Nuclear Propulsion For Merchant Ships

A propos de ce livre
Ceci est une copie numérique d’un ouvrage conservé depuis des générations dans les rayonnages d’une bibliothèque avant d’être numérisé avec
précaution par Google dans le cadre d’un projet visant à permettre aux internautes de découvrir l’ensemble du patrimoine littéraire mondial en
ligne.
Ce livre étant relativement ancien, il n’est plus protégé par la loi sur les droits d’auteur et appartient à présent au domaine public. L’expression
“appartenir au domaine public” signifie que le livre en question n’a jamais été soumis aux droits d’auteur ou que ses droits légaux sont arrivés à
expiration. Les conditions requises pour qu’un livre tombe dans le domaine public peuvent varier d’un pays à l’autre. Les livres libres de droit sont
autant de liens avec le passé. Ils sont les témoins de la richesse de notre histoire, de notre patrimoine culturel et de la connaissance humaine et sont
trop souvent difficilement accessibles au public.
Les notes de bas de page et autres annotations en marge du texte présentes dans le volume original sont reprises dans ce fichier, comme un souvenir
du long chemin parcouru par l’ouvrage depuis la maison d’édition en passant par la bibliothèque pour finalement se retrouver entre vos mains.
Consignes d’utilisation
Google est fier de travailler en partenariat avec des bibliothèques à la numérisation des ouvrages appartenant au domaine public et de les rendre
ainsi accessibles à tous. Ces livres sont en effet la propriété de tous et de toutes et nous sommes tout simplement les gardiens de ce patrimoine.
Il s’agit toutefois d’un projet coûteux. Par conséquent et en vue de poursuivre la diffusion de ces ressources inépuisables, nous avons pris les
dispositions nécessaires afin de prévenir les éventuels abus auxquels pourraient se livrer des sites marchands tiers, notamment en instaurant des
contraintes techniques relatives aux requêtes automatisées.
Nous vous demandons également de:
+ Ne pas utiliser les fichiers à des fins commerciales Nous avons conçu le programme Google Recherche de Livres à l’usage des particuliers.
Nous vous demandons donc d’utiliser uniquement ces fichiers à des fins personnelles. Ils ne sauraient en effet être employés dans un
quelconque but commercial.
+ Ne pas procéder à des requêtes automatisées N’envoyez aucune requête automatisée quelle qu’elle soit au système Google. Si vous effectuez
des recherches concernant les logiciels de traduction, la reconnaissance optique de caractères ou tout autre domaine nécessitant de disposer
d’importantes quantités de texte, n’hésitez pas à nous contacter. Nous encourageons pour la réalisation de ce type de travaux l’utilisation des
ouvrages et documents appartenant au domaine public et serions heureux de vous être utile.
+ Ne pas supprimer l’attribution Le filigrane Google contenu dans chaque fichier est indispensable pour informer les internautes de notre projet
et leur permettre d’accéder à davantage de documents par l’intermédiaire du Programme Google Recherche de Livres. Ne le supprimez en
aucun cas.
+ Rester dans la légalité Quelle que soit l’utilisation que vous comptez faire des fichiers, n’oubliez pas qu’il est de votre responsabilité de
veiller à respecter la loi. Si un ouvrage appartient au domaine public américain, n’en déduisez pas pour autant qu’il en va de même dans
les autres pays. La durée légale des droits d’auteur d’un livre varie d’un pays à l’autre. Nous ne sommes donc pas en mesure de répertorier
les ouvrages dont l’utilisation est autorisée et ceux dont elle ne l’est pas. Ne croyez pas que le simple fait d’afficher un livre sur Google
Recherche de Livres signifie que celui-ci peut être utilisé de quelque façon que ce soit dans le monde entier. La condamnation à laquelle vous
vous exposeriez en cas de violation des droits d’auteur peut être sévère.
À propos du service Google Recherche de Livres
En favorisant la recherche et l’accès à un nombre croissant de livres disponibles dans de nombreuses langues, dont le frano̧ais, Google souhaite
contribuer à promouvoir la diversité culturelle grâce à Google Recherche de Livres. En effet, le Programme Google Recherche de Livres permet
aux internautes de découvrir le patrimoine littéraire mondial, tout en aidant les auteurs et les éditeurs à élargir leur public. Vous pouvez effectuer
des recherches en ligne dans le texte intégral de cet ouvrage à l’adresse http://books.google.com
This is a reproduction of a library book that was digitized
by Google as part of an ongoing effort to preserve the
information in books and make it universally accessible.
https://books.google.com
B 1,536,292
M
O ICH L1 TH
( P 81 E
HI (
M
THE
TA
NE
LLIS
1811
OF MIO
THE
TA M
1811
S IT
2187
VER OP
MI
UNTIHVEERS
C
HO
THE
IN
W
1811
L181
M DI IN
WA
OFM 2181
IC
THE
M
НОТ
EET
ULIST
И
so
1817
TAT M
4
1
1
!
1
1
1
1
NUCLEAR
PROPULSION
for
MERCHANT SHIPS
by A.W. Kramer
Editor : Atomics
Member: Advisory Committee on Technical Information ,
U. S. Atomic Energy Commission
COM
* ATOMIC
MIS
GY
ENER
ENE
SIO
N
CA
RI
E
UNI
AM
TED
STA
STATE
SOF
Prepared under auspices of
DIVISION OF TECHNICAL INFORMATION

UNITED STATES ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION
1962
Engin . Library
VI
517
.K92
U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 1962
For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, V.S. Government Printing Office

Washington 25, D.C. - Price $ 2.25
DEPOSITEO BY THE
ITED STATES OF AMERICA
PREFACE
The world's first nuclear -powered merchant ship, the N.S. Savan
nah , has been constructed and will soon be placed in operation.
It was built by the United States Government to demonstrate the
technical and operational feasibility of nuclear energy as a source
of power for commercial vessels. Other countries have studied
nuclear propulsion for commercial ships, and several have made
plans for the construction of nuclear-powered dry -cargo vessels
and tankers. The advantages of an energy source likely to increase
the revenue-producing space aboard a ship are attractive; how
ever, as with central- station nuclear power, economic nuclear ship
operation has yet to be achieved .
Information acquired by the nuclear ship program in the United
States is already available to specialists as published in many eco
nomic and engineering studies and in numerous reports that de
scribe the Savannah in detail . The purpose of this book is to set
forth in one volume and in as simple language as possible the essence
of the information contained in the many highly technical pub
lications. Of necessity, I have drawn heavily on the experience
gained by those who designed and built the Savannah. Indeed, the
hard core of the book is about the Savannah. Nevertheless, I have
tried to survey the broader picture, set forth the principles and
issues relating to nuclear propulsion of merchant ships, generalize
where appropriate, and speculate a little about the future.
The book was written for anyone interested in the subject. It
should be especially helpful to designers and builders of ships,
marine engineers, operators, shippers, managers, government officials,
lawyers, and underwriters. I believe it will also appeal to others,
including nuclear scientists and engineers, scientists and engineers
in other fields, teachers, students, and writers.
The first two chapters furnish orientation on the subject of
nuclear ships, and the third provides technical background for
readers with no background in nuclear science. Logically, the
longest chapter in the book (Chap. 4 ) is devoted to the Savannah
herself. Several succeeding chapters cover precautions taken in
design , construction , and operation to ensure safety. In this aspect
of the ship development, the history of nuclear central-station
plants seems to be repeating itself: in unknown areas it is better to
take many precautions that later will be found unnecessary than to
run the risk of not taking the one safety measure that might prove
III
IV PREFACE
essential. Fueling nuclear ships, very different from taking on fuel

oil , is covered in Chap. 7, and the extensive training of the crew in
nuclear technology and reactor operation is described in Chap . 8.
Concluding chapters cover international aspects of nuclear mer
chant-ship propulsion such as handling in other ports , safety stand
ards, and insurance; the suitability of different reactor types; and
economics. The last two chapters are devoted to nuclear tanker
design, since it appears that the first economic application may be
for large tankers operating long distances, and to nuclear ship
activities elsewhere in the world including the Russian icebreaker
Lenin.
There is a 93-item glossary to help people not acquainted with
the nuclear field . The Appendixes contain details regarding the
Savannah which I consider too technical for the body of the book ;
they can be omitted by some without inconvenience or loss of essen
tial subject matter.
The nuclear merchant- ship program in the United States is ad
ministered by one office, which represents both the U.S. Atomic
Energy Commission and the U.S. Maritime Administration. This
office, headed by Richard P. Godwin , gave me whole -hearted sup
port. Many of its people furnished information and criticized my
manuscript very constructively. Preston P. Eddy, manager of the
Savannah program , provided as a source and reviewing authority
virtually the entire technical resources of his group and initiated
the cooperation of other organizations. K. W. Hess examined all
text on the Savannah's power plant; Thomas M. Christian was
especially concerned with the machinery portions of the manuscript,
and S. D. Kaplan, on loan from the Oak Ridge National Laboratory,
gave attention to the nuclear aspects of the Savannah part of the
text. Ralph N. Longaker , on loan from the U.S. Public Health
Service, reviewed text pertaining to environmental protection , and
Lt. Cdr. Maurice Gross, on loan from the U.S. Maritime Service,
contributed information on training programs. Robert L. Taylor
and Paul E. Carrico provided valuable liaison and review guidance.
At George G. Sharp, Inc., designers of the hull, Bernard Tichaz
and David L. Gorman gave valuable assistance in supplying in
formation on the design of the Savannah , including a copy of the
complete specifications. They also reviewed text on the design of the
vessel and on the economics of nuclear ships.
At the Babcock & Wilcox Co. , designers and fabricators of the
reactor plant, William M. Breazeale and John H. MacMillan pro
vided a technical review , especially of the chapters covering the
Savannah's reactor plant. In Lynchburg, Va ., I discussed the crew
training program with Babcock & Wilcox engineers and members
of the Lynchburg College faculty and audited lectures.
PREFACE V
At the New York Shipbuilding Corporation, Harborough I. Lill ,

project engineer for the construction of the Savannah , imparted to
me something of his enthusiasm for, and knowledge of, ships in
general and the Savannah in particular.
Joseph C. Czudak, construction representative for the Maritime
Administration at New York Shipbuilding Corporation , read the
manuscript carefully and obtained reviews from several in his office,
notably, Lt. Steve Gregurech, on loan from the U.S. Maritime Serv
ice to the Savannah start -up group. Their suggestions were in
valuable. Frank X. Klekotka , an electrical engineer not associated
with the project, also made helpful observations to the entire
manuscript.
Members of the States Marine Lines, the firm that will operate
the Savannah for the Government, reviewed the manuscript. Her
bert Hansen and R. O. Mehann made helpful suggestions on ship
and reactor operating matters, as did Capt. David B. McMichaels
regarding the crew -training program.
Information on the old S.S. Savannah was furnished by Frank 0.
Braynard, of the American Merchant Marine Institute, Inc. The
pen and ink drawing of the old vessel that appears in Chap. 4 was
made by Mr. Braynard for his book , Famous American Ships.
For data and information on the marine gas-cooled reactor con
cept of the British G.E.C./Simon-Carves Atomic Energy Group,
I am indebted to A. G. Hester of The General Electric Company,
Limited. I also acknowledge the cooperation of the National Acad
emy of Sciences in granting permission to abstract their “ A Glos
sary of Terms in Nuclear Science and Technology ," which was
approved by the American Standards Association and published by
the American Society of Mechanical Engineers.
This writing project was administered by the Scientific Publications
Branch of the AEC's Division of Technical Information . William C.
Gough, F. Charles Moesel , and T. W. Scott were helpful to me as
book project officers for the Branch's Technical Book Section , as
was also J. William Young, Chief of the Section. Marian C. Fox,
of the DTI Extension at Oak Ridge, gave meticulous and valuable
editorial attention to every page of the manuscript.
This book is indeed the work of many people without whose help
it could not have been written . For whatever merit it may have,
theirs is the primary credit. I , of course , assume responsibility for
the shortcomings of the book as well as the pleasure of being its
author .
ANDREW W. KRAMER
Lake Bluff, Illinois
CONTENTS
Page
PREFACE III
CHAPTER 1 Why NUCLEAR PROPULSION ? 1

1-1 General Considerations .. 5
1-2 Economics .... 6
1-3 Conservation of Natural Resources . 13
1-4 Technical Progress . 22
CHAPTER 2 THE COMMERCIAL NUCLEAR SHIP PROGRAM IN THE UNITED
STATES .. 35
2-1 Liaison ( Legal and Administrative) - 37
2-2 Support Program - 42
2-3 Opinions Expressed by Industry 45
2-4 Trends in Commercial Shipping 51
2-5 Analysis of Economic Factors . 54
2-6 Analysis of Technical Feasibility - 58
2-7 General Attitude Regarding Nuclear Propulsion -- 63
CHAPTER 3 BASIC PRINCIPLES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS. 65
3-1 Historical Background .. 65
3-2 Fundamental Frinciples of Nuclear Fission. 72
3-3 - Nuclear Reactors .- 81
3-4 General Aspects of Reactor Design . 96
3-5 Control of Power Reactors... 99
3-6 Xenon Poisoning 104
3-7 Reactor Operation .- 105
3-8 Structural Materials 106
3-9 Types of Power Reactors . 107
CHAPTER 4 THE N.S. Savannah -- 125
4-1 Legislative History of the N.S. Savannah 128
4-2 Characteristics of American Merchant Ships . 130
4-3_Purpose of the N.S. Savannah -- 131
4-4 General Design and Construction.. 132
4-5 Design of the Propulsion Plant.. ? 152
4-6 Arrangement and Functional Operation of the Nuclear
Power System .- 167
4-7 Containment and Shielding- . 184
4-8 Control and Instrumentation .. 190
4-9 Radiation -monitoring System . 203
CHAPTER 5 HAZARDS ANALYSIS . 207
5-1- General . 207
5-2 Reactivity Accidents . 216
5-3 Mechanical Accidents . 227
5-4 Ship Accidents . 243
5-5 Summary - 261
VII
VIII CONTENTS
Page
CHAPTER 6 OPERATING AND ENVIRONMENTAL CONSIDERATIONS . 263
6-1 Basic Considerations in Nuclear Ship Operation -- 264
6-2 Collection, Handling, and Removal of Radioactive
Wastes from Nuclear -powered Ships.- 267
277
6-3 Biological Implicationsof Radioactive Wastest
6-4 Meteorological and Hydrological Analyses Appli
cable to Operation of Nuclear-powered Ships ---- 281
6-5 Reduction of Radioactive Contamination by Scav
enging --- 290
CHAPTER 7 SERVICING NUCLEAR Ships . 295
7-1 Introduction . 295
7-2 Specialized Support Facilities .
ZA 295
7-3 Servicing Facilities for the N.S. Savannah 298
7-4 Nuclear Shore Facility - 299
7-5 Floating Servicing Facility -- 304
CHAPTER 8 TRAINING OF THE N.S. Savannah Crew 313
8-1 Introduction .. 313
8-2 General Description of the Training Program - 314
8-3 Physical Facilities for Training Program.. 316
8-4 Engineering Officers Training Courses. 321
8-5 Deck Officer Training Program ... 332
8–6 Training of Other Personnel. 338
8–7 Training of Foreign Engineers . 310
CHAPTER 9 INTERNATIONAL ASPECTS OF NUCLEAR SHIP PROPULSION 313
9-1 General Aspects of Nuclear Ship Insurance 311
‫زا‬ 9–2 Discussions and Negotiations with Foreign Nations

9-3 Legislation Proposed at the Rijeka Conference --H
318
319
9–4 Conferences with Foreign Nations Covering N.S.
Savannah Operations. 354
9-5 United States - United Kingdom Negotiations on N.S.
Savannah Operations--- 357
9–6 Action by Other International Bodies 360
CHAPTER 10 SUITABILITY OF DIFFERENT REACTOR TYPES ..
110-1 Technical Feasibility vs. Economics. 363
10-2 Reactor Power Cycles.- 384
10-3 Specific Reactor Systems- 389
10-4 Significant Factors in Design and Operation of
Nuclear Propulsion Systems--- 415
CHAPTER 11 ECONOMICS OF NUCLEAR PROPULSION . 421
11-1 Introduction ... 421
11-2 Comparative Economic Studies 421
11-3 Economic Analyses of Individual Nuclear Propulsion
Concepts .-- 428
11-4 British Economic Studies ... 439
11-5 General Consideration of Nuclear Ship Economics .. 453
CHAPTER 12 NUCLEAR TANKER DESIGN . 455
12-1 Introduction .- 455
12-2 Design Studies . 456
12-3 Comparative Status of Reactor Types in the Mari
time Program .. 461
CONTENTS IX
Page
CHAPTER 13 WORLD NUCLEAR SHIP DEVELOPMENT.. 497
13-1 USSR Nuclear-powered Icebreaker Lenin .-- 497
13-2 Developments in Japan.-- 512
13-3 Developments in the United Kingdom - 515
13-4 Plans of Other Nations.- 522
APPENDIX A CLASSIFICATION OF SHIPS IN THE U.S. MERCHANT MARINE . 533
APPENDIX B N.S. Savannah REACTOR DESIGN CONSIDERATIONS 537
B- 1 Thermal and Hydraulic Design . 537
B-2 Reactor Physics ---- 540
B-3 Hydraulic System for Control-rod Drive 543
APPENDIX C HEAT- TRANSPORT AUXILIARY SYSTEMS ON N.S. Savannah . 547
C -1 Pressurizing System. 547
C - 2 Relief System . 549
C-3 Primary -loop Purification System .. 551
C-4 Hydrogen -addition System. 552
C-5 Buffer -seal System . 553
C -6 Emergency Cooling System -- 555
APPENDIX D SUPPORTING SYSTEMS FOR N.S. Savannah . 557
D- 1 Sampling System. 557
D-2 Intermediate Cooling System ---- 558
D-3 Containment Air -conditioning System . IZ 559
D-4 Equipment Drain and Waste-collection System 560
D-5 Gaseous -waste -collection System .--- 562
APPENDIX E MAIN AND AUXILIARY MACHINERY OF N.S. Savannah .. 565
APPENDIX F CONTROL AND INSTRUMENTATION OF N.S. Savannah ... 569
F- 1 Safety and Reliability of the Instrumentation . 570
F - 2 Low -level Start - up Channels.- 571
F -3 Intermediate-range Channels . 573
F -4 Power-range Channels .- 574
GLOSSARY. 577
INDEX 593
Chapter 1
WHY NUCLEAR PROPULSION?
Anyone who has maintained even a partial interest in techno

logical progress throughout the world during recent years cannot
help being aware of the impact that nuclear energy has made in the
field of power development on the sea as well as on land. The dra
matic voyages of the U.S. submarines Nautilus and Skate under
the north polar ice fields have highlighted the success of nuclear
power for underwater ships far beyond the expectations of even
those closely associated with the development of these vessels.
Nuclear energy has not only enormously improved the performance
of these naval submarines, it has also created an entirely new
underwater vessel with undreamed of potential.
It is only natural, therefore, that those concerned with commer
cial shipping should be interested in the application of this new
energy source to the propulsion of merchant ships. The enormous
concentration of energy in nuclear fuels implies not only a greatly
extended cruising range for commercial ships, but also a cost reduc
tion at higher speeds. The successful application of nuclear power
to commercial shipping, however , cannot be brought about without
considerable development work. Although nuclear power has been
proved technically feasible for ship propulsion , many difficult eco
nomic , legal, and administrative problems remain to be solved.
However, from the days of the clipper, ships, shipbuilders and
1
shipowners of the maritime nations have always been alive to ad

vances in marine technology, and there is little reason to believe
that the spirit of progress and enterprise of the commercial ship
ping industry will be defeated by these problems. Several maritime
nations are studying the design of various classes of nuclear-powered
merchant ships, and in the United States interest in nuclear power
for commercial ships has resulted in the construction of the N.S.
Savannah , the world's first nuclear- powered merchant vessel.
It may be of interest at this point to present, briefly, some of
the early thinking concerning energy in the atom following the
discovery of radioactivity by Henri Becquerel in 1896 and the
subsequent isolation of radium by Marie and Pierre Curie a few
years later. Here was insight into another of nature's secrets, a
manifestation of matter that had not been suspected. Naturally,
1
2 NUCLEAR PROPULSION FOR MERCHANT SHIPS
people with imagination speculated both on the nature of and the

possible uses for the vast quantity of energy which seemed to be
stored in the heart of the atom . It was in the emanations from
radium that man first realized that the atom contained a store of
energy far greater than anything he had known before.
The discovery of radioactivity was perhaps the most revolution
ary in the entire history of science because it compelled man to
change his concept of matter and its relation to energy. This
strange, newly discovered property of matter exerted a profound
effect on man's thinking about the ultimate nature of the world
because it demonstrated that the principle of universal change, so
apparent in all aspects of nature, extended to the very elements
themselves. Since the futile attempts of the alchemists to convert
base elements into silver and gold , the elements had always been
regarded as immutable. With the discovery of radioactivity, how
ever, it was shown that not only were the elements changeable
but that the change was spontaneous. Such an astonishing dis
covery was bound to have far reaching consequences.
Before the discovery of radioactivity, man's knowledge of the
elements was extremely superficial. True, much was known of
chemical reactions, and, by means of Mendeleeff's Periodic Law,
the known elements had been classified according to their atomic
weights. The atoms, it was known , were the bricks of which the
universe was constructed , but, although much was known concern
ing the results of various combinations of these bricks, little or
nothing was known of the nature of the bricks themselves. Atoms
were thought to be indivisible, although many people had specu
lated on the idea that the atoms might be composed of still smaller
particles. However, had anyone ventured to predict the existence
of a substance such as radium , not only would it have been con
sidered wildly improbable, but actually opposed to all established
principles of the science of matter and energy. So drastic an inno
vation was not anticipated.
As Soddy 1 puts it : " If one were to demonstrate to an architect
or builder that the bricks he habitually and properly employs in
his constructions were, under other circumstances, capable of en
tirely different use — let us say, for illustration, that they could with
effect be employed as an explosive incomparably more powerful
than dynamite — the surprise of the architect would be no greater
than the surprise of the chemist at the new and undreamt of possi
bilities of matter demonstrated by the mere existence of such an
element as radium ."
At first radioactivity was considered to be merely an unexplain
able phenomenon ; it was not immediately apparent that it repre
sented any great amount of energy. Becquerel had shown that the
WHY NUCLEAR PROPULSION ? 3
radiation emanating from uranium compounds was capable of dis

charging electrically charged bodies. The process was also shown
to be accompanied by the production of heat.
Basing their experiments upon Becquerel's discovery, the Curies
made a systematic investigation of a large number of chemical
elements to determine whether any of them possessed the same
radioactive effect that uranium did. It was in the course of these
investigations that they discovered radium , which was found to be
more than two million times more radioactive than uranium .
Although the rays from radium and other radioactive substances
resembled X rays in their ability to penetrate opaque matter, they
were shown to be of different types. The first analysis of the com
plex radiations emitted by the radioactive elements was made by
Sir Ernest Rutherford. He classed the rays into three main types
and named them after the first three letters of the Greek alphabet :
alpha ( a) rays, beta ( B ) rays, and gamma ( y ) rays, distinguished
from one another by enormous differences in their power to pene
trate matter.
While it is true that all the effects that characterize radioactive
phenomena, such as heat, radiation , and nuclear transformation,
can be produced by other means, in radioactive substances they
occur spontaneously and without interruption .
It is this spontaneous emission of energy ( the rays constitute
energy just as any other type of radiation constitutes energy )
which makes the radioactive process so unique. Heat, light, and
X rays can be produced in numerous ways, but in those early
days it was a new demonstration of nature to find energy in these
forms being given out by a substance year in and year out without
apparent intermission or diminution and without the substance be
ing in any apparent way consumed or altered.
This was the arresting fact : How was it possible for energy to
evolve out of nothing ? When coal or carbon is burned, energy is
released in the form of heat, but the carbon disappears, that is,
it combines with the oxygen in the air to form carbon dioxide.
In other words, while in the form of coal, the carbon possesses a
certain amount of potential energy by virtue of its chemical affinity
for oxygen. During the process of combining with oxygen, car
bon releases this potential energy in the form of heat and light. In
the case of radium , however, there appeared to be no such com
bustion. Energy was being evolved at an enormous rate consider
ing the minuteness of the quantity of matter involved , energy far
greater than that obtained by the combustion of any known sub
stance ; yet apparently there was no diminution of the quantity of
radium present. So long as radioactivity was known only on the
scale and degree exhibited by uranium, it was possible to ignore
this aspect of continuous emission of energy because of the minute

ness of the amount of energy involved and the difficulty of proving
that it was not in some way derived from the surroundings. The
discovery of radium by M. and Mme. Curie, however, made the
world familiar with an element over two million times as active
as uranium . In this case the energy evolved was sufficient to pre
clude any uncertainty.
We know today that the answer to this phenomenon rests in the
atom itself — in the instability of the combinations of neutrons and
protons of which the nucleus of the atom is composed.
No attempt is made here to describe in detail the nature of radio
active processes or to describe the long, fascinating road of in
vestigation that leads from the discovery of radioactivity to that
of the fission of uranium by Hahn and Strassmann early in 1939:
it is all in the literature for those who may be interested , and it is
a story well worth pursuing. However, long before the events of
1939 which led first to the atomic bomb and later to nuclear power.
people with imagination had speculated that the atomic energy in a
single cubic inch of matter was sufficient to drive an ocean liner
across the Atlantic and back . To some extent this was wishful
thinking because in the early years of this century there was little
reason to believe that the energy in the nucleus of the atom could
be harnessed.
Lof greater significance perhaps is the fact that after the dis
covery of nuclear fission in 1939, the U.S. Government's original
interest in harnessing the power of the atom was not, as many
people suppose , to produce an atomic bomb but rather to devise
nuclear propulsion for ships. Nearly three years before the out
break of the war in Europe, the U.S. Naval Research Laboratory
was engaged in studying the idea of building a nuclear power
plant for the propulsion of ships. To attain a light-weight small
sized nuclear plant for shipbourd use, that Laboratory developed
one of the first methods for separating the essential isotope of
uranium ( [ * 235 ) from natural uranium . This was the thermal
diffusion method , which did not prove to be as practical as the
gaseous- diffusion method later developed and used at Oak Ridge,
Tenn. Once the decision was made to attempt to produce an atomic
bomb, however, that project claimed top priority, and all the na
tion's resources of money and skills were devoted to it . Nuclear
propulsion for ships was put aside until the end of the war. It is
interesting to note that several patent applications covering nuclear
power reactors were actually filed in Europe during the late 1930's.
After the war, when the subject of nuclear propulsion was again
considered, there were people who thought that atomic reactors,
with the large amount of shielding of steel and concrete which
they required, could never be carried aboard ship. They had in

mind, of course, the very large reactors at Hanford, Wash ., the
great plutonium -producing plant built during the war . Others
thought that human beings could not live and work in such close
proximity to radiation as would be required within the confines of
a ship's hull. Fortunately , there were others who thought that
these problems could be overcome, and to these people must go the
credit for the success of the atomic submarines and for the launch
ing of the first commercial nuclear -powered ship , the Savannah,
on July 21 , 1959. The Savannah, a nuclear-powered cargo-passen
>
ger ship, was built by the U.S. Maritime Administration and the
Atomic Energy Commission to demonstrate the technical feasi
bility of nuclear propulsion for merchant ships.
The realization of the tremendous concentration of energy in
nuclear fuel provides the first answer to the question , " Why nuclear
3 propulsion ?” During the early years of this century, coal was the
primary fuel used to propel ships of all kinds, naval and commer
cial alike. Since coal is bulky, it was difficult to load enough coal
on a ship for extended voyages ; the general use of fuel oil came
later. The extreme concentration of energy inherent in nuclear fuels
offered a rational solution to the problem .
Thus, the first reason for using nuclear energy for merchant
ship propulsion is that it offers greatly extended cruising ranges.
The second reason , theoretically at least, is that the use of nuclear
fuel wouldrelease more of a ship’s volume for cargo.
1-1 GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS
The technical feasibility of nuclear propulsion for ships has

been demonstrated by the successful performance of the naval sub
marines that the U.S. Navy has built and placed in operation in
recent years. The tong distances covered by these vessels both
submerged and on the surface, the ease with which they can be
maneuvered , their high speeds submerged as well as on the surface,
and the complete absence of health hazards to the crews from
radioactivity leave no doubt whatever that nuclear propulsion
plants can be built for any type ship . Basically, a nuclear- fuel
system differs from a conventional- fuel system only in the replace
ment of the usual furnace by a nuclear reactor. The reactor is the
source of heat, and this heat is used to generate steam to operate
conventional steam turbines or the heat can be absorbed by air or
other gases to drive gas turbines. Practically, however, there is a
vast difference between a nuclear reactor and a conventional furnace.
In addition to being the source of heat, the reactor is also the
source of dangerous radiation of an intensity equivalent to that of
tons of radium . Therefore reactors have to be provided with heary

and necessarily expensive shielding to protect personnel from the
radiation. There is another vital difference between a nuclear re
actor and a conventional boiler furnace. In the case of the coal- or
oil -fired boiler, the fuel undergoing combustion in the furnace at
any particular instant is sufficient to keep the system operating
for only a few seconds or minutes, depending upon the type of
firing system used. In the nuclear reactor the reactor core contains
the entire fuel charge for several years of operation, and, since
nuclear reactions are extremely rapid, elaborate control systems
are necessary to maintain the reactor at its safe operating level even
under the most extreme emergency conditions. The power level of
even a small reactor can rise from a very low value to many mil
Jions of kilowatts of heat in a small fraction of a second . ** For
these reasons, nuclear propulsion plants are at present considerably
more expensive than conventional propulsion systems.
When the nuclear submarines were constructed, cost was not the
controlling factor. A naval submarine is a weapon , and seonomic
considerations are of less importance in the construction and opera
tion of weapons than they are in commercial enterprises. The eco
nomic feasibility of nuclear power for commercial ships remains to
be demonstrated , although preliminary studies indicate that the
prospects are favorable. Indeed, many are of the opinion that by
around 1970 nuclear-propelled merchant ships will have been de
veloped to a point where they will have a cost advantage over
conventionalships.
The reasons for developing a nuclear -powered merchant fleet
can be grouped under three headings. In the order of their im
portance, they are ( 1 ) economics; ( 2 ) conservation of natural re
sources; and ( 3 ) technical progress.
1-2 ECONOMICS
The economic advantages of nuclear fuel over conventional fos

sil fuels as applied to ship propulsion are believed to be consider
able. Among these advantages are :
1. The elimination of the space and weight requirements for fuel
oil , which would result in increased cargo -carrying capacity.
* As an example , in June 1959 , at General Atomies' John Jay Hopkins Laboratory at
San Diego, Calif., the TRIGA research reactor installed there was " Aashed " to a peak
power level of 1,500,000 kw. In this test the TRIGA prototype reactor increased its
power output from 1 watt to 1,500,000 kw ( t ) in less than one -tenth of a second. The
actual flash lasted approximately 15 / 1,000 of a second . Scientific personnel could
safely stay within a few feet of the top of the tank in which the reactor was con
tained during the flash . This test demonstrated the inherent safety characteristics of
this reactor ,
2. An extension of the cruising range, which would make nuclear

ships virtually independent of fuel supplies outside home ports.
3. Operation at higher speeds than those now economically feasible
with conventional ships.
1-2.1 Studies on Nuclear Propulsion for Commercial Ships
Various aspects of the economics of nuclear propulsion for ships

have been under consideration in the United States and abroad
for a number of years. The design studies listed in Table 1.1
cover a range of proposed installations involving different reactor
types and various classes of vessels. As shown in this tabulation,
various countries have investigated the practicability of building
commercial ships, but , except for the Russian icebreaker Lenin ,
which cannot be properly classed as a commercial vessel, only the
Savannah has been built. The Japanese have considered the use of
a 44,000-shaft horsepower ( shp ), 20,100-ton ( gross) nuclear-pow
ered vessel to carry immigrants from Japan to South America.?
Comparing the costs for a pressurized -water reactor powered ves
sel and a conventional ship, the Japanese concluded that over a
20-year period of operation the financial rate of return for a
nuclear vessel would be half that for a conventional vessel , i.e. ,
nuclear, 17 percent , and conventional, 34 percent.
The British ( Table 1.1 ) report the results of an economic com
parison study of a conventional and a nuclear -powered super
tanker. Although the capital cost for a nuclear power plant was
between 1.5 to 2 times that for a conventional shipboard power
plant, the specific fuel cost ( dollars per shaft horsepower) was
less for nuclear-powered vessels larger than about 25,000 shp. The
operating costs for nuclear-powered ships when compared with con
ventional ships, assuming a cost of 8 cents per gallon for fuel oil*,
showed that the nuclear ship broke even at a cargo dead weight
of about 73,000 tons for a nuclear fuel burn -up of 2,700 megawatt
days per ton (Mwd / ton ) . Increasing the burn -up to about 5,400
Mwd/ton decreased the break -even cargo dead weight to about
44,000 tons.
France has had three design studies for a nuclear -powered tanker
under way for some time.. Two of these involve water-cooled re
* Dead weight is the carrying capacity only , over and above the actual weight of the
ship and her equipment, and comprises cargo, passengers, and fuel. The dead weight
of a floating ship at a particular draft is the difference between the displacements at
that draft and in the light condition .
The term “ megawatt-day per ton " is somewhat difficult to explain . It represents
the power that an agglomerate of fuel material would have produced during its time
in the reactor had it been i ton . Approximately 1 g of U 235 would be consumed per
ton of fuel if the burn-up were 4,000 Mwd / ton . This term is used almost exclusively
for natural-uranium or low - enrichment reactors.
613489 0–622
actors, one a pressurized -water unit and the other a boiling water
reactor. The third is a gas- cooled reactor. All three ships have
a nominal rating of 18,000 shp.
In the United States a number of studies of the application of
nuclear power to various types of merchant ships have been
made.5-14 These studies are concerned with both the technical and
economic feasibility of various types of reactor systems. The most
extensive of these studies 5 covers the application of four different
reactor types to various classes of ships in different sizes, for vari
ous speeds and power, and of different length trade routes. Eco
nomic predictions were made for 1957, 1965, and 1970. The pro
cedure was to use the costs and performance characteristics of vari
ous vessels and power plants and to simulate mathematically the
series of events the ships would experience in sailing on specific
trade routes . An IBM - 704 computer was used to obtain the re
sults from this simulation procedure because approximately 30,000
separate complete combinations were involved, representing some
5 to 10 million individual calculations. The results of this exten
sive study are discussed in considerable detail in Chap. 10.
Currently, only two nonmilitary nuclear vessels have been built,
the Savannah in the United States and the icebreaker Lenin in
Russia.15 The Lenin obviously is not typical of merchant vessels .
The Savannah , although built as a cargo-passenger ship , cannot be
regarded as typicalwith respect to costs because it is the first of
its kind and possibly because of conservatism in its design . The
major characteristics of these two vessels are listed in Table 1.1 ,
but both are described in greater detail in later chapters of this
book .
Many economic factors in ship propulsion are similar to those
which govern the economics of nuclear power in central stations.
Two additional factors enter, however, one being the weight of the
nuclear plant per unit of output ( which in comparative evalua
tions is balanced against the weight of a conventional propulsion
plant plus the weight of its fuel requirement for a given voyage )
and the other being the speed at which the ship is to be driven
(which is determined by the capacity of the plant installed in the
ship ) .
In addition to these new considerations, reactor safety enters the
economic picture perhaps more strongly than it does in the central
station reactor. There are two reasons for this : first, because the
propulsion reactor is subject to more external hazards, such as
collision , and second, because the hazard problems are international
rather than national.
Comprehensive studies of the economics of nuclear- powered ships
and conventionally powered ships indicate that on long trade routes
MARINE
-
1.1
Table
REACTORS
N.S. 15
Savannah Lenin study
Design Design Design Design study
Design
study Design
Specifications )(USA )(USSR )(USA study 3
study study F)( rance
rance ?
study
U
() K )(UK )(France J)( apan
.
Type .water
Pres .water
Pres .
mod
Organic .
cooled
Gas .
cooled
Gas . oiling
ater
.Pres
wBwater cooled
Gas water
.Pres
iNo
, nstalled .
3
data
:
Core
,ft
Diameter
.. 5.1 .
3 .
6 .
14 4.75 .
4.8 5.1 .
11.5 .
5.2
,ft
.Height 5.5 .
4.8 .
6.8 .
13 4.75
. .
4.5 .
5.1 11.5
. .
4.8
Fuel U
..
UO2
Sintered
UO.-
metal Uetal
m -
Cermet
U UO2 U
pellets
0. 2 Sintered
U0
.--
UO2
pellets
.
S.S.
pEnrichment
.,.)4.4
(aercent
v .
5 .
1.6 %
Several .
15 1.5 .
1.5 1.8 1.7
.
Cladding
... Stainless
steel
.Zr
alloy .
Al .
alloy
Mg Zr
or
s.S. .
Zr S.
S. .
Zr
U235
inventory
.,kg .
312.4 85 352 100 120 .117 .
140
Moderator H2O H20 Terphenyl
.. Graphite Graphite
H20 H20 GraphiteH20
.
:
data
Thermal
Mw
Thermal 9)70
.(n ax
0om
(m100 *
150 150 .
50 .
51 .
60 .
100
33,800
m flux
/sHeat
369,000 hr
per
ft
q.vtu
()..a63,500
,B-.. ax a132,000
.)( v
).(a70t
Mw
Coolant
. H20 H20 .
Terphenyl
CO2 CO2 .H20 H20
. .CO2 H20
.
Inlet
temp
, °F 496 .
478 623 423 500
. .508 Intermedi536
.ate 498
.
,°FOutlet
temp 519 616 660 752 896 .
565 exchange
Heat 932r .
537
pPressure
, si 1,750 92
, 40 (max
)40 300 800 .1,845 800 .
570 ,1,986
./hrate
br
Circulation
,l8,640,000 4,400 115
x08 8,400 8,400 tons
h200
/r .
30,000
,trons
rate
./hSteam .
133 3601 165 .
116 98 ..
80 .
240
F°.,Temp 462 590 .
Saturated 700 .
940 Saturated Saturated 450 .
482
WHY NUCLEAR PROPULSION ?
,psia
Pressure 472 400 800 .
500 .
1,030 .
600 650 650 .
570
:
data
Weight
Reactor
system
t, ons 600 1,054
. 500 .
528
Container
and
shield
..
,t1ons.930 1,963 1,000 2,550
.
,t,150
machinery
.1Propulsion
ons 2,750 1,100
. .
1,760
Nominal
shp 20,000 44,000 30,000
. 50,000 50,000 18,000 .
18,000 .
18,000 .
44,000
Life
at
power
.normal 800
days
. y
1 ear y2ears .
days
420
E
.* stimated
tAll
reactors
operating
.
co
at high speeds nuclear ships will be able to compete with conven

tionally powered ships. These studies show that the competitive
position of nuclear ships should improve between 1965 and 1970.
At present the cost of nuclear-powered ships is substantially higher
than that of conventional ships, but there is good reason to believe
that these costs can be reduced.
In any attempt to evaluate comparative costs of nuclear and
conventional ships, it should be understood that present estimates
are speculative and are based on different ground rules. In the ab
sence of practical experience, there is necessarily a considerable ele
ment of uncertainty in all cost estimates. As for the central
station type nuclear power plant, the main economic characteristics
of a nuclear propulsion plant can be grouped into those which affect
capital cost and those which affect fuel cost. There is no doubt that
at present and perhaps for a long time to come capital costs of
nuclear-propulsion systems will exceed those of conventional sys
tems by very substantial margins.
With regard to capital cost, the nuclear-ship propulsion plant
has, in one respect , a less favorable competitive situation to meet
than does the central-station reactor because there does not appear
to be an immediate prospect for very high power propulsion plants.
and it is well established that the nuclear power plant competes
more favorably in the larger sizes. In another respect, however,
the situation is more favorable. The cost of the nuclear reactor
and associated equipment represents only a fraction of the total
investment in a ship , and therefore the economic effects of perform
ance improvements, such as high speed or higher use factor, which
nuclear plants may provide are proportionally magnified.
1--2.2 Attitudes on Nuclear Propulsion
As in the case with almost any new concept or development ,

attitudes concerning the possibilities of nuclear propulsion for com
mercial ships vary widely among shipbuilders, owners, and opera
tors; they range from high enthusiasm to considerable pessimism .
There are two schools of thought on the question of economic
feasibility within the United States Government. The Maritime
Administration is decidedly optimistic about the chances of aa nuclear
tanker's being competitive in the near future, whereas the Navy
is not so optimistic. These opposing views were set forth before
the McKinney Panel 16 by spokesmen for the two agencies as early
as September 1955. A spokesman for the Maritime Administration
stated that within five years a tanker using a pressurized -water
reactor would be at worst only 44 percent higher in cost than a
conventionally fueled tanker; at best it would compete; and in
either case it would show a profit, only the size of the profit margin
being in doubt. Naval spokesmen , on the other hand, were of the
opinion that, in view of the present state of nuclear power plant
technology, it is not possible to predict the ultimate economic
feasibility of nuclear-powered commercial ships.
Although this testimony was given six years ago and although
no nuclear-powered tanker has been built to prove or disprove the
opposing claims, considerable technical progress has been made in
reactor design and construction , and recent studies by various or
ganizations seem to indicate that nuclear-powered tankers will be
able to compete with conventionally fueled tankers in the relatively
near future.
Aside from such factors as type and size of the ship, length of
the trade routes, nature of the cargo, and speed, which enter into
the question of economic feasibility, the factor of fuel cost is of
great importance. Conventional fuel costs can be expected to rise
in coming years because of decreasing fuel reserves and increasing
demand. Nuclear fuel costs, on the other hand, almost certainly
will decrease as a result of progress in the development of reactor
and fuel technology. At present, fuel preparation and fabrication
cost is a major item in nuclear fuel cost, but it is expected that this
can be substantially reduced in the future by more efficient methods
of preparation and by increased production.
1-2.3 Block Obsolescence of Present Merchant Fleet
The question of a new type of propulsion for merchant ships is

especially timely because the United States merchant marine fleet
is on the verge of block obsolescence. In the period between 1960
and 1965, about 93 percent of the 3,255 United States merchant
vessels of over 1,000 gross tons now serving will become obsolete,
i.e., 20 years old or older. This figure includes 336 of the 430
ocean -going tankers now in service. Although the useful life of
merchant ships may be considerably longer than 20 years, in gen
eral , ships tend to become obsolete in that time by law and by
economics. Any new type equipment that has not been developed
and proved to some extent within the next five or six years will
not be introduced into the next generation of ships.
In any consideration of the economics of commercial shipping,
it must be recognized that to some extent the U.S. merchant marine
is subsidized so that a stand -by reserve of shipping can be main
tained for use in case of national emergency. Commercial vessels
powered with atomic reactors undoubtedly would have special war
time value since the range of operation free from dependence on fuel
afforded by nuclear plants would be significant. This would be
particularly true if United States naval forces were largely con

verted to nuclear propulsion. In the absence of competitive eco
nomic status, however, there will probably be insufficient incentive
to apply this development on a wide scale.
As already indicated, the initial capital investment in a nuclear
powered commercial ship utilizing present technology is much
greater than that required for a conventionally powered commercial
vessel. For example, it is estimated on the basis of present develop
ment that the cost of a conventional $ 10,000,000 oil tanker would
be approximately doubled by the installation of a nuclear power
plant. Unless these very high capital costs can be reduced or bal
anced by savings in the cost of nuclear fuel or other economies,
such a ship obviously cannot be competitive. A great deal of tech
nological development must be accomplished if such cost reduction
is to be realized. The other expenses of a nuclear-powered ship
should be about the same as those for conventional power , except
for the cost of fuel ; and, as already mentioned, nuclear fuel costs
can be expected to be lower in future years.
In view of the block obsolescence facing the United States mer
chant fleet, it is obvious that a substantial number of ships will
have to be replaced in the relatively near future, otherwise the
United States will lower its maritime position in the world. De
spite the present high cost of nuclear-powered vessels, it would
appear that nuclear propulsion might be introduced for at least
specialized applications, such as large tankers or ore carriers, if
experience indicates that these applications are even marginally
competitive with conventional vessels.
Tables 1.2 and 1.3 give statistics concerning United States com
mercial tonnage and the obsolescence rate of both privately owned
and government- owned ships. Assuming that construction of re
placement ships in the privately owned United States fleet starts
when ships to be replaced are 18 years old (allowing an average
of two years for construction ), the peak of block obsolescence will
be reached in 1960 to 1964 for 924 ships out of a total of 1,138.
A similar peak for Government-owned ships will also be attained
as indicated in Table 1.2.
Atomic replacements for all present ocean -going tankers of over
15,000 tons, dead weight, after, say , 1960 would result in the con
struction of over 300 such vessels over a period of 20 years. Thus
the Maritime Administration foresees the possibility that merchant
marine needs could create a sizable demand for the construction
of atomic marine plants and for the production and processing of
fuel for these plants. Such large-scale production of nuclear power
plants would inevitably effect a lowering of costs.
1-3 CONSERVATION OF NATURAL RESOURCES
Despite the advantages of long cruising range and possible

economic savings in the operation of nuclear -powered ships in the
years to come, the question might still reasonably be asked : “ Why
try to develop a completely new source of energy at considerable
economic risk and effort when we already know how to produce
power for propelling ships safely, reliably, and at low cost from
conventional fuels ?” This same question, obviously, is also valid
with respect to the application of nuclear power to land -based
power plants. ]
Table 1.2 - UNITED STATES SHIPS OF 1,000 GROSS TONS AND OVER
( AS OF DEC . 31 , 1954)
Type Number Gross tons Dead -weight tons
PRIVATELY OWNED
Combination passenger and cargo . 40 445 , 000 334, 100

Cargo ships. 693 5, 034, 200 7, 383 , 500
Tankers . 405 4, 166, 300 6, 622, 200
Total . 1 , 138 9, 645, 500 14 , 339, 800
GOVERNMENT OWNED
Combination passenger and cargo . 212 1 , 869, 800 1 , 361 , 300

Cargo .. 1 , 880 13 , 280 , 000 19, 190, 700
Tankers .. 25 142, 800 215 , 700
Total .. 2, 117 15 , 292, 600 20, 767 , 700
There are several reasons for developing this new source of

energy, but the one that is the most compelling stems from the
steadily mounting demands on our customary energy resources . ( It
has been realized for many years that, if industrial civilization is
to be maintained in the world at even its present level, a new
source of energy must be developed. This is certainly true if we

are to look forward to a continuation of the progress in our way
of life. Although existing fossil- fuel reserves are still ample to
supply our power requirements for many decades to come, they are
not inexhaustible, and there is ample justification for assuming that
new sources of energy must be found for continued industrial
growth .
Why has this need for a new source of energy arisen ? The
answer to this is necessarily complex since it involves various as
Table 1.3—OBSOLESCENCE RATE BY TYPE OF SHIP ( AS OF DEC . 31 ,

1954)
Privately owned fleet Government-owned fleet
Type Type
Age of ship , Combi Age of ship , Combi
years nation years nation
Cargo Tanker Total Cargo Tanker Total
1. 15 15 1 .. 10 10
2 .. 15 15 2 .. 14 14
3.. 1 4 5 3. 6 6
2 2
‫ܚܨ‬
‫ܟܟ‬
‫ܛ‬
4 .. 2 6 4. 1 1
5 . 4 4 5 ..
6.. 3 3 6..
ల
.
7 .. 1 7 2 10 7.
8.. 7 12 1 20 8 ...
9.. 9 46 2 57 9 ..
10. 1 208 75 284 10. 299 4 343
如仍 wb3
11 . 3 213 91 307 11 . 78 424 14 516
12. 113 95 208 12 . 46 704 735
a
13. 34 34 68 13 . 15 409 424
14 . 1 22 14 37 14 . 7 2 12
15. 16 8 28 15 . 2 2
N
16.. 2 3 5 16. , 5 2 7
17. 6 6 17.
18. 12 12 18.
19. 6 6 19.
20 . 1 1 20 .
21 to 25 . 7 6 3 16 21 to 25 . 3 3
26 and over ... 4 11 10 25 26 and over. 22 2 24
pects of our industrial civilization, present and future. On the

demand side the need for new energy sources is in part due to
the enormous population increases, which medical science, higher
birth rates, and better economic conditions have produced through
out the world . On the supply side is the steadily increasing deple
tion of the world's coal , oil , gas, and potential water-power re
sources.
1-3.1 Effect of Population Growth
The population increase is of recent origin. During the first 700

years of the Christian era , world population may have made no
gain ; as far as is known , it remained essentially stable. Between
the years 700 and 1650, however, the world's population doubled.
It doubled again between 1650 and 1850 and again between 1850
and 1950. Thus, it took 950 years to double the first time, 200
years to double again , and only 100 years to double the third time.
It is obvious, therefore, that the rate of population growth is
increasing and that the next doubling will occur in less than one
hundred years. According to United Nations' estimates, the world's
population is increasing approximately 44,000,000 a year, and the
rate of increase is still accelerating. In 1956 the world population
400
POPULATION
, ILLIONS
300
M
100
0
1900 1950 2000 2050
YEAR
Fig. 1.1-Past and predicted population for the United States.
was placed at 2.734 billion . A recent estimate makes the astonish

ing claim that one out of every twenty persons who have ever
lived on earth is alive today,
Although it is obvious that the population of the world is sky
rocketing, attempts to forecast population growth in recent years
have not been very successful; nearly all such forecasts have fallen
short of actual values. As an example, the Bureau of Census in
1940 gave eight series of population forecasts for the United States
to the year 1975. The one considered most reasonable indicated a
total population of 160 million people in 1975. Apparently no one
even imagined that as early as 1958 the U.S. population would
reach 175 million . Current estimates of the Bureau of Census show
a population of 244 million in 1980. This is about 53 percent
higher than the estimate madeby the Bureau in 1946. Past and
predicted population for the United States is shown in Fig. 1.1 ,
with predictions until 1980 being based upon data and forecasts of
the Bureau of Census. After 2020 a trend toward saturation has
been indicated , as suggested by Palmer Putnam in his population
growth analysis and forecast.17 In his analysis, Putnam indicates
that the maximum populations obtained by projecting curves of
past growth of the world population may not actually be attained
because of limitations in food supply as well as a possible decrease
in birth rate.
[ Coupled with population growth is the constantly increasing an
nual use of energy per capita. If the energy use per capita were
to remain at present levels, the population factor alone would
serve to deplete existing energy reserves to a point where the situa
tion would become serious in not too many decades. However, the
per capita use of energy has been increasing steadily for many years
and is likely to continue to increase, not only in the United States
but in all other industrialized countries. This has come about
from the more intense use of all forms of power in homes, fac
tories, on farms, and in transportation on land, sea, and air.] Con
sidering electric power alone, in the United States in 1940 the use
of electricity per capita was 1,350 kilowatt -hours (kw -hr) per year.
In 1950, the annual usage per capita was 2,580 kw -hr ; in 1957, it
was 4,160 kw -hr; and in 1980 , it is predicted to amount to 7,360)
kw -hr. The combination of the various influencing factors has re
sulted in an expansion of the uses of electrical energy at an annual
compounded rate approximately three times the rate at which the
population is compounding.
Electric power , however, accounts for only a small fraction of the
energy used in the world. In the United States it amounts to only
14 percent of the total consumption if all forms of energy con
sumption are translated into common heat units. However, large
increases are occurring in the other uses also, particularly in the
field of transportation , and the effect of these increases on fuel
consumption has been drastic. It is estimated that more than half
of all the coal ever burned in the United States has been burned
since 1920 and that about half of all oil and natural gas burned
has been burned since 1940. Such consumption is out of all pro
portion to increases in population and indicates the extent of per
capita increases in energy use.
Figure 1.2 presents data on heat consumption projected to the
year 1980. It can be seen from the figure that electric power genera
80
70
TOTAL BTU
ENERGY
60
BTUEAR
/1, 095
Y
!
40
30
ALL OTHER
20
10
ELECTRIC
POWER
GENERATION
0 1
1920 1930 1940 1950 1960 1970 1980
YEAR
Fig . 1.2 - Data on heat consumption, showing the portion used in electric power
generation, projected to the year 1980.
tion accounts for only a relatively small portion of the total con
sumed .
Comparable per capita energy increases have been occurring in
other nations of the world, particularly in the industrialized western
nations, and these increases can be expected to continue at nearly
the same rate if the energy is available . To the increased demands
from already industrialized nations there may be added in the
future a surge of demands from previously undeveloped areas of
the world . In these areas there is agitation for the better things
of life, which seems likely to lead inevitably to the widespread
introduction of machine production and electrified living. This
would draw on energy resources both by drastically increasing per
capita use of energy and by acting as a spur to more rapid popu
lation increases.
Somewhat counterbalancing the growth in energy demand has
been the increase in efficiency in energy conversion . In the United
States, for example, it has been estimated that two -thirds of the
increase in energy output between 1920 and 1910 was accomplished
through gains in efficiency and only one- third through an increased
drain on energy reserves ( coal, oil, gas, etc.). We are , however,
approaching a point where increases in efficiency can no longer be
expected to match those of the past and where further increases in
energy demands must be accompanied by proportionate or nearly
proportionate increases in the input of energy sources. *
1-3.2 World's Energy Resources
[ How adequate are our supplies of energy resources to cope with
the rising energy demands ? Our principal reliance at present is in
falling water and in the so -called “ fossil fuels, ” i.e. , coal, oil , and
natural gas. With the exception of falling water, which accounts
for only 7 percent of the world's energy production, these resources
are finite and nonrenewable .
Coal represents the world's largest reservoir of fossil fuel. Vast
deposits are widely distributed throughout the world ; however,
much of the coal in the earth's crust is so narrowly distributed or so
far below the surface that it may never be practicable to recover it.
There is no such thing as an absolute reserve of coal, or oil , or
gas. Reserves are relative. There is more coal, oil , and gas in the
* During the past four decades the amount of heat required to produce a kilowatt
hour of electricity has dropped from over 42,000 Btu / kw -hr to less than 10,000 Btu in
the central stations of the United States . Although it is still possible to make incre .
mental gains in thermal heat rate , the cost of doing so rises rapidly as the practical
limits of efficiency are approached . Station costs rise as the heat rate decreases owing
to the higher cost of the high - pressure and temperature equipment needed and the more
complicated steam cycles required to attain the higher efficiencies. In general, it seems
to be economical to increase the station cost one dollar per kilowatt above normal cost
for each 74 Btu/kw-hr improvement in heat rate.
earth's crust than will ever be used.] It is not a question of empty .

