Professional Documents
Culture Documents
Better Decision-Making on
the Iowa Gambling Task
Anna Alkozei and Ryan Smith
Department of Psychiatry, University of Arizona, Tucson, AZ, USA
Lauren A. Demers
McLean Hospital, Belmont, MA, USA
Mareen Weber
McLean Hospital, Belmont, MA, USA; Harvard Medical School, Boston, MA, USA
Sarah M. Berryhill
Department of Psychiatry, University of Arizona, Tucson, AZ, USA
William D. S. Killgore
Department of Psychiatry, University of Arizona, Tucson, AZ, USA; McLean Hospital,
Belmont, MA, USA; Harvard Medical School, Boston, MA, USA
Abstract
Higher levels of emotional intelligence have been associated with better inter and
intrapersonal functioning. In the present study, 59 healthy men and women were
randomized into either a three-week online training program targeted to improve
emotional intelligence (n ¼ 29), or a placebo control training program targeted
to improve awareness of nonemotional aspects of the environment (n ¼ 30).
Compared to placebo, participants in the emotional intelligence training group
showed increased performance on the total emotional intelligence score of the
Mayer–Salovey–Caruso Emotional Intelligence Test, a performance measure of
emotional intelligence, as well as subscales of perceiving emotions and facilitating
thought. Moreover, after emotional intelligence training, but not after placebo training,
individuals displayed the ability to arrive at optimal performance faster (i.e., they
showed a faster learning rate) during an emotion-guided decision-making task
Corresponding Author:
Anna Alkozei, Department of Psychiatry, University of Arizona, 1501 N Campbell Ave, PO Box 245002,
Tucson, AZ 85724, USA.
Email: aalkozei@psychiatry.arizona.edu
854 Psychological Reports 122(3)
(i.e., the Iowa Gambling Task). More specifically, although both groups showed similar
performance at the start of the Iowa Gambling Task from pre- to posttraining, the
participants in the emotional intelligence training group learned to choose more advan-
tageous than disadvantageous decks than those in the placebo training group by the
time they reached the ‘‘hunch’’ period of the task (i.e., the point in the task when
implicit task learning is thought to have occurred). Greater total improvements in
performance on the Iowa Gambling Task from pre- to posttraining in the emotional
intelligence training group were also positively correlated with pre- to posttraining
changes in Mayer–Salovey–Caruso Emotional Intelligence Test scores, in particular with
changes in the ability to perceive emotions. The present study provides preliminary
evidence that emotional intelligence can be trained with the help of an online training
program targeted at adults; it also suggests that changes in emotional intelligence, as a
result of such a program, can lead to improved emotion-guided decision-making.
Keywords
emotional intelligence, Iowa Gambling Task, emotion-guided decision-making
Introduction
Emotional intelligence (EI) refers to an interrelated set of abilities—centered around
the accurate perception of emotion and its adaptive use in guiding thought and
behavior—that facilitate successful inter- and intrapersonal functioning (Salovey &
Mayer, 1990). How EI is best measured remains the subject of debate, but one
leading approach uses the Mayer–Salovey–Caruso Emotional Intelligence Test
(MSCEIT), which measures EI by testing an individual’s performance on various
emotion-related tasks in a manner similar to tests of cognitive intelligence (IQ;
Mayer, Salovey, Caruso, & Sitarenios, 2003). An alternative approach is to measure
EI via an individual’s self-reported emotional abilities (e.g., Bar-On Emotional
Quotient Inventory (EQ-i); Bar-On, 2004). These two approaches are respectively
referred to as the ‘‘ability model’’ and the ‘‘trait model’’ for testing EI (Mayer,
Salovey, & Caruso, 2000). Whereas the ability model of EI objectively tests how
well an individual performs on a number of tasks in relation to other individuals
from the general population (such as one’s ability to identify emotions from facial
expressions), the trait model of EI taps into an individual’s self-assessment of his/her
socioemotional abilities (e.g., ‘‘I am good at reading other people’s facial expres-
sions’’). While both models may be useful in understanding how EI is associated
with a number of aspects of inter- and intrapersonal functioning, the two models
only show modest correlations with one another (Webb et al., 2013).
