REMEDIAL LAW Provisional Remedies and Special Civil Actions Dean Jess Zachael B. Espejo, LL.M. RULE 66 QUO WARRANTO Part 2 Section 2, When Solicitor General or public prosecutor must commence action. — The Solicitor General or a public prosecutor, when directed by the President of the Philippines, or when upon complaint or otherwise he has good reason to believe that any case specified in the preceding section can be established by proof, must commence such action. (3a) MANDATORY QUO WARRANTO ‘The mandatory quo warranto action under Section 2 is commenced by the Solicitor General in the name of the Republic of the Philippines against a usurper or against a corporation, on the proposition that the State is the aggrieved party. The Solicitor General institutes the action when directed by the President of the Philippines, or when upon a complaint or otherwise, he has good reason to believe that any of the cases specified under the law exists to warrant the institution of a quo warranto proceedings (DEL MAR versus PHILIPPINE AMUSEMENT AND GAMING CORPORATION, G.R. No. 138298. November 29, 2000). When the Solicitor General commences the action in the name of the Republic of the Philippines, he does so in the discharge of his task and mandate to see to it that the best interest of the public and the government are upheld. Section 3. When Solicitor General or public prosecutor may commence action with permission of court. — The Solicitor General or a public prosecutor may, with the permission of the court in which the action is to be commenced, bring such an action at the request and upon the relation of another person; but in such case the officer bringing it may first require an indemnity for the expenses and costs of the action in an amount approved by and to be deposited in the court by the person at whose request and upon whose relation the same is brought. (4a) Section 4. When hearing had on application for permission to commence action. — Upon application for permission to commence such action in accordance with the next preceding section, the court shall direct that notice be given to the respondent so that he may be heard in opposition thereto; and if permission is granted, the court shall issue an order to that effect, copies of which shall be served on all interested parties, and the petition shall then be filed within the period ordered by the court. (5a) DISCRETIONARY QUO WARRANTO Quo warranto under Section 3, as previously discussed, is termed discretionary as it is brought by the Solicitor General or a public prosecutor at the request and upon the relation Provisional Remedies and Special Civil Actions (JZE) Rule 66— Quo Warranto Part 2- Page 1 of 18of another person (relator), provided there is prior leave of the court in which the action is to be commenced. The Solicitor General or the public prosecutor who brings the action may first require an indemnity for the expenses and costs of the action in an amount approved by and to be deposited in the court by the relator. Section 4 next provides that, upon application for permission to commence the petition for quo warranto, the court shall direct that notice be given to the respondent so that he may be heard in opposition thereto. One of two things can happen next. First, the court may withhold leave, in which case the action can proceed no further. Second, the court may give its permission and issue an order to that effect, copies of which shall be served on all interested parties. The petition shall then be filed within the period ordered by the court. SOLICITOR GENERAL MAY REFUSE ‘TO FILE QUO WARRANTO ACTION TOPACIO versus ASSOCIATE JUSTICE ONG G.R. No. 179895, December 18, 2008 In the exercise of sound discretion, the Solicitor General may suspend or turn down the institution of an action for quo warranto where there are just and valid reasons. Thus, in Gonzales v. Chavez, the Court ruled: Like the Attorney-General of the United States who has absolute discretion in choosing whether to prosecute or not to prosecute or to abandon a prosecution already started, our own Solicitor General may even dismiss, abandon, discontinue or compromise suits either with or without stipulation with the other party. Abandonment of a case, however, does not mean that the Solicitor General may just drop it without any legal and valid reasons, for the discretion given him is not unlimited. Its exercise must be, not only within the parameters get by law but with the best interest of the State as the ultimate goal. Upon receipt of a case certified to him, the Solicitor General exercises his discretion in the management of the case. He may start the prosecution of the case by filing the appropriate action in court or he may opt not to file the case at all. He may do everything within his legal authority but always conformably with the national interest and the policy of the government on the matter at hand. Section 5. When an individual may commence such an action. — A person claiming to be entitled to a public office or position usurped or unlawfully held or exercised by another may bring an action therefor in his own name. (6) REAL PARTY IN INTEREST Rule 3, Section 2 of the Rules of Court provides that a real party in interest is the party who stands to be benefited or injured by the judgment in the suit, or the party entitled to the avails of the suit. It also requires that, unless otherwise authorized by law or the Rules of Court, every action must be prosecuted or defended in the name of the real party in interest. Provisional Remedies and Special Civil Actions (JZE) Rule 66~— Quo Warranto Part 2- Page 2 of 18‘The quo warranto petitions under Sections 2 and 8 of Rule 66, in relation to Section 1 thereof, are brought in the name of the Republic of the Philippines as it is the party that has interest in correcting the public wrong brought about by the usurpation. Conversely, under Section 5, it is the person claiming to be entitled to a public office or position usurped or unlawfully held or exercised by another who brings the action in his own name. It therefore follows that not any person may file a petition for quo warranto under Section 5. LIBAN versus GORDON G. R. No, 175352, January 18, 2011 Quo warranto is generally commenced by the Government as the proper party plaintiff. However, under Section 5, Rule 66 of the Rules of Court, an individual may commence such an action if he claims to be entitled to the public office allegedly usurped by another, in which case he can bring the action in his own name. The person instituting quo warranto proceedings in his own behalf