ing the bin ; it is only a question of deciding how deep it is eco
nomical to dig. In a paper presented at the Geneva Conference on
the Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy in 1955, Robinson and Daniels,
of the United Kingdom , estimated the world reserves of coal which
can ultimately be extracted to be of the order of 3,000 billion tons.
This figure is less than one -tenth of estimates made in the early
years of this century.
Ultimate supplies of oil and natural gas are extremely difficult
to estimate. New fields are constantly being discovered , and tech
niques of extraction are being improved steadily . After
a review
of all available data , however , Robinson and Daniels concluded that
total recoverable petroleum and natural-gas reserves contain the
energy equivalent of 300 billion tons of coal. In addition , they
estimated that oil-bearing shales would ultimately yield the energy
equivalent of 150 billion tons of coal.
Thus, fossil- fuel reserves have been estimated to contain the en
ergy equivalent of about 3,450 billion tons of coal. Recent world
consumption of fossil fuels has been at a rate equivalent to more
than 2.5 billion tons per year. Comparing 2.5 to 3,450 billion would
seem to indicate that reserves are adequate.
" There are, however, two factors that change this picture. First ,
consumption of fossil fuels has been increasing at the rate of 2
percent per year. Consideration of the factors on the demand side
makes it appear that this rate of increase will be greater in the
future, perhaps 3 percent. With this rate of increase, annual con
sumption in 2050 would be over 50 billion * tons.187
In the second place, fossil fuels are not perfectly interchangeable
in their various uses . Current technology tends increasingly to
emphasize the use of fluid fuels, and these are far less plentiful
than solid fuels. Also , it is necessary to conserve a large quantity
of fossil fuels for use as lubricants and chemical raw materials and
for other nonfuel purposes; so by no means can all the reserves be
allocated for future use as energy sources.
It is difficult to draw precise conclusions from the welter of un
certain and conflicting factors which confront anyone who attempts
to analyze the adequacy of the world's fuel resources. Different
investigators invoke different basic assumptions and methods of cal
culation , and conclusions are often colored by personal prejudices
or vested commercial interests . There are widely varying estimates
concerning future population increases, per capita energy demands,
* The billion used in these estimates is in accordance with the American method of
numeration which follows the French (whose corresponding term is the milliard ) , a
thousand millions , 1,000,000,000. According to the English or German method of nu
meration , a billion is a million million , 1,000,000,000,000 .
24
20
ENERGY
BTU
16
,10
Supposing
Saturation
Trend In Per
Capita Demand
B
Supposing 2 %
Growth In Per
Capito Heat
Demand (Putnam )
0 11 1
1940 1960 1980 2000 2020 2040 2060 2080 2100
YEAR
Fig . 1.3 — Two curves showing an estimate of the pr able decline of fossil-fuel
reserves in the United States.
total fuel reserves, and how much of the reserve it will prove eco
nomical to recover.19
Figure 1.3 presents two curves showing one estimate of the
probable decline in the fossil -fuel reserves of the United States, one
based on a continued 2 percent growth per capita heat demand and
the other based on the assumption that there will be a saturation in
the per capita heat demand.17 Even if the latter assumption is cor
rect , note that it would extend the fossil fuels only for a period of
less than 50 years .
Whatever the assumptions and arithmetic one uses, however, the
conclusion seems inescapable that the period in the future during
which we may rely chiefly on fossil fuels must be measured in terms
of hundreds of years, perhaps 200 or 300 years at most, and pos
sibly very much shorter than that. This is emphasized by the
conclusions drawn by two students of this problem . Writing in
the Scientific American in October 1956, Eugene Ayres said : “ All
signs indicate we are within sight of the end of the fossil fuel
era on our planet. Our technology must press rapidly ahead to the
development of other sources of energy."
Palmer Putnam , speaking in 1951, found himself “ forced to
conclude that the social and economic incentives to develop new
sources of energy may become compelling in the United States before
A.D. 1975."
In some parts of the world , the need for a new energy source is
already at hand. In the United Kingdom , Japan, and Western
Europe, for example, the supply of conventional fuels is so pre
carious that industrial stagnation is threatened within a decade
unless these fuels are supplemented. It is because of this critical
fossil -fuel situation that England has embarked on a vast atomic
power program , which has as its object an electricity -generating

capacity of some five million kilowatts by 1965. ]
It is atomic energy that may rescue the world from the serious
plight confronting it ; indeed, at the present time, it seems to be the
only possible source of energy that will be able to fulfill the needs
of power -hungry nations. True, other possible sources have been
considered, solar power for example, but none of these other
sources appears to have the potential capability of meeting the
intensive power requirements of modern industrialized society. Al
though solar energy can no doubt serve to provide heat for domes
tic uses in underdeveloped areas of the world, it is not sufficiently
concentrated for large - scale industrial use. The tremendous con
centration of energy in nuclear fuel has already been mentioned ;
one pound of uranium , if completely fissioned, would release energy
equivalent to that of 2.7 million pounds of coal. The energy poten
tial in the known reserves of uranium is estimated to be at least
twenty times as large as that in the known reserves of fossil fuel.
The search for uranium , however, has been in progress for relatively
few years, and far more extensive reserves of uranium and thorium ,
which is also a nuclear fuel, may be discovered as the need increases.
1-3.3 Applications of Nuclear Energy
(nuclear
There are three areas in the world's use of power in which
energy has potential application. First is that involving
the generation of electric power. Already, large-scale programs are
going forward in the United States and in other countries to advance
the technology and bring the cost of nuclear power down to a level
where it will be competitive with fossil fuel. Despite many re
maining problems prospects of success in these endeavors are quite
bright. Beginning in the early 1960s, it is expected that an in
creasing proportion of the electric generating capacity added in
the United States each year will be nuclear, until, near the end
of the century , more than three quarters of the total annual addi
tions will be nuclear. This probably will be even more true in
England because of the critical nature of the fossil- fuel situation
there.
Nuclear energy might also find application to a considerable de
gree in the field of space heating (both domestic and industrial)
and in supplying low -temperature heat for industrial use, as in
paper mills, textile mills, and other industries where large amounts
of relatively low -temperature steam and hot water are needed .
An extensive study of this field of application has been made, and
it appears quite likely that the economic problems involved in this
field will be solved in the near future.20
The third area, and the area in which nuclear power has perhaps
the best chance of becoming competitive with fossil fuel, is the
area of nuclear propulsion for commercial vessels. Prospects for
the success of nuclear energy in propelling ships are very attractive,
and its general application to merchant vessels throughout the
world would conserve a large share of the liquid - fuel reserves. There
is nothing about nuclear power equipment which precludes its use
on shipboard. Its weight and volume requirements are reasonable ;
its effect on trim , stability, and hull strength can be met in design ;
shielding and safety needs can be handled ; and the propulsion
machinery will not be essentially different from that in conven
tional ships .7
This discussion of the conservation of natural resources has been
necessarily brief, but it should have made it clear that the need
for conserving fossil-fuel resources, particularly the liquid - fuel re
sources, provides an extremely important reason for the develop
ment of nuclear power for shipping of all kinds. With respect to
the United States, the nuclear power program should be viewed
in terms of long-term contribution to a solution of the over-all
energy program .. The United States is fortunate in having rela
tively ample fossil-fuel reserves for the near future as compared
with other countries. We, therefore, have a cushion of time during
which to solve the problems that lie between us and our objectives.
To some it may seem that progress in the development of nuclear
energy is slow , but, when viewed in light of the fact that the
nuclear power industry is only about six years old , it can be seen
that great strides have been made. In May 1953, the U.S. Atomic
Energy Commission released its first unclassified report on the
feasibility of nuclear power reactors.21 Electric power was gen
erated from nuclear energy for the first time in history on Dec. 21 ,
1951 , in the Experimental Breeder Reactor (EBR - I) at the AEC's
National Reactor Testing Station in Idaho ; this was a small ex
periment producing only 200 kw ( e ). At the time the AEC report
on the feasibility of nuclear power reactors was released in 1953,
there was still no nuclear reactor producing large amounts of power
anywhere in the world. At the first Geneva Conference on the
Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy in 1955, the Russians reported
that they had started operation of a 5,000 -kw nuclear power plant
near Moscow early in the summer of 1954.22
CAlthough the development of nuclear power for land - based plants
is important, the advantage of nuclear fuel for ships probably out
weighs the advantages for land -based plants, and this use can
become one of the most essential and productive of all the peaceful
uses of nuclear energy. Fuel costs in a high - powered conventional
ship run into millions of dollars over the life of a vessel. The
potentialities for reduction of the cost of nuclear fuels offers great

promise for economical operation of nuclear- powered ships .
1-4 TECHNICAL PROGRESS
Perhaps the most stimulating reason for United States partici

pation in the application of nuclear energy to the field of commer
cial ocean transportation lies in the possibility of uncovering a
number of new operating parameters. A preliminary study 23 has
been made of a number of unusual maritime applications of nuclear
energy in an effort to identify potential applications of this sort
and to analyze their feasibility. The results of studies of this kind
will be useful in guiding decisions concerning future research and
development related to maritime applications. In this study it was
necessary to review existing maritime activities, aside from stand
ard shipping operations, to determine whether they offer any pos
sibilities for the application of nuclear energy. While conventional
energy sources are presumably satisfactory, it is conceivable that
nuclear energy would be even more satisfactory.
In the search for unusual maritime applications of nuclear
energy, it is especially important to consider possible new activi
ties not now being conducted. With nuclear energy some entirely
new configurations and environments not possible with conven
tional energy may become possible. An important part of the total
study of maritime applications consists of a systematic search for
new ideas and new concepts. When feasibility is considered, analy
ses similar to those involved for existing activities and modifica
tions of existing activities should be applied. Proposed new mari
time operations must be analyzed in total. The first step will be
to verify the scientific and engineering feasibility of the opera
tion to make sure that it is physically possible before the eco
nomic aspects are considered. Economic feasibility in these cases
will depend on a comparison of estimated total costs and expected
total revenue of the entire operation .
Before these imusual maritime applications of nuclear energy
are discussed ,it is of interest to consider the physical and operat
ing characteristics of nuclear energy plants which are not avail
able in conventional energy installations. The most important of
these are :
1. Very high energy output potential per unit of weight and

space for fuel and equipment as compared to conventional
energy installations.
2. Ability to operate for long periods without refueling. This is
particularly important if high energy output is required and
for long voyages and operations in remote areas.
3. Ability to operate without oxygen ; important for undersea

operations.
4. Availability of radiation and isotopes in addition to heat.
This is possibly important for processing and experimental
work . Isotopes with short half lives would be available in
remote locations.
5. Possible availability of very high temperatures ; important for
processing or experimental work. ( This is now limited by
lack of materials that can withstand the temperatures involved .)
6. Cost of incremental power may be less than in conventional
systems as a plant is enlarged. This might make feasible in
transit processing of materials and might make possible some
extensions of existing operations that are not feasible with
conventional energy. ]
1-4.1 Transportation
The application of nuclear energy to the field of commercial

ocean shipping opens up the possibility for several new operating
concepts, such as the use of cargo as reactor shielding material, the
possibility of building submersible cargo ships that are capable
of high speeds while submerged and that can operate on long
routes without refueling, and, as already mentioned , in -transit
processing. Development work should be initiated on new and
unique hulls, following improved aerodynamic techniques, and on
new methods of propulsion . The supercavitating propeller might
be adapted to such new vessels, and the use of water- or steam -jet
propulsion systems might be considered.
'se of certain types of bulk liquid cargos as reactor shielding in
nuclear vessels would reduce the capital investment if suitable
cargos could be carried on all legs of all voyages. Materials used
in this way would be limited to those with good shielding prop
erties and those in which radiation would cause no undesirable
changes. In marine propulsion reactors shielding is usually divided
into primary shielding, which prevents nuclear activation of equip
ment near the reactor and permits access to this equipment when
the plant is shut down, and secondary shielding, which reduces
radiation to safe intensities at all normally inhabitable areas aboard
the ship . A review of nuclear -tanker designs has revealed three
instances in which the use of petroleum cargo for secondary shield
ing has been proposed . In these designs the primary shield reduces
the neutron flux to levels at which nuclear activation which might
introduce radioactivity into the secondary shield is no longer a
problem . The principal function of the secondary shield is to
absorb gamma radiation .
613489 0-02 -3
24 NUCLEAR PROPULSION FOR MERCHANT SHIPS 1
1
Based on a series of four studies,24
, -27 the outlook for replacing
all or part of the conventional secondary shielding by crude oil or
petroleum products appears particularly promising. Even in the
most severe case, it was shown that the cargo would absorb in 100
days less than 3 percent of the radiation dosage required to cause
even minor damage to petroleum products. One design for a 38,000
Dwt tanker powered by an organic -moderated reactor, which uses
an inexpensive hydrocarbon oil to fill a cofferdam for secondary
shielding, also employs for this purpose the diesel fuel tanks neces
sary to power the take -home engine. Diesel fuel tanks have been
proposed for secondary shielding on two other nuclear vessels.
Based on the limited dose data available, the use of hydrocarbons
as secondary -shield material appears completely satisfactory in all
these instances.
It therefore appears generally true that the physical and chem
ical properties of petroleum and its products will be unaffected when
used as secondary shielding in tankers following present designs.
Since chemical conversions will be low , the gas evolution from
irradiated cargo will also be extremely slight. The presence of
this gas will require no change in the precautions normally adopted
for the transportation of crude oil and petroleum products. Finally,
the rate of radiation -initiated corrosion which might be observed
when the hydrocarbon material is replaced by normal water ballast
for the return voyage of the tanker should also be very small or
nonexistent in tanker designs of the type considered to date. Thus,
the use of petroleum cargo as secondary shielding for nuclear
powered tankers appears feasible.
The advantages gained through the use of hydrocarbons as sec
ondary shielding on tankers can be extended to some extent by
utilizing crude oil or petroleum products as primary -shielding ma
terials. The incentive for doing this, however, is not as great as
in the use of cargo for secondary shielding since primary shields
are usually smaller in volume and weight. It appears likely that
more data will be required on questions such as corrosion and the
production of radioactivity in the crude oil in order to establish
the maximum shielding that crude oil could provide. The only
reactor design in which an organic material has been proposed
as primary shielding is the organic-moderated reactor for tanker
propulsion referred to above. The shielding material in this instance
is Dowtherm , a mixture of biphenyl and biphenyl ether. The radi
ation dosages and neutron - flux levels calculated for this design
would allow a substitution of crude oil for the Dowtherm in a
shield of this type without any effect on the radiation stability
of the crude oil .
It is more difficult to guarantee that there would be no problems

arising from neutron activation of organic primary-shielding ma
terials. Crude oils can contain up to a few percent of sulfur and
nitrogen and several hundred parts per million of activatable
metallic elements. At the flux levels to which the oil would be
subjected when used as shielding material, appreciable radioactivity
might be generated from these elements during a long voyage. If
neutron activation appeared to be a serious problem , it could be
reduced if pumping were employed to circulate cargo through the
shield compartment.
Although the prospect of using crude oil or petroleum products
as primary shielding in a nuclear-powered tanker appears encour
aging, this optimistic outlook must be tempered by recognition of
the limited data supporting this conclusion, particularly with re
spect to the economic attractiveness of such an approach .
(a ) Possible Vessel Types. The ability of a nuclear reactor to
operate without oxygen is obviously of great importance because
it makes possible underwater vessels capable of operating sub
merged over long distances. Nuclear-powered submarine cargo
ships would have advantages in that they would not be affected by
surface conditions of the ocean. One intriguing possibility that is
being considered is the development of nuclear-powered sea trains,
cargo vessels or tankers, operating on unique, new, or conventional
sea routes, on the surface or submerged , manned or unmanned .
There are several advantages to this concept of operation :
1. The power plant could be a separate unit merely coupled to
the cargo trailer or trailers ; it would not actually have to
enter each port of call. Trailers consigned to a particular
port could be uncoupled and transported to the dock area by
tugs. If the power plant did enter the harbor, it would not
have to remain there idle during unloading operations but
could go on to its next port of call. Such a system would
permit maximum utilization of the propulsion plant.
2.) Capital cost of the engine vessel would be less than that for
a large cargo ship.
3. The use of special containers or specialized bulk cargo ves
sels would result in handling economies and shortened turn
around time. If this method of handling were to be extended
to rail and truck systems also, the result would be a coor
dinated transportation system that provided a more continu
ous flow of goods from point of origin to consignee.
4. A submerged cargo vessel operating below the wave motion
would probably produce economies in its structural or hull
aspects. A cargo -carrying trailer for a sea train might even
be a sausage or light collapsible container made of Teflon , for

example, that could be left at its port of destination and
picked up on a subsequent trip loaded with cargo or collapsed.
A novel variation of this concept might be used : if the cargo
could be frozen into a shape that would lend itself readily
to being towed , it would be transported in that fashion. In
general, only relatively small amounts of energy would be
required to keep it frozen, depending upon the ocean tem
perature.
It has been suggested that nuclear-propelled submarines be used
during the winter months to transport iron ore under the ice of the
Great Lakes to lake ports serving the Eastern and Midwestern steel
centers, dependent upon lake depths, ice thickness, and the prac
ticability of loading ore in freezing weather. Cargo submarines
could also be used to deliver oil and other supplies to remote arctic
regions where there are now severe restrictions on regular delivery
schedules.
(b ) Hydrofoils. Another use of a nuclear power plant might be in
a
connection with the hydrofoil ship concept. Hydrofoil ships are

those in which the hull rises above the surface of the water during
operation and is supported on struts attached to submerged wings
or foils which produce the required lift by virtue of their speed
through the water. The principle of operation is similar to that
of the wing surfaces of an aircraft.
The hydrofoil concept gives promise of a class of vehicles that
would provide ocean transportation at speeds somewhere above the
fastest conventional types of ships and below the airplane. At pres
ent, the top speed of conventional large ocean vessels is in the
neighborhood of 34 knots. Airplanes, on the other hand , hare
speeds of from 100 knots upward, but the carrying capacity of air
planes is far below that of large ocean - going vessels. If the hydro
foil concept should prove successful with ships of relatively large
size, we would have a class of vessels that would fill the gap between
conventional ships and airplanes with respect to speed .
The basic technical characteristics of vehicles of primary interest
are total weight or displacement, installed power, and speed. The
relationship among these quantities must be considered before other
matters such as payload and cost can be determined .
A measure of economic feasibility is transport efficiency. This is
defined as the product of weight and speed taken per unit of power
required, and usually expressed as ton -knots per horsepower. Opti
mum hydrofoil craft lie between the speed ranges of displacement
vessels and aircraft for the same value of transport efficiency.
The peculiar fascination of hydrofoil craft is that ideally one
might hope to have a craft whose main fuselage or hull enjoys the
low resistance of low -density air, while its wings obtain lift at low
speed in high - density water . Unfortunately, actual craft are much
different from the ideal, and even the most ardent advocates of
hydrofoil craft have not claimed they could penetrate the inter
mediate speed zone.
An extensive study of an ocean -going hydrofoil craft has been
made for the Maritime Administration.28 This study involved both
conventional and nuclear power plants and included investigations
of speeds from 50 to 200 knots, displacements from 100 to 3,000
tons, and ranges from 400 to 3,600 nautical miles.
Two basic types of hydrofoil cross sections, subcavitating and
supercavitating, were extensively investigated . The subcavitating
section functions with water flow similar to the airflow about a
conventional aircraft wing section , which it resembles. Of the vari
ous sections that were compared , an ogive section with a lower flat
surface and small-radius leading edge, operating at about 2,000 lb /
sq ft loading, was found to be best. The maximum thickness of
this section is governed by the back sweep of the foil platform and
by the required craft speed.
The supercavitating sections are distinguished by their depend
ence on only the lower surface pressure for operation. They are
intended to operate at speeds higher than subcavitating sections.
Supercavitating sections form a steady -state cavity of air and
water vapor above the upper surface ; the upper boundary of this
cavity is a constant-pressure streamline, above which smooth flow
exists similar to that around a subcavitating foil. The formation
of this cavity is essential to the operation of these sections. A tran
sient cavity of similar shape also tends to form over subcavitating
sections at high speed. Its instability causes a rapid drag rise ,
erosion of the upper surface, and loss of life, however. The super
cavitating section deemed most promising is the Tulin bottom
shape, with leading -edge wedge angle, cambre, and loading being
dependent on speed.
Superior performance would result from the use of subcavitating
sections at low speeds and supercavitating sections at high speeds.
It is felt that subcavitating foils are limited to speeds below 70
knots . Above that speed the supercavitating foil gives promise of
the best performance.
The selection of a suitable power plant for the hydrofoil craft is
dictated primarily by specific fuel consumption (pounds of fuel per
horsepower -hour) and specific weight (pounds per horsepower ).
Within the speed limits of the study, direct jet thrust is prohibi
tively inefficient; therefore only light-weight diesels, gas turbines,
steam turbines, and nuclear power plants were considered . Since
the steam plant has a higher weight and a higher fuel consumption
than either the gas turbine or the diesel, it was dropped from the
study ; the remaining chemically fueled plants were carried through
out.
The nuclear plant, with a relatively high specific weight but
negligible fuel consumption, offers good possibilities at extreme
ranges. For ranges of over 3,000 miles, it is felt that a closed - cycle
gas-cooled nuclear reactor mounted in an underwater pod is worthy
of development. Such a plant would be entirely suitable for hydro
foil craft and could be developed in about ten years.
An optimum 1,000 -ton craft was designed to facilitate the study
of the characteristics of nuclear-powered hydrofoil craft. This
craft uses subcavitating hydrofoils and a 52,500 -hp pod -mounted
power plant driving one water propeller. Payload capacity is 331
tons, and the range is estimated at 130,000 nautical miles. The
cruising speed of this optimum -design vessel is 65 knots, giving a
productivity of 21.5 ton -knots per ton and a transport efficiency of
410 ton -knots per horsepower. This corresponds to 10 ton - knots
per horsepower for the Savannah .
(c) Ground-effect Machines. Even more startling in concept than
the hydrofoilis the possible use of nuclear power on what are
known as " ground-effect machines," also called “hydro -skimmers."
The term “ ground effects principle ” refers to the unusually large
lifting force that is obtained by the downward deflection of air
in the proximity of the surface over which an aircraft is traveling.
This large lifting force is the result of the partial containment of a
high -pressure air bubble, or zone, beneath the lower surface of the
craft.
It is well known that an augmentation of the lifting capability
of fixed- or rotating-wing aircraft occurs whenever such aircraft
are flying close to the ground. The main advantage of the airplane,
however, has always been regarded as its ability to escape from the
ground environment. Increases in performance have never been
judged by abandoning the freedom of the open sky, although be
fore World War II, the Dornier 12-engine amphibian DOX was
reported to have crossed the Atlantic entirely within the ground
cushion with greatly reduced drag.
This attitude may have to be reconsidered in view of the recent
discovery that there exist ways of increasing the lifting capability
of certain machines inside the ground effect not by 10 or 20 percent,
as in the case of airplanes and helicopters, but several hundredfold.
The use of this principle in the design of nuclear-powered ocean
vessels travelling on , or just above, the surface of the ocean could ,
if successful, revolutionize the maritime industry by allowing the
design of high -speed cargo vessels requiring little or no conven
tional seaport facilities. A review of the state of the art has re
vealed that the feasibility of the principle has been definitely

established in regard to static lifting mechanisms and that work
is currently in process to evaluate the effect of vehicle motion ,
wind , drag, and travel over irregular surfaces ( waves) on the sys
tem performance characteristics. To obtain the necessary size and
configuration information, the Navy Bureau of Aeronautics has
entered into a contract with Convair, at San Diego, to suggest and
investigate the feasibility of large ocean -going vessel designs pow
ered by conventional power plants. Ultimately it is the object of
these investigations to develop designs using nuclear power plants.
A ground -effect machine consists basically of a pad that is paral
lel to the ground and a certain distance above it . An air supply
is injected between the bottom of the pad and the ground. In its
simplest form , the air flow can escape radially freely. Without
attempting to discuss the aerodynamics of these devices, it is obvious
that if sufficient air is injected between the bottom of the pad and
the ground, the pad will be supported a slight distance above the
ground on a cushion of air.
. Various small models of machines
utilizing this principle have been built, but the most interesting
development in this field is the recent crossing of the English
Channel, from Calais to Dover, by the Hovercraft, a machine de
veloped by Christopher Cockerell in England. On July 23, 1959,
this craft, shaped like a flying saucer, made the crossing in 2 hr
and 3 min , flying a foot above the waves on a self -made air
cushion . The Hovercraft is an oval disk , 30 by 20 ft , surmounted
by a squat, broad funnel. A fan blows air down through two rings
of slots on the disks underside. More air from the same fan is
blasted through four ducts at the sides of the disk to move it and
steer it . The machine was said to lift off the ground or water as
soon as the engine revolved fast enough to build up the necessary
air pressure beneath .
Whether this principle is applicable to large ocean - going ships
remains to be demonstrated ; however, serious thought is being given
to the development of machines of this type. If large craft of this
type should prove feasible, it is quite likely that nuclear power will
be given serious consideration as a means of propulsion.
1-4.2 In-transit Processing or Multipurpose Vessels
The concept of in - transit processing utilizing nuclear energy is
based on the idea of the partial or complete processing of a com
modity or material during transit from a port at or near its origin
to its destination . The energy requirements for the processing
cycle may be provided more economically by adding capacity to
the nuclear- propulsion power plant of the ship than by adding the
equivalent capacity to a conventional power plant. This would

overcome the disadvantage mentioned previously ( Sec. 1-2.1 ) , i.e..
the lack of a demand for high -power nuclear plants aboard ship.
In studies of this concept, many possible commodities and ma
terials have been considered and various manufacturing operations
have been suggested ; some, admittedly, border on fantasy. Among
the materials that might be processed enroute are iron ore, bauxite,
scrap iron , crude oil, sulfur, and beryllium . Operation of distil
leries, food -processing plants, and deuterium (heavy hydrogen )
production facilities has also been considered .
Candidate items for this type of handling should be :
1. Items that lend themselves to bulk shipment, thus facilitating
handling aboard ship.
2. Items whose processing requires large amounts of energy.
3. Items with a minimum weight loss during processing.
4. Items with minimum requirements for extra chemicals or
other related supplies in their processing .
5. Items with minimum requirements for the recovery of chem
icals or other ingredients during processing.
6. Items with minimum requirements for fresh water in process
ing.
7. Items whose processing involves a considerable degree of
automation .
8. Perishable items that would yield a premium freight rate
if transportation time were shortened or if processing were
accomplished earlier in the production - distribution system .
9. Items that require heating or cooling or other processing
before further use or that can be efficiently carried in a
molten state .
10. Items whose source of supply is a long distance from the
user .
In connection with foodstuffs, in -transit irradiation may allow

the product to be handled without refrigeration once it reaches its
destination . This could be important as it pertains to storage and
distribution facilities.
( a ) In - transit Processing of Chemicals. Among the various ap
plications of this concept in the chemical field would be the radia
tion processing of insecticides and pesticides and perhaps other
chemical compounds on a nuclear - powered vessel enroute to under
developed areas where there is a large need for such items. Chem
ical reactions not greatly accelerated by radiation would not be
economical if a special gamma source had to be set up, but, if the
radiation potential were a free by- product of the ship's propulsion
plant, it would change the situation considerably.
The use of a nuclear-powered tanker for transporting liquified

natural gas might prove economical since the nuclear reactor would
have ample energy potential to maintain the gas in its liquid state.
( b) Fishing and Food Processing. Various unique possibilities
for nuclear power exist in the fishing industry. A nuclear mother
ship for a fishing fleet, for example, could operate long distances
from land and for long periods of time. Refueling problems would
be minimized, and the power plant could also provide the radiant,
thermal, or mechanical energy for preserving the catch for a longer
period. The catch could be irradiated, canned, frozen, or partially
processed at sea.
At present direct, alternating, and pulsed electric currents are
being used in the fishing industry to stun the fish , which can then
be caught by seines or pumped aboard. In other cases fish are
attracted by an electrical source, led into a funnel-shaped device,
and , then pumped aboard. Battery- or gasoline -engine -operated
electric fishing machines are effective only within about a 10- ft
radius ; experiments indicate, however, that a 250- kw source would
be effective on tuna, for example, in a radius of about 100 ft , using
a pulsed current. A high -energy source from a nuclear power re
actor would therefore add considerable range of effectiveness to
this fishing method and would provide the large amounts of pump
ing power required to operate the sytsem . A central power source
on a mother ship might be used to charge batteries or other
energy-storage devices on smaller boats.
A floating cannery, freezing plant, dehydrators, or radiation steri
lizer utilizing a nuclear energy source for the processing require
ments (and possibly even for propulsion ) could go to various
parts of the world or to the United States where there are agricul
tural surpluses or where people grow more than they can consume,
process, or get to the market areas. These regions, of course, would
have to be primarily on the coast or along navigable rivers. Can
.. If this fresh
ning requires significant amounts of fresh water
water could not be piped to the floating cannery from sources on
land, the operations would also have to include a salt -water con
version plant. Since food processing is highly seasonal, mobility
is essential for such a device ; however, this type plant is envisioned
probably as a one -of - a -kind item .
( c ) Mining and Dredging. The application of nuclear energy to
marine mining and dredging might be feasible in operations that
require high energy outputs, take place in remote regions, and must
function away from land for long periods of time. For the most
part, these operations would be confined to the continental shelf
and slope and would involve dredging of beach sands, movement
of large rock masses and removal of their ores, collection of min

eral nodules from the deep ocean floor, and drilling of oil wells on
the shelf and of geophysical exploratory holes through the crust
beneath the ocean basin .
( d ) Miscellaneous Applications. Nuclear energy could be ap
plied to vessels used in oceanography. There are several types of
floating laboratories for general oceanographic research which might
use nuclear energy for power requirements and propulsion. Floating
nuclear-powered plants for the extraction of minerals from sea
water might be feasible. It might also be feasible to use nuclear
powered ships for the production of isotopes at sea to utilize the
supply of trace elements in sea water and to create the short-half
life isotopes needed in research at sea .
1-4.3 Summary
These are some of the unusual applications of nuclear power in

the marine field . Some, no doubt, may never go beyond the idea
stage, but all of them together are indicative of the unique potential
of nuclear energy at sea and constitute a valid reason for engaging
in the development of nuclear-powered commercial vessels.
An essential reason for United States participation in the de
velopment of nuclear-powered merchant ships lies in the vast reser
voir of technical knowledge and manufacturing resources that has
accumulated in this country as a result of our wartime work in the
nuclear field . This technical and economic knowledge should be
made available to smaller nations that do not possess the material
or manufacturing resources to engage in expensive development
programs themselves. [ As already mentioned, the world's conven
tional fuel resources are unequally divided among the various na
tions, and it will probably be to the advantage of the have not na
tions to develop nuclear-powered ships even sooner than those na
tions that still have ample and inexpensive fuel reserves. The fact
that other countries are actively engaged in studies concerning
nuclear propulsion is indicative of their interest in this phase of
nuclear power development.) Only recently a large company in the
United States signed a contract to build an organic-moderated re
actor for a 10,000- shp merchant ship for the West German Gov.
ernment.
The research and development data on the Savannah,[ studies
on boiling-water, organic-moderated, and gas-cooled reactors for
maritime use have, properly, been declassified and are available to
countries that may wish to use them in building their own nuclear
powered ships . When the Savannah goes into commercial service
)
as the world's first nuclear - powered merchant ship , it is hoped she

will introduce a new era in commercial shipping just as her famous
predecessor, the first Savannah, did one hundred and forty years
ago when she became the first ship to use steam in crossing the
Atlantic.
REFERENCES
1. FREDERICK SODDY, The Interpretation of Radium , G. P. Putnam's Sons, New

York , 1922.
2. S. TAKEUCHI, T. ORAMURA, and S. MURAKAMI, Nuclear Powered Emigrant
Ship, Second U.N. International Conference on the Peaceful Uses of
Atomic Energy, A/Conf. 15 / P - 1319, 1958 .
3. R. V. MOORE and C. E. ILIFFE, Nuclear Propulsion for Ships, Second U.N.
International Conference on the Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy, A / Conf.
15 / P - 266 , 1938.
4. J. HAINZELIN et al . , Possibilities and Conditions of Uses of Water or Gas
Type Reactors in a Tanker, Second U.N. International Conference on the
Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy, A /Conf. 15/P-1137, 1958.
5. D. L. CONKLIN et al. , Economics of Nuclear and Conrentional Merchant
Ships, Report AWAE-5, American Radiator and Standard Sanitary Corp.,
June 1958.
6. M. FRANKEL et al., 22,000-8hp Marine Boiling -water Reactor Power Plant
for Commercial Tanker ( Preliminary Plant Description ), Aug. 1, 1958.
7. R. W. and R. C. MORRELL, Feasibility Investigation of a Closed -cycle Boil
ing -water Reactor for the Propulsion of a Merchant ship, Report AMF
GR -5-57, American Machine & Foundry Co. , Apr. 8, 1957 .
8. ATOMICS INTERNATIONAL, Economic Analysis of an OMR -powered 38,000
DWT Tanker, USAEC Report NAA-SR-1879, March 1957.
9. BABCOCK & Wilcox Co., Nuclear Merchant Ship Reactor : Final Safeguards
Reports, Vols. I and II , Report BAW-1164, June 1960.
10. GENERAL DYNAMICS CORP. , Evaluation of Coolants and Moderators for the
Maritime Gas-cooled Reactor, Report GA -570 , December 1958.
11. GENERAL DYNAMICS CORP. , Feasibility Report, Gas -cooled Reactors for Ship
Propulsion, Report GA-87 ( Del . ) , April 1957.
12. GENERAL MOTORS CORP. , Study for 20,000-shp Nuclear Propulsion System for
Tanker, Vols. 1, 2, and 4, 1957.
13. NORDBERG MANUFACTURING Co. and FORD INSTRUMENT Co. , 20,000-8hp Nuclear
Tanker, Vols. 1 , 2, and 4, April 1957.
14. THE RALPH M. PARSONS Co., Nuclear Powered Ship Program .
15. A. P. ALEXANDROV et al . , Atomic Icebreaker “ Lenin , " Second U.N. Inter
national Conference on the Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy, A / Conf.
15 / P - 2140, 1958.
16. U.S. CONGRESS, JOINT COMMITTEE ON ATOMIC ENERGY, Peaceful U8C8 of
Atomic Energy, Background Information, Vol. 2, Chap. 7, pp. 215–245 ,
January 1956 .
17. PALMER PUTNAM , Energy in the Future, D. Van Nostrand Co., Inc., Prince
ton , N.J. , 1953 .
18. HARRY A. KULJIAN , Proposal to Assist in Conserving Our Fossil Fuel Re.
sources ; Nuclear Power Generation , Power Eng ., 63 :54-57 (April 1959 ).
19. Louis H. Roddis, Jr. , Why Nuclear Power ? Address at REA Nuclear
Power Conference, Washington , D.C. , Oct. 7, 1957.
20. Paul L. GEIRINGER and Morton GOODFRIEND, Potential Applications of Nu
clear Energy for Process and Space Heat in the United States, USAEC
Report NYO - 2332, October 1958.
21. U.S. ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION , Reports to the USAEC on Nuclear Pourer
Reactor Technology, Government Printing Office, Washington , D.C. , May
1953.
22. D. I. BLOKHINTSEV and N. A. NIKOLAEV, USSR Atomic Power Station, Proc.
International Conference on the Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy, Genera,
3:35 ( 1955 ) .
23. STANFORD RESEARCH INSTITUTE, Unusual Applications of Nuclear Energy in
the Field of Marine Activities, Status Report on Phase I , March 1959.
24. E. F. BAXTER, Jr., and J. F. BLACK , The Effect of Radiation on Petroleum
and its Products, Report ESSO -MA - 1, ESSO Research and Engineering
Co., Aug. 1 , 1959.
25. E. F. BAXTER, Jr., and J. F. BLACK , The Application of Petroleum and
Petroleum Products as Shielding in Nuclear Propelled Tankers, Report
ESSO -MA - 2, ESSO Research and Engineering Co., Aug. 1 , 1959.
26. E. F. BAXTER, Jr. , and J. F. BLACK, The Application of Petroleum Prod
ucts as Moderator -Coolants in Marine Propulsion Reactors, Report ESSO
MA - 3, ESSO Research and Engineering Co., Aug. 1, 1959.
27. E. H. OKRENT, Lubrication Requirements of Nuclear -powered Surface Fes
sels, Report ESSO -MA - 4 , Esso Research and Engineering Co. , Aug. 1 , 1959.
28. GRUMMAN AIRCRAFT ENGINEERING CORP. and DYNAMIC DEVELOPMENTS , INC. ,
Study of Hydrofoil Seacraft, Study Summary, Report PGB-H-1 , Grum
mann Aircraft Engineering Corp., November 1958.
Chapter 2
THE COMMERCIAL NUCLEAR SHIP PROGRAM IN THE

UNITED STATES
Before a nuclear merchant fleet can be developed, a number of

questions must be answered. The Atomic Energy Commission , in
cooperation with the Maritime Administration , has developed a
two -phase program aimed at answering these questions. First and
foremost among the questions is : What is, and what will be in the
future, the competitive position of nuclear -powered ships in rela
tion to conventional ships? When this question is answered , it may
be possible to find answers to the following questions:
1. When should nuclear ships be built ?
2. In what areas of shipping can nuclear ships best be applied ?
3. How can an over-all conversion to nuclear power be accom
plished ?
The AEC -Maritime Administration program is divided into two
phases, a short -range program and a long -range program . The aim
of the short -range program is to build and operate a nuclear -pow
ered merchant ship with the knowledge we have gained from build
ing and operating land-based nuclear power plants and submarines.
Such a program will have twofold benefits. It will advance our
technological and economic experience to a point where we may
be able to answer the basic questions realistically. In addition, it
will show the world that as a nation we are actively engaged in a
program for the peaceful use of atomic energy. In fact, it was
this latter consideration that prompted the proposal in 1955 that
the United States undertake a project to build a nuclear -powered
merchant ship.
The product of this short -range program is, of course, the N.S.
Savannah , whose construction was begun in May 1958. The power
plant chosen for this ship is the pressurized -water reactor, which
proved so effective in the Nautilus. Valuable operating experience
will be gained from the Savannah as well as valuable information
on the economics of operation .
The aim of the long-range phase of the program is to utilize
the technical and economic experience gained from the Savannah in
developing economically competitive nuclear power on merchant
ships.
35
The first part of the program , i.e., the construction of the Savan
nah, is to provide operating experience and to win acceptance for
nuclear ships in the world ports. She will serve essentially as a
demonstration ship . Cost factors, however, will be a major con
sideration in the second part of the program .
Engineering evaluations and studies made under the long-range
phase of the program have already shown that nuclear energy for
merchant vessels is technically feasible and that it is safe to con
struct and operate merchant ships powered by nuclear reactors, spe
cifically by pressurized -water reactors . It is also important, for long
range applications and ultimate competitive economics, to give con
sideration to other types of reactor systems undergoing develop
ment at the present time. These include the boiling water reactor,
the gas-cooled reactor, and the organic -moderated reactor.
Economic factors can be determined and evaluated with accuracy
only after a comparative study of nuclear and oil - fired ships built
and operated at the same time. It would be desirable, therefore,
to initiate a program for the construction of a number of different
types of nuclear -powered commercial ships and at the same time
to undertake studies of those types of nuclear reactors which give
most promise of raising the steam pressures and temperatures to
the requirements of turbomachinery now used in merchants ships.
A design and construction program of this kind must permit maxi
mum flexibility so that continuous improvement and new develop
ments can be incorporated into the shipbuilding program .
The development of nuclear power- generating devices alone will
not suffice. Design and engineering efforts must go on continuously
in all aspects of marine technology to ensure development of nu
clear power that can be coordinated successfully with given ship
design and construction programs. With present technology it
would be possible to proceed immediately with a number of different
programs for the engineering, design, construction, and operation of
nuclear-powered merchant vessels without great risk of their be
coming obsolete in the near future.
Consideration of the present state of nuclear technology applicable
to merchant ships brings up the following questions:
Is any known reactor system technically and economically com
petitive with present methods of power generation ?
Do we have sufficient knowledge and technology today to begin
construction and operation of additional nuclear-powered ships ?
What possibilities do different reactor systems offer ?
These questions have been , and will continue to be, investigated.
Although there have been no conclusive answers, preliminary studies
seem to indicate that a nuclear -powered tanker is already close to
being competitive with conventional tankers.
U.S. COMMERCIAL NUCLEAR SHIP PROGRAM 37
14 2-1 LIAISON ( LEGAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE )
As indicated in Fig. 2.1 , the United States program involves con

struction projects, support projects, and research and development
projects to be carried on until 1968. Among the most important
are the extensive health , safety, and environmental studies that are
being made by various organizations.
In preparation for the entrance of the Savannah into United
States and foreign harbors, a number of legal and administrative
actions were taken while the ship was under construction . The
Atomic Energy Commission - Maritime Administration Interagency
Agreement relating to the operation of the Savannah was signed on
Mar. 6 , 1959, and on Mar. 9, 1959, the General Agency Contract
between the Maritime Administration and the States Marine Lines
was signed. According to these agreements, after the initial test
and trials and after a period of limited operation involving the
carrying of passengers and cargo , the Savannah will be chartered
to States Marine Lines to be used in normal commercial service on
CONSTRUCTION PROJECTS 1957/1958 1959 1960 1961 1962 1963 1964 1965 1966 19671968
NS Savannah Atomic Energy Commission
Boiling Water Reactor *
DEMONSTRATION PROGRAM Maritime Administration
Advanced Pressurized Water Reactor
Boiling Water Reactor

Organic Moderated Reactor
Gas Cooled Reactor-- Steam Cycle
Maritime Gas Cooled Reactor ( Government Owned Ship )
SUPPORT PROJECTS
Health, Safety, Environmental

OPERATION
NS Savannah
Moritime Gas Cooled Reactor & Based Prototype
Maritime Gas Cooled Reactor Ship
RESEARCH & DEVELOPMENT PROJECTS

NS Savannah Upgrading
Pressurized Water Reactor ( NS SAVANNAH )
Maritime Gas Cooled Reactor ( land Bosed Prototype !
Organic Moderated Reactor
Maritime Gas Cooled Reactor Ship
.
Advanced Studies
1957 1958 1959 1960 1961 1962 1963 1964 1965 1966 1967 1968
" Not included in 1960 Budget due to absence of authorizing
legislation
Fig. 2.1 — Present and proposed nuclear -powered merchant ship program
( calendar years 1957-1968 ).
a specified trade route on established schedules. States Marine Lines

will be the initial operator of the Savannah, but eventually the ship
may be chartered to other operators so that the education experience
may be shared.
The Interagency Committe on the Savannah Operation Policies,
consisting of representatives of the Department of the Treasury, the
Department of Commerce, and the Atomic Energy Commission , be
gan in February 1959 to develop prudent operating rules and areas
of agency responsibility. A joint task force on legal, administra
tive, procedural, and legislative matters concerning the foreign and
domestic operation of the Savannah was appointed by the Maritime
Administrator (MA ) and the General Manager (AEC ) to delineate
problem areas and recommend approaches to their solution.
In the course of the program of nuclear activities, the Maritime
Administration and the Atomic Energy Commission is taking into
account the recommendations and regulations of other Federal agen
cies such as the U.S. Coast Guard and the Public Health Service.
The National Committee on Radiation Protection ( NCRP ) has de
veloped specific recommendations for controlling radiation in a wide
variety of situations. These recommendations have been, in general,
adopted by the Atomic Energy Commission and were applied in the
design and construction of the Savannah. Although the NCRP has
recommended limits for the release of radioactivity to the environ
ment, special considerations are being given to the controlled release
of reactor waste products from nuclear ships. A subcommittee of
the National Academy of Sciences has been formed to evaluate the
technical factors associated with radioactive -waste disposal from
nuclear- powered ships. In the absence of an international agree
ment concerning the disposal of radioactive wastes at sea , storage
tanks have been provided on board the Savannah for even low- level
radioactive wastes. There will be no disposal of these wastes at sea .
To some extent this requirement for waste -storage facilities penal
izes the economic position of nuclear -powered ships in comparison to
conventionally powered ships.
Factors of this nature indicate the early need for international
agreement on the disposal of radioactive wastes at sea and for rec
ognition and resolution of technical and administrative factors of
concern to other seafaring nations with interests in nuclear propul
sion programs. These problems may be resolved through coopera
tive action of the International Atomic Energy Agency and also at
future meetings of the International Conference of Safety of Life
at Sea .
The U.S. State Department maintains continuing contact with the
maritime program and provides information on international prog
ress in this field . Maritime industries of Norway, England, Japan ,
and other countries are currently engaged in design studies for

nuclear propulsion systems. Through the State Department the
Maritime Administration is kept abreast of technical progress in
these areas.
The Society of Naval Architects and Marine Engineers has estab
lished a panel on the application of nuclear energy to marine pro
pulsion sysems. This group, the M-13 Atomic Energy Panel, is
currently developing technical safety criteria for all aspects of
nuclear merchant-ship design and operation. These include major
emphasis on radiation protection for passengers and crew members.
The Maritime Administration , Coast Guard, Public Health Service,
and several private firms are represented on this panel. It is
expected that recommendations made by this panel will serve as a
basis for developing future regulations in the design and operation
of nuclear merchant ships.
In the legislative field, the recent enactment of Public Law
85-602 ( S.4156 ) extends the provisions of the Atomic Energy Com
mission Indemnity Act to the operation of the Savannah beyond the
territorial waters of the United States. Originally, the Indemnity
Act, which indemnifies up to $500 million against claims resulting
from nuclear accidents, applied only to land -based atomic energy
installations in the United States. The modification of the Indem
nity Act to cover the operation of the Savannah applies only to the
Savannah at the present time and not to other nuclear- powered
ships.
Commercial marine -insurance groups are also actively engaged in
studies of nuclear propulsion . The American Institute of Marine
Underwriters has established a nucleonic committee for this express
purpose. In addition, property- and liability insurance interests,
which have organized as the Nuclear Energy Property Insurance
Association and the Nuclear Energy Liability Insurance Association ,
are also engaged in a review of the maritime applications of nuclear
energy .
Questions relating to national and international indemnity legis
lation for nuclear merchant ships will require considerable discus
sion and interchange of opinion by representatives of various nations
before they can be fully resolved . Informal discussions concerning
indemnity as well as other legal and administrative problems in
nuclear -ship operation have taken place between major maritime
nations and the several United States agencies directly involved
with the design, construction , operation, and regulation of nuclear
ships. From Sept. 1 to 17, 1959, a joint AEC - Maritime Adminis
tration task group on legal and administrative questions visited
Belgium , the Netherlands, Denmark, Norway, Sweden , and France
to discuss with the government representatives of those countries
613489 0-62
the question of acceptance of the N.S. Savannah into their ports.

Discussions were also held with the Euratom staff members in
Brussels. The discussions were of an informal nature and were
intended to elicit the attitudes of the various countries toward accept
ance of the ship and to determine, to the extent possible, the terms
and conditions under which the ship would be accepted into foreign
ports. During this visit no commitments were made and no com
mitments were sought.
During the course of each of the meetings, the Task Group made
a general presentation along the following lines :
1. A brief history of the Savannah was given. The Task Group
explained that the United States government had decided to
build , as a further demonstration of the peaceful applications
of atomic energy, a nuclear ship and, furthermore, that one of
the most useful ways to demonstrate the atom's capacity in
ship propulsion was to construct a combination passenger
cargo vessel. With the ship's completion, the United States
plans to make available to as many foreign countries as pos
sible the opportunity to observe the workings of this nuclear
ship and to permit foreign technical personnel an opportunity
to utilize the knowledge gained from its construction in the
development of their own nuclear-ship programs. Emphasis
was placed on the fact that all the information developed dur
ing design, construction , and operation is unclassified.
2. While it is desirable to have the Savannah treated as nearly as
possible like a conventional ship , it is recognized that rules and
regulations designed to assure safety will be necessary.
brief technical description of the vessel's construction, safety
features, and emergency capabilities was given to each group
of conferees.
3. The United States is preparing a very detailed set of reports,
entitled " N.S. Savannah Safety Assessment," which will con
sist of four volumes, covering engineering and construction ,
operation, health physics, and hypothetical accident analysis.
These volumes will be furnished to each country to whose port
the Savannah might desire entrance, and they will be provided
well in advance of the initial foreign voyage.
4. Although no introductory statement was made by the Task
Group on the Third-party Liability problem , every country
inquired as to the type of protection the United States would
provide against such liability arising from a nuclear accident
involving the Savannah. In response to such questions, the
Task Group explained in some detail the coverage afforded
the Savannah under the Price - Anderson indemnity legislation.
Although no definite conclusions were arrived at in the course of

these discussions, certain generally applicable conclusions, without
reference to specific countries or slight variations in points of view,
can be summarized as follows :
1. A government-to - government acceptance agreement will be
necessary in the case of each country to be visited.
2. Such an agreement can be in the form of an exchange of notes
between our State Department and the appropriate Foreign
Office. Such agreements would set forth understandings on
such matters as indemnification ; port-entry certificates and
rights of inspection ; licensing requirements for nonroutine
servicing, maintenance, or repair work on the Savannah; own
ership of special nuclear material; responsibility for radiolog
ical control in harbors ; requirements of local port authorities,
recognition of the role of the Port Team ; rights of the accept
ing government to information on the Savannah; and, in
general terms, the procedures to be followed and the respon
sibilities of the United States and foreign governments and
local port authorities in the event of a nuclear accident.
All these matters will receive further consideration, and more
formal discussions will be necessary before the various questions can
be resolved to the satisfaction of the parties concerned . As might
be expected , the question of liability presents the most difficult
negotiating problem . With only one exception it appeared that all
countries found the proposed N.S. Savannah Safety Assessment
adequate to serve as the basis for evaluation of the ship by appro
priate government regulatory bodies. The Task Group feels that
there are a number of significant points to be negotiated into accept
ance agreements, but, with the exception of the indemnity and
limit -of-liability points, there does not appear to be any demand
or desire on the part of the countries visited which could not be
reasonably negotiated and essentially satisfied.
Depending to some extent upon the resolution of the many inter
national problems involved, the broad outlines of the operating
program for the Savannah may be set forth as follows :
1. Regulatory bodies at the Federal Government level have had
the construction and preliminary plans under review for a
number of months; so all necessary approvals will have been
given before the vessel makes its initial voyage from the ship
yard to home port. Involved are the U.S. Coast Guard, the
Advisory Committee of Reactor Safeguards, the Atomic
Energy Commission Division of Licensing and Regulation , the
Maritime Administration , the Public Health Service , and the
American Bureau of Shipping, which is the private -ship clas
sification agency . Agreement among the various U.S. regu

latory groups regarding the Savannah will be a prerequisite to
detailed discussions with other nations.
2. The position of the United Kingdom as a leading country in
the nuclear and marine fields, plus its disinterested role in
the Savannah, could significantly aid in crystallizing a West
ern European position. Therefore, it was believed desirable
to reach general agreement with the United Kingdom on the
ground rules governing the construction and operation of
nuclear merchant ships prior to informal discussions with
other nations.
3. General rules and procedures for acceptance of the ship by
foreign ports will be established through informal discussions
between the United States and other principal maritime na
tions. These rules may be formalized as temporary regulations
appended to the statement that evolves from the 1960 Safety
of Life at Sea Conference, or they may be incorporated into
bilateral or other agreements with nations to be visited by the
Savannah .
4. Operation of the Savannah, after the initial test and trial
period, will be on a limited -commercial and demonstration
basis for approximately 18 months. Limited - commercial oper
ation involves the carrying of passengers and cargo at pre
vailing rates but not on scheduled runs ; this is the period
during which the Savannah will be visiting various U.S. cities.
The period of limited tests and trials, preceding the limited
commercial period, during which no 'paying passengers are
carried is considered experimental operation.
2-2 SUPPORT PROGRAM
The success of our program to introduce nuclear - powered mer

chant ships into normal channels of world commerce is dependent
upon our gaining acceptance by other nations. This, in turn , de
pends upon our ability to assess and minimize potential environ
mental hazards resulting from nuclear operations and to provide
fully for all necessary safety measures. This safety requirement
is imposed on all reactor projects, but, where a commercial mobile
reactor is concerned , the problems involved become much more
complex, particularly where such a mobile reactor has to visit for
eign ports. The objective of this phase of the program is to mini
mize accidents and their effects, to achieve public confidence, and
to prevent costly restrictions in ship operation.
The joint efforts of the Maritime Branch of the Atomic Energy
Commission and the Maritime Administration in this direction be
gan with an investigation of the operational hazards confronted by

merchant shipping in general and nuclear ships in particular.
Statistical data were gathered and analyses of collisions, groundings,
etc. were conducted by the U.S. Salvage Association . With this
information as a background , ship design criteria are being estab
lished give the greatest practical protection against damage from
such sources .
Another phase of the safety program is the investigation of the
probable spread (method and distribution ) of radioactive fission
products in the event of an uncontrollable release to the sea or
atmosphere. In this regard, a field survey was started in 1958
( continued through 1960 ) to develop tide, current, and salinity in
formation as a basis for an analysis of the movement of fission
products in harbors and estuarial waters.
The organization of the Support Program , indicated in Fig. 2.1 ,
is shown in detail in Figs. 2.2 and 2.3. In general, the operations
under this program can be grouped into the four classifications
shown : Environmental, Design Criteria (with regard to safety ),
Operations, and Acceptance. Each of these areas presents involved
and, to some extent, interrelated problems requiring extensive study
and analysis. These areas of study are discussed in considerable
detail in later chapters ; they are mentioned here because they form
a part of the over -all program . The environmental considerations
involve studies by the Coast and Geodetic Survey, the U.S. Coast
Guard, the Corps of Army Engineers, the National Academy of
SUPPORT PROGRAM
DESIGN CRITERIA
ENVIRONMENTAL OPERATIONS ACCEPTANCE
( SAFETY )
( See Fig. 2-3)

SITE SURVEY CODES AND
AND MONITORING REGULATIONS
HARBOR SHIELDING & INDEMNIFICATION

SURVEY CONTAINMENT AND INSURANCE
HARBOR MODEL
STUDIES NUCLEAR LITERATURE SHIP ACCIDENTS PUBLIC
SEARCH (SAFETY ) AND COLLISIONS RELATIONS
COUNTER
MEASURES DESIGN
SPECIFICATIONS
EMERGENCY ( SAFETY )
PROCEDURES
SAFEGUARD REPORT
FIG. 2.2—Diagram of the support program .

OPERATIONS
CREW TRAINING OPERATING PROCEDURES SHORE FACILITIES
MOCK - UP AT SEA MOBILE
HARBOR
SIMULATOR STATIONARY
AND PORTS
ACADEMIC
REFUELING
COURSE
Fig. 2.3 — Diagram of operations program .
Sciences, and other organizations. This portion of the program also

includes consideration of the disposal of radioactive wastes, which
is, and probably will remain, a difficult problem for a long time to
come, one requiring international agreements.
The Coast and Geodetic Survey has been conducting the harbor
survey, and the Chesapeake Bay Institute of The Johns Hopkins
University has been analyzing the data, correlating them with data
obtained from model surveys , and formulating means for more gen
eral application. Particular attention has been given to the hy
drology of the Delaware River in order to determine the probable
dispersion effects of an assumed accident to the Savannah moving
between the New York Shipbuilding Corporation's shipyard at Cam
den , N.J., and the Delaware River navigation channel in the vicinity
of the shipyard .
Armour Research Foundation in Chicago is analyzing and de
veloping countermeasures and materials to be employed to minimize
hazards accompanying the accidental release of radioactive con
taminants from nuclear ships to their environments. Various
scavenging agents have been tested for their ability to absorb radio
active material, and even the possibility of stirring up the bottom
of the harbor has been considered as an additional means of intro
ducing solids to scavenge the radioactive material. The Reactor
Projects Division at Oak Ridge National Laboratory also has made
an extensive environmental analysis of the Savannah's operation at
Camden . Other studies are being made relative to the design of
safety features for passengers and crews in the event of accidental
release of radioactivity, and further analysis is being made of the
requirements for radiation -monitoring equipment.
Under the general topic of Design Criteria are grouped not only
all problems inherent in the design of land -based nuclear reactors
but also those stemming from the mobile character of maritime nu
clear reactors. This latter group of problems necessitates a detailed
analysis of ship accidents. The structural design of nuclear -powered
ships would , of course, be affected by the findings of such an
analysis.
Under the general heading of Operations is crew training. As
explained in Chap. 8, an elaborate training program has been estab
lished for the training of personnel, not only for manning nuclear
powered ships but also for operating land support facilities. Re
fueling, another aspect of Operations, involves difficult questions
that require much study; indeed many ship operators regard the
refueling of nuclear ships as a tremendous problem since they feel
that only a small number of shipyards will be properly equipped
and available. In the future, however, the refueling problem will
probably become less serious. As improvements are made in re
actor design and fuel- fabrication techniques, the life of reactor
cores will be extended . The initial core in the Savannah reactor
is expected to serve for at least 31/2 years before it will need to be
replaced. More advanced types of cores can be expected to last
considerably longer.
Initially, the operation of the Savannah will be confined only to
domestic ports. Only after demonstration of her satisfactory op
eration between domestic ports and after completion of negotiations
with other nations will she make trips to foreign ports. Preceding
domestic- and foreign -port entry, port teams will visit each of the
major ports to meet informally with the local officials for briefings
and the determination of local port rules that will affect the ship's
operation. It should be emphasized that the initial statements on
acceptance of the vessel would come from local authority in do
mestic ports and from appropriate national authority in foreign
ports.
2-3 OPINIONS EXPRESSED BY INDUSTRY
Thus far the program has been , of necessity, a Government-con

ducted program . It has been assumed that the Government must
provide the initial support and that it must accept the initial risks.
As time passes, however, the aim of the program is to develop a
sound basis for industrial participation and eventual industrial in
dependence and competition. This transition may be similar to the
one that is slowly beginning to take place with respect to central
station nuclear power development, where private industry is carry
ing this work forward with the aid of the Government and with a
growing degree of independence.
At present, attitudes vary considerably among shipbuilders,

owners, and operators with regard to nuclear propulsion . Some
groups are cautious and are waiting to see what the outcome of
nuclear power will be. Others are actively investigating prospects
or performing feasibility studies of nuclear propulsion . Some op
erators are enthusiastic about this new field of technology and
want to be the first to own or operate a nuclear ship . However,
they realize that there will be serious cost restrictions on the first
few ships unless they are heavily subsidized by the Government.
Several responsible ship operators have indicated their willingness
to invest in nuclear -ship development under a cooperative program
with the Government.
In any evaluation of the opinions of industrial representatives.
it should be remembered that a lack of basic knowledge concerning
nuclear technology probably makes it difficult for shipping interests
to properly recognize the potentials of this new source of energy.
Current reluctance to participate in nuclear -ship development arises,
to some extent at least, from a lack of familiarity with the tech
nology and from the unknown economic aspects involved . Many
persons believe that nuclear -powered ships, economically competi
tive or otherwise, are at least 10 to 15 years in the future.
2-3.1 Design
1
In a study made in 1957 of opinions among shipbuilders and
operators, the general feeling was that the basic criteria for
nuclear-powered ships were going to be about the same as those
for conventional ships. Auxiliary-system requirements, deck ma
chinery, navigational equipment and concepts, ship sizes, etc. are all
items that are considered to be independent of nuclear propulsion.
Also, nuclear power requirements should impose little or no restric
tions upon the arrangement of cargo holds, decks, hatches, ma
chinery space, etc. This point is well illustrated in the general
arrangement of the Sarunnah. The weights and volumes of nuclear
ships also do not differ essentially from those of conventional ves
sels. The consensus was that it is feasible on the basis of present
design technology to construct a reliable nuclear merchant ship .
The final analyses of the feasibility, however , must be based upon
economic factors or operating restrictions (hazard consideration,
etc.), rather than on details of marine design.
J 2-3.2 Cargo Capacity
Results of the opinion study showed that it was generally agreed

that the major advantage with nuclear power is the increase in
cargo capacity for vessels traveling long distances. This advantage

would be most noticeable in ships with high fuel consumption rates
and in those carrying large dead -weight pay loads where the in
crease in pay load could be utilized most effectively. Most opera
tors felt that those types of ships with very short turn -around
time ( rapid loading and unloading ) would be most feasible for
nuclear propulsion because of the high time-at- sea to time-in -port
ratio afforded . If this assumption is correct, passenger ships and
dry-cargo ships do not appear economically as competitive for
nuclear power as bulk -cargo carriers, for example. Such volume
ordinarily required for fuel would be available for pay load if the
ship were a nuclear type, but the only type cargo that could utilize
this space would be a liquid cargo. The volume between the double
bottoms would still be utilized for ballasting and safety require
ments, and in general-cargo ships this volume may not be con
vertible for cargo pay loads.
2-3.3 Personnel Considerations
Because of the specialized training that will be required for

operators of nuclear -powered ships, it is possible that problems may
arise between owners and unions similar to those encountered by
railroads on conversion from coal- to diesel-powered systems. A
diesel locomotive, for example, does not need, in the true sense of
the word , a fireman, as does a coal-fired steam locomotive ; yet ,
because of union demands, diesel locomotives still carry at least
two men . The case of the nuclear ship, however, is somewhat differ
ent because of the larger number of persons involved in the opera
tion of a ship as compared with a locomotive, and it is not likely
that problems will arise that cannot be resolved if all facts con
cerning nuclear operation are made clear to all concerned . It is
more likely that difficulties may arise in maintaining specialists
who have received nuclear training and are no longer content to
remain at sea after having acquired a basic interest in this new
technology and its attendant industrial potential. On the whole,
however, nuclear propulsion is probably less likely to affect union
management relations than other future developments in the marine
field .
It is generally believed that the next logical development in
merchant ships will be made through automatic or remote-control
operation. Union manpower requirements make prospects for this
type of development difficult, but here also the solution is a matter of
education concerning the purpose and philosophy of automation.
✓ 2-3.4 Cost
At the time of the survey in 1957, it was generally felt that first
costs and operating costs of nuclear plants for shipboard installa
tion would be very high until the state of technology improves.
For example, present fuel- element fabrication techniques are quite
complex since all items are more or less handmade and tooled with
extreme accuracy. It should be pointed out here, however, that
since this survey of opinion was made there have been advances in
fuel -element fabrication, and at least one manufacturer is produc
ing nuclear fuel elements on a semi-production -line basis.
Most builders agreed that, irrespective of core and refueling con
siderations, reactor and machinery costs for nuclear ships will , for
some time, be at least twice the installation costs of conventional
fossil- fuel systems. Part of the cost is involved with the high degree
of reliability and over -design associated with a marine reactor,
especially where design specifications call for only one reactor per
ship * and require inclusion of special auxiliaries, such as fossil
fueled emergency boilers or diesel generators. In addition, it appears
that to compete economically in the marine field, a nuclear propul
sion system will have to have a very long core life and high relia
bility. The outlook for technological development is quite favorable ,
and resulting advances should effect sharp decreases in nuclear costs.
Until 1965, however, construction costs will be somewhat higher for
nuclear ships than for conventional ships, as shown by Fig. 2.4.
After 1965 , it is expected that the construction cost of nuclear ships
will decrease rapidly. Figure 2.5 shows daily fixed charges of the
two types of ships in 1965. The capital and interest charges for
nuclear -propelled ships may always be higher than the correspond
ing charges for conventionally propelled ships. To offset these higher
fixed costs , a nuclear ship design must take advantage of the lower
fuel costs and , in certain classes of vessels, increased cargo capacity.
A vital question arising throughout the entire maritime industry
in the United States is whether ships built for nuclear propulsion
will be constructed in the United States or by a foreign country and
whether they will be operated by domestic or foreign crews. The
answers to most of the economic questions that have been asked will
be directly affected by the answer to this question. Some of the
largest tankers in operation are owned by the United States and
operated under foreign flags. It is believed that the best economic
advantage to be gained with nuclear power is in large tankers, but.
because of cheaper labor, these tankers are operated under foreign
* The propulsion plant in the Russian icebreaker, Lenin , described in Chap. 13 , in
cludes three reactors , only two of which are required for normal service . The third
1s a reserve unit for emergency use.
35
32.5
-
30
8 REACTOR
MILLIONS
.
DOLLARS
26.8
25
OF
21.5
22.6 MACHINERY
20
-
16.6
17.4
15
-
OUTFIT & HULL

ENGINEERING
o
5 STEEL HULL
OWNER'S OUTFIT
0
Conv , Nuclear Conv . Nuclear Conv . Nuclear
GENERAL CARGO TANKER PASSENGER

Fig. 2.4Comparati ve constructi costs for conventional
on
and nuclear ships, 1965 .
14
13,763
THOUSANDS
MUL FUEL INVENTORY

DOLLARS
12,065
12
OF
AMORTIZATION
9,861
-
9,403
8 7,475
7,215 & INSURANCE
WAGES
SUBSISTENCE
w on CARA STORES , SUPPLIES, & EQUIPMENT
Nuclear Nuclear
MAINTENANCE & REPAIR
Conv. Conv . Nuclear Conv .
GENERAL CARGO TANKER PASSENGER CARGO
Fig. 2.5 — Daily fixed costs, 1965.
flags and some of them are constructed by foreign shipbuilders.

