhendra Sarasvafi, a commentator on the Y0V, apparently knew nothing
about materialism. He explains Barhaspatyas as the followers of the
buddhas’éstm (scripture of the Buddha, i.e. the canonical work of the
Buddhists) written by Brhaspati (bdrhaspag/asya brhaspati—pmnita—buddha—
idswa'nusdrinah). He also mentioned the doctrine of mom entariness of
consciousness and referred to the accounts in the MatPu and other sources
in which Brhaspati is said to have written a buddhas’dstm in order to delude
both the sons of Raji and the demons (rajfivutrfinfim-mum‘ndfim

vimohandya brhaspatinfi buddhas’c'tstmm pram'tam itr' matsyapurdnddau
pmsiddham, note on 101.3). Apparently the commentator, who pompously
entitledhis work as Vasisg‘ha-mahc'zrc‘zmdyam-tamarya-prakasa, was deficient
both in philosophy and Puranic studies. However, the MotPu 24.47 refers
to the Jain doctrine, not the Buddhist.1
0th er Puffinic Sources

The story is narrated more elaborately inPPu, Srstikhanda, Chap. 13, with
both Brhaspati and Sukra present. While the MaiUp story (7.8-9) starts and
stops abruptly — we are not told the reason that made Brhaspati assume the
form of Sukra and why Indra had to be given security — the PPu provides
the backdrop. It borrows another story from the War (3.18), although there
is neither Brhaspati nor Sukra in it. But Indra’ s insecurity is duly explained
The VPu story runs as follows: The demons had defeated the gods in
war. The gods decided to seek the assistance of Hari (Visnu). Hari created
a creature called Mayamoha (illusion-cum-delusion personified). This
allegorical character, first assuming the form of a Jain monk and then that
of a Buddhist mendicant, misled the demons by speaking against the Vedic
religion which is based on sacrifice (yajfia) involving slaughter of animals.
He urged them to follow the path of reason rather than accepting verbal
testimony (c‘zptavc‘zda). This kind of instruction made the demons stray from
the path of merit (dharma). Prior to that, they too were as much Veda-
abiding and seeker for freedom (mafia) as the gods. Thus they got
weakened, and the gods then could overcome them quite easily.The gods,
by defeating the demons in a battle, got back the right of receiving oblations
from the mortals on earth, which the demons had previousl usurped.
The PPu story says that Brihaspati, taking advantage of ukra’s absence,
disguised him self as Sukra and appeared before the demons. He taught them
all kinds of anti-Vedic views, decrying non—vegetarian diet, performance of
sacrifices and rites for the ancestors (srfiddha), and indulgence in coitus.
The gods and the brahmanas, they were told, also drink wine and eat flesh.
Hence, the religion adopted by them cannot contribute to the attainment of
heaven and/or freedom. Instigated by the Jain and Buddhist preachers
1 MaiUp 7.8, however, specificallyrefers to nairdtmyavdda, the doctrine of no-soul,

which, as the commentary says and almost all scholars agree, refers to Buddhism.
See the commentary onMaz‘Up, Cowell 1935, 206-207, also van Buitenen 1962, 153
n127.
Brhaspati and the Barhaspatyas 20 1
(Illusion incarnate, Mayamaya Purusa in disguise), the demons started

questioning the validity of performing Vedic rites.
This part of the story in the PPu is almost wholly taken from VPu 3.18
with some significant variations. For one thing, it makes use of the rivalry
between the two preceptors, Brhaspati and Sukra; they openly quarrel with
each other, whereas neither Brhaspati nor Sukra appears in the Wu. The
teachings of the Jain and the Buddhist monks are less elaborately stated in
the VPu than in the PPu.
The PPM story is highly intriguing for another reason. Sukra was away
from the demons. During his absence, Brhaspati appears to them in the guise
of Sukra. Sukra comes back after sometime and challenges Brhaspati. The
demons are at a loss to decide who the real Sukra is, since both look alike
and each of them claims to be so. Brhaspati then taunts Sukra:
There are thieves in the world who steal others’ goods.
But such an object as a stealer of the form and the body (of another person)
is not seen.
When Indra was guilty of the lapse of killing a brahrnana by slaying Vrtra
[a demon], it was you who absolved him of that (lapse) by the help o f the
science (s’cistm) of Lokayatika.
santi conihprthivydm ye paradmvycipahérinah |

evamvia'hd mi! drsrcis’ca rfipadehfipahfirinah [I
vrtraghfitena cendrasya brahmahatydpurébhavat |
lokc‘ryatikaééstrena bhavatfi sci tiraskrtfi || (PPM, Srstikhanda 13. 291-92)
To the best of my knowledge, no such achievement of Brhaspati in

exculpating Indra from his lapse of killing a brahmana (Vrtra) is to be found
anywhere in the whole corpus of Sanskrit literature, excepting the PPu,

Srstikhanda. It is also not clear how and why Lokayatika-éastra could be of
any use in making a person free from any lapse. No religious law-book
(Dhannas’astra/Smrti) contains such a provision. Does Lokayatika-s’astra in
this context mean anything other than materialism or a text of disputation
(disputatio), a sense found in Pali and Buddhist Sanskrit works (for details,
see R. Bhattacharya 2009/2011, 187-196)?
The Evidence of the Devi-bhfigavata (Mahi)Pural_1a

In between the VPu and the PPu there is Devi-bhdgavata (Mahd)Purdna
(DBhPu), 4.13-15 which too has been utilised in the PPu (see Hazra
1940/1987, 25). Indra, after losing his kingdom, tells Brhaspati what he
should do to help him. The preceptor of the gods then assumes the form of
Sukra and preaches the Iain religion to the demons. The original éukra
appears and challenges Brhaspati in his disguise. Faced by two Sukras, the
demons are at first perplexed, but ultimately opt for the pretender rather than
their true guru. Sukra in rage leaves the dem ons, his yajamc'mas. Brhaspati’s
mission is over, for he has been able to alienate the demons from éukra.2
Two later Puranas, .Sliva Parana (.Sqi'vaPu), Rudra-sarnhita, Yuddha—
kinda, Chaps. 1-5, and Lifiga Parana (LifigaPu), Part 1, Chap. 71, too have
this motif of delusion (moha). The same motif is retained in order to
accommodate the original story of the rivalry between the two gurus. These
two Purfinas, however, offer slightly different versions of the same tale.
Brhaspati in all these later texts plays a vital role in convincing the demons
to deviate from the Vedic path. It is to be noted that although Mayamoha
preached not only Jain and Buddhist views but also the views of all other
heretics, pagandas (see VPu 3.18.21), only the Jain and the Buddhist
doctrines are highlighted.
In the PPu, the change of roles (Brhaspati appearing as Sukra and
deluding the demons), as stated in the MaiUp before, is reintroduced.
Brhaspati also appears in other Puranas (see Appendix 1 below). But in the
stories relating to the deception of the demons, he is not present invariably
in all versions (See above Chap. Eighteen passim). Sometimes he is invoked
to delude the demons (as inMatPu 24.47-48), sometimes others do it instead
of him (as in the S'i'vaPu and LifigaPu, in which a Iain sage (muni) called
Mayapurusa (Illusion-person) created by Visnu deludes the demons. Cf.
Mayamoha in VIPu 3.17.41).
The Harivamsa: the Rfijeyas in Place of the Demons

The earliest source for the tale of Brhaspati in relation to the conflict
between Indra and the sons of Raji as well as the war between the gods and
the demons, however, is not the Pure—mas, but the Khila Harivamsa.
Although the work has been reshaped as a Purina (which originally it was
not) and several hundred lines have been added, it is still one of the earliest
sources for locating Brhaspati as the deluder. In a passage of the HV
2 The story contains several instances of unconscious humour. For example, éulcra
laments that the guru of all gods and the author of a Dharmasastra, whose words are
accepted as authoritative, could stoop so low as to adopt the doctrine of the
pagandas, and submitting to greed, turned out to be a heretical savant (paganda-
pandz'ta). How can the people then make him an dcdrjya? Suha finther laments:
‘Brhaspati, the best of the brahmanas, is deceiving my stupid yajamdnas (sc. the
demons) by assuming another dress like an actor!’ (1359-62).
(Harivams’a Parvan crit. ed. Chap. 21', vul. Chap. 28), Brhaspati, at the
request of Indra, sets out to defeat the Rajeyas who had usurped Indra’s
power. In order to restore the kingdom of the earth to Indra, Brhaspati first
performs a sacrifice to weaken the Rajeyas and thereby he succeeds in
reinstating Indra to his former glory. In an additional passage (327*, after
21.34), however, Brhaspati also writes a book on Arthas’astra (book of
polity) containing the nastika view. It was highly prejudiced against
dharma, and full of anti-vedic teachings (nastivadarthasasaam hi
dhannavidvesanam param, line 1). The Rajeyas were taken in by it. They
deviated from the path of virtue, and consequently were ousted from power
by Indra.
The story of king Vena/Vena is found in the HV, Harivamsa-parvan, Chap.5

and also in several Puranas (for details, see Appendix B below). This king
in his overbearing pride orders his subjects not to follow those instructions
that are prescribed in the scriptures. He used to declare, ‘Do not perform
sacrifices, do not pay homage to the gods and do not donate for religious
purposes’ (H VHarivams’a—parvan Chap. 5. 6-7). The sages tried to dissuade
him but could not succeed. Hence, he had to be done away with.
Interestingly enough, there is no reference to any book composed by
Brhaspati (as interpolated in the additional passage 327* in the HV,
Harivams’a—parvan, Chap. 5) or any doctrine, such as Jainism or Buddhism
(as in the Wu and the PPu, discussed above), nor any reference to logic or
sophistry (as in the MatPu): Vena apparently made up his doctrine all by
himself. No mention is made ofBrhaspati in theHV, Chap.21 (crit. ed.) or
in any of the Purinas that contain the tale of Vena Only in the VDMPu the
word Zokc'zyata occurs twice:
[Vena] always indulged in unholy scriptures, and was a well-know

Lokayatika. He issued orders that were ineligious.

[The sages said:]
You should not flout the rules establishedby your ancestors and obeyed by
your forefathers by following Lokayatika sayings.3
asacchasfiarato nityam lokéyatikasattwnah |

cakfira lake marydddm dharmabdhyo narddhipah ||108.6||
[WW mull]
3 The available English translation of this Purina by P. Shah (2000-2002) uses such
words as ‘materialist (follower of carvaka [sic])’ and ‘Carvak’s (sic) preachings’
(vol. I, 214), although there are no such words in the original.
pfirvapmvrttfim maryfiddm pfirvaihpflrvatamih krtfim I

lokayatika-véigzena nu tvam hantumihfirhasi “108.8“
Three Sources for the Accounts ofAnti-vedic Views

By far, we have come across three stories that speak of the anti-/non-Vedic
views (but not materialism, only the Jain and the Buddhist religious credos,
not the Jain and the Buddhistphilosophies). All of them are recorded by the
authors of the Puranas that are brahmanical in origin and considered
canonical by all devout Hindus. The stories are:
First, the gods and the demons engaged in an eternal war with the
outcome of the battles continuously oscillating from one to the other party.
Second, the story of Raji and his sons as found in two versions. They
were either duped by Brhaspati (as in MatPu 24.47) and/or by some god-
created being who preached anti-Vedic doctrine/s to them and led them
astray from the Vedic path (as in MatPu 2444-48 and duParana 92.87-
99). It is for all practical purposes the same as the first, with the demons
replacing the Rajeyas (see Appendix 1 below).
Third, the story of Vena as found in two versions. In one version (HV,
Harivarns’a—parvan, Chap. 5, both crit. ed. and vul.), king Vena proclaims
himself superior to all brahmanical gods, sacrificial rites, etc. That is how
he staked his claim to receive all forms of oblations. In one version he is
said to have performed the most heinous lapse: he encouraged mixture of
castes, vama-sankara (SivaPu, Vangavasi ed. 52.3-4. For further details
concerning Vena see Vidyalankara 1:1081-87). All this infuriated the sages
who finally assassinated him. No supernatural aid was required. The sages
did so by trampling him under their feet (or by some other means, such as,
by yelling a mighty roar, as in the account given in Bhagavata Parana
4.14.34). So it was Vena’s hybris (insolence) that brought about his
downfall; Brhaspati’s aid was not required. The sages were competent
enough to deal with him. No Indra or Brhaspati was found necessary.
Only the account in the VDMPu, as shown above, contains the name
Lokayata, which may very well be a later addition, as is the composition of
a non-vedic Arthas’astra by Brhaspati in the HV (see above). However, the
VDMPu does not mention Brhaspati even once. In any case, Vena was an
autodidact; he did not need anyone to misguide him.
Let us now analyse the three sources one by one.
In the first instance, the battle against the demons necessitated the
creation of one, or more than one, anti-Vedic religion. They require either
the help of Brhaspati or the intervention of Illusion (ma‘zyc‘tpurusa) or
Illusion-cum-Delusion personified (méyfi-moha). However, as has been
noted above, Brhaspati is not present invariably in all the stories. It is only
in the HV, the MatPu (one version) and the Dtu that Brhaspati appears
all alone to practise deception. There is no mention of materialism by any
of its many names, such as, Lokayata or bhritavada (both occurring in the
Manime'kalai, a Tamil epic composed in the sixth century CE) or Carvaka-
mata, etc. (see Chap. Three above, 41-48) whatsoever in the texts that
mention Brhaspati. The antagonist is mostly jina—dharma, the religion of
Jina (Mahavira), and sometimes Buddhism, another anti-Vedic religion, or
both. These two non-Vedic religions were highly critical of animal sacrifice
in the rites for the ancestors (s’raddha) and in sacrificial rites (yajfia), and
found fault with drinking wine in the Sautramani sacrifice (for details see
above Chap. Eighteen, 195, Appendices A and B). It has been shown that
the objection has its origin in the religious standpoint of the Jains and the
Buddhists, the doctrine of non-injury (ahimsa) being their chief article of
faith. It has got nothing to do with materialism as such.
The Upshot (I)

To sum up then: in the two stories that have so long been fancied to have
mentioned Brhaspati (VPu 3.18 and PPu Srstikhanda, Chap. 13), he has no
role to play as the preacher 0f materialism. In fact, as the stories g0,
Buddhism, Jainism and other heretical doctrines appear to be pre-existing.
The creature made by Visnu merely makes use of them: he is not shown to
be their progenitor. The demons, instigated by a Jain and/or a Buddhist
monk and other heretics (pagandins), speak out against the Vedic religion,
but not against religion as such, since they too were desirous of freedom
(mukti) and they preferred the alternatives to the vedic way, that’s all. In any
case, materialism is nowhere to be found in what Mayamoha preaches or
what the demons tell one another in the War and the PPu accounts.
Notwithstanding this role of Brhaspati, as related to Jainism/Buddhism,

it is Brhaspati alone who is proclaimed to be the aciriyar (Sanskrit acarya,
master, founder) of the Lokayata system in the Tamil epic, Manimékalai
(27.80). But here he is on a par with Kapila, Kanada and other human
originators of the rest of the five philosophical systems. This Brhaspati is
not identified with ‘bhagavan Suraguru,’ as Sriharsa (KhKhKh 15) and
Jayaras'i (TUS, 125) do. Similarly in the PPM Uttara-khanda (Vangavasi ed.
236.2—5 = Anandashrama ed. 26366-69), he is treated as much as a human
being, trailing no cloud of glory from the world of the gods:
Goddess! Let me tell you the names o f the dark (tamasa) sastras, listen to
me. The very remembrance of these deludes even the cognizant ones. At first
I speak of the Saiva sfistras, such as the Pasupatas and others. Then listento
the Brahmana, Who being enthralled by my power preached the following
sfistras. Kanada spoke o f the great doctrine o f Vaisesika; similarly Gautama
spoke of Nyaya, Kapila of Samkhya, and Dhisana [Brhaspati] of the highly
reprehensible Cirvfika view (dhfsanena tathdpmktcim cdrvfikam atigarhitam).
We shall see that the same is true of the PC and the NC (see below). This
gradual degeneration of Brhaspati from the status of the preeeptor of the
gods to an ordinary hum an who could always be eulogized but never to be
worshipped as a god is worth noting.4
Taking leave of the Purinas, let us now turn to secular works and see the
role that Brhaspati is made to play in them.
Part 2: Vacaspati in the Prabodhacandrodaya