Enhancing EI
While using EI training as a way to improve emotional and social skills has
received relatively little attention within some areas of psychology (including clin-
ical psychology), similar training efforts have received considerable attention
within education and organizational psychology. For example, a number of
social and emotional skills programs have been implemented in school settings
(from kindergarten through high school), and have been shown to promote greater
academic performance and long-term success, better emotion regulation abilities,
higher self-esteem, increased prosocial behavior, as well as reductions in conduct
problems and emotional distress in comparison to no-training comparison groups
(for a review of such programs, see Durlak, Weissberg, Dymnicki, Taylor, &
Schellinger, 2011). One prominent example is the RULER program, the efficacy
of which has been empirically supported in school settings (Brackett, Rivers,
Reyes, & Salovey, 2012; Reyes, Brackett, Rivers, Elbertson, & Salovey, 2012;
Rivers, Brackett, Reyes, Elbertson, & Salovey, 2013). Furthermore, among emer-
ging adults, specifically university students, Pool Dacre and Qualter (2012) showed
that attending a series of weekly EI workshops led to increased ability EI and
emotional self-efficacy in comparison to students who chose a different elective.
The targeted training of social and emotional skills has also gained extensive
attention in the business setting. For example, Slaski and Cartwright (2003)
showed that attending a series of daylong programs to develop insight into
856 Psychological Reports 122(3)
cognitive tasks that involve intense emotions, but have found no association
between EI and ‘‘cool’’ cognitive tasks that do not involve intense emotions.
Furthermore, in line with this, Alkozei, Schwab, and Killgore (2016) have
shown that individuals with higher levels of ability EI, but not trait EI, are more
likely to utilize relevant facial features when presented with photographs during the
performance of an emotional decision-making task. In addition, individuals with
higher levels of ability EI also perform faster on social exchange problems (Reis
et al., 2007), and were observed to display greater performance on a simulated
arctic rescue scenario task that included high levels of stress (Fallon, Matthews,
Panganiban, Wohleber, & Roberts, 2013; Fallon et al., 2014). While the majority
of these studies suggest that ability EI is a better predictor of success on emotional
decision-making tasks than trait EI, one study did show that higher levels of trait
EI were positively associated with the ability to ignore irrelevant facial cues during
a social gambling task (Telle, Senior, & Butler, 2011). This study did not include a
measure of ability EI, and it is therefore unclear whether measures of ability EI
would have been stronger predictors of task success. Overall, while these findings
are interesting and important, the tasks used to assess affective decision-making
ability in these studies are not commonly used and therefore not well validated. As
a result, based on these findings, it remains difficult to draw specific inferences
about the role of EI in real-life decision-making.
The Iowa Gambling Task (IGT), on the other hand, is a widely used task that
mimics real-world decision-making under conditions of uncertainty; it also spe-
cifically assesses the ability for decisions to be adaptively guided by patterns in
rewarding and punishing feedback. While there has been some debate in recent
years, improved performance on the IGT over time appears to occur via implicit
learning—that is, before the individual gains a conscious understanding of task
contingencies (Bechara, Damasio, Tranel, & Damasio, 1997, 2005). This implicit
learning is hypothesized to occur through what have been termed ‘‘somatic
markers’’ (i.e., pleasant/unpleasant bodily emotional responses that occur auto-
matically when considering different decision options in light of prior experience;
Bechara et al., 1997, 2005). It is also well established that individuals with brain
damage to the medial orbitofrontal cortex (OFC) perform poorly on this task,
most plausibly due to their acquired inability to effectively generate/use such
somatic affective signals to guide choice/behavior (Bechara, 2004).
Given that EI is in part defined by the ability to adaptively use emotions in
guiding decision-making, it makes sense to expect that IGT performance and EI
would be positively related. However, studies have shown no associations
between performance on the IGT and trait EI (Brabec, Gfeller, & Ross, 2012;
Demaree, Burns, & DeDonno, 2010). In contrast, better performance on the
IGT was shown to be associated with better ability EI in one study (Webb,
DelDonno, & Killgore, 2014), but this relationship did not remain significant
after controlling for IQ. Thus, IGT performance differences may reflect under-
lying differences in cognitive processing that contribute to both EI and IQ.