Whether this arrangement would deter the use of large nuclear
tankers remains to be seen .
It is obvious that at the present time the economic aspects of
nuclear propulsion for merchant ships presents questions that are
more difficult to answer than those relating to the technical aspects
of nuclear ship design and operation. Present high costs suggest
that to reach the point in nuclear technology and equipment where

nuclear ships can compete economically, it may be necessary to sub
sidize the construction of nuclear ships as long as they remain at an
economic disadvantage .
✓ 2-3.5 Operational Problems
Evaluations by various organizations indicate that there are still

a number of economic and engineering problems that must be solved
before use of nuclear merchant ships can become widespread. Ships
with large cruising radii can realize some economic advantage with
existing types of nuclear propulsion plants, but this advantage may
be influenced by other factors, for example, the routes traveled by
various classes of ships. When very large ships are considered , the
problems of harbor availability and canal passage versus longer
routes around the Cape of Good Hope and Cape Horn must be
evaluated . From the standpoint of harbor and docking facilities, it
may be necessary to unload or refuel several miles off shore ( at float
ing docks, for example ). Offshore unloading, however, might solve
the problem of the possible, but remote, radiation hazard involved
when a nuclear ship is brought into conventional docking facilities.
The regulations concerning the movement of ships in harbors set
up by the U.S. Coast Guard , the American Bureau of Shipping, and
other organizations will require close examination with respect to
nuclear propulsion. One of the most serious problems requiring
evaluation with respect to harbor operations is the possible release
of large quantities of radioactive material in the event of collision ,
sinking, or fire involving a nuclear -propelled ship. This problem
already has been given serious consideration, and in the Savannah
everything possible has been done to prevent the spread of such
radioactive material by enclosing the entire reactor system in a gas
tight steel containment vessel inside the hull of the ship. This
method of reducing the radioactive hazard is in accordance with
design practice in the case of United States land-based nuclear power
plants. Despite all efforts to design the Savannah so that the chance
of rupture of the containment vessel is very remote, still there is
always the possibility that the unforeseen will occur ( that the con
tainment vessel would be punctured in a collision ), and so very
extensive studies have been made to determine just how the radio
activity would spread in the case of an unexpected release. The use
of a large containment vessel aboard ship has disadvantages in that
it decreases the useful volume of the ship and adds to the com
plexity of the propulsion system . The use of such containment
should be discouraged if an alternate design can be developed. One
suggestion is that the ship itself be designed to serve as the contain

ment vessel.
2-3.6 Development Program
In general , the maritime industry expressed the opinion that the

procedure probably to be followed in a logical development of
nuclear power is as follows : The first vessels that are constructed
will be operated to gain experience, formulate rules, regulations, in
surance requirements, international agreements, and other attendant
regulations and operational data . After the initial difficulties in
operation and design have been overcome, more ships in operation
will result in technical developments that will improve designs for
reactor systems and reduce their size and cost.
2-4 TRENDS IN COMMERCIAL SHIPPING
Ship types and hull designs are tied closely to trade routes, type
of cargo , speed required , purpose, and economics. Shipbuilders con
sider present hull designs essentially optimum for each type ship,
its cargo route, and purpose. Therefore , no radical departures in
design are predicted in the foreseeable future. The trend in block
and in prismatic coefficients possibly may be toward a fuller hull
form . Ships, generally, are limited in length by maneuvering re
quirements and available docking facilities; therefore the trend is to
increase ship depth ( draft ) as much as docking facilities will permit
to obtain maximum volume. Ships usually are made as wide as
possible consistent with the principles of good design. The trend
in displacement is to decrease light-ship weight, if possible, to allow
a greater cargo pay load.
J 2-4.1 Tankers and Other Bulk Carriers
Although current data show a surplus of tankers at the present

time, this class of ship will obviously become increasingly important
owing to the increasing consumption of petroleum products through
out the world. True, as explained in the preceding chapter, oil re
serves are ultimately expected to run out, but this fact will not
affect the rate of petroleum consumption for a number of decades.
Therefore, tankers, as a class, are expected to remain important in
world shipping operations.
The trend in tankers is toward larger sizes, the average speed of
which will be about 14 to 17 knots. Medium -size ships will be about
35,000 to 60,000 tons (dead weight ). Tankers of 85,000 to 100,000
tons (dead weight ) will be built only for long trade routes, where
they have a decided economic advantage. It is recognized that small

tankers will still have a definite place in the industry, serving on
coastal runs and short hauls. The larger vessels suffer a handicap
because of limitations in canal and port facilities, but this disad
vantage is more than offset by savings in fuel and crew costs per
ton of cargo carried . Port limitations will undoubtedly be overcome
by the installation of offshore loading and discharging facilities,
With respect to the use of nuclear power for tankers, most opera
tors are in agreement that tanker or ore-carrier sea trains appear
to be the most promising concepts at present on the basis of engineer
ing economics. A number of persons have expressed the opinion
that nuclear power is not likely to be feasible for merchant ships
other than tankers, ore carriers, and possibly passenger ships on
North Atlantic or round -the -world routes.
✓ 2-4.2 General- cargo Ships
General-cargo ships have reached a maximum practical size with

the Mariner Class. Development trends in this type of ship are
limited by cargo -handling problems, dock availability, and handling
facilities. Several operators have stated that they do not feel
nuclear- propelled general-cargo ships are feasible. Any advantage
gained will depend upon an increase in cargo capacity exclusively,
and in this respect some nuclear plants may be at a disadvantage
since the gain in space will be the double -bottom space that would
have no particular use in a nuclear -powered ship.
✓ 2–4.3 Combination Passenger - Cargo Ships and Passenger Ships
Combination passenger -cargo ships and passenger ships will fo )
low about the same trends in the future as general-cargo vessels.
Large passenger ships, with their tremendous fuel requirements,
might warrant further careful evaluation for nuclear possibilities.
Subsidies for large passenger ships are difficult to obtain from the
Maritime Administration ; therefore, passenger ships, as such , will
not increase in size except under Government subsidy for defense
competition or for specific routes . Most passenger types are com
bination passenger - cargo types.
The possible increase in speed of passenger ships that might re
sult from the application of nuclear power is not necessarily a factor
of importance unless the increase in speed is very large. This is
due to the fact that large passenger ships have to time their move
ments in harbors in accordance with tidal periods. A slight increase
in the rate of speed of a ship such as the United States or the
Queen Mary, which might shorten the trans-Atlantic voyage by a
few hours, might not be an advantage since entrance to harbor and

dock facilities would depend upon the time when tide conditions
were favorable. If, however, the speed increase was such as to gain
an entire day in the trans -Atlantic crossing, then there would be
considerable advantage.
Since subsidies are granted for various classes of ships and since
the bulk of the cargo types are approaching block obsolescence, as
explained in Chap. 1 , a suggestion has been made that each company
that is replacing several ships of a type construct at least one nuclear
propelled ship for each type. Thus several different types of ships
would be placed in operation under a variety of economic conditions,
and invaluable information would be gained.
2-4.4 Ship Capacity
It is not likely that the use of nuclear power for passenger ships
will require a particularly serious rearrangement of passenger areas
nor that such rearrangement would have any effect on stability or
trim . Many persons in the maritime industry believe that the ad
vantages of eliminating the uptakes in nuclear ships has been exag
gerated. Venting must be provided for waste gases and for air
supply to the engine room ; therefore the gain in the uptake space
will be small. Even though these requirements will be somewhat
less than those required for conventional ships, the refueling of
nuclear reactors may require that access hatches be provided in the
top of the ship. Therefore, the equivalent of present uptake spaces
will still be required .
The trend in fresh -water storage requirements will be toward mak
ing, rather than carrying, drinking water and make-up water for the
steam -turbine systems. This will save compartment space and
afford a gain in cargo space. If the double-bottom space is not re
quired for fuel in nuclear ships and cannot be used for liquid cargo,
there is some question among maritime industry personnel as to how
this space could be effectively used. It may be possible to modify
somewhat the double-bottom design requirements for nuclear ships,
but most persons are of the opinion that nuclear ships will still re
quire double-bottom space to maintain structural integrity.
In conventional ships the fuel load is used as ballast, and com
pensations are made to maintain trim and stability as fuel is con
sumed . In a nuclear - propelled ship there will be no such fuel supply,
and therefore consideration must be given to some suitable substitute
for ballast. Also a careful analysis will have to be made of the effect
of empty double -bottom spaces, or design changes to eliminate these
spaces, on the performance of the ship . A shift of the metacenter
of stability would be undesirable if it resulted in excess acceleration
in roll recoverability above the maximum allowable for crew and

passenger comfort. Ballast tanks are also used to compensate for
variation in machinery placement, a slight aft trim being preferred .
The pay -load arrangement is essentially fixed ; however, the ma
chinery space itself can be shifted fore and aft, depending upon the
cargo to be carried and the vessel type. Limitations on the freedom
of placement of machinery will be exerted by the method of con
tainment chosen for the nuclear system . For nuclear systems, with
their attendant high specific weight, care must be taken in weight
distribution to avoid prohibitive ballast requirements and the conse
quent trim adjustment.
J 2-5 ANALYSIS OF ECONOMIC FACTORS
Under the AEC - Maritime Administration Nuclear Propulsion

Program , a number of commercial organizations were retained to
make detailed studies not only of the technical feasibility of various
reactor concepts and propulsion systems but also of the economie.
feasibility of these reactor systems applied to various types and sizes
of ships and trade routes. Most of these studies involve the con
struction of specially built ships, but in one case at least a design
was proposed in which an existing conventionally powered ship was
to be converted to nuclear propulsion by replacing the conventional
power plant with a nuclear reactor system .
A very extensive economic study was made 3 of the difference in
the cost -revenue relationships that would result from variations in
types, sizes, and rates of utilization of vessels serving the major
trade routes. A comparison of the cost - revenue relationships would
indicate the optimum vessel for each trade route. Five vessel types
were investigated : general-cargo, tanker, dry -bulk cargo, passenger,
and passenger - cargo vessels. The present and future requirements
for these vessel types were developed for the major trade routes in
terms of cargo and other trade - route features.
This study was conducted on the basis of ship -family concepts.
Within these ship families, speed -length ratios, block coefficients, and
other design characteristics were adjusted. In this manner each ship
and power -plant combination could be shown to its best advantage.
and necessary adjustments could be made to the design characteristics
to compensate for the differences between the conventional and
nuclear plants.
The method of arriving at results in this study is of interest be
cause of the magnitude of the operation. Nuclear power plants were
compared with one another and with conventional plants, and en
tire ship, power-plant, and trade - route combinations were evaluated.
The procedure consisted in utilizing the costs and performance char
acteristics of various ships and power plants and simulating mathe

matically the series of events the ships would experience in sailing
specific trade routes. All the mathematical operations were done on
a computer.
Although the conclusions resulting from this study are , on the
whole, quite encouraging, it should be obvious that the accuracy of
an operation of this kind depends upon the correctness of the basic
premises. Unless the input data are based on realistic practices, the
results will not be valid . No matter how detailed and extensive an
operation of this kind may be, the accuracy still depends upon the
knowledge, experience, and judgment of those who assemble the
input data .
No doubt the greatest element of uncertainty in predicting the
competitive position of nuclear -powered ships lies in the lack of
knowledge about future reactor design and costs. No one can pre
dict with any degree of certainty just what the course of reactor
development will be during the next 10 or 15 years. New technical
developments will introduce new economic factors. It is possible
that a radically new reactor may be developed which will significantly,
affect nuclear-ship costs, but such revolutionary developments can
not be anticipated in present economic studies. Any economic projec
tion is more or less academic. The studies made thus far have been
based on anticipated technological improvements that are expected
to take place at a moderate rate and have been reasonably well estab
lished by past experience in the nuclear field , as well as in other
fields of technology and industry. They are, in all probability,
quite realistic. Nobody can predict the exact size, shape, or type
of reactor that will be powering a ship 25 years from now ; therefore
a nuclear ship -propulsion program must be based upon types that
today seem to have a reasonably good future.
One of the studies 4 indicated that, on the basis of existing tech
nology, a nuclear-propelled tanker incorporating a boiling -water re
actor has a lower fuel cost than a conventionally propelled tanker .
Based on reasonable objectives for reductions in nuclear - fuel fabrica
tion costs, it was demonstrated that operating fuel costs for the boil
ing-water reactor may, except for inflationary trends, remain constant
>
at a level comparable to fuel costs of $2 to $ 2.20 per barrel.

The cost of nuclear fuel in the future is an important factor in
predictions of the economics of nuclear ship propulsion , and it is
dependent not only on developments in fuel fabrication and mate
rials but also on the Government's policy in regard to plutonium
credit . * At present, the AEC grants a credit of $ 30 per gram for
*As explained in Chap. 3, certain types of reactors produce plutonium , which, be
cause it is a fissionable material, has a definite cash value and can be sold to the
Government at a price set by the Government.
613489 0-62
FABRICATION
URANIUM
/LNUCLEAR
,DBOLLARS
COSTS
al
ion
FUEL
ent
OF
v
Con
l t
Fue Cos
3
OLLARS
,DARREL
COSTS
FUEL
OIL
80
/B
ar
le
Crue st
/G 0 Fuel
dit
c
1$/ 2Fu ar
Nu
o
,P C
le
dit
G, el
Cure st
Nuc
$3
P oC
2.0 3.0 4.0 5.0

OPERATING FUEL COSTS, MILLS/SHP - HR.
Fig. 2.6 – Comparison of operating fuel costs per shaft horsepower for conven
tional and nuclear propulsion ( 22,000-shp boiling -water reactor ) . Nuclear :
60 -Mw boiling water reactor ; 10,000 -Mwd / ton fuel exposure. Conventional:
specific fuel consumption rate, 0.50 / shp -hr ; fuel -oil heating value, 18,541
Btu / lb .
plutonium that is formed in a reactor ; this price, however, is guar

anteed only through 1963. After that it is expected the credit will
gradually be reduced and will approach $ 12 to $ 14 per gram . This
decrease in plutonium credit, however, is expected to be somewhat
compensated for by reductions in fuel- fabrication costs.
Figure 2.6 shows a theoretical comparison of operating fuel costs
for nuclear and conventional ships, both incorporating a 22,000-hp
propulsion plant. This comparison demonstrates that, with a fuel
oil price of $3 per barrel, the operating fuel cost for the conventional
ship is 4.4 mills per shaft horsepower -hour ( shp -hr ). Based on
nuclear -fuel fabrication costs of $ 70 per pound of uranium , with a
$ 30 per gram plutonium credit, the operating cost for the nuclear
ship will be 2.9 mills per shp -hr. This nuclear -fuel cost is equivalent
to fossil- fuel costs of $2 per barrel. Foreign operated reactors are
presently guaranteed a plutonium credit of $ 12 per gram , therefore,
the operating costs for a foreign nuclear ship is likely to be some
what higher - approximately 3.85 mills per shp -hr.
As a result of improved fuel-manufacturing practices, it is er
pected that nuclear - fuel fabrication costs in the period 1965 to 1966
will be reduced to $ 10 to $ 15 per pound of uranium . With the lower
fuel- fabrication cost and a $ 12 per gram plutonium credit, the operat
ing fuel costs for both domestic and foreign nuclear ships will be
around 3.9 mills per shp-hr.
- Other factors that may influence future nuclear ship costs will
result from developments toward solving the containment problem .
Containment is the practice of enclosing a nuclear reactor and asso
ciated equipmeut within a special gastight enclosure that will retain
the radioactive materials that may be released during a nuclear ac
cident. Such containment vessels have to be designed for the maxi
mum pressures and temperatures that might result from the vaporiza
tion of all the water in the primary cooling system . Containment is
an expensive but necessary precaution in the construction of reactor
plants at the present time. There is no reactor of any appreciable
power.level, perhaps of 1 Mw of heat or more, which cannot have a
credible major accident. The consequences of such an accident are so
great that one must either locate the reactor in an uninhabited ,
remote location or surround it with a container that will not permit
fission products to escape. The cost of providing containment, there
fore, should be regarded as insurance. At present, containment
vessels are necessarily large, and aboard ships'this detracts from
the useful cargo space available. Further development may , of
course , make it possible to use smaller and lighter containment ves
sels than are now used . One method of achieving this is by the use
of pressure suppression. Recent experiments on the use of water
inside the containment vessel indicate that it may be possible to
reduce the maximum design pressures to only a few pounds per
square inch. At present, design pressures as high as 100 pounds
per square inch or even more are common . In these experiments it
was found that as soon as the steam released inside the vessel came
in contact with the pool of water at the bottom of the vessel, the
pressure dropped greatly. Further effort in this direction appears
promising
Another approach to the solution of the containment problem lies
in the possible development of some means that would make a nuclear
а
accident impossible.. Recently an announcement was made of the

development of aa safety fuse, an idea that has been thought of and
worked on for a long time. This particular reactor fuse is designed
to provide absolute protection by shutting down pool type research
reactors without the use of external controls in the event of abnormal
operating conditions. If such a fuse could provide absolute protec
tion for all reactor types, then perhaps it would be possible to do
away with containment structures. Until such a successful reactor
safety fuse is developed , it is likely that the containment problem
will remain a significant element in nuclear reactor construction .
Aboard the Saranah the reactor and all associated equipment are
enclosed by aa containment vessel that is structurally entirely separate
from the ship's hull. It may , however, be possible in future nuclear
ships to design the ship's hull so as to provide the containment. This

might reduce the cost and at the same time provide increased cargo
space.
La
2-6 ANALYSIS OF TECHNICAL FEASIBILITY
In addition to the economic studies, various organizations were

1
I
retained to complete detailed designs of different reactor - ship com

binations. These combinations are described in subsequent chapters.
For the present and for the immediate future, the most promising
types of nuclear reactors for ship propulsion are the pressurized
water and the boiling-water reactors. Both these types have demon
strated their practical feasibility in the field of power generation,
and both can be built in sizes suitable for ship -propulsion plants.
The organic -moderated reactor ( Sec. 3–9.3 ) has also been investi
gated, and it shows promise ; but thus far no power plants have been
built using this type reactor. The high -temperature gas -cooled reac
tor also is considered to have future possibilities, but much develop
ment work remains to be done before this reactor can be considered
practically feasible. In Great Britain low -temperature gas -cooled
reactor plants have been developed to a high degree of success, but
such reactors are considered too large and bulky for shipboard use.
A high -temperature gas-cooled reactor, however, would be much
smaller in size for a given power output, and considerable work is
being done on both sides of the Atlantic in the development of this
reactor. Such a reactor would have attractive possibilities in con
nection with the use of gas turbines for ship propulsion.
Despite the success of the boiling water reactor at Argonne Na
tional Laboratory ( ANL ) and at the General Electric Co. Vallecitos
plant near Pleasanton, Calif., it is still the opinion of some groups
in the shipping industry that the only feasible reactor for shipboard
use is the pressurized -water reactor. This opinion is based on present
technology and on the potential foreseen for future reactors of this
type. Although the practical feasibility of the pressurized -water
system has been demonstrated , there are disadvantages resulting from
the relatively poor steam conditions and the low thermal efficiency.
These factors reflect themselves in the need for large turbines, con
densers, and auxiliary machinery, which , in turn , call for more
machinery space and result in a higher first cost . The boiling water
reactor also is characterized by the same relatively poor steam condi
tions; so , from that standpoint, one has no particular advantage over
the other.
In the canvass of industry's opinion, some organizations preferred
the boiling water reactor. The operation of the Experimental Boil.
ing Water Reactor (EBWR) at ANL has been eminently successful.
as has also the operation of the boiling water reactor at Vallecitos.
There has been some question as to the effect of the pitch and roll
of a ship on the velocity of rising steam bubbles in a boiling water
reactor. The question is : How does a marine boiling-water reactor
plant maintain constant reactivity and, therefore, constant output
when seas are running ? In answer to this question , the designers of
the boiling water reactor reported that, based on the design condi
tions of roll and pitch established for the T - 5 tanker, the variation
in steam - bubble formation due to such roll and pitch was not such as
to affect the stable operation of the reactor in an appreciable man
ner, and the effect was considered to be negligible. Actually, the
effect was equivalent to moving one of the 21 control rods a distance
of 2 in . As for the sloshing of water above the chimneys in a
boiling water reactor, this also was proved to have no appreciable
effect on the stability of operation.
Some groups considered the best approach to nuclear power for
merchant vessels would be the substitution of an inert-gas coolant
with a closed-cycle gas turbine for a pressurized -water system , thus
eliminating heat exchangers and low -pressure low -temperature steam .
There is little doubt that a high -temperature gas-cooled reactor sys
tem would be attractive from the standpoint of thermal efficiency,
but the development of such systems depends upon the solution of
many difficult problems involving fuel elements and fuel-element
materials since these reactors would have to operate in a temperature
range above 1,100 ° F . The design of such high -temperature gas
cooled reactors, however, is being given considerable study, and con
struction of two prototypes for land -based power plants has been
authorized under the AEC's Power Reactor Demonstration Pro
gram . In addition to the difficulties in the design of such gas -cooled
reactors, there is no practical gas turbine available which has been
designed for use with helium , the gas most frequently proposed .
Turbine and compressor problems also will be encountered , especially
with regard to seals. An axial-flow compressor will require approxi
mately 45 to 50 stages; however, the Escher -Wyss centrifugal-flow
gas -turbine concept looks promising in this respect.
Both the aqueous homogenous reactor and the organic -moderated
reactor have received serious consideration in nuclear propulsion
studies. The organic -moderated reactor, in which a hydrocarbon
fluid such as diphenyl or terphenyl is used as the moderator and also
the coolant, has considerable potential for nuclear propulsion , pro
vided no excessive breakdown of the moderator - coolant fluid occurs
as a result of the intense radioactive flux to which it is exposed in
the reactor. Theoretically the organic fluids considered for such
reactors are not expected to become appreciably radioactive, and this
is an attractive feature since it would ease the secondary -shielding
400
TEL.nl PUMPS, PIPING , ETC CONTROL RODS INSTRUMENTATION
1200
800
Jual 400
fia REACTOR
VESSEL
HEAT
EXCHANGERS
PRESSURIZED WATER REACTOR
BOILING WATER REACTOR

REACTOR
INTERNALS
SHIELDING AND
CONTAINMENT
ORGANIC MODERATED REACTOR
GAS COOLED REACTOR

FIG. 2.7 — Comparison of reactor component costs.
requirements. The aqueous-homogeneous reactor in which the fuel

is dissolved or suspended in the coolant to form a solution or a
slurry which is circulated through the primary reactor system also
is considered to have promise, but difficulties arise because of the
extra shielding requirements for the auxiliary components of the
system , the containment problem , and the relatively large quantity
of fuel needed in the primary loop. The advantage of the aqueous
homogeneous reactor lies in the elimination of the fuel- fabrication
problem and the fact that it permits of continuous chemical reproc
essing for the removal of the fission products ; however, on board
ship the latter is likely to be more of a disadvantage owing to the
extra volume needed for such a reprocessing plant.
Figure 2.7 shows a comparison of various reactor component costs
for four types of reactors .
W 2-6.1
Possible Improvements in Pressurized -water Systems
Advocates of the pressurized -water reactor look forward to a
number of engineering improvements in this system which will make
it more attractive for nuclear propulsion than it is at present. The
first improvement from the point of view of competitive economies
will be the use of a larger power plant with a higher load factor.
This improvement, which is not necessarily peculiar to pressurized
water reactors , will exploit the negligible fuel weight of a nuclear

plant in comparison with that of conventional ships. Such a power
plant would be suited either to a high -speed passenger vessel or to
a supertanker, in the one case for speed and in the other for cargo
capacity.
A sizable reduction in reactor -core cost is a second hoped - for
advance. This may be accomplished in a number of ways. In long
life oxide fuel cores of low power density, the upper limit on fuel-rod
size is often set by the temperature in the fuel. Hence, fuel may be
increased in size once it is learned whether or not the occurrence of
melting -point temperature at the center of the rod is acceptable. In
the types of rods currently feasible, the cost per rod is almost constant
regardless of the diameter, and fuel -rod costs constitute the major
cost of the core. Therefore, for a given core diameter and length,
the major cost will diminish roughly as the square of the rod
diameter, i.e., larger diameter rods means a smaller number of rods.
If the central temperature of the rod ceases to be a design limitation ,
rod diameter can be increased to the point where heat-transfer
surface is the only limit. These improvements, of course, are also
applicable to fuel elements for boiling water and organic -moderated
reactors.
Better fuel -rod fabrication techniques will undoubtedly also con
tribute to lowering cost and, in particular, to better and more effi
cient fuel-rod assembly techniques. At the present time, despite
attempts at automatic production -line techniques, fuel rods are gen
erally loaded by hand, a time-consuming operation .
A third group of improvements in both operating economy and
capital investment will come when the integrity of fuel -rod fabrica
tion makes it possible to postulate failure-proof fuel elements for
the life of the core. At present it is necessary to allow for the pos
sibility of at least a few fuel rods developing pin holes or cracks
through which the primary water may become contaminated with
fission products or may even leach out fuel. To provide protection
against this event adds considerable expense to the purification sys
tem , waste disposal system , shielding, refueling techniques, isolating
methods, and many other elements in the over -all design.
A fourth area of improvement will be in the engineering of reac
tor controls, control- rod drives, and the reactor safety systems. In
regard to control instrumentation and the safety system , it should
be possible with more experience to greatly simplify them . The
pressurized -water system is expected to improve its natural stability
and safety, even under the most rigorous maneuvering and sea con
ditions, in a surface vessel as well as in a submarine. Minor econo
mies, such as the use of transistors in electronic circuitry, also appear
hopeful.
For control- rod drives, bottom -mounted hydraulic drives are very
attractive, even for ship reactors, since they would greatly simplify
the removal of the reactor-vessel head and subsequent refueling opera
tions. Certain types of nonmechanical control rods may be derel
oped , for example, neutron -absorbing fluids, which should be con
siderably less expensive. Such developments would also permit
substantial savings in the cost of the core-supporting grid plates and
control - rod shrouds and baffles.
A fifth economy may be achieved through simplified refueling
methods, in conjunction with bottom -mounted or fluid control rods,
as described . For example, it may be possible through a few properly
located nozzles in the reactor head to withdraw and replace all fuel
elements. This would permit an all-welded reactor without a flanged
head. The flanged head on present reactor vessels adds greatly to
the cost and seriously limits its design pressure.
A sixth feature promising cheaper reactor power, particularly in
large reactors, is the achievement of what is known as " power flatten
ing.” This involves the attainment of a more even distribution of
the neutron flux across the diameter and over the length of the reac
tor core . For a reactor already designed to its limit of size and heat
flux, such power flattening may offer as much as a threefold increase
in power from the same core .
A significant step in economy may be achieved by using carbon or
low -alloy steel in the primary system in place of the stainless steel
now used . This step is dependent upon a better knowledge of the
characteristics of carbon steel in relation to the build -up of activated
corrosion products and perhaps upon the development of a low -cost
alloy to resist these effects.
In addition to these possible improvements, new types of pressur
ized -water reactors are being investigated, each offering distinet eco
nomie advantages over the present types. Pressure -tube reactors, for
example, in which the high pressure of the primary coolant is con
fined to tubes surrounded by a moderator at a lower pressure, promise
to effect a considerable reduction in the thickness and consequently
the cost of the reactor vessel.
✓ 2–6.2 Improvements in Boiling-water Reactors

Most of the possible improvements described for pressurized -water
reactors are also applicable to the boiling water reactor. The in
herent simplicity of the boiling water reactor recommends it for use
in ship propulsion. The use of nuclear superheating in boiling -water
reactors gives promise of considerably higher thermal efficiencies.
Nuclear superheating has already been achieved on an experimental
basis in a boiling water reactor, and the design of a reactor with :
integral nuclear superheat has been completed . Thus far, six na

tural-circulation boiling -water reactors have operated successfully
as land - based plants. More such plants are under construction, and
there are indications that nearly competitive nuclear power will be
achieved in the near future. The current economic picture coupled
with the long-range fuel cycle of this reactor indicates that current
shipboard designs are realistic concepts. The question that must be
answered is that regarding the feasibility of boiling -water reactors
for shipboard application. This question is considered in detail in
later chapters, but it can be stated here that the proponents of this
type reactor are fully assured concerning its feasibility in shipboard
use .
2-7 GENERAL ATTITUDE REGARDING NUCLEAR PROPULSION
It should be obvious from even this brief consideration of nuclear

propulsion for merchant vessels that many problems remain to be
solved before this new source of energy can be applied generally
throughout the world. As already mentioned attitudes on nuclear
propulsion vary widely, particularly concerning its economic feasi
bility in the near future . There is, however, great interest in the
technical feasibility, and there is little downright pessimism concern
ing its ultimate application in the marine field. Instead of the deri
sive remarks that were made about such things as the " horseless
carriage, ” gas light, and the early steam locomotive, we find eager
interest in the construction of the Savannah. Few would argue that
the motive behind the construction of this first nuclear merchant ship
is not a worth -while effort. The Savannah's performance will be
followed closely by maritime interests throughout the world . It
should be obvious that the Savannah has, in some respects, the char
acteristics of a newborn , ungainly creature which some years from
now may be as obsolete from a technical standpoint as the reciprocat
ing steam engine is today.
Despite the enthusiasm of the proponents of nuclear power, its
course in the maritime industry must be plotted carefully. Ade
quate regulations governing the control of hazards of nuclear plants
must be provided ; however, care must be taken not to impose un
necessary or arbitrary restrictions that will retard development. It
is reasonable to believe that the Wright brothers would never have
gotten their fragile airplane off the ground if the current require
ments of the Civil Aeronautics Board had had to be met. The safety
of nuclear plants, however, is paramount, and this is being kept in
mind in every step of the Government program . Instead of the care
free philosophy, or, perhaps, the absence of any philosophy what
ever, that resulted in many boiler explosions and so much loss of
life in the early steamboat days, we find the United States Govern
ment, through agencies such as the Atomic Energy Commission , the
U.S. Coast Guard, and the Public Health Service, is well informed
as to the hazards and has established substantial requirements. These
requirements tend to make economic construction of nuclear power
plants develop more slowly. The same government, on the other
hand , encourages progress by financing this pioneering work ; thus
it is reasonable to assume that such an environment will produce just
as many technological improvements as have been witnessed in the
past . In this effort the United States Government has in mind the 1
interest of other nations in the development of nuclear propulsion, 1

not only in the formulation of terms and conditions governing the
movement of nuclear ships in world ports but also in providing
courses that enable foreign engineers to observe the construction of
the Savannah and the general aspects of nuclear propulsion for
merchant ships.
REFERENCES
1. D. L.: CONRLIN , J. J. GORDON , and S. REED Nixon, Ship Design Trend Sur.
vey for the Atomic Energy Commission Maritime Reactors Branch , Re
port ASAE - 18, American Radiator and Standard Sanitary Corp., Atomic
Energy Division , June 1957.
2. J. E. KENTON, Editorial, Wanted Nuclear Clipper Ships - Now , Nucleonics,
17 ( 4 ) : 85 ( April 1959 ) .
3. D. L. CONKLIN et al., American Radiator and Standard Sanitary Corp.,
Economics of Nuclear and Conrentional Merchant Ships, Superintendent of
Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington 25, D.C., June
30 , 1958.
4. R. L. SCHMIDT and L. F. FIDRYCH , Boiling -water Reactor for Merchant Ship
Propulsion, in Proceedings of the 1958 Nuclear Merchant Ship Symposium ,
Washington , D.C., August 1958, USAEC Report TID - 7563, p. 134, January
1959.
5. R. L. WHITELAW, The Outlook For Improvements in Pressurized -water Re
actors For Marine Propulsion, in Nuclear Powered Ships for American
Ship Operators, A Symposium Held in Washington , D.C., July 30, 1957 ,
USAEC Report TID - 7539, p. 93, September 1957.
Chapter 3
BASIC PRINCIPLES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS
Many people who read this book may not be familiar with the
basic principles of nuclear energy . It is for those people that this
chapter is included. It gives a brief account of the history of
nuclear power development together with a simple discussion of the
basic principles underlying the design and operation of nuclear
reactors. The basic principles of nuclear reactions are not difficult
to understand ; indeed , in many ways they are easier to grasp than
the processes involved in many chemical reactions. Chemical proc
esses involve the interaction of 102 different elements ; whereas most
nuclear reactions are concerned largely with only a few fundamental
particles - protons, neutrons, and electrons.
③[ 3-1 HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
Like many other things in this world , nuclear energy has two
natures : one constructive, the other destructive. We know the
destructive nature - Hiroshima and Nagasaki. The constructive
nature of nuclear energy has been slower in revealing itself; yet
from the beginning many people felt that it was there. Ideas about
nuclear structure had their beginning some 2,500 years ago, when
Democritus in ancient Greece propounded the concept that all matter
is made up of tiny , invisible particles, which he called " atoms, "
from Atomas, not cuttable .
After Democritus, however, little was done for some 2,000 years,
and it was not until the foundations of modern physics and chem
istry were established in recent times that scientists began to realize
that the nucleus of the atom contained a vast store of energy. As
explained in Chap . 1 , it was the discovery of radium by the Curies
around 1900 that initiated a period of research and a series of dis
coveries that culminated in 1939 in the discovery of the fission of
uranium .
3-1.1 Discovery of Fission
The modern period of atomic research may be regarded as dating

back to around 1920, when several investigators predicted the pos
sible existence of a particle possessing no electric charge. This neu
65
tral particle, named the “ neutron" by W. D. Harkins, was discov

ered by James Chadwick 1 in England in 1932.
The discovery of this neutral particle in the nucleus of the atom
opened up intriguing possibilities in nuclear research , and the neu
tron immediately became an important tool in physical laboratories.
The reason for this will be clear when it is understood that before
the neutron was discovered all atoms were thought to consist only
of electrically charged particles. The helium atom , for example,
was thought to consist of a nucleus made up of four protons (carry
ing positive charges ) and two electrons ( carrying negative charges).
The negative charges of the two electrons, it was assumed , neutral
ized the positive charges on two of the four protons, thus giving the
nucleus as a whole a positive charge of two. Because of this positive
charge, the helium atom had to have two external electrons if it
was to be stable. All other atoms were assumed to be built in the
same way, except that the heavier atoms were thought to carry
larger numbers of protons and electrons in their nuclei and a cor
respondingly greater number of external electrons. Figure 3.1 illus
trates the structure of the helium atom according to this concept .
Long before the internal structure of atoms was studied, chemists
had learned much about the elements, the one containing the lightest
atoms being the gas hydrogen and the heaviest, the metal uranium.
Through innumerable experiments the make -up of nearly all the
atoms of the various elements was revealed. Most of the atomic
volume, it was discovered, is occupied by the orbits of the rapidly
moving external electrons, each carrying one unit of negative electric
charge. The hydrogen atom contains only one electron ; uranium has
92. Helium , as indicated in Fig. 3.1 , has two. Since electrons are
extremely light, practically all the atom's weight is concentrated in
the small speck of matter, the nucleus. In chemical reactions, it is
only the outermost layers of electrons that are affected ; the nucleus,
located far within the electron orbits, is completely unaffected .
Since atoms normally have no electric charge, obviously each atom
must in some way contain an amount of positive electricity to bal
ance the negative charges of all the electrons. Also, since the elec
trons were extremely light, it was logical to assume that most of the
mass must be associated with positive charge. Chemical experi
ments, however, gave no information concerning the positive charge
or the mass.
In 1914 the British physicist Ernest Rutherford performed experi
ments that gave the first definite clue confirming the idea that the
mass and positive charge were located at the center of the atom.
Rutherford's experiments involved shooting alpha particles ( the
nuclei of helium atoms) produced from radium through thin sheets
of metal. In the process the high-speed alpha particles usually
BASIC PRINCIPLES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS 67
Protons
Nucleus Protons Nucleus
+
External External
+ + Electrons Electrons
Electrons
+
Neutrons
Fig . 3.1 - Concept of the structure of Fig. 3.2 — Concept of the structure of
the helium atom before the dis the helium atom following the dis
covery of the neutron. covery of the neutron.
would pass through the metal and be scattered only slightly , but on
rare occasions they would be deflected widely and sometimes even
be turned back. Rutherford reasoned that these wide deflections
could only be caused by small positively charged particles in the
atoms.
These experiments by Rutherford marked the beginning of nuclear
physics. Other investigators were soon engaged in similar bombard
ing experiments. In all this work , however, physicists were com
pelled to use these charged particles, i.e. , alpha particles, pro
tons (the nuclei of hydrogen atoms), or electrons, as projectiles in
bombarding other atoms. When used as projectiles, these charged
particles could be accelerated to high velocities by electrical methods,
or they could be used as emitted spontaneously by radioactive ele
ments such as radium .
The difficulty with this method was that the positively charged
protons or alpha particles were repelled by the strong positive
charges on the nuclei of all atoms; therefore it was extremely diffi
cult to score direct hits on the nuclei of the atoms. Electrical forces
increase enormously as the distance between charged particles de
creases; hence a close approach of similarly charged particles is al
most an impossibility unless the projectile particles have extremely
high energies.
With the discovery of the neutron by Chadwick in 1932, the situ
ation changed entirely. Since the neutron is electrically neutral, it
is neither attracted to, nor repelled by , the nuclei of atoms, and it
can enter into nuclear reactions with virtually no energy at all .

Also, as a result of this discovery, the concept of nuclear structure
became more logical. The helium nucleus is now assumed to con
sist of, simply, two protons and two neutrons, as shown diagram
matically in Fig. 3.2. The two positively charged protons balance
the negative charges of the two external electrons.
Being electrically neutral, neutrons, cannot be accelerated to high
velocities by electrical methods. High -energy neutrons can , how
ever, be produced by the radiation from naturally radioactive ele
ments. In the first neutron sources to be developed, neutrons were
obtained by bombarding light elements such as beryllium with the
alpha and gamma radiation from radium and polonium . Small
neutron sources can be prepared by mixing radium or polonium with
beryllium powder. In a mixture of this kind, alpha particles that
are spontaneously emitted by the radium knock neutrons out of the
beryllium , giving them considerable kinetic energy. Such a source
will produce neutrons with energies as high as 10 million electron
volts ( 10 Mev ) . *
Following the discovery of the neutron , interest in nuclear experi
mentation spread rapidly, and during the early thirties a number of
interesting discoveries were announced . The results of much of the
first experimental work with the neutron , however, were confusing,
and it was not until 1939 that this state of confusion was resolved .
In January 1939, the scientific world was startled by a " Letter to
the Editor" in Nature by Lise Meitner and Otto Frisch announcing
the achievement of nuclear fission .
Lise Meitner, a woman political refugee from Germany, had be
come associated with the Physical Institute of the Swedish Academy
of Science in Stockholm . Otto Frisch , also a refugee, had found
a welcome in the Institute of Theoretical Physics of the University
of Copenhagen. Both were nuclear physicists, and their letter was
entitled , “ Disintegration of Uranium by Neutrons; A New Type of
Nuclear Reaction ."
In this letter they summarized the state of confusion which had
been built up around the effects that were observed when uranium
was bombarded by neutrons. In Italy, Enrico Fermi had bombarded
uranium with neutrons as early as 1934 and had found in the residue
certain elements that simply did not make scientific sense. He
found that such bombardment gave rise to at least four different
radioactive substances.. Others were quick to take up this line of
* An electron volt is a unit of energy , not of electric potential; it represents the kinetic
energy gained by a particle having one electric charge ( the charge on an electron ) when
it passes through potential difference of 1 volt.
investigation , among them Professor Meitner, herself, then still

working in Berlin with Professor 0. Hahn .
During 1938, Hahn and a colleague, F. Strassmann, discovered
what they thought was an isotope of radium in the uranium prod
ucts after neutron bombardment. They were much distressed , how
ever, when work of Mme. Joliet- Curie and a coworker, in France,
showed that it could not possibly be an isotope of radium but that
it must be an isotope of a much smaller atom , possibly barium with
atomic number 56. The atomic number of uranium is 92. Hahn
and Strassmann checked the results of their experiments once more
and found to their astonishment that it was, indeed, barium that
they had mistaken for radium . Contritely, they confessed their
error in a paper published early in January 1939. As chemists, they
had to accept the evidence that it was barium , but from a nuclear
standpoint the presence of barium was unexplainable.
Meitner and Frisch, however, saw the experiment in a different
light. As soon as they read Hahn's paper, they knew they had the
explanation. Their own Letter to the Editor in Nature was dated
Jan. 16 , 1939, and in it they stated : “ It seems, therefore, possible
that the uranium nucleus has only small stability of form , and may
after neutron capture, divide itself into two nuclei of roughly equal
size ..."
Two nuclei of equal size ! It was clear that, if this were true, the
atom had been split.
Their letter went further. Lise Meitner understood the implica
tions of the Einstein mass-energy equation, E = mc2. The letter
continued : “ These two nuclei formed by the fission of the uranium
atom should gain a total kinetic energy of about two hundred mil
lion electron volts. ” The implication was obvious; this was atomic
2
energy !
3-1.2 Mass - Energy Equivalence
Meitner and Frisch had compared the mass of the uranium nucleus
with that of the resulting fission fragments. The atomic masses
of all the chemical elements were, of course, well known ; and they
found that the total mass of the fission fragments was somewhat less
than the mass of the uranium atom from which they had been
formed. The missing mass had been converted into energy.
Thirty -five years earlier Albert Einstein had said this could hap
pen , and Meitner's calculations, based on the experimental data of
Hahn and Strassmann , were in complete agreement with Einstein's
predictions.
It so happened that early in January 1939, Professor Niels Bohr,

as he was preparing to leave Denmark for the United States, heard
from Frisch and Meitner about their theory of uranium fission.
The famous physicist naturally was much excited, and, as soon as
he arrived in the United States, he told his fellow physicists about
the developments. The news spread rapidly throughout the scien
tific world ; physicists in laboratories everywhere immediately set
up equipment to obtain experimental verification of the theory.
Confirmation came almost immediately and simultaneously from
a number of countries. Scientists everywhere abandoned what they
were doing and began detailed experimental work on nuclear fission ;
papers and communications by the dozen swamped editors of scien
tific journals. Nuclear fission had been proved, but there was still
a more important question to be answered : When the uranium
nucleus splits, does the process release additional neutrons ?
3-1.3 Neutron Emission in Fission
The possibility of the release of additional neutrons was even more

important than the process of fission itself because, if additional
neutrons were produced, such neutrons might cause other uranium
atoms to split, and thus a chain reaction would result. There was,
in fact, a favorable chance that additional neutrons would be pro
duced . It was known that the heavier atoms, such as uranium , have
more neutrons in their nuclei in proportion to the number of pro
tons than the lighter atoms. In the elements at the lower end of the
periodic table of chemical elements, the number of protons and
neutrons in the nuclei is equal. Going upward in the periodic table,
toward the heavier elements, it is found that the nuclei carry a
preponderance of neutrons over protons. The nucleus of the ura
nium -235 ( generally designated by the symbol for the element and
the atomic weight, (+235) atom , for example, with an atomic weight
of 235, contains 143 neutrons but only 92 protons. It seemed quite
likely therefore that, if such a nucleus were split into two roughly
equal parts, the resulting fragments could not carry a proportionate
share of excess neutrons and that some of the neutrons would be
released .
It was also postulated that neutrons in an atomic nucleus could
be discharged in other ways. Since a neutron could be regarded as
a proton that had been neutralized by the capture of an electron , a
neutron could throw off an electron and thus change into a proton .
The electron thrown off in this process was to become known as a
“ beta particle," and the process today is called “ beta decay.”
In the fission process it seemed probable that both processes would

occur. Some of the neutrons in the fragment nuclei would emit
electrons and so change into protons ( thereby raising the proton
count ) , and others would be emitted bodily. These latter neutrons
would be available to carry on the process of fission in other uranium
atoms. There was every reason to believe that the fission of one
uranium nucleus would release several free neutrons, each of which
could split other nuclei and in this way carry on the process ad
infinitum .
Enrico Fermi, who had done the early work on neutron bom
bardment in Italy , was, in 1939, a political refugee in the United
States and was a professor at Columbia University. Upon learning
about the Meitner-Frisch theory, Fermi immediately suggested that
if enough neutrons were released in the fission reaction it might be
possible to produce a self-sustaining nuclear chain reaction . This
possibility was also considered virtually at the same time by H. von
Halban, F. Joliet , and L. Kowarski in France, and undoubtedly by
other physicists in Europe and America . If such a chain reaction
could actually be realized, then there was some prospect that the
release of atomic energy or , more correctly , nuclear energy might
become a practical and economic possibility .
3–1.4 The Chicago Chain -reacting Pile
The concept of a self-sustaining nuclear chain reaction, then , was

the beginning of a series of events which culminated in the historic
event at the University of Chicago on Dec. 2 , 1942 , when the world's
first self-sustaining nuclear chain reaction was established in a
crude pile ( only later were they called “ reactors" ) built by Enrico
Fermi and his associates.3
By the end of 1939, the war had started in Europe, and on
Dec. 7, 1941 , events at Pearl Harbor shattered our complacency. As
early as July 1939, a group of scientists in the United States, many
of them political refugees from Europe, sensing the immense appli
cations of atomic energy in war , contrived to have Albert Einstein
write his now - famous letter to President Roosevelt, urging the impor
tance of giving official backing to atomic energy research . By that
time the concept of the atomic bomb had entered the picture, and
it was feared that, if the allied nations did not develop such a
weapon , Hitler would .
The first atomic pile at the University of Chicago was built pri
marily to determine whether it was possible to achieve a nuclear
chain reaction. While work was in progress, however, the nuclear
chain reaction acquired an additional interest of great significance.
613489 0–62
It was known by early 1941 that uranium - 238 * (U238) absorbs slow
neutrons to form the short- lived uranium - 239 ( U239 ) , which is ulti
mately transformed into plutonium - 239 (Pu239). Plutonium , it was
subsequently proved, is a highly suitable fissionable material for use
in atomic bombs and in atomic power reactors.
Thus, the Chicago pile had two purposes : first, to prove that
a self -sustaining nuclear chain reaction could be achieved, and, sec
ond , to prove that the fission of U235 in such a reactor would produce
a new fissionable material, plutonium , from the absorption of
neutrons by U238 nuclei.
The original Fermi pile was of the simplest type. It consisted
merely of a pile of graphite blocks, some 15 ft high and about 20 ft
square, in which a large number of pieces of uranium metal and ura
nium oxide had been distributed according to a formula arrived at in
advance on the basis of piecemeal experimentation and mathematical
computation . It may seem strange that so simple an arrangement
merely a pile of graphite bricks and uranium slugs - could be the
source of such far-reaching events. The reason is not difficult to
understand ; basically, it is quite simple.
3-2 FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES OF NUCLEAR FISSION
The basic principle of nuclear fission is illustrated by the dia

gram shown in Fig. 3.3. Here, a neutron is captured by the nucleus
of an atom of U 235, forming a compound nucleus of U236. The
U236 nucleus, however, is unstable and in perhaps something on the
order of a millionth of a second or less splits into two roughly equal
parts with a total energy release of approximately 200 Mev. Most
of this energy is represented by the kinetic energy of the two fission
fragments and by the kinetic energy of the neutrons that are re
leased in the process, although the latter, being of much smaller
mass, represent only a small portion of the total energy. Some
energy is also released in the form of electromagnetic radiation
( gamma radiation ), but this too is small compared to the energy
of the fission fragments. All this energy release eventually appears
as heat . The kinetic energy of the fission fragments is converted
into heat in a short time close to the point of fission . The fission
fragments themselves decay through alpha, beta, gamma , and neu
tron emission . These particles have kinetic energy and generate
heat in their surroundings even after the fission reaction has been
completed. The energy of the gamma radiation and the neutrons
from fission also appears as heat in the surroundings adjacent to
the fission .
* Natural uranium is a mixture of several isotopes. Natural uranium contains ap

proximately 99.3 percent U238, 0.7 percent U235, and a trace of U 234,
Fission
Fragment
Neutron
o
U - 236
FISSIONING
Neutron
Neutron
U - 235 U - 236
wa Gamma Radiatio
n
-10,000,000 sec
Neutron
Fission
Fragment
Fig. 3.3 — Diagram showing the fission of U236 by capture of a neutron .
Some measure of the significance of this energy release can be

obtained by comparing the 200 Mev released per atom in nuclear
fission with the 1.5 ev released per molecule of carbon dioxide
formed by the combustion of carbon and oxygen in the burning of
coal or other fossil fuel. The energy released in the fission of U235
is over 130 million times greater than that released in the combus
tion, or burning, of coal or oil . Stated another way , the energy
represented by one pound of U235 is roughly equivalent to that con
tained in some 1,500 tons ( 3 million pounds) of coal.
Although this enormous energy release is significant, the really
important feature of the process of fission is the emission of neu
trons. On the average, from two to three neutrons are emitted, as
indicated in Fig. 3.3, and these neutrons are capable of producing
fission in other U235 nuclei .
3-2.1 Need for a Moderator
It was known, even in the early days before the Chicago pile was
built , that to produce a self -sustaining nuclear chain reaction the
free neutrons released in the fission process would have to be slowed
down because high -speed ( high -energy ) neutrons are far less effer
tive in producing fission in U235 than low -speed neutrons.
This was the reason graphite was used in the construction of the
original Fermi pile. Graphite, among other substances, has the
property of slowing down, or moderating, fast neutrons. When
released in the fission process, the neutrons have extremely high
energy Their speed is of the order of 75,000 miles per second.
For these neutrons to be effective in causing fission in ( * 235 nuclei,
their speed must be reduced to something of the order of a mile
per second, which is approximately the speed of the atoms and

molecules in ordinary materials at room temperature. This speed,
or energy, therefore, is usually referred to as " thermal energy ," and
neutrons whose energies have been reduced to values in this region
are called “ thermal neutrons.'
This reduction in the speed of fast neutrons is effected by what is
known as " elastic scattering,” essentially an elastic or billiard-ball
type collision of the neutrons with the nuclei of surrounding mate
rial. In each such collision a neutron loses a definite fraction of
the energy it had just prior to the collision . This fraction , as might
be expected , is greater the smaller the mass of the nucleus with which
the neutron collides, being greatest when the nuclei have approxi
mately the same mass as the neutron itself. After a number of such
collisions, the speed of a neutron has been reduced to such an
extent that the neutron has approximately the same kinetic energy
as the atoms, or molecules, of the surrounding medium . At this
point the neutrons are referred to as " thermal neutrons," and at this
energy they are most effective in producing fission in U235 nuclei.
Thermal neutrons have energies of only a small fraction of an
electron volt (0.025 to 0.3 ev ) ; whereas the energies of the fast neu
trons are measured in millions of electron volts.
The fact that neutrons, after having their energies reduced from
millions of electron volts to a mere fraction of an electron volt , are
still able to produce nuclear reactions is remarkable. Protons, alpha
particles (helium nuclei ) , and other changed particles can also be
slowed down by elastic scattering, but then they can no longer inter
act with nuclei because they are unable to penetrate the potential
energy barriers that surround all nuclei.. Also, as such charged
particles slow down, they tend to pick up electrons and so become
neutral atoms, losing their ability to cause nuclear reactions. Slow
neutrons, on the other hand , having no electric charge, are not
repelled by the electrostatic forces surrounding nuclei and can enter
nearly all atomic nuclei, inducing fission in certain of the heavier
ones .
The reason slow neutrons are more effective in causing fission in
["235 is rather difficult to explain since the interaction between neu
trons and nuclei involve principles of quantum or wave mechanics.
In the strange world of the quantum , all subatomic particles such
as neutrons and protons exhibit a dual nature, behaving sometimes
as particles, sometimes as waves, and often exhibiting the charac
teristics of both at the same time. Whether neutrons exhibit the
characteristics of particles or waves depends upon their energy . At
low speeds they behave more like waves; at high speeds or energies
they act more like particles. Subatomic particles have definite wave
lengths depending upon their energy ; at high speeds the wave
length is short, at low speeds, long. Since a long wave length can
be thought of as being larger than a short wave length, it seems
logical to suppose that a slow neutron, having a long wave length ,
would have a better chance of hitting a nucleus than a fast neutron
having the characteristics of a very small particle. This, very
roughly, explains why slow neutrons are more effective in colliding
with and entering U235 nuclei than high -speed neutrons. The energy
required to bring about interactions between neutrons and nuclei
varies with different nuclei. As is explained in Sec. 3–3.1 , other
isotopes of uranium , U238 for example, require high -energy neutrons
to produce fission .
These properties of the neutron , then , explain the need for mate
rials in a nuclear reactor to slow down neutrons. Such mate
rials are called " moderators." A good moderator is a substance
formed of atoms of low atomic weight , substances in which the
nuclei of the atoms have approximately the same atomic weight as
the neutrons themselves. The atom that has an atomic weight closest
to that of the neutron is hydrogen since the nucleus of the hydrogen
atom is a single proton ; for this reason hydrogen - containing sub
stances, such as water, are good moderators. Carbon also has good
moderating ( slowing -down ) properties, and that is why carbon in
the form of graphite was chosen as the moderator in the first Chi
cago pile.
3-2.2 Critical Size
Before the first Chicago pile was built, considerable experimental

work had been done at Columbia University to determine if it would
be possible to build a nuclear reactor.3 By the middle of 1941 suffi
cient information had been accumulated to undertake the construc
tion of a small experimental pile of graphite and uranium to test
certain ideas which, it was hoped , would lead to the design of a
self-sustaining nuclear reactor. Under the supervision of Fermi,
a cube of graphite with an 8 - ft edge, containing about 7 tons of
uranium oxide and arranged in a predetermined fashion , had been
set up at Columbia University. A source of neutrons * was placed
near the bottom of the uranium - graphite configuration, or lattice,
as it is called, and the number of neutrons present was measured
at various points throughout the structure.
* A small number of stray neutrons are always present in the atmosphere owing to
cosmic radiation from outer space , but a much stronger neutron source can be ob
tained by causing alpha particles from radium or polonium to react with nuclei of other
atoms, particularly those of beryllium . A convenient neutron source, therefore, is a
small quantity of metallic beryllium powder mixed with a radium compound sealed in a
small capsule. Such a " source " placed in , or near , a nuclear reactor will serve as the
initial source of neutrons for operation of the reactor.
The main purpose of this experimental work was to determine

whether or not a sufficient number of the neutrons released in the
fission process would be available to sustain a chain reaction . It
was known that some of the neutrons would escape from the system
and that others would be absorbed by impurities in the reactor
system in nonfission reactions. For there to be a sustained chain
reaction , at least one of the several neutrons emitted during the fis
sion process must cause fission in another uranium nucleus. In that
event, the multiplication factor of the reactor would be 1 . The
multiplication factor is the ratio of the number of neutrons pro
duced by fission in one generation to the number of the immediately
preceding generation. For the maintenance of a chain reaction , it
is not necessary that every neutron produced in fission initiate an
other fission. The minimum condition is that for each nucleus under
going fission there shall be produced, on the average, at least one
neutron that causes fission in another nucleus. If this is exactly the
case, then , the multiplication factor ( k ) is exactly equal to 1. With
this condition just as many neutrons are produced as are used.
If k is exactly equal to, or somewhat greater than , 1 , a chain
reaction will be possible; but, if k is less than 1 by even a very small
amount, the chain reaction cannot be sustained . Suppose, for exam
ple, a particular generation starts with 100 neutrons; if k is 1 ,
there will be 100 neutrons at the beginning of the second generation,
100 at the beginning of the third, and so on . Once the reaction
has started , it will continue at the same rate at which it began . If
the multiplication factor is greater than 1 , the number of neutrons
will increase with each generation. Thus, a few neutrons can initiate
a rapidly growing chain of fissions.
This brings in the factor of critical size. The critical size of a
system containing fissionable material is defined as the size in which
the number of neutrons produced in fission just balances the number
lost by leakage and by nonfission capture. The critical size is not a
constant; it depends on the isotopic composition of the uranium , the
amount of moderator, the shape and arrangement of the materials,
and the presence of various substances capable of the parasitic cap
ture of neutrons. Parasitic capture refers to nonfission capture of
neutrons by the moderator, by various extraneous substances, such
as impurities in the moderator and in the uranium , and by the fission
products.
The proportion of neutrons lost by leakage (from the system )
relative to the proportion causing fission and so producing more
neutrons can be diminished by increasing the size of the system .
The escape of neutrons occurs at the exterior of the system , and
fission takes place in the interior. The number of neutrons lost by
escape thus depends on the external surface area ; whereas the
number of fission neutrons available is determined by the volume.

The loss of neutrons by escape is minimized therefore by decreasing
the surface area -to - volume ratio. This can be done by making the
system as large as is convenient, preferably in the form of a sphere.
For a given volume, a sphere has the smallest possible surface area ;
i.e. , as the size of a sphere is increased, the surface increases as a
function of the square of the diameter, but the volume increases
as the cube of the diameter.
During the summer of 1941 , the experimental work under Fermi
continued at Columbia. A second natural-uranium - graphite lattice
was built with materials of greater purity, and in May 1942 an in
finite-medium multiplication factor of 0.98 was obtained. An in
finite medium assumes a reactor of infinite size. In such a reactor
there could , of course , be no escape of neutrons from the system .
In a practical reactor, this condition can be approached in a unit
of reasonable size. The achievement of a k of 0.98 indicated that
the goal of unity was rapidly being approached. By July 1942,
definite indication that a chain reaction was possible in a natural
uranium oxide - graphite lattice was obtained when a value of 1.07
was calculated for an infinite -medium multiplication factor. No
actual chain reaction was achieved in this system because it was
below critical size, but the results indicated that a large structure
of the same general type would maintain a nuclear chain reaction .
During this period a tremendous amount of effort was directed
toward obtaining sufficient quantities of uranium metal and very
pure graphite. This was an extremely difficult task . Normally,
the presence of 1 part boron in 500,000 parts of graphite would
have been of no consequence, but, when this graphite was to be
used in a reactor as a neutron moderator, this small amount of
impurity assumed considerable significance. Boron is a highly effec
tive absorber of neutrons; therefore, since there were virtually no
neutrons to spare in this work , the presence of even a small amount
of boron was detrimental.
By the fall of 1942, there were sufficient quantities of pure graphite
and uranium metal available to allow an attempt to construct a
chain -reacting system that would exceed the critical size and thus
would be self-sustaining. The plan was to construct, at the Uni
versity of Chicago, a cubic lattice of lumps of uranium metal and
uranium oxide (not enough uranium metal was available to use all
metal) surrounded by a sphere of graphite. The graphite, cut into
bricks, was built up in layers; alternate layers contained the lumps
of uranium or oxide. The structure was called a " pile " since it
had been made by piling one layer upon another.
Because it was not known exactly when the critical size would
be reached and because it was anticipated that neutrons produced by
cosmic rays might initiate the chain reaction the instant the critical
size was reached, cadmium strips, acting as neutron absorbers, were
inserted in the pile as a safety measure .
3-2.3 December 2, 1942
The Chicago pile was completed during the fall of 1942. As it

approached completion , careful measurements were made of neutron
activity within the pile. By carefully withdrawing the cadmium
strips and measuring the neutron intensity by means of neutron
detecting instruments, the scientists could observe the approach to
critical size. On Dec. 2, 1942, everything was ready for the final
experiment. On the afternoon of that day, a small group of scien
tists was gathered to witness the event. Upon withdrawal of the
cadmium neutron - absorbing rods, the sharp increase in neutron in
tensity within the pile, shown in the historic record reproduced in
Fig. 3.4, indicated that a nuclear fission chain reaction was actually
taking place. This was the first time that human beings had ever
initiated a self-sustaining nuclear chain reaction .
This historical account is presented here because of its funda
mental importance. The purpose of the experimental work done
was primarily to further the atomic bomb project ; today, however,
it remains the basis for the world-wide interest and activity in the
development of atomic power for peaceful purposes.
3-2.4 Fission Reaction a Source of Heat
The Fermi pile was extremely simple and, except in principle,

bears little resemblance to the complex and highly instrumented
nuclear power reactors of today. It was not operated long enough
to generate an appreciable amount of heat or other radiation. It
did not, for example, produce heat enough to require a cooling
system , nor did it generate enough radiation to require the construc
tion of shielding to protect the scientists who worked around it
from its rays. The pile was operated at the rate of one -half watt ;
on Dec. 12, however, it was run at a rate of 200 watts for a short
time.
The pile did function for a sufficient length of time to prove that
a chain reaction was possible and that the reaction would produce
as a by -product a new element unknown in nature called " pluto
nium ," which , like [ *235 , is a highly efficient nuclear fuel. Also ,
and this is of far-reaching importance, the chain reaction produced
heat, and it is this heat that is used to generate mechanical or elec
trical power in all nuclear power plants today. This heat results
from the release of the 200 Mev of energy that is released in the
o
ОО
3:53 PN
PILE - SHUT DOWN
BY SAFETY CONTROL .
3:38 PM
о
О
PILE BECOMES
CRITICAL:
O
INSTRUMENT
RANGE CHANGED
o
оо
3
TINSTRUMENTE
RANGE MANGED
MIN.
o
15
ACTIVITY LEVEUS OFF

PILE NOT CRITICAL
2:20 PM
-CONTROL ROOS
WITHDRAWN
o
CHECKING
0
EQUIPMENT
o
FIG. 3.4–Historic record of the world's first nuclear chain reaction at the
University of Chicago, Dec. 2, 1942.
fission of each ["235 nucleus; nearly all this energy appears as heat
within the pile or reactor.
In so far as power is concerned , a reactor is primarily a source
of heat. In a steam power plant, the reactor system merely takes
the place of the conventional coal-, oil-, or gas -fired furnace and the
boiler; the remainder of the power system -- the turbines, electric
generators, and auxiliaries — all remain essentially the same.
A nuclear reactor, however, is quite different from a coal- or an

oil-fired furnace. The amount of energy contained in the fuel in
the furnace of a conventional steam boiler is extremely small, i.e. ,
no more than can carry the load for a very short period of time,
a few seconds or a few minutes depending upon the type of firing
system used ; thus a conventional furnace has to be fed continuously.
A nuclear reactor, on the other hand, carries enough energy in the
fuel constituting the core to operate a large power plant for many
months, or even years , without replenishment. In the case of the
nuclear -powered merchant ship Savannah , it is expected that the
initial core will operate the ship under normal conditions for at
least three and one- half years, and possibly longer, before it needs
replacing
The concentration of energy in the core of a nuclear reactor is
almost beyond belief. Consider the fact that a quarter of a cubic
inch of U235, a piece the size of a small eraser, contains as much
energy as 6 million cubic feet of gas, 7,000 cubic feet of oil , or 5,000
cubic feet of coal. True, only a small part of this U 235 can be
burned before the accumulation of fission products makes it necessary
to replace it , but even the very small fraction consumed gives it
an incomparable advantage over conventional fuels.
It is this enormous quantity of stored energy in the fuel elements
of a nuclear reactor which makes a reactor completely different
from an ordinary steam boiler. Although it is impossible for a
nuclear reactor to explode in the way that an atomic bomb explodes,
the energy rise in a reactor can be so rapid as to melt or even
vaporize the entire core and surrounding structure . If this were
to happen , dangerous radioactive fission products would be released
to the environment, thereby making large areas uninhabitable for
an extended period of time. Because this danger has been recog
nized from the very beginning, the aim of nuclear reactor designers
has been to design reactors with safety features that would make
such a nuclear accident virtually impossible. Not only are reactors
equipped with elaborate control systems that automatically prevent
the nuclear reaction from going beyond control, but also many re
actors are of the self -regulating type, which , even if all the control
elements were removed , because of the inherent nuclear character
istics, would shut themselves down .
To investigate the inherent safety aspects of water -cooled nuclear
reactors, the AEC has conducted, and is continuing to conduct,
elaborate experiments at the National Reactor Testing Station in
Idaho. The first of these experiments had their origin in work
done at the Argonne National Laboratory near Chicago on the
feasibility of boiling water reactors. These were called the
BORAX experiments (from BOiling Reactor AX experiment ).