In Krsnamisra’s allegorical play, the PC, Act 2, Vacaspati (another name of
Brhaspati) is not represented as the progenitor of the materialist system. He
is merely the author of the science (s’astm) of a doctrine thatpre—existed(see
below) among the forces of the evil. King Maharnoha (Great Delusion)
declares,
This science was composed by Vacaspati who followed our view and he has
givenit to Carvaka. This science is popularizedin the world byhirn through
his disciples and their disciples. (Act 2, Ci 345. Trans. by S.K. Nambiar,
modified in C/L. Emphasis added.)
tad etadasmadabhiprc‘qyfinubandhinfi vdcaspatinfi pranfya cfirvfikfiya

samarpz'taml
term on sis‘yopas‘isya-dvérenésmimlloke bahulfkrmm tantrum” (Act 2', 40)
Vacaspati/Brhaspati here no longer belongs to the side of the gods; he

does not produce this science to help Indra in particular and the gods in
general to regain their former glory. He is now under the power of the Prince
of Evils and works as per his instruction. Vacaspati thus recedes into the
background. It is Carvaka who, along with Kali (personification of the Iron
Age), now appears, very much like a Principal of a school, or rather an
4Jonardan Ganeri admits that the date of Brhaspati is ‘unknown’ (2011, 703), but in
the Appendix to his paper it is stated that ‘ [t]he first knownreference to Brhaspati is
from the sixth century. . . . It is reasonable to speculate, therefore, that Brhaspati is
no later than 200 CE’ (2011, 703 n32). Whatever be the merit of this dating, it
assumes that Brhaspati is a human, not a god or demi-god who existed from times
immemorial.
instructor in a hermitage (dimmer). He has his own disciples, as any

Samkhya or Nyaya or Vedanta guru would have. The purpose of
Mahamoha, it is to be noted, is not to delude the gods, but to corrupt the
humans on earth. Carvaka here is shown to be wholly subservient to
Mahamoha, who calls him (Carvaka) his ‘dear friend’. Carvaka approaches
him and says:
Carvéka: So this is king Mahamoha! (going near him) May the king be
victorious! I salute you.
Mahdmoha: Welcome, Carvaka, be seated here.
Carvaka (sits): Kali prostrates before you
Mahfimoha: Ah! Kali, unimpaired blessings be upon you!
Cdrwika: By your grace all is well. He has accomplished everything
(ordered by you) and wishes to (worship at) your feet. For —
Afier receiving the great command (fiom you) and having accomplished it
by destroying his enemies, he is now happy and delighted, and with his great
joy feels blessed and prostrates himself at the lotus feet of the Lord! (Act 2
verse 24.) 5
But there is a problem. Hearing Carvaka’s words Mahamoha says:
Mahdmoha: And what has that Kali achieved?

Cdrvdka: Lord, he caused the virtuous to forsake the path shown by the
Vedas and act according to their own wish. It is thy glory, my Lord — neither
mine nor Kali’s (tadatra hetuma cfipyaham) — for this achievement. (Act 2
verse 25)
The people of the north and west have forsaken the three Vedas, not to speak
of tranquillity and self-restraint. In other places too, the three Vedas exist
only as a means of livelihood. (C/L 347)
Carvaka and Kali thus become two separate entities, their activities, too,
are in different regions of India. A few lines before this, they seem to have
been presented as one and the same person! To add to this confusion,
Carvaka is made to quote a verse, presumably composed by Brhaspati,
whom Carvfika calls the c‘zcc'nya (master):
5This is the second verse attributed to Brhaspati in SDS, 5.50-51, 13.112-113. The
verse occurs with variants in several other sources. See R Bhattacharya 2009/2011,
84, 91. Some other verses occuninginPC, Act 2 are also foundinthe SDS and other
sources. See R. Bhattacharya 2009/2011, 84 $1.2 =PC, 2.26; SL3 =PC, 2.20; $1.4
=PC, 2.21.
The Acarya [Brhaspati] has said:
‘Oblations in the fire, the three Vedas, the carrying o f three staves tied
together, and smearing of oneself with ashes — all these are the means of
livelihood of those who are devoid of intelligence and manljness.’ (Act 2
verse 26; C/L 347)
Afier quoting the verse Garvaka adds:
Those in Kuruksetra and other places, my Lord, need not fear the birth of
Knowledge and Spiritual Awakening, even in a dream.
To which Mahamoha replies:
Well done. That great holy place is rendered useless. (C/L 347)
So far as the PC is concerned, Brhaspati has become thoroughly

hum anised, having no association with the gods or the demons either. He is
not required to deceive either the demons or the Raj eyas. Now he has got a
new associate: Kali (or he is Kali himself).
Kali in the Naisadhacarita

Sriharsa in his NC Canto 17 provides an account of the charges made against
the gods by a materialist and the counter-charges brought against him by the
gods. However, Sriharsa dispenses with Brhaspati altogether. The charges
against the gods are first brought by an anonymous member of Kali’s army
(NC 17.36). When the gods had made their reply in defence, the accuser
appears before the gods and humbly admits:
Ye gods, 1 am not guilty, 1 am subject to others, I am a. panegyiist of Kali.

My tongue (lit. mouth) is fluent in flattering him. (17.108. Transby K.K.
Handiqui (1956), slightly modified).
No sooner had he said this than Kali himself steps out and starts
denouncing the gods (17112-39). It is now his turn to speak of materialism
and condemn the gods, the Vedas, and the fistika philosophical systems such
as Mime—111155, non-dualist Vedanta and Nyaya. Neither Carvaka nor
Mahamoha, nor even Brhaspati, has any role to play in this narrative.6
6 K.K. Handiqui in his English translation of the NC has quite illegitimately

introduced the name Carvaka (1956, 17.92, 95) while the text has no such word. On
the other hand, he renders Lokayata as ‘heretic’ (1956, 17.97) where the word has
Importance of Brhaspati
Our interest in Brhaspati is not prompted by idle curiosity. The brahm anical
authors would not permit the demons or the Rajeyes to formulate their own
anti-Vedic views; Brhaspati or Mayamoha or some other creature like
Mayapurusa fashioned by some god is required to preach to them and
convert them to one or the other of the non—Vedic doctrines. Only in the
case of king Vena/Vena no such supernatural aid is required (in all but one
source. See Appendix B below). The reason is evident: the nfistika—éfistm
(heretical science) is to be understood as a product specially manufactured
with the express purpose of deluding the demons, or any other force opposed
to the gods, such as the Rajeyas. This nastika-s'dstm is not to be taken as a
proper philosophical doctrine at all; it comprises all anti-Vedic views rolled
into one.
Second, it is to be noticed that the term nastika-sfisWa does not
necessarily mean materialism; the Buddhists, and more particularly, the
Jains were always included in the ambit of nfistikas when the name is used
by brahmanical authors. The mythographers, as in Greece and Rome so in
India, loved to give free rein to their fancy', a consistent account either of
events or of doctrines is rarely found — nor is it to be expected — in the
Puranic tales. It is the Jain view that is mostly mentioned and reviled in the
Purinas. R.N. Dandekar has rightly observed that the authors of the Pure—mas
knew more of the Jains than the Buddhists (as their main enemy) and their
knowledge of materialism and its adherents was extremely vague (1993,
752). Som etim es the materialist doctrine is attributed to the Buddhists or the
Jains, simply because the authors of the Puranas were more interested in
defending brahm anism as a religious dogma, not as any pro-Vedic
philosophy. Their interest in and knowledge of different philosophical
schools, whether orthodox or heterodox, appear to be minimal, almost non-
existent. Ganesh Thite has recently shown that the Serums, rhapsodes of
itihc‘tsa—purc'ma (legendary history), were practically ignorant of Vedic rites
and sacrifices; their ignorance, rather than their knowledge, is revealed in
different recensions of the Ram and the Mbh. Thite writes:
Much of these epics were transmitted from generation to generation by the

wandering bards, monks and public narrators, some of whom may be semi-
learned brahmanas. In any case these people cannot be said to be
academicians or scholarly people (2014, 418).
been employed as a proper name, and should have been retained in translation. See
above Chap. Nine.
The same rem ark applies equally to the redactors of the Puranas. They
knew practically nothing about the three main heterodox philosophical
systems. It would hold true for some commentators (like the commentator
on the YOV mentioned above) and the like.7 So far as the Puranas are
concerned, total emphasis is laid (besides fabricating new fantastic stories)
on religion; philosophy was merely a side issue. Opposition to Buddhism
and Jainism was exclusively religious in nature; philosophy, whether
anelrc‘zntavc‘zda, or vijfic‘mavc‘zda meant nothing to the redactors of the WM
although these two vc‘zdas are mentioned in VPM 3.18.10, 16. They knew
only the rudiments, or more probably merely the names of the heretical
doctrines, that’s all. The stories in the Wu and the PPu concerning the
deception of the demons bear clear testimony to this. The preacher of
anekfintavdda appears as a naked monk (Digambara) and that of
vijfidnavdda as one wearing a blood-red robe, the typical dress of a Buddhist
mendicant. Add to this the fact that, besides the Buddhist and the Jain,
Mayamoha in the VPu also converted the rest of the demons by preaching
other heretical doctrines (anyc‘mapyanya-pc'zsanda-prakc'zrair-bahubhih,
VPn 3.18.21), which again appear to have already existed in full-fledged
form. The poisondas do not represent any philosophical doctrine; they
collectively constitute a combination of the non-Vedic religious cults, so
graphically described in the MaiUp 7.8.
MaiUp 7.8 is the first source for the study of heresiology in India. The
Purénas too contain many such passages, making the unclothed (digambara)
Jains appear as the arch enemy of the Vedas. More interesting, however, is
the long list of diverse religious communities, no fewer than forty six
enumerated by Siddharsi in his UBhPK (906 CE). There are such strange
names as Uktamda, Ulka, Khumkhukha (Khumkhuka), Cuficuna,
Paksapaksa, Vidyuddanta and the like (1901-14, 1-21, 547-548; see also
Jacobi’s Preface, xxvii-xxxv). Unfortunately most of these heretical sects
are now difficult, if not impossible, to identify. The list incidentally

mentions the Kalamukhas the Kapalikas and the Lokayatas (1901-14, 547).
According to Siddharsi, the towns dwelt by Bhavacakras, Naiyayikas,
Vais’esikas, Bauddhas and Miniamsakas have the same names, those of
Lokfiyatas are called Bfirhaspatyas (lokc'iyatam itiprokmmpuramatra lathe—t
pamm | barhaspagzc‘zéca te lokc'i ye vastavyc‘tlz pure ’tm bhoh ll 1901-14,
7 Ciranjiva Bhattacaryya Sarman (eighteenth century) makes similar ludicrous

mistakes in his Vidvan-moda-taranginz" campfi. He confuses between the Carvaka
and the Jaina doctrines. There is an English translation of the work by Kalikrishna
Deb Bahadur (1832), entitled Fountains of pleasure to the learned. It is mentioned
in Rev. James Long’s Catalogue, 1990 reprint, Part 2, 32 and Parisista-Kha 121.
661). Why this special provision is made for the Lokayalas is a matter of
conjecture; nothing definite is known about it.
In any case, if Mai Up 7.8 is the locus classicus of heresiology,
Siddharsi’s works is an elaboration of the list of heretics by a Jain guru. In
both cases, the heretics belong both to the Great Tradition and the Little
Tradition.
Philosophy vis-c‘t-vis Religion

Objections to materialism on religious grounds were thus brought into the
domain of philosophy with the well-known distinction made between the
c'zstika and the nastika schools. The distinction was for all intents and
purposes religious, not at all philosophical. Cf. mohitfis tat yajuh sarvfim
trayz'mfirgc‘zs'ritam kathc‘tml kecid vinindfim vedfinfim devfinc‘tm aparedvyja /
yajfia—kama—kalfipasya tathc‘mye ca dwjanmanfimll VPu 3.18.220d-23, all
referring to the three Vedas, the (Vedic) gods, the sacrificial rites and the
twice-born. These are the four props of brahmanical religion. Once the
concept of nastikya was introduced to the domain of philosophy, it could
only reiterate purely religious objections — whether nastika means a denier
of the Other World or of the authority of the Veda or any other idea inimical
to orthodoxy (for instance, whether matter or consciousness appears first, as
found in BrhadUp 4.5.13 (opponent’s View) and its rejection in 4.5.14).
Such a distinction is not to be found in the list of the Six Systems based on
argument (say-tarkz‘).8 Despite the difference in the lists of names — some
include Mimarnsé, some do not - the c‘zstika and the nc‘zstika systems rub
shoulders with one another apparently without any concern, paying no
attention either to the Other World or to the Veda.
BrhaspatiH umanized
Brhaspati, as we know from the Tamil epic Manimékalai, was long ago
accepted as the original teacher (dofirya) of the Lokayata school:
These are the systems that accept logic:

Lokayata, Buddhism, the Sankhya.
Nyaya, Vaisesika, and Mimamsa.
8 For a detailed discussion of sap-tarkf, see Gerdi Gerschhiemer 2007, 239-248.

Incidentally Siddharsi, too, speaks of the followers o f six philosophical systems,
namely, Bhavacalcras, Naiyayikas, Vaiéesikas, Bauddhas, Mimamsakas and
Lokayatas (Upomiti 1901-14, 661).
The teachers o f these six: Brihaspati,

Buddha, Kapila and Akshapada,
Kanada and Jaimini. At present
The six systems of logic in use are
Through perception, inference, the Shastras,
Analogy, presumption and negation.
(27.78-85. Trans. Prema Nandakurnar)
What is to be noted is that Brhaspati is presented here as a human being,

very much like the Buddha, Kapila, Kant—Mia, and others. Brhaspati is just a
founder of a philosophical system, based on logic. There is no motive of
deluding anybody, whether the demons or the sons of Raji. Lokayata is a
positive system of philosophy, very much like Nyaya, Vais’esika, and
others.g
We come across the name Barhaspatya as a synonym for the
Carvfika/Lokayata and Nastika at least from the eighth century CE. The
Buddhists and the Jains too used this name to designate the materialists
along with the other name, Nastika. This term meant only the materialists
to them, whereas it included them in the vocabulary of the brahmanical
philosophers and, more importantly, law-m akers. However, as we have
seen, Brhaspati does not play his role as the deluder of the demons or of
other hum an enemies of the gods in all the Puranic accounts.
There is little room for doubt that materialism in its different
manifestations is not invariably connected with Brhaspati. In the Buddhist
tradition, for example, Ajita and Payasi were considered competent enough
to formulate their materialist ontology without being duped by any divine
or semi-divine being. It is the same with the Jain tradition in which king
Paesi appears as an independent agent preaching materialist ontology,
denying any life beyond this life. It is only in the brahm anical tradition that
materialism is projected right from the outset (even before the basics of the
doctrine is stated) as a false doctrine manufactured by Brhaspati in order to
delude the demons or the sons of Raji. The purpose was to ensure the safety
of the gods and enable them to have their due share of the sacrifices.
9 The omission of Jainism or the doctrine of pluralism (anekfintavfida) and

probabilism (syfldvflda) in the list given in the Manimékalai is significant but not
inexplicable. This is the first instance of sar-tarkf. Another enumeration is later
found in the work o f Iayantabhatta (NM, Chap. 1, 9: Samkhya, Arhata, Buddhist,
Carvaka, Nyaya and Vaisesika). The second, third and fourth are nastika systems;
others, Listika. Rajasekhara (Chap. 2, 191) follows another schema, which too
includes Jainism.
RC. Hazra noted long back: ‘In order to wam the people against
violating the rules of the Varnis'rama dharma numerous stories have been
fabricated to show the result of violation’ (1940/1987, 235). He refers to the
story of Raji, Vena and the demons mentioned above. ‘Besides these and
similar other stories, there are numerous chapters on the description of the
ages (yuga), on hells and on the results of actions’ (ibid.). The intention of
the redactors of the Puranas is crystal clear: to create fear in the minds of
listeners and dissuade them from following any of the current non-Vedic
religious doctrines.
The source of all this, of course, is MaiUp 7.8. After enumerating the
story of Brhaspati in disguise (quoted above), it quotes almost verbatim
from the KazhaUp and the fs’dUp. The reference to Katha 2.5 is obvious.
But what is not so obvious is the leap from the story of Brhaspati to the
discourse on viayd and aviafyd. However, this account was amplified in the
Purinas. The purpose was evidently to highlight the falsity of the non-Vedic
doctrines (Buddhism and Jainism in particular). Yet Brhaspati’s name got
associated with Lokayata (see Manime'kalai 27.78- 80) and later the Carvaka
(see TSP vol. 2, 520, ba‘zrhaspatyc‘rdayah), the philosophical system all
hum an in origin, untouched by any demi-god or any preternatural entity.
Whatever be the original function of the preceptor of the gods, we know
of him in relation to only one activity, namely, deluding the unsuspecting
demons either in the guise of Sukra (hinting at an old rivalry between the
two preceptors) or working in the background without assuming any
disguise (as in the Khz’la Harivams’a account, crit. ed, Harivams’a-parvan,
Chap. 21; vul. Chap. 28).
In the Purinas, however, the Iains in particular turn out to be the chief
target of attack. In the later part of VPu 3.18 the unclad one (nagna) assumes
a more generic character: whoever is bereft of the cloak (samvarana) of the
Veda, not the Iains alone, is branded as a nagna. There is another story
(most probably an interpolation), which reveals the gruesome effects of not

abiding by the rules of Dharmas'astra. The process of maligning all
heterodox communities must have started much earlier than the fifth
century, when the Wu was redacted. As Hazra observes: ‘The hatred
towards the Nagnas in Vayu 78.24, 79.25, the Iains and the Buddhists, as
also the occurrence of the Nirgrantha and Pasanda in chaps.78-79 suggests
the date: the end of second century AD.’ (1940/1987, 16). Brhaspati then
was merely incidental in the plan of condemning the non-believers in the
sanctity of the Veda and the Dharmasastras. In other words, religion rather
than philosophy was at issue.
21 4 Chapter Nineteen
Evidence from the Manimékalai