must claim and be able to show that he is entitled to the office in dispute, otherwise the action may be dismissed at any stage. In the present case, petitioners do not claim to be entitled to the Senate office of respondent. Clearly, petitioners have no standing to file the present petition. Of further note is that the petitioner in Section 5 may maintain an action in his own name without the intervention of the Solicitor General or public prosecutor (see NAVARRO. versus GIMENEZ, G.R. No. L-4576, February 27, 1908, citing ACOSTA versus FLOR, G.R. No. 2122, Sep 13, 1905). Also, a petitioner who does not claim to be entitled to the office allegedly usurped or unlawfully held or exercised by another cannot question the latter's title thereto by quo warranto. CUYEGKENG versus CRUZ G.R. No. L-16263, July 26, 1960 Thus, one who does not claim to be entitled to the office allegedly usurped or unlawfully held or exercised by another cannot question his title thereto by quo warranto. In the case at bar, petitioners do not claim to entitled to the office held by respondent herein. None of them has been appointed thereto and none of them may, therefore, be placed in said office, regardless of the alleged flaws in respondent's title thereto. They merely assert a right to be appointed to said office. Considering, however, that there are seven (7) petitioners and that only one (1) office is involved in this case, none of them can, or does, give an assurance that he will be the one appointed by the President, should said office be declared vacant. In short, the claim of each petitioner is predicated solely upon a more or less recipient of the appointment. It is obvious, therefore, that none of them has a cause of action against respondent herein. PETITIONER HAS THE BURDEN OF PROVING ENTITLEMENT TO THE SUBJECT PUBLIC OFFICE MORO versus DEL CASTILLO, JR. G.R. No, 184980, March 30, 2011 Provisional Remedies and Special Civil Actions (JZE) Rule 66~— Quo Warranto Part 2- Page 3 of 18FACTS: ISSUE: RULING: On December 7, 2005 the Ombudsman charged respondent Del Castillo, then Chief Accountant of the General Headquarters (GHQ) Accounting Center of the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP), with dishonesty, grave misconduct and conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service. On April 1, 2006 the GHQ reassigned Del Castillo to the Philippine Air Force (PAF) Accounting Center and assigned Moro, then Chief Accountant of the Philippine Navy, to take over the position of Chief Accountant of the GHQ Accounting Center. Meantime, on August 30, 2006 the Ombudsman placed Del Castillo under preventive suspension for six months and eventually ordered his dismissal from the service on February 5, 2007. Following the lapse of his six-month suspension or on March 12, 2007 Del Castillo attempted to reassume his former post but he was unable to do so since Moro declined to yield the position. Consequently, on April 4, 2007 Del Castillo filed a petition for quo warranto’ against Moro with the Regional ‘Trial Court (RTC) of Paraiiaque City. Del Castillo claimed that Moro was merely detailed as GHQ Chief Accountant when the Ombudsman placed Del Castillo under preventive suspension. Since the latter's period of suspension already lapsed, he was entitled to resume his, former post and Moro was but a usurper. On October 10, 2007 the RTC dismissed Del Castillo's petition, holding that ‘Moro held the position of GHQ Chief Accountant pursuant to orders of the AFP Chief of Staff. The RTC found that the Ombudsman's February 5, 2007 Order, which directed Del Castillo's dismissal from the service, rendered the petition moot and academic. Whether or not respondent Del Castillo is entitled to be restored to the position of that he once held. NO. An action for quo warranto under Rule 66 of the Rules of Court may be filed against one who usurps, intrudes into, or unlawfully holds or exercises a public office. It may be brought by the Republic of the Philippines or by the person claiming to be entitled to such office. In this case, it was Del Castillo who filed the action, claiming that he was entitled as a matter of right to reassume the position of GH@ Chief Accountant after his preventive suspension ended XXX. But, as Moro points out, he had been authorized under SO 91 to serve as GHQ Chief Accountant. Del Castillo, on the other hand, had been ordered dismissed from the service by the Ombudsman in OMB.P-A-06-0031-A. Consequently, he cannot reassume the contested position. Del Castillo of course insists, citing Lapid v. Court of Appeals, that only decisions of the Ombudsman that impose the penalties of public censure, reprimand, or suspension of not more than a month or «fine of one month salary are final, executory, and unappealable. Consequently, when the penalty is Provisional Remedies and Special Civil Actions (JZE) Rule 66~ Quo Warranto Part 2- Page 4 of 18dismissal as in his case, he can avail himself of the remedy of appeal and the execution of the decision against him would, in the meantime, be held in abeyance. But, the Lapid case has already been superseded by In the Matter to Declare in Contempt of Court Hon. Simeon A. Datumanong, Secretary of DPWH. The Court held in Datumanong that Section 7, Rule ILI of Administrative Order 7, as amended by Administrative Order 17, clearly provides that an appeal shall not stop a decision of the Ombudsman from being executory. The Court later reiterated this ruling in Office of the Ombudsman v. Court of Appeals. In quo warranto, the petitioner who files the action in his name must prove that he is entitled to the subject public office. Otherwise, the person who holds the same has a right to undisturbed possession and the action for quo warranto may be dismissed. Here, Del Castillo brought the action for quo warranto in his name on April 4, 2007, months after the Ombudsman ordered his dismissal from service on February 5, 2007. As explained above, that dismissal order was immediately executory even pending appeal. Consequently, he has no right to pursue the action for quo warranto or reassume the position of Chief Accountant of the GHQ Accounting Center. Section 6. Parties and contents of petition against usurpation. — When the action is against a person for usurping a public office, position or franchise, the petition shall set forth the name of the person who claims to be entitled thereto, if any, with an averment of his right to the same and that the respondent is unlawfully in possession thereof. All persons who claim to be entitled to the public office, position or franchise may be made