In the course of these experiments, boiling water reactors were op
erated under extreme conditions. Rapid removal of the control
rods subjected the reactors to enormous power excursions. From
these excursions it could be determined whether the negative tem
perature coefficient due to the rapid formation of steam voids in the
water moderator would shut the reactor down before the fuel ele
ments reached the melting point. This was proved to be so during
the course of many experiments extending over a period of several
years . In one instance, because the fuel elements in the first
BORAX reactor had become deformed from repeated stress, the
reactor was sacrificed in a final experiment in which a vital control
rod was completely ejected from the reactor core . In this case
the power level of the reactor went from 0 to over 19 million
kilowatts in less than a tenth of a second, and the instantaneous
transformation of all the water in the reactor into steam resulted
in an explosion that wrecked the reactor. This was a steam explo
sion , however, not a nuclear explosion. The instruments showed
that, although the ejection of the control rod required only about 0.2
sec , the rod was only about 80 percent out of the core when the
reactor power reached its peak value.
The BORAX experiments focused attention on the underlying
problem of reactor oscillations, or excursions ( sudden rise in power
level ) , and served as a starting point for the extension of experi
mental studies of this kind. The SPERT (Special Power Excursion
Reactor Tests) program , also being conducted at the National Re
actor Testing Station for the AEC , was initiated partly to answer
new questions raised by the BORAX work . The SPERT experi
ments include studies on both boiling -water and pressurized -water
reactors. Altogether, these experiments have furnished evidence of
the high degree of stability of water-moderated reactors and the
inherent safety features that characterize their performance. The
knowledge that boiling water reactors possess inherent rapid power
limiting processes capable of protecting properly designed reactors
against reactivity excursions ( i.e., the departure of a reactor from
the critical condition in either direction due to change in multipli
cation factor) of many millions of kilowatts per second has done
much to give this type reactor a high degree of acceptance through
out the world . The pressurized -water reactor used in the Savannah
has self-limiting power characteristics of this kind.
3-3 NUCLEAR REACTORS
Basically, the operation of a nuclear reactor for power produc

tion involves bringing together sufficient fissionable material, for
example, U-235, to support a controlled chain reaction and extracting

the heat released by the fission process while retaining the fission
products. Unfortunately, it is not possible to leave the fuel ele
ments in a solid - fuel reactor until all the fissionable material has
been burned out. As the U235 undergoes fission and fission products
accumulate, these fission products absorb neutrons, leaving fewer
neutrons available for further fission . A time is reached when the
fission products absorb so many neutrons that only a small number
of the total neutrons released result in fission. At that point it is
no longer economical to keep the depleted fuel in the reactor; it
must be removed, and new elements must be inserted. As already
indicated , the depleted fuel still contains most of the U235 orig
inally present; this can be recovered by chemical reprocessing.
Provision can be made to counteract some of this " poisoning,"
as the accumulation of fission products is called, by deliberately in
troducing certain neutron absorbers, such as boron , into the fuel
elements themselves. The presence of the boron reduces the initial
reactivity of the system ; therefore more fuel is needed . However,
since the boron burns out as a result of neutron absorption , the
over -all effect is that of making more fuel available as it is needed .
Although this improves operation and increases the life of the core,
fuel elements still have to be replaced periodically. It is possible,
however, to design reactors in which the fuel is in the form of a
liquid , i.e., a slurry or solution of uranium or other fissionable
material in a liquid or liquid metal. In these reactors new fuel
can be introduced and the depleted fuel can be removed continu
ously. Such reactors are known as “ homogeneous reactors” as con
trasted with the heterogeneous reactors considered thus far. A
homogeneous reactor is one in which the fissionable material and
the moderator are combined in an essentially homogeneous mixture.
A heterogeneous reactor, on the other hand , is one in which the
fuel and moderator are separate and discrete bodies.
Nuclear reactors can be classified in various ways according to
application , nuclear characteristics, coolant, mobility of the fuel ,
etc. Applications include stationary power, mobile power, plutonium
,, and research. For stationary power, fuel economy is
production
important since nuclear fuels must compete with fossil fuels in
this area . Mobile power reactors are designed for high power
density and light weight. By power density is meant the number
of watts developed per unit of volume in the reactor core . Reactors
for ship propulsion come under the heading of mobile power reac
tors. Research reactors are designed to provide neutron and gamma
ray sources for research purposes.
Basically , all nuclear reactors produce three things, neutrons,
fission products, and heat. The neutrons can be used to produce new
materials, such as plutonium, which is valuable since it can be used

as reactor fuel . Thus, the neutrons can be considered as having cash
value. The large amount of heat generated in a reactor may, or
may not, have cash value, depending upon how efficiently it is ex
tracted .
The best examples of reactors utilizing neutrons for production
are the reactors at Hanford , Wash. These reactors are used solely
for producing plutonium . Of course, large quantities of heat are
also generated , but the temperature is so low that the heat cannot
be used practically. Its removal is strictly a cooling operation ;
it is released to the waters of the Columbia River. However, if
the temperature of the Hanford reactors could be raised and if the
heat could be extracted at a high enough level to generate steam ,
it would be possible to produce both electric power and plutonium
at the same time. The New Production Reactor under construction at
Hanford is designed to operate at temperatures sufficiently high to
produce steam for the practical and efficient generation of electricity.
Since more than one neutron is released in each fission of U235,
it is conceivable that a reactor producing heat for power could , at
the same time, produce as much or even more new fissionable ma
terial than it consumes. This process is called “ breeding." Experi
mental breeder reactors have been built, and these have shown the
process to be technically feasible; however, a number of practical
problems remain to be solved before breeder reactors prove com
mercially feasible. The reactors at Hanford are not breeders; they
do not produce as much new fissionable material as is consumed
in the process .
There is nothing of a perpetual-motion nature in the process of
breeding ;5 it is merely the process of converting nonfissionable ma
terial ( U 238 ) into fissionable plutonium . The process is illustrated
diagrammatically in Fig. 3.5 . The capture of a neutron by the
C 238 nucleus results in the formation of a U239 nucleus. This
process is accompanied by the emission of gamma radiation as indi
ON CL
E
IC
LE
MA TI
M IA TA ARTI BE
TA
PA
RT
GA RA
D BE P
u
v
ΞΌ
THERMAL
NEUTRON
a
U - 238
plus
U - 239 NP - 239 PU- 239
Neutron 23.5 Min 2.3 Days 24,000 YT

Half Life Half Life Half Life
FIG . 3.5 - Conversion of U238 into P239 by the capture of a thermal neutron .
cated . The U238 nucleus is unstable, having a half life of 23.5 min .
It emits a beta particle (an electron ) and thus becomes neptunium
239 (Np239 ). The U239 nucleus also is unstable, having a half life
of 2.33 days; it , in turn , emits a beta particle and becomes Pu239.
It is obvious that if more than one of the several neutrons pro
duced in the fission of C 235 is effective in producing a Pu239 nucleus,
there will be a gain in the amount of fissionable material. When
this condition is attained, the process is called “breeding."
In the reactors at Hanford, U235 serves to maintain the fission
reaction , but some of the neutrons are captured by the U238 (which
comprises over 99 percent of natural uranium ) with the ultimate
formation of Pu239 in the manner described. Thus the [ 235 con
sumed by fission is replaced, to some extent, by another fissionable
species, Pu239. At the same time the energy released in the fission
of U 235 appears as heat. In the Hanford reactors this heat is wasted,
but in principle it can be used for producing useful power. Whether
a reactor converts a portion of the [ *238 into plutonium in this man
ner depends upon the design of the reactor.
The reason for building reactors for consuming one fissionable
material to obtain another lies in the difficulty of separating the
fissionable U235 in natural uranium from the U23 These two types
of uranium are isotopes, that is, they have exactly the same chemical
properties but have different atomic weights. Thus, they cannot be
separated by chemical methods. They can be separated by physical
methods by virtue of their different atomic weights, but these
physical processes require large amounts of energy and are very
expensive. However, Pu239 is different chemically from (1238; con
sequently these two elements can be separated by chemical methods,
and this, then , is the reason for building reactors such as those at
Hanford . Even though the amount of Pu239 produced in these
reactors is less than the amount of ( * 235 consumed, the process is
commercially attractive.
Reactors that do not produce an appreciable amount of new
fissionable material are called " burners ” because they merely burn
( consume) the [ *235. Obviously, if [1238 is present in any quantity,
some of it will be converted to Pu239 regardless of the reactor de
sign , but in some reactors the percentage is so small as to be of
little significance. Reactors that produce significant quantities of
new fissionable material, although less than the amount of fissionable
material consumed , are called " converters " when the new fissionable
material is recovered and used in other reactors or for other pur
poses. The reactors at Hanford fall into this class. When the new
fissionable material produced in the reactor remains in the reactor
to be consumed along with the original fuel, thus extending the 1
1
CL
E LE
TI IC
TA R TA RT
BE PA BE PA
O
THERMAL
NEUTRON Th - 232 U - 233
Th - 233 Po - 233
23.5 Min 27.4 Days

Half Life Half Life
Fig. 3.6 — The thorium conversion process.
life of the fuel loading, a reactor is said to be a " regenerative

reactor. ” And, as already explained , reactors that produce more
fissionable atoms than are consumed are referred to as “ breeder re
actors ” or simply as “ breeders. "
In addition to the conversion of U 238 to plutonium , another con
version process is possible with thorium - 232 ( Th232 ). Although
natural thorium , which is nearly 100 percent Th232, does not fission
with thermal neutrons, it captures neutrons to form thorium - 233
( Th233) . This nucleus has a half title of 23.5 min and decays by
beta emission to protactinium -233 (Pa233). Next, the Pa233, with
a half life of 27.4 days, emits a beta particle and decays to U233.
Uranium - 233 fissions with thermal neutrons, and so natural thorium
is a potential fuel material. The thorium conversion process is
shown in Fig. 3.6 .
Thus it is seen that two types of conversion processes are possible,
one originating with U238 and leading to the production of Pu239,
and the other originating with Th232 and leading to the production
of U233
Because [ *235 is the only fissionable material found in nature, it
is inevitable that in these early stages of reactor development this
material must be used to maintain the chain reaction in nuclear
reactors . The amount of U235 in the world , however, is very small
compared to the total amount of uranium ; so , unless there is some
un forseen discovery, the supply of ( * 235 will eventually be used
up. Since natural uranium contains about 140 times as much U238
as it does ["235, it is obvious that the long-range future of the
>
nuclear energy industry will depend on the development of effi

cient converter or breeder reactors.
The technical feasibility of the breeding process has been demon
strated. An experimental breeder has been in operation at the
National Reactor Testing Station for almost a decade, and, as
early as the summer of 1953, the AEC announced that breeding
had been accomplished on an experimental scale. The Russians
have a fast breeder using plutonium oxide, operating at 5 Mw
( thermal). This reactor reached full power in early 1959.
Breeder reactors are, however, difficult to build , and consider

able development work remains to be done before breeder reactors
become a commercial reality. At present two breeder reactors are
under construction in the United States, and one , the 60 -Mw ( ther
mal) Dounreay reactor, is currently operating in northern Scot
land . The largest of these is the Enrico Fermi fast breeder being
built by Atomic Power Development Associates near Detroit, Mich .,
which is rated at 300 Mw ( thermal) and 100 Mw ( electrical ).
Construction on the second experimental breeder reactor ( EBR - II)
was started at the National Reactor Testing Station in 1957 ; it was
scheduled to be completed in 1961. This reactor will have a rated
output of 62.5 Mw (thermal ).
The prospects for realizing breeding on a commercial scale de
pend upon the number of fission neutrons liberated for each neutron
absorbed by the fissionable material. One neutron is required to
maintain the fission chain , and , in addition , more than one is needed ,
on the average, to make breeding possible. Hence, apart from neu
trons lost by leakage or nonfission capture, somewhat more than two
fission neutrons must be available for each neutron absorbed.
The number of neutrons released in thermal-neutron fission varies
with the different types of fissionable material. The average num
ber of neutrons released by the three known fissionable materials
are as follows: U235, 2.07 ; Pu239, 2.10 ; and ( 233, 2.30.
>
3-3.1 Nuclear Characteristics of Reactors
The nuclear characteristics of power reactors are of significant

importance. In general, reactors can be classified according to
their nuclear characteristics in a number of ways : ( 1 ) according to
the neutron spectrum , ( 2 ) whether homogeneous or heterogeneous,
( 3 ) with respect to the enrichment of the fuel, ( 4 ) type of modera
tor used, and ( 5 ) fuel and fertile material.
The first category, neutron spectrum , refers to the speed or the
energy of the neutrons bringing about fission . A thermal reactor ,
for example, is one in which the neutrons are predominantly at
thermal energy. The average energy of a thermal neutron is about
0.03 ev. This is equivalent to the speed of gas molecules at room
temperature, somewhat over a mile per second . A moderator is
essential in a thermal reactor.
A fast reactor is one in which the neutrons causing fission are
predominantly at an average energy above 100,000 ev. * The fuel
* Fission by slow ( thermal) neutrons was the first and , as later events were to prore .
the most important type of nuclear fission , It was soon realized , however, that the
nuclei of other elements of high atomic number could be made to undergo fission .
Uranium - 238 undergoes fission only with fast neutrons. Although tission of U235 is
most effective with thermal neutrons, fission of t1235 is also caused by neutrons having
higher energies.
for a fast reactor must be enriched at least 10 percent in U 233,

[ *235, or Pu239. A fast reactor must have little or no moderator.
Fission is induced primarily by fast neutrons that have lost rela
tively little of the energy with which they were released . Fast
reactors have potentially high neutron economy; that is, a high per
centage of the neutrons emitted in fission will iduce fission other
nuclei. In a fast reactor, because absorption cross sections for fast
neutrons are relatively small, parasitic ( nonfission ) capture is a
minor problem ; as a consequence the choice of construction materials
is greater than for thermal reactors .
Between thermal and fast reactors it is possible to design inter
mediate and epithermal reactors. In an epithermal reactor, a sub
stantial fraction of the fissions (say 30 or 10 percent) is induced
by neutrons of more than thermal energy. In an intermediate
reactor, fission is induced predominantly by neutrons whose energies
are greater than thermal but much less than the energy with which
the neutrons are released in fission . From 0.5 to 100,000 ev may be
taken roughly as the energy range of neutrons inducing fission in
intermediate reactors.
With respect to the practical use of these various types of re
actors , each has certain advantages and disadvantages. Thermal
reactors have the great advantage of flexibility in size, which can
be attained by varying the nature and properties of the fuel and
the moderator, in particular. Their main disadvantage is the loss
of neutrons due to parasitic capture by constructional and other
materials and by fission products. Fast reactors have potentially
high neutron economy, but there is some restriction in regard to
possible fuel materials. Through a choice of moderator and struc
tural design, a thermal reactor can be made to operate on virtually
anything from natural to highly enriched uranium or plutonium .
A fast reactor, on the other hand , requires 'a fuel containing an
enrichment of from 10 to 40 percent fissionable material, [ 233,
[ "235, or Pu239. The large amount of fissionable material needed
to attain critical size is one of the disadvantages of a fast reactor.
Critical size , however, may be quite small since no moderator is
needed ; indeed a fast reactor of considerable power output may be
no larger than a foot or even less in diameter. The outstanding
advantage of certain types of fast reactors is their ability to breed
new fissionable material; in this respect they have considerable ad
vantage over thermal reactors, and it is for this reason that they
command particular interest.
In intermediate reactors some moderator is required but not as
much as in thermal reactors, and the amount of fissionable material
needed to attain criticality is smaller than in fast reactors. Breed
613489 04627
ing is also possible with an intermediate reactor, but the process

is not as efficient as in a fast reactor. Thus far, there appears to
have been only moderate interest in developing intermediate re
actors; the only one to be built was the Submarine Intermediate
Reactor ( SIR ), the original reactor installed aboard the submarine
Seawolf.
The nuclear characteristics of a reactor are also dependent upon
whether a reactor is homogeneous or heterogeneous. As already
explained , a homogeneous reactor is one in which the moderator
and fuel are combined in one homogeneous mixture, usually in
liquid form . Several experimental reactors of this type have been
built ; one, the Homogeneous Reactor Experiment ( HRE ) at Oak
Ridge National Laboratory, was built to test the feasibility of
maintaining a fission reaction in an aqueous solution circulating
at high temperature and pressure. This reactor used a solution of
enriched uranyl sulfate and distilled water . The solution served
as the fuel, moderator, and coolant. Before this unit was dismantled
in December 1954 to make room for a larger homogeneous reactor
experiment, it was operated at thermal power levels up to 1,000
kw, and on Feb. 24, 1953, about 150 kw of electricity was generated
through its associated steam -electric - generating equipment. Al
though this type reactor appears to offer considerable potential,
no commercial power units have been built.
Heterogeneous reactors are those in which the fissionable material
and moderator are arranged as separate and discrete bodies, usually
according to a pattern of such dimensions that a nonhomogeneous
medium is presented to the neutrons. Most of the power reactors
built to date are of the heterogeneous type. Heterogeneous reactors
can be designed to a wide variety of specifications, involving many
different kinds of materials as fuels, moderators, and coolants, and
with seemingly endless structural variations.
The third factor involved in nuclear characteristics is enrichment
of the fuel. Enrichment refers to the amount of fissionable material
in the fuel over the amount in the natural element. In the case of
uranium , it means the percentage of 1 *235 in the fuel over the 0.7 per
cent contained in natural uranium . Natural-uranium and slightly
enriched reactors usually contain enough fertile material ( U+238 or
Th232) in the core or in a blanket * surrounding the core to provide
a conversion ratio above 0.7. This means that for every nucleus
that undergoes fission on the average somewhat more than 0.7 of a
nucleus of new fissionable material is formed in the core or in the
blanket. Blanketed reactors thus generate fissionable material to
* A blanket is usually a layer of fertile material surrounding the core . Fast neutrons
produced by the fission of the nuclei in the core pass into the blanket where they con
vert fertile U 238 or Th232 into Pu 239 or U 233 , respectively.
replace the material burned , although the amount so produced is

almost always smaller than the amount burned . In this way the
amount of fuel available for power production is extended over a
longer period. Such reactors, therefore, are more economical from
the standpoint of fuel consumption than highly enriched unblanketed
thermal reactors. Because of this, reactors of this type are used
there fuel costs are important, as in central-station power plants,
and for the same reason they show promise for the propulsion of
ships.
For applications where a high neutron flux is important and where
power is of little consequence, highly enriched unblanketed reactors
are useful. Many research and test reactors are fueled with enriched
materials to provide a high neutron flux at moderate power, although
in some test reactors the power level is quite high. The Engineering
Test Reactor ( ETR ) at the National Reactor Testing Station , runs
at 175 Mw . Research and test reactors can tolerate considerable
neutron leakage because fuel economy is of little importance.
The fourth factor influencing the nuclear characteristics of a re
actor is the moderator. The moderator, as already explained, is the
material in a nuclear reactor used to moderate, that is, slow down ,
neut rons from the high speeds at which they are released in fission .
Neutrons lose energy (speed ) in scattering collisions with the nuclei
of the moderator. A good moderator has a high scattering cross
section * and a low atomic weight. In each collision there is chance
of absorption. The loss of neutrons during the slowing down process
is reduced if the moderator atoms have a low neutron -absorption
cross section. High scattering cross section implies frequent colli
sion ; this gives the neutron a better chance of being slowed down
before it is captured and also reduces the average net distance traveled
in slowing down so that leakage is reduced . Small mass results in
a large average energy transfer per collision ( requiring few colli
sions) and so reduces both opportunities for capture and distance
traveled .
The only elements that are commonly considered as moderators are
carbon ; hydrogen or heavy hydrogen (hydrogen having a nucleus
composed of a proton and a neutron ; also called " deuterium ") in
the form of H20 or 1,0, respectively, or as organic compounds;
and beryllium or beryllium oxide (BeO ). Thermal reactors, there
* Cross section is a concept in nuclear processes that has to do with the probability
that a given event can occur. It is less a function of the geometrical cross section
(area ) of the nuclear particles than of their energy. In an encounter between a neu
tron and a nucleus, there is a probability that either the neutron will be absorbed by
the nucleus or it will be scattered , that is, deflected or turned back . Thus, the prob
ability that a neutron will be deflected in an encounter with aa nucleus is referred to as
the " scattering cross section." On the other hand , the probability that a neutron will
be absorbed by the nucleus in such an encounter is called the " absorption cross section."
fore, are classified by these moderators. The fact that these elements
have different slowing -down, absorption , and physical characteristics
markedly affects the size and nature of the reactors.
The fifth factor affecting the nuclear characteristics of a reactor
is the choice of fuel and fertile material. The fuels used in nuclear
reactors are U235, U233, and Pu239. Uranium - 238 is not usually con
sidered a fuel, but it does fission to some extent at high neutron
energies (above 1 Mev ) and therefore contributes to the fission
process. Uranium - 238 is usually thought of as a fertile material,
leading to the production of plutonium by the process previously
explained. Thorium -232 also is a fertile material since it is con
verted into U233 by the process illustrated in Fig. 3.6.
3-3.2 Reactor Coolants
Since a nuclear power reactor generates heat at a tremendous rate

and at an extremely high concentration, the type of coolant or heat
transfer medium used is a most important factor in reactor design.
Coolants can be separated into five broad classes: ( 1 ) water, ( 2 )
gases, ( 3 ) liquid metals, ( 4 ) inorganic fluids, and ( 5 ) organic fluids.
No attempt is made here to consider all the various characteristics
of coolants; however, a brief discussion of some of the more com
monly used coolants is given.
( a ) Water as a Coolant. Water is a fairly good heat-transfer
medium , is easy to handle, provides some lubrication , offers no serious
corrosion problems that are not insurmountable by proper choice of
materials, and is readily available and economical. For these reasons
it has found wide application as a reactor coolant. Since water is
also a good moderator, the coolant and moderator are often one and
the same medium ; in fact, water -cooled reactors are usually water
moderated . It is possible, however, to have water -cooled reactors
with other types of moderators .
Under fast -neutron radiation in a reactor, the oxygen in the water
forms nitrogen -17 ( N?? ) , and this emits penetrating gamma radia
tion . The X 17, however, has a half life of only 7.5 sec ; so it consti
tutes no lasting hazard as a source of radioactivity. Impurities in
the cooling water, however, do tend to become radioactive, and, since
such radioactive impurities tend to accumulate in the system , it is
highly essential that the water in the cooling system be maintained
at a high degree of purity. Modern water-conditioning equipment
is available which can keep the impurities in water down to a frac
tion of a part per million , and this is adequate for power-reactor
operation. The most serious drawback to the use of water as a heat
transfer medium is its low boiling point at moderate pressures
( 212 ° F at atmospheric pressure ). This means that cooling -water

loops have to be maintained at high pressure to keep the water
from boiling at reasonably high temperatures; even a modest coolant
temperature of 550 ° F sets up a vapor pressure of 1,500 lb per square
inch ( psi) in the primary system .
Heavy water ( 120 ) has essentially the same chemical and physical
properties as light water (H2O ), but its nuclear properties are quite
different. The choice between light water and heavy water is based
primarily on physics and economic considerations rather than heat
transfer. In general, if the application is one for which either light
water or heavy water is to be used as coolant and moderator, the
superior nuclear performance of heavy water must be balanced
against its higher cost. At the present prices fixed by the AEC ,
heavy water sells in the United States for $28 per pound. Heavy
water has a low absorption cross section , which is important in reac
tors where neutron economy is important. The low absorption cross
section of heavy water constitutes no particular advantage in reactors
that contain high absorption -cross-section materials, e.g., a highly
enriched power reactor using fuel elements clad in stainless steel .
It is obvious that, since the use of water as a reactor coolant is
intimately related to its use as a moderator, its selection involves
consideration of its nuclear properties as a moderator as well as of
its characteristics as a heat -transfer medium . At present the low
operating temperature limit for both 110 and D.O systems limits
plant thermal efficiencies to from 25 to 30 percent. This can be im
proved by the development of nuclear superheating, and considerable
work on this is being done at the present time.
( b ) Gas Coolants. Although gas cooling has been used extensively
in England, gases are inherently poor heat-transfer agents because
of their low density compared with liquids. This difficulty can be
overcome to some extent by operating the gas-cooling systems under
high pressure, but this in turn introduces difficult problems in de
sign and construction . These difficulties, no doubt, can be overcome,
and several types of high -temperature high -pressure gas-cooled reac
tors are under consideration both in England and in the United
States. One advantage of gases as coolants is that the number of
gas atoms per unit volume is small compared with condensed mate
rials ; so gases do not particularly affect neutron economy.
With respect to heat removal, hydrogen is superior to all other
gases, and its neutron characteristics are also favorable . The explo
sion hazard introduced by using hydrogen in a nuclear reactor, how
erer, makes its use unsuitable from a practical standpoint.
Helium offers excellent possibilities as a gas coolant. It has
reasonably good heat-transfer characteristics, is completely inert, and
is stable at high temperatures. Helium is being considered for use

in the high -temperature high -pressure gas -cooled reactors now being
developed ; indeed , it is in the high -temperature high - pressure region
that gas cooling possesses attractive possibilities that may compensate
' for its shortcomings. Such high -temperature gas systems also offer
í excellent opportunities for the development of nuclear gas-turbine
systems for ship propulsion and stationary power plants. Helium ,
however, is difficult to obtain since the helium resources of the world
appear to be limited. Also, there is at present a large ( and increas
ing demand for helium for use in other scientific and technical
fields, and this may preclude its widespread use as a reactor coolant
at the present time.
In England, where low -pressure gas -cooling has been used almost
exclusively in nuclear power plants, carbon dioxide has been used in
all the power reactors in operation and under construction date.
At the relatively low temperatures at which the English systems
operate (slightly over 600 ° F ), carbon dioxide (CO .,) has the ad
vantage in that it is cheap, readily obtainable, and sufficiently inert.
At high temperature, however, CO , reacts with graphite ( in graph
ite -moderated reactors ) to form carbon monoxide ( CO ) according to
the following reaction : CO2 + C 200. In this reaction , of
course , the graphite would be destroyed.
( c ) Liquid -metal Coolants. Liquid metals as coolants for reactors
have a particular advantage in that they provide high heat-transfer
rates and do not require pressurizing to operate at high temperature.
The first liquid metal that comes to mind is mereury because it is a
liquid at room temperatures. Aside from good heat- transfer charac
teristics, which mercury possesses, a reactor coolant must also have
a low neutron -capture cross section, and on this basis mercury is not
suitable.
The alkali metals are of most interest as reactor coolants, and
among them sodium has been most attractive from the beginning.
Sodium or a sodium -potassium alloy ( XaK ) is the principal liquid
metal coolant thus far used in actual reactors . The first sodium
cooled reactor was the Experimental Breeder Reactor ( EBR - I ) at
the National Reactor Testing Station . Sodium has a relatively low
melting point ( 208 ° F ) ; it is not corrosive to most common struc
tural materials up to 1,200 ° F . provided a low oxygen concentration
is maintained ; and it has reasonably good nuclear properties. It
also has a low thermal-neutron -absorption cross section .
When sodium absorbs neutrons, a radioactive isotope, Na24 , is
formed which is a high -energy emitter of gamma radiation, with a
half life of 15 lir. The absorption of neutrons may also form Xa ”?
with a half life of 2.6 years. No trouble has been experienced in the
reactors in operation from the Na22 activity ; but considerable shield

ing is required to guard against the Na2+ activity, and a waiting time
of approximately two weeks is required before access can be had
to piping and equipment after a reactor is shut down.
One disadvantage of sodium is that it reacts violently with water,
and great care is necessary in designing sodium -water heat exchang
ers to ensure that no leakage between the two sides of the system
can ever occur. In some cases heat exchangers have been built with
concentric tubes by means of which the sodium is separated from
the water by an annular space between two inner tubes containing
mercury . The purpose of the mercury is merely to keep the water
from coming in contact with the sodium in case of leakage either way.
The high boiling point of sodium , coupled with its good heat-trans
fer characteristic, offsets some of its disadvantages, and it has been
given a significant amount of attention as a reactor coolant. Sodium
is used in the Atomic Energy Commission's Sodium Reactor Experi
ment ( SRE ) operated by Atomics International at Santa Susanna,
Calif., and in the Dounreay Fast Reactor in the north of Scotland ,
and it will be the coolant for the Enrico Fermi Fast Breeder Reactor
near Detroit, Mich .
Other liquid metals have been considered as having possible use in
reactors, but none have been used in actual reactors. Lithium and
gallium both have been studied . Lithium - 7 has a much higher heat
capacity than sodium , and , since its induced radioactivity is low , it
is easy to shield . Lithium - 7, however, is considerably more difficult
to obtain than sodium .* The reason for considering gallium is that
it provides an exceptionally high heat-transfer coefficient and it melts
at a low temperature, 86 ° F . However, it is extremely corrosive and
has a high neutron -absorption cross section ; hence it appears un
likely that this metal will find practical application in power reactors.
( d ) Inorganic Fluids. Fused salts, and especially fluoride salt
mixtures, are being currently considered as reactor coolants because
of their negligible vapor pressure at high operating temperature.
Difficulties in materials compatibility have arisen chiefly because of
their corrosive properties. Among other fused salts studied is
sodium hydroxide. Its hydrogen content gives it good moderating
properties, and from this standpoint it is attractive ; however, this
compound has a high neutron -absorption cross section, a high melt
ing point, and is corrosive at high temperatures. It is doubtful that
it has practical value as a reactor coolant.
.Xatural lithium is a mixture of two isotopes, Lio and Li?, in the proportion 7.5 and
92.5 percent, respectively. The reason natural lithium is not suitable as a coolant is
because LiG has a very high neutron -absorption cross section value ; thus, if lithium is
to be useful as a reactor coolant, it is necessary first to remove the Li6 , and this is
necessarily expensive.
( e ) Organic Coolants. A class of compounds which appears to

offer considerable promise as reactor coolants (and moderators ) in
cludes certain organic compounds such as diphenyl and terphenyl.
Diphenyl has been used as a heat -transfer agent between various
circuits in conventional steam -boiler plants; for example, it is used to
transfer the heat in the stack gases to the combustion -air supply to
the furnace. It has good heat-transfer characteristics, is easy to
handle up to temperatures of 650 to 750 ° F, and its neutron charac
teristics are very favorable. Another advantage is that these organic
fluids are not corrosive with respect to uranium or the structural
materials used in nuclear reactors.
Whether or not these organic fluids can be used in power reactors,
however, will depend upon their ability to withstand neutron irradia
tion and high temperatures without dissociation or decomposition .
In the event of such breakdown, decomposition products might be
deposited on the fuel -element plates and thus impair heat transfer.
Decomposition products, no doubt, can be readily removed by distil
lation , but recent experiments indicate that the decomposition prod
ucts in many cases are just as good as, and sometimes better than ,
the starting material. Where diphenyl is used , for example, the
decomposition product is partly terphenyl, which is an even better
coolant than diphenyl.
It has been found that the decomposition products can be allowed
to build up to something like 15 percent without unduly affecting
the behavior of the coolant.
One advantage of the organic fluids is that reasonably high tem
peratures can be obtained in reactor systems without high pressure .
Finally, the materials are not expensive. Because of these attractive
characteristics, organic fluids are being given serious consideration ,
and studies have been made with respect to the application of
organic-moderated and -cooled reactors to commercial-ship propul
sion systems.
A disadvantage of organic fluids as reactor coolants is the problem
of disposing of quantities of highly radioactive wax that accumulate
in the reprocessing of the fluids.
3-3.3 Mobility of Reactor Fuel
Another way of classifying nuclear reactors is in regard to the

mobility of the fuel. There are three possibilities: ( 1 ) stationary
fuel, ( 2 ) fuel moved with the coolant, and ( 3 ) fuel moved with a
separate carrier.
( a ) Stationary Fuel. In this case the fuel is in the form of solid
plates, rods, or pellets, or perhaps a liquid encased in tubes. Most
power reactors in use today fall into this category. Since the fuel
is in the form of discrete elements, these reactors are heterogeneous

reactors. In reactors of this type, the fuel is added or removed
from the reactor in batch quantities. This does not necessarily mean
that the entire fuel charge is removed or replaced at one time; usually
only a few elements are replaced, depending upon the degree of
burn -up ( or depletion ). In a heterogeneous reactor not all the fuel
elements in the core are depleted at the same rate ; those in the center
usually are subjected to a higher neutron flux and thus become de
pleted at an earlier time than those near the outside. Consequently,
these have to be replaced before the others.
Stationary fuel has the advantage of staying in the reactor and
confining its fission products in the reactor. With natural uranium
or slightly enriched uranium , a fuel charge may last from one to
several years. As fuel elements become depleted, they are removed
from the reactor core and sent to chemical reprocessing plants where
the still-remaining U 235 is recovered along with any Pu239 or U"233 .
Even though special fuel-handling devices and transport equipment
are necessary for these fuel elements, the heterogeneous type reactor
is the easiest to maintain .
( b ) Fuel Movement with the Coolant. In reactors in which the
fuel is moved by the coolant, the fuel is in the form of a liquid or
slurry, molten metal, fused salt, or dust suspended in a gas. In the
aqueous homogeneous reactor, the fuel is intimately mixed with the
coolant, and the mixture then acts as fuel and moderator. The
fuel is usually a sulfate of uranium or a suspension or slurry of
an insoluble uranium oxide. The reactor is simply a large pot that
is an enlargement in the circulating system , as shown in Fig. 3.7.
When the fluid fuel enters the enlargement, it forms a critical mass,
Steam Out
Feed Water
HEAT EXCHANGER
(Boiler)
REACTOR
Entire system filled with

uronyl sulfate in water
To Purifying
System
Circulating Pump
Fig. 3.7—Pripciple of the aqueous homogeneous reactor system .

resulting in fission of U235 and consequent heating of the liquid .

This heat is transferred to a secondary loop by means of the heat
exchanger. There are no fuel elements, consequently no superfluous
materials are required. Since the heat is generated directly in the
coolant, no temperature drop occurs between the fuel and the coolant.
The particular advantage of the homogeneous reactor, aside from
its basic simplicity, is the fact that the fuel can be continually
reprocessed by bleeding off a small amount from the circulating
system and reprocessing this stream . Its disadvantage is that the
system as a whole is quite radioactive, and procedures for remote
maintenance of all parts of the primary circulating system must be
considered in the design of the plant.
( c) Fuel Movement by a Separate Carrier. Although systems
utilizing the movement of fuel by a separate carrier have been stud
ied , no reactors falling into this class have been built. In such sys
tems the fuel would be moved continuously through the reactor in
the form of a liquid , a suspension, or a paste. The desire to achieve
a high concentration of fissionable material has resulted in a scheme
to make the fuel into a paste or putty ; however, the controlled
pumping of such pastes remains to be demonstrated .
✓ 3-4 GENERAL ASPECTS OF REACTOR DESIGN
There are many other factors in the design of nuclear reactors

besides those already discussed which have to be considered in the
selection of a reactor for a particular application, and some of
these factors are not too well understood . Reactor engineering is
still a new field, and there are many differences of opinion among
the experts on virtually all phases of design and operation . The
establishment of any one design feature will usually influence all
the others. Aside from nuclear considerations, the selection of fuel
and fertile materials plays a large part in determining the choice
of a reactor . At the present time fuel-preparation and -fabrication
is a major item in nuclear fuel costs , but it is expected that this can
be substantially reduced in the future. This reduction will result
from increased burn -up, cheaper fabrication methods, and increased
production.
The design of a nuclear reactor must satisfy both nuclear and
heat-transfer requirements. Fuel-element thickness, for example, is
governed by the heat flux and the allowable temperature drop in
the fuel elements. If the fuel elements are too thick , the heat
developed in the center of the elements might not be able to travel
to the surface fast enough , and as a result the interior might exceed
the melting point of the metal or oxide.
constant heat output from the reactor is maintained by keeping

the rate of fission constant for that output. This means that the
neutron population must remain fixed. In some ways a nuclear
reactor can be likened to a furnace in which the air for combustion
is replaced with an atmosphere of neutrons. In a furnace any vari
ation of the draft or air supply results in a change in the rate of
combustion. Similarly, in a reactor, any change in the neutron flux
results in a change in the power level of the reactor.
The total number of neutrons produced must be equal to the num
ber that are absorbed and that leak out of the reactor plus one
neutron per fission to maintain the chain reaction . The total num
ber of neutrons produced per fission is dependent on the fuel and
is between 2.1 and 2.3. In power reactors it is desirable to have as
many neutrons as possible absorbed by fertile materials to minimize
fuel costs.
l'sually, an attempt is made to keep the conversion ratio as high
as possible (with reasonable construction ), somewhere between 0.7
and 1.0 for thermal reactors and above 1.0 for fast reactors. This
means that for every atom of U235 that undergoes fission , 0.7 to
1 atom of plutonium is produced from the U-238. This new fuel is
produced either within the core itself or in the blanket, depending
upon the design of the reactor. In power reactors the designer tries
to keep the leakage and absorption in the moderator, coolant, and
structure to less than 0.4.
3–4.1 Fissionable Materials
The characteristics of the three kinds of fissionable material, U235,

[ 233 , and Pu239, are listed in Table 3.1. As shown , ( *235 exhibits
>
Table 3.1 - CHARACTERISTICS OF FISSIONABLE MATERIALS
No. of neutrons*
Fuel Occurrence Radioactivity Handling precautions
Thermal Fast
225 Natural uranium .. 2.07 2 2 Weak y and weak a from None.

associated U 234
(* Made from thorium ... 2.3 2.5 Strong y and a . Remote handling ,
shielding,
Pu 239 Made from U239 2.1 2. 6 Strong α . Handle in dry box .
• " Thermal" refers to the number of fission neutrons produced per neutron captured in a thermal reactor.
* Fast ' refers to the process in a fast reactor .
a very low level of radioactivity. It can be handled with no danger

so far as radioactivity is concerned . This is important in systems
where corrosion is a serious problem and fabrication is difficult be
cause it permits easy access for inspection and handling. For this
reason U235 is preferred as the fuel for heterogeneous reactors. The

fabrication of fuel elements for heterogeneous reactors at the present
time involves many hand operations that would be made much more
difficult if the materials used were highly radioactive.
It will be noted that the number of neutrons per capture for U233
( 2.3 ) is higher than for U235 ( 2.07 ) for thermal reactors. Thus,
the use of U233 might make thermal breeder reactors possible. Ura
nium - 233 emits strong alpha and gamma radiation ; so it is necessary
to use remote-handling techniques and shielding in the manufacture
and handling of fuel elements made of this material.
The number of neutrons emitted by the fission of plutonium in
a fast reactor is so much higher than that emitted by any other
material that its use, so far, has been confined almost entirely to
fast reactors. Plutonium also is radioactive, emitting strong alpha
radiation ; so direct contact with the material or ingestion must be
avoided , and fabrication has to be conducted in a dry box.
3-4.2 Fertile Materials
Only two fertile materials occur in nature, U238, which constitutes

over 90 percent of natural uranium , and Th232, Natural uranium
and enriched uranium have fissionable material mixed with the
fertile material, and , as explained previously, the fertile material
is converted into plutonium and partially burned in place. Thus,
the conversion of the fertile material into fissionable material extends
the initial fuel charge in such reactors .
Thorium , on the other hand, does not have fissionable material
mixed in with it and by itself cannot sustain a nuclear chain re
action . It is, however, converted into [ *233 by capture of neutrons
emitted during fission. This material can , therefore, be used in
blankets around the core of reactors to capture the neutrons that
would otherwise be lost by leakage, or the thorium can be mixed
with the fissionable material and used in fuel elements.
3–4.3 Resonance-escape Probability

A factor that the reactor designer must take into consideration
in the selection of the fuel and the moderator and also in the arrange
ment of these materials in the reactor is the resonance -escape prob
ability. As already explained, the purpose of the moderator in a
reactor is to slow down the speed or energy of fast neutrons to
thermal values so they will cause fission of the U*235 atoms in the
fuel. However, in this reduction of speed ( from 1 Mev or more to
around 0.3 ev ) by successive collisions with surrounding atoms, the
neutrons have to pass through a range of speeds ( or energies )
around 5 ev, which is the energy for resonance capture by U238.

Neutrons so captured will not produce fission and so constitute a
loss. For most neutrons the energy is brought below this resonance
capture value very rapidly ; but , since all neutrons do not behave
exactly alike, there is a chance that a few will be captured, and
allowance must be made for this by introducing a factor called the
“ resonance- escape probability .” This factor is always less than
unity and is a measure of the probability that any fast neutron will
reach the thermal-energy region without suffering capture. In the
slowing -down process neutrons are also captured by impurities and
by the moderator, but strictly speaking the resonance -escape proba
bility refers only to resonance capture by U238 nuclei.
To increase the resonance -escape probability, the reactor designer
uses what is called “ lumping, " that is, the fuel is lumped in slugs,
rods, or plates in the form of a lattice with the moderator material
in between . This not only increases the resonance -escape probability
but also minimizes the degree of enrichment needed in thermal
reactors. Lumping has a significant effect on the multiplication
factor, which is usually chosen to have a value of 1.05 or higher for
power reactors.
In water -moderated reactors it is necessary to maintain the ratio
of water to uranium at a definite range of values because of the
strong slowing- down power and the rather high absorption cross
section of the water. The water-uranium ratio in such reactors is
usually kept between 2.1 and 4.1 .
3-5 CONTROL OF POWER REACTORS
Although a nuclear power reactor is a heat source just as is a

boiler furnace, the control of a reactor is very different from that
of a boiler furnace. In the case of the boiler furnace, the power
level is controlled by regulating both the fuel feed and the com
bustion air. The nuclear reactor, on the other hand, as explained
previously, has in it all the fuel that it may need over a period of
months or even years, and the rate of consumption of this fuel is a
direct function of the neutron flux in the core of the reactor. So , the
control of the reactor involves the regulation of the neutron flux.
This is accomplished by the introduction of neutron absorbers into
the core ; these absorb neutrons that otherwise would cause fission,
and in this way the chain reaction is kept from going out of control.
This is explained in somewhat greater detail as follows:
When all the fuel elements have been loaded into the core of a
reactor, one by one, the combined assembly eventually reaches what
is called a “ critical mass” ; it has a multiplication factor equal to,
or greater than, 1. If the multiplication factor is greater than 1 ,

the number of neutrons will increase with each generation. Thus,
a few neutrons can initiate a rapidly growing chain of fissions. The
chain is prevented from going out of control by the insertion into
the system of neutron absorbers, usually in the form of rods of
material having high neutron -capture properties. A reactor using
this type of control is shown in Fig. 3.8. Actually, when fuel ele
ments are loaded into a reactor core , the neutron -absorbing control
rods are placed in first. Then, when a critical assembly is attained ,
the absorbing rods are removed gradually to bring the reactor up
to the desired power level .
The use of neutron -absorbing control rods is one of several ways
of controlling a reactor. In the case of a heterogeneous reactor
using a liquid ( water, heavy water, or perhaps an organic material)
as moderator, control can be effected by lowering or raising the level
of the moderator in the core. When the moderator level is lowered ,
because of the decrease in volume of the moderator in the core, the
number of fast neutrons that escape from the reactor is increased ;
hence the reactivity is decreased. In another system, a liquid neu
tron absorber such as boric acid is introduced into the coolant flowing
through the reactor core. Figure 3.9 is a diagram of a liquid
Control Drives
REACTOR
BB
CORE
Control Rods
REACTOR
CORE
Pump
Valve
Coolant
Water Tank
FIG . 3.8 - Diagram of a hetero .

geneous reactor in which re .
activity is controlled by the Fig . 3.9— Heterogeneous reactor con
movement of neutron -absorbing trolled by adjustment of the liquid
rods . level of the moderator.
moderated reactor in which control is effected by a variation of the

liquid level.
3-5.1 Delayed Neutrons
Since the fission of uranium is virtually an instantaneous proc

ess , one may justifiably wonder how it is possible, by means
of mechanically operated control rods or variations in liquid level,
to keep a power reactor under control. It is reasonable to assume
that the neutron density and energy output would increase with
such extreme rapidity that no mechanical control, eren if automatic,
could be sufficiently rapid.
It would have been extremely difficult, if not impossible, to con
trol reactors by mechanical means if it were not for the fact that
the neutrons released in the process of fission are not all released
simultaneously.
. Figure 3.3 shows two fast neutrons being emitted
as a result of a fission reaction . Over 99 percent of the neutrons
released in fission are released instantaneously . These are called
" prompt neutrons.” However, in addition , about 0.75 percent of
the total number of neutrons released in the slow -neutron fission of
uranium are delayed neutrons. The production of these delayed
neutrons continues for some time after the nuclear fission process.
The production of delayed neutrons is the result of the successive
decay of various radioactive products of the fission of the [ * 235
nuclei. These fission products have half lives of from about 0.1 to
55 sec ; thus the delayed neutrons can be detected for several min
utes, the intensity falling off gradually. It is these delayed neutrons
that make it possible to control nuclear reactors since they give the
mechanical control devices time to operate.
The delayed neutrons are emitted with considerably less energy
than the prompt neutrons. For this reason , in a practical reactor,
the delayed neutrons are less likely to leak from the reactor than are
the fission neutrons. Thus, greater importance can be assigned to
the delayed neutrons than to the fission neutrons in reactor control.
3-5.2 Types of Reactor Controls
Practical types of reactor controls fall into three categories :

( 1 ) The coarse rods or ( shim rods) for start-up and shutdown of
the reactor. These rods are usually arranged in groups called
" shim banks. " ( 2 ) Next, there are the fine (or regulating rods
for maintaining a steady operating level. These are usually faster
moving individual rods that are not capable of damping the re
action as much as the shim rods. These rods should be limited in
damping power to an amount smaller than that necessary to take
the reactor from prompt critical to critical . * ( 3 ) Finally , there are

rods whose principal purpose is to shut down a reactor quickly.
>
These are called " safety rods" or " scram rods.” They are provided
largely to shut down the reactor rapidly in case of an emergency.
Frequently the same rods are used for coarse control and for safety
purposes.. These rods are held up by electromagnets ; they can
be dropped quickly by switching off the magnetizing current.
The design of the safety rods is predicated on the principle that
an ever-ready safety -rod bank should always possess more damping
power than any rod or rod combination in the reactor which can
be moved at a given time. Control rods may be converted to
function as safety rods, depending upon their position in the
reactor and on the life of the reactor fuel . For example, a shim
rod bank could be completely withdrawn from the reactor as gradual
depletion of the fuel took place. This shim -rod bank could then
be converted to function as a safety bank. In the earliest reactors
control rods were moved by hand, but electric motors and hydraulic
mechanisms are now invariably used . Such power-actuated rods
are always protected so that they will move into the reactor core in
the event of a power failure. As already mentioned the control
rods are often held up by electromagnets, which would automatically
release the rods in the event of failure of the electric power supply.
In some reactors, particularly where the control rods are arranged
horizontally, the control-rod mechanisms include fly wheels that have
at all times stored in them sufficient inertial energy to drive the
rods into the reactor even after the electric power supply is shut
off. For some purposes the motion of the control rods is under the
guidance of a human operator; for others it is accomplished
automatically.
3-5.3 Start -up and Low- power Operation
A reactor that is shut down may be considered to have negative

reactivity or a multiplication factor less than 1. The absolute value
of the reactivity at shutdown is a function of the fuel loading, neu
tron absorption and reflection , and environmental conditions such as
temperature. When a reactor is started, this state of reactivity
must be changed. This is accomplished, generally, by some form of
mechanical motion in , or in the immediate vicinity of, the reactor.
Neutron -absorbing rods may be withdrawn ; fuel may be added ;
the amount of, or density of, the moderator may be changed ; or the
* Prompt critical describes the condition in which a reactor is capable of sustaining
a chain reaction without the aid of delayed neutrons . If a reactor is supercritical on
prompt neutrons, the reaction rate will rise rapidly because the time required for the
average neutron cycle is extremely short. A reactor in this condition is extremely diffi
cult to control .
position of, or amount of, reflector may be altered. In power reac

tors now in use, neutron -absorbing rods are most often used to con
trol reactivity .
One might wonder where the first neutrons come from in the
start-up of a reactor. The answer to this question is that there are
always some neutrons present in the atmosphere owing largely to
cosmic radiation from outer space. For this reason it is impossible
to prevent a chain reaction in a critical or supercritical mass of
fissionable material except by introducing neutron -absorbing mate
rials into the mass. A nuclear reactor will start itself as soon as
the control rods are removed.
It is usual practice, however, to provide аa built- in neutron source
in the reactor. The basic problem in starting up a reactor is to get
the initial neutron count level up high enough so that the detecting
instruments (neutron counters, ionization chambers, etc. ) can measure
this level with good accuracy. The initial neutrons are obtained
from artificial radioactive sources strategically inserted into the
reactor. These sources emit neutrons either by gamma-neutron or
alpha -neutron reactions. The alpha - neutron sources such as radium
beryllium consist of an intimate mixture of radium and beryllium
compressed into a small pellet . Such sources yield approximately
1 million neutrons per second .
The absolute strength of the neutron source need not be known.
All that is needed in the start-up of a reactor is the number of
neutron counts per second or the value of the current produced in
the neutron -detecting instruments. The neutron source and the
detecting elements should be so arranged that the number of counts
is a direct indication of the multiplication in the reactor . Conse
quently, the positioning of the neutron source or sources in the
reactor should be carried out with great care . Sources in the geo
metrical center of the reactor core generally give best results, pro
vided the detecting instruments are properly placed. The stronger
the neutron source, the more counts per second will be indicated by
the detecting instruments. Neutron sources are usually rated in
curies.
( a ) Initial Start-up. The procedure involved in starting up a
new reactor, i.e. , one that has never been brought up to power, is
somewhat different from that in starting up reactors after they
have been in operation and then shut down. Initial start -ups are
made with very slow rates of changes in reactivity ; the control
rods are removed very slowly and carefully. Neutron -sensitive ion
chambers are used to measure the very weak neutron flux at the
beginning of the operation. These ion chambers are very sensitive
instruments capable of detecting individual neutrons (also other
kinds of radiation such as gamma rays and alpha and beta particles ) .
613489 0-628
Usually they are located in the reactor shield , as far from the core
as is consistent with their sensitivity so that local flux variations
are minimized. The average flux at the ion chamber is then pro
portional to the average neutron density in the core. The average
neutron density is almost a direct measure of the reactor power.
In an initial start -up the object is to bring the reactor up to
criticality but not to go beyond this point to an appreciable power
level. Usually the counting instruments are provided with adjust
ments so that the sensitivity can be changed as the counting rate
goes up. At first very sensitive scales are used ; then , as the counting
rate increases and the instrument pointers tend to go off scale , adjust
ments are made to bring the instruments to a less - sensitive condition .
This adjustment may be necessary several times. As the multipli
cation factor approaches 1 , the counting rate approaches infinity.
At this point considerable care must be exercised to keep the reactor
from becoming prompt critical.
( b ) Normal Start-up. A reactor that has been operated at
power level and then shut down is in a different condition than a
reactor that has never been operated because of the accumulation
of radioactive fission products in the core . These fission products
emit radiation even after the reactor has been shut down, and this
radiation affects the instruments. Most of this radiation is gamma
radiation , but the gamma rays are strong enough to create neutrons
by gamma -neutron reactions. The number of neutrons so produced
depends upon the quantity of material involved , the gamma -ray
intensity , and the elapsed time after shutdown .
In addition , there is the effect from the delayed neutrons. The
longest lived of these delayed -neutron emitters has a half life of
about 55 sec ; so the effect disappears in a short time. Usually,
after about 20 min no neutrons are produced from this source.
Another factor that influences the condition of a reactor that has
been shut down after operation at power level is the temperature
of the system . The temperature of the coolant and moderator has
an effect on the multiplication factor. For example, water is less
dense at high temperatures than it is at low temperatures, and this
decrease in density has a negative effect on the multiplication factor,
i.e., it has a negative temperature coefficient . Thus, if the tempera
ture coefficient ( the effect of temperature on the reactivity of the
reactor) is negative, the reactivity will be reduced, and the detect
ing instruments will count fewer neutrons.
3-6 XENON POISONING
A factor that significantly affects the operation of thermal reactors

is fission-product poisoning. As the fission products accumulate in
the fuel, they absorb neutrons and thus leave fewer neutrons avail
able for fission. Although there are many different kinds of fission
products, the two that give most serious trouble are xenon - 135
( Xe135 ) and samarium - 149 (Sm149 ). Of these xenon is the stronger
absorber of neutrons.
At reactor start -up no xenon is present. As the reactor continues
operation, however, xenon is formed as a result of fission and builds
up to a level at which it absorbs so many neutrons that the multi
plication factor is reduced to a value less than 1 . If a sufficient
amount of excess reactivity has not been built into the reactor to
compensate for this decrease, the reactor will tend to shut down.
Allowance therefore has to be made for this accumulation of xenon
in the design of the reactor core.
The very fact, however, that Xe135 is such a strong absorber of
neutrons indicates that it will be continually burned out ( its effect
as a neutron absorber neutralized ) by the neutron flux . Thus, an
equilibrium level of xenon concentration is reached where the for
mation of xenon and its absorption are balanced .
Xenon -135, however, is formed by the radioactive decay of iodine
135 ( 1135 ) in which an electron ( beta particle) is emitted :
1135 *Xe135
B ( 6.7 hr )
This means that 1135 has a half life of 6.7 hr and that by throwing
off a beta particle it changes into Xe135. The Xe135 itself decays into
cesium - 135 ( Ce185 ) , also by emitting a beta particle. In this case the
>
half life is 9.2 hr. Thus,

Xe135 Cs135
B ( 9.2 hr )
Because of these spontaneous nuclear reactions, xenon continues

to build up from the 1135 after shutdown and reaches a peak about
11 hr after shutdown . The value of this peak of xenon concentration
is a function of the steady power level of the reactor and its par
ticular design . If a reactor is loaded with insufficient fuel, it may
be impossible to override this peak xenon concentration during the
start- up of the system. In cases where not enough excess reactivity
is built into the reactor, if the reactor is not started up again
quickly after shutdown, it will be impossible to restart it until the
Xe 35 decays into Cs135. This may require as long as 24 hr.
3-7 REACTOR OPERATION
Once a reactor has been started up and brought to its desired

power level , it is maintained at that level, or any other level re
quired by changing load conditions, through manipulation of the
control rods. Even under steady-state operation over a long period
of time, the fuel tends to become depleted , and this will require the
removal of some of the neutron -absorbing control elements to keep
the multiplication factor equal to 1.
Usually, a reactor is brought up to power level by manual control,
but, once power level is reached, automatic control is introduced .
Various types of control systems are used , but, since the details of
such systems are quite complex and of interest largely to designers,
they will not be considered here. Two general types of control are
in use, a proportional type regulating system and a discontinuous
type regulating system . A proportional system is one in which the
position of the control elements is changed in proportion to, and
in phase opposition to, any error created either by a power -demand
change or by an internal system transient. A discontinuous regulat
ing system is one in which no control is exercised unless an actual
change takes place in the control loop itself. The proportional sys
tem is more accurate , but the discontinuous system is less sensitive
to minor variation of neutron flux in the reactor core.
3–8 STRUCTURAL MATERIALS
The choice of materials for use in the construction of nuclear

power reactors depends on the size and type of the reactor, the
purpose, the operating temperatures and pressures, and the location
with respect to inhabited areas. Thermal reactors have to be con
structed of materials having low neutron -absorbing characteristics.
This restricts the number of possible structural materials consider
ably. In the case of fast reactors, neutron absorption is less impor
tant, and there is a greater variety of materials from which to
choose. The economic design of reactors that are to operate at
high temperatures greatly narrows the range of materials that can
be used. Aluminum , for example, which has good neutron charac
teristics and is very satisfactory at low temperatures, is quite useless
at high temperatures because of its low melting point. Stainless
steel , on the other hand, which has excellent characteristics for
operation at high temperatures and pressures, has high neutron
absorbing characteristics, and this limits its use in thermal reactors.
Among the factors to be considered in choosing reactor materials
are the mechanical properties such as tensile strength, hardness, and
ductility ; chemical properties such as corrosion resistance and
chemical reactivity with the coolant, moderator, or fuel ; thermal
properties such as melting point, specfic heat, thermal conductivity,
thermal coefficient of expansion, and solid-state phase transitions;
nuclear properties such as neutron absorption, scattering cross sec
tion ; radiation damage, which is the effect on the mechanical prop
erties of the materials of exposure to radiation ; and, finally, the

important matter of cost.
Because nuclear reactors are sources of dangerous radiation , they
have to be shielded to protect the personnel in charge of operation
and maintenance under normal operating conditions. In addition,
since there is the possibility in the event of an accident that radio
active fission products might be released to the atmosphere, re
actors have to be provided with containment enclosures that will
confine the radioactive material in case of such accidents. The shield
ing and containment of nuclear power reactors constitutes a difficult
problem in reactor design , and it adds considerably to the over-all
cost of nuclear power plants. For land-based nuclear power plants,
concrete provides an excellent shielding material, and its weight
and thickness are not particularly important; but for mobile power
plants, as on shipboard, size and weight limitations restrict the use
of concrete as a shielding material.
✓ 3-9 TYPES OF POWER REACTORS
Basically, all nuclear power reactors are similar, consisting of a

core containing nuclear fuel ; usually a moderator, but not always
since fast reactors can be built without a moderator ; a cooling or
heat- transfer system, a control system , and shielding. Practically,
however, it is possible to design an almost endless number of dif
ferent type reactors using various combinations of fuel, fertile
material, coolant, moderator, and method of control. Several years
ago Alvin Weinberg, Director of Oak Ridge National Laboratory,
made a table of the various elements involved in the design of
reactors, something like the one shown below, listing fuel, fertile
material, moderator, coolant, neutron energy, and geometry. Under
each heading the number of different combinations are listed as
follows : four for fuel , five for moderator, two for fertile material,
etc. Multiplying all together, the result is : 4 X 2 X 5 X 5
X 3 X 2 ---
1,200.
Fuel Fertile Moderator Coolant Neutron energy Geometry

material
Nat . U ... Thorium ... H20 . Gas . Fast Heterogeneous.

U 25 Uranium . Ꭰ 20 . HO Intermediate . Homogeneous .
U233 Beryllium . D20 . Thermal
Puma Beo Liquid metal...
Nothing Hydrocarbons .
Thus, there are at least 1,200 combinations from which to choose .

It should not be surprising, therefore, that the problem of reactor
design has been confusing to many who are not familiar with the
basic principles of reactor operation.
Various countries are geared to certain designs because of scarcity
of construction materials and fuels. For example, most European
countries have based their designs on the use of natural uranium
because of a lack of enriched uranium ; however, this is beginning
to change as facilities for producing enriched materials are pro
vided. Different environmental situations also affect reactor de
sign and the use of nuclear energy .
England, because of the critical fossil -fuel situation that has
existed there for a number of years, has had to act quickly in pro
viding nuclear power and at the present time is engaged in an
ambitious program of nuclear power plant construction . In Eng
land the urgency of the situation made it necessary to use the sim
plest and most reliable type of reactor available at the time the
program was started, and so the British have developed the gas
cooled graphite-moderated natural-uranium reactor to a high de
gree of usefulness and efficiency .
In the United States, on the other hand, conventional fuels are
still relatively plentiful and cheap, and it is less urgent to develop
nuclear power. Consequently, it has been the policy of the AEC
to try to develop various reactor concepts so that, when the time
comes when nuclear power is actually needed, there will be a num
ber of tested designs from which to choose. Russia, for the same
reason, is developing many different types of power reactors.
3-9.1 Water- cooled Reactors )
Of the various possible types of power reactors, the two that

have been developed for practical use in power systems are the
water -cooled water -moderated reactors and the gas-cooled graphite
moderated reactors. Experimental plants using sodium cooling
and organic moderators have also been operated.
Water-cooled reactors can be divided into two general types : ( 1 )
pressurized -water reactors and ( 2 ) boiling-water reactors.
Usually water -cooled reactors are also water moderated, although
it is possible to have water-cooled reactors with other types of mod
erators, for example, water -cooled graphite -moderated reactors. The
latter, however, have not been used in this country as power reac
tors; they are used as plutonium -production reactors ( as at Han
ford , Wash .) where the operating temperatures are relatively low.
Water has a number of desirable properties both as a coolant and
as a moderator. It has good heat-transfer properties, its neutron
characteristics are good, it provides some lubrication, and it is
stable up to the temperature limits set by other reactor materials.
Control
OO 0,0 Console STEAM
GENERATOR
Biological Shield
Electric
TURBINE , Generator
Pressure
Vessel
Neutron Flux
Condenser
Sensing
Instruments Hot Well
REACTOR
CORE
Condensate
Coolant Pump Pump
Fig. 3.10 — Pressurized -water reactor power system .
Its one major disadvantage is its low boiling point, it boils at

212 ° F at atmospheric pressure. This means that to keep the water
in a reactor cooling system from boiling, the entire heat -transfer
loop must be kept under pressure. Thus, the pressurized -water re
actor was developed.
In the early days of reactor design, it was thought that boiling
in the core of a reactor would lead to serious instability in its per
formance, and it was for this reason that the first water-cooled
reactors to be developed were pressurized reactors. There were
some investigators, however, who felt that boiling in a reactor
could be tolerated , and this led to the BORAX experiments ( Sec.
3–2.4 ). As a result of the BORAX work, the first boiling -water
nuclear power reactor was built at the Argonne National Labora
tory. This reactor, known as the Experimental Boiling Water Re
actor ( EBWR ) , became critical on Dec. 1 , 1956.
( a ) Pressurized -water Reactors. In pressurized -water systems
there are two ways in which the vapor pressure of the water can
be contained . One method is to submerge the entire core in water
contained in a pressure vessel, as shown in Fig. 3.10 . This pres
sure vessel must be large enough to contain the entire core, and
sealed openings must be provided for the control mechanisms. The
pressure vessel must be designed to withstand the full pressure of
the system , and, since this is in excess of 1,500 psi , such pressure
vessels require heavy walls ; consequently, they are expensive.
The second method of containing the high -pressure coolant is to
confine the pressure to tubes in which the fuel elements are installed .
In this case only the coolant flows through the tubes, the moderator
being contained in the shell of a comparatively light tank sur
rounding the tubes. The principle of this type of pressure-tube
reactor is shown in Fig. 3.11 . The disadvantage of the pressure- tube
reactor is that the tubes must be capable of withstanding an intense
neutron flux, and, since they are located in the core , neutron ab
Coolant
Tube Closure
Inert Gas
Shielding
Pressure Tubes
Reflector
Containing
Coolant
Core Control Rod
Moderator
Moderator Control-Rod
Drive
U
Fig. 3.11-Principle of the pressure-tube type reactor.
sorption must be minimized by the use of materials such as alumi

num . Thus far, no large reactors using the pressure -tube system
have been built , but at least one nuclear power project using a
pressure -tube reactor is in the course of development.
The pressurized-water reactor, using water under pressures up
to 2,000 psi , has received much attention in the United States. The
fuel elements are in the form of rods or plates of enriched uranium
or uranium dioxide encased in a corrosion - resistant zirconium alloy
or stainless steel . The temperature at the surface of the fuel ele
ments may be as high as 600° F ; the internal temperature may be
higher. The pressurized water is circulated through the reactor core
from which it removes heat and then through an external heat ex
changer (which is actually a boiler ) where steam is produced in a
secondary system . The water in the primary loop is circulated by
means of centrifugal pumps, usually of the canned rotor type, in
which the rotor of the driving motor is completely sealed in a metal
casing and operated in the liquid being pumped.
The system is provided with a pressurizer to maintain the pres
sure within the closed primary system between very narrow limits
under varying conditions of load . The pressurizer is a closed ves
sel , partially filled with water, connected directly to the reactor
pressure vessel and provided with immersion type electric heaters.
At times when the pressure in the system tends to decrease, the
heat supplied by these heaters evaporates sufficient water to com
pensate for all normal fluctuations.
One advantage of the pressurized -water reactor is its compact
ness, especially when highly enriched fuel is used. This is im
portant in mobile plants, as, for example, in submarine vessels
where space is at a premium . With water as a moderator and

with highly enriched fuel, it is possible to construct a core of small
size having a high power output. For use where space is not so
important, as for land -based power plants or large surface vessels,
a fuel of low enrichment in a pressurized -water reactor has certain
advantages over the highly enriched fuel. First, the fuel cost is
lower ; second, the system permits partial regeneration of fissionable
material by conversion of the U238 into plutonium ; and , third, the
larger size of the core results in more effective conditions for heat
removal.
The size of a pressurized- water reactor is dictated primarily by
the heat requirements. For a unit generating up to 750 Mw of heat
energy, a 6 - ft -diameter core in an 8 -ft -diameter pressure vessel is
needed. The wall thickness of the vessel , using carbon steel , will
be about 812 in . Such carbon -steel pressure vessels are usually lined
with a thin layer of stainless steel to reduce corrosion .
One disadvantage of water- cooled reactors when uranium metal
is used as fuel is corrosion in case the cladding surrounding the fuel
is ruptured or destroyed. Recent developments in the technology of
uranium dioxide fuel for such reactors has eliminated much of the
corrosion difficulty, and nearly all the pressurized (and also boiling )
reactors being built at the present time are designed for the use of
oxide fuel.
The technology of pressurized - water reactors is well developed,
and , in addition to the Shippingport reactor , which has been in op
eration for several years, several other large pressurized units have
been constructed, notably, the Indian Point Station of Consoli
dated Edison Company of New York and the station of the Yankee
Electric Company at Rowe, Mass. It was because there had been
considerable experience with both the design and operation of the
pressurized system that it was selected as the type of reactor to
power the first nuclear merchant ship, the Savannah .
( b ) Boiling -water Reactors. As the name implies, boiling water
reactors are those in which the water in the reactor itself is turned
into steam by the heat developed in the core. Such boiling reactor
systems are usually classified according to the degree of intercon
nection between the reactor and the steam turbine. Those in which
the steam passes directly from the reactor into the steam turbine
are called " direct-cycle " plants. If a heat exchanger is interposed
between the reactor and the turbine so that the steam from the
reactor is condensed to generate secondary steam for the opera
tion of the turbine, the plant is said to be of the " indirect -cycle"
type. Various combinations of these two basic types can be used,
with part or all the reactor steam going directly to the turbine and
with additional steam being generated in heat exchangers. Such

combinations are referred to as " dual- cycle ” systems. Each of these
basic types may operate with either natural circulation or forced
circulation . The fraction of the reactor heat utilized in producing
steam may also vary over a wide range, depending upon the cool
ant temperature and flow rate.
Boiling -water reactors that produce superheated steam have been
proposed, and such superheated steam has already been produced in
experiments; but no reactor of this type has been built. An in
tegral superheater type boiling -water reactor, however, is being
designed for the nuclear power plant of Northern States Power
Company being constructed near Bismarck , N. Dak .
Most of the work on boiling reactors in the United States has
been on heterogeneous types, but work on homogeneous boiling
reactors has been done at Oak Ridge National Laboratory and also
in Russia. Russian authors presented a paper at the 1955 Geneva
Conference on the Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy which indicated
their interest in homogeneous boiling reactors with thorium fuel
and a heavy -water moderator.?
There is considerable interest in heterogeneous boiling reactors
using heavy water, and various conceptual designs of boiling -heavy
water reactors have been proposed. The Experimental Boiling
Water Reactor ( EBWR) at Argonne National Laboratory, although
operating with light water at present, is designed for future con
version to heavy water.
Direct-cycle Boiling -water Reactors. As shown in Fig. 3.12, the
direct-cycle boiling -reactor system consists simply of a reactor in
which the steam is generated , a steam turbine with condenser, and
a feed -water pump. In an actual system , there would be auxiliary
apparatus such as water -treating equipment, waste-cleanup equip
ment, and control devices common to other types of water-cooled
reactors Since the steam is generated directly in the reactor, an
external steam generator ( heat exchanger) is not required. As a
Electric
TURBINE Generator
Steam
Condenser
BOILING Hot Well
REACTOR
Water
Reactor Feed
Pump
FIG. 3.12 — Simplified diagram of a direct -cycle boiling reactor.