The association of Brhaspati with Lokfiyata is first found in the
Manimékalai (see above). It further speaks of another materialist doctrine
called bhfitavfida. A bhiitavfidin expounds his system to Princess
Manimékalai and tells her in which respect it differs from Lokayata (27.265-
276). In later times, when bhfitavfida is no longer recognized as a different
school of materialism (although in the Tamil epic, Lokayata and bhutavfida
are two distinct schools with some area of difference), Brhaspati lost the
stature of an acarya: he became just a name as attested by the PC. Like
Kanfida or Gautama, he is made to appear as quite a human figure, not as a
semi-divine teacher of a system of philosophy which is to be taken as it is,
not as an instrument of delusion. Brhaspati of this play carries no association
with the Purinic Brhaspati, the fabricator of a system meant to delude the
demons and the sons of Raji. Apparently Krsnamis’ra did not care to
remember the VPu story in which Mayamoha preached Jainism and
Buddhism, two anti-vedic religious systems, not any philosophical one.
Sriharsa preferred to identify the m aterialist with kali, the personification of
an eon (yuga) degenerating from the satya or hrta (the Golden Age).
Everything was proper and righteous in the first yuga: things started
degenerating in the treté and the dvfipam till it reached its nadir in the kali.
In the NC too, materialism is projected basically as an anti-religious system
and only partially as a philosophical one. The putative m aterialist harangues
against five items: 1. The sacrificial rites (yajfia) and fire sacrifice
(agnihotra), 2. Purity of caste (fatis’uddhi), 3. Gender discrimination, 4. The
concept of heaven and hell, and 5. Worship of gods (devapfijana). All these
are related to the brahm anical religion, both Vedic and Purénic.
The attitude towards the astika philosophical system 5 too is most evident
in Kali’s denunciation of Mimarnsa (NC 17.61) and more particularly of
Nyaya (Gautam a, aka Gotam a, the founder of this system, is called ‘the most
bovine’, go-tama, NC 17.75). In the Jain and Buddhist philosophical works,
as also in their religious texts, the philosophical aspects (epistemology,
ontology, etc.) of materialism are treated more seriously, without any
reference to its non— or anti-vedic character.
Intelligence of Brhaspati: Evidence from the Paficatantra

The intelligence of Brhaspati (and Sukra, also called Usanas) is proverbial.
We often come across one character or the other inthe Mbh being compared
With either of the two: yathc‘i buddhim brhaspatib, yathovécapure-I s’ukram
maha‘buddhir brhaspatih, brhaspatisamabuddhyd, all in reference to Bhisma.

Vidura is said to have excelled both Brhaspati and Sukra in intelligence.1°
In the Paficatantra we read:
Modesty (or shame), affection, cleamess of voice, discretion, goodness of

heart (or mental ease), vitality, passion, relationship with one’s kinsmen,
absence of pain, sports, discharge of religious duties, knowledge of the
.s‘cistms (or action in conformity with their precepts), a talent like that of
Sumguru (Erhaspaty, purity and the thought about (desire for) conforming
to the rules of conduct — all these proceed in the case of men when the pot
in the form of the belly is full of grain (i.e., when men are in affluent
circumstances). (1982, Book 5, tale 12, verse 91', 498)
lajifi snehah svamvis‘adatfi buddhayah saumanasyam

prdnonafigah svajanamamatd duhkhahdnirvildsdb |
dharmah ééstmm sumgurumatih faucamdcdmcintci
sasyaih pfirnejathampirhareprfinindm sambhavantill (Ibid., 253)
Here there is no question of non-conformism: the intelligent man is both

sierra-abiding and prosperous. It may be noted in this connection that the
boasting of Jayaras'ibhatta that he has out-Brhaspati—ed Brhaspati (1940,
125) alludes to this super-intelligent Brhaspati, not to the alleged founder of
the materialist system.
EW. Hopkins in a rare flash of humour says, ‘Brhaspati (the planet
Jupiter) is preceptor of the gods and gives them instruction orally, as well
as composes a geisha for them and others [meaning presumably the
demons], but otherwise he is remarkably inactive’ (1972, 181).11
Whatever might have been the original function of the preceptor of the
gods, we know of him in relation to only one activity, namely, deluding the
unsuspecting demons either in the guise of Sukra. or working in the
background without assuming any disguise (as in the Khfla Harivams'a

account).
10 Further examples would be found in Sc'irensen, s.v. ‘Brhaspati’ and ‘Cukra’. There
is a Bangla proverb, buddhi—te brhaspatz’, meaning a veritable Brhaspati in
intelligence, applied to any highly intelligent person (also employed satirically).
“ Cf. However, Kavya (Sukra) is credited with preparing an abridged version of an
encyclopedia of Niti, Dharma, etc. originally composed by Brahman and
successively abridgedby Siva, Indra andBrhaspati. Mbh, crit. ed. 12.85-91.
The Upshot (2)

The upshot of the preceding account is that the birth of materialism cannot
be ascribed to Brhaspati. There is no uniformity in the legends given in the
Puranas. Moreover, the story of Vena has no Brhaspati to delude him. He
became a Lokayatika all by himself (as in the VDMPu account but not in
any other source). The sons of Raji are sometimes said to be deluded by
Indra via Brhaspati (Vayu Parana) but in other accounts (for example, the
MatPu) they, like Vena, turned anti-vedic all by themselves. In any case,
right from the Manimékalai we find Brhaspati as totally anthropomorphic
as much as Kapila, Kanada or Jaimini. No halo of divinity, or even semi-
divinity, is found around his head. The basic theme — delusion of the demons
and the sons of Raji — is also conspicuously absent in the PC and the NC.
Materialism is as much a system of philosophy as the other five tarkas.
Materialism may not be a right kind of philosophy, acceptable to religious
orthodoxy, but there is no question of rejecting Lokayata as a philosophy
that is not to be taken seriously. Everyone speaking of sat-tank? mentions
materialism as a matter of fact, even though, like the Buddhist and the Iain
systems of philosophy, it is admitted to be outside the Vedic periphery.
In appropriate Attribution
Anantalal Thakur has acutely observed that no Buddhist, Jain or Carvaka is
known to have admitted himself to be a nfistflm (2015, 188): others called
them so. Similarly there are reasons to believe that the first and the last of
the four nam es given to the m aterialists in India, viz., Birhaspatya, Cari/aka,
Lokiyata and Nastika (AC 3525-527 and many other works; for details see
above Chap. Three, 41-48) were actually employed by the opponents of
materialism. The alleged Carvaka aphorism, ‘The aphorisms of Brhaspati
are everywhere merely for the sake of objections,’ sarvatm

paryanuyogoparc‘myeva Sam-mi brhaspateh, as also its variants (see R
Bhattacharya 2009/2011, 96-97, 106-107) is a case in point. Anantavirya
calls this sentence a sflkta, ‘a good or friendly speech, wise rem ark,’ not an
aphorism, sfitm (2009/2011, 277). The word sfltra is sometimes found used
rather loosely. For instance, Karnakagomin calls the first line of a verse,
vis’ege anugamfibhavc‘zt Same—mye siddhasc‘zdhanam (26) a 551m, which most
certainly it is not (for the various readings of the verse, see R. Bhattacharya
2009/2011, 86 SI. 16).
The name Bfirhaspatya as applied to materialism, whether pre-Cfirvfika
or Carvfika, is, however, inappropriate in all respects. In fact it is a misnomer
insofar as none of the sources, whether belonging to itihc‘isa or puréna, refer
to Brhaspati as the progenitor of materialism. Wherever he is found writing

a sdstm, it is related to polity, or any work admittedly anti-Vedic in nature,
it is never represented as a philosophical base text. In the PPu he preaches
Jainism, Buddhism and other heretical doctrines. But, as has been shown
above, the nature of the objections to the Vedic sacrificial rites is at bottom
religious, never philosophical. In spite of the mention of anekc'mtavc'ida and
Vijfic‘mavc‘zda, all that the converted demons speak of is non-injury and
celibacy, not materialism or any philosophical doctrine at all. There is of
course a reference to other paganda views (as inthe VPu 3.1821), but there
is nothing to show that any of the tenets preached by Mayamoha refers to
materialism as such. As to Jainism and Buddhism, at least two names,
anekdntavéda (pluralism) and wjfidnavfia’a (doctrine of consciousness) are
mentioned in the VPu (3.18.10, 16). Some fanciful etymology of the names
too is given. However, what the Deceiver (or Deluder) actually does is to
speak of non-injury, celibacy and teetotalism, all of which are tenets
connected with rules of religion, not philosophy. The rest of the Puranic
sources too do not bother about philosophy: there opposition is entirely
religious.
There are also some other grounds for challenging the attribution of
materialism to Brhaspati. First, the purpose behind bringing in Brhaspati or
such allegorical characters as Mayamoha or Mayapurusa is explicitly
directed to portray the non-vedic systems as false, designed to delude the
enemies of the gods, be they mythical creatures like the demons or hum ans
like the sons of Raji. Second, the identity of the followers of Brhaspati is
never divulged. Gunaratna in his zeal to associate all philosophical systems
with a corresponding religious cult in one-to-one correspondence, makes
the Carvakas and the cfirvfikaflcadesnzas (a section of the Carvakas) identical
with the Kapalikas, the worshippers of Sakti, who are and had always been
very much theistic, with some practices of their own (TRD 300) that may
appear reprehensible to some. This supposed identification is more than

unwarranted; it is a calumny pure and simple. D.R. Shastri made a thorough
study of the alleged relationship between the Carvakas and the Kapalikas.
He came to the conclusion that there is no basis for equating the two (1982,
174-185) as Gunaratna does.12 SN. Dasgupta too made a study of the
Kapalikas and came to the conclusion that there was no philosophical basis
12 DR. Shastri, however, has been too lenient towards Gunarama. He has tried to
trace the course of the steady degeneration of the Carvakas, referring to the so-called
‘cunning (dhfirta) Carvakas’ mentioned by Jayantabhatta (NM, vol. I, 100) and
related it to Gunaratna’s description of the Kapalika orgy. All that Gunaratna says
lacks evidence: everything appears to be concocted. What made the Jain savant go
for such an equation between the Carvakas and the Kapalikas is to be wondered at.
of this sect: ‘ [W]e have no proof that the Kapalikas and the Kalamukhas had
any distinct philosophical views which would be treated separately’ (1975,
vol. 5, 3). He further says, ‘[W]e know practically nothing of any
importance about the Kapalikas and the Kalamukhas’ (1975, vol. 5, 5). He
reiterates this opinion again on another occasion (1975, vol. 5, 50).
Therefore Gunaratna’s facile identification of the Carvakas and the
Kapalikas is not at all acceptable (For a detailed study of the Kapalikas and
the Kalamukhas, see Lorenzen 1991).
Unfortunately we cannot be certain who first used the name Barhaspatya
to designate the materialist system, whether pre—Carvaka or Carvaka, and
also its adherents. Kamalas’fla (eighth century) mentions Carvaka (both in
singular and plural), Lokayata and Lokayatika, and Nastika (TSP 520, 633,
637, 639, 657, 663, 665, 939 and 945) as well as Barhaspatya (520).
Haribhadra (eighth century) speaks of Lokayata (SDSam verses 79c and
80a; 299.17 and 301.2) and Carvaka (ibid. verse 85d; 307.18) but not of the
other two. From his reference to astikava'din (ibid. 78d; 2998), however, it
may be presumed that he was conversant with its opposite, nc'zstikavc'tdin. In
the ninth century Barhaspatya is used both as an adj ective and as a countable
noun by Jayanta (bfirhaspatyc'zm (singular) in MM I.43.11 and
bc-trhaspatyc'mdm (plural) 1275.20) and by Silfifika (14—05mm 189, and Sfitm.
9-10). Som adeva Sfiri (tenth century) too mentions the bdrhaspatyas
(Yas’astilaka 269) as Anantavirya attributes the authorship of the base text
of the materialists to Brhaspati (brhaspatek sfitrc'mi, the aphorisms of
Brhaspati 177) as does Abhayadeva (eleventh century) and others (for
details see R. Bhattacharya 2009/2011, 106-07 notes). Hem acandra (twelfth
century) in his lexicon,AC, records all four names as synonymous (3.526-
27) as does S-M (SDS 2, lines 13-15, 22).
No philosophical work that has so far come down to us offers any
explanation of the name Barhaspatya. Of course, nobody knows for certain
why Nyaya is called Nyaya; once it stood for MTmarnsa also (cf. Jaimini’s
Nycbzamc'tlc'zvistam). There is no way of ascertaining whether Yoga
originally meant the philosophical system propounded by Patafijali or a
system of logic that is now called Nyaya. Phanibhushana Tarkavagisha says
that Nyaya also was once called Lokayata (1981, vol. I, xv). So it is too
much to expect that some kind soul would inform us why Barhaspatya was
chosen as another name for the materialist system as well as its adherents,
and how and from when it got attached to materialism. All we know is
that right from the eighth century CE, when the name Carvaka is found in
philosophical literature, it already has no fewer than three other synonyms.
Some of them might have already been in use (such as, Lokayata,
Bhfitavada and Carvaka), but some others (such as, Dehatmavada and
Bhutacaitanyavada), or more fanciful ones (such as Maha-bhfitodbhava-

caitanya-Vadi-mata or Bhuta-mau'a-tattva-vfida), not to speak of such
derisive nicknames as Paficagupta and Kundakita).13 All of these, beginning
with nahr'yavc'idi', natthi'yavc‘zf, nahiyavddKI/‘asu. 169, 275, 329) were coined
by the immaterialist critics.
I would, however, like to point out that the association of Brhaspati to
the founder or c‘zcc‘zrya of materialism (as Manimékalai’ says) is not
explicated anywhere in the whole corpus of Sanskrit literature available to
us. He may at best be called the propagator of the m‘zstika view in the broad
sense of the term (which would include the Buddhist, the Jain and many
other religious systems and cults, belonging to both the Great Tradition and
the Little Tradition), but not in the narrow sense of the term which would
signify materialism alone. Howsoever, it is worth noting that Indian writers
believed in two Brhaspatis: one set (for instance, the Purina redactors,
Iayaras'i, and Sflharsa, author of the of the KhKhKh) viewed Brhaspati as a
god, and the other set (for instance, Krsnamis’ra and Sfiharsa, author of the
NC) considered him to be purely human, associated with Kali, who
represents the force of evil. The materialists in India never called them selves
Barbaspatyas, for by calling themselves so, they would admit their
affiliation either to the chaplain of the gods or to Kali. Both of them would
be inadmissible to the atheistic thinkers. In any case, it is high time to get
rid of the false notion that the Brhaspati in Indian philosophical literature,
whether divine or human, has anything to do specifically with materialism.
13 For the fancifiil names see Franco 1997, 243 and n3. For the derisive ones see
above Chap. Seventeen.
Appendix A
A tabular representation of the presence/absence of Brhaspati in deluding
the demons/the Rajeyas is given below, followed by a summary of the
observations made in this essay.
Purina Deluder Deluded Means