parties, and their respective rights to such public office, position or franchise determined, in the same action. (7a) SPECIFIC ALLEGATIONS IN QUO WARRANTO PETITION When the action is against a person for usurping a public office, position or franchise, the petition shall set forth the following: 1. The name of the person who claims to be entitled thereto, if any; 2, An averment of his right to the same; and 3, An averment that the respondent is unlawfully in possession thereof. All persons who claim to be entitled to the publie office, position or franchise may be made parties. Their respective rights to such public office, position or franchise will be determined, in the same action. Section 7. Venue. — An action under the preceding six sections can be brought only in the Supreme Court, the Court of Appeals, or in the Regional Trial Court exercising jurisdiction over the territorial area where the respondent or any of the Provisional Remedies and Special Civil Actions (JZE) Rule 66~— Quo Warranto Part 2- Page 5 of 18respondents resides, but when the Solicitor General commences the action, it may be brought in a Regional Trial Court in the City of Manila, in the Court of Appeals, or in the Supreme Court. (8a) VENUE OF QUO WARRANTO ACTION ‘The quo warranto petition must be filed before the Supreme Court, the Court of Appeals, or in the Regional Trial Court exercising jurisdiction over the territorial area where the respondent or any of the respondents resides. The residence of the petitioner is immaterial. ‘The doctrine of judicial hierarchy must also be observed, considering that the Supreme Court, the Court of Appeals and the Regional Trial Court have concurrent jurisdiction over the aetion. If it is the Solicitor General who commences the action in the name of the Republic of the Philippines, specifically in a uo warranto petition under either Section 2 or 3 of Rule 66, in relation to Section 1, the petition may be brought before a Regional Trial Court in the City of Manila, the several stations of the Court of Appeals, or the Supreme Court, again subject to the doctrine of judicial hierarchy BAR QUESTION 2001 A group of businessmen formed an association in Cebu City calling itself Cars Co. to distributelsell cars in said city. It did not incorporate itself under the law nor did it have any government permit or license to conduct its business as such. The Solicitor General filed before a Regional Trial Court in Manila a verified petition for quo warranto questioning and seeking to stop the operations of Car Co. The latter filed a motion to dismiss the petition on the ground of improper venue claiming that its main office and operations are in Cebu City and not in Manila. Is the contention of Cars Co. correct? SUGGESTED ANSWER: The contention of Car Co. is not correct. While as a rule, a petition for quo warranto filed before the RTC should be brought in the place where the respondent resides, this rule shall not apply when the petition is filed by the Solicitor General who is given the prerogative to file the petition in the Regional Trial Court of Manila. Section 8. Period for pleadings and proceedings may be reduced; action given precedence. — The court may reduce the period provided by these Rules for filing pleadings and for all other proceedings in the action in order to secure the most expeditious determination of the matters involved therein consistent with the rights of the parties. Such action may be given precedence over any other civil matter pending in the court. (9a) EXPEDITIOUS DETERMINATION AND PRECEDENCE ‘The court in which the quo warranto action is pending may reduce the periods for filing pleadings and for all other proceedings in the action in order to secure the most Provisional Remedies and Special Civil Actions (JZE) Rule 66— Quo Warranto Part 2- Page 6 of 18expeditious determination of the matters involved therein consistent with the rights of the parties. At the court's discretion, such action may be given precedence over any other pending civil matter. EXHAUSTION OF ADMINISTRATIVE REMEDIES NOT REQUIRED CORPUS versus CUADERNO, SR. G.R. No. L-17860, March 30, 1962 While it may be desirable that administrative remedies be first resorted to, no one is compelled or bound to do 80; and as said remedies neither are prerequisite to nor bar the institution of quo warranto proceedings, it follows that he who claims the right to hold a public office allegedly usurped by another and who desires to seek redress in the courts, should file the proper judicial action within the reglementary period. As emphasized in Bautista vs. Fajardo, 38 Phil. 624, and Tumulak vs. Egay, 46 O.G. 3683, public interest requires that the right to a public office should be determined as speedily as practicable. BAR QUESTION 1980 If the principal of a public high school is illegally replaced by another, is it a requirement that, before he can go to court on a quo warranto, he should first exhaust administrative remedies? SUGGESTED ANSWER: No. There is no such requirement under Rule 66. The action has to be brought within one G) year from the cause of ouster from office or the right to hold the office arose. A quo warranto proceeding is one of the instances where exhaustion of administrative remedies is not required, Section 9. Judgment where usurpation found. — When the respondent is found guilty of usurping into, intruding into, or unlawfully holding or exercising a public office, position or franchise, judgment shall be rendered that such respondent be ousted and altogether excluded therefrom, and that the petitioner or relator, as the case may be, recover his costs. Such further judgment may be rendered determining the respective rights in and to the public office, position or franchise of all the parties to the action as justice requires. (10a) JUDGMENT WHERE USURPATION FOUND, In case of usurpation of a public office, when the respondent is found guilty of usurping, intruding into, or unlawfully holding or exercising a public office, position or franchise, the judgment shall include the following: (a) The respondent shall be ousted and excluded from the office; (b) The petitioner or relator, as the case may be, shall recover his costs; and Provisional Remedies and Special Civil Actions (JZE) Rule 66~— Quo Warranto Part 2- Page 7 of 18(© Such further judgment determining the respective rights in and to the public office, position or franchise of all the parties to the action as justice requires. ‘The remedies available in a quo warranto judgment do not include correction or reversal of acts taken under the ostensible