Steam , 500 psi TURBINE Hot Water , 2000 psi Steam , 500 psi
135 MW TURBINE
27 % Eff. 135 MW
27 % Eff .
REACTOR REACTOR
500 MW Heat 500 MW Heat BOILER
Condenser
Boiling Water. Condenser
500 psi No Boiling.
Fuel Element Fuel Element
Temp. 500 ° F Temp., 600 ° F
5000 gal/ min

5,000 gol/min 100,000 gal/min
Pumping Power, Pumping Power,
1 % of Turbine Output 5% of Turbine Output
(a) (b)
FIG. 3.13 — Comparison of direct boiling cycle ( a ) with a cycle using a pres
surized -water coolant and heat exchanger ( b ) ; both systems supply the
same turbine.
result , either the same temperature can be attained with a lower

average fuel temperature, or a higher steam temperature can be
attained for a specified fuel temperature. Because no excess pres
sure is required to prevent boiling of the water in the reactor, the
pressure vessel can be designed for a lower pressure. In a pres
surized -water system , for example, with the water in the pressure
vessel (and the entire primary loop ) at 2,000 psi, the pressure of
the saturated steam leaving the heat exchangers is only around 600
psi. In a boiling water reactor, the same operating steam pressure
can be achieved with a reactor - vessel pressure of only slightly over
600 psi.
In the direct -cycle boiling reactor only the reactor feed pumps
are necessary , and, since the size of the units is considerably smaller
than the coolant circulating pumps in pressurized -water systems or
in boiling cycles using forced circulation, the pumping requirements
of natural-circulation boiling reactors are comparatively small .
Since the steam produced in the reactor is used directly, many of
the usual thermal barriers within heat exchangers and reactors are
eliminated . Consequently higher efficiencies should be possible for
the same fuel temperature, and tolerable efficiencies should be ob
tained with reduced temperatures and pressures. This is shown in
Fig. 3.13.
Since the steam generated in the boiling reactor is passed directly
to standard power- generating machinery, condensed , and recycled to
the reactor vessel, it is obvious that the carry -over of radioactivity
constitutes an important problem , not only with respect to safety of
personnel during operation but also with regard to maintenance
The reactor water contains dissolved and suspended impurities,

together with water dissociation products, which are activated by
the neutron flux in the reactor. Thus, the steam leaving the boiling
interface carries droplets of water and volatile substances that are
highly radioactive. The problem is to reduce this radioactive carry
over to the minimum possible value.
Fortunately the process of boiling itself provides a natural sep
arating influence. As the steam rises in the reactor free space,
entrainment is decreased as a result of settling or impingement on
the reactor walls and internal components. As shown by the opera
tion of EBWR, the amount of radioactivity in the steam within a
few inches above the boiling water level is some 10,000 times less
than that in the water itself. In the boiling water system , the great
bulk of radioactivity is concentrated within the shielded reactor
tank.
As far as the water itself is concerned , that is, pure water , the
only significant radioactivity induced in it is that due to the forma
tion of N16 This has a half life of only 7 sec (decaying to ( 16 with
the emission of a beta particle and gamma radiation ) ; so the actual
radioactivity encountered in the coolant of a boiling water reactor
is not serious. However, if the highest possible purity of the water
in the system is to be maintained, part of the reactor water must be
circulated through cleanup loops, where suspended and dissolved
matter can be removed . The stringent requirements in regard to
removal of radioactive material from both water and steam have
led to extensive experimental work with small -scale laboratory
apparatus and with the BORAX reactors. In general, the results
of this work have been very encouraging, and, in the actual opera
tion of EBWR and the General Electric Company boiling water
reactor plant at Vallecitos, Calif., the amount of radioactive con
tamination in the external system has been small and has produced
no maintenance problems to date. Experience in these plants has
shown that access to the turbines, piping, and other equipment is
possible shortly after reactor shutdown.
Dual-cycle Boiling -water Reactors. The amount of heat extracted
from the core of a boiling water reactor depends to some degree
upon the temperature of the incoming water. If the water is sub
cooled , more heat can be abstracted . This fact led to the dual -cycle
design shown in Fig. 3.14. In this illustration it is assumed that
the reactor generates steam at 600 psi, as shown by the steam line
leading directly from the reactor to the turbine throttle valve.
The steam passes through the turbine, is condensed, and, by means
of pumps, is returned to the bottom of the reactor. Saturated
water from the reactor flows through a flash tank or secondary
Electric
TURBINE Generator
Steam , 600 psi
BOILING
REACTOR
Steam , 350 psi Condenser
FLASH TANK
( Secondary
Steam Generator)
Flash Pump Reactor Feed Pump
Fig. 3.1 + Simplified diagram of the dual-cycle boiling reactor.
steam generator, where some of the heat energy is removed to

produce steam at 350 psi . This secondary steam is admitted to a
lower stage of the turbine. The cooled water from the secondary
steam generator is circulated back to the reactor by means of the
circulating pump. This provides the subcooled water for the re
actor when mixed with the condensate from the condenser.
The dual cycle endeavors to overcome the two main limitations
of the simple boiling cycle, i.e., low power output for a given size
and poor stability under load variations. It preserves a large
amount of natural circulation and much of the basic equipment
simplicity of the direct cycle. There is some compromise of the
thermal-efficiency gains theoretically obtainable in the simple boil
ing cycle, but this cycle maintains a thermal-efficiency advantage
over pressurized -water reactors. The major safety advantages asso
ciated with boiling are as effective in the dual-cycle reactor as in
the simple direct -cycle boiling reactor.
The first dual-cycle boiling water reactor to be constructed is the
Dresden station of the Commonwealth Edison Company near Chi
cago. This light-water -moderated forced -circulation boiling reactor
with a rating of 627 Mw ( thermal) and 180 Mw ( electrical)
reached criticality early in October 1959 and is currently in commercial
operation.
Indirect-cycle Boiling-water Reactor. The indirect-cycle boiling
water reactor evolved from the desire to reduce maintenance and
design problems by eliminating radioactive carry -over from the re
actor to the major pieces of equipment in the system such as the
turbine and the superheater, if the latter is included . This is accom
plished by the use of two distinct loops linked thermally through
a condensing -evaporating heat exchanger. The arrangement is
shown in Fig. 3.15. Steam generated in the reactor is condensed on
the primary side of the heat exchanger, giving up its heat to gen
erate steam at a lower pressure on the secondary side. The entire
secondary system may be of conventional design and may be lo
cated external to the containment shell. The indirect cycle has
TO TURBINE
825 ° F
600 psig
STEAM
MWWW
GENERATOR
1 1
450 ° F
890 psia
BOIUNG 350 ° F
REACTOR Drain
Cooler
From
Feed
Heater
4490F
Core
FIG. 3.15 — Simplified diagram of the indirect-cycle boiling reactor.
available all the potentialities for increased power output through

subcooling that are available for the dual cycle.
The heat capacity of the heat exchanger acts as a damper and
introduces a time lag that protects the reactor from sudden tran
sients and provides time for the control system to take the neces
sary corrective action . Because of this time lag, the load -response
characteristic of the indirect cycle are superior to those of the direct
cycle since the reactor has time to adjust to a load change rather
than opposing it .
The added expense of the heat exchangers and piping for two
loops instead of one is a disadvantage of the indirect cycle. In addi
tion , owing to the temperature drop required across the heat ex
changer, the thermal efficiency for a given reactor pressure is less
for the indirect cycle than for the direct cycle. Stated another way,
for a given turbine throttle pressure, the reactor pressure for the
indirect cycle must be greater than for the direct cycle.
C'omparison of Boiling-uuter Cycles. From a practical physical
standpoint, no nuclear reactor power cycle is more attractive than
the direct boiling cycle. Its simplicity both in equipment and in the
nature of the equipment gives it the lowest possible investment cost.
The absence of heat exchangers between the reactor and the steam
turbine permits higher efficiencies for the same fuel temperature
compared with other cycles.
The dual cycle has as an objective the removal of as much energy
as possible by confining the boiling to the upper part of the re
actor without exceeding the limit of reactivity for good stability.

With the dual cycle the control of the turbine is largely through
the operation of the secondary steam -admission valves, and the
pressure in the reactor is not changed materially by primary turbine
regulating -valve movement.
The attractive features of the indirect cycle lie in the fact that
there is no radioactive carry -over from the reactor into the turbine.
The load response characteristics are improved over those of the
direct cycle because of the time lag inherent in the heat exchanger.
These attractive features, however, are offset by the additional
equipment required and by perhaps a slightly lower thermal effi
ciency.
3-9.2 Gas - cooled Reactors
Gas coolants for reactors provide certain advantages over liquids

for power reactors, and, although they have not achieved practical
use in the United States, the entire nuclear power program in Eng
land is based on the use of this type reactor. In the United States
gas -cooled reactors have been in use as experimental reactors from
the very beginning; indeed , the first nuclear reactor to operate at
an appreciable power level was the air -cooled uranium - graphite re
actor at Oak Ridge in 1943. A second air -cooled reactor went into
operation in 1948 at Brookhaven National Laboratory. This unit
operates at around 30 Mw (thermal), but, since it is a research re
actor, the heat is wasted to the atmosphere. In England, where
gas-cooled reactors are used for power generation , carbon dioxide
is used as the coolant since it is relatively inert at high tempera
tures. Helium has potential applications at high temperatures and
pressures ; it is inert, has high thermal conductivity, and has a low
neutron -absorption cross section . It holds particular promise for
high -temperature applications with gas-turbine cycles, such cycles
offering high thermodynamic efficiencies. Another advantage of the
graphite-moderated gas-cooled reactor is that it can operate with
natural uranium . This was an important factor in the selection
of this type of reactor for the British nuclear power program .
However, compared with liquids, gas coolants are characterized by
low volume heat capacity and low heat-transfer coefficients. For
this reason when used in power reactors they require larger flow
passages through the reactor and higher fuel-element temperatures
for a given reactor heat output and coolant power than do liquids.
These disadvantages can be offset to some degree by the use of high
pressure gas, and considerable effort is being directed at the pres
ent time toward the development of such high -pressure gas-cooled
Electric
Steam TURBINE Generator
Hot Gas
Condenser
Hot Well
STEAM
GENERATOR
GAS COOLED
REACTOR
Condensate
Pump
Blower
Fig. 3.16 — Principle of the gas-cooled reactor system for steam generation .
reactor systems. The gas -cooled reactor system , as shown in Fig.

3.16, is quite simple, consisting of a closed primary gas loop involv
ing the reactor, the heat exchanger or steam generator, and a blower.
The hot gas transfers the heat to the water in the steam gen
erator.
Interest in gas-cooled reactors in England started with the
Calder Hall reactors , which went into operation in October 1956 .
This was the first large-scale nuclear power plant in the world . In
these reactors the carbon dioxide gas is maintained at a pressure of
100 psi . It is heated to 637 ° F by passage around the magnesium
clad ( alloy ) fuel elements, which are arranged vertically in aa matrix
of graphite. In the heat exchangers, which consist of a boiler and
superheater, steam is generated at 595 ° F , 210 psi pressure. Each
reactor (there are four at present) contains 130 tons of natural
uranium and has a heat output of about 180 Mw and an electrical
output of approximately 39 Mw. In later stations being built in
England, the Calder Hall type reactors have been much improved
upon , and the very large nuclear power stations being built using
this same general principle are much more compact.
The Calder Hall reactors contain a graphite moderator, weighing
over 1,000 tons, in a cylindrically shaped pressure vessel . The
machined graphite blocks forming the moderator have vertical
fuel channels for the natural-uranium elements, which can be loaded
or removed while the reactor is in operation. Four single -stage
centrifugal CO2 -coolant blowers circulate the gas through the pri
mary loop. These blowers are driven by 2,000 -hp motors.
At present the only gas -cooled reactors in use for power genera
tion use the steam cycle, but, as already mentioned, gas-cooled re
actor systems operating at high temperatures are attractive because
Hot Gas
GAS COOLED
REACTOR
POWER TURBINE
COMPRESSOR
Shaft TURBINE Electric
Generator
COMPRESSOR Heat Exchanger
FIG. 3.17—Recirculating type gas-cooled nuclear gas-turbine cycle.

Heat from coolant can be recovered as steam.
they make possible the use of gas turbines with consequent high
thermodynamic efficiency. Extensive studies of such nuclear gas
turbine systems have been made, particularly with regard to the
possible application to the propulsion of commercial ships. The
principle of the closed-cycle gas-turbine is shown in Fig. 3.17. Com
pressed gas is heated in the reactor, and this gas drives both the
compressor turbine and the power turbine. The exhaust is cooled in
a heat exchanger and then delivered to the compressor inlet.
Heat from the coolant can be recovered as steam . Actual' gas
turbine cycles proposed for power use are somewhat more compli
cated, but the principle remains essentially the same.
Graphite as a moderator in a nuclear reactor for use with a gas
turbine has excellent high -temperature strength , has a large heat
capacity, suffers little or no radiation damage at high temperature,
and may be used unclad if helium is used as the coolant. As a
homogeneous core material, graphite gives the additional advantage
of ruggedness, excellent heat-transport efficiency, and the ability
to withstand very high temperatures .
Because of the extensive experience the British have had with
gas-cooled graphite -moderated reactors, the existing technology of
this type reactor is well developed, although it is realized that the
low temperatures at which the present reactors operate limit the
thermodynamic efficiency of the systems. Preliminary design studies
of high -temperature high -pressure helium - cooled reactors, however,
indicate that much higher efficiencies can be attained, and it is quite
possible that the gas-cooled reactor will reach a high degree of
acceptance both for land -based nuclear plants and for nuclear ship
applications.
613489 0–62 -9
ORGANIC
COOLED
Electric
AND Steam TURBINE Generator
MODERATED
REACTOR Organic
Liquid
Condenser
STEAM
Hot Well
GENERATOR
Core
Condensate
Coolant Pump
Pump
FIG. 3.18 — Organic - cooled and -moderated reactor.
3-9.3 Organic- moderated Reactors j

‫مه‬The organic -moderated and -cooled reactor is aa simple arrangement
consisting of a heterogeneous reactor in which the fuel elements are
surrounded by a high -boiling- point hydrocarbon liquid that serves
both as the moderator and the coolant. This hot liquid is the work
ing medium and is pumped through separate heat-exchange equip
ment to generate steam for power purposes ( Fig. 3.18 ) .
A number of inherent advantages characterize this type plant from
both an economic and safety standpoint. The organic coolant con
tains considerable hydrogen , which has excellent moderating prop
erties and results in compact core sizes, hence lower costs for struc
tural material and low shielding weight. The organic-moderated
reactor also has a high negative temperature coefficient , which acts
as an automatic stabilizer and affords complete xenon override ; that
is, this type of reactor may be started up any time after it has been
shut down. These advantages of the high negative temperature
coefficient, however, are offset by the fact that it increases the con
trol problem .
The particular advantage of organic -moderated reactors lies in the
fact that temperatures up to around 700 ° F can be attained at low
pressures.. In a specific design study in which the coolant outlet
temperature was 622° F , the reactor operating pressure was 35 psi.
This low operating pressure reduces sealing and gasket problems and
allows the use of thin walls on tanks and piping. This is of signifi
cant advantage on shipboard since it reduces equipment weights. As
a result of the low operating pressure, the reactor coolant contains
a minimum amount of stored energy. A ruptured pipe will not
cause extensive damage nor release appreciable quantities of radio
activity to the atmosphere.
There are no chemical reactions between the organic coolant, fuel
cladding, fuel, or structural materials. Ordinary materials such as

aluminum and carbon steels can be used throughout. The organic
coolant becomes only moderately radioactive during operation ; hence
after reactor shutdown there is access to the reactor compartment
for a limited time. Experimental results from the operation of an
" in -pile ” test loop at the Materials Testing Reactor (MTR ) in Idaho
indicate that 15 min after reactor shutdown personnel may enter the
reactor compartment and remain for 20 min without exceeding the
weekly allowable radiation dose . Two days after shutdown, a main
tenance man may work in the compartment for several hours.
Among the various organic compounds that have been considered
for use in the organic -moderated reactors, those that appear to offer
considerable promise are diphenyl and terphenyl [ Sec. 3–3.2 (e ) ].
An experimental facility to test the chemical and thermal behavior
of a number of organic coolants under actual reactor conditions has
been constructed at the National Reactor Testing Station in Idaho.
Called the Organic Moderated Reactor Experiment (OMRE ), it is
designed to produce 16,000 kw of heat.
Physically, the organic -moderated reactor resembles the pressur
ized- water system, but the reactor pressure vessel , the piping, and
the shielding are much lighter. Physical control of the reactor also
is similar ; it is accomplished by two means : ( 1 ) by a change in
moderator temperature and ( 2 ) by movement of the neutron -absorb
ing control rods. As the temperature of the reactor increases for
any reason, the density of the moderator decreases. Hence, the
neutrons travel a greater distance while slowing down in velocity;
consequently more of them escape from the core without producing
fission . This tends to decrease the fission rate and also the reactor
temperature.
The core design and fuel- element design of organic-moderated
reactors are similar to those of water - cooled reactors. Fuel may be
uranium or uranium dioxide, slightly or fully enriched . In the case
of the OMRE at the National Reactor Testing Station , the fuel is
in the form of fully enriched uranium dioxide stainless- steel plates
20 mils thick and 2.5 in . wide, with 5 mils of stainless -steel cladding
on each side .
Although no organic -moderated reactor power plants have been
built, two electric utility companies are planning to build this type
plant. The AEC is building and will soon place in operation for the
City of Piqua, Ohio, an 11,400 -kw (electrical) unit, and an identical
unit has been selected for installation in Latin America. An extensive
study program was also undertaken to investigate the feasibility of
organic-moderated reactor systems for the propulsion of merchant
vessels.
3-9.4 Other Types of Nuclear Reactors
( a ) Graphite-moderated Sodium -cooled Reactor. Among the other

types of nuclear reactors to whieh considerable experimental effort
has been directed in the United States is the graphite -moderated
sodium -cooled reactor. As indicated in Sec. 3–3.2 ( c ) , the high boil
ing poini of sodium , coupled with its good heat-transfer character
istics, makes it a desirable coolant. The Sodium Reactor Experi
ment ( SRE ) in California, with a heat power level of 20 Mw,
represents the first stage in the development of this type reactor.
The use of liquid sodium as a coolant permits a high coolant tem
perature out of the reactor at moderate pressures of only about 100
psi. Since sodium becomes highly radioactive in a reactor, an in
termediate heat exchanger is incorporated into the system between
the reactor and the steam generator. In such a system , shown in
Fig. 3.19, the sodium in the primary loop gives up its heat to an
other liquid metal, sodium -potassium ( Nak ), in the intermediate
heat exchanger. The NaK carries the heat at high temperature to a
NaK -to -water heat exchanger, which is the steam generator. This
steam generator may be of the once-through type where the feed
water enters at one end and leaves as superheated steam at the other
end . Each coolant loop has its own circulating pump. The prin
cipal advantage of NaK is its low melting point ( it is molten at
room temperature whereas sodium melts at 97 ° C ), which may elimi
nate the need for preheating the system before initial charging and
during reactor shutdown.
( b ) Aqueous Homogeneous Reactors. The aqueous homogeneous
reactor has already been mentioned briefly in Sec. 3.3 ( see Fig. 3.7 ).
In all heterogeneous reactors it is necessary to remove the spent fuel
elements and replace them with new ones. The spent elements,
since they still contain valuable fissionable and fertile materials.
must be put through a complex series of chemical processes for the
PRIMARY SYSTEM INTERMEDIATE STEAM SYSTEM
SYSTEM
Electric
Sodium - Potassium TURBINE
Generator
( NOK )
REACTOR
STEAM Condenser
Sodium
GENERATOR Hot Well
(Na)
Condensate
Pump Pump
Pump
Intermediate
Heat Exchanger
Fig. 3.19 - Sodium -graphite reactor.

recovery of these materials, and, since this has to be done by re

mote handling, it is a costly procedure. The primary aim of the
homoengeous reactor concept is to eliminate the need for the re
processing of solid fuel elements. In such systems an aqueous so
lution of uranyl sulfate is the fuel. The water acts as the modera
tor as well as the fuel-carrying coolant medium .. The reactor vessel
is merely an enlargement in the primary loop. Heat is generated
by fission in the solution under pressure, and the solution is circu
lated through an external heat exchanger where steam is produced.
Such a system permits the continuous withdrawal of a small frac
tion of the solution during operation for reprocessing of the fuel
and removal of the waste fission products. No fuel-element fabri
cation is involved, and, if a practical homogeneous reactor can be
achieved, its construction and operating cost could be low . The
disadavntage of the system is that the entire system , including the
heat exchanger, contains highly radioactive materials, and this makes
maintenance extremely difficult. For maintenance on such systems,
it may be necessary to provide for the remote handling of all equip
ment, including piping, fittings, and valves .
(c ) Liquid -metal Fuel Systems. Liquid -metal fuel reactors
( LMFR ) also have been under consideration for a number of years,
and , although considerable experimental work has been done in the
investigation of the characteristics of liquid -metal fuels, no LMFR
has ever been built. Liquid -metal loops ( containing uranium ) have
been operated, but no critical assembly has been constructed . It is
contemplated that such liquid -metal fuel systems would use a dilute
solution of highly enriched uranium metal in molten bismuth. This
permits operation at high temperatures without pressurization ; this
is not practical with the aqueous system . In principle the LMER
system is similar to the aqueous homogeneous system except for the
use of the liquid -metal fuel. There is an essential difference, how
ever, in that a stationary graphite moderator is necessary. The
thermal-neutron capture cross section of bismuth is quite small, but,
since its mass is high, it does not slow down neutrons to any extent;
so a graphite moderator would be used if such a reactor is ever
built. The LMFR system is attractive because of its promise of
high -temperature operation at low pressures, but the difficulties in
volved in the practical development are great. Thus far, no reactor
of this type has been started ; a project to build one was recently
dropped.
REFERENCES
1. JAMES CHADWICK , The Existence of a Neutron , Proc. Roy. Soc. London ,

A136 : 692 ( 1932 ) .
2. J. C. FEINBERG , The Atom Story, 1st ed. , pp. 130–141, Philosophical Li

brary , Inc., New York, 1953.
3. HENRY D. SMYTH , Atomic Energy for Military Purposes, Princeton Uni
versity Press, 1945.
4. ANDREW W. KRAMER , Boiling Water Reactors, 1st ed ., pp. 45–141, Addison
Wesley Publishing Company, Inc., Reading, Mass., 1958.
5. ANDREW W. KRAMER, Basic Facts About Industrial Power Reactors, Power
Eng., 57 : II -IV ( June 1953 ) .
6. SAMUEL GLASSTONE, Sourcebook on Atomic Energy, 2nd ed ., D. Van Nostrand
Company, Inc., Princeton, N.J. , 1958.
17. A. I. ALICHANOW , W. K. ZAVOISKY, R. L. SERDUK, B. W. ERSHIER, and L. J.
SUVOROW , A Boiling Homogeneous Nuclear Reactor for Power, Proc. Intern .
Conf. Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy, Geneva , 1955, 3 : 169 ( 1956 ) .
Chapter 4
THE N.S. SAVANNAH
On May 22, 1819 , a 320-ton wooden ship with all sails set on her
three masts and belching smoke from a strange -looking funnel
amidship began an epoch-making voyage from the port of Savan
nah, Ga. , to Liverpool, England. She was the S.S. Savannah, the
first vessel to use the power of steam on an Atlantic crossing. The
29 -day 11 -hr voyage was successful even though the little craft
could carry only enough coal and wood to permit about 89 hr of
steaming spread over a period of at least 7 days. Capt . Moses
Rogers, skipper of the vessel, stopped briefly at Kinsale, Ireland,
to replenish his fuel supply so that he could steam up the Mersey
River to Liverpool under power.
The vessel's approach to the Old World was quite dramatic . Old
records state that, when the station at Cape Clear had sighted her
with smoke belching from her stack, they concluded she was afire,
and the British revenue cutter Kite, which was lying in the Cove
of Cork , was sent to her relief by the admiral of the fleet. The
surprise of the Britishers can be imagined when the Savannah, with
out a sail set, outdistanced them completely. It was not until after
the exasperated crew of the cutter had fired shots over the American
vessel that she stopped and gratified their curiosity.
Thus, the Savannah ushered in the Steam Age of ocean travel.
The little ship was of fairly conventional design and was about 100
ft long. She was built at the Crockett and Fickett shipyard at
Corlear's Hook , New York, and was launched there on Aug. 22, 1818.
Originally designed as a sailing packet for the New York -Le Havre
trade, she was purchased by Scarborough Isaacs ( a wealthy ship
ping firm in Savannah, Ga. ) and was fitted with a steam engine.
The latter innovation, a venture considered by many to be nothing
less than foolishness, was prompted by Capt . Moses Rogers, who
had been associated with Robert Fulton and Robert L. Stevens in
commanding several of the early river steamboats. The engine was
a one -cylinder 90-hp inclined engine built by Stephen Vail, with
boilers by Daniel Dod. Propulsion was by means of paddle wheels
that could be collapsed and taken inboard . Her stack was tall with
a canted top, designed to keep sparks from the sails. She was a
grotesque craft, known in her day as the “ steam coffin," a monu
125
mental first in transportation history yet a colossal failure commer

cially.
Registration papers for the Savannah state that the vessel had
" one deck and three masts, length 98 ft 6 in ., breadth 25 ft 10 in .,
depth 14 ft 2 in . ” When finally outfitted and ready for her now
famous crossing, the 320 -ton S.S. Savannah represented a total in
vestment of $ 50,000, almost twice as much as that of a conventional
ship in those days.
The power plant that was to make history aboard the S.S. Savan
nah would be inadequate for a medium -size automobile by today's
standards. It consisted of a single direct -acting low -pressure 90 -hp
engine, having a cylinder diameter of 40 in . and a stroke of 5 ft .
The paddle wheels consisted of eight radial arms; these were held
in place by a flange and were arranged to fold like a fan . They
were equipped with a series of joints to facilitate their removal
from the shaft in bad weather. In addition to the engine, the vessel
carried the usual complement of sails and masts, with the exception
of the royals ( Fig. 4.1 ) .
The experiment of crossing the ocean under steam was consid
ered so hazardous that Capt. Rogers found it necessary to recruit
SAVA
Fig. 4.1 — Sketch of the S.S. Savannah.

THE N.S. SAVANNAH 127
the crew in his home town , New London, Conn . It was freely pre
dicted that the Savannah would be a steam coflin , and only the
reputation of her officers induced men to ship aboard the craft.
On Saturday, May 22, 1819, now celebrated throughout the United
States as Maritime Day, Master Rogers recorded in his logbook the
first departure of a transoceanic steamer : “ At 7 a.m. got steam up,
winded ship, and hove up the anchor, and at 9 a.m. started with
steam from Savannah . ” Feeling satisfied with the engine's per
formance on the way down from New York, Capt. Rogers was will
ing to risk ridicule by starting the engine in full view of watching
throngs.
The Savannah proceeded slowly to Tybee Light, where she re
mained several days. At 6 a.m. on May 25 , the pilot was dropped ,
and, propelled by both steam and sails, the Savannah put to sea .
In 2 hr, according to the log, the wheels were " unshipped.” Captain
Rogers was determined to reach Liverpool without damage to the
machinery and was therefore careful to use the paddles only during
calm weather. Rogers' peculiar performance of taking the wheels
in in rough weather, through fear of having them washed away, was
unique; no other vessel is known to have been constructed to permit
such an operation .
On June 17, at noon , the Savannah was boarded off the coast of
Ireland by the crew of the King's cutter Kite, who, seeing the smoke
belching from the Savannah's stack, thought the vessel was on fire.
The London Times, on June 30 , 1819, reported the event as follows:
" The Savannah , a steam vessel - first of the kind ever to cross the
Atlantic - was chased a whole day off the Irish coast by the Kite,
which mistook her for a ship on fire." The Kite was finally com
pelled to drop a shot over the Savannah's bow to stop the smoking
vessel .
Captain Rogers, having saved some fuel for a triumphant entry
into the River Mersey , " shipped the wheels, furled the sails, and
came to anchor off Liverpool with the small bower anchor " on June
20 , at 5 p.m. She was out of Savannah 29 days 11 hr, during which
time the engine had been run a total of 80 hır. For fuel she had
had 75 tons of coal and 25 cords of wood .
After a round of meetings and celebrations in England , Capt.
Rogers took the vessel to Sweden and then to Russia in the hope of
selling it , but he was unsuccessful and finally sailed home. Her
owners were dissatisfied with the cost of operating the slip ; so tlie
engine was taken out , the paddle wheels were removed , and the ship
was put in the coastal cotton trade. She plodded along until Nov. 5,
1821 , when she ran aground on Fire Island off the coast of New
York, a total loss.
This brief account of a significant event in maritime history pro

vides the background for another important event in maritime de
velopment, the construction of another Savannah, to usher in the
Atomic Age. When President Eisenhower signed the bill author
izing the construction of the first nuclear- powered merchant ship in
the latter part of 1956, he bowed to the request of shipping men
from all over the United States and named her the N.S. Savannah .
It was fitting and proper that he should do this because the new
ship, which bears the designation " N.S.," is another first, a first as
important as the one that opened up a new era 141 years ago.
4-1 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE N.S. SAVANNAH
Interest in the construction of an atomic-powered merchant ship

began around 1952, when it became clear that there would be no
serious technical difficulties in the construction of such a ship . At
that time several technical and economic studies were initiated, and
preliminary reactor plant designs were prepared for ships of various
63 types of commercial service and with various horsepower ranges.
It was on Apr. 25 , 1955 , that the President of the United States,
Dwight D. Eisenhower, first suggested the construction of a nuclear
poweredmerchant ship. Thefollowing is an excerpt from an ad
dress delivered by Mr. Eisenhower at the annual meeting of the
Associated Press in New York City :
" .. We have added to the United States Program for Peaceful
Uses of Atomic Energy an atomic -powered merchant ship. The
Atomic Energy Commission and the Maritime Administration
are now developing specifications. I shall shortly submit to the
Congress a request for the necessary funds, together with a de
scription of the vessel .
The new ship, powered with an atomic reactor, will not require
refueling for scores of thousands of miles of operation. Visiting
the ports of the world , it will demonstrate to people everywhere
this peacetime use of atomic energy, hamessed for the improve
ment of human living. In part, the ship will be an atomic exhibit ;
carrying to all people practical knowledge of the usefulness of
this new science in medicine, agriculture, and power production ."
>
C In November of the same year, the U.S. Maritime Administration

initiated feasibility studies of nuclear reactor power plants suitable
for installation in a 22,000 -shp tanker. On Mar. 15, 1956, the Mari
time Administration received proposals from companies in the nu
clear industry to undertake the design and construction of the nu
clear power plant for the ship .
The law ( Public Law 818 ) under which the N.S. Savannah was
built was passed by the Congress on July 30, 1956 ; it made available
approximately $42.5 million for the development and construction
of the ship . With this approval finally obtained , the project began
to move at d rapid rate. On Oct. 15 , 1956 , the Contractor Selection
Board announced their recommendation that the Babcock & Wilcox
Co., long active in the marine -equipment field , be selected as prime
contractor for the nuclear power plant. The same day , the President
released the following statement :
“ ... I have today directed the Atomic Energy Commission and
the Department of Commerce to proceed as rapidly as possible
with the design and construction of the first nuclear powered mer
chant ship, in accordance with provisions of Public Law 848. ...
The Atomic Energy Commission will furnish the reactor and
be responsible for its installation. The Maritime Administration,
Department of Commerce, will be responsible for the design and
construction of the ship .”
Attached to the President's statement was a letter signed by Chair
man Lewis L. Strauss for the Atomic Energy Commission and Sec
retary Sinclair Weeks for the Department of Commerce. This letter
announced their decision that the ship would be a combination pas
senger - cargo vessel, instead of the oil tanker originally proposed,
powered by a pressurized -water reactor. It was decided that the
entire project would be under the management of a single project
manager chosen jointly by the Maritime Administration and the
Atomic Energy Commission. The following morning, Oct. 16, 1956 ,
acting on a letter of intent, the Babcock & Wilcox design team for
the Nuclear Merchant Ship Reactor (NMSR ) Project was assem
bled in Lynchburg, Va ., where the company's Atomic Power Divi
sion is loacted . Conceptual engineering of an advanced reactor core
was started the following day, some six months in advance of the
signing of a formal contract.
Approximately six months later, on Apr. 4, 1957, George G. Sharp,
Inc., was awarded the contract to design the ship. On Apr. 8 , 1957,
a fixed -price agreement was signed , confirming the awarding of the
contract for the complete nuclear power plant to the Babcock &
Wilcox Co. Shortly thereafter, the De Laval Steam Turbine Co.
was selected to supply the propulsion equipment. As a result of
the head start that was obtained by initiating design work the
previous October, six months in advance of the actual contract,
Babcock & Wilcox was able to release some of the component de
signs and start manufacturing within one month after being awarded
the contract .
On Nov. 16, 1957, the New York Shipbuilding Corporation was

awarded the construction contract covering the building of the ship
itself.
The creation of this vessel just six years from its conception in
April 1955 ( four and one-half years from start of design ) is testi
mony to the skills brought together by the three principal contrac
tors, George G. Sharp, Inc., ship designers; Babcock & Wilcox Co.,
nuclear plant manufacturers; New York Shipbuilding Corporation,
shipbuilders; and the joint Maritime Administration - Atomic Energy
Commission group, which represented the interests of the Govern
ment.
When the N.S. Savannah puts to sea, she will be a monument on
the long road of marine development started by the little steam
powered S.S. Savannah so long ago. Compare this new vessel to
the old one in terms of fuel-carrying capacity : the old vessel could
carry fuel for only about 80 hr of steaming; the new nuclear-pow
ered ship expects to run under normal operation for at least three
years, or some 300,000 miles, on her initial fuel charge, possibly
longer.
4-2 CHARACTERISTICS OF AMERICAN MERCHANT SHIPS ?
Some slight knowledge of the physical characteristics of some of

the other vessels in the American Merchant Marine would be help
ful to a better understanding of the characteristics of the N.S.
Savannah. The Savannah is slightly larger than the class of ships
known as the " Mariners." The Mariners are cargo vessels approxi
mately 560 ft in length, 76 ft in width , and having a dead -weight
tonnage of around 13,000 tons.
By comparison, the Savannah is 595 ft in length , 78 ft in width ,
and has a dead -weight tonnage of 9,990 tons. The Mariner's service
speed is 20 knots, compared with the Savannah's 2014 knots.
In addition to having names such as Mariner, Victory, and Lib
erty, the various classes of ships in the American Merchant Marine
have code numbers, and individual ships are named for various
categories of things. Some are named for birds, fish , or animals;
others are named for national parks, historic settlements, forts,
trails, etc.The Liberty ships built during World War II were
named for deceased persons who had made notable contributions to
the history and culture of America and for merchant seamen who
had lost their lives in service.
A list of the code numbers for the several categories of vessels is
given in Appendix A. In accordance with the code that has been
established, C1 cargo vessels are named for capes . C2 vessels are
named for famous clipper ships. (3 ships are named for birds,
fish , and animals in combination with the prefix " sea” such as S.S.
Sea Otter. C4 vessels are also named for birds, fish , and animals
except that the prefix “ marine ” is used , for example, S.S. Marine
Flasher. T1 ( coastal) tankers are named for oil fields in the United
States, and T2 tankers are named for American national parks and
historic settlements.
The present classification of vessel designs was adopted in 1914 .
It uses a combination of letters and numerals in groups to identify
the vessel types. The details of this system of classification, to
gether with tables showing vessel characteristics with respect to code
numbers, are given in Appendix A.
4–3 PURPOSE OF THE N.S. SAVANNAH
From the inception of the program , it has been acknowledged that

the Savannah will not compete economically with the operation of
conventionally powered ships. It was realized that a passenger
cargo ship with a nuclear power plant could not approach the eco
nomics of a tanker or bulk carrier such as an ore ship. However,
the Savannah can serve on a number of trade routes and services.
A single- purpose ship such as an oil tanker would , in general, be
restricted to one trade route and a limited number of ports or har
bors. The Savannah will enter aa number of ports and serve a variety
of duties which will further the acceptance of nuclear ships in all
maritime nations of the world . Therefore, one mission of the Saran
nah is to ensure acceptance of nuclear ships in the harbors of the
world . The second reason for building the Savannah is so that she
can serve as a prototype for nuclear -powered plants for merchant
ships. Although Navy experience has proven that nuclear plants
can be installed in ships, merchant ships are designed and built with
components considerably different from those used by the Navy.
A merchant ship is not exposed to the hazards of combat and does
not require the excess rating required by naval vessels. This does
not means that merchant-ship components are any less safe than
naval components, but only that the requirements of design criteria
are different. One might compare the Savannah to a truck as one
would compare a naval nuclear submarine to a fine racing car.
Therefore, the Savannah will be used as a test facility for the devel
opment of nuclear marine components with specific application to
merchant ships. A third mission of the Savannah is the training
of merchant -marine personnel and the development of satisfactory
operating procedures for the merchant marine. During the first
several years of the Savannah's life , it is expected that trainees will
be on board at all times. This will provide a pool of trained oper

ators for subsequent nuclear merchant ships.
In summary, the basic purpose of building the Savannah is to
obtain experience in the operation of nuclear merchant ships which
will hopefully result in greater productivity and a better competitive
position for the American Merchant Marine. Nuclear power alone
cannot achieve this goal, but it is an integral part of the over-all
program which , it is anticipated , will provide American ship oper
ators with the technology and economic incentive to remain leaders
in the world's merchant marine.
44 GENERAL DESIGN AND CONSTRUCTION
444.1 Construction Schedule
Following the formal signing of the contracts with the ship de

signers, the shipbuilders, and the manufacturers, events moved
rapidly.
The keel was laid at noon on May 22, 1958, at a ceremony high
lighting a nation -wide observance of National Maritime Day.
The sponsor was Mrs. Richard Nixon, the wife of the Vice -Presi
dent of the United States. Using a radioactive wand, symbolizing
the Atomic Age, Mrs. Nixon, assisted by Edward L. Teale, President
of New York Shipbuilding Corporation, directed placement of the
first steel section for the new vessel. When the wand was brought
close to a Geiger counter, it set up a series of clicks ; these clicks
were amplified and used as a signal to an overhead-crane operator
to lift the first 60 -ton keel section into place.
From that time on, construction proceeded at an extremely rapid
rate. The major portion of the hull was in place by the beginning
of February 1959, and the containment vessel for the reactor and
associated equipment was installed at the end of that month. The
reactor pressure vessel was delivered to the shipyard in February 1959,
and it was placed in position in the containment vessel aboard the ship
in May. The main propulsion machinery (the turbines, condenser,
and reduction gear) was installed in early July, before the ship was
launched on July 21 , 1959. At the time of the launching, the hull was
complete, including the superstructure. The ship was essentially com
plete by the summer of 1961 .
The nuclear fuel loading of the Savannah reactor was completed on
Nov. 29, 1961. Following criticality, the reactor will be put through
zero- and low -power tests and will be brought up to 10 percent of power
at Camden , where the ship was built. After inspection of these pre
liminary operations and review by the AEC's regulatory staff, the
Savannah will be moved to Yorktown, Va ., for full-power operation

and for initial sea trials in the spring of 1962.
An interesting feature associated with the construction of the
ship was the construction of a full - scale mock -up of the reactor
system containment vessel and the equipment that it contains. This
mock -up , which is made of steel , wood, and plastic , was erected in
one of the shops at the New York Shipbuilding Corporation in
Camden , N.J. It served two primary purposes : first, it was used
in the determination of proper clearances between the various com
ponents and piping surrounding the reactor, and, second, it served
as a model to acquaint the prospective crew members of the
Savannah with the relative location of the equipment in the con
tainment vessel while they were undergoing training. The time,
money, and effort that went into the design and construction of
this mock -up proved well worth while because in some instances
clearances within the containment vessel are extremely close and
the preliminary determinations of these clearances by means of the
mock -up no doubt saved costly changes in the installation of the
actual equipment in the ship.
3
144.2 General Features :
The Savannah is a single-screw passenger-cargo ship having an
over-all length of 595 ft. She has a beam of 78 ft , and her design
draft is 29 ft 6 in. Total displacement at this draft is approximately
22,000 tons. Her cruising speed is 21 -knots, developed with a
normal output of 20,000 shp. She is essentially a sheltered -deck
vessel of advanced design and will carry 60 passengers and a crew
of 109. The Savannah has a slightly higher center of gravity than
a conventional ship with full tanks. The general arrangement of
the ship is shown in Figs. 4.2 and 4.3.
There are three complete decks ( A , B, and C ) , with cargo plat
forms at various levels below and a deep tank near the bow. A
promenade deck extends over the A deck for about one - third of the
ship’s length from a point slightly forward of midship. Above
this is a shorter boat deck and navigating-bridge deck. The ship
has an inner bottom ( as required by regulation ), providing tanks
that will be used for clean ballast when required, diesel oil ( for
the emergency power plant ) , and distilled water. The ship is
divided into eleven transverse watertight compartments by bulk
heads. The hull is built on a transverse framing system , except
the inner bottom , which is a combination of transverse and longi
tudinal framing especially stiffened in the region of the reactor
space. The inner bottom extends throughout the length of the ship ,
terminating at the peak space in the stern and the deep tank just
aft of the forward peak space.*
密 134
NUCLEAR
PROFILE
OUTBOARD
ELEV
MACHY
PATTERY SPARE 10 T
PARTS O
LOOM TON N
N
CARGO SS
FT
I CI
-Gº
33
HOUSE
OF
TOP * F1
SO .
NO
-ICADING EMERGENCY NS
O !
N PASSAGE PILOT
1*.*
/
I9O PURSES GINOON HOUSE "
77-0
DK
BROGI
NAV 5 TO
1
10 TON 15 H.
WORK OFICE
OFFERS FAN
6 11
ROOM 0123.23
LOUNG
5/
QUARTERS "
DICK
BOAT
SWIMMING 194
OK
PONENADE
POOL VERANDA LOUNGE
MAIN
UNS TONN 'DICE
*A
KOSPITAL SUNS
LOBBY
MAIL AREA
SICAS "#DICK
STEERING
GEAR
ROOM
DINING GALLEY
MAIN
"C
DECK
GENERAL
CARGO PAS
POR
.7
NO
ROLD TANK
..
NO
HOLD HOLD
.5NO CONTROL SPACE
REACTOR .4
NO
KOLD HOLD
NO
. .7
NO
MOLD NO.1
HOLD KALLASTI
CENTER "DDICK
WATER SPACE
MACHINERY
----
ALLEY
SRAFT
RICES ALLEY
SHAPT TANK !
NO
TAN
DEEP TOP
TANK
.7SW
NO
OR
BALL .SW
NO
OB
PALLAST .3SW
NO
DB
OL
JOULU
15
BALLAST MOILLA 15
SWBALLAST
NO
04
WALL
FEID 1/3
MALLAST
.SW
&OCH
...
D
VODA
WACH
REACTOR
(POS
KALLAST
)SW
PROFILE
INBOARD
PROPULSION FOR MERCHANT SHIPS
SWITALLY
profiles
4.2
FIG
O
-
inboard
utboard
.and
Savannah
N.S.
the
of
>
SAIL
PASSINOM
ROOMS ROOMS
STATE
PASSENOE
.NOLD
NO wich
UNED
( moat MAIN CACIO
.
NO
MOLD )
MAICN LOWY CASING MEA
MEDICAL SACE ROOM
FAN .
NO
MOLD .3
NO
MOLD .?
NO
HOLD .
NO
MOLD
TANK 10.
- *
15
STATIROOMS
PASSENGER OFFICE
3/5 $
STATLOOMS
PASSINGUR
DECK
A
613489 0-62-10
GOVT
MRSONNGI &LOUNGE
M35
C
I
OFFICERS
FOR
AN
TLAINES
STEERING
GEAR
CARGO
GENERAL CARGO
GENERAL ROOM
DINING
[ GALLIY
MAIN WAAI
REACTOR GENERAL
CARGO CARGO
GENEAL CMIGO
GENIAL CAGO
GENERAL
DEPARTMENT
ENGINE STWOS DEPARTMENT
DICK DECK
I
THE N.S. SAVANNAH
ELECTRONIC
SMOO
WORK
CARGO
GENIAL GENERAL
CARGO CARGO
GENIAL
MACHINERY
CASING SPACE
---
REACTOR CARGO
OENEN CMCO
GENERAL CARGO
GENERAL GENIAL
CARGO
CARPINTER
CDECK
STEWARDS
QUARTES
AS QUARTERS
STEWAROS
MACHINERY STORES LOADING PASSAGE

4.3
Fig
.-D
plans
eck
135
With her modern sweeping lines, the Savannah presents a most

attractive profile. Her teardrop -shaped superstructure is set suffi
ciently aft to enhance the vessel's foresection, which tapers to its
well -raked bow . The forward deck contains the hatch openings
for the four forward cargo holds. Just forward of the wheelhouse
and aft of No. 4 cargo hold is located another hatch, providing
access to the reactor space .
Aft , the superstructure steps down to a generous expanse of
deck at the promenade- and A-deck levels. The after-deck section
contains the hatch openings for Nos. 6 and 7 cargo holds.
The uppermost deck, referred to as the “ navigating -bridge deck , "
serves a dual purpose. The forward end of this deck is given over
to the pilot house with the radio room on the starboard side and
the chartroom on the port side outboard of that area which houses
the gyro compass. The balance of the navigating -bridge deck is
given over to berthing space for three radio operators and two
cadets, as well as to providing space for the fan rooms, a battery
room , and the emergency -generator room.
The pilot house and navigation bridge are equipped with the
most advanced type of navigation and communication equipment
available. These facilities were designed with the objective of
providing maximum visibility through the widest possible angle .
The design allows almost 180- deg vision , which is equal to, or
greater than, that of any other passenger -cargo ship. Dominating
the area is the wheelhouse console, housing all normal wheelhouse
instrumentation and located well forward on the center line of the
ship. Installed on either side of the steering stand are the latest
type navigational radar sets operating on different frequencies.
Another important unit in the wheelhouse is the control console for
the hydraulically operated anti-roll stabilizers.5
The boat deck, the next uppermost deck, is devoted entirely to
officer's accommodations. A spacious officers' lounge is located on
the after end of the deck, affording observation on either side of
the ship as well as aft and overlooking the passenger recreation
area .
The promenade deck is given over to public rooms. The full
deck width forward has a " walk -around ," which features a series
of 30 -in .-high windows, permitting an unobstructed, yet sheltered,
view of the sea. Forward on the promenade deck is the main
lounge, which can be closed off from the adjacent writing room
and card room by folding screens. The main lounge is equipped
with projection equipment for motion pictures as well as for closed
circuit -television viewing of the reactor spaces, enablng the opera
tion of equipment inside the containment vessel to be observed
with safety. The after end of the promenade deck contains the
veranda and cocktail bar, modern in decor, which , through glass
doors, opens onto the swimming pool. The remaining deck space
on this level will be utilized as a shipboard game area . A special
observation gallery is provided to enable the passengers to view
the propulsion machinery and the main control room . Here, pas
sengers can observe the control-room operation and the turbo
machinery while the ship is under way.
Within the hull structure, A -deck level is assigned to the main
lobby, passengers' staterooms, and accommodations for the purser,
steward , doctor, and nurse . The ship's hospital and dispensary are
also located on this level , as is the health -physics laboratory where
the radiation exposure of passengers and crew is kept under con
stant surveillance. In keeping with the modern design of the ship's
propulsion system , a modern decor is carried out in all the passenger
staterooms and public areas through the use of materials that are
functional as well as decorative. All the public areas on the ship,
the passengers' staterooms, and the pasengers' dining room , which
is located on the B deck, are entirely air conditioned.
4_4.3 Hull and Weight Characteristics
It is of interest to compare the hull and weight characteristics of

the Sarannah with those of a similar but conventionally powered ship.
Such a comparison is given in Table 4.1 . The Savannah is slightly
larger than the Mariner, C4 - S - 1a type, which has an over-all length
of 560 ft ( see Table A.1 , Appendix A ) . The Savannah's over-all
length is 595 ft. The Mariners are 20-knot vessels whose speed and
large cargo capacity make them particularly adaptable to carrying a
great variety of dry cargoes. The slightly greater beam of the
Savannah as compared to the Mariner class results from the stability
requirements for the passenger - cargo ship. The light weights of
the two ships, as indicated, are nearly equal, excluding the reactor,
containment vessel with supports, and shielding. The total weight
of these items is nearly equal to the weight of the fuel oil at the
beginning of a voyage for a conventional ship . Dead weights* are
not compared in Table 4.1 because such a comparison would have to
consider the cruising range. For a range of 13,000 miles, the
nuclear- ship cargo weight is almost 600 tons ( 6.6 percent) more
than that of the conventional ship. For a 10,500-mile radius, the
cargo dead weights are equal in the departing condition .
* The total weight of a ship at any draft is equal to the displacement at that draft.
Dead weight is carrying power only, over and above the actual weight of the ship and
her equipment, and comprises cargo and bunker oil or coal . The dead weight of a ship
floating at a particular draft is the difference between the displacement at that draft
and the displacement in the light condition .
Table 4.1 - CHARACTERISTICS OF NUCLEAR AND CONVENTIONAL

SHIPS
Conventional ship Nuclear- powered ship
Dimensions:
Over - all length (approx.) . 595 ft 6 in . 595 ft .
Length between perpendiculars . 545 ft 0 in .. 545 ft 0 in .
Beam . 78 ft 0 in . 78 ft 0 in .
Depth to A deck . 50 ft 0 in . 50 ft 0 in .
Depth to B deck . 41 ft 0 in . 41 ft 0 in .
Design draft 29 ft 6 in .. 29 ft 6 in .
Weights:
Steel , * tons.. 5, 845 5 , 845
Outfit , t tons . 2 , 125 2 , 190
Machinery, tons. 1,070 1 , 020
Reactor system, shielding and sup
ports, tons 2 , 595
Light ship ( incl. margin ), tons . 9 , 040 11 , 650

Displacement and capacities :
Light ship , tons 9 , 040 11 , 650
Cargo , tons .. 8, 845 9 , 340
Stores (full) , tons. 150 150
Passengers and crew , tons .. 45 45
Tanks and swimming pool , tons . 3 , 330 565
Full-load displacement, tons . 21 , 410 21 , 840

Speed and power :
Design sea speed , knots . 20.25 . 20.25 .
Emergency (take-home) speed , knots .. 6.
Normal shaft horsepower and pro
peller speed ( rpm ) - 20,000 ; 106.7 .-- 20,000 ; 106.7 .
Max. continuous shp and propeller
speed (rpm ) ---- 22,000 ; 110 . 22,000 ; 110 .
Number of propellers .. 1 ... 1.
Normal cruising radius , miles 13,000 350,000.
* Steel weights of both ships, exclusive of reactor supports, are essentially equal .
tOutfit for both ships is essentially same, except for difference in fuel piping and generators.
Structurally, the Savannah differs from the normal passenger

cargo ship only in that the reactor and containment foundations
are comparatively much heavier than the foundations required for
normal ship's machinery. The heavy longitudinal members are
carried well beyond the reactor- and machinery -space transverse
bulkheads to tie with a smooth transition into the hold double
bottom structure. Hence, the ship would not be penalized in situa
tions ( such as grounding on a ledge ) in which discontinuities would
prejudice longitudinal strength.
The stability of the Savannah is essentially the same as that of a
conventional ship of the same class and size As compared to the
THE X.S. SAVANNAH 139
nuclear ship in which the weight of the reactor, containment, and

shielding replace an equivalent weight of oil ( but at a higher
center ), the conventional ship has a lower center of gravity when
its tanks are full. At some point in its route, the conventional
ship would have to start taking on ballast to compensate for the
fuel oil consumed . The weight of the fuel- oil and salt- water bal
last needed to meet stability requirements probably would be less
than the weight of the reactor, containment, and shielding owing
to the lower center of the tanks.
The type of shielding selected for a nuclear ship has a significant
effect on the weight and stability of the vessel . In selecting the
shielding for the Savannah, preliminary studies indicated a range
in weight of 3 to 1 for various materials. This was narrowed down
on the basis of stability, cost , and space to essentially two arrange
ments, which differed in weight by over 400 tons, the heavier one
having a center 2.8 ft higher. The net effect of this difference on
the stability of the loaded ship is negligible.
44.4 Basic Arrangement /

In a passenger - cargo ship, it is normal practice to locate the
superstructure and passenger accommodations over the machinery
spaces and the stores hold so that the cargo holds may be left free
for overhead cargo gear. The nuclear-powered ship, however, as
already indicated, includes one blind hold, served only by side ports
and elevators, which resulted from the space requirements for ma
chinery and considerations of refueling. The total length of the
machinery compartment is greater for the nuclear ship owing to
the length of the containment vessel housing the reactor, steam
generators, and associated equipment. The containment vessel con
stitutes a major difference between the nuclear ship and a conven
tional ship. As explained in Chap. 3 , because of the possible re
lease of radioactivity, it is necessary to enclose the entire reactor
system in a gastight steel containment vessel , which, in the case of
the Savannah, is 35 ft in diameter and 50 ft 6 in. long, lying fore
and aft in the reactor compartment. Figure 4.4 shows the inboard
profiles of both the nuclear ship and a conventional vessel . It will
be noted that the conventional ship has a machinery -space length
of 70 ft ; whereas the nuclear ship has a machinery -space length
of 55 ft and a reactor compartment length of 60 ft . However ,
stores spaces are provided outboard of the containment vessel in
the reactor compartment; whereas in the conventional ship a sep
arate hold is provided for this purpose. Comparing the length of
machinery spae plus storage space, there is little difference be
tween the two types of ships.
.BRIDGE
,NAV
DK
.BOAT
DK
140
PROM
DK
.
POOL "ADECK "A
DECK
D
"B ECK
D"
C" ECK
HOLD
NO
.5 CONTAIN
HOLD
NO
H
.67 OLD HOLD
.
1NO
VESSEL
M
( ENT
SPACE
MACH'Y D"
D" ECK
TUNNEL
SHAFT HOLD
NO
.4 NO
3.HOLD .2
NO
HOLD
TANK
EP
DE TOP
TANK
50
'-0"32 "55
'-0 '-0"|
50 "
'-0
55 60-0
'-0"
55 '1 0
5-0 125
"0-'
'-0"
55 "55
' 0
-
PA,.
SHIP
NUCLEAR
NAV
BRIDGE
DK
BOAT
DK
PROM
DK
POOL D
"A ECK
D"
A" ECK
B"D
"ECK
&
||STORES "C
D
" ECK
HOLD
SERVICE
SPACES
.NO
7 HOLD
NO
.
6 HOLD
NO
.5 NO
1.HOLD
MACH'Y
SPACE STABI D
"D" ECK
SHAFT STORESI HOLD
NO
.4 HOLD
.NO
3 HOLD
.2NO
TUNNEL LIZER
DEEP
TANK
.. TOP
TANK
32
|0"'- '-0"1
50 '-0"
55 '-
"050 "
'-0
70 !"-0'54|5 '
'-0
"55 '-
"055 '-0"
50 !"0-128
A.P.
NUCLEAR PROPULSION FOR MERCHANT SHIPS
CONVENTIONALLY
POWERED
SHIP
Comparative
inFig
--
.4.4
inboard
aof
and
theuclear
onventional
Ncnprofiles
ote
that
nuclear
superstructur
ship
been
has e
moved
toaft
overhead
give
access
reactor
wcompartment
is,the
hich
approximatel
amidship
.placed y
THE X.S. SAL'ANNAH 141
Weights of the order of 50 tons must be handled in the refueling

of a reactor of the type installed on the Savannah. An overhead
access system therefore was selected . It was desirable to keep this
access as low in height as possible because of the heavy weights that
hare to be lifted ; therefore, the superstructure was not placed over
the reactor access opening. Instead it was placed aft of the reactor
hatch , extending over a cargo hold aft .
Because of its large size and weight, it was necessary to place
the containment vessel forward of the engine space ; it was too
large to mount above the propeller shafting without protruding
through the main deck, and stability considerations did not permit
placing this heavy equipment so high up in the hull.
The midship location of the reactor and machinery was selected
as a result of considerable study. For the Savannah the nuclear
reactor system , together with its shielding, is roughly equivalent in
weight to conventional machinery plus fuel. Therefore, since a
variable movable weight ( fuel) is being replaced by a constant
fixed weight, it was desirable to so locate the machinery that the
ship in the fully loaded condition would have essentially an even
keel trim and in the empty condition would trim by the stern .
General Arrangement of Power-plant Machinery ✓

The propulsion system of the Savannah differs from that of a
coventional ship primarily in that the source of heat for generating
steam for the propulsion turbines is a nuclear reactor instead of an
oil- fired boiler furnace. The propulsion machinery is essentially
the same as that on a conventional ship ; it consists of a two-element
steam turbine driving a single propeller through mechanical reduc
tion gears. Steam is supplied by two main steam generators, which
are heated by the cooling water of a single nuclear reactor .
The auxiliary electric power and steam requirements are pro
vided by two geared steam - turbine generator units and one low
pressure steam generator, both supplied with steam from the main
steam generators. The stand -by electric and steam requirements are
furnished by two diesel- powered electric generators and one oil
fired boiler. Emergency electric power is furnished by a diesel
powered emergency generator located on the navigating -bridge
deck. Emergency propulsion power is furnished by a 750 -hp elec
tric motor, which is coupled to one of the high -speed pinions in the
reduction gear. A quick -connect coupling permits engagement of
this motor in less than 2 min .
A simplified diagram of the Savannah propulsion system is
shown in Fig. 4.5. This diagram shows the nuclear reactor and the
main steam generator with the primary -loop circulating pump at
142
PRESSURIZER
STEAM
GENERATOR
HP
SEPARATOR
REACTOR
LP 2 URBOGENERATORS
T
1
CIR
.P UMP
1 DEAERATOR COND
AUX
MAIN
COND
CONTAINMENT
STAGE
Ist P
. UMP
C OND
AUX
OH HEATER
W.
F.
COND
MAIN
FEED
MAIN AIR
MAIN
HEATER
P.
H. PUMP
PUMP EJECTOR
SERVICES
SHIPS
AUX
HEATING STEAM
P.
L.
AIR
.
GEN
GALLEY EJECT
LAUNDRY
ETC.
DRAIN
STEAM
P.
L.
TANK .F EED
PUMP
GEN
—S4.FIG
N.S.
the .5
implified
diagram
of
Savannah
nuclear
propulsion
.system
the left . The reactor is the source of heat. The heat developed
in the core of the reactor by virtue of nuclear fission is removed
by water being pumped through the primary system and is trans
ferred to the steam generator. Since the reactor, the steam genera
tor, circulating pumps, and connected piping are all radioactive,
all the equipment in the primary loop is enclosed in the gastight
containment vessel as indeated. In this simplified diagram ( Fig.
1.5 ) only one primary loop is shown ; actually, there are two
steam generators and two circulating pumps.
The secondary steam generated in the steam generators is piped
to the main propulsion turbine, to the two auxiliary turbogenera
tors , and also to the low -pressure steam generator supplying low
pressure steam to ship's services. Since the secondary steam is not
radioactive, the piping and equipment carrying this steam need
not be shielded ; hence, it is all installed outside the containment
vessel . From both the main and auxiliary condenser, the conden
sate is pumped back to the main steam generators just as it is in a
conventional marine power plant, that is, it is heated to a tem
perature close to that existing in the steam generator by means of
several feed-water heaters.
The arrangement of the machinery in the engine room is shown
in Fig. 1.6.) The geared steam -turbine propulsion unit and the usual
auxiliaries for this type of plant are shown as well as the ship's
service equipment : refrigeration units, air -conditioning machinery,
salt -water distilling plants, etc. The physical size of the propulsion
units and the steam auxiliaries in the feed and condensate system
are somewhat larger than would be found in a conventional steam
plant of the same power because of the low -pressure and low
temperature steam produced in present pressurized -water reactors.
Figure 4,7 shows the location of the central control room . This
control room is an innovation in a marine power plant, although
it is quite common in land -based power-plant practice. In this
room are centered all the controls for the entire power plant, for
the reactor as well as the steam - generating system and the pro
pulsion machinery. The room is enclosed in glass so that the opera
tors have a clear view of the propulsion machinery ; the room is
air conditioned . V
4_4.6 Safety ✓
Studies conducted by The Babcock & Wilcox Co. conclude that
the Sarannah has been designed to meet the highest standards of
safety, both in the conventional sense and in light of the additional
potential hazards of a nuclear propulsion plant. In general, the
ship was designed to meet the following safety requirements:
1. The ship shall be as safe, or safer than, any other vessel of its
class with regard to the usual " hazards of the sea ."
2. In no credible accident shall there be any hazardous release
of radioactivity to the environment.
The accidents to which a ship is normally exposed include col
lision, grounding, sinking, flooding, storm damage, fire, and explo
PRIMING PUMPS
AND TANK BILGE INJECTION
ION EXCHANGERS
MAIN CIRC PUMP SEWAGE
FEED MAKEUP TANK
PUMPS AUX,
QUF. W.
L. O. QU PUMPS
COND
B. & B. AUX. COND.