858 Psychological Reports 122(3)
Methods
Participants
In total, 62 individuals (54% female) were recruited from the greater Boston
area and were randomized in equal numbers to the active EI (i.e., ‘‘internal
awareness’’) or placebo (i.e., ‘‘external awareness’’) training programs.
Participants ranged in age from 18 to 50 years (M ¼ 27.55, SD ¼ 7.95), were
all primary English speakers, and free from major medical, neurological, and
psychiatric conditions (as determined by a thorough phone screen). Participants
reported completing an average of 15.63 years of education, ranging from 12 to
20 years (SD ¼ 1.98). The sample was predominantly Caucasian (53.2%), but
also included individuals identifying themselves as African American (11.3%),
Asian (16.1%), and multiracial (17.7%). Two participants in the active EI
condition and one participant in the placebo condition dropped out of the
study prematurely, leaving n ¼ 29 in the active EI program and n ¼ 30 in
the placebo condition.
Materials
Bar-On Emotional Quotient Inventory. The EQ-i was used to assess self-reported, or
trait, EI (Ruiz-Aranda, Salguero, & Fernández-Berrocal, 2011). The EQ-i
includes items describing different factors of emotionally intelligent behavior
(e.g., ‘‘I am aware of my feelings’’). The EQ-i provides a global score of EI,
as well as five composite subscales measuring various aspects of EI, including
the ability to relate well to others (Interpersonal), emotional self-awareness and
self-confidence (Intrapersonal), emotional flexibility and problem-solving
(Adaptability), ability to cope with stress (Stress Management), and general opti-
mism and contentedness (General mood). The raw EQ-i scores were transformed
into standard scores based on the general population norms provided by the test
manual and scoring program (nonadjusted for sex). The EQ-i has demonstrated
excellent internal consistency (a ¼ .97) and good test–retest reliability ranging
from r ¼ .75 to .80 (Bar-On, 2004).
Figure 1. Example screenshots of the EI training and the placebo training program.
EI: emotional intelligence. (a) Example screenshot of how the EI training and the placebo
training were matched. (b) Example screenshot of other EI skills trained in the active EI
training program.
This placebo training condition was closely matched to the EI training program,
such that participants practiced similar skills (e.g., learning to identify an
emotion from a face based on its features versus learning to identify a plant
based on the features of a leaf) across the different modules (see Figure 1(a)).
Participants in both conditions received an e-mail with a homework assignment
after each module in order to encourage practice and generalization of the skills
learned. Participants were asked to indicate whether they completed the home-
work and reflect on what they learned.
Iowa Gambling Task (IGT). The IGT is a widely used computerized decision-making
task that assesses the ability to implicitly learn from reward and punishment
contingencies in order to use this information to arrive at the most advantageous
decision-making strategy. The IGT is presented as a card game whereby partici-
pants are shown four decks of cards on the computer screen. Participants are
instructed to pick one card at a time from any deck they choose and that they may
change decks as often as they like. Each time they select a card, the computer will
inform them that they won money. However, every so often, the computer will
also inform them that they lost money as well. Participants are instructed that the
goal of the task is to win as much money as possible and that they have $2000 of
credit. A bar on the top of the screen indicates to participants how much money
they have won or lost. Participants were told that although it is unknown how
much money they will win in each deck, there is one piece of information that will
make it more likely that they will be successful at the game: out of these four decks
of cards, some are worse than others. To win, participants should try to stay away
from ‘‘bad’’ decks. (For two of the decks, the amount of money won is usually
high, but occasionally participants will receive an extremely large penalty. Over
the course of the task, these decks are considered disadvantageous, or ‘‘bad
decks,’’ because they will incur a net-loss overall. Two of the decks on the
other hand will lead to comparatively smaller wins, but also smaller losses.
Over the course of the task, these decks are considered advantageous, or ‘‘good
decks,’’ because choosing these decks frequently will incur a net-gain overall.)
Participants choose 100 cards over the course of the task before it self-terminates.