Agni 16.1-13 The Buddha Demons Buddhism
disguised as
Mfiyfimoha
Devibhégavata 4.13- Brhaspati Demons Jainism
15 disguised as (4.13.54-56)
Sukra
Garuda 1.32 The Buddha Demons Not given
(Buddhism ?)
Harivams‘a. Brhaspati Raj eyas Sacrifice [and by
Harivfims’a—Parvan. composing an
Chap. 21 Arthas’astra or a
Dhai‘mas’fistra]
Linger, Pfirvabhaga Narayana Demons Anti-Vedic

71.85—94 disguised as Sfistra having
Mfiyin and 16,00,000 books.
Muni (The
Buddha)
Matsya 2444-48 Brhaspati Raj eyas Sacrifice and
jinadharma
(24.47).
Matsya 47. 183-206 Brhaspati Demons Not In entioned.
disguised as
Sukia
Padma Srsti. 13.366- Mfiyfimaya Demons Buddhism,
371 Purusa Jainism and
other pagaflda
doctrines (Cf.
Visnu 3.18)
Siva Yuddhankhanda Mayfimaya Demons Jainism

Chap. 4.1-2 Purusa
Vayu 92. 87-99 Brhaspati Raj eyas Sacrifice
Viwu 3.18 Mayamoha Demons Buddhism,

created by Jainism and
Hari (Visnu) other pc‘zmnda
doctrines
(3.18.1-21).
It is not clear, at least to me, what van Buitenen says apropos Mai Up:
‘ Section 7.9 brings Brhaspati who has the (late) reputation of being a false
teacher, on account of the materialist smrti ascribed to Brhaspati. Here he
invents the false knowledge of the unorthodox. 7.10 is a more enlarged-
upon doublet of 7.9, but here the false knowledge is authored by Brahmi’
(1962, 88-89). What could be a ‘materialist smrti’? Is it not a contradiction
in terms?
Brhaspati is found in some of the Puranas working as a deluder either of
the demons or of the sons of Raji, who had threatened the power and
position of Indra. He does not produce, so far as my knowledge goes,
anywhere in the Itihasas and the Puranas, a work of smrti. It is only in an
additional passage in the HV that Brhaspati is said to have composed a Book
of Negative Arthas’astra and/or Dharmas’astra. So far as the so—called
Bdrhaspatya Dharmas’dstm is concerned, enough fragments are available
to reveal the basically orthodox character of the work. The author’s respect
for Manu and the thoroughly traditional views expressed in most of the
cases are only too apparent (see R. Bhattacharya 2009/2011, 25-26). As to
the Brhaspati—niti mentioned in the Mbh, Aranyakaparvan, 33.56-57 (crit.
ed), Iacobi’s view is decisive: ‘The Niti-teachings of Brihaspati which
Draupadi expounds in Mahabharata111.32 [vul.], are at any rate as orthodox

as one can wish!’ (1911/1970, 737', 1918, 104). So the very idea of
‘materialist smrti’ is downright absurd.
Admittedly the Puranic stories lack coherence and consistency. When
the texts were composed by different persons living in different parts of
India, no unified pattern is to be expected. Yet it is clear on the surface that
the story of Indra and the Rfijeyas was but a parallel to that of the gods and
the demons. The presence of Brhaspati in some of the stories and his
absence in some others are equally intriguing. In any case he is not
indispensable to the restoration of the authority of Indra. Even when
Brhaspati takes an active part in deluding the demons/Rfijeyas, he is found
having recourse to some sacrifice (for example, Paistika—yfiga), not
producing a base text of any materialist philosophy. Hence, the association

of Brhaspati with materialism is never established in the Itihasas and the
Purinas.
Is this Brhaspati, who is ‘credited’ with conceiving materialist
philosophy, with the sole purpose of deluding the enemies of the gods and
make them stray from the Vedic path, a demi-god or a human being? The
question arises inevitably, for the putative authors of the Earhaspazya
Dharmas’c'istm (Brhaspati—smrti) and the Boirhaspagia Arthas‘c'istm
mentioned by Kautilya, are never treated as divine but thoroughly human
by nature and origin. Even in the PPu Siva mentions Dhisana along with
Kanada, Gautam a, Kapila as the authors of non—Vedic s’astras (PPu Uttara-
khanda Vangavasi ed. Chap. 236.2—7ab = Anandashrama ed, Chap. 263.66-
70). One verse refers to Visnu disguised as the Buddha in order to destroy
the demons (daitydndm nds’andrthdya visnunfi buddharfipind, Vangavasi
ed. 236.6ab = Anandashrama ed. 263-69cd). Hazra thinks that the whole
chapter is an interpolation ‘by some persons belonging to the Sfi or Madhva
sect’ (1940/1987, 126).
Appendix B
The Story of Vena is found in the following works (excepting the Mbh):
H VHariv Parv 5
Br . 68
B Part 4 . 14-15
. 62
. 5216-18
1.108
Padma B . 36-39
?
The earliest source of the Vena legend is a single verse in the Mbh (crit.
ed. 5999). Vena is said to have been under the sway of wrath and malice
and performed unmeritorious acts (adharma) on his subjects. The sages
killed him with a kus’a grass empowered by a spell (mantrapfita). All
Purinas follow this account. Only one verse in VDMPu 1.108 mentions
Lokayatika (a later addition?) In any case, all sources mention Vena’s
indulgence in anti-vedic acts, but all by himself, with none to inspire or
provoke or assist him. Only in the PPu Bhfimikhanda, Visnu deludes Vena
by preaching Jainism.
CHAPTER TWENTY
CARVAKA MISCELLANY
Carvaka Miscellany I
Max Mflller’s faux pas
Modern scholars nowadays seldom (if at all) refer to Friedrich Max Muller
(1823-1900). But to our great—grandfathers he was a highly respected man,
both as an Indologist and as a friend of India. In his once-celebrated work,
The Six Systems of Indian Philosophy (1899/1971), he wrote: ‘The name of
Karvfika [Carvfika] is clearly connected with that of Karva [Carve] and this
is given as a synonym of Buddha by Balas’astrin in the [Sanskrit] preface to
his edition of the Kas’ika (p. 2). He is represented as a teacher of the
Lokayatika or world-wide system, if that is the meaning originally intended
by that word.’ 1
It is a comic faux pas. Had Max Muller cared to turn a few pages of the
said edition of Kfisikc'i, on reaching p. 49 he would have found that the word
Buddha (on p2) is a mere misprint for buddhi (intelligence). Bala Sastri was
simply paraphrasing the words of Vfimana-Jayfiditya, the authors of Kc‘ts’ikfi.
In their explication of Panini’s As; 1.3.36, they had written, nayate carvz'
Zokfiyate, and explained the sentence as follows: ‘Cc‘zrvz‘ is buddhz‘. Due to
his association with it (intelligence), the teacher, too, is called Carvi. He
establishes the principles of the Lokayata-sastra (the science of Lokayata)

with the help of reason. Thus, he is respected and worshipped by his
disciples.”2
One, however, cannot be sure whether the word, lokc‘ryata, here stands
for the science of disputation (vitandas’fistm, as in all Pali and Buddhist
1 Max Muller 1899/1971, 99, referring to Kfisikfi by Vamana-Jayaditya, ed. Bala

Sastri 1898.
2 Since 3513 Sastri’s edition is not easily available, readers may consult any available
edition of Kfisikci, for example, the one edited by Narayana Misra 1969 or Raghuvir
Vedalai‘ikér (ed), 1997. See also V. S. Agarwal 1953, 393.
224 Chapter Twenty
Sanskrit works) or the Carvika system of philosophy?l But the word

definitely refers to a system based on reason.
Max Muller was misled again due to a further misprint: carva, a
meaningless word, for cc'zrvz', ‘intelligence’. He took carver to be a namesake
of Buddha.
The Debt ofmtimsfi and Nydya-Vaiéesika to the Cfirvfika

Ember Krishnam acharya, editor of the editio princeps of Santaraksita’s TS
(eighth century CE), notices a number of verses that are taken verbatim from
Kumarilabhatta’s works (seventh or eighth century CE).4 Kumfirila was a
Munfimsaka and a staunch opponent of the Buddhists. The editor, however,
failed to notice four verses in Chapter 22 that deal with the Lokayata. Satkari
Mookerjcc (1935) was the first to point out: ‘The entire argument put inthe
mouth of the materialist [in T is boldly taken mutatis mutandis from
Kumarila’s S‘loka—vdrtika. The Slokas from 1865 to 1868 are reproduced
verbatim and 813. [Srloka-s] 1869 to 1871 are but a summarized version of
Kumarila’s storms 59-64 and 69-73, a‘tmavc‘zda, s. v. [slokavartika], pp.
703-07.’ 5
Recently Eli Franco has observed, ‘It seems that the most orthodox and
the heterodox schools [5c the Mimamsa and the Carvaka] have joined
forces to criticize the Buddhists . . . . Yet the question arises whether these
are Mimamsa arguments adopted by the Carvika or vice versa.’6 He takes
Kumarila to be the debtor. Santaraksita, too, knew them to be Carvfika
arguments but found it ‘easier . . . to quote them in an already versified
form’ 7 (as done by Kumfirila).
Mookerjee also notes that Sfidhara, a tenth-century Nyfiya-Vaisesika
philosopher in his Nydyakandalz‘ ‘employs similar arguments to prove the
impossibility of metempsychosis [= rebirth] in the Buddhist theory of Soul
or rather no-Soul. Sfidhara opines that the theory of momentary

consciousness would land the Buddhist in rank materialism, which denies
3 See R. Bhattacharya 2009/2011, 187-200.

4 TS 1926, vol. 2, Appendixes, 83-97. The text has been translated into English by
Ganganath Jha, published by the same publisher in 1937—39. Both the text and
translation have been reprinted in 1968 and 1986 respectively (the latter has been
brought out by Motilal Banarsidass. Pandit Dvarikadasa Shastri has also published
the text (1968/1981). The number of verses is one short of the Baroda edition.
5 Mookerjee 1935/1975, 204 n2.
5 Franco 1997, 100.
7France 1997, 101.
Carvaka Miscellany 225
post-m ortem existence of the Soul or conscious life, to be accurate.’8 He

further says, ‘We are tempted to believe that Sridhara has borrowed his
arguments from Kumfirila whom he quotes with great respect in other
places.’9
It appears then that both the Mimamsa and the Nyiya—Vais’esika schools,
in their polemics against the Buddhists, borrowed some of their weapons
from the Carvaka arsenal. Kumarila took them first and Sridhara in his turn
took them from Kumarila.
Cdrvfika in a Work on Poetics
An interesting reference to the Can/aka occurs in Locana by Abhinav agupta

(tenth/ eleventh century CE). It is a commentary on Anandavardhana’s
influential book (itself a commentary) on poetics, tanyc‘tloka (ninth
century CE). Anandavardhana says that words in poetry have a two—fold
meaning: the stated one (vdcya) and the suggested (pratiyamc‘ma) one.10
Defending this approach, Abhinavagupta writes that the concept of two-fold
meaning is necessary, for ‘discerning critics decide that it (the suggested
meaning) should be the very soul of poetry.’”Then he adds: ‘But those
whose minds are confused due to its intimate association with the aspect of
“the stated meaning” start doubting its separate existence, even as the
Carvakas who doubt the separate existence of an entity like the soul apart
from the body.’
The Carvéka theory of the self (soul) is that it is inseparable from the
body. So long as the body is alive, consciousness, cognition, etc. are to be
found accompanying it. The soul, unlike what the idealist philosophers say,
cannot exist without a substratum, that is, the body. Abhinavagupta cleverly
refers to this concept.
Both Anandavardhana and Abhinavagupta were Kashmirians. Udbhata
Bhatta, a Carvaka philosopher, also belonged to Kashmir (if he is the same

Udbhata mentioned in Kalhana’s Rajatamfigim', RT).12 Abhinavagupta’s
reference to the Carvakas also disproves Rhys Davids” view (if further
evidence to disprove it was at all required) that there was no school of
thought or a system of philosophy called the Lokfiyata, although all writers
8 Mookerjee 1935/1975, 204 n2.

9 Mookerjee 1935/1975, 204 n2.
1° Ariandavardhana 1944, Uddyota ONE, 88-89.
‘1 I have quoted fiom the translation by K. Krishnamoorthy with some
modifications. See Krishnamoorthy 1988, 98-99.
12 See ‘Udbhata’, New Catalogus Catalogomm, v01. 2, ed. V. Raghavan, Madras:
University of Madras, 1966, 31, referring to R T 4. 495.
226 Chapter Twenty
from Kumarila and Sankaracarya to S-M (fourteenth century) use the name,
Lokayata and Lokayatika, as “mere hobby-horses, pegs on which certain
writers can hang the views that they impute to their adversaries, and give
them, in doing so, an odious name.”13
Ajita Kesakambala: A Belated Appearance

The earliest verses attributed to the Carvaka/Lokayata are found quoted in
two commentaries on a work by the Buddhist philosopher, Nagarjuna
(second century CE). 14 The verses run as follows:
Man (purusa) consists of only as much as is within the scope of the senses.
What the vastly learned ones speak of (as true) in but similar to (the
statement): ‘Oh! Blessed one! Look at the footprints of the wolf.’15
‘Oh! the fair one, possessing beautifirl eyes! Drink and eat. Oh! The
one with a charming body! That which is past does not belong to you. Oh!
The timid one! The past never comes back. This body is only a collectivity
[of the four natural elements, namely, earth, air, fire and water].’ 16
The story behind these verses has been told by the commentators of the
Haribhadra’s SDSam.17
What has so far gone unnoticed is that in their commentaries on

Nagérjuna’s Madhyamaka—éfistra, Buddhapalita (fifth century CE),
‘3 T.W. Rhys Davids 1899, 166. C. Bendall pointed out in 1900 that Rhys Davids
was mistaken in saying so (Athenaeum, 30 June, 1900).
14 Pandeya (ed), 1988-89. The two commentaries mentioned in the text refer to the
last two.
‘5 Pandeya, vol. 2 (on 16. 1), 64-65 (on 18.6). Bhavaviveka alone quotes both;
Candrakirti only the first one. It is to be regretted that Pandeya while restoring the
first verse itavaviveka’s commentary from its Tibetan translation to Sanskrit (the
original text is lost) wrote lake ’yam instead of puruso. This is totally unwarranted.
The Tibetan version has skyes-bu (203 b8 and 232 b6) which cannot but be purusab.
The verse occurs in many other works but Haribhadra (and following him,
Rajasekharasfiri and a few others) wrote loko ’yam (which Pandeya remembered):
everyone else wrote purusa. (For all relevant sources see Bhattacharya 2009/2011,
185—86). Pandeya also failed to discern that the next two lines in the Tibetan
translation (203 b8—204 a1 and 232b7-8) constitute a verse, and so he printed them
as prose.
1“ This verse is also found (with minor variants) in Haribhadra’s SDSam (v. 82),
filanka’s commentaries on the dcdrar'rga- and SKS-s, and Rajaéekharasfiri’s Sad-
dan‘ana-samuccaya.
‘7 R. Bhattacharya 2009/2011, 175-86.
Bhavaviveka (fifth/sixth century) and CandrakTrti (sixth/seventh century)

refer to the materialist doctrine18 but, instead of referring to any Carvaka
aphorism or verse, all of them go back to the words of Ajita Kesakambala,
a senior contemporary of the Buddha. Thus we have the Sanskrit version of
the beginning of a passage that is attributed to Ajita in a Pali Suite: ‘This
world does not exist, the other world does not exist. There is no effect of
good and evil deeds, there is no result. There is no self-created being, etc’ 19
The passage needs some explanation. The first sentence does not mean
that Ajita denies the reality of this world. It simply suggests that
performance of religious duties yields no result either in this world or in the
next. That is to say, contrary to the assurance given in the Dharrnas’astras,
sacrifices, etc. ensure neither wealth and well—being in this world
(abhyudaya) nor the summum bonum, liberation (nihs’reyasa).2°
In the last sentence the words translated as ‘self-created being’ are sattva
upapdduka in the original. ‘According to Buddhist belief, living beings are
divided by their mode of birth into four classes: those born of the egg such
as birds, some snakes, etc', those born of moist heat such as insects, etc;
those born of the womb such as mammals and men; and those born of
them selves such as gods, Buddhas, Bodhisattvas, Cakravartins, hell-
dwellers, etc’21
In short, then, Ajita denies the existence of all gods as well as the
efficacy of performing rituals.
Buddhapalita and others elected to go back to the earlier, proto-
materialist doctrine rather than the doctrine that developed the materialist
view anew.22
18 See Pandeya (ed), 1988-89, (n14), vol. 2, 60, 63-64, 66 (on 18. 5-7).
19 SPhS, DN, Part I. 1958, 48. In the Pali Sum: there are two more clauses before the
last one: ‘There is no father, there is no mother,’ which is omitted by Buddhapalita

and others.
20 A detailed discussion will be found in R. Bhattacharya 2009/2011, 45-54.
21 Vogel 1970, 21 n9. He refers to Nagarjuna’s Dharmasamgmha and anon,
Mahabutparti as his authorities. For a different interpretation of the term,
upapdduka, see Macqueen 1988, 39 I165.
22 No Carvaka/Lokayata fragment so far available echoes the words o f A j ita as found
inthe Pali Sutm. It strengthens the view that the CarvakafLokayata did not originate
from Ajita’s circle in the fifth century BCE but developed later quite independent of
Ajita. There is no evidence to support the continuity of the materialist tradition from
Ajita to the compilation of the Cdrvcika—sfltm (or the Paumndam—sfltra). Erich
Frauwallner, too, has made a distinction between ‘The oldest materialist doctrines’
(represented in his opinion by Pfirana, Ajita and Kakuda) and ‘The Lckayata
System’ (which, he believes, arose in the pre-Chiistianperiod, founded by Carvaka).
See Frauwallner 1997 vol. 2, 219-221. Franco and Preisendanz have followed him
228 Chapter Twenty
Tracing an Unidentified Verse