POID MAIN CIRC. WATER
AUX . CIRC. PUMPS INLET SCOOP
COOLER WATER P. PUMPS .
L. 0.
AUX .
COND
D ER COND. DIST.
DISCH. O CIRC.
STRAIN . ATMOS. DR. TK. PUMPS
L. O. SERV.
PUMPS
MAIN
M. G. SET 'CONDENSER 1ST STAGE
FEED HTR.
(EMERGENCY MOISTURE
SEPARATOR
MAIN CONDE
POWER ) PUMPS .
RED GEAR 28 126
1481 1246 144 138 134 730 -3RD
SHAFT TURBINE
STAGE
ALLEY [FEED
M. G. SET CROSSOVER THRUST HTR
BEARING ,
(EMERGENCY POWER )
D.O.
PURIFIER
ge
SUBM . BILGE
PUMP
OUTLET
SCOOP
D
DIESEL INTER .
L.O. COOLING I
TANK W. SYS.
1001
Cou MAIN FEED PUMPS PUMPS 41
DIESEL ENG. (EMER, POWER )

FIRE
Ho PUMPS
PORT FEED PUMP INTERMEDIATE HEAT

EXCHANGER
-Plan of the engine room floor ( lower level ) .

MAIN
CIRC ,
PUMP
STORAGE BATTERIES AUX . DIST.
Iepi
!
o AIR PLANT.
EJECT .
SWITCHBOARD
TURBO GENERATORS
AUX .
AIR
opmp3 EJECT .
DIST.
MAIN
PLANT
DN
TURBINE
CROSSOVER MAIN AIR
EJECTOR
REDUCTION
GEAR HOT WATER
HEATER
CONTROL
REACTOR
L. P.
TURBINE
CONSOLE
CONTROL
CENTER
C. L. SHIP
14 UP 136 134 132 130 DN 128 126
148 144 142 140PM 138
MAIN 3RD STAGE
CONTROL FEED
00
CONSOLE HEATER
H. P.
TURB . THROTTLE
VALVE
SWITCHBOARD
TAKE HOME MOTOR

DN
(EMERGENCY POWER)
TUP
||
AIR COND. MACHY L. P. STEAM GENERATOR

TON
, X
Broor
AU
AUX .
REFRIG . MACHINERY BOILER
Zoro
SCUTTLEBUTT
19h
LO. L.O. NUCLEAR
SETTLING STORAGE STOR EROOM
TANK TANK NUCLEAR WORKSHOP ELECTRICAL
WORKSHOP
- STOR EROOM
-Plan of auxiliary machinery flat and control station.
sion . Although preventive measures against such accidents are

provided in the design of all ships, the second requirement listed
above demands that preventive measures be doubly effective so
that, if any such accident should occur, there would be no serious
injury or loss of life from radiation alone.
Problems concerned with the safety of nuclear-powered ships

are considered in detail in Chap. 5 , but the more important ones
involved directly in the desgn of the Savannah are considered here.
It should be pointed out that accidents are considered principally
from the standpoint of release of radioactivity. Sinking, for ex
ample, is not a major hazard unless it is coupled with a dangerous
release of radioactivity. The safety of passengers and crew from
the normal hazards of ocean travel is considered to be adequately
handled by compliance with the existing regulatory bodies. Normal
ship's safety requirements are treated only in so far as they affect
the ship's ability to avoid or withstand severe damage.
The safety of the ship from a nuclear standpoint, which involves
the personnel aboard and the general community surrounding the
ship while in port, presents conditions that are without precedent
in marine experience. These conditions involve the design of proper
containment of radioactive equipment, shielding against radiation ,
and measures for minimizing the effects of radation under emergency
conditions. A detailed discussion of these problems is presented in
Chap . 5, but some of them are considered below .
( a ) Containment. One of the basic safety problems of a pres
surized -water -cooled reactor plant is the possible release of fission
products in case of an accident to the primary system . Although
such an accident is a remote possibility , the results of such an acci
dent and the possible safety measures had to be considered very
early in the design of the Savannah. At least two methods of com
bating this hazard were possible, but careful study of the problem
led to the decision to install the reactor and all associated steam
generators, pumps, piping, and related equipment within a shielded
pressure vessel capable of retaining the mechanical energy as well
as the radiation release resulting from an accident.
The steel containment vessel is the fourth of five barriers to the
escape of radioactive fission products. The five barriers are, first ,
the high -density oxide fuel, which rest riets the release of all fission
products; second, the fuel tubes, which are designed, manufac
tured , and inspected in accordance with rigid specifications; third ,
the primary-system equipment, every piece of which is manufac
tured in accordance with all applicable codes and subsequently
tested at a pressure of 1.5 times the design pressure; fourth , the
containment vessel; and fifth , the reactor compartment in which
the containment vessel is installed . The reactor compartment is
constructed and properly ventilated to control the dissemination
of radioactive gases and particulate matter in the event of leakage
from the containment vessel. Even in the event of a drastic failure,
such as accidental melt -down of fuel elements, the last three bar
THE X.S. SAL’ANNAH 147
riers are still available to provide protection against accidental re

lease of radioactive material.
The operating experience of the Savannah will serve as a standard
to which future nuclear ships will be compared ; hence, the entire
plant is designed to facilitate maintenance. Accordingly, the shield
ing more than satisfies the requirements listed above.
In the absence of international regulations on ocean disposal of
radioactive wastes, the Savannah is designed for 100 percent con
tainment of all radioactive liquid and solid wastes. The ship is also
designed for complete containment of gaseous radioactive wastes
while operating in confined waters or unfavorable meteorological
conditions. At sea , under favorable conditions, low - level radio
active gases will be released to the atmosphere after being moni
tored .
The containment vessel for the Savannah is 35 ft in diameter
and 5012 ft long, consisting of a cylindrical section with hemispher
ical ends surmounted by a cupola through which vertical access is
obtained . It is designed for an internal pressure of 173 psi and
is capable of withstanding the pressure that would result from a
complete rupture of the primary coolant system . For a carbon
steel vessel , this requires a thickness of 23/8 in . in the cylindrical
section and 1316 in. in the hemispherical ends. This vessel repre
sents a large component of unusual size and shape to be included
within the ship's structure, introducing problems of support, con
struction , thermal stress, resistance to external and internal damage,
and shielding.
Some consideration was given to the use of the ship's hull in the niby
design of the containment . An enclosure consisting of two trans
verse bulkheads, the inner bottom , a deck , and two longitudinal bulk
heads was designed. Because of the larger volume of such a com
partment, the design pressure was significantly less than that for
the cylindrical spherical vessel, but the total weight of steel required
was greater than for the pressure vessel and its supports. For this
reason the separate containment vessel was installed .
Longitudinal continuous girders, in line with the inner-bottom
girders and welded to the tank top, support the cylindrical portion
of the containment vessel; the hemispherical ends overhang. The
longitudinal girders, set normal to the containment vessel, extend
well toward the compartment-end bulkheads and are transversely
supported by deep saddles, which are in line with the inner-bottom
foor. Details of the containment support are shown in Fig. 4.8.
The longitudinal bulkheads, port and starboard , transmit the loads
to the compartment-end bulkheads. The aft end only of the cylin
drical portion of the vessel is bolted to a transverse saddle of heavy
| PROM DECK (580-99
" A " DECK ( 509-0 ")

- 18 ' -0 "
REACTOR
CONTAINMENT
VESSEL
" S " DECK (41-0 ")
O "C " DECK

31' - 6 " SCANTLING
DRAFT
-35 ' - 0 " I.D.

" D" DECK ( 23' - 0 ")
14'-0" FLAT
TANK TOP
o
이 이이 이이 이이 000
ololololololololo
Fig. 4.8Details of the containment-vessel support .
construction, leaving the vessel free to expand . Emergency chocks

are provided near the forward end, and additional anti -rolling
chocks are provided at mid -height. Near the C-deck level an addi
tional brace is provided primarily to support the containment if the
ship is on her beam ends in a sinking condition.
(b ) Shielding and Radiation . The reactor vessel is surrounded
by a primary shield consisting of a 17- ft steel tank ; a 33 - in. annular
space between the tank and reactor vessel is filled with shielding
water. The water annulus is supplemented by a lead shield at the
outer tank wall, which varies in thickness from approximately 1 to
4 in . The primary shielding is designed to permit entry into the
containment ressel for maintenance within 2 hr after the reactor
is shut down .
Secondary shielding is also provided. This consists of a combi
nation of polyethylene, lead, and concrete of sufficient thickness to
reduce radiation to allowable levels . The concrete encloses the lower
part of the containment vessel; the top part is covered with lead
and polyethylene.
When the permissible radiation levels were being established for
the various spaces , consideration was given to whether the space was
to be used by passengers, crew , or stevedores, the relative time that
personnel would be in the space, etc. It was assumed that the
crew , or at least a portion of the crew , would use film badges for
recording exposure to radiation but that passengers and stevedores
would not. Actually, the shielding has been designed to permit

100 percent occupancy for 365 days a year.
( c ) Operational Flexibility. The Savannah is designed to per
form similarly to conventional ships. She will be capable of using
the same harbors and docking facilities and will have similar maneu
vering characteristics. Bypasses are provided in the steam system
so that the main turbine can respond to bridge commands without
reference to rate of change in reactor load , but this feature is pro
vided largely for emergency use. Maneuvering will , in general, be
accomplished by changing the reactor power level by means of the
reactor control rods. Where sudden speed changes are necessary,
the bypass valve automatically opens and at the same time the
reactor power level changes. The bypass valve around the main
turbine permits the dumping of high -pressure steam directly into
the main condenser. It has three essential functions, as follows :
( 1 ) under closed throttle conditions, it ensures reactor operation in
the power range, ( 2 ) it provides a safety valve to the steam system ,
and ( 3 ) it allows rapid maneuvering rates while maintaining rela
tively constant reactor power, when this proves desirable.
( d) Machinery and Emergency Power. From the safety stand
point, the provision of sufficient power to maintain steerage and
maneuverability is the principal requirement of the propulsion plant.
To this end, duplication of machinery components and power sources
on the Savannah has been carried to such a degree that the only
vital units without backup of some form are the rudder, propeller,
and shafting. As previously indicated, a 750 -hp motor is provided
to drive the propeller under emergency conditions. This is known
as the " take-home" motor. This source of propeller power is re
quired not only because the reliability of the plant has not been
proved, but also because the reactor after a sudden shut-down (known
as a scram ) requires at least one -half hour to be brought back to
operating power.
Under normal conditions the reactor would not be shut down. On
a nuclear ship the start-up from the cold condition may take from
15 to 20 hr; whereas in a conventional vessel only 4 hr is required.
In port, however, the nuclear ship would not shut down its reactor ;
in fact, it probably would never have to shut down except for
refueling, and even then it would not be allowed to cool off entirely.
The water would probably be kept at a temperature of around 150° F.
This is not true of conventional ships. Usually when such ships
come into port, the power plants are shut down and only auxiliary
boilers are kept hot to supply steam for heating and small amounts
of electricity.
In addition to the " take -home" motor, a temporary supplementary
oil- fired boiler plant is provided in No. 7 hold , to be retained until
the reactor has reached a condition of relatively trouble - free opera -

tion . This plant is capable of developing 2,000 shp ahead and about
1,750 shp astern, using the main propulsion turbine ; it may be used
in lieu of the take -home motor. Using forced -circulation boilers, it
can , like the take- home motor, be brought on the line in about 2 min .
In case of reactor plant failure, the stored heat in the system will be
available for a short period ; thus at no time will the Sarunnah be
without power to the shaft.
With the main propulsion unit shut down and the 750 -hp take
home motor in use , the Savannah will be capable of developing
approximately 6 knots in a mild sea. When heading into a 50 -knot
wind, a speed of about 1 knot can be maintained with no sea current.
In addition , this power is considered sufficient to allow turning the
ship away from the wind and running with the sea if this operation
is desirable .
If for any reason it is necessary to shut down the reactor and the
main steam -propulsion system , the 750 -kw diesel generator units are
available to take over the load by means of the emergency propulsion
motor. These diesel sets are capable of furnishing the power re
quired for the emergency propulsion motor, a reactor cooling pump
and essential ship's services. At the same time the oil-fired boiler
previously mentioned would supply steam to the ship's services and
to the main air ejectors to keep vacuum on the main turbine and
thus minimize windage losses when running on the emergency pro
pulsion motor. It should be noted that the reason for operating
one of the reactor cooling pumps under emergency conditions is to
carry away the decay heat produced in the core of the reactor after
the reactor has been shut down.
When some experience has been gained with nuclear power plants
at sea , it is possible that the emergency propulsion features can be
omitted in later designs. This follows the philosophy used in the
first design of some other new propulsion systems.
The Savannah is also provided with an emergency electric gen
erator located on the navigating -bridge deck to supply power for
essential services, as required by U.S. Coast Guard regulations, in
the event that electric power from the engine room fails owing to
flooding or fire. This emergency generator will also provide power
to the reactor cooling pump.
( e ) Jarine Ilazards. The nuclear ship is subject to all the usual
marine hazards of storm , fire, grounding, and sinking, and these
have all been considered in the design of the Savannah . Because
of the absence of oil fires in the boilers and the general reduction of
oil piping and hot surfaces, the fire hazard in the engine room of a
nuclear ship is considered to be somewhat less than in a conventional
vessel.
THE X.S. SAT’ANNAH 151
The principal design problems were with respect to collision and

sinking. It is obvious that a first consideration is to locate the
reactor in the ship at a spot least subject to collision damage. After
an extensive study of marine accidents, it was decided to locate the
reactor on the center line somewhat aft of midship, consistent with
stability requirements. To further protect the reactor and contain
ment vessel in case of collision, a collision mat has been integrated
with the secondary shielding. This collision mat, made up of alter
nate layers of 1 - in. steel plate and 3 -in . redwood planks, forms an
integral part of the shielding and at the same time affords protec
tion against penetration of the containment vessel as a result of
collision.
In the event of aa marine accident leading to eventual sinking, the
reactor would be shut down as soon as possible. The reactor would
be cooled on emergency power as long as the ship was afloat. If
sinking occurs in shallow water, the containment vessel will remain
intact, and the surface exposed is sufficient to carry away heat by
natural convection . If sinking should occur in deep waters , where
the submergence pressure would otherwise collapse the containment
vessel, automatic flooding valves will admit sea water to the con
tainment vessel to prevent rupture of the vessel and will close when
the pressure is equalized, thus preventing release of radioactive
material.
The ship may sink in a non -upright position, and for this reason
supports have been provided to hold the containment vessel in place
with the ship on her beam ends and in other positions.
With respect to the hull itself, because of the need to support the
heavy reactor equipment, the structural members have been strength
ened to the point where the collision resistance is such that only
large supertankers or high -speed passenger liners traveling at high
speed could penetrate the ship's hull to the containment vessel.
Loss of a propeller or shaft failure is not a common occurrence ,
but, if this should occur in shallow waters, the Savannah has anchors
with 1,000 ft of chain that can be dropped far enough off shore to
hold the ship and keep it from grounding ashore. Loss of steering
gear, like the loss of propeller, can lead to grounding or collision.
There are two steering stations on the Savannah , one on the bridge
and one at the after steering control on the docking bridge, in addi
tion to the handwheel on the gear itself. The steering gear has two
independent power plants, each capable of handling the rudder
under design conditions. In addition , a hand pump is supplied for
use in positioning the rudder in case the main hydraulic supply
should fail .
( f ) Maneuvering Capabilities. The Savannah compares favor
ably with conventional steam vessels in maneuvering capability. It
6134890—6211
is estimated that the ship can be stopped in a distance of 3,900 ft

from the design speed using the design backing torque. “ Design
backing torque " is specified as 80 percent of the ahead revolutions
per minute and is developed as soon as the turbine steam - chest pres
sure reaches design values, with considerable headway still on the
ship. The time to this point, from experience, is essentially the time
to close the ahead throttle and open the astern throttle, a matter of
about 20 sec.
Under emergency conditions, for example, in case of a reactor
scram (sudden insertion of all control rods) while proceeding under
nuclear power in a restricted channel, the contained heat in the
reactor system is adequate to bring the ship to a stop in approxi
mately the same time as that required for conventional ships of the
same size . The ship may then anchor until the main propulsion plant
is again available or , as with any other vessel in similar circum
stances, may proceed under emergency power with a tug escort.
Operation under emergency power ( either the 750 -hp motor or the
temporary steam -boiler plant) in restricted waters will ordinarily,
as is customary , be with a tug escort .
In conclusion , for general safety of operations at sea , the
Savannah is designed to the highest current standards and is as safe as,
or safer than, any comparable vessel. Only extraordinary conditions
could constitute a threat to her sa fety.
4-5 DESIGN OF THE PROPULSION PLANT
4-5.1 General
The Savannah's propulsion system comprises the pressurized -water

reactor plant installed in the containment vessel; the main steam
turbines and reduction gear ; the main condensers; the feed -water
system involving purification ; the turbogenerator to supply auxiliary
equipment and the ship's hotel load ; and the auxiliary diesel and
package boiler to supply the ship's needs when the nuclear reactor
has been shut down .
The pressurized -water type reactor was selected for three reasons:
first, because of the short ship -construction schedule ; second, because
of the degree of information available on the design and operation
of this type reactor ; and third , because of the decision not to build
a land -based prototype before actually building the reactor system
for the Sarannah .
The pressurized -water system is simple in principle, as explained
in Chap. 3. It consists of a reactor vessel in which is installed the
core of fissionable material . On the primary side, water is passed
THE X.S. SAL ANNAH 153
through the reactor core, where it is heated ; it is then led through

a heat exchanger, where it gives up its heat to the water in the sec
ondary system . Saturated steam , generated on the shell side of the
heat exchanger, is then fed to the main propulsion turbine and the
ship's auxiliaries.
4-5.2 The Reactor
As in any nuclear power plant, the heart of the Savannah nuclear

propulsion system is the reactor. It is in the core of the reactor that
the heat is generated . It is necessary to maintain an uninterrupted
flow of water through the core to remove this heat as fast as it is
generated. Any diminution or interruption in the flow of coolant
would immediately result in a rise in temperature of the fuel ele
ments , and this would soon lead to melting and rupture of the fuel
element cladding. So it is necessary to provide adequate circulating
pump capacity to maintain the coolant flow at all times. In the
Sarannah reactor system there are two primary coolant loops, each
containing two circulating pumps, connected in parallel so that if
one pump is shut down the other will maintain the flow.
( a ) Core Design. The active core of the reactor is approximately
a right-circular cylinder, 62 in. in diameter and 66 in. high. It is
made up of 32 fuel elements, 8.5 in . square and 76.5 in . long. The
cooling water makes three passes through the reactor vessel ( i.e.
the coolant crosses the horizontal midplane of the reactor vessel three
times even though the second and third passes are within the core
itself ) . The internal construction of the reactor is shown in Fig.
4.9. The coolant enters through two nozzles near the bottom of the
pressure vessel , flows up the annular thermal shield passages ( first
pass ), down the 16 peripheral fuel elements (second pass ), and finally
up the inner 16 fuel elements. Twenty - one cruciform shaped control
rods, actuated by drive mechanisms mounted on top of the reactor
vessel, control the reactivity by virtue of their neutron -absorbing
capacity.
The entire core and the thermal shields are supported by the core
support skirt, which is mounted on the vessel wall near the upper
flow nozzles. The core is completely enclosed by the inner thermal
shield and the lower flow baffle. These are shown in Fig . 4.9. There
are three thermal shields, the inner one just referred to ; a second,
the core support shield, which also serves to support the core ; and
the fixed outer shield, which is permanently attached to the reactor
vessel. These three stainless -steel thermal shields protect the vessel
from thermal stresses induced by gamma-ray heat and from radia
tion damage .
10' - 10 " DIA
-7 ' 6 " DIA .

Mounting Flange For
Control Rod Drive
Mechanism
Control Rod 串 Main Hold

Nozzle Seal Down Spring
Upper Flow
Baffle Assembly
26 ' - 10 1/2"
!
COOLANT
Upper Grid
Plate
Fixed Outer Control & Follower

Thermal Shield Rod
Core Support
Shield
CORE
Fuel
Containment
Assembly
Inner Thermal
Shield
Lower Grid
Plate
Reactor
Vessel
Lower Flow
Baffle Assembly
COOLANT
Control Rod Lower

Emergency Plenum
Snubber Chamber
FIG. 4.9 — Reactor vessel and internals.

CORE
REGION
LOWER PLENUM FLOW REFLECTOR REGION FLOW
THIRD PASS FUEL ELEMENTS
CONTROL ROO CHANNEL FLOW

FUEL ELEMENT
NOZZLE LEAKAGE
FLOW
SECOND PASS FUEL ELEMENTS
OUTLET
NOZZLE
THERMAL
LEAKAGE
INLET SHIELDS THROUGH MAIN
NOZZLE CORE SEAL
Fig . 4.10 — Schematic diagram showing flow of coolant through the reactor core.
The egg -crate lattice containing the fuel elements is confined be

tween an upper and a lower grid, which are approximately 92 in .
apart. These grids hold the fuel elements in place. The core and
other internals are held down against the upward thrust of the
coolant flow by the upper baffle hold -down spring. The downward
force of this spring is transmitted to 18 equally spaced vertical
struts that bear on the upper grid plate. The internal supports will
hold the core in place if the ship should capsize.
The upper grid plate provides a manifold in which the coolant
is turned downward into the 16 outer fuel elements during its second
pass through the core. Flow tubes below the lower grid plate
serve as an extension of the fuel-element cans, directing the down
ward - flowing coolant from the 16 outer fuel -element channels into
the lower plenum region.. The flow tubes also serve to prevent
crossflow and the accompanying lateral thrust against the control
rod extensions that are located here , as shown in Fig. 4.9.
The flow pattern through the core can be better understood by
reference to Fig. 4.10. The coolant enters the reactor through two
diametrically opposed entrance nozzles located on the lower head .
The entering flow impinges on the outer surface of the lower plenum
chamber and proceeds tangentially around the reactor vessel to a
point 90 deg from the inlet nozzles, where it turns, mixes slightly,
and proceeds up into the thermal -shield region. In the thermal
shield region the flow is broken up into three parallel paths. The
coolant that enters the annulus between the outer thermal shield
and the core- support shield is divided into two streams, one of which
is diverted through a series of holes into the annulus between the
inner shield and the middle shield . The portion that flows up be
tween the vessel wall and the outer thermal shield passes through
a series of flow holes in the top of the outer thermal shield . This
stream mixes with the coolant from the annulus between the outer
thermal shield and the core -support shield .
All the flow from the thermal shields enters the manifold region
of the upper grid plate , where it is turned 180 deg and proceeds into
the second - pass fuel elements. As the flow passes through the lower
cover plate of the upper grid -plate assembly into the fuel-element
nozzles, some leakage occurs. A maximum of about 5 percent of the
total flow leaks into the control-rod and reflector regions at this
point .
The flow then proceeds downward through the second -pass fuel
elements, into the outer 16 lower flow tubes, and into the lower
plenum chamber. In the lower plenum the flow is distributed three
ways. Approximately 85 percent of the total coolant flows into the
center 16 flow tubes. The remaining flow , since it does not pass
through the fuel elements, is classed as " leakage flow." Leakage
flow includes the control- rod coolant and the reflector -region flow .
From the lower plenum most of the leakage flow passes through the
orifices in the lower cover plate of the lower flow - baffle assembly. A
small quantity flows up the annulus bet ween the lower plenum cham
ber and the lower flow -baflle assembly. This flow rejoins the major
portion of the leakage by passing through the orifices near the top
of the lower flow -baffle assembly.
On reaching the base plate of the fuel-container assembly, the
leakage flow enters the control-rod channels and the reflector region .
Ultimately all the leakage flow passes through the orifices in the
orifice seal plate, except for a small amount which leaks past the
fuel -element nozzles into the flow tubes of the upper grid plate.
The main body of the coolant flows from the lower plenum
through the third -pass fuel elements to the upper plenum . It
should be noted that once the coolant enters a given flow tube from
the lower plenum , it is conducted straight through to the upper
plenum . The flow tubes of the lower and upper flow -baflle assemblies
serve to reduce turbulence in the coolant entering and leaving the
fuel elements. In the upper plenum the main coolant flow and the
leakage flow mix, turn 180 deg, and travel downward to the outlet
nozzles.
THE N.S. SAVANNAH
I
157
Transition and
Spring Assembly
Upper Adapter
оооо
II
Center Shaft OM DODOO

Spacing Ferrule
Fuel Rod 8.496
Fuel Bundle Assembly
4 Required
boog
72" Bundle Length
0
-,663 Rod Pitcb Spacing
8.496
001
Section Z-Z
Fuel Element Assembly T T

Z
QOOOOOOOOO
Centering Pad.
Lower Adapter
Section Y- Y
FIG . 4.11 - Sections through the fuel element, showing the four bundles
of fuel rods.
( b ) Fuel Elements. The fuel elements, shown in Fig. 4.11 , are

each made up of four separate bundles ( subassemblies) of full
length fuel rods. Each fuel element is an integral welded and
brazed unit approximately 81/2 in. square and 76 in . in over -all
length . The elements are designed to withstand shock due to ship
motion, vibration due to water flow , thermal distortion due to nuclear
heating, and various loadings that occur in handling, shipping, and
manufacturing. Each of the four subassemblies is a 6-by-7 array of
fuel rods arranged in a square matrix.
The fuel rods are 0.5 - in .-O.D . stainless - steel tubes filled with
0.4245- in.- O.D. uranium dioxide pellets, pressed and sintered to 91
percent of theoretical density. The uranium dioxide is enriched
with U235 to an average value of 4.4 wt . % . The pellets are held in
the tubes by welded end plugs. The gap between the tube and the
pellets contains helium , which is introduced during the end -plug
welding process. The helium gas permits thermal expansion of the
fuel pellets and, at the same time, serves to transfer the heat from
the surface of the pellets to the tube wall. Each of the four bundles
comprising a fuel element contains 41 fuel rods, giving a total of
164 rods in each fuel element. It will be noted from Fig. 4.11 that
one corner of each of the four fuel-rod bundles is cut off at 45 deg ;
this accounts for the fact that there are only 41 rods in each 6 -by - 7
array. Since there are 32 fuel elements in the core, the core as a
whole has a total of 5,248 fuel rods. The rods are on 0.663 - in .
centers, giving an over-all metal -to -water ratio for the homogenized
core of 0.76. The active length of the fuel is 66 in ., leaving approxi
mately 2 in . clearance to accommodate differential thermal expansion
of the fuel relative to the tube.
An insulating spacer at the bottom of each fuel rod between the
end plug and the first UO , pellet reduces the temperature in the
end plug. A spring at the top of each fuel rod accomplishes the
same function at that end and minimizes damage to the pellets when
the elements are transported from the fabricating plant to the ship.
The rod spacing is maintained by small tubular stainless - steel
ferrules brazed in place approximately every 8 in . along the length
of the element. A support frame at each end of the fuel element
attaches the four subassemblies into an integral assembly. The
frame is designed to maintain structural stability with a minimum
amount of interference with the coolant flow. The lower frame
mates with a self-centering seating surface on the lower transition
piece of the fuel -container assembly. This serves to align and sup
port the fuel element. The upper frame acts as a seat for the fuel
element nozzle. As shown in Fig. 4.11 , a cylindrical shaft extends
72 IN
8.496 IN.
0.4375 IN.
Fig. 4.12 — Photograph of one of the fuel elements, together with a detail
showing the construction of the fuel rod.
the full length of each fuel element . A handling knob, attached to

this shaft, provides a means for lifting and handling the fuel ele
ment. The shaft also provides a receptacle for the two start-up
neutron sources. Figure 4.12 shows an assembled fuel element and
a cut -away section of one of the fuel rods.
Temperature levels and temperature distributions have been deter
mined for the fuel pellets at various operating power levels and
positions in the core. All pertinent factors that could influence these
temperatures have been studied. Included in the study were such
factors as thermal expansion of the fuel pellets and the tubes, varia
tion of fuel conductivity with temperature, dilution of the helium
filled gap between the pellets and the tubing with low -conductivity
fission gas, eccentricity of the pellets inside the tubes, variation in
manufacturing tolerances for pellets and tubing, and variation in
fuel density and enrichment.
Since the gap between the pellets and the tube is one of the most
important factors affecting the fuel temperature level , it has been
the object of particularly intensive study. The fuel and the cladding
( i.e., the tubes) expand at different rates; hence the gap size, and
therefore the heat -transfer characteristics, change with reactor power
level. Another extremely important factor in determining fuel tem
peratures is the thermal conductivity of the gas in the gap between
the pellets and the tube. The helium in the tubes initially has a
thermal conductivity of approximately 0.15 Btu /hr / sq ft / ° F at the
temperature level estimated for full-power operation. Low -conduc
tivity ( 0.01 Btu /hr /sq ft/ ° F ) gaseous fission products gradually
diffuse into this gap and thereby reduce the thermal conductivity of
the gas and raise the fuel temperature level. The rate of diffusion of
the fission gases from the fuel is a function of the neutron flux, the
temperature and density of the fuel, and the length of time of irradia
tion. The fuel temperature, therefore, is dependent upon the fission
gas release. From detailed analyses of these various factors, it has
been shown that in normal operation fuel temperatures will never
exceed the melting temperature , even using the “ worst case" or the
condition in the hottest channel of the core .
It is expected that the initial fuel loading will last approximately
three years. This estimate is based on an operating schedule of
-60 percent at sea at normal power and 40 percent in port. The initial
loading of uranium is approximately 15,500 lb , of which 670 lb is
U235. During the core life, about 137 lb of U 235 and 13 lb of Pu239
will be burned. A normal oil- fired ship of the size and speed of the
Savannah would burn about 700 barrels of oil per day underway, or
about 80,000 tons of oil for three years of operation.
The use of uranium dioxide as the fuel in the Savannah reactor is
important since uranium dioxide as a fuel has several advantages
over uranium metal. First, there is no incompatibility between
uranium dioxide and water, as is the case with uranium metal.
Uranium dioxide is a ceramic; it is not subject to corrosion in any
significant degree. Second, uranium dioxide is capable of operating
at very high temperatures since its melting point is around 5,000 ° F ,
and it has excellent structural stability under high radiation flux and
at high temperature. Although it has lower thermal conductivity
than uranium metal, the absence of corrosion problems with the oxide
fuel and its high -temperature characteristics compensate for its
shortcomings with respect to thermal conductivity. For further data
on the thermal, hydraulie, and nuclear characteristics of the reactor
core , see Table B.1 in Appendix B.
( c) Pressure Vessel. Details of the reactor pressure vessel are
shown in Fig. 4.9. The 6.5 - in .- thick walls and 6 - in .- thick hemi
spherical closure heads of the 98 - in . - I.D . vessel are constructed of
carbon steel to withstand the 2,000 -psig internal design pressure. All
inside surfaces of the reactor vessel are clad with extra -low -cobalt
type 304 stainless steel to inhibit corrosion of the vessel walls and
thus minimize the presence of corrosion products in the primary
coolant.
The vessel was designed and fabricated with the utmost care to
ensure its reliability and integrity. The U.S. Coast Guard Marine
Engineering rules and regulations were used as criteria for sizing

the thickness of the steel walls. In addition to meeting these regula
tions, each design detail was subjected to rigorous analytical evalua
tion, making use of the latest engineering know -how and techniques.
Many of the design details were checked by experimental methods.
Each piece of material used in the construction of the vessel was
tested to assure compliance with the material specifications. The
completed vessel successfully passed hydrostatic tests in the Bab
cock & Wilcox shops at a pressure 1.5 times the design pressure
of 2,000 psig.
The over-all height of the reactor vessel is approximately 27 ft,
exclusive of the control-rod drives, which extend another 2112 ft
above the top head . Two nozzles located in the bottom head and two
in the upper shell section provide connections for the coolant flow
piping
The upper head of the vessel is removable to provide access for
loading and unloading the reactor core. This head is attached by
48 studs; each stud is 5 in . in diameter and weighs 350 lb. The
vessel is hermetically sealed by means of a welded seal membrane.
Two O - ring gaskets serve as auxiliary seals. As explained previ
ously, three stainless -steel thermal shields protect the vessel walls
from thermal stresses induced by gamma -ray heat and from radia
tion damage. The water and steel thermal shielding has a total
thickness of 15 in.
On the outside of the reactor vessel is an insulating jacket con
sisting of 3 in . of glass wool. Outside this insulating jacket is the
primary shield . This is a water- filled tank approximately 185 in .
in outside diameter and 17 ft 8 in . high. The water annulus, ap
proximately 33 in . thick , provides the shielding required to prevent
appreciable neutron activation of materials inside the containment
vessel and to reduce neutron doses outside the secondary shield dur
ing operation to below tolerance levels.
( d ) Control-rod Drive Mechanism . Twenty -one control- rod drives
are used to position the 21 cruciform control rods. The drives
are mounted vertically on the upper head of the pressure vessel and
are connected to the control rods by means of shafting that pene
trates the closure head through 21 nozzles. Each nozzle is equipped
with a buffer seal that allows a continuous inflow of demineralized
water to the reactor vessel .
A simplified diagram showing the principle of the control-rod
drive mechanism is shown in Fig. 4.13. Positioning and motion of
a control rod is accomplished by the combined use of an electro
mechanical drive unit and hydraulic pressure. The portion of the
drive mechanism that moves during a scram ( Sec. 3–5.2 ) consists
GEARED
MOTOR
HYDRAULIC
CYLINDER
DRIVE PISTON
SPROCKET CHAIN DRIVE

OURT
DRIVE
GEAR
POSITIONING PLATE
SHOULDER ON SHAFT
LEAD SCREWS
CONTROL ROD
EXTENSION SHAFT
PRESSURE VESSEL
Fig. 4.13 — Simplified diagram of the control-rod drive mechanism . In normal

operation the control-rod drive shaft is positioned by the electric motor ,
which controls the positioning plate. On scram , however, the drive shaft is
driven into the core by the hydraulic cylinder shown at the top .
of the control rod, seal shafting, safety latch, hydraulic piston rod ,
and hydraulic piston. These scram components are held against
the underside of the drive carriage during normal positioning by
the force of the reactor pressure acting on the area of the seal shaft ;
they will, therefore, follow the carriage. The carriage is positioned
by twin lead screws driven by an electric drive motor.
The shafting that passes through the drive carriage has a shoulder
( Fig. 4.13 ) that bears on the underside of the carriage during nor
mal positioning and is free to travel downward during a scram . In
other words, in this type mechanism , the electric motor positions
the rod during normal operations, but the hydraulic cylinder drives
the control rod into the core in case of emergency . Normally, the
pressure in the reactor keeps the shoulder of the drive shaft up
against the positioning plate.
The hydraulic system serves to balance the force of the reactor
pressure on the control-rod shafting during normal positioning to
provide the energy for the scram motion . Hydraulic pressure, regu
lated with respect to reactor pressure, is applied to the piston during

normal positioning to produce a downward force balancing the up
ward thrust due to reactor pressure so as to minimize wear in the
lead screws and positioning carriage.
Every precaution has been taken to ensure proper operation of
the control-rod mechanism under the most adverse conditions. After
the mechanisms had successfully passed tests to prove their dura
bility, ability to scram in an upright position , and ability to per
form under adverse thermal and salt -saturated atmospheric condi
tions, the mechanisms were put through a unique dry - land tilt test.
In this test a simulated reactor with prototype control-rod drive
was tested at 30-deg inclination. Figure 4.14 is a photograph of the
control mechanism undergoing this test.
Fig. 4.14-Control-rod drive undergoing tilt test.

FIG. 4.15 — Safety -latch model.
The hydraulic pressure necessary for scram is maintained con

tinuously in a " scram accumulator" (Appendix B ) . The scram pres
sure is held in check by a pilot-operated scram valve controlled by
the electrical safety systems. When the pilot pressure is released,
the full scram accumulator pressure is applied to the piston, resulting
in a net downward force on the control-rod drive line sufficient to
accelerate the control rod into the core at the required rate.
The control-rod mechanism is also provided with a safety latch.
This is attached to the drive shaft and consists of two latch arms
that encircle two tie rods forming a part of the stationary mechanism
structure. A photograph of a model of the safety latch is shown in
Fig. 4.15. The latch arms are inoperative as long as the positioning
carriage engages the shoulder on the drive shaft. The latch arms
are also free to ride the tie rods during scram when the shoulder
leaves the positioning carriage. However, they are designed to seize
the tie rods securely should the control -rod drive line attempt to
move out of the reactor at any time it is not engaged with the posi
tioning carriage. The safety latch will hold the control rods in
the core in the event the ship should capsize. Consequently, under
no circumstances can the reactor pressure or the hydraulic piston
withdraw a rod at a faster rate than the driving carriage will allow,
and, once a control rod has been driven in by a scram , it cannot
be withdrawn until the drive carriage has been moved down to
release its latches. Further details of the high -pressure hydraulic
THE NS . SAVANNAH 165
system supplying the power to the control-rod drives are given in

Appendix B.
As already indicated, the control rods are of a cruciform pattern,
made up of three distinct sections. From top to bottom these are :
a 23- in . stainless-steel extension ; a 62-in. neutron -absorbing portion
containing enriched boron -stainless steel supported in a stainless
steel composite ; and a 59-in. Zircaloy follower. All three sections
are rigidly fastened together in a continuous assembly. There are
21 cruciform -shaped control rods in the core, arranged on a 9.7-in.
square pitch with the center rod in the center of the core , as shown
in Fig. 4.16.
The control section uses enriched boron-stainless steel as the neu
tron -absorbing material . The design eliminates any dependence upon
the neutron-absorbing material for structural characteristics. This
is achieved by enclosing the absorbing material within a structural
FUEL
INNER
ELEMENTS THERMAL
SHIELD
CRUCIFORM
CONTROL RODS
CORE
SUPPORT
SHIELD
50
o'o '
PRESSURE FIXED OUTER

VESSEL THERMAL SHIELD
9 FT. 2 IN .
FIG . 4.16 —— Arrangement of fuel elements in the reactor core, showing also the
location of the 21 cruciform -shaped control rods.
CONTROL
ROD
DRIVE
MECHANISM
Control Rod
Nozzle
Seal
PRESSURE
CONTROL VESSEL
RODS
Upper Grid Plate
FUEL
ELEMENTS
CORE
Lower Grid
Plate
Lower Flow
Baffle
Assembly
FIG. 4.17—A cutaway view of the complete reactor showing the control rods
and core.
sheath of stainless steel . The methods of attachment used reduce

the problems of differential thermal expansion between the sheath
and the absorbing material.
The follower rod is made up of Zircaloy -2 angles, spot-welded
together to form a cruiciform cross section . The stainless- steel ex
tension on the upper end of the control-rod assembly replaces the
boron -containing stainless steel . This section is above the core where
the neutron -absorbing material is not required. A cut - away view
of the complete reactor assembly showing the control rods and core
is given in Fig. 4.17.
4-6 ARRANGEMENT AND FUNCTIONAL OPERATION OF THE

NUCLEAR POWER SYSTEM
4-6.1 General
The general principle of the Savannah's propulsion system was

referred to briefly in Sec. 4–5. Here, it is described in greater de
tail. Figure 4.5 is a simplified diagram of the propulsion system ; it
can be divided into seven more or less separate sections, as follows :
1. Production of heat
2. Heat transport to heat exchangers ( steam generators)
3. Transmission of heat energy to the main and auxiliary turbines
4. Utilization of heat energy in the main turbines to drive the
propeller
5. Auxiliary electric power generation
6. Return of condensate to the heat exchangers ( steam generators)
7. Low - pressure steam generation
Figure 4.5 shows only the main components of the system . In
addition, there are a number of auxiliary and supporting systems
such as the water -purification system , emergency cooling system ,
waste-collection system , and reactor pressurizing system . Details of
these auxiliary and supporting systems are given in Appendixes C
and D.
4-6.2 Production of Heat
The principle of the production of heat in the core of the nuclear

reactor is explained in detail in Chap. 3 ; it will not be reviewed
here. The fission of the uranium atoms in the fuel elements heats
the fuel elements to high temperatures, and this heat energy is re
moved by the water flowing through the core . Although the maxi
mum temperature in the interior of the fuel rods runs as high as
3,310° F, the maximum surface temperature of the fuel rods( in the
third pass ) is kept to 603 ° F.
4-6.3 Heat Transport to Heat Exchangers
The heat generated in the core is transported to the heat ex

changers by two loops, each containing two circulating pumps, one
heat exchanger ( steam generator ), two check valves, and two stop
valves together with the necessary piping. The system also is pro
vided with a pressurizer to maintain a constant pressure on the
primary cooling system and a hydrogen -addition system . The latter
maintains from 20 to 40 cm of hydrogen per liter of water in the
613489 04-02-12
primary system to recombine with oxygen formed by dissociation

of the water by radiation . With the exception of the hydrogen
addition system , the entire primary system is installed within the
containment vessel . The flow of cooling water in each of the two
primary loops is from the discharge side of the pumps to the reac
tor, from the reactor to the steam generators, and from the steam
generators back to the suction side of the pumps.
The system is designed to transfer 70 Mw or 239,000,000 Btu /hr
from the reactor core at full load with a water flow rate of 8.6 mil
lion lb /hr. The water inlet temperature to the reactor at this power
level is 496.3 ° F, and the outlet temperature is 519.7°F. At all
steady-state loads below 239,000,000 Btu /hr, the coolant temperature
rise across the reactor will vary, in proportion to the load, about a
constant average temperature of 508 ° F .
It is essential in a pressurized -water system to maintain the entire
primary coolant loop at a high enough pressure that no boiling of
the water occurs. In the Savannah system , this pressure is 1,750 psi .
At the maximum power of 22,000 shp, the reactor generates ap
proximately 70 Mw of heat; the temperature rise of the water
through the reactor is 23.4 °F, and the water arrives at the steam
generators at about 519 ° F . In the steam generators the primary
water generates saturated steam from the feed water entering at
about 345 ° F . The relationship between steam pressure and load is
shown in Fig. 4.18. It will be noted that as the amount of heat
transferred in the steam generator increases, the primary water
temperature range steadily increases. The steam generated for the
maximum load condition is 265,850 lb /hr. Steam is delivered to the
turbines at a pressure that rises with decreasing loads from a mini
mum of 445 psig at maximum power to 715 psig at zero power.
The heat -transport system is designed for a maximum allowable
working pressure of 2,000 psig, and the secondary system (the steam
line to the turbines), for 800 psig. In addition, it is designed to
meet the following changes in steam demand : ( 1 ) 20 to 85 percent
in 10 sec and ( 2 ) 100 to 20 percent in 3 sec.
During operation the 1,750- psi pressure in the primary loop.is
maintained by an electrically heated pressurizer vessel in which a
steam space is maintained in equilibrium with the water by alternate
use of electric heaters and spray coolers as the transients of the
system demand . The location of the pressurizer in the system is
indicated in Fig. 4.5 and in somewhat greater detail in Fig. 4.19,
which is a simplified diagram of the heat-transport system . This
shows the two primary loops, each with a steam generator and two
primary circulating pumps. Further details of the pressurizer sys
tem are given in Appendix C.
PPRESSURE
750
OUTLET
,STEAM
DRUM
SIA
550
TEMPERATURE
450
PRIMARY
WATER
520
"F,
INLET
510
500 OUTLET
490
0 20 40 60 80
HEAT TRANSFERRED IN STEAM GENERATOR , MW
Fig. 4.18 - Primary water temperature vs. load and steam-drum outlet pressure
vs. load, for rated load of 74 Mw ( thermal ) .
All material in contact with the reactor coolant water in the

heat-transport system is stainless steel . The thermal stresses in the
system are limited to an acceptable level by limiting the heating
and cooling rates to approximately 50 ° F /hr. Both loops in the
heat-transport system are ventable and drainable. The vents are
connected to a gaseous-waste disposal system header, and the drains
are connected to the equipment drain and waste collection system .
( a ) Steam Generators. Each of the two steam generators con
sists of a U -tube U -shell lower drum with the primary piping con
necting to the inlet and outlet nozzles on the heads of this drum ,
as shown in Figs. 4.20 and 4.21 . This lower drum forms the boiler
section . It has an over-all length of about 20 ft and contains 812
stainless -steel 34 -in .-O.D . tubes. The shell side of these boilers is
connected to an upper drum , located on the center line and above
the lower drum, by means of 13 risers and 8 downcomers. The risers
and downcomers are designed to ensure natural circulation at all
loads and positions of the ship. Cyclone separators and scrubbers
170 NUCLEAR PROPULSION . FOR MERCHANT SHIPS
WATER
SPRAY
PRESSURIZER
STEAM FEED STEAM FEED
ROD SEALS
HEATERS
1
PRIMARY PUMPS PRIMARY PUMPS
BOILER BOILER
1750 PSI 1750 PSI
10,000 Gal/Min 10,000 Gal/Min LET
DOWN
MAKE -UP ORIFICES COOLER
Gal
Min
126
2000
PSI
ION MAKE -UP

WATER
EXCHANGERS
BUFFER
SURGE
FILTERS
TANK
PURIFICATION
BUFFER SYSTEM DRAIN
CHARGE
PUMPS
FIG. 4.19 — Simplified diagram of the primary system.
are provided in the upper drum to supply dry saturated steam at the
outlet nozzles. Steam quality is maintained at approximately 0.25
percent moisture. The steam generators are designed for 2,000 psig
on the tube side and 800 psig on the shell side and 650° F for both
the tube and shell sides.
The basic control for the steam generators is a three -element feed
water control using steam flow , water flow , and boiler-drum level
as controlling media. The primary signals are taken from the
steam flow and feed- water flow , and a ratio is established such
that as steam flow increases, water flow increases at the same rate.
These two signals are balanced in a ratio relay, and the output
signal from the relay is sent to a Standatrol, which also has pro
visions for readjustment from the boiler-drum level . The output
signal from the Standatrol is the signal that controls the feed
water flow .
As mentioned previously, an electrically heated pressurizer hav
ing a steam volume of 92 cu ft is used to maintain pressure under
normal steady-state conditions at 1,750 psia. The steam space
provides a surge volume for the heat-transport system and, in con
junction with the spray water and electric heaters, limits the sys
tem pressure fluctuations during normal load transients to a range
between 1,695 and 1,800 psia. Sixty-two cubic feet of water in the
pressurizer provides the expansion volume needed in out-surges.
Gate Valve
Pumps 1 1 Steam Drum
Heat Exchanger
Check Valves
React
Metal Shielding
or Outlet
Pressurizer Surge Line
o Reactor Reactor Inlet
15 °
15 °
Gate Valve :
Reactor Inlet React
or Outlet
Instrument Thimbles
Shield Water Tank
Check Valves
Steam Drum
Pumps
Heat Exchanger
ID Gate Valve
0 1 2 3 4 5
Feet
FIG . 4.20 — Plan view of the reactor system in the containment vessel.
3" Safety Valve

Nozzles
1 8 " Steam Outlet
Nozzle Vent
Feet
A
0 i 2 3
STEAM DRUM
4" Feedwater
Nozzle
Outlet Nozzles
Vent
HEAT EXCHANGER
Drain 1
Inspection Port
Hondhold
FIG . 4.21-Steam generator, side elevation.

( b ) Primary Circulating Pumps and Piping. All four primary

circulating pumps are vertically installed centrifugal canned -motor
zero -leakage pumps ( the pump stator can is seal-welded to the
volute ). Each motor is equipped with an auxiliary winding to
operate the pump at half speed, as may be desirable for removal
of decay heat after the reactor has been shut down. The pumps
are installed close to the steam generators and are rated at 250 kw,
5,000 gal/min at 495 ° F , under a total head of 70 psi .
Main primary piping is 12916 in . in inside diameter, and the
branch piping between the boiler outlets and the Y fitting, contain
ing the pumps, is 89/16 in. in inside diameter . All primary piping is
of type 304 stainless - steel hollow forgings with a design pressure
of 2,000 psi. Each primary loop also contains two main gate valves
by means of which its steam generator and pumps can be isolated
from the reactor. A check valve is installed downstream of each
pump .
( c ) Stop and Check l'alves. The gate valves for the heat-trans
port system are actuated by electric -motor operators capable of an
operating speed of 12 in./min on the reactor outlet valves and 3
in./min on the reactor inlet valves. These valves are located in the
inlet and outlet lines of each loop adjacent to the reactor so that
either loop can be isolated from the reactor, if necessary. The
valves are designed to open and close against a 2,000-psi differential
pressure and to withstand a pressure of 2,000 psi on either side
when closed. Although these pressures might occur during an
emergency, the normal pressure differential across the valves should
not exceed 100 psi .
An additional sa fety precaution against excessive pressure in an
isolated loop has been taken by employing a small manual stop
check bypass valve around the gate valve downstream of each
primary pump. These valves are provided to check any flow to
ward an isolated loop and to permit flow around the inlet gate
valve should a main coolant pump be started unintentionally. If
complete isolation of a loop were desirable, such as during a par
tial hydrostatic test , the manual stop feature of the valve would
be used for the positive shut off.
A check valve is located at the discharge of each pump to re
strict reverse flow in the event of a pump failure in either loop.
Each valve is the conventional swing type, but with a small hole
in the disk to permit a low flow through the branch piping to
maintain equal temperature throughout the loop.
The heat-transport system equipment inside the containment ves
sel is arranged to meet two objectives: first, to obtain the most
compact practical arrangement and, second, to arrange the equip
ment on a single supporting structure that will offer the minimum

restraint to the containment shell.
These two objectives are satisfied with an arrangement that lo
cates the heaviest component, the reactor vessel, on the center line
of the containment and as close to the bottom of the containment as
possible. The next largest components, the two boilers, are located
in the widest part of the containment on the port and starboard
sides of the reactor. With this arrangement of the major com
ponents, a steel supporting structure was designed to adequately
support the equipment under normal conditions and under the most
severe pitch -and -roll conditions. This supporting structure is ar
ranged so that all the loads are carried into the ring girders of
the containment vessel in the lower quadrant of the containment
vessel. There is no connection between the structural steel and the
hemispherical ends of the containment or the middle or upper quad
rants of the containment to produce restraints to the free flexure
of the containment shell. A plan showing the arrangement of the
equipment in the containment shell is shown in Fig. 4.20, and a
cut-away drawing is shown in Fig. 4.22.
The large primary coolant pipe lines connecting the reactor pres
sure vessel to the steam generator are arranged to obtain minimum
flow length between these components, consistent with the flexibility
they must have to withstand the differential temperature growth
under normal and transient operating conditions. Owing to the
Fig. 4.22 — Cutaway view of the containment vessel showing arrangement

of equipment.
166
-
---
Les 1.
!
the
* the
che p
Tienter
P e and
elount o
lowi
Baf!! primary
Assen
fecerated f
s delivered
Cuds from a
Fig. 4.17--A cutaway view dizero power
Lumum allc
: . Tstem ( the
sheath of stainless steel 1. it is design
: 20 to 85 pe
the problems of ditte
and the absorbing
The follower r che primary lo
2 ressel in wh
her to form
e water by alte
on the up
de transients
containing
th on -absorb
er in the syste
blete res *** detail in Fig
is sport system .
Fig. 4.11 enerator and
essurizer
173
THE X.S. SATANYA
PRESSURE
offer the minimum

OUTLET
B
STEAM
DRUM
,PSIA
rangement that lo
9 on the center line
50
the containment as
boilers, are located
port and starboard
of the major com
gned to adequately
and under the most
ng structure is ar
TEMPERATURE
he ring girders of
3
of the containment
PRIMARY
WATER
$ 20
ctural steel and the
,F
NE
Idle or upper quad
to the free flexure
arrangement of the
in Fig. 4.20, and a
500 ng the reactor pres