**In the present study, a variant of the IGT was chosen where decks could ‘‘run
out,’’ such that people were forced to switch decks they selected a given deck too
many times. In order to assess whether participants learn which decks are good
and which are bad, participants’ performance was calculated across five bins of
cards (i.e., within the 1st–20th card, the 21st–40th card, etc.). We calculated ‘‘net-
scores’’ for each bin (i.e., number of bad decks chosen minus number of good
decks chosen within each bin), and total number of good decks chosen to quantify
performance on the IGT. Previous work using the IGT (Bechara et al., 1997,
2005) has suggested that performance changes across bins 1–3 reflects the majority
of the implicit affective learning (i.e., encompassing what are termed the ‘‘pre-
punishment’’ and ‘‘pre-hunch’’ periods), whereas performance tends to stabilize in
Alkozei et al. 863
bins 4 and 5 (i.e., termed the ‘‘hunch’’ and ‘‘conceptual’’ periods, respectively), but
individuals gradually gain explicit self-reportable knowledge of why they are
choosing the good decks over the bad decks.
Procedure
Participants completed two comprehensive assessment sessions on separate days,
approximately three weeks apart. On the first visit, participants completed a
range of emotional and cognitive tests, including the MSCEIT, EQ-i, WASI,
BDI-II, and IGT. Participants were then randomized into one of the two aware-
ness-training conditions, and completed their assigned training program at home
via the Internet over the following three weeks. Participants returned for a
posttraining visit three weeks after their initial visit and completed some of
the same emotional and cognitive tests, including the MSCEIT, EQ-i, BDI-II,
and IGT. Participants were compensated for their time.
Ethical considerations
This study was reviewed and approved by the McLean Hospital Institutional
Review Board and the US Army Human Research Protection Office. All par-
ticipants were provided with written and verbal information about the study.
In order to participate in the study written consent was required.
Results
Descriptive statistics
Participants in the two groups did not differ in age, sex, BDI-II scores, general
intelligence, or EI at pretraining (see Table 1). EQ-i and MSCEIT scores were
positively correlated (r ¼ .45, p < .001). Scores on the MSCEIT correlated
negatively with scores on the BDI-II (r ¼ .51, p < .001), and positively with
scores on the WASI (r ¼ .29, p ¼ .03). Scores on the EQ-i also correlated nega-
tively with scores on the BDI-II (r ¼ .50, p < .001), but not with scores on the
WASI (r ¼ .05, p ¼ .70). Performance on the IGT at pretraining (i.e., total
number of good decks chosen) was significantly correlated with MSCEIT
scores (r ¼ .32, p ¼ .02), EQ-i scores (r ¼ .29, p ¼ .03), WASI scores (r ¼ .47,
p < .001), and BDI-II scores (r ¼ .42, p < .001). Controlling for the effects
of WASI and BDI-II scores, the relationships between IGT performance and
scores on the MSCEIT and EQ-i became nonsignificant (MSCEIT: r ¼ .04,
p ¼ .75; EQ-i: r ¼ .17, p ¼ .23). BDI-II scores did not significantly change for
either group from pre- to posttraining, F(1, 60) ¼ .12, p ¼ .73. As performance
on the EQ-i was associated with BDI-II scores, we controlled for this variable
in any analysis that included the EQ-i below. In addition, as performance on
864 Psychological Reports 122(3)
the MSCEIT and IGT was associated with both BDI-II and WASI scores, we
controlled for both of these variables in all analyses that included MSCEIT
and/or IGT scores below.
EI training. When controlling for BDI-II and WASI scores, participants in the EI
training group showed a significant increase in total MSCEIT scores in
Alkozei et al. 865
IGT changes from pre- to posttraining. When controlling for WASI and BDI-II
scores, a repeated measures ANCOVA showed that there was no significant
effect of day of testing (i.e., from pre- to posttraining), F(1, 49) ¼ <.005,
p ¼ .99, and no significant day by netscore (per bin) by group interaction, F(4,
46) ¼ 1.99, p ¼ .11, (see Figure 3(a) and (b)). As we might have been underpow-
ered to detect a significant effect when looking at performance across the five
bins separately, we repeated this ANCOVA with IGT performance overall (i.e.,
total number of good decks chosen at pre- and posttraining) as the dependent
variables and group allocation (active EI versus placebo training) as the inde-
pendent variable. However, this analysis also showed no significant effect of day
of testing (pre- to posttraining), F(1, 59) ¼ .02, p ¼ .88, and no significant group
by IGT performance interaction, F(1, 50) ¼ 1.42, p ¼ .24.
