Sane CHAPTER 13 Revolt and Consolidation: The Plan of Agua Prieta Ironically, it was President Carranza’s pressure on Sonora that would ultimately bring all the elements of Obregén’s political network into play against him. Alehough until this time Obre- gén had conducted an open political campaign within the limits of the law, the legal attacks made against him and the moves against the state Carranza considered to be Obregén’s power base pushed the Sonoran leaders to declare an armed movement against the Carranza government. They were thus able to mobilize individuals and groups who had formerly been acquiescent to a peaceful transfer of power along with those who had remained in rebellion against Carranza, The ease with which this mobilization was carried out illustrates the enormous strength of the political support Obregin and his associates had been building so carefully. Carranza’s campaign against Sonora had begun well before the moment of crisis. In mid-r9i9, he had declared the Rio Sonora to be the property of the federal government and had begun to make plans to divert some of its waters. In a state that was largely desert, this threat was a substantial one, ‘Though Carranza probably had the legal authority to take this step, it was nevertheless a direct slap in the face of the Sonorans, who had been promised control over these waters by Madero him- self in 1913. The problem was still unresolved when Calles passed the governorship to Adolfo de la Huerta, elected for the 1919-1923 term despite Carranza’s effort to keep him in New York as consul to prevent his campaigning." 3Clodoven Valenzucla and Amado Chaverri Matamoros, comps, Sonora ¥ Carranza, pp. 9. 11-12; Antonio Rivera, La Revolucién en Sonora, p. 504.234 Alvaro Obregén. Shortly thereafter, Carranza fred the acting director of the Secretariat of War, Juan José Rios, who had been the leader of one of the Red Battalions under Obregén at Celaya, and sent of forces there. In Sonora, he replaced ‘of Calles and thus of ment, Meanwhile, the Carrancistas were because he had, according to rumor, been, onistas with mone ‘A more serious the agreement with the Yaquis, which had been arranged by de la Huerta and Rios, although many of the obligations were ‘met out of stare funds? He then named Manuel ML ‘who had long fought under Obregén bu: thrown in his hand with Carranza, to ations in Sonora, Sinaloa, and Lower quarters of the ¥ omnia, with his head- mm to be an enemy ved by the Sonorans vocation to the now peaceful Indians to revolt agtin, weakening the state and giving Carranza an excuse for widespread repression, By the end of March, it was apparent that Carranza was planning to send smber of federal troops, principally 1nd his appoinerene was id nor take de la Huerta long co react. On A\ he sent a message to Carranza protesting the arrival of oops in the pore of Guaymas, supposedly co put dow a Revolt and Consolidation 235 the Vagus, who were not in revolt. Moroes, he accwed hen of ping cone wth she apenas eho fa teen thou out ofthe sae at ach flor. The tops maesPing ode le Hue ween ft ings 0 Sor 0 Spores governmen ect wt pected ta and ite another more satisfactor them in igts. He tended by explaining thar should the Yaquis be forced to move. into the Sierra again, where chey had no way of making they would be farced to rob again and the federal troops rec ag, se ate gir of ie ay gave de ls Tlucrta special po oe har wat doceed 3“ rei ov independenes and sovereign.” The rout Sure all powers necosty 1 - proect the sat te ct Cary Ap 86 ASRE 8 LE La eben iat Abas ioe Aston Cease by236 Alvaro Obregén powers over the finance and war. 1 governor was given permission to change the seat of government whenever necessiry, a sign that the Sonorans viewed a long-lasting civil war 28 the posible consequence of ther acions" Meanwhile, the Sonorans had been ng arms and ammunition in the U thers, and were rec ‘been in ‘of the Tampico oil regions, Manvel Peliez, with whom Cejudo was asociated, to assure himself of Peléer* suppose should he become president. Howeve that he had urged Cejudo to revole ign for office was such a success. any case, the circumstances of che charges we . had made peace ment in id= after promising to join the government to fight rebels nas he had Revolt and Consolidation 237 instrument of the polities! machina- government's case was built been forged y before the refused £0 be used as at quently went to the phone to get instructions and was heard to protest that he simply couldn'c do what was asked. In his excitement, he even tried co smoke his cigar nguil throughout, insisting that the court sd no connection with 1 judge dismissed the proceed- ‘ordered Obregin to report back ne A amber of dept and seston seat CObregén a tclegran congratulating him on the fifth aniversary ico City], March 49 and yo. and Apel 29F1 Menor Repebliene238 Alvaro Obregén espite rumors that his ‘was also threatened, 2c- ssip. General Andrés Castro, who had this casual meeting, which had been carefully arranged to be both public and publicized, must have given the president some so, on the eleventh news arrived from Calles to the effect that the state of Sonora, in view of Carranza’s communication (of