authority of an office or franchise. Judgment is limited to ouster or forfeiture and may not be imposed retroactively upon prior exercise of official or corporate duties (REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES versus SERENO, G.R. No. 237428, May 11, 2018) JUDGMENT NOT BINDING ON SUCCESSOR, Ordinarily, a judgment against a public officer in regard to a publie right binds his successor in office. This rule, however, is not applicable in quo warranto cases. A judgment, in quo warranto does not bind the respondent's suecessor in office, even though such successor may trace his title to the same source. ‘This follows from the nature of the writ of quo warranto itself, It is never directed to an officer as such, but always against the person — to determine whether he is constitutionally and legally authorized to perform any act in, or exorcise any function of the office to which he lays claim (MENDOZA versus ALLAS, G.R. No. 181977, February 4, 1999). Section 10. Rights of persons adjudged entitled to public office; delivery of books and papers; damages. — If judgment be rendered in favor of the person averred in the complaint to be entitled to the public office he may, after taking the oath of office and executing any official bond required by law, take upon himself the execution of the office, and may immediately thereafter demand of the respondent all the books and papers in the respondent's custody or control appertaining to the office to which the judgment relates. If the respondent refuses or neglects to deliver any book or paper pursuant to such demand, he may be punished for contempt as having disobeyed a lawful order of the court. The person adjudged entitled to the office may also bring action against the respondent to recover the damages sustained by such person by reason of the usurpation. (15a) RIGHTS OF PERSONS ADJUDGED ENTITLED TO PUBLIC OFFICE If the judgment rendered in the quo warranto proceeding is favorable to the person averred in the complaint to be entitled to the public office, he may exercise the following rights after taking the oath of office and executing any official bond required by law: 1, To take upon himself the execution of the office; 2. 'To immediately thereafter demand of the respondent all the books and papers in the respondent's custody or control appertaining to the office to which the judgment relates; and 3. To bring action against the respondent to recover the damages sustained by reason of the usurpation within one (1) year after the entry of the judgment establishing the petitioner's right to the office in question. SANCTIONS UPON RESPONDENT Provisional Remedies and Special Civil Actions (JZE) Rule 66— Quo Warranto Part 2 - Page 8 of 18In addition to possible liability for damages, if the respondent refuses or neglects to deliver any book or paper pursuant to the demand of the person averred in the complaint to be entitled to the public office, he may be punished for indirect contempt as such act constitutes “disobedience of or resistance to a lawful writ, process, order, or judgment of a court” as stated in Rule 71, Section 3(b) of the Rules of Court. Being an indirect, and not a direct, contempt of the court that rendered judgment, such contempt is punished only after a charge in writing has been filed, and an opportunity given to the respondent to comment thereon After a charge in writing has been filed, and an opportunity given to the respondent. to comment thereon and to be heard by himself or counsel. Section 11. Limitations. — Nothing contained in this Rule shall be construed to authorize an action against a public officer or employee for his ouster from office unless the same be commenced within one (1) year after the cause of such ouster, or the right of the petitioner to hold such office or position, arose, nor to authorize an action for damages in accordance with the provisions of the next preceding section unless the same be commenced within one (1) year after the entry of the judgment establishing the petitioner's right to the office in question. (16a) PRESCRIPTIVE PERIOD FOR FILING As a general rule, an action for quo warranto against a public officer or employee to oust him from office must be brought within one (1) year after the cause of such ouster, or the right of the petitioner to hold such office or position, arose. The same period applies to the action for damages referred to in Section 10. Urgency to resolve the controversy on the title to a public office to prevent a hiatus or disruption in the delivery of public service is the ultimate consideration in prescribing a limitation on when an action for quo warranto may be instituted (REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES versus SERENO, G.R. No. 237428, June 19, 2018) ‘The period fixed in the rule is a condition precedent to the existence of the cause of action, with the result that, if a complaint is not filed within one year, it cannot prosper although the matter is not set up in the answer or motion to dismiss (Abeto vs. Rodas, G.R. No. 1-2041, November 3, 1948). The inaction of the officer for one year could be validly considered as a waiver (BUMANLAG versus FERNANDEZ, G.R. No. 1-11482, November 29, 1960). ‘A person claiming right to a position in the civil service must institute the proper proceedings to assert his right within the period of one year from the date of separation, otherwise he will be considered as having abandoned his office, or even acquiesced or consented to his removal, and, therefore, not entitled to bring action for his reinstatement. ‘The rationale of this doctrine is that the Government must be immediately informed or advised if any person claims to be entitled to an office or a position in the civil service as against another actually holding it, so that the Government may not be faced with the predicament of having to pay two salaries, one, for the person actually holding the office, although illegally, and another, for one not actually rendering service although entitled to do so (MADRID versus AUDITOR GENERAL, G.R. No. L-13523. May 31, 1960). Provisional Remedies and Special Civil Actions (JZE) Rule 66— Quo Warranto Part 2- Page 9 of 18EXCEPTIONS TO THE ONE-YEAR PERIOD As can be culled from the Supreme Court's discussions in the case of REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES versus SERENO, G.R. No. 237428, June 19, 2018, there are exceptional cases that justify departure from the strict prescriptive period for the filing of quo warranto petitions. First, when filed by the State at its own instance, through the Solicitor