3.
to obtain minimum
with the flexibility
emperature growth
0 23 ins. Owing to the
HEAT TRANSFERRED 0 260
14.418_Primary water temperature to 1. c . **
18. load, for rated load its 12.12 .
All material in contact with the resourie 1.2

tat-transport system is stainless stee. Te
-Estem are limited to an acceptable fete timing
und cooling rates to approximately 31 °F br. Bura me te
heat-transport system are ventable and disable The
connected to a gaseous-waste- disposal system se mi
ag zeilema
are connected to the equipment drain and
(a) Steam Generators. Each of the two sum
sists ofa U -tubeU -shell lower drum with the primary piece
necting to the inlet and outlet nozzles on the healsof
as shown in Figs. 4.20 and 4:21. This lower drum fome fare
mection. It has an over - all length of about 30 ft mic
stainless-steel 34-in-0.D. tubes
connected to an upper drum, l.ocaTtheed oshnetllhesidcteoentoefr tthheesviizta'e
the lower drum,by meansof 13 risers and8 ntar we s
and downcomers are designed to ensure natural amat
howing
m
loads and positions of the ship. Cyclone separstans it
unusual strength of the primary piping system and to the relatively

short lengths involved, this piping is supported only at the ends ;
no intermediate supports are necessary.
( d ) Heat- transport Auxiliary Systems. In addition to the main
components in the heat-transport system , a number of auxiliary sys
tems are provided. These are : ( 1 ) a pressurizing system ; ( 2 ) re
lief system ; ( 3 ) primary -loop purification system ; ( 4) hydrogen
addition system ; ( 5 ) buffer-seal system ; and ( 6 ) emergency cooling
system . Some of these are located within the containment vessel,
some within the secondary shielding, and others outside the sec
ondary shielding.
Since the details of these systems are given in Appendix C, they
are discussed only briefly here. The pressurizing system has already
been mentioned ; its purpose is to limit the pressure fluctuations
caused by thermal expansion and contraction of the primary -system
coolant during power -plant load transients.
The relief system , as its name implies, is provided to prevent the
pressure at any point in the nuclear portion of the plant from ex
ceeding that for which it was designed .
The primary purification system removes impurities from the
primary cooling water. It involves a low-pressure resin-bed de
mineralizer system , which maintains the primary water purity and
provides buffer -seal inlet water to the 21 control-rod shaft seals via
the buffer-seal system .
Certain inert gases, such as argon , xenon , krypton, and radon,
which may accumulate from fission products, will not be removed
by the primary purification. The primary water is stripped of
these gases by a gas-removal arrangement at the buffer -seal surge
tank .
The buffer -seal system supplies high -pressure purified water to
the control -rod -drive buffer seals, thereby preventing outward leak
age of primary cooling water. This system is also arranged to
inject purified make -up water into the primary system when needed.
The hydrogen -addition system maintains a hydrogen atmosphere
in the low - pressure buffer-seal surge tank to recombine with oxy
gen formed from dissociation of water by radiation and for strip
ping the fission -product gases previously mentioned.
Finally, there is the emergency cooling system, provided to re
move the decay heat from the core of the reactor when all elec
trical power supplies are inoperative, except the 300-kw diesel elec
tric generator on the navigating -bridge deck.
4-6.4 Secondary System
The secondary system transfers the heat energy in the form of
saturated steam from the steam generators to the main and auxiliary
turbines, as indicated in Fig. 4.5. The steam pressure at the turbines

varies between 445 psig at maximum power to 715 psig at zero load .
The secondary system also includes the condensate return and feed
water- heating system by means of which the water in the secondary
system is returned to the steam generators. In addition to furnishing
steam to the main and auxiliary turbines, the secondary system also
supplies steam to the low - pressure steam generator.
A quick -closing stop valve is located in the steam line from
each steam generator, just outside the containment vessel shell, to
cut off the steam from either steam generator should a large leak
suddenly occur from the primary system into the boilers. These
valves are designed to close in less than a second. A stop -check
valve is also provided in each line.
A main and an auxiliary feed line are provided from the main
feed pumps to each steam generator. As required by code, each
line is provided with a stop -check valve, a regulating valve, and
a stop valve. The stop -check valves and regulating valves are
located just aft of the engine-room bulkhead . The regulating valves
in the main and auxiliary lines are automatically operated in con
junction with the three-element boiler control system previously
mentioned . The main and auxiliary feed lines join just before pene
trating the engine -room bulkhead ; thus only one line goes into
each boiler. An electric-motor -operated gate valve is located in the
single feed- water line just outside the containment vessel to isolate
the boiler, when necessary .
The condensate return system is of conventional design. As shown
in Fig. 4.5 , the condensate lines from the propulsion line and the
auxiliary turbogenerators join just before the main line enters the
first- stage feed -water heater. From the latter the water passes to
the deaerating feed -water heater and on to the main feed pump.
The main feed -water pump is steam driven and supplied directly
from the main steam header to the propulsion turbine. The main
feed -water pump delivers the water to the steam generators, thus
completing the cycle.
A special feature of the secondary system is the bypass around the
propulsion turbine by means of which high -pressure steam can be
dumped directly into the condenser without passing through the
turbine. This bypass is provided to give additional flexibility in the
control of the ship. In case of a sudden drop in turbine load, the
steam pressure would tend to rise rapidly, and this would auto
matically open the dump valve and discharge steam directly into the
condenser. The steam dump will also be of value in permitting
reactor testing to full power at dockside, thus permitting all reactor
auxiliaries to be tested prior to sea trials.
4-6.5 Supporting Systems
In addition to the primary -loop auxiliary system described briefly

in Sec. 4-6.3 and in detail in Appendix C , a number of supporting
systems are provided . These include a sampling system to determine
the purity of the water in various parts of the reactor system , an
intermediate cooling system , the containment air -conditioning system ,
the electrical system supplying power to the reactor system , an
equipment-drain and waste- collection system , a gaseous-waste- collec
tion system , and a decay -heat removal system .
The details of these various supporting systems are presented in
Appendix D, but a brief description of their function is given here
for a better understanding of the propulsion system as a whole .
The sampling system has the following functions: ( 1 ) to supply
representative liquid samples to indicate the effectiveness of the
primary -loop purification system ; ( 2 ) to supply liquid samples of
the drains collected in the laboratory waste tank , high- and low
activity -waste storage tanks, and the inner-bottom tanks ; and ( 3 ) to
supply aа continuous flow of primary water to a fission -product moni
tor and deionized water to a radiation monitor.
The main function of the intermediate cooling system is to furnish
clean cooling water to the various components in the reactor system.
The system also provides an intermediate barrier between the pri
mary water system and the sea . Basically the intermediate cooling
system consists of two intermediate coolers, cooled by sea water,
through which fresh water flows to a number of different compo
nents. For example, there is a line to the cooling coils in the reactor
shield tank . Here, the cold water removes heat from the annular
water shield that surrounds the reactor pressure vessel . Another
line furnishes cold water to the shaft seals of the primary circulating
pumps. The two intermediate coolers were designed for the sea
water to enter at 85 ° F and leave at 106 ° F. The fresh water enters
at 143 ° F and leaves at 95 ° F . Further details of the intermediate
cooling system are given in Appendix D.
The containment- vessel air -conditioning system is designed to
maintain a constant maximum ambient temperature of 130° F and
a maximum relative humidity of 80 percent within the vessel . Cool
ing water for this system is derived from the intermediate cooling
system at a maximium temperature of 95 ° F. During normal opera
tion of the propulsion system , the containment vessel is inaccessible,
and no outside air is introduced to , or discharged from , the vessel.
Any moisture condensed on the dehumidifying coil will be removed
by a suitable drain line to the containment drain tank. The air
temperature and humidity in the vessel is indicated on the main
control console, thereby permitting manual adjustment of the cool
ing- water flow , as required, to maintain the desired temperature

conditions inside the containment.
The routine handling of radioactive materials is a new operation
for ship personnel. Since such materials are potentially dangerous,
considerable attention has been given to procedures for their han
dling aboard the Savannah as well as their ultimate disposal .
During normal operation of the reactor system , fission products
build up within the core of the reactor and in systems external to
the reactor as a result of neutron interaction with the primary cool
ant and materials of construction. During normal operations of the
pressurized-water system , long - lived radioactive gases are produced
by activation of the primary-system corrosion products and short
lived wastes resulting from the activation of the primary coolant.
The radioactivity in the primary cooling water is due largely to
short- lived isotopes of oxygen and nitrogen. Continuous operation
of the reactor at its normal power will maintain a level of 45 to 50
curies of short- lived radioactive isotopes in the water.
Although pure water itself does not acquire long -lived radioac
tivity in a nuclear reactor, any corrosion products that might form
in the system do become radioactive, and every precaution must be
taken not only to maintain rates of corrosion at a minimum but to
remove corrosion products from the system before they can accumu
late to an appreciable degree. Experience with other reactors using
stainless steel in the primary system indicates that the hydrogen
concentration of the water is important in controlling the rate of
corrosion and that a pH (hydrogen- ion concentration ) of about 10
is desirable. These insoluble corrosion products, which are mixtures
of oxides of iron , chromium , and nickel, are almost completely
removed at the bypass filter and ion exchanger. The filter cake,
ion -exchanger resin , and the back - flush and service water would thus
contain long - lived activity such as Feng and Co. The filters and
resin beds are shielded during operation and are designed to allow
for ready removal and replacement.
Two waste -collection systems are installed to remove radioactive
wastes from the reactor system , one for handling liquid wastes and
the other for handling gaseous wastes.. The equipment-drain and
waste -collection system is designed to collect from the reactor system
all drainage that might be radioactive.
The gaseous -waste -collection system has two functions: ( 1 ) to
concentrate and accumulate the majority of the radioactive gases
that could be released should a fuel- element cladding defect develop
and ( 2 ) to provide for dilution of some gaseous activity in conjune
tion with filtration and release to the atmosphere at tolerable levels.
The decay -heat removal system is provided to remove heat gener
ated in the core of the reactor as a result of the decay of the radio
active fission products after the reactor has been shut down. Nor
mally, decay heat is removed while the primary system is held at
1,750 psi and 508 ° F. During refueling, however, decay -heat removal
must proceed with the reactor open .
Only existing equipment having other functions during normal
operation is used to remove the decay heat. This equipment involves
the primary circulating pumps, the steam generators, the let - down
coolers, and the buffer charge pumps.
Immediately following a reactor shutdown for any reason , the
diesel generators will start automatically and take over the electrical
load. Suitable starting and switching equipment is provided for this
purpose. If the primary circulating pumps are kept operating, the
decay heat will be removed by generating steam in the boilers. Some
of this steam will operate the main feed pump, and the remainder
will pass through the auxiliary condenser dump line, where its heat
will be transferred to sea water. There is sufficient heat -storage
capacity in the steam generators and primary system to operate the
turbogenerators at full load for at least 15 min .
In the event the reactor is shut down as a result of having to cut
off the steam from both boilers, the subsequent decay heat can be
removed through the purification system to the let-down coolers
( supplied from the intermediate cooling system ) and then to the sea.
The maximum heat load the let- down coolers can accommodate will
be equal to decay -heat generation at about 10 min after the scram
occurs. The decay heat generated for the first 10 min after scram
will not produce any adverse effects since the heat capacity of the
loop is such that the average temperature will rise only 10° F.
Either of these methods of removing decay heat is adequate to main
tain the reactor at a safe temperature level for an indefinite period
of time.
When it becomes necessary to cool the primary loop to a tempera
ture level that requires no pressurization , the pressure and corre
sponding temperature on the secondary side of the boiler may be
lowered slowly. The rate at which the temperature decreases will
be set so that excessive thermal stresses will not be set up in any of
the heavy slow-cooling components. When the heat -transport-loop
temperature has been decreased to approximately 250° F by the steam
generators ( with the pressurizer still maintaining a safe subcooled
condition ), the let-down coolers can be used to cool down the rest
of the way to 160 ° F , the value tentatively set as the refueling tem
perature.
Summarizing, there are two safe and adequate means of removing
the decay heat produced in the reactor after shutdown : ( 1 ) by use
of the primary system to transport the heat from the reactor to the
steam generator, where it is dissipated in generating steam , and
( 2 ) by use of the let-down coolers in the purification system .
4-6.6 Electrical System
The electrical system that supplies power to the reactor system

and its auxiliaries is designed to provide a high degree of reliability
to assure reactor safety during all phases of operation, including
periods of shutdown. The system consists of the load control and
protective devices, containment wiring, and all metering, interlock
ing, and alarms associated with electrical loads for the reactor sys
tem ( Fig. 4.23 ) .
Power for the system is normally supplied by two turbogenerators
( Fig. 4.5 ) , each rated at 1,500 kw, 0.8 power factor, 450 v, 3 phase,
60 cycles. For increased reliability, a double --bus arrangement is
used , and, for continuity of power in the event of a bus fault, an
automatic transfer arrangement is provided so that operation of the
bus differential relays will transfer all vital loads from the faulted
bus to the opposite bus. During normal operation the two buses are
tied together by a normally closed circuit breaker.
In addition to the main turbogenerator supply, two auxiliary
750- kw diesel electric generator sets are installed in the engine room
to serve the following functions:
1. Provide power to the main bus for operating those loads re
quired to supply decay -heat cooling to the reactor after a scram
shutdown .
2. Provide emergency take- home power in the event of failure of
the nuclear power plant.
3. Provide power for reactor start-up .
4. Provide spare generating capacity for normal operation in case
of failure of a main turbogenerator.
During normal operation the two auxiliary diesel generators will
be on stand -by. In the event of a reactor scram or emergency, these
diesel generators will be automatically started and synchronized on
the main bus which , in turn , will supply and distribute power to the
components required for reactor cooling. Since the capacity of each
diesel generator is adequate to furnish power for decay-heat removal
and an additional small amount for lighting and ship services, an
emergency condition will not arise if either diesel fails in starting
The steam generators and primary coolant loop, as previously ex
plained , have sufficient heat storage to allow the turbogenerators to
be held on the line at full electrical load for a period of 15 min after
scram . The diesel generators should start in 10 sec . If emergency
take -home power is required , either diesel generator can be used to
operate the 750 -hp wound -rotor take -home motor.
A 300 -kw emergency diesel generator is also provided. This
emergency unit is installed above the bulkhead deck and will supply
GENERATOR
TURBO DIESEL DIESEL TURBOGENERATOR
KW
1500 GENERATOR GENERATOR KW
1500
KW
750 KW
750 EMERGENCY
180
GENERATOR
300KW
v
50 B
V US
450 SECTIONI MOTOR
H
- OME
TAKE 450
BUSY
2V
SECTION
‫לל‬
120/1/60
120
B
VUS BUS BUS
E450
V MERGENCY
ROD
CONTROL
TO
5DC
A
/ CT D
/)AC ‫ללללללל‬ CUBICLE ?
17
L00-0
-00-0
OPERATED
MOTOR
TO EMERGENCY
SHIP'S
-G
M
SM-GETS
PANEL
VALVE LOADS
BATTERY
F
V
120 LOATING
CONTROL CONSOLE -
CONTROL ROD CUBICLE
11
III
SECTION D- 1
CGP
. ONTROL TRANSFER
OTION C- 2
SWITCH
SECTION A- 1
TO EMERGENCY COOLING M. O. VALVES
SECTION D-2
mPRESSURIZER
H
m EATERS
) )
SECTION C-1
1STATION
)
BUS
450V
TO
c
O
TO STATION
2
V
450 CONTROL
GROUP
TO EMERGENCY SWBD .
120
TO
V/160
BUS
BUS TO
CRITICAL
11
.PANEL
INSTR
TO 120 BUS
SECTION A-2
CONTROL
ROD
QOQ CUBICLE
PANEL
VALVE . ANEL
PINSTR
CRITICAL
CONTAINMENT
IN
TRANSFORMER
FIG ROD
CONTROL
electri
diagra .23
ne mcal
-lO—.4. ine MOTORS
PUMP
THE X.S. SALANNAH 181
power to the 150 - v emergency switchboard . This source will provide

power during an emergency in which both the main turbogenerators
and the auxiliary diesel generators are inoperable. Loads such as
emergency lighting, the low -speed windings of the primary coolant
pump motors, and the emergency cooling system will be connected
to the emergency switchboard . The emergency generator can be
started from the main control room .
Finally, a battery -protected source of electrical power is provided
for supplying power to those loads requiring an especially depend
able power source with no interruption due to switching or loss of
auxiliary power. Two alternating current- direct current motor
generator sets, fed from the main bus, have their d -e generators
connected to a 120 - v d -c bus in parallel with a storage battery. Dur
ing normal operation the storage battery floats on the d -c line and
is maintained in a fully charged condition at all times. The a -c
generators of these motor generators supply the necessary 120 - v a -c
power for nuclear and nonnuclear instrumentation . Each motor
generator is capable of supplying the full demand load of the system
that it serves ; therefore, one of the sets will serve as a stand -by for
the other set . An alternate supply of 120 - v single -phase 60 - cycle
power is taken from a bus supplied by 450 / 120 - v transformers.
The electrical loads associated with the nuclear plant may be
grouped as follows :
1. Battery -protected loads : These loads cannot be interrupted by
loss or switching of auxiliary power. Included in this category
are instrumentation , reactor control, and radiation -monitoring
system loads.
2. Emergency diesel generator-protected loads : These loads are so
vital to reactor and ship safety that they must be maintained
despite the loss of all auxiliary power. Included in this group
are emergency lighting, emergency cooling system , and the low
speed windings of the primary coolant pump motors.
3. Auxiliary diesel generator -protected loads: These loads must
be operable whenever power from the main turbogenerators is
not available, for example, during periods of reactor shutdown
or turbogenerator failures. These loads include the primary
coolant pumps, air -conditioning fans, pressurizer heaters , bufer
charge pumps, and the fresh -water and salt-water circulating
pumps in the intermediate cooling system .
4. Noncritical loads : Loads under this classification are not re
quired for reactor cooling after shutdown. Also , their loss
would not greatly affect the operation of the nuclear steam
generator. These loads are tripped from the line in the event
of a reactor scram .
4-6.7 Utilization of Heat Energy in Main and Auxiliary Turbines
The propulsion -machinery plant on the Savannah includes the

main propulsion unit and all the necessary auxiliaries for a single
screw passenger - cargo ship, consistent with the best merchant-marine
practice and workmanship. Certain special features that are con
sidered necessary and expedient in a completely new type of ship
of this kind have been incorporated .
The general arrangement of the machinery is shown in Figs. 4.6
and 4.7. The main propulsion unit is a cross -compound geared
steam turbine, of special design to meet the saturated - steam condi
tions peculiar to the nuclear plant, which drives the propeller
through a line of shafting at about 107 rpm when delivering about
20,000 shp under normal conditions. The unit is capable, however,
of continuous operation when developing 22,000 shp at about 110 rpm
under maximum power conditions.
( a ) Steam and Exhaust Systems. The main steam lines are in
stalled independently from the outlet of each steam generator but
are then combined at a junction and led through a cyclone type
steam separator to the main turbine maneuvering manifold . A
strainer is installed before the ahead and astern maneuvering valves.
The main throttle valve, astern valve, and boiler stop valves are all
controlled from inside the engine-room control station .
The main steam line also serves the two auxiliary turbogenerators
as well as the main feed - water pump, which, as previously men
tioned, is steam driven. The exhaust steam from this pump is deliv
ered to the third -stage, or high -pressure, feed- water heater. Excess
steam passes from the high -pressure heater to the direct-contact
(deaerating ) heater. Any excess steam over that needed by the feed
water heaters is dumped to the main or auxiliary condensers. As
explained previously, sufficient maneuverability for the main turbine
and generator units is provided by a system with dump valves to
spill excess steam to the main condenser.
( b ) Boiler Feed System . Three boiler feed pumps are installed ;
two are the main feed pumps, and the third is the port feed pump.
All three pumps are connected to take suction from the direct
contact heater outlet and to discharge to the boiler drums via two
common feed lines. One of these lines is the main feed line, incor
porating the high -pressure heater as well as the feed-water regu
lators and stop and check valves. The feed -pump suction and dis
charge lines are cross connected and arranged so that one pump may
be overhauled while the other is in service. In addition to the con
nections just described , the port feed pump is connected to take suc
tion from the distilled -water tanks.
( c) Drain Collecting System . A steam and fresh -water drain

collecting system collects the drains from all high -pressure steam
lines , valves, turbine gland - seal drains, low points in the steam ex
haust, and other machinery. All high -pressure steam lines, valves,
and equipment subject to full boiler pressure under operating con
ditions are drained by branches connected to the high -pressure drain
collecting main .
The high - pressure drain collecting main consists of a single pipe
or loop extending, where necessary , through the machinery space.
All parts of this drain are lower than the parts to be drained . The
discharge from this main is connected to an atmospheric drain tank
through a perforated pipe below the normal working level.
( d ) Condensate System . There are two main condensate pumps,
each of which has sufficient capacity to handle the condensate from
the condenser under maximum power conditions. These pumps take
suction from the main condenser hot well and discharge to the
deaerating heater through the main air -ejector inter- and after-con
denser and the first stage feed -water heater . Condensate recirculat
ing lines are provided at the air-ejector condensate outlets by means
of automatic recirculating valves that are set to open when the tem
perature of the condensate at the air-ejector outlet reaches 140 ° F .
The recirculated condensate is led to the main and auxiliary con
densers through properly baffled openings.
( e ) Jain and Auxiliary Circulating -water Systems. Sea water
for the main condenser and the main lubricating -oil coolers is sup
plied by scoop circulation when underway, but a main circulating
pump is provided for use when starting up and maneuvering. The
main valves on the circulating system are motor operated and con
trolled from the main control room . A bilge suction is connected
to the main circulating -pump suction line for emergency use. * This
bilge -suction connection is fitted with a strainer and stop -check
valve. The lubricating -oil coolers are connected in parallel with the
main condenser.
An auxiliary circulating water system is provided for the auxiliary
condensers and their associated turbogenerator lubricating -oil and
air coolers. Two auxiliary condenser circulating water pumps are
installed with a common sea suction and with discharges cross con
nected so that either pump can supply either condenser or its asso
ciated turbogenerator unit. The circulating system and auxiliary
condenser are installed so as to permit circulation through the con
denser, generator lubricating -oil cooler, and generator air cooler even
when the ship is operating in a light-draft condition.
• The U.S. Coast Guard requires that the circulating pump be installed in such a
manner that it can be used as a bilge pump in an emergency .
613489 0-62-13
4-6.8 Machinery -space Ventilation
The machinery spaces aboard the Savannah are ventilated by

mechanical ventilating systems. The supply system consists of three
40,000 -cfm fans, suitable weather intakes located in forward portions
of the top of the ship, and all necessary ducts with terminals and
dampers. The exhaust systems also are provided with three 40,000
cfm fans.. One of these exhaust fans is in the upper casing to ex
haust air from the upper level of the engine room . The other two
exhaust fans have duct runs with intakes located in the immediate
vicinity of equipment and main pipe runs where the possibility of
air contamination through leakage or failure of joints exists. The
air from the exhaust system is discharged to the weather through
openings located in the aft portion of the top of the ship. The sys
tems are designed to ensure a pressure slightly below atmospheric in
the machinery spaces .
With outside air at 90 ° F , the temperature in the engine room at
main operating panels and watch stations is not to exceed 110 ° F ; at
all other operating stations, aisles, and working levels, the tempera
ture is not to exceed 120 ° F .
Provision is made to furnish mechanical exhaust systems of 4,000
cfm capacity to serve the void spaces around the upper portions of
the reactor containment vessel and a single such system for the lower
void spaces. The air supply to these spaces, however, is by natural
ventilation .
In addition, a mechanical exhaust system is provided with a
capacity of 1,500 cfm to exhaust air from the containment vessel.
This system will be used for purging the air inside the containment
vessel prior to reactor shut down and containment- vessel entry. One
of the penetrations in the containment vessel is fitted with a tail pipe
and valve to supply air to the containment. This valve will be
opened when the containment exhaust system is operated.
Specific data on the main and auxiliary machinery are given in
Appendix E.
4-7 CONTAINMENT AND SHIELDING
4-7.1 General
The general philosophy and basis of design of containment vessels

for nuclear reactors is considered in detail in Chap. 5. As explained
in that chapter, the solution to the containment problem aboard
nuclear ships can be approached in three different ways: by the use
of unit containment involving a separate hermetically sealed con
tainment vessel held rigidly within the ship ; by the use of compart
ment containment in which the ship's structure itself is reinforced
to withstand maximum internal pressure ; or by what is known as
" controlled ” containment, i.e., the use of a light-weight containment
vessel fitted with pressure -relief blowout devices to permit the con
trolled escape of flashed steam and fission products to preselected
ship compartments.
The Savannah employs the unit -containment technique. This
method appeared superior since it was easily adapted to the ship's
structure without major reinforcement or compartment arrangement.
4-7.2 Containment Description
As shown in Fig. 4.22, the containment vessel is a cylinder with

hemispherical heads. The vessel measures 35 ft in diameter and
5012 ft in length. The containment vessel was fabricated entirely
at the New York Shipbuilding Corporation, in four sections. A
cupola, 1312 ft in diameter by 1612 ft high is mounted on the verti
cal center line of the vessel ; this houses the control-rod drives.
A hatch at the top of the cupola is provided for refueling and gen
eral servicing of the reactor. Two access hatches, 42 in . in diameter
located fore and aft of the cupola, are provided for replacing or
servicing components such as pumps, valves, and other control
elements.
As the basis for the design of this containment vessel , the follow
ing requirements were established :
1. The containment vessel is to remain sealed at all times during
plant operation .
2. The design pressure of the vessel will be determined by postu
lating the instantaneous release and expansion ( as steam or
vapor) of the entire content of the primary system .
3. No high -pressure high -temperature piping containing primary
water will be permitted to penetrate the containment vessel.
4. All penetrations of the containment for wires and piping will
be designed to withstand the containment design pressure, and
the number of such penetrations will be kept to a minimum .
5. Any equipment that might fail or give trouble during plant
operation will either be installed in duplicate or provision will
be made to isolate the faulty equipment from the rest of the
plant, in most instances without hindering plant operation.
6. Normally, no entrance to the containment vessel will be per
mitted until the plant has been shut down , the vessel has been
purged with air, and the radiation level has been reduced to
permissible tolerance.
In the construction of the containment vessel all the above require

ments were adhered to, but, with respect to item 6, an air lock has
been provided on one of the 42-in . access openings to allow a man
to enter without violating containment .
4–7.3 Design and Fabrication of Containment Vessel
The vessel is designed for a maximum internal pressure of 186
psig. This design pressure results from requirement 2 and is perhaps
an overdesign because of the improbability of a large rupture in the
primary system . When the design pressure was being calculated, no
allowance was made for the cooling effect of the vessel wall and the
internal structural steel or the large volume of water in the primary
shield around the reactor. Also, it was assumed that the vessel's
ambient air instantaneously absorbs heat from the flashing mixture,
causing its temperature to rise immediately to the same value as the
mixture.
The containment vessel was designed according to the best engi
neering practice and subject to the approval of the Coast Guard and
the American Bureau of Shipping.
In the fabrication of the containment vessel, the cylindrical sec
tion and the two hemispherical sections were constructed as separate
subassemblies. These two subassemblies, together with the cylin
drical section and the cupola, after being furnace stress relieved ,
were taken to the ship and joined by welding. All welds were
checked by dye penetrant inspection and radiography. Upon com
pletion of the assembly, all penetrations for control wiring, power
wiring, and piping were blanked off by flanges and the access
hatches were sealed by temporary covers while the containment ves
sel was filled with 1,200 tons of water and subjected to a hydro
static test . After the hydrostatic test was completed, the lead and
polyethylene secondary shielding was applied to the outside of the
containment vessel .
4–7.4 Shielding
For most land -based nuclear power plants, the choice of shielding
material and design characteristics generally revolves around costs,
but shipboard applications introduce a second and probably more
difficult problem , that of reducing the weight of the shields without
appreciably raising first costs. Shielding represents an appreciable
percentage of the total weight of the ship . Although shielding
weight is least when shields are placed as close to the radiation
source as possible, two factors work against this close- in feature
in ships, namely, the need to service the equipment routinely and
under emergency conditions and the need for rigid structural mem
bers upon which to'fasten the secondary shielding to resist the effects
of pitch , roll , and possible collision or grounding of the ship .
The shielding consists of the primary shielding (around the reactor
vessel) and the secondary shielding. The primary shielding atten
uates the core neutron flux to such an extent that materials outside
this shield will not undergo sufficient neutron interaction to become
important sources of gamma radiation . It also shields fission
product-decay gamma radiation emanating from the core . The
primary shield reduces gamma radation originating in the pressure
vessel and in the thermal insulation to values that permit limited
access to the interior of the containment after reactor shutdown.
The secondary shielding further attenuates the neutron and
gamma radiation from the reactor during operation and the 6.3 -Mev
gamma radiation from the N16 formation in the primary -loop water
to acceptable dose -rate levels at the exterior of the shield. This sec
ondary, or biological , shield in the case of the Savannah reactor
is placed at the exterior of the containment vessel. Thus, the bio
logical shield serves also to reduce personnel radiation exposure
hazards during a reactor accident involving release of fission
products.
The primary shield consists of a 33-in . annulus of light water sur
rounding the pressure vessel and extending 17 ft 21/2 in . from a
point well below the active core to well above it . The water annulus
is supplemented by a lead shield at the outer tank wall. The lead
extends above the primary shield tank and is applied to the insu
lation canning in this area ; it varies in thickness to optimize shield
weight while reducing reactor gamma radiation to a constant level
at the containment wall . The primary shield is more than sufficient
to limit the dose rate to 200 mr /hr inside the containment vessel
half an hour after shutdown.
The secondary shielding consists of a combination of from 5.2 to
6 in. of lead and a minimum of 8 in. of polyethylene around the
upper portion of the containment vessel , and concrete ( around the
lower portion of sufficient thickness to reduce reactor and coolant
radiation doses to allowable levels. The general arrangement of the
secondary shielding is shown in Fig. 4.24. Basically , the concrete
encloses the lower part of the containment vessel and vestibule ; the
top part is covered with lead and polyethylene. Where space re
quirements were stringent, barytes concrete was used because of its
greater density and better shielding quality. Salt -water ballast and
fresh -water tanks 5 ft deep are provided in the inner bottom beneath
the concrete to minimize radiation streaming.
MAIN LOUNGE
OS REM /YR
MAICM COVER POLYETHYLENE
PROM DK .
DISPENSARY
FAN ROOM
& OPER , ROOM
S REM / YR
PASSAGE
OSREM / YR
BARBER
REMY
LEAD A DK .
CREW
REACTOR
MAIN GALLEY
S REM / YR
HATCH
DECONTAM
SHOWER " 1 " DK .
AUX
.
PASS
-C OK .
STORES
LOADING
PASSAGE
* D * DK .
R/YS EM
De
R
SPACE
.MACR
ORDINARY
CONCRETE
14-0 FLAT
CROSS ORDINARY STEEL LARYTES
FLOODING CONCRETE CONTAINER LEAD
CONCRETE
& PASSAGE POLYETHYLENE
1,1
MO
126 UL.
CROSS 100
FLOODING
DUCT
(a)
ENTR
.CREW
WEATHER DK .
PASS
PASS
KUS
PASSENGER S. R. PASSENGER S.R.

0.5 REM / YA . OS REMY
PASS
PASS
CREW QUARTERS STEWARD'S MESS

CREW PANTRY
3 REMYR
S REM / YR
LEAD
PASS, BAG PASSAGE MAIN LAUNO RY
BUTCHER SHOP & LINEN
S REM / YR 5 REM / YR
PASS
LEAD DEV , STORES

REFRIG . STORES
S REM / YR PASS REFRIG. STORES
SREM YR .
PASS
PASS
STABILIZER STABILIZER
REFRIG . STORES REFRIG STORES
3 REMY 3 REM / YR
AT NORMAL POWER AT NORMAL POWER
STARLIZES
PASS
STABILIZER REFR
STEWARO'S STORES STORES 5 REMYR
| SEMYR AT NORMAL
AI NORMAL POWER POWER
HO
180 PORT
(b )
CROSS FLOODING DUCT

ELEV
! 17 " LEAD
CL
120
STEEL CONTAINER
LEAD
CONCRETE
(ORDINARY
ELEV POLYETHYLENE ORDINARY CONCRETE
COLLISION MAT & SHIELD

(LAYER I * STEEL , 3* REDWOOD )
PLAN VIEW AT C. I. OF VESSEL
(c)
FIG. 4.24-Containment vessel, showing secondary shielding.

THE X.S. SALAVVAH 189
Other shielding consists of a shielded fuel-transfer plug, a lead

shielded transfer cask for use in refueling operations, and 4 in . of
lead - shielding casing integral with each demineralizer ( ion ex
changer) and effluent filter in the purification system . The upper
portion of the containment vessel, including the control-rod cupola,
is shielded by lead and polyethylene, as indicated in Fig. 4.24.
The drawings also show the collision mats and antirolling chocks
built up from alternate layers of 1 - in . steel plate and 3 - in . redwood
planks. These mats form an integral part of the shielding and at
the same time provide protection against penetration of the contain
ment vessel in the event of collision.
4-7.5 Design Dose Rates
Before the design of the shielding could proceed , it was necessary

to establish shipboard radiation -dosage levels and to determine
shipboard practice in regard to the control and accessibility of var
ious ship compartments to the crew and passengers. It was known
that the shielding would weigh between 1,000 and 2,000 tons, depend
ing upon the radiation levels and accessibility permitted . This,
understandably, has a major effect upon the entire ship.
It was decided that the shield should satisfy the following restric
tions on the allowable radiation levels in areas to which passengers
and crew have access.
1. In all areas to which passengers have access, radiation levels
will not be greater than an integrated dosage of 0.5 rem / year.
This is a conservative figure since it is determined by the point
of highest activity assuming a person stayed at that point
for the entire year. When allowance is made for movement
aboard ship and distance from the core , the average exposure
received by any passenger will probably be about 0.15 rem ,
comparable to what he would receive on land from background
soil radioactivity and cosmic radiation. When these radiation
levels were determined , credit was taken for the fact that the
average integrated reactor power during the year will be
50 MW ( 66 percent of normal power) .
2. In all areas to which crew members have free access, radiation
levels will not be more than 5 rem integrated dose per year.
This dose rate has been recommended by the U.S. National
Research Council and the National Committee on Radiation
Protection . Since an area with a 5 -rem level is small and not
an area of general use and since no crew member will be aboard
the ship a full year, it is extremely doubtful whether any crew
member will receive more than an integrated dose of 0.5 rem
in a year .
3. Only the engineering crew and officers will be allowed access

to the controlled machinery spaces, and they will be required
to wear personal dosimeters. Deck hands and other ship's per
sonnel will not be permitted in these spaces without the Cap
tain's permission. Engineers will be limited to an integrated
dose of 5 rem / year. This will include radiation received in
their living quarters and in “ restricted areas," such as the con
tainment vessel, where time will be rigidly supervised.
4. Certain areas are noted as " limited areas" and are not normally
entered when the reactor is at power. These areas include the
fan room , baggage compartment, certain refrigeration space,
and possibly one hold forward of the reactor compartment.
At full reactor power ( 70 Mw ), a dose rate of 1 rem per
168 -hr week will be permitted in these areas. They will remain
locked at all times, and the Captain's permission will be re
quired for access.
The 33 in. of water and the 1 to 4 in. of lead placed around the
pressure vessel reduces the radiation levels to those from unshielded
primary piping. Since the space around the reactor is at a premium ,
the radiation from the reactor core is divided equally between gamma
and neutron radiation. The dose rate outside the primary shield
with the plant at full power would then be constituted as follows:
approximately 10 percent from neutrons originating in the reactor
core ; 10 percent from gamma rays originating in the reactor core ;
and 80 percent from gamma rays originating in the primary cooling
system . Dose rates from neutrons originating in the primary cool
ing system are negligible.
In the interest of determining what the penalty in terms of
shielding weight would be by reducing radiation levels, as described
above, the shielding weights were computed to attain three levels
of radiation for passengers as follows :
Shielding
weight,
Passengers Crero tons
2 rem / year . 5 rem /year 1 , 030

0.5 rem /year 5 rem /year 1 , 107
0.1 rem /year 5 rem /year 1 , 189
4-8 CONTROL AND INSTRUMENTATION
4-8.1 General
Although a nuclear power reactor serves essentially the same

purpose as a steam - boiler furnace in a conventional power plant in
that it is the source of heat , the control of a reactor is very different
from that of a steam boiler and furnace.
The power level of a nuclear reactor is a function of the neutron

flux, and this is measured by neutron- sensitive instruments of various
kinds, depending upon the degree of sensitivity required. The basic
instrument involved in these neutron detectors is the ionization
chamber, which, in its simplest form, is a cylindrical chamber, the
walls of which serve as one electrode of an electrical circuit. In the
center of the chamber is placed the other electrode in the form of
a thin rod or wire. The chamber is filled with a gas, such as argon ,
carbon dioxide, nitrogen , or even air, at a low pressure.. When the
instrument is in use, an electric potential is impressed across the
electrodes and adjusted so that, normally, the gas in the chamber
will not conduct electricity. However, if any ionizing radiation ,
such as X rays, gamma rays, or beta particles, enters the chamber,
the gas becomes conducting, and an electric current will be set up
in the circuit. This current usually is in the form of very weak
pulses; therefore the pulses have to be amplified by electronic
amplifying equipment to be read or counted. These ionization
chambers can also be modified to detect neutrons.
No attempt is made here to describe the details of all the various
types of pulse chambers, counters, scalers, and other neutron -sensi
tive instruments available nor the various types of electronic ampli
fiers, discriminators, and integrating circuits that are associated
with these circuits. All of them together provide an enormous
counting or measuring range, extending from the measurement of
single neutron counts per second to hundreds of billions of neutrons
per square centimeter per second .
Because no single instrument can cover such a wide range, reactor
control systems involve a series of counting chains or measuring
channels which overlap each other to provide a continuous measuring
range over the entire neutron - flux variation from zero to full power.
Each of these channels usually consists of aa suitable neutron detector
connected to electronic amplifying circuits, which , in turn , connect
to visual or recording instruments and also to automatic control
devices. For example, certain of the measuring channels are con
nected directly to the scram release mechanisms so as to automat
ically shut down the reactor in case of too rapid a rise in power
level. A more complete discussion is given in Appendix F.
4–8.2 Nuclear Instrumentation
The nuclear instrumentation on the Savannah reactor system con

sists of 10 neutron - flux measuring channels that cover the entire
flux range of the reactor with four measuring ranges from source
power through 150 percent of maximum . As shown in Fig. 4.25,
1011
-3
10
TAMP
1010
-3
10
AMP Normal Operating
Normal Range Normal End
Power Channels Intermediate
10-4 Power Range
AMP
1
109 Channels
108
Power Range
107
Chonnels 8,9 , & 10

/EC
SCM
Intermediate
E
EUTRONS
NEUTRON
Range Channels 5,6, & 7

106
-7
FLUX
10
,NQ
AMP
S
/
100,000 10-8
AMP
C /S
Fission Chamber
Start Up Channels 10,000
3 & 4
104
CAS
1070
1,000
-
100,000 AMP
103 CS 5/5
THERMAL
10,000 100
102 CS C/S
BF Stort Up
Channels 1 & 2
1,000 10
IT
C/ S C /S
10
100
C /S
I COUNT/SEC
1
10
C/ S
10-1
I COUNT/ SEC
10-2
Fig. 4.25 — Chart showing the four overlapping neutron -measuring ranges.
the four measuring ranges are covered by three basic channel groups,
the source -range, intermediate- range, and power -range channels.
The nuclear instrumentation system measures the reactor flux
level and its rate of change and supplies this information to the
reactor operator and the automatic control and safety system .
To prevent blind start-up * of the reactor in a clean condition
( one that has never been operated ) , subcritical neutron multiplica
tion must be detected with the control rods fully inserted. Two
100 -curie Po-Be ( polonium-beryllium) sources located diametrically
opposite each other in the core provide a sufficient source of neu
trons to give a detectable counting rate.
Each of the 10 instrument channels consists of a neutron detector,
electronic amplifiers, and indicating, recording, or integrating in
struments, some of which are connected to automatic control equip
ment. The first four channels ( Nos. 1 , 2, 3, and 4 ) are start-u
channels. Channels 1 and 2 provide neutron - flux - level and start-up
rate ( rate of rise of neutron flux ) information from source power
to approximately one ten -millionth ( 10-? ) of the maximum power
of the reactor, or a neutron counting rate range of from 1 count/ sec
to 100,000 counts /sec.
Channels 3 and 4 each cover the range from one billionth ( 10-0 )
to one ten - thousandth ( 104 ) of maximum power.
The detecting instruments used on channels 1 and 2 are extremely
sensitive. After the neutron-flux level rises into the range of the
intermediate channels, the counters ( detectors ) on channels 1 and 2
are electrically removed to minimize radiation damage to the
detectors.
As the power level of the reactor continues to increase, the rise in
neutron- flux level is accompanied by an increase in the gamma- flux
level. Channels 3 and 4 cover this range ; these channels use detec
tors that are less sensitive to gamma radiation than the detectors
used in channels 1 and 2.
Channels 1, 2, 3, and 4 are similar in operation. Pulses from the
detectors enter a pulse integrator, which contains an amplifier and a
discriminator. The amplifier increases the amplitude of the pulses;
· the discriminator passes only those having magnitudes characteristic
of neutron counts. The pulses are accumulated in the count- rate
circuit , the output current of which is proportional to the pulse rate
from the detector. The log microammeter receives this current and
provides outputs proportional to the reactor start-up rate and the
*A reactor that has never been operated exhibits virtually no radiation at the start,
and in the absence of a neutron source even the most sensitive neutron and radiation
detectors would have difficulty in detecting the degree of neutron activity . An arti
ficial neutron source is usually provided, as explained in Chap. 3, to provide a meas
urable neutron activity .
logarithm of the neutron - flux level . The outputs are displayed as

start-up rate and log count rate. A start -up rate trip signal is fed
to the safety system through the fast -insertion panel to cause rod
insertion for start-up rates greater than a preset limit (approxi
mately one decade per minute ).
Channels 5, 6, and 7 are the intermediate-range channels. These
channels overlap the start-up channels by approximately two dec
ades, covering a power range of approximately one one -millionth
( 10-6) of full power to above full power level .
Channels 8, 9, and 10 cover the power range. These operate over
>
a range of approximately one ten - thousandth of full power ( 6.8 kw )

to 1.5 percent of maximum power (approximately 100,000 kw ) .
The signal outputs from the detectors on these channels enter the
power-range panel, where they are amplified by magnetic ampli
fiers to produce neutron - flux -level information, which is displayed
as percentage of maximum power. A scram -level trip signal is sent
to a panel in the safety system.
4-8.3 Reactor Control System
The focal point of reactor control and instrumentation is the

reactor control console in the central control room. Here are located
the indicating, integrating, and recording instruments that describe
the condition of the entire plant at all times. Alarm signals are
provided which warn the operators of dangerous conditions as soon
as they exist . Control switches are located on this console to permit
the operator to control coolant flow , reactor power, steam flow , etc.,
>
by means of remote motor -operated pumps and valves. In addition,

closed -circuit television is provided to show the actual operation of
important components within the sealed containment vessel during
operation . The console controls operate stop valves to permit iso
lation of a loop in case of leakage or for maintenance of the plant.
A view of the main control console is shown in Fig. 4.26.
The reactor control system is a semiautomatic system that main
tains a constant average primary coolant temperature during steady
state operation. The constant average system temperature-control
scheme minimizes the size of the pressurizer. Variations in coolant
temperature and steam flow are detected by sensors which , through
the control system , supply corrective action to the reactor control
rods. This corrective signal initiates movement of a group of con
trol rods with a velocity proportional to the corrective signal up to
a preset velocity limit. This maximum velocity limits the power
rise rates to a safe value and still permits rapid maneuvering of the
plant. The control system prevents excessive transients in the pri
mary coolant temperatures during demand load changes.
THE SS STANIH 195
: 1
10
000 CODEDCDTI
DODOC
FIG . 4.26Main control console .
‫عے کے‬
+
+ + + ‫ ܦ‬+
CENTRAL
+
ND
+ + +
+
Fig. 4.27 — Control- rod configuration,
Sufficient flexibility is designed into the system for normal auto

matic or manual control. All control rods on the reactor are assigned
to groups, as indicated in Fig. 4.27, and the groups are differentiated
by the terms, " shim groups" and the “ control group . ” The latter
are those rods that are connected to the servo -system , that is, to the
automatic control system. The shim - rod groups are capable of being
manually adjusted only ; whereas the control group can be either
manually or automatically controlled .
The design of the control system was based upon the following
operating conditions :
1. Either automatic or manual control will be used during normal
cruising or steaming conditions, although automatic control is
to be preferred.
2. Automatic control will be used during docking, emergency , or
other maneuvering.
3. The design basis assumes that the operators will always be
present for manual functions regardless of the method of con
trol being used.
4. Transfer to automatic control will be made at some steady
state power level.
Under manual control the system is an open loop in which the
operator is required to make decisions regarding the condition of
the plant. During a maneuvering command the reactor power
output neutron level must be altered by manual control of the control
rods. With this mode of control, the operator can manually posi
tion any rod individually , any of the shim-rod groups or the control
group. Manual control of the plant will be used during the follow
ing phases of operation : ( 1 ) initial criticality and start -up from
subcritical to 15 or 20 percent of full power ; ( 2 ) manual linear
power operation from 20 to 100 percent of full power in the event
the automatic control system has failed or is cut out of the system .
( a ) Initial Criticality and Start-up. During this phase all reactor
operations are in the manual mode of control. All start -ups are
made either from the reactor section of the main operating console
or from the adjacent rod control panel. Manual individual rod con
trol can be carried out most easily from the rod control panel. The
main control panel is used primarily for pump indications and con
trol . The rod control panel is provided to assist the operator ; it
provides a full indication of the condition of the control-rod drive
system .
Assuming that the plant has been brought to thermal equilibrium
at the desired temperature and pressure by manual adjustment of
the control rods, the neutron counting rate and rod positions are
noted . As criticality is approached the rods are withdrawn in
progressively smaller increments with shorter time intervals between
rod motions. After criticality has been reached, the reactor is
brought up to the desired power level on periods greater than or
equal to 35 sec by transferring to manual group operation ( instead
of individual rod operation ) of the servo - controlled rods. After
the system has reached operating temperature and pressure, power
operation can proceed . With the reactor steady at 15 to 20 percent
of full power , the reactor can be transferred to automatic control.
( b ) Manual Linear Power Operation. Manual linear power oper

ation is also open -loop control ; however, in this phase of plant oper
ation , the operator must monitor both the nuclear and the nonnuclear
plant parameters. Manual linear power operation of the reactor
will be carried out by manual group operation of the servo -controlled
rods. The speed of the rod group will be fixed on the basis of the
adjustment for automatic control. The operation of the rods will
be discontinuous, i.e., on or off.
. Setting the rod velocity on this
basis permits the operator to handle maneuvering rates substantially
less than those designed for automatic control. The following are
the control parameters at the disposal of the operator for manual
linear power operation :
1. Engine- order telegraph indicator or annunciator
2. Steam flow at each boiler outlet
3. Total steam flow
4. Turbine throttle positions ( ahead and astern )
5. Secondary steam pressure and temperature
6. Reactor cold -leg temperature ( T )
7. Reactor hot- leg temperature ( TN)
8. Temperature difference across reactor ( Tr- Tc)
9. Neutron level ( reactor thermal power )
10. Reactor period
11. Primary coolant flow
12. Rod - group position
13. Pressurizer level
14. Average temperature [ ( T. + T) ) /2 ]
с
The limitation of this method of operation is the ability of the

operator to maintian primary coolant temperature variations follow
ing load changes, within limits imposed by the pressurizer design .
During normal steady -state operation of the plant, small fluctuations
in load can be handled while the average coolant temperature is
maintained at about 508 ° F. During a maneuvering command, con
trol of the plant will require two operators, one on the reactor oper
ating section and one on the steam -electrical sections of the operating
console.
( c ) Automatic Control of the Plant. The automatic control sys
tem forces or drives the reactor as a heat source to meet the thermal
demand placed on the secondary system and maintains a constant
primary coolant temperature during steady -state operation. An
error signal is derived which is proportional to the difference be
tween the reactor power level and the secondary thermal demand .
This error signal serves as a command to a servo -controlled group
of control rods and positions the group with a velocity proportional
to the magnitude of the error signal up to a preset velocity limit.
The maximum velocity limit will restrict the reactivity insertion

( rate of power rise ) rates to a safe value but will still permit satis
factory maneuvering of the plant. The automatic mode of control
prevents excessive transients in the primary coolant temperature
during load- demand changes and permits the pressurizing system
to handle the volumetric changes.
Figure 4.28 is a diagram showing the results of studies made of
the functioning of the automatic control system. These studies
indicated that a malfunction of the automatic control system which
leads to an abnormal control-rod withdrawal rate will not result in
a fast period. As indicated by Fig. 4.28, minimum periods of
not less than 30 sec result from the maximum withdrawal of the
control rods associated with the automatic control. Although the
load is increased from 20 percent to 85 percent of full power in
10 sec, the minimum reactor period is less than 30 sec.
( d ) Control-rod Operation . There are five commands for control
rod operation , as follows : individual rod control, manual group
control, automatic group control , fast insertion, and scram.
With manual individual rod control, the reactor operator is able
to raise or lower each of the 21 rods in any sequence by the use of
an " up -down-off " switch . Rod speed is fixed by the mechanism
gearing, with up -down motion being continuous. This method of
operation is designed for use during start-up and to trim the rods
before switching to automatic or group control. There are 21 indi
cators for individual rod-position indication.
The three non -servo -controlled groups move at their preset speed,
and the normally servo -controlled group operates at a speed limit
set by initial adjustments.
In the automatic mode of control, the rod group programmed for
automatic operation receives the command signals from the group
demand unit. This unit commands the group to move upon actu
ation of the upper or lower position cam limit switch in the group
demand unit; the control is transferred to the other servo group
by the sequence switching unit.
A fast insertion may be intiated from the nuclear instrumentation ,
the safety system , and a manual station on the operating console.
The fast -insertion signal in any case enters the switch unit, which
commands all rods to insert at their maximum speed. In this action
all modes of control are bypassed until the action is stopped by the
operator. The system is returned to the manual mode of control
after the fast insertion is stopped by the operator.
4-8.4 Reactor Safety System
The reactor safety system monitors signals from the nuclear and
nonnuclear instrumentation to detect safe and unsafe conditions
THE N.S. SAV’ANNAH 199
70
NEUTRON COUNT
60
LOAD
DEMAND
50
-REACTOR POWER
40
MW
30
20
10
+ 10
INCHES
ROD POSITION
O
-10
-20
SECONDS
REACTOR PERIOD
100
200
300
400
1000
3RD. PASS OXIDE TEMP
900
5 800
700
600
540 3RD PASS CLAD TEMP.
520
AVERAGE SYSTEM TEMP.
6 500
480 STEAM TEMP.
460
0 100 200 300
TIME , SECONDS
FIG. 4.28 Results of control studies.
and initiates corrective action as necessary. Two modes of corrective

action, scram and fast insertion , are initiated by the safety system ,
depending upon the nature of the abnormal condition . For scram
action, all withdrawn control rods are rapidly inserted in the
reactor core by the force of the hydraulic pressure ( Sec. 4–5.2d ) .
613489 0-62-14
During a fast insertion, all withdrawn control rods are inserted at

the maximum rate available through the electromechanical drive.
The fast -insertion signal over -rides all automatic control or manual
rod signals. As shown in Fig. 4.29, which is a diagram of the
reactor safety system , the scram -alarm panel receives signals from
the neutron instrumentation as well as from the plant process
instrumentation involving pressures, temperatures, and mechanical
failure of equipment. The reactor safety system is designed to
protect the reactor from damage during all abnormal conditions,
with the exception of a major rupture in the primary system . The
number of scram signals has been kept to a minimum consistent
with the philosophy of reactor protection. Coincidence of unsafe
indications from two independent instruments is used whenever
possible to minimize spurious scrams due to minor malfunctions.
Table 4.2 summarizes the scrams required to protect the reactor.
The level settings tabulated are based on the results of the studies
of various types of reactor accidents involving both reactivity acci
dents and mechanical accidents. All level settings are adjustable
so that new information on the present reactor core or subsequent
cores can be accommodated. The scram on high neutron flux is
established to prevent the centers of the fuel pellets from melting
and to prevent cladding surface burn out in the hot channel at a
steady -state power level of 130 percent of maximum power with
two or more primary coolant pumps operating at full speed . In
the start -up range the level is decreased to a range from 10 percent
to 30 percent to prevent full- power operation at primary -system
pressures between 600 and 1,200 psi . The primary-system tempera
ture scram provides an independent backup for the neutron-flux
scram with two or more primary coolant pumps operating at full
speed. With one pump operating, primary protection is provided
by the high -temperature scram , which will shut down the reactor
at steady -state power level below burn -out level. A temperature of
540° F was selected to prevent cladding -surface burn -out at all values
of coolant flow. The scram on low primary -system pressure prevents
boiling in the hot channel at a steady -state power level of 130 per
cent of maximum power. In addition , the low -pressure scram forces
the control rods into the core following a major rupture in the pri
mary system . The scram based on loss of power to the primary
coolant pumps shuts the reactor down upon loss of flow . This
scram also shuts the reactor down in the event of total loss of
electrical power .
As explained in Sec. 4-5.2d, the primary source of energy which
drives the control rods into the reactor during a scram is hydraulic
pressure. Sufficient energy is stored in the accumulator on each
ing permits either scram amplifier to be withdrawn for servicing by

transferring the 21 rod scram relays to the remaining amplifier.
Fast insertion of all withdrawn control rods may be initiated
from the following three sources :
1. Manual insertion : The operator can initiate a fast insertion
by pushing the fast -insertion switch . The insertion can be
halted by pushing the stop switch .
2. Reactor period : Period information is supplied from the
source range channels 1 and 2 and from the intermediate
channels 5, 6, and 7. Coincidence is required for fast inser
tion , based on period information from the intermediate chan
nels.
3. Servo malfunction monitor : Each servo rod is equipped with
a position monitor. When a servo rod is operated synchron
ously , the servo malfunction monitor will initiate a fast in
sertion if any rod in the servo group fails to follow a posi
tion demand signal. Failure to follow a position demand sig
nal indicates a malfunction that could lead to asymmetric rod
movement and resulting flux peaking. The fast insertion ini
tiated by the servo malfunction monitors cannot be stopped
by the operator.
4–9 RADIATION - MONITORING SYSTEM
The radiation -monitoring system on the Savannah provides ade

quate protection for the nuclear power plant and operating per
sonnel yet affords the flexibility that may be required for future
technical investigation. Thirty -three fixed monitored points are in
volved, of which nine are monitored constantly, the remainder being
scanned either automatically or manually as operating conditions
dictate. The entire system is composed of the following general
categories :
Fixed health -physics monitoring - 15 detectors
Plant functional monitoring -- 10 detectors
Gaseous-waste monitoring - 8 detectors
Total.. 33 detectors
The fixed health -physics system consists of 15 detectors and is

designed essentially to monitor the radiation emanating from the
power plant. The plant functional system consists of 10 detectors
designed to detect five different conditions of radioactivity leakage.
Each channel has a range of from at least one decade below to one
decade above the decade within which the radiation tolerance alarm
point is assigned, with the exception of the A -deck monitor.
The main radiation -monitoring panel is located within the ship's

main control room . Each channel is designed to transmit the radia
tion level seen by its detector to an indicator ( or recorder) show
ing also the set alarm condition. An alarm is sounded by an audible
and visible signal at the control console as well as in the monitoring
panel when the detected radiation level exceeds the set level. The
reactor operator is able to silence the audible alarm by means of a
momentary contact switch on the console, without impeding the
reception of additional alarm signals from other points. The visible
signal, however, remains lighted while the over - tolerance radiation
condition persists. The monitor panels are also equipped with facili
ties for calibration, alarm -point adjustment, radiation -level record
ing, normal operation indication, and alarm annunciation for each
channel and monitoring point. An auxiliary annunciator panel
containing indicator lights for each channel is installed in the
health physics office for convenient over -all survey of the radiation
situation.
4-9.1 Fixed Health-physics Monitoring
The purpose of the fixed health - physics monitoring system is to

provide protection for plant operating personnel and passengers.
This system consists of 12 area detectors, 2 containment access de
tectors, and 1 detector on the cation column in the fission-products
monitor. Through an automatic scanning mechanism , 6 detectors
can be sequentially switched into each channel and the radiation
levels at these locations can be measured. An adjustable time delay
( 15 to 300 sec ) is included in the system to permit a suitable selec
tion of counting time for reliable dosage determination per moni
toring point. The option of manual detector selection is also avail
able to permit observation for prolonged periods of any one of the
monitoring points.
In the selection of monitoring points, the locations chosen were
those of closest proximity to the reactor containment vessel ac
cessible to personnel during normal operating times. Where pos
sible, symmetry of radiation sources within the containment vessel
was taken into account to reduce the necessary number of monitoring
points. Preliminary calculations of shielding indicated maximum
radiation points in general on the vertical and horizontal midplanes
of the containment. The obvious locations were therefore the pas
sageways transversing the reactor compartment The 12 area de
tector monitoring points, as well as the detector sensitivities re
quired , are listed in Table 4.3.
Table 4.3-AREA DETECTOR MONITORING POINTS

Sensitirities,
Channel Monitor Deck and location mrhr
1 1 A , outside doctor's office 0. 01-10
2 B , port passageway - 0. 01-10
3 B , reactor space . 0. 01-10
4-5 C , starboard and aft passageways.. 0. 01-10
6 D , port passageway 0. 01-10
2 7-8 D , sampling room and port side passage .. 0.1-100
9–12 Tank top port side , starboard , aft , and machinery 0.1-100
space, sampling room , D deck .
A permanent record of the information from the 12 area moni

tors can be recorded on two records at the monitoring panel , one
recorder functioning on each channel.
4-9.2 Plant Functional Monitoring
The objectives of the plant functional monitoring system are :

( 1 ) to detect leakage in the boilers from the primary to the sec
ondary side, ( 2 ) to detect leakage into the intermediate system
from the primary system , ( 3 ) to detect depletion of the ion -ex
change resins by effluent activity from the primary-system demin
eralizers, ( 4 ) to detect the presence of gross fission products in the
primary system as a result of possible defective fuel elements, and
( 5 ) to detect buffer-seal leakage.
Where a channel has more than one detector, a selector switch
is available on the monitor panel to allow examination of the vari
ous detector signals in turn . For boiler leak detection a radiation
monitor is located in a tap -off from the blowdown line from each
boiler, preceded by a cooler. The use of blowdown water for leak
detection ensures that radioactive matter will be in concentrated
form at the point of detection . Cooling water from the primary
pumps, shield water cooler, etc. , returns into a common header, and
one radiation detector is located downstream of the letdown coolers
in the common return manifold . The effluent from the demineral
izers is monitored constantly in the primary demineralizer effluent
sampling line. Thus, a low background area can be utilized for
the detector location . Continuous flow is maintained in these lines
past the sampling bombs located at the sampling station. Since
the effluent activity should remain relatively constant during the
useful ( active ) life of the demineralizer, depletion will be indi
cated by a sudden rise in effluent specific activity to a value ap
proaching the influent activity.
The fission -product monitor is designed to indicate the relative
gross fission -product activities in the primary system . The monitor
will not, however, determine the location of, or the number of,
fuel-element defects.
4–9.3 Gaseous-waste Monitoring
Gaseous-waste disposal is checked by a system that monitors the

gaseous wastes discharged through the radio mast, the highest point
on the ship. ( The function of the liquid -waste -collection system
is such that a continuously monitoring channel is not required ; a
periodic test made of each tank is more than sufficient to determine
any significant increase in activity level.) For gaseous-waste-dis
posal detection, all plant components that may release gaseous ac
tivity can be vented via a common carrier to a dilution point.
From this point the activity, diluted to a tolerable level , may be
discharged through the ship's mast to the atmosphere or to the
dock by ventilating equipment provided by the shipyard.
REFERENCES
1. FRANK 0. BRAYNARD, Famous American Ships, Hastings House, New York ,

1956.
2. U.S. DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE , Ships of America's Merchant Fleet .
3. Douglas C. MACMILLAN, George G. Sharp, Inc., The Nuclear-powered Pas
senger -Cargo Ship, in Nuclear -powered Ships for American Ship Opera
tors, A Symposium Held at Washington , D.C. , July 30, 1957, USAEC Re
port TID-7539, p. 6, 1957.
4. GEORGE G. SHARP, INC. , Final Specifications, Nuclear Powered Passenger
Cargo Ship, May 8, 1958.
5. HARBOROUGH , I. LILL, Nuclear Ship Sarannah , paper delivered before So
ciety of Naval Architects and Marine Engineers, Philadelphia Section ,
May 15, 1959.
6. BABCOCK & Wilcox Co., Nuclear Merchant Ship Reactor : Final Safeguards
Report, Vol. I , Description of the N.S. Suvannah , Report BAW-1164, June
1960.
Chapter 5
HAZARDS ANALYSIS
5-1 GENERAL
The advent of nuclear propulsion brings to the shipbuilder and

ship operator the promise of a source of heat of unprecedented
concentration and potential, one capable of driving a large mer
chant vessel at normal power for at least three and one-half years
on a single fuel charge. At the same time this new type of pro
pulsion raises many questions concerning safety and protection.
Even before the first nuclear -powered ship was designed, careful
consideration was given to the safety aspects of nuclear propul
sion .1, 2
Because of possible hazards involving the release of radioactivity,
land - based central- station power reactors are located at a distance
from thickly inhabited areas. Nuclear ships, on the other hand , will
be near large population centers when they enter harbors ; thus
the probability of a reactor accident and the potential hazard of
such an accident are of great significance and interest. If a nuclear
powered ship were to collide with another ship in a harbor, could
the reactor be protected from damage? What effect would the
ship's position on the surface or underneath the surface of the
water have on criticality of the reactor or decay-heat removal ?
If fission products were released to the sea , how would they dis
perse , and what would be their immediate and ultimate fate ? Can
control measures be devised to reduce the probability of collisions
or the potential seriousness of the consequences ?
Such questions make it clear that the nuclear -powered ship will
present many conditions and requirements that differ markedly
from those of conventional steam- and diesel - powered vessels com
plying with existing laws and regulations. It is the purpose of this
and the following chapter to describe the various steps that have
been taken toward determining what problems will be met and
what steps are needed to solve them . First, however, the historical
background and the present functioning of United States require
ments relating to the safety of merchant ships will be considered
briefly.
207
5-1.1 Development of Safety Standards v

In 1807, Robert Fulton demonstrated that a steamboat could be
used with commercial success , and immediately this new means of
transportation began to develop with great rapidity in the United
States. The country was young, and, except for the fringe along
the east coat, the country was largely uninhabited. The vast fertile
areas of the Middle West were ripe for development and awaited
only a suitable means of delivering products to outside markets.
Against this potential need the capabilities of the steamboat were
quickly recognized. By the year 1834, the rapidly increasing fleet
of steamers on the Mississippi and the Ohio Rivers numbered 234.
In the early years of steam navigation, proper provisions for
sa fety in construction and operation were frequently disregarded.
As a result there were many accidents involving serious loss of life.
In the years 1831 , 1832, and 1833 , some 66 steamers were lost on
the western rivers alone, mostly as the result of boiler explosions.
The losses were so severe that it was suggested that the boilers and
machinery should be installed in a separate vessel , passengers being
restricted to a barge towed astern. Curiously enough, this same
suggestion has been made for nuclear- powered oil tankers.
The seriousness of the situation led to the enactment by Congress
in 1838 of a statute called " An Act to Provide for the Better Se
curity of the Lives of Passengers on Board of Vessels Propelled in
Whole or in Part by Steam .” This act created what was known
for many years as the “ Steamboat Inspection Service."
With the passage of time, additional laws were passed ; some
were aimed at improving the organization of this service, and
others provided necessary broadening of the scope of its activities.
Added to the requirements of national origin were numerous in
ternational agreements that were drafted to establish minimum
safety standards among the maritime nations of the world .
At the present time the statutes and the international conventions,
along with the regulations that implement them , cover in a broad
sense all aspects of merchant-ship design, arrangement, construction ,
and manning that have аa bearing on safety. Since 1942, the ad
ministration of these requirements has been a function of the U.S.
Coast Guard . The U.S. Coast Guard's Office of Merchant Marine
Safet y comprises a headquarters staff located in Washington, D.C.,
which provides administrative and technical supervision of these
activities, and inspection offices in our principal seaports and on
the inland lakes and rivers, from which the actual inspections for
seaworthiness are conducted .
As an example of how the Coast Guard carries out these func
tions, consider a typical seagoing ship. Prior to, and during, con
HAZARDS ANALYSIS 209
struction of the ship, plans showing the structure, machinery, de

tails of fireproofing, escapes, lifesaving equipment, etc. , are ex
amined by the Coast Guard for compliance with requirements. Coast
Guard inspectors examine the vessel during construction and upon its
completion issue a certificate that permits the vessel to go into
service. The certificate also specifies the complement of licensed
officers and other members of the crew required for safe navigation.
One of the general inspection requirements contained in the statutes
requires the Coast Guard to “ ... inspect before the same shall be
put into service, and at least once in every year thereafter, the hull
of every steam vessel carrying passengers; to determine to its satis
faction that every such vessel so submitted to inspection is of a
structure suitable for the service in which she is to be employed,
has suitable accommodations for passengers and the crew, and is
in a condition to warrant the belief that she may be used in navi
gation , with safety to life ..."
Under this requirement, the Certificate of Inspection for a pas
senger vessel must be renewed each year, following a complete
examination of the vessel's hull, machinery, and equipment. In
addition to passenger vessels, the Coast Guard inspects tank vessels
and dry -cargo ships under similar procedures.
The relative effectiveness of the procedures that have gradually
developed , as outlined here, is demonstrated by the fact that dur
ing the past five years only three passengers have lost their lives
as the result of a marine casualty on United States flag vessels
inspected by the Coast Guard. Absolute safety cannot be achieved,
but, considering the number of passengers who travel each year on
all our ferryboats, excursion boats, ocean liners, and other com
mercial vessels, this is an enviable record .
As a result of new developments and varying conditions, con
sideration must constantly be given to the need for changes in the
safety requirements for merchant ships. In this respect the Coast
Guard has for many years leaned heavily upon industry itself.
Where industry standards exist , in the form of codes or recom
mended practices, the policy of the Coast Guard has been to paral
lel such standards to the greatest extent possible. An example of
this is in the structural requirements for a vessel's hull. The Coast
Guard rules, instead of setting forth detailed strength standards
for a vessel, state that, in general, compliance with the standards
established by the American Bureau of Shipping will be consid
ered as satisfactory evidence of the structural soundness of the
vessel. The American Bureau of Shipping is a classification so
ciety whose published standards are developed with considerable
industry participation . Changes proposed to their rules are care
fully considered by the technical committees appointed by the