Associations between changes in IGT performance and changes in ability EI. In order to
investigate whether changes in MSCEIT scores affected performance on the
IGT, we correlated the difference in MSCEIT scores from pre- to posttraining
with the difference in the total number of good decks chosen on the IGT from
pre- to posttraining while controlling for WASI and BDI-II scores. For partici-
pants in the EI training group, total MSCEIT difference scores were marginally
866 Psychological Reports 122(3)
(a) 125
120
115
EI training
MSCEIT Total 110
100
95
90
Pre-training Post-training
(b)
(c)
Figure 2. Changes in MSCEIT total and subscale scores from pre- to posttraining. (a)
MSCEIT total; (b) MSCEIT perceiving emotions; (c) MSCEIT understanding emotions; (d)
MSCEIT managing emotions; (e) MSCEIT facilitating thought. All analyses were controlled
for WASI and BDI-II scores. MSCEIT: Mayer–Salovey–Caruso Emotional Intelligence Test;
WASI: Wechsler Abbreviated Scale of Intelligence; BDI-II: Beck Depression Inventory.
*p < .05, **p < .001.
Alkozei et al. 867
(d)
(e)
Figure 2. Continued.
positively correlated with difference scores in the total number of good decks
chosen between pre- and posttraining (r ¼ .33, p ¼ .06, one-tailed), but this rela-
tionship was not present for participants in the placebo training group (r ¼ .01
p ¼ .49, one-tailed). The difference between the correlations within the two
groups was marginally significant (Z ¼ 1.4, p ¼ .06, one-tailed; see
Figure 4(a)). This correlation seemed to be driven by changes in the perceiving
emotions branch of the MSCEIT, as greater changes in the perceiving subscale
scores within the EI training group were associated with a greater change in the
total number of good decks chosen (r ¼ .46, p ¼ .03; two-tailed); this relationship
was not present for participants in the placebo training group (r ¼ .07, p ¼ .74,
two-tailed). This difference between the correlation coefficients of the two groups
reached statistical significance (Z ¼ 2.03, p ¼ .05, two-tailed; see Figure 4(b)).
For the other MSCEIT subscale scores, no such associations were found.
Follow-up analyses: EI training effects on IGT learning rate. It has been established that
learning on the IGT does not occur linearly; instead, individuals appear to go
868 Psychological Reports 122(3)
Table 2. Changes in MSCEIT scores from pre- to posttraining between the two groups.
EI Placebo
training training
(n ¼ 29) (n ¼ 30) Statistics
MSCEIT total pretraining 102.44 (10.93) 99.54 (11.28) F(1, 57) ¼ 2.98*
MSCEIT total posttraining 108.26 (10.11) 101.15 (14.35)
MSCEIT_understanding pretraining 99.70 (10.47) 98.03 (10.70) F(1, 57) ¼ .03
MSCEIT_understanding posttraining 103.07 (8.55) 100.84 (11.25)
MSCEIT_perceiving pretraining 105.32 (14.41) 105.81 (14.23) F(1, 57) ¼ 4.55*
MSCEIT_perceiving posttraining 112.49 (11.76) 105.54 (18.04)
MSCEIT_faciliating pretraining 102.39 (16.80) 101.65 (18.05) F(1, 57) ¼ 15.35**
MSCEIT_facilitating posttraining 120.12 (14.13) 103.96 (19.68)
MSCEIT_managing pretraining 100.14 (10.33) 98.03 (10.70) F(1, 57) ¼ .47
MSCEIT_managing posttraining 99.00 (10.05) 98.32 (11.55)
EQ-i total pretraining 101.59 (12.35) 99.86 (16.91) F(1, 55) ¼ .88
EQ-i total posttraining 102.69 (14.65) 99.07 (17.37)
EQ-i interpersonal pretraining 99.17.66 (18.51) 100.97 (15.11) F(1, 55) ¼ .1.32
EQ-i interpersonal posttraining 98.72 (17.48) 97.45 (16.91)
EQ-i intrapersonal pretraining 101.24 (14.58) 101.03 (19.31) F(1, 55) ¼ .80
EQ-i intrapersonal posttraining 101.03 (16.98) 99.07 (19.27)
EQ-i adaptability pretraining 101.52 (10.48) 99.21 (13.92) F(1, 55) ¼ .002
EQ-i adaptability posttraining 101.52 (11.28) 100.03 (15.35)
EQ-i stress management pretraining 105.21 (9.83) 102.28 (11.61) F(1, 55) ¼ .05
EQ-i stress management posttraining 106.72 (9.98) 103.45 (11.99)
EQ-i general mood pretraining 102.72 (12.06) 98.48 (16.76) F(1, 55) ¼ .13
EQ-i general mood posttraining 103.03 (12.71) 99.38 (17.97)
Note: All analyses were controlled for WASI and BDI-II scores. EQ-i: Bar-On Emotional Quotient
Inventory; MSCEIT: Mayer–Salovey–Caruso Emotional Intelligence Test; WASI: Wechsler Abbreviated
Scale of Intelligence; BDI-II: Beck Depression Inventory; *p < .05, **p < .001.