General, such as in the case of a petition filed in Section 2, prescription shall not apply. When the government is the real party in interest, and is proceeding mainly to assert its rights, there can be no defense on the ground of laches or prescription. The basic principle that "prescription does not lie against the State" which finds textual basis under Article 1108 (4) of the Civil Code, applies. This, of course, does not equate to a blanket authority given to the Solicitor General to indiscriminately file baseless quo warranto actions in disregard of the constitutionally-protected rights of individuals ‘The Supreme Court added that “(i)ndeed, there is no proprietary right over a public office. Hence, a claimed right over a public office may be waived. In fact, even Constitutionally-protected rights may be waived. Thus, We have consistently held that the inaction of a person claiming right over a public office to assert the same within the prescriptive period provided by the rules, may be considered a waiver of such right, This is where the difference between a quo warranto filed by a private individual as opposed to one filed by the State through the Solicitor General lies. There is no claim of right over a public office where it is the State itself, through the Solicitor General, which files a petition for quo warranto to question the eligibility of the person holding the public office. As We have emphasized in the assailed Decision, unlike Constitutionally-protected _ rights, Constitutionally-required qualifications for a publie office can never be waived either deliberately or by mere passage of time. While a private individual may, in proper instances, be deemed to have waived his or her right over title to public office and/or to have acquiesced or consented to the loss of such right, no organized society would allow, much more a prudent court would consider, the State to have waived by mere lapse of time, its right to uphold and ensure compliance with the requirements for sueh office, fixed by no less than the Constitution, the fundamental law upon which the foundations of a State stand, especially so when the government cannot be faulted for such lapse.” Second, when filed by the Solicitor General or public prosecutor at the request and upon relation of another person, with leave of court, such as in the case of a petition filed under Section 3, prescription shall apply except in instances where the following established jurisprudential exceptions are present: (1) There was no acquiescence to or inaction on the part of the petitioner, amounting to the abandonment of his right to the position; (2) It was an act of the government through its responsible officials which contributed to the delay in the filing of the action; and (8) The petition was grounded upon the assertion that petitioner's removal from the questioned position was contrary to law. Provisional Remedies and Special Civil Actions (JZE) Rule 66— Quo Warranto Part 2 - Page 10 of 18When filed by an individual in his or her own name under Section 5, prescription shall apply, except when the above-stated established jurisprudential exceptions are present. Section 12. Judgment for costs. — In an action brought in accordance with the provisions of this Rule, the court may render judgment for costs against either the petitioner, the relator, or the respondent, or the person or persons claiming to be a corporation, or may apportion the costs, as justice requires. (17a) COMMENT ‘This provision is self-explanatory and requires no further elaboration. LANDMARK CASES ‘The Supreme Court made its most comprehensive and instructive discussions on quo warranto in its main decision in REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES versus SERENO, G.R. No. 237428, May 11, 2018, and in its subsequent resolution of Respondent's Ad Cautelam Motion for Reconsideration in REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES versus SERENO, G.R. No. 237428, June 19, 2018, ‘The factual backdrop of the case is within the realm of public knowledge. From November 1986 to June 1, 2006, former Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, respondent Ma. Lourdes P.A. Sereno was a member of the faculty of the University of the Philippines-College of Law. Sereno was also employed as legal counsel of the Republie of the Philippines up until 2009. She also served as a Deputy Commissioner of the Commission on Human Rights. Incidentally, the Human Resources Development Office of the University of the Philippines (U.P. HRDO) certified that there was no record on respondent's personnel file of any permission to ngage in limited practice of profession. Despite having been employed at the U.P. College of Law for almost twenty years, the record of the U.P. HRDO only contains the Statement of Assets, Liabilities and Net Worth (SALN) for 1985,1990,1991, 1993 to 1997, and 2002, as filed by respondent. On the other hand, the records of the Central Records Division of the Office of the Ombudsman yields that there is no SALN filed by respondent for calendar years 1999 to 2009 except for the SALN ending December 1998 which was subscribed only in August 2003 and transmitted by the U.P. HRDO to the Ombudsman only on December 16, 2003. Belatedly, in respondent's Ad Cautelam Manifestation/ Submission, she attached a copy of her SALN for 1989 which she supposedly sourced from the "filing cabinets" or "drawers of U.P." Similarly, despite having been employed as legal counsel of various government agencies from 2003 to 2009, there was likewise no showing that she filed her SALNs for these years, except for the SALN ending December 31, 2009 which was unsubscribed and filed before the Office of the Clerk of Court only on June 22, 2012. After having served as a professor at the U.P, College of Law until 2006, and thereafter as practitioner in various outfits including as legal counsel for the Republic until 2009, the respondent submitted her application for the position of Associate Justice of the Supreme Court in July 2010. On August 2010, Sereno was appointed as Associate Justice. On 2012, the position of Chief Justice was declared vacant, and the Judicial and Bar Council Provisional Remedies and Special Civil Actions (JZE) Rule 66— Quo Warranto Part 2 - Page 11 of 18(JBC) directed the applicants to submit documents, among which are “all previous SALNs up to December 31, 2011” for those in the government and “SALN as of December 31, 2011" for those from the private sector. The JBC announcement further provided that “applicants with incomplete or out-of-date documentary requirements