It has been shown that the VDMPu is the source of the famous verse
attributed to the Carvakas, ‘ So long as there is life, live happily’ (yavajjz‘vam
sukham fiver), etc.23 A part of this couplet was changed by S—M, the
Vedantin (fourteenth century) to read: ‘Drink clarified butter (even) by
borrowing” (mam krtvc? ghrtampivet) while in all other sources (both before
and after S—l\/I) it reads: ‘Nothing is beyond the reach of death” (nfisti mrtyor
agocamh). In the Mahfipuréna, the couple of lines, however, does not
constitute a stanza (s’loka) by itself. They are the second and first lines of
two consecutive stanzas.24
Two such lines have been quoted from the same source (VDMPu) in
three later works.25 The couplet, as be fore, originally formed the second and
first lines of two consecutive stanzas. They run as follows:
Penances are only various forms of torment, and abstinence in merely

depriving one self of the pleasure of life. The rituals of agnihotra, etc. appear
only to be child’s play.26
It cannot be ascertained whether the author of the VDMPu quoted it from

another source (oral or written) or composed the lines himself. In any case,
the materialist view seems to have been reflected in these lines although the
author of the Mahfipurana was as much opposed to materialism as the later
writers who quoted these lines.
Bhfiguri or Bhfigurf?
B. N. Puri in his study on Patafij ali (second century CE) writes:
The Lokayatas were not unknown in that period. Patafijali refers to Bhaguri
as a famous exponent of this school who provided specimens of the
in this regard in their article on the Indian School of materialism, 1998 vol. 6, 179
(‘Early materialists’ and ‘The classical materialistic philosophy”).
23 See Bhattacharya 2009/2011, 175-86.
24 VDJMPM, éaka 1834, I. 108. lScd-l9ab. f. 70.
25 See Haribhadra Vikrarnasamvat 1978, verse 34, f. 25a (reads bhogavaficandb
(sic!) in the secondpride); AID III. 9, 57 (reads —vaficanam) and Guuaratna, 1905-
1914, 302, verse 1 (misprinted as 2) (reads yaimz— for yam/rm, samgama for
samyama, and vaficand). The verse originally occurs in the VDMPu (n24 above), I.
108. l4cd—15ab, 70.
25 I quote the translation from Crirvdka/Lokdyata 1990, 269.
Lokayata doctrines according to his views (varnikci Bhfigurz‘ Laka‘qyarasya),

or way oflife (vfirtikd Bhdguri lokciyatasya). 27
On the basis of this interpretation Puri concludes: ‘The name of the

founder of this school — Carvaka is not mentioned by the Bhasyakara (5c.
Patafij ali), but his philosophy was well-known.”
It is rather odd that Puri does not notice that the nam e is not Bhaguri, but
Bhaguri in Kielhorn’s edition as also in the two commentaries by Kaiyata
and Nages’abhatta, who explain the word as fikfivis’esal’t and
lokdyataséstmsya vyfikhyfinarfipo granthavisesal’t, a commentary on the
Lokayatas’astra.28
Monier—Williams mentions both Bhaguri and Bhagufi, the first, in eaning
the name of a person, the second, of a work. So there is no reason to confuse
the two, yet Puri and many others have made this mistake.29
Incidentally it may be observed that this Lokayatas’astra most probably
is not a book of the Carvaka/Lokayata school but rather a work of the art
and science of disputation, or tarkas’ésrm, noted in the K4.”
Carvaka Miscellany II
Materialism in India, very much like materialism in Greece, has to be
reconstructed on the basis of fragments. Although the materialist tradition
can be traced back to the early Upanisads on the one hand, and the Buddhist
and Jain canonical works on the other, the fragments offer only a glimpse
of materialist thought. The same is true of the Presocratic philosophical
tradition in Greece. Yet the glimpses we have from other, non-philosophical
works are no less illuminating than those found in philosophical works
proper. Some instances of the early sources related to pre—Cfirvaka
materialism have already been offered before (see R. Bhattacharya 2012b).
In what follows I propose to add a few more instances related to the anti-
Vedic traditionIn entioned by Patafijah, the voice of rationalism found in the
Puranas, the reception of Jabali, a proto-m aterialist thinker as well as the
27 Puri1990,178.
28 Kielhorn (ed) 1909, vol. 111, 325-326 (on As; 7. 3. 45 (7), (8));
Vydkaranamahdbhawa with Kaiyata’s Pradz'pa and Nagesabhatta’s Udcfizom, part
III, 1967, 210.
29 Monier-Williams 2002, 752, column 1, bottom.
30 KA 1965, 1.2.10. For a detailed discussion, see R Bhat‘taeharya 2009/2011, 131-
36.
230 Chapter Twenty
Carvaka/Lokayata in modernIndian literature, and finally the representation

of Lokayata in .Tain literature and the Rdjatamfigim‘.
The pramattagita
The stanzas spoken by Jabali in the Ram, Ayodhyakanda (crit. ed. canto
100.2-17, vul. canto 108.2-18), like the verses in the VPu 3.18.24-29,
reproduced in PPu Srstikhanda 13.366—71, may very well be taken as
specimens of the so-called pramattagl'tas, ‘stanza sung through
thoughtlessness’ (Patafg'ali Mahdbhfirya chap. 1, Paspas’ahnika, Calcutta ed.
1972, 18, Pune ed. 1975, 13). Such stanzas were current in India at least
from the time of Patafijali (c. second century BCE). The word is found in its
seventh-century commentary, Jayaditya and Vamana’s Kc‘zfiikc‘zvrtti (on As;
6.2.149), along With similar names, such as suptalapita, unmattapralapita
and vzpannaruta (1987, 428). It may also be noted in passing that
Sankaracarya criticizes Sugata (the Buddha) in the following terms:
‘Moreover, Buddha exposed his own incoherence in talk (asambaddha-
pmlc‘zpitvam) when he instructed the three mutually contradictory theories
of the existence of external objects, existence of consciousness, and absolute
nihilism . . .’. (onBS 2.2.32)
The term pramattagr'ta would literally mean ‘sung While intoxicated’
(1987, 751) or as Béhtlingk and Roth gloss, unachtsam gesangen,
‘inattentively sung’. The word, however, is used in a special sense in the
Mahfibhésya. Abhyankar and Shukla translate it as ‘(a verse) recited by a
dunce’ (Pune ed. 1975, 13). It stands for any epigram Which is anti-Vedic
or critical of the Vedic religion, as opposed to the pro-Vedic ones that are
called bhrfija (Calcutta ed. 1972, 17, Pune ed. 1975, 13).31 Sabara too
employs the same term in his Mfmamtvdsfitra commentary (na caitat
pramanagrtam I'tyuktam. Sahara onMrmamsasam, 2.2.26; 110-, pramanagrtam
tatmbhavatfim ityavagamyate; na caitanyfikhyam, ibidem, 3.1.17; 159)

The performance of s’raddha (rites for the ancestors) and other acts
suggesting belief in the Other World {pamloka} were satirized in such
31 Eminent Sanskritists like Abhyankar (Mahfiibhdgya Pune ed. 1975, 13) and
Sukumar Sen (1970, 40 n1) have taken bhrdja to meanpramattagfta and vice versa.
This certainly carmot be true. The context makes it clear that a distinction is being
made between two kinds o f verses (s’lokas): those which conform to the Vedas and
those which do not. The former is called bhréja; the latter,pramarttagz‘ta.
Moreover, the bhraja should not be considered as a kind of udbhaza sloka
(floating verse, verse of unknown authorship) as Sukurnar Sen proposes (p.40 n1).
A bhrcija is not just any floating verse but a particular kind o f verse that adheres to
the Vedas, as opposed to thepramartagfra.
Carvaka Miscellany 23 1
epigrams as are found in the VPu (Vangavasi ed.) 3.18.24-29, reproduced

in PPu Srstikhanda (Vangavasi ed.) 13.366-71, and other texts. S—M cited
some of them at the end of his doxographical work, SDS, chap.l. Verses in
the same vein are found in several sources. Averse by Dharmaldrti (so dear
to Rahula Sankrityayana), at the end of his auto-commentary on the PV,
immediately comes to mind:
vedaprdmcinyam kasyacit kartrvfidah mane dhamecchdjfltivdddvalepah |

samtfipfimmbhabpdpahfim‘qya ceti dkvastapmjfidnfimpafica limgdnicQj/eH
(1341,1953, 617-18)
Belief in the authority of the Vedas, and in a creator (of the world), desiring
merit from bathing, pride in (high) caste, and practising self-denial for the
eradication o f sins — these five are the marks of stupidity o f one whose
intelligence is damaged 32
Other sources for pramattagz‘tas I readily recall are: (a) DA, the
Mahayani Buddhist work (1959, 321 verses 22-28 = Sardfila 18-19), (b)
Jain texts, such as SVM Mallisena’s commentary on Hem acandra’s AYVD,
Chap. 11 (61-65; Thomas’s trans. 66-72). The chapter is directed against
NITmérnsfi, targetting Jaimini', the verses quoted by Mallisena denounce
injury of animals whether in sacrifices or in the performance of s’rfiddhas.
Cf. also Hemacandra’s YS 237-49, folios 96b—98b and the auto-commentary.
(For a thorough discussion see R Bhattacharya 2009f2011, 16.)
32 Samkrtyayana also quoted this verse in his Daréana digdaréana (1944/1978, 806
n1). The chapter on the Buddhist philosophy in this book appeared separately as an
independent work called Bauddha dan‘ana. The verse is quoted there too
(1948/1983, 184 n2). In Sarnlcrtyayana’s editio princeps of the P V with
Dharmakirti’s auto-commentary and Kamakagomin’s sub-commentary (1943), the

last pdda (quarter-verse) is printed as follows: dhvasmpmjfid (mim paficaflimgdni
jfidye (618). Ram Chandra Pandeya has emended the reading of the last quarter-
verse (pfida) as dhvastaprajfiflne (1989, 359).
In his Introduction to the P V with Prajfiakaragupta’s commentary (1953)
Samkiftyayana says, ‘In order to make cause-effect relations comprehensible, the
Buddha with a view to clarifying “discontinuous continuity” spoke of “This being
there, that happens”. This is how he laid the foundation of clear and profound logic.
The outcome of this is the verse of Dharmakirti. . . . The Buddhists totally rejected
the authority of word (verbal testimony), ‘buddhena .
kfiifyakdmnasamvandhfivadhdmnfirtham ca “asmin sati idam bhavafiti”
spasfikaranena pmfigzammutpfido ’gddi | Buddhena bhémte svacchanda—pmudha—
pramdnasdstrasya stitrapétah krtah | etasyeva phalam yad dhammkfrtinfi
“vedaprfimcinyam...j&gjze ll” bauddhaih sabdasya prdmcinyam sarvatobhévena
prawdkhyfitam | (ga).’
232 Chapter Twenty
Satirical epigrams against the Vedists (as also other religious sects and
the Lokayata materialists) were composed not only in Sanskrit but also in
Apabhramsa. The 010t (couplet)s by Sarahapfida, the Mantrayani (also
known as Sahajayfini and Vajrayani) guru, provide some such examples.
See Shastri, 1388 BS., 84-127 (dohc'is by Saroja—vajra (Saraha) and
Krsnficarya (Kahnu) with commentaries in Sanskrit; Bagchi 4-21 (text and
Sanskrit chayc'i (gloss) of 32 verses), and 72 et seq (text, Sanskrit chc‘ryc‘z and
commentary); Sankrityayana, 1957, 2-4 (text with a chc‘ryc‘z in Old Hindi),
1957, 38-42 (Tibetan text and Apabhrams’a versions .33
Saraha satirizes Brahma (Brahmin), Ts’vara (theist), Arhanta (Jain),
Bauddha, Lokayata, and Samkhya. The commentary (in Sanskrit) describes
all of them as ‘the six systems of philosophy,” saddarsandni (H. Shastri
1323/1388 BS, 84, Bagchi ed. 1938, 72). In Samkrtyayana’s edition only
four sects or communities are mentioned: the Brahmanas, the Pas’upatas (a
cult of the worshippers of Siva Pas’upati, the lord of the animals), the Iains,
and the Buddhists.
As has been pointed out before (see R. Bhattacharya above Chap.
Eighteen), all of such satirical epigrams do not represent the materialist
view; the Iains and the Buddhists, among others, too are known to have
composed similar epigrams in Sanskrit. Songs and verses of the same
nature, mostly orally transmitted in Modem Indian languages, are still
current among the minor communities belonging to the Little Tradition (S.
Dasgupta (1946) called them ‘obscure religious cults’). A recent study of
the Bfiuls by Jeanne Openshaw (2002) contains some specimens of Bfiul
songs rendered into English. Other communities like the Balahe'iri,
Sahebadhani, etc. are strongly anti-Vedic and anti-brahm anical. They too
vent their feelings in songs that are being collected by field-workers and
researchers like Sudhir Chakrabarti and others. A compilation of the so-
called pramattagz‘tas from all available sources (like Colonel Jacob’s
collection of popular maxirns and proverbs, lauia’ka nyéyas) would

doubtless make interesting reading.
33 M. Shahidullah translated the dohfis and songs by Kanha and Saraha into French
(which he called ‘les chants mystiques,’ mystic songs) in 1928. The venerable
puritanical Professor was so ill at ease with the word nitamba (posterior) in a debt?
by Saraha (No.7, directed against the Jains) that he rendered it into French as ‘les
parties intimes d’une jeune femme’ (1928, 169). An English translation of
Shahidullah’s book is now available (Sinha Roy2007). The above mentionedphrase
is faithfully translated as ‘the intimate parts (nitamba) of a young woman’ (2007,
157).
Appeal to Reason in the VPu and the PPu