(a) 15
10
5
IGT Netscore
EI training
Placebo training
0
1 2 3 4 5
-5
-10
Bins
(b) 15
10
IGT Netscores
EI training
0
Placebo training
1 2 3 4 5
-5
-10
Bins
Figure 3. IGT netscores across the five bins for both groups. (a) Pretraining performance
on the IGT. (b) Posttraining performance on the IGT. All analyses were controlled for
WASI and BDI-II scores. WASI: Wechsler Abbreviated Scale of Intelligence; BDI-II: Beck
Depression Inventory; IGT: Iowa Gambling Task.
full self-reportable knowledge of the game. As the group comparisons above
might have been limited by statistical power (i.e., a small sample size for the
number of measurements that were compared), we elected to conduct a follow-
up analysis to investigate whether the active EI training may have led to better
870 Psychological Reports 122(3)
Figure 4. Correlations between change in total MSCEIT scores and change in total
number of good decks chosen from pre- to posttraining for the internal awareness
group. (a) Total MSCEIT scores; (b) MSCEIT perceiving emotions scores. All analyses
were controlled for WASI and BDI-II scores. WASI: Wechsler Abbreviated Scale of
Intelligence; BDI-II: Beck Depression Inventory; MSCEIT: Mayer–Salovey–Caruso
Emotional Intelligence Test.
Alkozei et al. 871
learning on the IGT (i.e., relative to the placebo training). Specifically, as pre-
vious work has suggested the existence of individual differences in learning rate
on the IGT (Visser-Keizer, Westerhof-Evers, Gerritsen, Van Der Naalt, &
Spikman, 2016), we investigated the possibility that participants in the active
EI training group (relative to those in the placebo training group) would show
an increased learning rate during the implicit reward learning process. A higher
learning rate was here operationalized as learning to choose a greater number of
good minus bad decks from the start of the task until the beginning of the
‘‘hunch’’ period of the task (approximately from bin 1 to bin 3; cards 0–60).
This time window from the start of the task to the start of the ‘‘hunch’’ period
was specifically chosen because, as described above, it is considered the part of
the task in which the majority of implicit affective learning and performance
increases occur. In fact, between bins 1 to 3, we observed that participants in the
active EI training group had a significantly increased learning rate from pre- to
posttraining in comparison to participants in the placebo training group, even
when controlling for WASI and BDI-II scores, F(1, 49) ¼ 4.71, p ¼ .02.
Discussion
The aim of this preliminary study was to investigate the effectiveness of a three-
week, 6-lesson, online EI training program for improving EI and performance
on an emotional decision-making task. The results suggest that the training
program was successful in increasing ability, but not trait, EI scores in compari-
son to a placebo control training program. In particular, individuals who com-
pleted the active EI training program showed an enhanced ability to perceive
emotions, and to use their emotions to facilitate other cognitive processes.
Furthermore, individuals in the EI training program showed quicker learning
of the advantageous decision-making strategy on the IGT from pre-to posttrain-
ing (i.e., in comparison to the placebo control group). Increases in performance
on the IGT from pre- to posttraining also correlated positively with changes in
ability EI scores for individuals who underwent the EI training program, but not
for individuals in the placebo control group.