will not be interviewed or considered for nomination.” Sereno expressed in a letter to the JBC that, since she resigned from UP Law on 2006 and became a private practitioner, she was treated as coming from the private seetor and only submitted three (3) SALNs (i.e., her SALNs from the time she became an Associate Justice). Sereno also said that, considering that most of her government records in the academe are more than 15 years old, it is reasonable to consider it infeasible to retrieve all of those files, and that the clearance issued by UP HRDO and the Civil Service Commission should be taken in her favor. There was no record that the letter was deliberated upon, Despite this, Sereno was said to have complete requirements. On August 2012, Sereno was appointed Chief Justice. On August 30, 2017, or five years after respondent's appointment as Chief Justice, an impeachment complaint was filed by Atty. Larry Gadon against respondent with the Committee on Justice of the House of Representatives for culpable violation of the Constitution, corruption, high crimes, and betrayal of public trust. The complaint also alleged that respondent failed to make truthful declarations in her SALNs. ‘The impeachment complaint was endorsed by several members of the House and, thereafter, was found to be sufficient in form and substance. The respondent filed her answer and, after the filing of the reply and the rejoinder, the House Committee on Justice conducted several hearings on the determination of probable cause, the last of which was held on February 27, 2018. During these hearings, it was revealed that respondent purportedly failed to file her SALNs while she was a member of the faculty of the U.P. College of Law and that she filed her SALN only for the years 1998, 2002 and 2006, During the hearing on February 7, 2018 of the House Committee on Justice, Associate Justice Diosdado M. Peralta, as a resource person being then the acting ex-officio Chairman of the JBC, further claimed that during the JBC deliberations in 2012, he was not made aware that respondent submitted incomplete SALNs. ‘The hearings before the House Committee on Justice spawned two relevant incidents: one, the proposal of the House Committee for the Supreme Court to investigate on the proceedings of the JBC relative to the nomination of respondent as Chief Justice; and two, a Letter dated February 21, 2018 of Atty. Eligio Mallari to the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) requesting that the latter, in representation of the Republic, initiate a quo warranto proceeding against respondent. Invoking the Supreme Court's original jurisdiction under Section (1), Article VIII of the Constitution in relation to the special civil action under Rule 66 of the Rules of Court, the Republic of the Philippines, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) filed a petition for the issuance of the extraordinary writ of quo warranto to declare as void respondent's appointment as Chief Justice of the Supreme Court and to oust and altogether exclude her therefrom. In justifying resort to a petition for quo warranto, the Republic argues that quo warranto is available as a remedy even as against impeachable officers, like respondent. The Provisional Remedies and Special Civil Actions (JZE) Rule 66— Quo Warranto Part 2 - Page 12 of 18Republic argues that a petition for quo warranto is different from the impeachment proceedings because the writ of guo warranto is being sought to question the validity of her appointment, while the impeachment complaint accuses her of committing culpable violation of the Constitution and betrayal of public trust while in office. Respondent, for her part, contends that the Chief Justice may be ousted from office only by impeachment. Respondent contends that the use of the phrase "may be removed from office" in Section 2, Article XI of the Constitution does not signify that Members of the Supreme Court may be removed through modes other than impeachment. According to respondent, the clear intention of the framers of the Constitution was to create an exclusive category of public officers who can be removed only by impeachment and not otherwise The above case for quo warranto presented several issues for the Supreme Court's resolution. In its Decision, the Supreme Court took the occasion to examine and revisit its past decisions and doctrines, as well as foreign precedents, on quo warranio. The two cases are must-reads for all students of the law. However, for purposes of this chapter, focus will be devoted to the Supreme Court's jurisdiction over original actions for quo warranto, the viability of quo warranto as a remedy to oust an impeachable officer under the 1987 Constitution while impeachment proceedings have in fact been initiated, and the distinctions between quo warranto and impeachment. SUPREME COURT'S JURISDICTION OVER, ORIGINAL ACTIONS FOR QUO WARRANTO, ‘The Supreme Court said that Section 5, Article VIII of the Constitution, in part, provides that the Supreme Court shall exercise original jurisdiction over petitions for certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto, and habeas corpus. The Supreme Court, the Court of Appeals and the Regional Trial Courts have concurrent jurisdiction to issue the extraordinary writs, including quo warranto. Relatedly, Section 7, Rule 66 of the Rules of Court provides that the venue of an action for quo warranto, when commenced by the Solicitor General, is either the Regional Trial Court in the City of Manila, in the Court of Appeals, or in the Supreme Court, While the hierarchy of courts serves as a general determinant of the appropriate forum for petitions for the extraordinary writs, a direct invocation of the Supreme Court's original jurisdiction to issue such writs is allowed when there are special and important reasons therefor, clearly and specifically set out in the petition. In Sereno, the Supreme Court decalred that direct resort to it is justified considering that the action for quo warranto questions the qualification of no less than a Member of the Court. The issue of whether a person usurps, intrudes into, or unlawfully holds or exercises a public office is a matter of public concern over which the government takes special interest as it obviously cannot allow an intruder or impostor to occupy a public position, While traditionally, the principle of transcendental importance applies as an exception to the rule requiring locus standi before the courts can exercise its judicial power of review, the same principle nevertheless, finds application as it is