the ninth, would be forced to assume her sovercigney. Obre- Revolt and Consolidation 239 igén, under constant in Mexico City, remarked to those who were assembled at the home ‘Alessio Robles, where he was staying, farco must have good reasons f ‘we're caught here in the mouse in the CR.OM,, and, rkers who had helped ‘was a moment of extreme by Carran's men. Escape to the north was obviously’ impossible; Sonore was too far away and the areas in between insecure. Obregén therefore resolved to go south toward the Zapatista, with whom he had ‘come to an agreement in March. He began his preparation for fight on Apri For hi way men. his car a box car on his ; sie ec Sr Ce To territory. When Maycoree joined Obregén’s cause, the candi ne we pif escape Mexico Ci ‘own regularly se esa vor Sonora tho of MapuFences 240 Alvaro Obregén time, and at least since some time in March he had been sure Obregén and the Zapatistas had a considerable community of interest. First of all, the Zapatistas had been trying other revolut ‘oursde of the Carranza movement in opposition to the Carranza government. They were encouraged when Obregén resigned War to retum to Sonora and from that time ed viewed him as a potential recruit or even leader for their cause, They had the privileged classes who did wach the same cerms in which Obregén himself the battle, rey had been attempts to approach urban labor for the porpos ied to make con ry.” They had uch the same uncritical which Obregin himself welcomed support. They fad aly made serve efor in ne ‘Archivo de Amado Aguirre, pene esi Ci. a Revolt and Consolidation 241 alliance such revolutionary leaders as J. Agustin Castro, Luis Gutiérrez, Juan Andreu Almazis ‘come to support Obregi Angeles, before his own death, had been in contact with the southern as the Zapatseas, delgined w ‘ lied to the man they fe would ea emg Taupin Co Speier Pom AZ\ imself and meet the Obregonista threat, that he knew he was beaten. Pablo Gon. more of his support . Not even Guadalupe Sin- chez, the candilo who controlled the railroad route co Vera- cruz, could be counted on, and on May 7 word of his defection although no one was quite suce if the report were true” On that same day, Carranza left Mexico Gy, although many of the eoops he had counted on did not ing the railroad line, Ca- 5 despite repeated offers he surrender. His that his cause was 38 he moved quickly and prosecute the killer, this danger faded" ana Revolt and Consolidation 245 Carranza, despite his position as head of the executive power of the nation, had found himself ult Hee had badly overestimated his own positin, and gave the Obt ing to try Obregén on false charges almost everyone ingers of the few days berween Obre- ity and the collapse of the Carranza ‘government ‘was almost bloodless, and the campaign thar ‘order had been reestablished, was carried on in a spirit Robles Dominguez, the resul already foregone. Prominent among Obregén's companions jon period were Luis Morones of the Partido 10 had followed him south jaz Soto y Gama, the Zapatista agrarian cho had been active in the Comision fo the period iesce in his presidency. In addition to they would have to acqi ream woes bers ht Oop wre upton ea fe lu iy he harmed ae efor for plc eurcer: Mama v5 Cane Vlog246 Alvaro Obregén his supporters wit Rai contacts made the and the Bakers’ Uni political relationships for Obregin, Gradual in Mexican society were reconciled to the der. Calles himself had made the first structing the Chihuahua Obre- ide was quite diferene from that @ few when these same workers were being urged t0 in 2 situation that might well have meant Revolt and Consolidation 247 a, a few days after the election, emphasized this ment. Foreshadi ay a few years later ab after the fever of re the necessary ion, he said in of reconstruering the count guide icin now paths, or that we are only able to destroy and ct to Feconstruct th He went on so state cht tis furure was in the hands of those who could aid in its reconstruction, and he urged all capable men to help. He added that he was traveling cbe count cisely so that he would know which individuals were and capable of helping with this my ional task, atthe same time he emphasized tha domain of the men of Y fis presidency, whe of government above mow, Asan example of his picy of consol Fam Nc ancndl puts fered by the Soin party. by BRE penuces af Boneguén by the Ra rota bythe Seno! of Agriculture” erica had slowed dow, and Mevico fers song.engh groups of workers, waymen’s Workers The tempo of heaved a see Revita de Tucan, Spe & ei, repre Ror, cate meee, HOLY 7248. Alvaro Obregén of the presidency would echo the earlier institution of a strong chief executive: the Spanish viceroy, the former dictator Diaz, Stil, the goals of government had undergone a significant change, and the new president was amenable to alternation in office, even if he would later prove unwilling to give up office entirely. Mexico was about to enter a new political era, an era of mass politics and stability. This combination, in Latin Ameri- cca at least, was to be unique for many years. Mexico had under- gone her social revolution; consolidation and reunification under new principles was underway.