The nastilgza (lit. negativism) in the Jfibfili episode of the Ram
Ayodhyakanda, crit. ed. canto 100 vul. canto 108, is confined to only two
areas. The firsy is the denial of or, as in an interpolated passage in Bv
(Bengali version) of the Ram (Gorresio’s ed. 1844, 116.34cd—40ab,
Thakur’s ed. (Kalikata) 1932-41, 11634—39), doubt concerning the Other
World and whatever else it implies, such as, the denial of the existence of
the extra—corporal soul, and hence the futility of performing s’rfiddha,
donating to the Brahm arias, etc (crit. ed. verses 2.—l4', vul. verses 2—15). The
second area, allied to the first, is the denial of the validity and veracity of
religious law books related to domestic rites (crit. ed. verse 15', vul. verse
16). The context admittedly permitted only this much.
Another aspect of ndstikya is found in the VPu 3.18, plagiarized in the
PPu, Srstikhanda Chap. 13. The passage may very well be a specimen of
Pre-Cérvaka materialist thought which supplements the na‘stz’kya of the
Jabali episode in Rc‘zm (2.100-01 in the crit. ed., cantos 108-09 in the vul.),
inasmuch as another significant theme is introduced, namely, rationalism. I
do not use this term in the sense current in of seventeenth-century Europe
(as in the contraposition of empiricism vs. rationalism), but to suggest ‘the
practice or principle of basing opinions and actions on reason and
knowledge rather than on religious belief or emotional response,’ as defined
in COED (2011).
Both in the VPu and the PPu, Mayamoha, Tllusion—cum—Delusion
personified, is a magical being createdby Hari (Visnu) to defeat the demons,
asums, who were pious Vedists then (vedamfirgdnusdrinah, VPu 3.17.39).
Mayamoha approaches them and not only speaks against the Vedas but also
pleads for adhering to reason, yukti instead of abiding by authoritative
verbal testimony, dptavéda. In order to deceive the demons, Mayamoha
denounces the three Vedas, criticizes the gods for promoting injury to
animals, 111’d (referring to animal sacrifice in yajfias), indulging in
drinking wine and consuming flesh in s’rc'tddha ceremonies, and for being
lecherous. A Digambara Jain and a Buddhist monk (both of them are
Mayamoha in disguise) are made to preach their respective doctrines and
persuade the demons to give up the Vedic path. They are converted by
Mayamoha to the Jain and the Buddhist faiths and thereby made to renounce
their own religious duties (svadharma). What they say among them selves
after their conversion to anekdntavéda, the Jain doctrine of pluralism, and
vijfidnavdda, the Buddhist doctrine of idealism, very well expresses the anti-
Vedic viewpoints concerning non-injury, ahimsd, abstinence from sex and
alcohol (teetotalism), all characteristic of the Jains and the Buddhists (see
234 Chapter Twenty
above Chap. Eighteen). Most of the verses in this episode are assigned to
the demons. The passage runs as follow:
‘The precepts,” they (sc. the demons) cried, ‘that lead to the injury of animal
life (as in sacrifices) are highly reprehensible [lit irrational]. To say that
casting butter into flame is productive of reward, is mere childishness. If
Indra, afier having obtained godhead by multiplied rites, is fed upon the
wood used as filel in holy fire, he is lower than a brute, which feeds at least
upon leaves. 17an animal slaughteredin religious worship is thereby raised
to heaven, would it not be expedient for a man who institutes a sacrifice to
kill his own father for a victim? If that which is eaten by one at a grada'ha
gives satisfaction to another, it must be unnecessaiyfor one who resides at
a distance to bring food for presentation in person. ’ (Trans. H.H. Wilson
1840/1980, 491-92)
naitaa1yuktisaham vain/am himsé clharmaya nesyate |

havimsyanalaa'aghdhaniphalcbzetyarbhakoa'itam ||
yajfiair anekair devatvam avapyemh‘ena bhujyate |
s’amya'di yadi eet hastham tadvaram patrabhukpasa I]
nihatasya pasorjajfie svargapraptiryadisyate |
svapitayajamanena kinnu tasmanna hanyate ||
trptayejayatepumso bhuktamanyena eet tatah I
kuwacchraddham sraddhayannam na vaheynhpravasinah ||
(VPu, Vangavasi ed. 3.18.24—27, Bombay ed. 3.18.26-29;PPu, Srstikhanda,

Anandashrama ed. 13.371-74, Vangavasi ed. 13. 366, 369, 367, 368. As
usual there are some variants.)
Right from H.H. Wilson and J. Muir down to D.R. Shastri, Bishnupada
Bhattacharya and others, many, if not all, scholars have taken the VPu
stanzas as representing the materialist view (for sources, etc. see above
Chap. Eighteen). They might have been misled by Sadananda Kas’miraka

(seventeenth century) who quoted (as usual, with variants) four stanzas
(100-01), mentioned their exact source, VPu 3.18 [Vangavasi ed. 3.18.24-
27] — doubtless a rare event — in his ABS, Chap. 2 (every chapter in this book
is called ‘cudgelling’, mudgara-prahara), devoted to the refutation of the
Carvaka (98-106).
There is, however, no materialist in the VPu or PPu tales. The stanzas
could very well fit in the mouth of a Buddhist or a Jain. Nevertheless, there
are at least two stanzas which seem to reflect the View of a rationalist who
is opposed to all religions, not just Vedic ritualism. Although it is not
explicitly mentioned in the text, the two stanzas that follow are spoken by
Mayamoha. He urges the demons:
First, then, let it be determined What may be (rationally) believed by

mankind, and then you will find that felicity may be expected from my
instructions. The words o f authority do not, mighty Asuras, fall from heaven:
the text that has reason is alone to be acknowledged by me, and by such as
you are. (Trans. H.H. Wilson 1840/1980, 491—92)
janas‘mddheyam ilyetad avagamya Iato vocab |

upeksya s’reyase vdkyam rocatdm yan mayeritam H
m: hyapmvfidd nabhasa nipatcmti mahfisurdh |
yuktimad vacanam grahyarn mayc‘uzyais ca bhavadvidhailz ||
(Wu, Vangavasi ed. 3.18.28-29, Bombay ed. 3.18.30-31',PPu, Srstikhanda,

Anandashrama ed. 13375-76, Vangavasi ed. 13.370-71. As usual, variant
readings are found in every edition.)
Such an uncompromisingly rational approach (of. Wu 3.18.24a, quoted

above) is not expected of a Jain or a Buddhist monk. The VPu, it should
be noted, speaks not only of these two sects but also of other heretics
(pagandins)34 with whose doctrines Mayamoha deluded the rest of the
demons: anyc'm5pyc'mya—pc'zsanda—pmkc'zrair—bahubhir . . . daiteyc'm
mohayc'zmc'tsa ma'yc'zmoha ’timohakrt (VPu 3.18.21). It is conceivable that the
two stanzas quoted above represent the view of a rationalist, or just a
reasoner, haituka, who was equally a béte noire (pet aversion) of the
religious law-makers (see R Bhattacharya 2009). He need not necessarily
be a materialist. He may very well be one of the lokayatika brfihmanas
mentioned in Rc‘zm, Ayodhyfikanda, crit. ed. 94.32, vul. 100.38, who are
accused of being contemptuous of the religious law-books,
Dharmase'tstras.35
Jfibfilz‘ and the CErvfika/Lokfiyata in Modern Indian

Literature
The Jabali episode in the Ram Ayodhyakanda (crit. ed. cantos 100-01; vul.
cantos 108-09) attracted some modern Indian authors to write stories and
34 A recent study by Federico Squarcini (2011) deals with the dissident voices
recorded in the epics and the Puranas, as well as mentioned by the authors of the
Dharmasastras and their commentators. See also R. Bhattacharya 2009, 49-56.
35 The whole canto, however, has the appearance of being interpolated. See Mbh,
Book 2, Sabhaparvan, crit. ed. (1944) canto 5 and Editor (FranklinEdgerton)’s note,
489-91, and Ram, Book 2 Ayodhyakanda, crit. ed. (1962) canto 9 4 and Editor (P.L.
Vaidya)’s note, 702.
236 Chapter Twenty
plays highlighting his heretical views as found in the composite version of

the epic. I am, not competent to speak about all modem Indian languages.
However, some information may be available on the net. AH. Salurnkhe
(1982/1987) and Pradeep Gokhale (2013) have mentioned several such
Marathi works. I can only speak of modem Bangla literature, but the
account given below should not be taken as exhaustive. There must be some
other works which escaped my notice or I am at present unable to locate (for
instance, I remember having read a piece on Carvaka by Jahnabikumar
Chakrabarti printed in a Bangla journal but just cannot recall its name).
Iswarchandra Gupta (Ts’varacandra Gupta, 1812-1859) composed an
allegorical opera @fitrfipc’rlfi) called Bodhendu Vikasa Ncitaka in six acts. It
was, as Gupta him self said, ‘similar to the play Pmbodhadacandrodaya’.
This allegorical play written in Sanskrit by Krsnamis’ra, an arch Advaita
Vedantin (twelfth century CE) has been translated into Bangla several times
in the last two centuries. Gupta was the first to offer an enlarged version in
verse and prose. Some parts of his paraphrase were published serially in his
own journal Samvc'ida Prabhfikam and the first three acts were published in
book form by his brother Ramachandra Gupta (Ramacandra Gupta) in 1270
BS (1863-64) after his death. The full play came out in 1308 BS (1901-02).
There is a character called Carvaka in the original Sanskrit play and Gupta
has expanded the speeches attributed to him, added long declamations and,
quite Imdaunted by any fear of committing anachronism, indulged in
condemning female education in schools etc. (1974-75, 199-208) as he did
in his own verse satires. These were the burning issues that rocked Bengal
in the mid-nineteenth century. Notwithstanding all this, Bodhendu Vikc'xsa
Neitaka exhibits perhaps for the first time the appearance of a materialist in
Bangla literature, although it is not an original work but an over-extended
paraphrase of a Sanskrit play. Gupta’s opera is too long to be performed on
any stage, open-air or proscenium (in print it covers 1974-75, 165 -400, that
is, 236 pages!)

The play was not well-known but some of the speeches in verse by
different characters like Krodha (anger), Ahar'ikara (egotism), Himsa
(jealousy), Lobha (greed) followed by Carvaka’s speech to his disciple were
extracted in a selection of his poetic works published in two parts by
Basurn ati-Sahitya—Mandira (date unknown). They were printed as
independent poems. ‘Cfirvvfiker mata’ (the view of Carvéka) (n. d, 283-86).
The poem covers, besides Carvfika’s speech to his disciple he satires on a
mendicant ascetic and then a dandin (an ascetic carrying a stuff).
Despite Rama’s harsh rebuke and Jfibfili’s ultimate confession to his
opportunism followed by Vasistha’s whitewash as found in the vul. (which
was the main source of the authors of Bengal), Jabali appears as a dyed-in-
the-wool rationalist in Paras’urama (pseudonym of Rajshekhar Basu

(Rajas’ekhsara Basu 1880-1960)’s short story, ‘Jabali’ (1333 BS, 1926 CE),
later included in his second collection of short stories, Kajjali' (1335 BS,
1928 CE) and then in part 2 of his collected works (posthumously published)
(Granthdvalf 2:33-55).36 At the beginning of the short story Paras’urama
quotes Jabali’s speeches as found in the vul., cantos 108-09 (but not in Bv;
the second speech of Jabali is conspicuously absent in the NE version as a
whole) from Hem chandra Bhattacharyya (Hem acandra Bhattacaryya
1831‘?-1906)’s Bangla translation of the Rim (composite version).37 Then
he fabricates a story which tells what happened after Jabali’s return to
Ayodhya. The story glorifies Jabali at the expense of the gods and the sages.
Abanindranath Thakur (Tagore) (Abarfindranatha Thakura, 1871—1951),
better known as a painter, turned Paras’urama’s short story into a comic
opera with enormous gusto (Abam‘ndmRacandvalz', vol. 6). He even makes
Jabali say, ‘I’ve read Carvaka,’ which the sage never declares either in the
Ram or in Paras’urama’s short story, the immediate source and inspiration
of A. Thakur.
Saradindu Bandyopadhyay (Saradindu Vandyopadhyaya 1899—1970),
him self an eminent litterateur, considered Paras’urama’s protagonist as one
of the ‘immortals’ in Bangla fiction (‘Amaravrnda’, included in his
collection of stories, Byumerc'rm (Boomerang) (1345 BS, 1938-39 CE), later
in Slamdindu Amanibc‘ts (Omnibus), 1388 BS, vol. 7, 1-9). Jfibfili appears as
a character in this story too.
Mention may be made of three more works which highlight the
materialist doctrine although they do not mention Jabali. Matilal Das
Matilala Dasa, ? - 7) composed Cc'zrvvfika, a verse play in three acts (1340
BS = 1933-34 CE). He had already published two collections of his poems
and a collection of short stories. In this play Carvaka is a disciple of
Brhaspati. He is a philanthropist and a seeker of truth and reason. He
preaches his views (adapted from S-M’s SDS, Chap. 1) in face of the
35 The story has been translated into English by Pradip Bhattacharya (available on
the net <www.boloji.com/index. cfin?md=Cantent&sd=Articles&.ArticleID. >
37 Hemachandra Bhattacharyya also edited the composite version o f the text in
Nagari type, which, along with the Bangla rendering, was published from Kalikata
in 1869—84. Rajshekhar Basu himself later made an abridged Bangla translation of
the Ram in 1353 BS (1946 CE). In his Introduction to this work he specially
mentioned Jabali as an interesting character, for he could bec orne either an dstika or
a néstika depending on the circumstances (vii). (One feels Basu actually appreciated
the sage’s ‘justified foxiness’). The abridgement of the Ram (as also of the Mk)
proved to be a great success, particularly among the readers who were loath to go
through the whole Ram in Hemac andra Bhattacharyya’s translation.
238 Chapter Twenty
opposition of King Samaraketu, Kautsa, a sage and others. Kasyapa

condemns him as a rebel, a revolutionary, a hypocrite, a heretic, etc.
Upendranath Sensastri (Sen Shastri) (Upendranfitha Senas’astfi, 1894 -
1996) wrote a play, Cdrvvaka, in prose (c.1939). It was published
posthumously in a Bangla quarterly in 1997. Senshastri too draws heavily
on S-M and makes Carvaka appear as a freethinker and a social rebel.
Arindrajit Mukhopadhyaya (ArTndrajit Mukhopfidhyaya, 1896- 1966) is
the author of an eight-page long poem, ‘Carvvaker Ukti’ (The speech of
Carvvaka) which is included in his book of poems bearing the same title
(1363 BS = 1955). Here too Carvfika is presented as a benefactor of m ankind
and one of his aims was to found a well-organized society for the good and
happiness of the greatest number.
In a note preceding the poem Mukhopadhyaya says: ‘A few days back
one monk confined himself underground in a box measuring six cubic feet,
at the outskirts of Delhi in order to meditate for some days for the benefit of
the world and he died.’ This incident prompted him to compose the poem.
Pramathanath Bishi (Pramathanatha Bis’T 1901—1985) wrote a novel,
Pumc'watc'im (1378 BS, 1971-72 CE). Carvaka here (1378 BS, part 3 Chaps.
5-6, 253-54, 256-70) appears as a guru who has his own hermitage in a
secluded spot near the Himalayas. He lives there with his disciples and
preaches hedonism. People from different parts of India visit him;
sometimes there are heated debates with the Vedists. He is not portrayed
altogether unfavourably, but he too fails to satisfy the query of Jarfi, the
hunter, who wished to know how he could be absolved of the sin of killing
Vasudeva Krsna inadvertently. Thus Carvaka’s philosophy is found
wanting.
The influence (or rather the shadow) of Paras’urama’s ‘Jabali’ is
noticeable in Bishi’s portrayal of Cari/aka. However, his is the only
composition that highlights what he considered to be the shortcomings of
the Carvaka doctrine; other Bengali authors implicitly approve of Carvika’s

Views.
Lokayata in Jain Canonical and Secular Works

Very much like the Buddhist canonical works, such as the ‘Brahmfiyusutta’ MN
2:41.11; 1958, 382, 41.2.9; 1958, 390', ‘Selasutta’ 2:423; 1958, 397;
‘Assalayanasutta’ 2431.1; 1958, 403; ‘Car'ikisutta’ 2:49.113; 1958, 429;
‘Sangfiravasutta’ 2250.1. 1; 1958, 482, and paracanonical works like MP
1.10, 1.23, 4.3, 4.26, and Lalitavistara 1877 Chap.12, 179, some Jain works
too record more or less similar curriculum of studies (for the princes?) They
include, besides the Vedas and the Vedfingas, and such secular subjects as
arithmetic, music, poetry, drama and stories, several philosophical systems.