without doubt that the State maintains an interest on the issue of the legality of the Chief Justice's appointment. Provisional Remedies and Special Civil Actions (JZE) Rule 66— Quo Warranto Part 2 - Page 13 of 18Further, it is apparent that the petition is one of first impression and of paramount importance to the public in the sense that the qualification, eligibility and appointment of an incumbent Chief Justice, the highest official of the Judiciary, are being scrutinized through an action for quo warranto. The Supreme Court further noted that its action on the petition has far-reaching implications, and it is paramount that the it makes definitive pronouncements on the issues presented for the guidance of the bench, bar, and the public in future analogous cases. Policy and ethical considerations likewise behoove the Supreme Court to rule on the issues put forth by the parties. The Supreme Court described itself as a vigilant advocate in ensuring that its members and employees continuously possess the highest ideals of integrity, honesty, and uprightness. It further stated that “(m)ore than professional competence, this Court is cognizant of the reality that the strength of Our institution depends on the confidence reposed on Us by the public. As can be gleaned from Our recent decisions, this Court has not hesitated from disciplining its members whether they be judges, Justices or regular court employees. This case should not therefore be treated merely with kid gloves because it involves the highest official of the judicial branch of the government. On the contrary, this is an opportune time for this Court to exact accountability by examining whether there has been strict compliance with the legal and procedural requirements in the appointment of its Members.” It bears repeating that, while Sereno allowed a direct invocation of the Supreme Court's original jurisdiction to issue extraordinary writs, including quo warranto, when there are special and important reasons, in GIOS-SAMAR, INC., versus DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION AND COMMUNICATIONS, G.R. No. 217158, March 12, 2019, the Supreme Court seems to have already rejected this exception to the doctrine of hierarchy of courts. Thus, when a question before the Supreme Court in a quo warranto petition involves the determination of a factual issue that is indispensable to the resolution of the legal issue, the Court will refuse to resolve the question regardless of the allegation or invocation of compelling reasons, such as the transcendental or paramount importance of the case. DISTINCTIONS BETWEEN QUO WARRANTO AND IMPEACHMENT. By way of commonality, both impeachment and quo warranto may result in the ouster of the public official. Other than this, the two proceedings are materially different. The following table is presented to point out the significant distinctions between impeachment and quo warranto, based on the current state of our laws and as discussed by the Supreme Court in the Sereno cases: At its most —_ basic, impeachment proceedings are political in nature. It is essentially a political process undertaken by the legislature ‘As to nature ‘An action for quo warranto is judicial, a —_proceeding traditionally lodged in the courts. It involves a judicial determination of the eligibility or validity of the election or Provisional Remedies and Special Civil Actions (JZE) Rule 66— Quo Warranto Part 2 - Page 14 of 18to vindicate the violation of the public's trust. appointment of a public official based on predetermined rules. ‘As to who initiates the action ‘The House of Representatives has the exclusive power to initiate all cases of impeachment. Quo warranto petitions may be commenced by the The Solicitor General or a public prosecutor, in the name of the Republic of the Philippines, or by a private individual in his own name. As to jurisdiction ‘The Senate has the sole power to try and decide all cases of impeachment. ‘The Supreme Court, the Court of Appeals and the Regional ‘Trial Court have concurrent jurisdiction to hear petitions for ‘quo warranto, As to cause of action ‘The cause of action lies in the ‘The cause of action lies on the commission of an| usurping, intruding, or impeachable offense. unlawfully holding or exercising of a public office. As to the what type of | Impeachment necessarily | Quo warranto against an act are involved presupposes that respondent legally holds the public office and thus, is an impeachable officer, the only issue being whether or not he committed impeachable offenses _ to warrant removal from office. In other words, impeachment concerns acts that make the impeachable officer determines whether or not respondent legally holds the position to be considered as an impeachable officer in the first place. Quo warranto thus involves aet that render the officer ineligible to hold the position to begin with. officer unfit to continue exercising his or her office. ‘Astowhatisbeing | Impeachment indicts an | Quo warranto questions the questioned officer for the so-called | validity of a public officer's impeachable offenses without questioning his title to the office he holds. appointment and his title to the office he holds, ‘As to what the proceedings cannot determine Impeachment is not the proper remedy to determine validity of the respondent's election or appointment. to office, Quo warranto is unavailing to determine whether or not an official has committed misconduct in office and is not the proper legal vehicle to evaluate the —_ person's, performance in the office. In a limited sense, however, quo warranto covers a public officer who does or suffers an act which, by the provision of law, constitutes a ground for the forfeiture of his office. Provisional Remedies and Special Civil Actions (JZE) Rule 66— Quo Warranto Part 2 - Page 15 of 18As to relief granted Tn impeachment, a conviction for the charges of impeachable offenses shall result to the “removal” of the respondent from the public office that he is legally holding. It is not legally possible to impeach or remove a person from an office that he in the first place, does not and cannot legally hold or occupy. Tn quo warranto, when the respondent is found guilty of usurping, intruding into, or unlawfully holding or exercising a public office, judgment is rendered that such respondent be ousted and altogether excluded therefrom. Quo warranto grants the relief of “ouster” and exclusion of the respondent from office. ‘As to specific grounds ‘The specific grounds are culpable violation of the Constitution, treason, bribery, graft and