To our knowledge, this is the first study to show that an online EI training
program can successfully lead to an increase in ability EI (but not trait EI) in an
adult population, and that such a training program can also improve perform-
ance on an emotionally guided decision-making task. It is surprising that indi-
viduals in the present study did not show an increase in self-perceived (i.e., trait)
EI after the training program. One might have plausibly expected that the act of
going through such a training program would lead individuals to expect that
their abilities had improved, leading to higher self-reported EI. However, it is
also possible that the training program simply affected different individuals in
opposite ways. For example, just as children’s self-related beliefs become more
realistic with age, plausibly due to corrective feedback provided by additional
872 Psychological Reports 122(3)
scores from pre- to posttraining (i.e., perceiving emotions subscale scores and
total scores) did correlate with changes in IGT performance for individuals in
the active EI training group, but not for those in the placebo training group,
even when controlling for IQ (i.e., at significant levels for the perceiving emo-
tions scores, and at trend levels for total scores). These findings therefore suggest
that, while IQ plays an important role in predicting performance on the IGT, and
performance on tests of EI and IQ may draw on partially overlapping cognitive
processes, training-related increases in EI can still influence IGT performance over
and above what can be accounted for by baseline IQ levels. Furthermore, the
present findings suggest that the EI-related ability to accurately perceive/recognize
emotions may bear the greatest relevance to IGT performance.
The related increases we observed in IGT and EI appear plausible when one
considers that both EI and IGT performance are believed to draw on self-related
emotion perception processes. As such, by increasing individuals’ ability to
perceive their own emotional state, EI training may have facilitated their ability
to effectively perceive and use their own somatic emotional responses (somatic
markers) during the decision-making process as well. This interpretation is
consistent with previous findings that individuals with better interoceptive
awareness (i.e., on a heartbeat perception task) show improved performance
on the IGT in comparison to individuals with poorer interoceptive awareness
(Dunn et al., 2010; Werner, Jung, Duschek, & Schandry, 2009), and that indi-
viduals with better interoceptive awareness showed greater activity within the
anterior insula, which predicted better decision-making on the IGT (Werner
et al., 2013). These interpretations remain speculative, as we did not measure
interoceptive awareness in the present study; the MSCEIT is also unable to
measure a person’s objective ability to perceive their own emotions/bodily feel-
ings accurately. Future studies should therefore include interoceptive awareness
assessments to test this hypothesis further. It also remains unclear whether the
enhancing effects of EI on IGT performance persist for any extent beyond the
follow-up visit. Future studies would benefit from including long-term follow-up
assessments in order to establish whether EI training can lead to lasting
improvements in emotion-guided decision-making.
It should be noted that this is a preliminary study and its findings should be
replicated in larger sample sizes. While we found no effect of age or gender on
the rates of improvements in ability EI, and our sample included a relatively
broad age range (18–50 years), inferences regarding the generalizability of these
findings would nevertheless be strengthened by examination of additional popu-
lations, such as various age and cultural groups. In addition, the effects of EI
training on other aspects of inter- or intrapersonal functioning warrant further
investigation, such as quality of social relationships, psychological adjustment,
resilience to stress, and general well-being. Despite these limitations, the findings
from the present study suggest that EI can be successfully enhanced through
the use of a brief online training program, which is a considerably less costly,
874 Psychological Reports 122(3)
Conclusion
To our knowledge, the present study is the first to provide evidence that ability
EI can be improved via an online training program for adults; it is also the first
to show that changes in EI as a result of such a program can lead to improved
performance on an emotionally guided decision-making task, possibly by
improving self-related emotion recognition processes (e.g., improving interocep-
tive awareness). Future studies will be necessary to improve EI training programs
in such a way that individuals show superior performance on all branches of EI,
possibly through the use of computerized adaptive learning to tailor content
to each individual’s emotional strengths and weaknesses. Future work should
replicate these results in a larger sample size; they should also focus on the
long-term effects of EI training, and its impact on other aspects of inter- and
intrapersonal functioning, such as vocational and academic performance, quality
of relationships, and psychological well-being.
Funding
The author(s) disclosed receipt of the following financial support for the research, author-
ship, and/or publication of this article: This work was supported by a USAMRAA grant
to WDSK (W81XWH-09-1-0730).
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Author Biographies
Anna Alkozei is a postdoctoral researcher in the Department of Psychiatry,
University of Arizona. She is interested in identifying novel ways to improve
psychological wellbeing in healthy as well as clinical populations.