For example, in the Vasu. 1987, 24, we read of MTmémsa, Samkha
(Samkhya), Loyiya, Loyayatiya, Satthitamta (Sasthitantra), etc.38 The
Anuyogadvc'tmsfitram mentions Loyayayam (1999 ed. sfitra 49; 91). It also
mentions Vaisesiyam, Buddhavayanam, Vesiyam, Kavilam, Loyayayam,
Satthitamtam, Madharam, etc. (ibid.', see also 1968 ed. sutra 72; 1999, 29).
Namdisfittam sfitra 67 too has a similar list of subjects under the head of
mithyc'rémta works, beginning with the Bhdmz‘a (Mk) and the Ram.-
Kanakasaptatih, Vais’esika, Buddhavacanam, Vais’ikam, Kfipilam,
Lokfiyatam, Sastitantram, Matharanl (Nos. 10-17) (1924 ed. sfitra 42 f. 193b,
1997 ed. 113).39
The position of Lokayata in the syllabus may suggest that it stands for a
system of philosophy, not disputatio, teaching the art and the science of
disputation (vitandfi-vfida—s’dstm} as in the Pali and Buddhist Sanskrit
tradition.40 But the haphazard mamer in which the subjects of study are
enumerated — philosophical systems and various other subjects named
unsystem atically — coupled with the uncertainty of reading (e.g., the mss of
the Namdi. mention several names to denote one subject:
Abhitamasuraksam, Hamtmfisurukkam, Bhi'bhasfiksma and Bhi‘bhfisurutta
(1997 ed. ‘Bhuumika’ 20. See also Amt. 1999 ed. 91 and Nandi. 1968 ed.
[44]) —renders the task of identifying the subjects and their contents extremely
difficult, if not impossible, at the present state of our knowledge.
38 Jamkhedkar 1984, 78-79, writes ‘Loyayatiyavada (lokflyatikaafidaf [sic], instead

of ‘Loyayatiya’ as in the printed text. The Vasu, middle section (first part)
[majjhimakhafido (padamo bhago)] contains more names, some of which are not
easy to identify: samikkhamtavdda, kanaga, sattari, mfisumkkha-sikkha, vesisz'ta,
yovayoi. . . (1987, 24). For a general survey of the Jain system of education, see B.
Dasgupta 1999.
39 Attempts have been made to identify the names with little success. Vaisika, for
instance, has been explained as a book of erotics (Kamasastra). It has been called
striveda (Veda for women) in the Cfirni on the SKS (Namdi 1997 ed. ‘Bhuumika’
20).
4° lokciyata is a polysemous word and it is not always easy to decide in which of the
many senses the word has been employed in a text. In KA 1.2.1 Anviksiki is one of
the viafizds; and Anviksiki stands for Samkhya, Yoga, and Lokayata (1.2.10). There
is no unanimity of opinion concerning what Anviksiki means — the science of
reasoning or philosophy or logical philosophy or what. Hence the meaning of
Lokayata too remains doubtful. See R. Bhattacharya 2009/2011 131-35. Personally
I am inclined to take Anviksiki in the sense of a logic-based philosophical system,
and Lokayata as disputatio, the art and science of disputation. For further details
regarding Lokayata in Pali and Buddhist Sanskrit works, see R. Bhattacharya
2009/2011, 187-200, and above Chap. Eight.
240 Chapter Twenty
Mention of Cfirvdka in K ahlana’s Raj ataraftgirfi

Carvfika makes his appearance in the m ost unexpected places. For instance,
Anandavardhana recalls Carvaka in passing when he speaks of dhvani (see
Chap. Twenty, 227-228). Another such instance is found in the RT, the saga
of the kings of Kashmir, written by Kahlana (eleventh/twelfth century).
Bohtlingk andRoth m ention this instance in their Sanskrit— Wo'rterbuch (s.v.
Carvaka) as does Monier-Williams in his Sanskrit English Dictionary
(1899), but no scholar, to the best of my knowledge, mentions this instance,
let alone comment on or analyse it in detail.
In course of a series of advice given by king Lalitfiditya to his ministers,
he wams:
Those who in this country desire to have the mastery at all times guard
against dissentions among themselves; for in their case no peril arises from
alien enemies as there is none for the Carvakas from the world beyond.
(4.345) 41
atmsthaih sawadfi raksya svabhedahpmbhavisnubhib I
cclrvclkdnclm ivaisclm hi bhqyam napamlokatah ||
41 MA. Troyer, the editor of the editia princeps of the RT and its first French
translator, wrote ‘esprz‘ts forts’ (strong spirits) after ‘Tchfirva(fi)kas’ both in his
rendering of RT 4.345 (1840, vol. I, 159) and in the Index (1840, vol. II, 629).
(B ohtlingk and Roth, and Monier-Williams refer to this edition in their dictionaries).
The secondmeaning given in Troyer’s Index is ‘philosophes d ’une secte hétérodoxe’
(philosophers of a heterodox sect). Apparently the Carvakas reminded Troyer of the
appellation ‘esprz'ts forts" given to a school of French philosophers in the
seventeenth-century. My fiiend, Dr Krishna del Toso of Trieste, explains (personal
communication (It. 26. 01. 2014):

As far as ” esprits forts" is concemed, thisis a quite typical French expression
originally coined, by their opponents, to re fer to the libertines of the XVII 0.
CE, like Pierre Gassendi, Gabriel Naudé, Francois de la Mothe 1e Vayer, etc.
The expression implicitlymeans: one who does not indulge in faith, one who
considers faith as something good for superstitious "weak spirits".
Of course, "esprits forts" at the very beginning was used with a derisive
sense, but after a while it became an actual — as it were — ”positive" definition
in se. T o be clear, the French libertinism of the XVII c. was a philosophical
movement (libertinage érudit) characterized by the rediscovery of the Greek
skeptic thought (Pyrrho) and the re-evaluation o f Epicurus' philosophy. The
libertines were used to argue solely on rational grounds and theyrefused any
kind of revelation. They accepted a morality founded only on reason and on
the “Law ofNature”.
This is a part of a series of advice, which however smacks of Kautilya

or Machiavelli, in both Lmscrupulousness and cruelty:
Even for no offence in this country that dwellers in the depths of the
mountains shouldbe fined. For if they should accumulate wealth, they might
become impregnable in the shelter o f the forts.
Action should be taken repeatedly so that the people in the villages
should not possess grain for consumption and bullocks for the area of the
fields in excess o f animal requirement.
For if they were to have excessive wealth they might become very
terrible Damaras [well-to—do/ prosperous landed gentry or feudal barons] in
a single year, able to violate the authority of the king. (4346-48)
The above instances, varied and divergent both in space and time, point out
a significant aspect of the impact of materialism in Indian life and thought,
both in pre-modern and modern times. Veda-baiting is not the exclusive
mark of the materialists — the Buddhists and the Jains did not lag behind —
but rationalism, denial of all authority (verbal testimony, s’abda) is a trait
associated with the materialists alone (although the Buddhist logicians too
didnot admit word as an instrument of cognition). It is interesting to observe
the positive response to Jabali and his preaching in modern Bangla works.
And lastly, the distinct tradition relating to Lokayata found in Jain canonical
and secular works deserves further exploration. By accumulating all these
details it will be possible to reconstruct the materialist tradition in India
more fully and creditably.
Carvaka Miscellany III

Asura-mata (the View of the Demons) and Lokfiyata
Krsna tells Arjuna in the G175:
In this world the creation of creatures is two fold, god like and demoniac.
The god like has been fully declared; hear from Me, O PIitha’s son, as to the
demoniac.
Demoniac creatures do not know what to do and what not to do, neither
purity nor right behavior; there is no truth in them.
They call the creatures truthless and lawless and Godless, produced by
a union of the sexes, having lust only for cause. (16.6-8, 236. Trans. Mohini
M. Chatterji)
242 Chapter Twenty
Sankarficfiraya and some of his followers (Anandagiri, NTlakantha,

Madhusfidana Sarasvati, Dhanapati, éehara and Hanumat) in their
commentaries on these verses explain this view of the accused as ‘the view
of the demons’ (mum-mam) and the view of the Lokayatikas. On the other
hand, Ramanuja, Des'ika, Venkatanatha and Vallabha refer to the demons
only, without bringing in the Lokayatikas. Valadeva mentions the
svabhc‘zva—vc‘zdins (the adherents of the doctrine of ‘own—being’; broadly
speaking, of inherent nature of all beings) and the Buddhists as well as the
Lokayatikas. Apparently, he wanted to include all the three non-Vedic
heterodox schools, the nfistikas, under the head of asuras, demons.
Madhusfidana too refers to the doctrine of ‘own—being’ (svabhdva) along
with that of the Lokayatikas. Some of the commentators also refer to a line
from a verse attributed to Brhaspati in the SDS: ‘The authors of the three
Vedas are the sages, frauds and thieves, trayo vedasya kartdro mum‘-
bhanda—nisficardh, a variant of the verse 10 of the Carvfika fragments (see
R. Bhattacharya 2009/2011, 85). Nflakantha even mentions two aphorisms
from the so-called Bc'zrhaspatya-sfitm (a collection of the aphorisms of
Brhaspati, the alleged founder of materialism in India): kfima evaikal:
pumsc'irthah (Pleasure (lit. desire) is the only aim of life) and caitanya—
vis'isjah-kcbzahpumsah (The body endowed with consciousness is the spirit)
— both of them spurious Carvaka fragments (see R. Bhattacharya 2009/2011,
96).
Why do Sankara and his followers, all non-dualist Veda‘mtins, think of
the Lokayatikas when there is nothing in the context which could even
remotely be related to materialism as a philosophical doctrine? Other
commentators had no such inclination to detect a hidden reference to the
Lokiyatikas in this passage or in any other verse in the whole of the Gitc't.
They take the word asum literally, meaning demons and nothing else.
I suspect that Sankara had an episode in the Cha‘Up (8.7- 8) in mind. It
involves the gods and the demons represented by Indra and Virocana
respectively. Both of them went to Prajapati to know the nature of the self.
Praj apati told them to come well-dressed and decorated with ornaments. He
then asked them to look at their reflections in the river. When they had done
so, he enquired, ‘What do you see?’ Both of them replied that they were
seeing their own reflections. Prajapati said, ‘This is the self (era fitmeti).
Virocana went back, thinking that he had known what the self was; it was
the body itself. Indra, however, had a second thought. Even after having
taken leave of Praj fipati, he came back, wishing to know more about the self.
Presumably Sankara took his cue from this episode in the ChfiUp and
related the asura-mata to the Lokayatikas, who did not believe in the
existence of any extra-corporal soul or spirit. Sankara’s followers too, it
seems, agreed with their master and without enquiring further if their
master’s view really fits the context of the G175, echoed his view without
any further explanation as to why the view of the demons is to be identified
with that of the Lokayatikas. Other commentators on the G175, not belonging
to the non-dualist Vedantin camp, had no inclination to read anything more
than what this passage in the G175: intends to convey. This is why they did
not go beyond the literal meaning and indulge in philosophizing.
The perennial war between the gods and the demons provides several
episodes inthe Puranas, ranging from bare reference to detailed descriptions
spread over several chapters. The outcome of the battles varies from time to
time: on some occasions the gods lost to the demons. Then they had resort
to Visnu (or Siva) for assistance. Hari or Hara creates a creature that is
Delusion (moha) personified. This creature assumes the forms of a heretic
— a naked Jain monk, a Buddhist mendicant or any pagandin (anti-Vedic) —
and deludes the demons so successfully that they gave up the Vedic path
and embraced the non-Vedic views. The locus classicus is VPu 3.18. Almost
all Indian and Western scholars have taken this story to refer to the
Carvaka/Lokayata materialists, although it has been demonstrated that
materialism has got nothing to do with the Puranic story (see above Chap.
Eighteen). Sankara too might have been under the same delusion, namely,
that the Puranic story was associated with the Lokayatikas, and related the
doctrine of the demons in the Gite“; to the Lokayatikas.
S. N. Dasgupta ’s faux pas

Many centuries after Sankara, SN. Dasgupta took the opinion of Sankara
seriously and sought to trace back the origin of Lokfiyata to, of all places,
Sumer. ‘This passage in the Chandogya seems to be of special importance,’
he says:
[T]hat there was a race different from the Aryan, designated here as mums,
who dressed their dead bodies, adomedthem with ornaments, provided them
with food, so that when there was a resurrection of these dead bodies they
might with that food, clothes and ornaments prosper in the other world and
it is these people who believed that the body was the only self. (1975, vol.
3, 528)
Dasgupta then boldly proposes a hypothesis: ‘It seems possible,

therefore, that probably the lokdyata doctrines had their beginnings in the
preceding Sumerian civilization in the then prevailing customs of adoming
the dead and the doctrine of bodily survival after death’ (1975, vol. 3, 529).
Then he goes on to the ‘proof’ provided in the KathaUp and the BrhadUp
244 Chapter Twenty
that there were people who did not believe in the existence of any
consciousness after death.
Debiprasad Chattopadhyaya in his Bangla book, Lokdyata Darfana
(1956), mentions Dasgupta’s hypothesis but refuses to believe that Sumer
or Assyria had anything to do with materialism (1956, 17, 434-44, 533-40).
However taking his cue from Sridhara’s commentary on the Gite? 16.6-8, D.
Chattopadhyaya entitled the first chapter of his English work, Lokc'zyata
(1959) as Asura—mata (1-75). Here too he dealt with Dasgupta’s hypothesis
and rejected it (1959 54-57). In the second revised edition of his Bangla
book (1969) D. Chattopadhyaya alters his plan and recasts the whole text.
Now he changes the title of his first chapter from ‘lokdyatar arthavicdm’
(Examining the meaning of Lokayata) to Asuramata — lokdyata dars’aner
samasyd (The Asura-view — Problems of Lokayata Dars’ana). The new
chapter now ranges from p. 1 to p. 280! However, the criticism of
Dasgupta’s view is retained:
Two major assumptions are involved in this (so. the Lokayata views had
their origin in ancient Sumeria. First, the asuras meant only the ancient
Sumerians. Secondly, the burial custom was characteristic only of them. . . .
However, on closer examination, we find both the assumptions to be highly
doubtful. (1956, 54-55)
After citing other views concerning the asuras, Chattopadhyaya

concludes:
This diversity of views concerning the asuras at least shows that the problem
is not a simple one and as such we cannot smoothly identify them with the
ancient Sumerians. The point is that the many references we come across in
our ancient literatures to the asuras are not all of the same nature; this
suggests that probably the term was not used in any uniform sense at all.
(1956, 57)
Dasgupta’s hypothesis is so ridiculous on the face of it — he has no
evidence to support his view — that no detailed refutation, after D.
Chattopadhaya’s work, is called for. Long after all this, K. C.
Chattopadhyaya reopens the matter of the alleged Sumerian origin of
Lokayata in an essay (1975), censuring both Dasgupta and D.
Chattopadhyaya for promoting such a ludicrous theory. He blames
Dasgupta most: ‘D. P. Chattopadhyaya has been misled by Prof. Dasgupta
in his Lokfiyata and he has assumed that the Lokfiyata system the philosophy
of the Asura people’ (1975, 154 n42). The censure of Dasgupta is quite
justified, but D. Chattopadhyaya, it should be noted, did not go the whole
hog with Dasgupta. On the other hand, he rejected Dasgupta’s unsupported
hypothesis in no unclear terms. K. C. Chattopadhyaya did not notice all this;

on the other hand, he went on accusing Dasgupta for misleading D.
Chattopadhyaya!
BrhaspatiDisguised as Sukra
Besides the Chc‘zUp, another Upanisad, the MaiUp, also contains a passage
which speaks of the gods and the demons and their gurus, Brhaspati and
Sukra respectively:
Brhaspati, having become gukra, created this false knowledge for the
security of Indra and the ruin of the Asuras. Through it they point to what is
auspicious as being inauspicious, and say that one must ponder the injurious
character of the scriptures like the Veda etc. . . . (7.9)
The gods and asuras, being desirous of the atrnan, betook themselves to
Brahman. Having bowed to him they said: “Reverend, we are desirous of
the arman: teach us.” There upon, having pondered awhile, he thought: “The
asuras are afier a different airman.” Therefore something different was taught
them. (7.10) (trans. J. A. B. Van Buitenen)
The passage preceding these two enumerates ‘the obstacles of

knowledge” (ffic‘mopasargfih) and ends up with the following verse.
Thus the text says: erring because of the sophisms, false illustrations and
grounds o f the doctrine that holds there is no 512131311 [nairdtmyavdda], the
world does not know what the conclusion o f Vedic wisdom is. (7.8)
The term nairc‘ztmyavc‘rda, has unanimously been accepted as meaning