corruption, other high crimes, or betrayal ‘The specific ground is that the respondent is guilty of usurping into, intruding into, or unlawfully holding or exercising a public office. of public trust, QUO WARRANTO AND IMPEACHMENT CAN PROCEED INDEPENDENTLY AND. SIMULTANEOUSLY Given their differences, quo warranto and impeachment are, thus, not mutually exclusive remedies and may even proceed simultaneously. The existence of other remedies against the usurper does not prevent the State from commencing a quo warranto proceeding. Pertinent portions of the Supreme Court’s decision are reproduced as follows: Impeachment is not an exclusive remedy by which an invalidly appointed or invalidly elected impeachable official may be removed from office. Even the PET Rules expressly provide for the remedy of either an election protest or a petition for quo warranto to question the eligibility of the President and the Vice-President, both of whom are impeachable officers. Following respondent's theory that an impeachable officer can be removed only through impeachment means that a President or Vice- President against whom an election protest has been filed ean demand for the dismissal of the protest on the ground that it can potentially cause his/her removal from office through a mode other than by impeachment. To sustain respondent's position is to render election protests under the PET Rules nugatory. The Constitution could not have intended such absurdity since fraud and irregularities in elections cannot be countenanced, and the will of the people as reflected in their votes must be determined. and respected. The Court could not, therefore, have unwittingly curtailed its own judicial power by prohibiting quo warranto proceedings against impeachable officers. Further, the PET Rules provide that a petition for quo warranto, contesting the election of the President or Vice-President on the ground of ineligibility or disloyalty to the Republic of the Philippines, may be filed by any registered voter who has voted in the election concerned within ten (10) days after the proclamation of the winner. Despite disloyalty to the Republic being a crime against public order defined and penalized under the penal code, and thus may likewise be treated as "other high Provisional Remedies and Special Civil Actions (JZE) Rule 66— Quo Warranto Part 2 - Page 16 of 18crimes," constituting an impeachable offense, quo warranto as a remedy to remove the erring President or Vice-President is nevertheless made expressly available. XXX Furthermore, the language of Section 2, Article XI of the Constitution does not foreclose a quo warranto action against impeachable officers. XXX The provision uses the permissive term "may" which, in statutory construction, denotes discretion and cannot be construed as having a mandatory effect. We have consistently held that the term "may' is indicative of a mere possibility, an opportunity or an option. The grantee of that opportunity is vested with a right or faculty which he has the option to exercise. An option to remove by impeachment admits of an alternative mode of effecting the removal. XXX We hold, therefore, that by its tenor, Section 2, Article XI of the Constitution allows the institution of @ quo warranto action against an impeachable officer. After all, aquo warranto petition is predicated on grounds distinct from those of impeachment. The former questions the validity of a public officer's appointment while the latter indicts him for the so-called impeachable offenses without questioning his title to the office he holds. XXX To subscribe to the view that appointments or election of impeachable officers are outside judicial review is to cleanse their appointments or election of any possible defect pertaining to the Constitutionally-prescribed qualifications which cannot otherwise be raised in an impeachment proceeding. The courts should be able to inquire into the validity of appointments even of impeachable officers. To hold otherwise is to allow an absurd situation where the appointment of an impeachable officer cannot be questioned even when, for instance, he or she has been determined to be of foreign nationality or, in offices where Bar membership is a qualification, when he or she fraudulently represented to be a member of the Bar. Unless such an officer commits any of the grounds for impeachment and is actually impeached, he can continue discharging the functions of his office even when he is clearly disqualified from holding it. Such would result in permitting unqualified and ineligible public officials to continue occupying key positions, exercising sensitive sovereign functions until they are successfully removed from office through impeachment. This could not have been the intent of the framers of the Constitution. We must always put in mind that public office is a public trust. Thus, the people have the right to have only qualified individuals appointed to public office. To construe Section 2, Article XI of the Constitution as proscribing a quo warranto petition is to deprive the State of a remedy to correct a "public wrong” arising from defective or void appointments. Equity will not suffer a wrong to be without remedy. Ubi jus ibi remedium. Where there is a right, there must be a remedy. Provisional Remedies and Special Civil Actions (JZE) Rule 66— Quo Warranto Part 2 - Page 17 of 18XXX Nevertheless, for the guidance of the bench and the bar, and to obliviate confusion in the future as to when quo warranto as a remedy to oust an ineligible public official may be availed of, and in keeping with the Court's function of harmonizing the laws and the rules with the Constitution, the Court herein demarcates that an act or omission committed prior to or at the time of appointment or election relating to an official's qualifications to hold office as to render such appointment or election invalid is properly the subject of aquo warranto petition, provided that the requisites for the commencement thereof are present. Contrariwise, acts or omissions, even if it relates to the qualification of integrity, being a continuing requirement but nonetheless committed during the incumbency of a validly appointed and/or validly elected official, cannot be the subject of a quo warranto proceeding, but of something else, which may either be impeachment if the public official concerned is impeachable and the act or omission constitutes an impeachable offense, or disciplinary, administrative or criminal action, if otherwise. Provisional Remedies and Special Civil Actions (JZE) Rule 66— Quo Warranto Part 2 - Page 18 of 18