Buddhism. Rfimafirtha in his commentary says:
vedaviajzdntamm iri vedam viafizdntaraficegzarthah I]

(Cowell’s edition, 1935, 206-07).
The learned commentator makes no distinction between the doctrine of

nihilism, momentariness and consciousness. He also points out that this
learning of Veda is of a different kind. Van Buitenen, too, in his translation
renders nairdtmyavdda as ‘the doctrine that holds there is no atman’ (that
is, permanent soul) and provides a one-word note, ‘Buddhism ’ (1962, 153).
The other non-Vedic doctrines in this passage refer to various popular cults,
resembling the Bauls, F akirs, and many such sects and sub-sects belonging
to the so-calledLittle Tradition of India today. There is no mention, not even
246 Chapter Twenty
the slightest hint, of materialism or even proto-materialism of any sort in

the MaiUp passages quoted above. On the other hand, there is a clear
allusion to Buddhism, admittedly a non-Vedic doctrine. The others are all
various communities with their own esoteric modes of worship and
meditation. There is no probability of any form of materialism or proto-
materialism to be indicated in the MaiUp, as in the Chc‘zUp.
It may also be mentioned in passing that the MaiUp story relating to
Brhaspati in the guise of Sukra reappears in the PPu, Srstikhanda (Chap.
13) in more details. In an enigmatic passage Brhaspati taunts Sukra: ‘Did
you not exculpate Indra from the sin of killing Vrtra by means of the
teachings of Lokayatika?’
vrtraghdtena cendrasya brahmahatjzfipurfibhavat |

Iokcfiiatikaéfistrena bhavaté sci tiraskrtd ll (13 .29 2)
I am yet to learn what lokdyatika—éc‘zstm could possibly signify in this

context. Surely it cannot mean disputatio, the art of disputation, the sense it
occurs in the Buddhist canonical and paracanonical works both in Pali and
Sanskrit (see above Chap. Eight). Nor can it stand for materialism, for the
concept of exculpation and materialism do not go together. Secondly, while
the story of the slaying of Vrtra by Indra is well known, there is no reference
to Indra’s exculpation from a sin involving the killing a brahmana in any of
the Puranic dictionaries and encyclopedias I have been able to consult.
Thirdly, how and by which way such acquittal can be made is not stated in
the Dharmasastras either. Hence, the enigma remains.
The Lokdyatika and the Buddhist in the Rs Upanisad

(According to Uvata and Mahidhara)
Uvata (1100 CE) and Mahidhara (1600 CE) are two commentators on the
White Yajurveda (Vfijasaheyi Samhité). The féfiUp, which belongs to this
Sukla Yajurveda Samhitfi (Chap. 40), has also been glossed by them. The
fsfiUp, verse 12 (=Sukla YV. 40.12), refers to the worshippers of asambhflti
and sambhriti:
andham tamahpmviéami ye ’sambhfltim upfisate |

tato bhfiya iva te tamo ya u sambhfitydm ratdh ||
Those who worship uncreated nature, enter into gloomy darkness, into still
greater darkness those who are devoted to created nature. (Trans. E. Roer)
Roer in a note explains: ‘Uncreated nature, asambhfiti, nature which has

no cause, the same with of avyakta, unmanifested nature’ (n.d., 8011).
Rammohun Roy translated fsc‘z verse 12 as follows:
Those observers o f religious rites who worship Prakriti alone, shall enter
into the dark region: and those practisers of religious ceremonies that are
devoted to worship solely the prior operating sensitive particle, allegorically
called Brahma, shall enter into a region much more dark than the former
(English Works 1995, vol. 2, 54).
This is not at all a literal translation, but an elaborate paraphrase based

on Sankara’s commentary.
A variant of this verse is found in the same text as verse 9:
andham tamahpmvz'santi ye ’vicfizém uprisate |

tato bhfiya iva te tamo ya u viafizfiyfim ratfih I]
A literal rendering of the verse would be:
Those who worship nescience, enter into gloomy darkness; into still greater
darkness those who are devoted to science.
None of the commentators goes beyond this. Uvata, however, brings in the
Lokayatikas. He is of the opinion that the Lokayatikas,having been introduced,
are here blamed (lokciyatikdhpram—{ya ninajzcmte. White Yajurveda 1929, 608).
He also quotes two Carvaka aphorisms: jalabudbudavcy’jivdh (Souls are like
water bubbles) and madasaktivadvijfia'nm (Consciousness is like the
intoxicating power [of the intoxicating drink]) (1929, 608). The first is an
exact quotation of Carvaka fragment 1.9 and the second, an adaptation of I. 5
(see R. Bhattacharya 2009/2011, 79, 87).

Malfidhara copies Uvata almost verbatim, with the only exception that
instead of Lokayatikas Mahidhara speaks of the Buddhists (bauddhfilz
pmstriya ninajzante. White Yajurveda 1929, 608). Moreover, he quotes the
same two aphorisms. No other commentator of the fs’éUp, to the best of my
knowledge, has resorted to the Lokayatikas or the Buddhists in explaining
these two verses. 42 No two commentators explain the two verses alike.
42 I do not claim to have read all the commentaries on the EflUp. However, I did
consult more than a dozen commentaries and glosses, belonging to all sorts of
Vedantins, both dualist and non-dualist, and such exotic ones as by Paficanana
Tarkaratna (§Jkta—dars‘ana-sarfipa—dvaitavdda), Valadeva Vidyabhfisana (Gaudiya
248 Chapter Twenty
éankara even takes the liberty to claim that sambhfiti in Ha verse 12 should
be taken to mean asambhfiti; similarly vina‘s‘a is claim ed to stand for
sambhfiti! Vedantades’ika and Kurunarayanahave taken exception to such an
unsupported and unsupportable claim (Radhakrishnan, n.d., 576). Similarly
the Krirma Parana explains fs’c‘t verses 12-14 as follows:
Undoubtedly the worshippers of other deities than Visnu go to blinding

darkness, but undoubtedly to greater darkness they go who do not censure
and condemn such persons (and fail to try to correct their mistakes).
Therefore those who know the lord Nfiréyana, in His true form as free from
all evils and who also condemn the worshipers of false deities, are truly the
goodpeople. (qtd. by Madhvacarya 1909, 10-11)
All this is doubtless interesting, if not for the wild and fanciful
interpretations having no relation whatsoever to the words in the text, but
for the ingenuity and boldness exhibited by the learned commentators.
Admittedly each of them had an axe to grind, otherwise why add to the
already existing number of commentaries? Nevertheless, nobody has
outdone Uvata and Mahidhara, who, like the proverbial juggler, produce the
Lokayatikas and the Buddhists out of their pagris, head-dresses (instead of
hats).
Lack of historical sense is responsible for the introduction of these two
heretical sects. Sukhlalji Sanghvi (1880-1977), the Gujarati savant, had
studied Sanskrit and the philosophical systems of India with traditional
scholars. Ultimately, however, he came to realize the shortcomings of the
traditional system. He confessed:
I had studied philosophy according to the old style of the Pandits and had
certainly derived a number of advantages therefrom; nevertheless, when I
first undertook the writing and research work and, at the same time,
consulted the outstanding works written and edited by the various Indian and
foreign scholars I became conscious of one great shortcoming of mine. The
shortcoming was my inability to make out how as a result of mutual
discussion and criticism the various philosophical systems of India
influenced one another either negatively or positively, by whom and when
was this influence exercised, and what was the extent thereof. . . . In the
course of all this activity I became firmly convinced that the study of any
philosophical system inevitably demands certain prerequisite and that this
prerequisite includes a fairly accurate understanding of the historical
Vedanta), and Bhaktivinoda Thakura (Suddha—bhakti—pmcfim, Propagation of pure

devotion), etc.
intewelationship obtaining between the various philosophical systems of

India. (1961, iv. Emphasis added).
Uvata and Malfidhara, not to speak of Sankara, the great ficc‘trya, never
learnt this lesson. They were sadly deficient inhistorical sense. Hence these
ludicrous identifications.
The yavajjivam Verse in the Yogavasistha

The Yogavc‘zsistha Rama-Wang (YOV) refers to materialism, called, among
other names, dehc‘ztmavc‘zda, the doctrine of the body and the soul
(Uttarardha, Nirvana-prakarana, Chap. 100) and quotes the well-known
yavajjz'vam verse as follows:
ydvajjfvam sukham jivenmisti mriyuragocarah |

bhasmibhfltasya santasya pananigamanam kutah || (100.2)
It is to be noted that the verse is quoted almost in the earliest form known
to us so far (see n43 below): the use of s’dntasya for dehasya in the first
hemistich of line 2 is significant. 43 The second hemistich of line 1, misti
mrtyur agocarah, instead of nfisti mrtyor agocamh (nothing is beyond the
ken of death) seems to be unique, for the latter reading, viz. nasti mrtyor
agocamh, is found in all other sources that quote this hemistich instead of
the distorted version, mam krtvc‘r ghrtam pibet (drink clarified butter even
by incurring debt), found only in S—M’s SDS, Chap. 1, 14 lines 125-126 and
nowhere else. Ananda—Bodhendra-Bhiksu, the learned commentator to the
YOV, however, elected to explain this hemistich as follows: Lokayata
agocara = non-perceptible. As long as one is alive, one’s own death is not

perceptible. Indeed by perceiving others’ death, (one’s) own death too is
[likewise] inferred. But inference is not a means of knowledge for the
Carvakas, since they do not admit any means of knowledge other than
perception. This is the sense.
agocarah apratyaksah | no tavajjivatah svasya mrtyuh pratyaksah | parescim

mrtyudars‘amid dhi svasjycipi mrtyus taafizaa’ anumiyate | no canumanam
carvdkfinam pramcinwn praWaksatirikta-pramdnfimbiwupagamfld iti
bha'vah |. . . (Basumati ed,712', Mumbai ed. 1918?, vol. 2, 1296).
43 For other occurrences of this verse in no fewer than thirteen instances and the
variants found in them, all composed after the eighth century CE, see R. Bhattacharya
2009/2011, 201-206.
250 Chapter Twenty
Here is an example of what Eli Franco has called ‘commentatorial

Wizardry’ (1997, 118). An epigram meant to deny rebirth is turned to
suggest that a materialist does not admit even the existence of death, since
they do not admit inference as a means of knowledge! Purandara and other
materialists, however, declare quite unequivocally that the Carvakas too
admit of such an inference as is well-known in the world (see R.
Bhattacharya 2009/2011, 82-83, 90-91).V.L. Mitra, however, rendered the
verse as follows:
A living being is happy so long as the dread of death (either of himself or
others) is out of his view; and that there is no reappearance (revivification)
of the dead, that is already reduced to ashes. (Hence there is no happiness
either for the living or dead (according to them). (n. d., 4:348)
Other translations in Bangla (Vangavasi ed. 1905-06, 702) and Hindi (vol.
5, 144) follow the commentary faithfully, as if they had no idea of the
original reading of the verse (for which see R Bhattacharya 2009/2011, 84-
85, Sloka 1.7). They should have realized that mrtyor agocamh makes much
better sense than mriyur agocamla. Taken as a Tatpurusa (Sasthi) compound,
it couldbetter be expalined in its expanded form (vigmhavfilgza): [k0 ’pi] mrtyor
agocara misti.
The verse occurs in the Y0 V quite abruptly in a chapter entitled
‘Refutation of Nastikahood’ (Nastikya-nirakarana, Uttarardha). Rama
enquires of Vasistha how the miseries of this world of those who maintain
so (that is, what is said in the verse quoted above, 100.1) can be assuaged:
yuktih sydt kfdrs‘l' brfihman samsdre duhkhaéfimaye |

teslfim yesflm ayam paksah .s‘ruyatdm ucyatfim tatah ||
Here too there is no mention of any author of the ydvq'vam verse,

but only such vague pronouns as resam yescim.

In the very next chapter, another verse reads:
To the Barhaspatya (follower o f Brhaspati = materialist) the Other World

does not exist.
ml viajzateparo [aka bdrhaspatyasya yasya Eu (101.3ab)
Our learned commentator, not satisfied with the m aterialist alone, brings
in the Buddha. He elucidates: Earhaspatya stands for the followers of the
Buddha’s text composed by Brhaspati (bdrhaspagzasya brhaspati—pmm‘ta—
buddha—s’dstrdnusdrinah (Basumati ed. n.d. 723', Mumbai ed. 1918?, 1300)!
Here is a semblable of Mathara (see above), who believed quite sincerely
that the Buddhist and the materialist were one and the same.
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Bhattacharya - 2020 - More Studies On The Cārvāka - Lokāyata

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More Studies on the

This book firstpublished 2020

C ambridge Scholars Publishing

Lady StephensonLibrary,Newcastle upon Tyne, NE6 2PA, UK

BritishLibrary C ataloguing in Public ation Data

Copyright© 2020 by Bamkrishna Bhattacharya

Chapter Two ............................................................................................. 24

Chapter Three ........................................................................................... 40

Chapter Four ............................................................................................. 49

Chapter Five ............................................................................................. 65

Chapter Six ............................................................................................... 70

Chapter Eight ............................................................................................. 84

Chapter Ten ............................................................................................ 109

Chapter Eleven ....................................................................................... 117

Chapter Twelve ...................................................................................... 124

Chapter Thirteen ..................................................................................... 139

Chapter Fourteen .................................................................................... 144

Chapter Fifteen ....................................................................................... 156

Chapter Sixteen ...................................................................................... 171

Chapter Seventeen.................................................................................. 176

Chapter Eighteen .................................................................................... 181

Chapter Nineteen.................................................................................... 197

Carvaka Miscellany I .............................................................................. 223

Bibliography ........................................................................................... 251

The book is a sequel to my Studies on the Carvﬁka/Lokﬁyata (Firenze 2009;

Brhaspati is widely believed to be the founder of the materialist system

ABORI Annals of the Bhandarkar Oriental Research Institute

SPM Mallisena. Syc'ldvc'zdamaﬁjarz‘

RELEVANCE OF THE KATHA UPANISAD

1 In a review article of Bollée’s translation of the Jain Paesi legend, Piotr

Max Muller and supported by Whitney (see below).

The other approach of tracing the rise of materialism in India was

universe) recorded in Svetc‘zs’vatam Upanigad ( ve Up) 1.2, another question

5 Hermann Jacobi 1922,146; 1923, l l e t seq.

Whitney’s translation 1890, 104).

The episode of Naciketas, proclaimed by Death, everlasting, the wise man

too. One of which is its importance as a document of the confrontation

10 D. Chattopadhyaya in his last days was engaged in preparing a Bangla monograph

In the KathaUp, we find Naciketas spelling out his doubt (vicikitsd,

much the question of the priority of matter or consciousness that divided

happens to every individual consciousness after the death of the body. It is

sheath,’ ayam muﬁjo, ayam isikﬁ, . . . yam asi, ayam kosi . . .

In the KajhaUp, however, there is no reference to any creator-god in

by offering him a valuable gift of the knowledge of a Fire and naming it

or as a ﬁsh, . . . as something else in different places.” Max Mﬁller’s translation,

reconciliation of the two. In the KathaUp knowledge is not upheld over

is translated by Roy as follows:

Yama himself admits:

the sacred ﬁre, whereby I became possessed of this sovereignty of long

It is also worth noting that there is no mention of any kind of knowledge

27 Cf. what R. E. Hume says about this strange mystiﬁcation of knowledge:

KNOWLEDGE — not “much learning,” but the understanding of

nasdmpardyahpmtibhdti bdlam pramdcﬁzantam vittamahen mﬂdham|

There is no (consequence to) aims-giving, sacriﬁce or oblation. A good or

It should be noted that while introducing the doctrine of Kum Era

called ‘the doctrine of the eternal’ (sassatavada, Sanskrit (Skt.)

a single affirmation: ‘This indeed is the greatest world; enjoy your

ajfiascfismddadhénaéca saméayfitmfi vinasfyati |

Naciketas suffered from this kind of vzpmtzpatti'.

In fact, what the KarhaUp ultimately seeks to establish is the importance

established. And who could be a better authority, dpta, to speak of what

Thus the importance of the KathaUp as a document embodying the

There is a tendency to consider Ianaka, Uddalaka, Yajﬁavalkya and other