American Bureau of Shipping, the membership of which includes
naval architects, marine engineers, and men from the shipbuilding
and shipping companies.
Another example of Coast Guard liaison with industry is the fact
that the Coast Guard never makes changes in the Rules for Tank
Vessels without first submitting the proposed changes to the Tanker
Committee of the American Petroleum Institute for comments.
This group is organized as an advisory panel to the Merchant
Marine Council of the Coast Guard. Other advisory panels that
function along similar lines are the Western Rivers Panel , the
Motor-boat and Yacht Panel, and the Offshore Oil Advisory Panel .
In addition, the Coast Guard maintains liaison with other Govern
ment agencies whose requirements affect the construction or opera
tion of ships to ensure that the ship owner will not be faced with
conflicting requirements.
When the possibility of nuclear-powered merchant ships began to
be seriously considered, it became evident very early that many
new problems and changed conditions would be presented. In Janu
ary 1955 , the Navy submarine U.S.S. Nautilus successfully com
pleted her initial sea trials, and at the same time questions began
to arise concerning the adaptation of this new power source for
use in merchant ships.
A month earlier, in December 1954, the Ship's Machinery Com
mittee of the Society of Naval Architects and Marine Engineers
decided to organize an Atomic Energy Panel. The original purpose
of this was to catalog available declassified articles relating to the
generation of power by nuclear means and to arrange to publish in
the Society's bulletin from time to time a list of articles that
might be of interest to the membership .
Shortly after the panel had been organized, the U.S. Maritime
Administration sent out inquiries concerning the design of a nuclear
powered propulsion plant for a merchant vessel and stipulated that
the installation would have to meet the regulations of the Amer
ican Bureau of Shipping and the U.S. Coast Guard . Since the
Coast Guard had no applicable requirements, it followed its normal
procedure in such situations and sought suggestions and advice from
a committee that would adequately represent industry on the par
ticular subject. Accordingly, in July 1955 , the Coast Guard asked
the Society of Naval Architects and Marine Engineers whether the
Atomic Energy Panel , which had recently been set up by the
Ship's Machinery Committee, could serve the Coast Guard in an
advisory capacity regarding developments related to nuclear -powered
merchant ships.
After giving this proposal serious consideration, the Society and

the Coast Guard felt that, if the panel membership were expanded
to include members familiar with the design , application, construc
tion, and operation of nuclear reactors as well as representatives of
the shipbuilding and ship -operating industries, the panel would be
in a position to serve the Coast Guard as an industry advisory
group .
As finally constituted , the panel was made up of specialists from
the major American boiler companies, electrical manufacturers,
shipbuilding organizations, steel companies, oil companies, ship
operators, and the American Bureau of Shipping. The first meeting
of the expanded panel was held in January 1956. At this meeting all
aspects of the Coast Guard regulations that apply to merchant
ships were reviewed, the thought in mind being to determine what
parts of the present regulations might be affected by the installa
tion of a nuclear reactor. Since the use of nuclear reactors on
shipboard will require a new concept of safety regulations analogous
to those presently required for conventional steam plants , various
industry organizations have committees working toward uniform
practices for nuclear installations. The panel will maintain close
liaison with these groups in an attempt to avoid in the future the
formidable task of attempting to make economic sense out of prac
tices that have become completely and unnecessarily divergent simply
because they developed without basic guide posts for coordination .
As is well known, the Atomic Energy Commission has an Ad
visory Committee on Reactor Safeguards which , under various
names, has been functioning for some time. In a series of papers
presented by its chairman, this committee has outlined in broad
terms its procedure for evaluatingi reactor designs. After careful
consideration the panel thought it should follow a similar procedure
but that initial emphasis should be given to outlining the broad .
basic parameters as a guide for evaluating the safety aspects uniquely
associated with nuclear power on merchant ships. While this out
line was being developed , it became evident that some of the items
would have to be considered under more than one set of conditions,
depending on where and how the vessel was operating at any given
time. As developed at the present time, the basic framework is as
follows :
A. Vessel situation
1. At sea
2. In restricted waters
3. At dockside facilities
B. Categories to be studied with regard to applicable vessel

situation
1. Containment
2. Shielding and radiation tolerances
3. Waste disposal
4. Refueling
5. Controls
6. Standby components
7. Emergency components and equipment
8. Manning (personnel)
9. Inspection , overhaul, and repair
10. Operational restrictions
It will be noted that the categories under B are extremely broad,
and, depending on the type of reactor being considered, the safety
requirements under each category will vary. The next step, there
fore, is to take a specific type of reactor and point out the details
that should be considered in connection with each category and
under each vessel situation . It is believed that with this basic
framework the Coast Guard will be in a position to consider a spe
cific submittal and to determine what provision is being made in the
design to ensure safety. It is anticipated that the Coast Guard will
eventually be able to formalize regulations.
Originally the AEC thought in terms of six different types of
reactors from which they hoped to develop at least one economic
reactor for ship propulsion , but at the present time primary interest
is concentrated on only three reactor concepts. The first is the
pressurized -water type selected for the Savannah, and this has been
given the most concentrated attention . However, feasibility studies
are being made for a boiling water reactor and a gas-cooled re
actor. This concentration on these reactor concepts does not imply
complete abandonment of other concepts such as the organic -mod
erated reactor, but for the present the first three types take prece
dence .
An important aspect of merchant -ship operation is the fact that
the vessels are engaged in international trade. Many nations and
even particular ports, as well as international waterways, have
their own regulations regarding safety. Presently these various
requirements are coordinated through international conventions,
which , in the United States, are handled by the Shipping and Com
munications Division of the State Department. Since all countries
are interested in the safety and security of their ports and since it is
essential that merchant ships be able to trade freely between all
ports, it will eventually be necessary to have a set of standards to
use as a guide for the construction and operation of nuclear mer
chant vessels as can presently be found for conventional ships in

the 1948 International Convention for Safety of Life at Sea and
in the International Load Line Convention . Conferences have al
ready been held with several foreign nations concerning certain
aspects of nuclear propulsion , and others will be held in the near
future .
5-1.2 Nature of Hazards
In the analysis and evaluation of the hazards associated with the

Savannah and with nuclear- powered merchant ships in general,
particular emphasis has been given to the safety features embodied
in both the design and the operation of such vessels. Although the
pressurized -water reactor plant has been operated both on land and
in naval submarines, the installation of such plants on merchant
ships raises questions about code requirements for design and fabri
cation on the one hand and the ability of a shipyard to meet the
more drastic requirements of the new technology on the other. Any
consideration of the hazards associated with nuclear ship operation
must include hazards that might arise during normal operation as
well as those created by accidents.
Nuclear power plant accidents fall generally into two major cate
gories : ( 1 ) reactivity accidents and ( 2 ) mechanical accidents. Re
activity accidents result from the introduction of more excess reac
tivity into a reactor than is normally required for increases in
power. Mechanical accidents result from malfunctioning or failure
of plant equipment. Much work has been done on the pressurized
water system , and its performance is well understood ; but each
installation has peculiarities of its own and must be analyzed in
dependently. Safety devices and procedures must be established on
a case by case basis.
The potential danger of a nuclear reactor to the environment
stems from the very large quantity of radioactive material that
accumulates in most reactor systems. The radioactivity in a power
reactor shortly after shutdown is equivalent to that of many pounds
of radium . For operating times of practical interest ( hours or
more ), the activity level immediately after a shutdown is not very
sensitive to the duration of operation , but the rate of decay is sen
sitive to this variation . For reactors that have operated for a long
time, the rate of decay is low . In a reactor that has operated for
a year, a year of shutdown will reduce the activity less than a
factor of 100 below that shortly after shutdown.
The tolerance inside the human body for many fission products is
very small; hence the potential hazard from fission products, if they
could escape from the reactor and become dispersed, is correspond

ingly large. Various estimates have been made on a theoretical basis
of the loss in human life in case of the large -scale release of radio
active material as a consequence of a reactor accident. The poten
tiality of a reactor for causing widespread damage if uncontrolled
dispersion of fission products were to occur has required a very strict
approach to the question of reactor hazards. From the earliest days
of reactor design , it was realized that every possible precaution
should be taken to prevent accidents that might allow the escape
of fission products from the reactor envelope. As soon as it was
realized that reactors would be located in populated areas, a fur
ther precaution was adopted. This consisted in enclosing the reactor
in a secondary containment shell wherever it was deemed conceivable
that an accident could occur that would allow the escape of fission
products from the reactor proper. The secondary containment vessel
was considered an extra safety precaution ; its sole purpose was that
of preventing widespread destruction and damage in the highly im
probable case of an accident of high destructive potential.
More recently the original considerations have been made even
more strict, and present safety criteria specify no radiation dose to
off-site personnel in excess of current standards for short-term expo
sure, even as the result of the maximum credible accident. These
approaches to the problem of safety were formulated specifically with
regard to land -based central- station nuclear installations, but they
apply perhaps even more rigidly to nuclear installations on merchant
vessels since, as already indicated, such vessels will enter harbors in
large population centers in both domestic and foreign ports. The
international aspects of commercial shipping make it imperative that
the hazard from reactivity accidents be reduced to the absolute
minimum .
Although it is, of course, generally recognized that the uncertain
ties in accident analysis and containment design are great enough
that some possibility of fission -product dispersion remains even after
the best possible containment design has been made, the fact remains
that thus far no more effective method of reducing nuclear hazards
has been devised . The necessity for the secondary containment shell
has often been deplored as an obvious economic penalty on the
nuclear power plant, and from time to time it has been suggested
that the money invested in such containment might be spent more
effectively in other ways to attain safety. However, no other safety
concept has yet been advanced which is so nearly independent of all
other safety devices and safety features and which can therefore
give a comparable degree of safeguard against systematic uncertain
ties in the safety analysis.
The secondary containment vessel is particularly attractive for

the pressurized -water and boiling water reactors developed in the
United States. These reactors are compact and operate at relatively
high power densities and specific powers ;* hence they allow the use
of reasonably small containment vessels. The pressurized-water and
boiling-water reactor systems also contain large quantities of high
pressure high -temperature water which would flash into steam in case
of a major system rupture. It is largely to contain this steam and
water vapor that the containment structure is provided.
In the United States the provision of a secondary containment
shell is not considered to reduce the importance of other safety pre
cautions but is considered a final barrier against the dispersion of
fission products in case other safety precautions prove inadequate
despite careful attention .
When the design parameters of land-based nuclear reactor con
tainment structures were being worked out an attempt was made to
define precisely the maximum credible accident. As far as reactivity
accidents are concerned , the hazards of aa nuclear-powered ship are
not essentially different from those of land-based reactors, but the
mobility of the nuclear -powered ship necessitates a more involved
study of safety and salvage problems than land -based plants. Ship
board reactors are potentially subject to types of accidents which
land -based plants need not consider, namely, accidents involving
collisions and grounding of ships at sea or in harbors.
As part of the U.S. Nuclear Propulsion Program for Commercial
Ships, a considerable amount of study has been given this problem
of hazards. Analysis has been made of major marine accidents
throughout the world ; marine hazard studies have been made for
the various types of reactors (pressurized -water, boiling water, gas
cooled, and organic-moderated reactors ) ; and the theoretical possi
bilities and consequences of major accidents have been carefully
considered. It should be emphasized , however, that the existing
statistical data on the history, nature , and causes of merchant-ship
casualties, especially those involving ships larger than 15,000 tons
dead weight, are not complete.
It was found that agencies such as Lloyds Marine Department,
the Board of Underwriters of New York , the U.S. Maritime Admin
istration , and the U.S. Coast Guard had not compiled needed types
of data. However, the Liverpool Underwriters stated that for vessels
of 500 tons and over the average number of casualties ( collisions,
groundings, fires, etc. ) is now about 7,000 per year. On the basis
of available data, it was estimated that there may be about seven
accidents a year, of minor to major degree, involving ships of over
• The specific power is the power produced per unit mass of fuel present in a reactor.
613489 0-62 15
20,000 tons dead weight. Three or four of these occur in ports or

in bodies of water such as the Baltic, the Mediterranean, Caribbean,
and the Red Sea. When nuclear ship programs are in full stride.
by about 1970, one or two of these accidents may occur near popu
lated areas .
While it is unlikely that any collision that might occur in a harbor
would be of such severity as to actually rupture the reactor or even
a vital part of the reactor system , every effort has to be made to
prevent such an accident. A nuclear reactor such as that on the
Savannah with a design thermal rating of 74 Mw would have a total
fission -product reactivity measured in millions of curies, and , if in a
collision accident this material were completely mixed with the sur
rounding body of water, the concentration calculated for several
seas of interest would be many times the tolerance level ( for drink
ing water) of 10-10 curies per liter. Such values, however, are un
realistic for an actual case since they do not take into account fission
product decay, ocean currents, biological factors, or the probability
of release to the atmosphere .
In the studies that have been made, the availability of fission
products for dispersal from both heterogeneous and homogeneous
reactors has been considered . The results indicate that, for fuel
elements that survive the initial shock and possible distortion , sea
water corrosion will play a minor role in the rupture of cladding
and fuel material.
5-2 REACTIVITY ACCIDENTS
Reactivity accidents are defined as those accidents that result from

the addition of more excess reactivity to the core than is required
for normal changes in power level. The addition of such excess
reactivity initiates an increase of power , which , if allowed to con
tinue, could result in physical damage to the core and the subsequent
release of fission products to the primary coolant. In such accidents
the magnitude and rate of potential power excursions are reduced by
three inherent negative reactivity effects associated with low -enrich
ment pressurized -water reactors :
1. The negative temperature coeflicient of the moderator ( the
water ) produces a decrease in reactivity with increase in mod
erator temperature owing to the decreased moderating proper
ties of water. This coefficient is comparatively large and is
important primarily in limiting slow power excursions since
there is some time lag associated with the diffusion of heat
through the oxide pellet and cladding of the fuel element to
the water.
2. The negative Doppler coefficient reduces reactivity following an

increase in fuel temperature as a result of increased resonance
absorption in the U238. This reactivity effect is particularly
important in limiting rapid transients since the fuel starts to
heat immediately after a change in reactor power. Although
the Doppler coefficient is only about one -tenth the magnitude
of the moderator temperature coefficient, transient fuel-tempera
ture variations in oxide- fuel reactors are much larger than
coolant temperature changes; thus the magnitude of their effect
is comparable .
3. The formation of steam bubbles in the core due to boiling of the
coolant will also reduce the reactor power. The negative reac
tivity associated with the formation of steam bubbles is known
as the “ void coefficient, ” and, since boiling does not normally
occur in the core, it is only important in limiting the ultimate
nuclear excursion that would result from complete failure of
all reactor protective devices.
The reactor safety system for the Savannah (described in Chap. 4)
is designed to monitor operation and shut the reactor down, thereby
preventing core damage by keeping the fuel -element cladding and
fuel pellets in the hottest channel from melting. The safety system
is designed to function primarily in the event of equipment failures
or abnormal plant operation resulting from failure of the operator
to exercise sound judgment. The analysis of the different types of
possible accidents presented in the following sections demonstrates
the effectiveness of the safety system and of the inherent reactivity
effects in protecting the reactor core from damage. First, several
different types of operating accidents in which the control systems
act in time to prevent a serious release of fission products from the
reactor system will be considered. Then the events following a
maximum credible accident in which the containment vessel serves
to prevent the release of radioactive material to the environment
will be considered .
5-2.1 Start - up Accident
For a start-up accident to occur in the Savannah's reactor, it is

assumed that , following initiation by the operator, withdrawal of
the control rods continues past the intended point, starting with the
reactor subcritical at the flux level of the neutron source . This situa
tion might develop as a result of operator error, nuclear instrumen
tation failure, or control- rod circuitry malformation . Protection of
the core from damage during this transient is provided by three
independent safety -system operations. When the reactor period
( Appendix F ) reaches 26 sec, the safety system causes all control

rods that are not fully inserted in the core to be driven into the
core at the maximum rate available with the mechanical drive. This
automatic fast insertion overrides all withdrawal signals, but the
action may be halted by the operator. If the reactor period de
creases to 8.7 sec , the safety system initiates a scram. A third
safety -system circuit scrams the control rods when the reactor power
reaches an overpower trip level . The overpower trip level is 130
percent of maximum reactor power.
The rate at which excess reactivity can be added to the reactor by
withdrawal of the control rods is dependent upon the net reactivity
worth of the rods, the vertical position of the rods in the core, and
the withdrawal velocity. For normal start-up, the operator can
manually withdraw a single control rod or a group of not more than
five rods. It is impossible to withdraw more than five control rods
simultaneously at the control console. Major changes in the panel
wiring would be required to group more than five control rods.
The start-up accident was analyzed on the electric analog computer
at Battelle Memorial Institute . Owing to the difference between
the behavior of the reactor when it is operated below the power range
and its behavior in the power range, the simulation of this accident
was divided basically into two parts. Below the power range the
heat output of the reactor is negligible ; hence there are no negative
reactivity effects due to changes in the temperature of the fuel and
moderator. Consequently all reactivity additions are due to rod
removal and are cumulative, resulting in a rapid rise in neutron
level. In the power range any increase in power is reflected in a
fuel and moderator temperature rise. The negative reactivity effects
associated with these increased temperatures tend to counteract the
positive reactivity inserted by rod withdrawal ; the result is a de
creased net addition of reactivity and slower reactor power transients.
The results of the analog study for the low - power region of a
typical start- up accident are presented in Fig. 5.1 . In this case the
reactor is initially 3 percent subcritical at an initial power level
13 decades below full power. About 75 sec after initial rod motion ,
the reactor becomes critical. Shortly after the reactor becomes criti
cal , the start-up range nuclear instrumentation ( Appendix F ) indi
cates a period of 10 sec, at which time the safety system initiates
a fast insertion of all withdrawn control rods. The reactor power
rise is halted at a power less than one decade above the power at the
trip point. If, for some unaccountable reason , the fast- insertion
mechanism should fail, the reactor period decreases to 3 sec, at which
time a reactor scram is initiated . A delay time of 240 msec between
the indication of the 3-sec period by the nuclear instrumentation and
1 Sec . Period
Trip Level
WATTS
10 !
1 Sec , Period
Scrom
REACTORPOWER
10-2
T
3 Sec . Period
10-3
Trip Level
FOR SCRAM
10-1
10 Sec. Period 3 Sec , Period
CRITICAL
Trip Level Scram
FOR FAST INSERTION
10-3
65 70 75 80 85 90 95 100
TIME , SECONDS
Fig . 5.1-Start-up accident analog study, low-power range .
the initial inward rod motion is incorporated in the reactor simula

tion and accounts for the slight rise in power level shown in Fig 5.1
before the 3 -sec scram becomes effective in dropping the power level.
It should be noted that the period trips assumed in the analysis
and shown in Fig. 5.1 were far shorter than those actually selected
for use in the Savannah's reactor safety system . Therefore, should
a start-up accident occur on the Savannah, the power excursion
would be far less than is indicated by this accident analysis.
The inherent safety of low -enrichment uranium dioxide reactors
can be demonstrated by allowing the power excursion during a
start- up accident to continue into the power range. An analysis of
a power excursion is presented in Fig. 5.2 for the case in which
TEMPERATURE
CENTRAL
CHANNEL
PELLET
900
HOT
,'F
800
700
600
REACTOR
500
POWER
300
,MW
200
No Scram
Scram
oo
Flux Trip
Level
0
94.3 94.4 94.5 94.6 94.7 94.8 94.9 950 95.1 952
TIME , SECONDS
FIG . 5.2—Start-up accident analog study, high -power range.
there was no safety action following a continuous rod withdrawal

in the Savannah's reactor from source level ( 3 percent subcritical).
When the reactor reaches the megawatt level, the temperature of the
oxide fuel begins to increase, with a resultant increase in U238 reso
nance absorption. The negative reactivity effect of this temperature
rise is sufficiently strong to limit the excursion to an instantaneous
peak of less than 300 Mw . The negative temperature reactivity
effects of the moderator are negligible in this particular case because
the duration of the excursion is so short that essentially no heat is
transferred out of the fuel rods. Owing to the very short duration
of the power peak, the total energy added to the core is small , and
the central temperature of the fuel in the hot channel after 95 sec
of rod withdrawal is only about 850° F. The temperature at this
time is still increasing because the fuel temperature is lower than
that corresponding to equilibrium conditions at the instantaneous
power.
The inherent negative reactivity effect of the Doppler coefficient
is effective in limiting the initial rapid power excursion, but a con
tinued rod withdrawal results in a low power rise similar to that
discussed in Sec. 5-2.2 . The peak of the initial rapid power excursion
is reached 120 msec after the reactor power reaches the overpower
scram level , as shown in Fig. 5.2. Since the delay time for the over
power scram is 240 msec from scram level , rod motion is not initi
ated until 120 msec after the peak power has been reached . Since
the inherent reactivity effects delay the initial rapid power rise over
this latter period of 120 msec, small changes in scram delay time or
an increased scram velocity produce no reduction in the peak power .
Consequently the principal effect of the overpower scram is to termi
nate the withdrawal of the rods so that a slow power rise does
not occur.
From this analog study, it is clearly evident that no core damage
would be sustained from the postulated continuous rod withdrawal
accident from the source power level. Any one of three possible
safety actions will protect the Savannah's reactor.
5-2.2 Rod Withdrawal in the Power Range
The nature of this accident is identical to the start-up accident

except that rod withdrawal is initiated when the reactor is oper
ating in the power range. Accidental rod withdrawal might be
initiated by a control-rod circuitry malfunction, an operator error,
or a control-system failure, if the plant is operating on automatic
control.
Since the safety actions based on reactor period are disabled above
7 Mw ( 10 percent full power) , two independent safety actions are
provided to protect the core in the power range, namely, the over
power scram and the high primary water temperature scram . The
first thermal design criterion to be exceeded in a power excursion
is the melting of the fuel . This occurs first in the central portion
of the fuel rod in the hot channel. Central melting of the fuel
occurs at a power level below that at which steam formation or
burn -out occurs in the hot channel and well below the power level
at which the average reactor outlet temperature of the coolant ap
proaches the boiling point. Consequently the overpower scram trip
level of 130 percent maximum power was chosen to prevent central
melting of the fuel rod in the hot channel. The scram trip level
for the coolant outlet temperature ( 540° F ) will prevent burn -out
in the hot channel of the inner pass.
Results of analog studies for this accident in the Savannah's re
actor are presented for an initial power of 100 (assumed to be 69
Mw ) percent in Fig. 5.3. The reactivity rise corresponds to the
$
*The power excursion shown in Fig. 5.2 is more severe than would be expected in the
actual reactor owing to the extremely low source level assumed . The actual source
level in the Savannah reactor is estimated to be only 9 decades ( not 13 as in the simu
lated case ) below maximum power. The polonium - beryllium neutron sources in the
1 reactor would have to decay for five years to reduce the source level to the assumed
value of 13 decades below maximum power. Since the nuclear instrumentation covers
12 decades below maximum power, the operator could not initiate rod withdrawal from
13 decades below full power without circumventing the interlock which prohibits rod
withdrawal when the neutron count rate is less than 6 counts/sec.
TEMPERATURE
UO2 Melting Point
,F
5000
CENTRAL
4000
PIN
3000
POWER
CENT
175
,PER
150
125
100
75
50
25
0 1
0 2 6 8 12 14 16 18 20 22 24
TIME AFTER ACCIDENT , SECONDS
Fig. 5.3 — Analog study of rod withdrawal in the power range.

Initial power assumed to be 69 Mw.
withdrawal of the five strongest control rods at a maximum velocity

of 15 in./min with the rods in the position of maximum differential
worth . The hydraulic system on the control- rod mechanism is de
signed to limit the withdrawal speed to 30 in./min in the event of
a complete mechanical failure of the electromechanical portion of
the drive. As indicated in Fig. 5.3, the scram initiated at 130 per
cent design power limits the central fuel temperature in the hot
channel to less than 4,700 ° F. If the overpower scram action failed
to function, the reactor power and central fuel temperature would
continue to rise, and the center of the fuel rod in the hot channel
would reach the melting point approximately 13 sec after initiation
of rod withdrawal. With a continuing rise in power, the reactor
outlet temperature would reach 540 ° F in 30 sec. A reactor outlet
temperature scram would then prevent melting of the fuel -element
cladding in the hot channel. If the power excursion were to con
tinue, however, boiling in the hot channel would occur at 35 sec,
assuming no increase in primary-system pressure.
5-2.3 Cold -water Accidents
Owing to the negative moderator temperature coefficient of reac

tivity, an accident can result from the excess reactivity associated
with the sudden introduction of cooler water to the Savannah's
reactor. Through a combination of operator error and failure of
safety interlocks, an idle loop ( there are two primary lops) which
contains water that is colder than that in the operating loop may be
put into service. The severity of the resultant power rise would
be a function of the idle -loop temperature and the rate at which the
colder water was introduced .
There is no normal operating condition in which a heat-transport
loop would be isolated. It may be necessary to isolate a heat-trans
port loop because of a leak or equipment malfunction , but the loop
would be considered inoperative until the equipment was repaired .
Access to the containment vessel is restricted to periods of reactor
shutdown ; thus an idle loop in which equipment has been repaired
would be reactivated with the reactor subcritical.
Rod -bottom interlocks normally prevent the operator from opening
the inlet valve or starting a primary pump unless the reactor is
subcritical. In addition, there are two interlocks that limit the
temperature and rate of cold-water introduction to the core and one
safety action that protects the core in the event of an interlock
failure. The reactor inlet valve is a slow-opening valve that takes
approximately 4 min for full stroke. An interlock is provided which
controls the sequence of inlet valve and pump operations so that the
pumps in the idle loop cannot be started with the reactor inlet valve
open . A second interlock prohibits the opening of the reactor inlet
valve unless the temperature difference of the coolant between the
idle loop and the reactor is less than 75 ° F. In addition to mini
mizing any possible power excursion following activation of an idle
loop, this interlock also protects the primary piping and boilers
from severe temperature gradients due to the sudden introduction
of hot water to a cold loop. Should the cooler water be introduced
by intentionally defeating the interlocks, the resulting power excur
sion would be halted by the combined effects of the negative fuel
temperature reactivity coefficient and the overpower scram .
The rate of cold-water introduction from an idle loop is strongly
dependent upon the sequence of operations used to activate the idle
loop. The flow transients have been analyzed for two cases : ( 1 )
opening the shutoff valve in the reactor inlet line with both coolant
pumps operating and ( 2 ) starting both main coolant pumps in the
cold - water loop with the shutoff valves open .
The flow transients for the two cases are presented in Figs. 5.4
and 5.5. In the valve -limiting case, both pumps in the idle loop are
-
120
Hot Loop
NORMAL
100
FLOW
CENT
,PER
Cold Loop
BO
60
40
20
1
40 80 120 160 200 240
TIME , SECONDS
FIG. 5.4 — Cold -water transient, valve - limiting case. Normal flow , 1111 lb /sec ;
pumps at full speed before valve opens.
operating at full speed before valve motion is initiated. The flow

from the idle loop increases slowly to 60 percent normal flow in 40
sec . During this period the cold water is mixing with the water
from the hot loop. As shown in Fig. 5.5, the flow transient is much
more rapid for the case in which the pumps are started with the
valve open . In this case the pumps are started with the valve open
and 90 percent normal flow from the cold loop is reached in less
than 1 sec.
As was done with the other types of possible accidents, the cold
water accident was analyzed on the analog computer at Battelle
Memorial Institute. The cold water from the idle loop was mixed
homogeneously with the hot water returning from the active loop.
The resulting reactor inlet temperature transient was introduced to
the simulator, which computed the resultant reactor power excursion.
The assumption of perfect mixing of flow from the two loops prior
to entering the core second pass is not an accurate representation
of the actual physical conditions in the thermal shields. However,
a nuclear calculation indicated that the core reactivity for uniform
temperature distribution was greater than that for the other extreme
of zero mixing. For the case of a uniform water temperature of
110
100 Hot Loop
90
1
-
CENT
FLOW
,PER
Cold Loop
-
70
--
60
NORMAL
50
E -
40 Check
Valve
In
Cold
30 Loop
I
Opens
-
-
20
--
10
1
0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.0 1.2 1.4 1.6 1.8
TIME , SECONDS
FIG . 5.5 — Cold -water transient, pump- limiting case. Normal flow , 1111 lb / sec.
315 ° F, the effective multiplication factor ( kerl ) was 1.118. With

one- half the core at 500 ° F and the other half at 130° F, the kere was
1.104. Consequently the reactivity addition during the cold -water
introduction based on uniform mixing is considered conservative,
i.e., larger than would actually occur in the reactor.
The power excursion resulting from the rapid pump -limiting flow
transient was investigated with and without the overpower scram
for an idle-loop temperature of 130° F. At this temperature the
flow transient introduces 2 percent reactivity in the first second. The
combined effects of the negative Doppler coefficient and the over
power scram limit the power excursion to approximately 500 Mw .
The power rises and falls sharply within 1 sec ; the integrated heat
generation is not considerable. For the case of no safety action, the
extent and duration of the excursion are increased and damage will
result. The pump-valve interlock is incorporated to prevent this
rapid reactivity introduction by allowing the slow -opening valve to
limit the flow rate from the idle loop .
0.6
,MILLIONS
REACTOR
, -2.5 x 10-S AK /°F Doppler
POWER
PEAK
-1.5 x 10-5 AK /ⓇF Doppler
EC
BTU
/S
1 -Minute Gate Valve
04
.
1 - Minute Valve
4 - Minute Valve
4 - Minute Valve
Scram Level
o
1
100 200 300 400 500
COLD LOOP TEMPERATURE , ° F
Fig. 5.6 — Cold -loop start -up. Initial power, 55 per cent of maximum power .
Moderator temperature coefficient varies with temperature.
For the valve -limiting case, the accidental activation of the idle
loop was investigated for several values of idle-loop tenperature,
for two* valve -opening times, and for two values of the Doppler
coefficient of reactivity. The results of this study are presented in
Fig. 5.6 for the cases in which there is no scram. The peak power
during the accident transient is greater in all cases for the Doppler
coefficient of -1.5 x 10-5 8k/ ° F . The effect of the Doppler coefficient
is more pronounced with the 1 -min valve owing to the more rapid
rise in power. With a rapid power increase, the heat generated in
the fuel rod has less time to diffuse to the coolant, and this results
in larger fuel-temperature transients. Increasing the valve opening
time from 1 to 4 min reduces the peak power by a factor of 2.5 in
the case of a 130 ° idle-loop temperature. Hence, with both inter
locks functioning, accidental activation of an idle heat -transport
loop results in a moderate power rise.
The reactor is thus protected against possible cold-water accidents
by three safety interlocks. In addition, the Savannah operating
manual specifies that the reactor must be shut down prior to start
ing the pumps in the isolated loop . The manual also specifies that
* The present design incorporates an inlet valve with a 4 -min opening time. The
valve is on the reactor outlet pipe.
the temperature of an idle loop must be within 75 °F of the active

loop temperature prior to starting pumps in an isolated loop. In
the unlikely event that the interlocks are disabled and the operating
procedures violated, a reactor scram will safely terminate any result
ing excursion .
5-3 MECHANICAL ACCIDENTS
5 3.1 Fuel -element Failures
One of the benefits of the use of oxide fuel is the possibility of

operating with fuel rods that have developed defects either during
manufacture or after being placed in operation. Uranium oxide is
a ceramic fuel and is not subject to corrosion in water as is uranium
metal. Although the probability of failure of a single fuel rod may
be small , the large number of fuel rods in the core increases the
probability that a certain number of fuel rods may become defective.
For this reason , it is desirable to be able to continue operation of
a reactor over long period of time with several defective fuel rods
present in the core. As a consequence of this type of operation,
radioactive fission products may possibly be released from the rods
and accumulate in the primary loop, purification system, liquid
waste collection and storage system , gaseous-waste collection system,
and , to a slight degree, in the containment vessel. The major por
tion of these fission products will be concentrated in the ion ex
changers and gaseous-waste collection system described in Chap. 4.
A program has been developed for predicting, by theoretical
means, the composition and quantity of fission products that can be
released as a function of the amount of oxide fuel exposed to the
coolant. The analysis is based on UO, data obtained from experi
ments conducted at the Canadian test reactor at Chalk River,
Ontario .
Although the release of fission products from defective fuel rods
will result in increased radiation levels outside piping and compo
nents containing primary coolant water, the contribution to the total
radiation level from the primary system is negligible during power
operation compared with the N18 activity. Consequently the addi
tional activity due to fission products in the primary coolant becomes
significant only after the reactor has been shut down and access to
the region inside the secondary shielding or the containment vessel
is necessary. Figure 5.7 presents the dose rate 4 in . from the sur
face of the primary coolant piping and steam generator in the
Savannah's power plant as a function of time after reactor shut
down . The reactor is assumed to have been operating for 300 days
prior to the fuel-element failure which resulted in the exposure ( to
400
RATE
DOSE
,M
/HR 300
200
150
100
90
BO
70
o
2 3 5
TIME AFTER SHUTDOWN DAYS
Fig. 5.7 — Dose rate within the containment vessel from fission products in the
primary coolant water. Dose rate measured 4 in. from primary piping.
primary water) of 363 kg of fuel , or approximately 55 percent of the

total fuel loading. The reactor is assumed to have operated an addi
tional 100 days prior to shutdown. The radiation level decreases to
a value of 200 mr/hr one day after the reactor has been shut down.
An additional four days is required to reduce the radiation level to
100 mr /hr. Since the dose rate following reactor shutdown is di
rectly proportional to the quantity of fuel exposed , the dose for other
amounts of exposed fuel can be estimated from Fig. 5.7. The
shielding thickness on the ion exchangers and components of the
gaseous -waste collection system are based on the fission -product re
lease from 726 kg of exposed fuel. Thus, the release of fission prod
ucts from the defective fuel elements does not significantly increase
the direct -radiation levels during reactor operation ; however, some
inconveniences may result after shutdown owing to the increased
time required for equivalent radiation levels within the secondary
shielding and containment vessel to be reached.
Although the radioactivity from fission products is significant, the
actual quantity in circulation is extremely small. Consequently the
life of the ion exchangers in the primary purification system is not
affected . Operation with fission products in the primary coolant
does not require the use of the gaseous-waste collection system to
ensure that all fission gases are accumulated in a shielded container.
5-3.2 Missile Formation
Several surveys of industrial experience with pipe and equipment

failures in stationary and marine power plants have been under
taken to determine the causes for complete circumferential failures
and their consequences. Two general conclusions can be drawn from

industrial experiences to date : ( 1 ) With the exception of two cases
involving the use of carbon -molybdenum steel, there have been no
complete circumferential failures in large -diameter pipes. In no
case was there any record of high - velocity fragments resulting from
pipe failures. (2) The only machinery or equipment failures that
have generated missiles of any consequence were generated only by
failures of rotating equipment.
All primary- and secondary -system equipment installed in the
Savannah is designed to the existing standards and regulations of
the Coast Guard and the American Bureau of Shipping. In view
of marine experience with systems designed to these standards, pipe
failures are expected to occur as ductile tears and splits with no
fragments formed . The largest rotating items in the containment
vessel are the primary -loop coolant pumps. The moderate size of
these pumps, in comparison with propulsion turbines and turbo
generator rotors, and the strength of the steel shell encasing them
preclude the possibility of any part of the pump piercing the shell .
The rotating mass of the containment-vessel cooling fans is small,
and the cross sectional area is large so that their failure could not
rupture the 114 -in. ( minimum thickness ) containment -vessel plates.
Thus, the only likely sources of missiles within the containment
vessel are small accessory components, such as small sampling valves,
intrument wells, and gauges, which might be torn loose . The exact
means by which this might happen and the resultant velocities are
difficult to assess . In most cases on record , the mass of these com
ponents has been small and the resultant damage negligible. The
possible effect of such small missiles on the containment vessel has
been analyzed. Several assumptions have been made regarding the
type of failure and the potential velocity of a missile. A resistance
thermometer, which weighs approximately 11 lb and has an effective
diameter of 2 in ., has been used as the basis for the missile analysis.
The thermometer is assumed to fail instantaneously around the full
circumference of the weld to the primary piping and to accelerate
to a maximum velocity under the pressure of the primary coolant .
An empirical relation developed by the Ballistics Research Labora
tory was used to determine the effect of missile impingement on the
containment vessel. With the expected velocity of 350 ft/sec the
resistance thermometer will not penetrate the 114 -in . wall of the
vessel; in fact, the vessel will withstand the impact of 2 -in. -diameter
missiles weighing up to 20 lb striking at a velocity of 350 ft /sec.
Consequently it has been concluded that the containment vessel will
not be breached by small accessory components that might tear loose.
5-3.3 Loss of Coolant Accident
The loss of coolant accident results from mechanical failure of the

piping of a component in the high - pressure primary system . Such
an accident involves the release of steam and fission products into the
containment shell, and this release is the basis upon which the con
tainment shell was designed, the instantaneous flashing into steam
of 77,000 lb of water in the primary system . This steam would de
velop a maximum containment- vessel pressure of 173 psig. The
development of this pressure assumes a rupture of the primary sys
tem and thus presents the possibility of core melt-down due to
fission after-heat and shutdown heat .
In most cases a failure of the piping system would consist of a
minor leak for which adequate make-up water could be supplied
through the buffer -seal system referred to in Chap. 4. There is no
record of ruptures in large pressure vessels ; however, a survey of
marine and conventional power plant accidents indicates that small
pipe ruptures have occurred. Therefore, a leak in the primary
system resulting from the ductile rupture of a pipe is considered
credible. Owing to the care taken in the design , fabrication, inspec
tion, and testing of materials and welds, any failures in the large
stainless -steel piping will be in the longitudinal splits in the pipe
walls, rather than brittle circumferential fractures. Based on these
considerations, the maximum leak that can be anticipated in the
primary system is that which results from a longitudinal split in
one of the 12916-in . primary pipes equivalent in area to the cross
section of the pipe.
Table 5.1 presents a chronological summary of the events following
the postulated maximum leak in the primary piping. The time stated
for each event is approximate within the accuracy of the assump
tions incorporated in the analysis.
The results of the blowdown analysis are presented in Figs. 5.8
and 5.9. The pressure drops to saturation pressure corresponding to
the primary coolant temperature in a fraction of a second. During
this short time interval, water flashes into steam out through the
0.868-sq ft hole. The flow is assumed to be similar to the flow
through an orifice. After the pressure reaches saturation pressure,
water and steam flow occurs, and the flow rate through the rupture
is computed by a quasi-steady -state method developed by W. F.
Allen . The mass of coolant remaining in the primary system
steadily decreases to approximately 5 percent of the initial mass.
Unless the break occurs near the reactor inlet nozzle, the mass of
coolant remaining is independent of the location of the rupture.
The inertia forces resulting from the agitation of flashing and
PRESSURE
PRIMARY
SYSTEM
2,000
,PSIA
1500
1000
500
REMAINING
COOLANT
PRIMARY
SYSTEM
60,000
IN
,LB
40,000
20,000
0
10 20 30 40 50
O
TIME , SECONDS
Fig. 5.8 - Primary -system blowdown.
boiling of the coolant during the blowdown period would tend to

overcome any tendency toward separation of steam and water. If
the break occurred at the reactor inlet nozzle, the mass of water
remaining would be less because some of the water remaining after
blowdown would drain to the containment vessel by gravity.
Figure 5.9 shows the increase in steam volume during the blowdown .
It is interesting to note that after 10 sec only 3 percent of the system
mass has flashed to steam but that this mass occupies 50 percent of
the primary-system volume. As mentioned previously, this rapid
increase in steam volume provides an inherent shutdown mechanism
as a result of the negative void coefficient of reactivity.
Calculations have been made to determine the rate at which the
fuel rods melt following the loss of coolant. During the first 10 sec
of the blowdown , heat is transferred from the fuel rod, at a rate
based on the heat -transfer coefficient, to water at saturation tempera
ture . For the remainder of the blowdown, during which time
greater than 50 percent of the primary-system volume is filled with
613489 0-62-16
90
BO
WEIGHT
CENT
,PER
-
70
Volume
E
60
50
VOLUME
40
T
&
INITIAL
30
20
10
Weight
10 20 30
TIME SECONDS
Fig. 5.9 Vapor formation in the primary system.
steam , heat transfer is based on a coefficient for low-velocity steam.

After 30 sec the fuel rod is assumed to be insulated. The variations
of cladding - surface and central fuel -element temperature with time
in the average fuel rod following the primary -system rupture are
presented in Fig. 5.10 . The shutdown of reactor power results in a
flattening of the temperature profile in the fuel rod. The pellet
central temperature decreases from its steady -state value of 1,630 ° F
until temperature equilibrium is established in the insulated fuel rod
in approximately 2 min. Owing to the decreased heat-transfer co
efficient , the cladding -surface temperature rises to meet the pellet
central temperature. The fuel- rod temperature increase after tem
perature equilibrium is established represents the storage of decay
heat in the UO , pellet and stainless -steel cladding. Since the melting
point of the stainless -steel cladding (approximately 2,550°F ) is sig.
nificantly below the melting point of the UO , fuel pellet (approxi
mately 5,200 ° F ), the temperature of the fuel rod will increase until
the cladding melts. When a sufficient portion of the cladding melts,
the UO , pellet splinters will fall to the bottom of the reactor vessel.
Table 5.1-SEQUENCE OF EVENTS FOLLOWING MAXIMUM CREDIBLE

LOSS OF COOLANT ACCIDENT
Time Action
0. Longitudinal split occurs in largest primary coolant pipe, equiva
lent in area to the cross section of the pipe (1276 in . inner
diameter) .
1 sec . Primary- system pressure drops to saturation, approximately 700
psi .
1 sec . Reactor scram based on low primary-system pressure . Dynamic
forces on the control rods following such a major leak do not
hinder the scram action of the control rods since ample hydraulic
pressure is always available to force the control rods into the
core . In fact, the net force available to drive the rods into
the core is greater owing to the decrease in primary-system
pressure .
4 sec . Approximately 20 percent of the primary-system volume is filled
with steam . Negative void coefficient due to flashing of water
in the core assists control rods in reducing reactor power.
30 sec. Pressure equilibrium reached between primary system and
containment vessel . Water level in the pressure vessel is
below lower grid plate ; so core is exposed to steam only.
500 sec . Decay heat generated in the fuel elements heats cladding to the
melting temperature ( 2550° F) in the hottest region of the
reactor core .Released fission products are assumed to be
instantly dispersed uniformly throughout the containment
vessel.
13 min . Radiation dose rate outside the secondary shielding reaches a
maximum of 20 r/hr .
2 hr. Assuming total gas leakage from the containment vessel at the
rate of 0.2 percent of the containment free volume in 24 hr,
the maximum dose rate under the worst atmospheric is approxi
mately 10.0 mr/hr.
Similar curves of fuel- rod temperatures were computed for the

range of initial power densities expected in the reactor. Based on
the radial power distribution with no control rods in the core , cor
responding to the end of the core lifetime, the time it takes fuel rods
at various radial positions to reach 1,600 ° F and 2,550 ° F was com
puted . These results are presented in Fig. 5.11 . The fuel rods in
the high- flux regions of the reactor begin to melt 8 min after the
system ruptures. However, the cladding temperature on the hottest
fuel elements reaches 1,600 ° F approximately 2 min after the system
ruptures. Owing to the decrease in tensile strength of stainless steel
with increasing temperature, the fuel -element cladding is assumed
to fail when the temperature reaches 1,600 ° F . Theoretically, 50 per
cent of the pins will have failed approximately 40 min after the
primary system ruptures.
As the fuel-element cladding continues to melt , the fuel rods lose
their structural rigidity, and the UO , drops out of the cladding,
TEMPERATURE 1800
1600
1400
,F
1200
Pellet Center
1000
800
Cladding Surface
600
400
0 200 400 600 800 1000 1200 1400
TIME . SECONDS
FIG. 5.10 Average fuel-element temperature, 4 -sec scram delay.
Effective Core Radius

30
1600 ° F
RADIUS
, NCHES
I
2550 F
20
10
1000 2000 3000 4000 5000 6000 7000

TIME SECONDS
FIG. 5.11—Time variation of radial temperature distribution.
ultimately collecting in the lower portion of the pressure vessel. The

possibility of post-melt-down critically was investigated for the most
reactive configuration of a UO, sphere with an infinite reflector of
stainless steel. The multiplication coefficient for such a sphere was
computed to be 0.657. There appears, therefore, no possibility of
attaining fast criticality following the core melt -down . In a similar
manner the possibility of a critical configuration at thermal, or
epithermal, energies was analyzed. The infinite multiplication fac
tor was computed as a function of the ratio of water volume to metal
volume in the UO, and melted cladding as it settles to the bottom of
the vessel. Assuming that all the fuel particles were spheres of the
same size results in a value of 0.95 for the infinite multiplication
factor ( k . ) . Therefore, this configuration could not be critical re
gardless of the geometry in which it accumulated . It is likely that
there will exist some random distribution of small fuel particles
which will result in a more highly compact mass. It therefore seems
unlikely that either a fast or thermal chain reaction can result from
a core melt -down.
Decay heat continues to be generated after the fuel-cladding mix
ture has melted and dropped to the bottom of the reactor pressure
vessel. The insulation on the bottom of the reactor vessel is ar
ranged to permit cooling by natural circulation of water after the
loss of coolant from the primary system . The water that has been
discharged from the primary system collects in the bottom of the
containment vessel and is therefore available for cooling the pressure
vessel. By this means, the decay heat is removed through the lower
head of the reactor pressure vessel and the fuel -cladding mixture is
retained within the reactor vessel.
t
Following the fuel -element failure, the gaseous fission products
and smaller percentages of the nonvolatile fission products which
have been generated and stored within the fuel elements are released .
The exact quantity and rate of release is difficult to evaluate. Experi
mental work reported by the Westinghouse Atomic Power Division ?
indicated that the percentage of fission products released is strongly
dependent upon the UO, pellet density and temperature. Most of
the experimental work has been based on the behavior of inert gases
such as xenon and krypton ; so the exact behavior of other gases
has not been established. For the purpose of this analysis, the con
servative assumption was made that all the gaseous fission products
generated within the fuel rod during 600 days of operation at
69 Mw are released at the time the rod fails. The radial distribution
of fission products was weighted to approximate the radial flux dis
tribution . Since none of the fuel elements fail or melt within the
30 -sec blowdown period , the possibility of UO , or fission products
in the solid state reaching the containment vessel through the clad
ding rupture and system leak is very slight. When the fuel -element
cladding melts, the UO, and any contained fission products fall to
the bottom of the pressure vessel.
Although only those fission products or oxides of fission products
which are volatile at the cladding melting point are likely to dif
fuse to the containment vessel , the assumed release percentages in
clude some non volatile fission products. Table 5.2 indicates the as
sumed percentage release for the noted elements. These percentages
are larger than measured releases of fission products from molten

reactor fuels.
The fact that pressure equilibrium between the primary system
and containment vessel is established before the release of fission
products would result in a time delay between failure of the fuel
element and dispersal of fission products throughout the contain
ment vessel. However, in these analyses the gaseous fission products
were assumed to be uniformly distributed within the containment
vessel at the moment of release from the fuel rods.
Table 5.2—FISSION-PRODUCT RELEASE

Amount
released ,
Elements percent
Xe , Kr-Rb, I -Br, Cs- 100
Sr, Ba . 10
Te-Se, Sb, Eu , Mo, Tc , Sm ... 1
Y, La, Ce, Pr, Nd , Pm, Zr, Nb, Ru, Rh ... 0.1
On the basis of these assumptions, the radiation levels outside the

secondary shielding following a loss of coolant accident were com
puted. The results are presented in Fig. 5.12. The dose rate rises
initially during the period when the rods are failing at a rapid
rate, reaching a 20 r /hr peak 800 sec after the failure. Although
the fission -product release continues beyond 800 sec, the dose rate
22
20
OENTGENS
18
DOSE
RATE
,RR
H
/
4
o
4 1 11
O 2000 4000 6000 8000
TIME , SECONDS
Fig. 5.12—Post-accident dose rate outside secondary shielding.

decreases owing to decay of the short half -life isotopes. Two hours
after the accident, the dose rate has decreased to 6 r /hr, and the
integrated dose rate just outside the containment vessel for the first
2 hr is approximately 22 r. These doses would be reduced by a
factor of 100 at the bow and stern of the ship, ignoring attenuation
and scattering by the intermediate ship structure. If access to the
areas in the immediate vicinity of the reactor compartment were
restricted, the integrated dose for crew and passengers could be
maintained below 5 rem for several days after the accident.
With the containment vessel pressurized following the primary
system rupture, an additional radiation hazard may result from
minor containment -vessel leaks. The containment vessel and its
penetrations are designed to minimize the possibility of any leakage
from the vessel. In addition, the structural integrity and the leak
tightness of the containment vessel are tested prior to operation of
the plant. However, any test developed to demonstrate the vessel
integrity has some minimum leakage level, which can be determined
with certainty. Since leaks resulting in rates below the sensitivity
of the tests would pass undetected, it is pertinent to investigate the
potential hazards resulting from such a leak . In the Shippingport
pressurized -water reactor containment tests, the minimum measur
able rate was 0.15 percent of the vessel volume in 24 hr, and the
Experimental Boiling Water Reactor ( EBWR ) tests 9 were sensi
tive to 0.06 percent of the vessel volume in 24 hr.
It is assumed that all leakage from the containment vessel would
be collected in the reactor compartment, which would be continu
ously ventilated to the top of the radioactive -effluent discharge mast
(height, approximately 90 ft ) . It is further assumed that the reac
tor-compartment discharge would be filtered with 99.9 percent ef
ficiency for all activity except the noble gases.
Based on these assumptions, the Oak Ridge National Laboratory
has made extensive calculations that predict the resultant potential
dose rates downwind of the ship . For nighttime inversion condi
tions, the maximum dose rate to inhalation is less than 5 mr/hr to
the thyroid . The maximum whole-body gamma dose rate from sub
mersion in the radioactive cloud is 8.4 mr /hr, 2.000 ft downwind of
the ship . For short -term emergency exposure, these dose rates do not
represent an undue hazard to the general public.
5-3.4 Loss of Forced Coolant Flow

A loss of coolant flow accident results when the water flow through
the reactor is accidently stopped with the reactor at power or is
accidentally reduced below that required to remove the heat being
generated in the reactor. The reduction of flow may result from

loss of electrical power supply to all operating pumps or from
mechanical failure of single pumps. The power input to the pumps
is monitored so that upon loss of power to a pump an alarm is
sounded to warn the operator that a pump has malfunctioned . If
the power to all four pumps is lost, the reactor safety system ini
tiates a scram .
It is possible to determine the consequences of single or multiple
pump failures by analyzing the reactor power at which fuel-element
burn -out or pellet central melting occurs in the hot channel for
various combinations of pump operation . This information is shown
in Fig. 5.13. The burn -out and pellet central melting curves are
based on steady -state operation at the indicated reactor power. The
recommended operating power for each pump combination is also
shown in Fig. 5.13. The loss of coolant flow accident can be traced
on Fig. 5.13 as a straight line at constant power with decreasing
1
300 Recommended Operating

Points
280
260
e l
rn nn
Bu -out - Hot Cha
REACTOR
MAXIMUM
240
POWER
CENT
,PER
220
2004
180
Pellet Central Melting

1600
| Hot Channel
140
120
1000
80
60
40
Pumps
P2umps
Pumps
P2- umps
L2 oops
P1ump
door
20
0
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100
TOTAL REACTOR FLOW, PER CENT
Fig. 5.13-Pumping limits on reactor operation

( based on 69 Mw maximum power ) .
flow . This approximation to the actual transient is conservative

since the reactor power will decrease slightly following the flow de
crease . The power reduction is caused by the negative reactivity
associated with an increase in average coolant temperature in the
reactor core . Starting at the maximum recommended operating
power for each pump combination , horizontal lines can be drawn to
indicate the path of the loss of flow transient. If the initial maxi
mum operating power is less than the steady -state burn -out power
for the flow rate of the final pump configuration, no damage to the
fuel elements is incurred . From examination of Fig. 5.13, it can
be seen that as many as three pumps can be lost without exceeding
the burn -out level .
The loss of power to all pumps was studied for the normal case
in which the reactor is scrammed by the pump- failure monitor and
for the extreme case in which no safety action is initiated. A tran
sient flow analysis of the primary system was conducted for the case
of total loss of forced coolant flow . The flow transient for the loss
of all four pumps on the Savannah is presented in Fig. 5.14. This
flow coastdown was simulated on the electronic analog computer at
Battelle Memorial Institute 5 to determine the average reactor power
transient without scram . It is evident from a comparison of the
curves in Fig. 5.15 that the initial drop in reactor power is accelerated
100
90
TORQUE
TOTAL
FLOW
CENT
FULL
Hydraulic Torque
AND
,P ER
Flow
-
2 20
L
Windage Torque
Electrical
10 Torque
o
2 5 6 7 9
TIME , SECONDS
FIG. 5.14 - Flow coastdown due to loss of pumping power.

100
90
MAXIMUM
POWER
CENT
80
,PER
70
60
50
40
30
20
No Scram
10
Scram
IO 20 30 40 50 60 70
TIME , SECONDS
Fig . 5.15 — Reactor power transient.
by the reactor scram. With no scram the decrease in power is slower

since some time is involved in heating the primary coolant. In ad
dition to supplying the negative reactivity to reduce reactor power,
the coolant must continue to rise in temperature to override the posi
tive reactivity component resulting from the cooling of the fuel. In
this case , the reactor outlet temperature reaches saturation tempera
ture approximately 3 sec after the loss of pump power. Since the
effect of void formation was not simulated on the BMI analog, the
indicated reduction in power after the first 3 sec is slower than
would be anticipated in the actual reactor.
The average reactor power transient that was generated in the
BMI analog then served as the basis for analyzing the effect of the
total loss of coolant flow on the hot - channel fuel rod . The varia
tion of cladding temperatures following the loss of flow is very
sensitive to the assumption of the value of the heat- transfer coef
ficient at the cladding surface. For the conditions actually antici
pated in the event of aa complete loss of coolant flow , the heat-transfer
coefficient used accounted for local and net boiling at the surface of
the cladding, assuming that the transition to film boiling did not
occur. The thermal conductivity of the mixed helium and fission
products in the gap was assumed to be 0.03 Btu / hr / ft² /° F .: Owing
to the substantial resistance to heat transfer in the gap between the
pellet and the cladding, the cladding temperature seeks the tempera
ture of the coolant for any reasonable value of surface heat- transfer
coefficient. In this case the maximum cladding surface temperature
is 625 ° F, and no damage to the fuel element is anticipated.
Several very conservative assumptions were applied to the tran
sient loss of coolant flow analysis for the hot channel to demonstrate
the effect of surface heat-transfer coefficient on the cladding tempera
ture. For the normal case in which the reactor is scrammed , the cool
ant temperature in the hot channel is assumed to increase to the
saturation temperature ( 617°F ) during the first 10 sec of the flow
coastdown. Concurrently, the heat-transfer coefficient is assumed to
be reduced from 2,670 to 20 Btu /hr / ftp /° F to reflect the combined
effects of the flow reduction and the formation of a steam film around
the fuel rod . The heat -transfer coefficient of 20 Btu /hr/ ft2 / ° F repre
sents a minimum value for complete film boiling.10 For the case in
which no safety action is initiated, the time to saturation and mini
mum heat-transfer coefficient in the hot channel is reduced to 3 sec. A
scram delay time of 0.5 sec has been assumed for the time from the
start of the flow coastdown until the inward motion of the control
rods is initiated.
With these very extreme assumptions, a maximum cladding sur
face temperature of 1,800° F is reached approximately 35 sec after
the loss of flow for the case with a scram . Scram delay time is not a
critical parameter in this accident since eliminating any scram delay
only reduces the peak cladding temperature by 100 ° F . For the
extreme case in which no safety action is initiated, the cladding sur
face temperature reaches 2,400° F in 30 sec . Even in this extreme
case , the heat generation rate is so low at the time the cladding
reaches its peak temperature that film boiling heat transfer is suf
ficient to remove the heat. Even in the case of these extremely
conservative assumptions, any damage to the core would be minor
and limited to the midplane of a few isolated hot channels. The
resultant release of fission products and the corresponding radiation
doses would be similar to those described in the fuel- element- failure
section ( Sec. 5-3.1 ) .
Although these results indicate that the fuel - element cladding in
the hot channel does not melt following the loss of coolant flow with
appropriate safety action , emergency cooling is required to prohibit
the formation and collection of steam between the first and second
passes. Approximately 15 min after loss of flow , the top of the fuel
elements in the outer pass will be exposed to steam . Normally,
with either diesel generator operating, primary coolant can be
circulated through the reactor by the primary coolant pumps op
erating on the low -speed motor windings. Decay heat can thus
be removed through the boilers and auxiliary condenser. If the
steam generators cannot be used to remove decay heat, two additional

methods are available, depending upon the source of emergency
electrical power. With either of the 750-kw diesels operating, it
is possible to remove decay heat through the let -down coolers and
the intermediate coolers by operation of the buffer charge pump
and one set of intermediate circulating pumps. With the 300 -kw
diesel generator operating, decay heat can be removed by the emer
gency cooling system . Thus, there are available at least two methods
for removing decay heat for any combination of emergency power,
and steam blanketing at the entrance to the outer fuel elements
should not occur.
53.5 Control-rod-mechanism Failures

Various potential failures in the Savannah's control-rod mecha
nism have been considered, and the significant safety features in
corporated in the design are described here. Single failures, sequen
tial failures ( where a single component failure causes additional
components to fail ), and in some cases the result of unrelated
double failures have been considered.
( a) Accidental Rod Withdrawal. ( 1 ) In normal operation the
control -rod load is carried against nonreversing Acme lead screws.
( 2 ) Before the scram solenoid can be reset, the lead -screw car
riage must be in contact with the driven shoulder of the rod as
indicated by the " engaged " limit switch .
( 3 ) Any tendency for rod withdrawal at a time when the driven
shoulder is not in contact with the lead-screw carriage is prevented
by the latch mechanism .
( 4 ) In the event of simultaneous failure of the latch and another
component causing rod withdrawal, the withdrawal rate is limited
to 200 percent of maximum withdrawal speed.
( 5 ) Failure of the mechanical attachment of a drive to the
thimble could cause uncontrolled rod withdrawal. This attachment
is designed with a safety factor sufficiently large to withstand any
force imposed by normal operation and ship motion.
( 6 ) Most conceivable electrical failures in the regulating rod
control system are indicated by failure monitors, which annunciate.
scram , or initiate a fast insertion . There are conceivable failures
that can result in withdrawal at a rate higher than that demanded
by the input to the speed limiter. In this event, the affected rod
or rod bank could withdraw no faster than the synchronous speed
of the two -phase drive motor ( 18 in./min ). Other conceivable fail
ures in the control system could result from accidental connections
of the motor power leads to power buses, but these failures, although
conceivable, are highly improbable and do not affect the capability of

the system to scram.
( 7 ) Simultaneous failure of the pump pressure-control and relief
valve might cause excessively high hydraulic-system pressure, which
could burst one or more accumulators. Loss of pressure in the burst
accumulators would scram the remaining drives, and the drive
motor could run down those that are unable to scram.
( b ) Loss of Power to Vital Buses. ( 1 ) Following loss of power
to vital buses, the hydraulic power supply will not operate. Hy
draulic pressure in the supply manifold will decrease, scram of all
rods will be initiated at preset low pressure in the supply manifold.
Energy for the scram is provided by the accumulators.
( 2 ) Drive motors will not operate. Loss of power to this bus auto
matically initiates a scram.
( 3) Loss of power to instrumentation bus. In the event of loss
of power to the instrumentation bus, rods scram owing to the fail
safe action of scram valves and the reactor safety system.
(c) Protection Against Other Failure. In addition to the mechan
ical and electrical failures described, a number of other failures are
conceivable, but in each case protective measures are provided. For
example, position-indication and limit switches may fail or the
hydraulic power supply might be affected . In the latter case, as
described in Chap. 4, if the first pumping unit fails, the second is
brought into operation automatically, with no interruption of pres
sure . A third unit is kept in reserve and can be manually started .
All such conceivable mechanical and electrical failures have been
analyzed and investigated to demonstrate that soundness of the
design philosophy prevents any significant hazard to the operator
or general public.
5-4 SHIP ACCIDENTS
In studies of safety it is necessary not only to consider the hazards

that conceivably could result from reactivity accidents or from fail
ure of the mechanical or electrical systems aboard ships, but also
those resulting from the changing conditions and locations in which
a merchant ship operates in its normal service.
Of primary interest in this respect is the possibility of collision .
As far as the Savannah is concerned , the probability of a collision
will be very low. Passenger and passenger - cargo ships are rarely
involved in collision because of the greater care with which ships
of this type are usually operated. Since the Savannah will be
operated by a highly trained crew, the possibility of collision will
be even less with this ship than with a conventional ship . There is,
of course, always the possibility that the Savannah may be struck

by another vessel, and this has received serious consideration in the
hazards analysis of this first nuclear ship. Although estimates of
collision frequency and damage probability are not complete, suffi
cient information is available to define their order of magnitude.
For example, it can be shown that a ship must be capable ( in terms
of displacement and speed ) of developing a kinetic energy greater
than some " critical energy " to cause sufficient damage to the Savan
nah to threaten the integrity of the reactor containment vessel. The
critical energy varies from ship to ship, but, if this critical energy
is taken at its minimum value, over 95 percent of the world's mer
chant fleet is excluded immediately on the grounds of insufficient
speed or mass.
Studies have shown that, given a collision involving the Savannah ,
the probability that the striking ship will be large enough, fast
enough, and will strike in a position where damage to the reactor
is possible is only about 7 in 1,000. This estimate excludes the
probability of the collision itself, which will be very low. It also
excludes the probability that the striking ship will actually be
operating at the speed necessary to reach the critical energy . The
probability that the striking ship will actually be operating at the
critical speed will be very small in restricted areas where collisions
are most frequent. In general, the larger the ship, the longer its
headreach, and the more difficult it is to control. Therefore, it is
established practice for large ships to proceed in harbors at greatly
reduced speed. Preliminary investigation has shown , for example,
that the Queen Mary ( with a critical speed of about 10 knots ) very
rarely exceeds 10 knots in New York Harbor .
Studies of collision frequency and damage probability are being
continued, but preliminary data enables the following tentative con
clusions to be drawn :
1. The probability that the Savannah will be struck in the re
actor compartment by a vessel operating at a speed above the
critical speed is extremely slight.
2. The probability of such an event taking place in a restricted
waterway is so slight as to be practically incredible.
The critical energy of vessels involved in all merchant-ship col
lisions in recent years is insufficient to cause damage to the Savan
nah's reactor compartment or the contained equipment.
5-4.1 Collision Effects
Shock and penetration are the two potential sources of damage

to machinery components in collision accidents. The acceleration or
deceleration of large masses in collision can result in the disloca

tion of machinery components and can, conceivably, rupture pipe
lines, destroy shielding, jam control equipment, etc. The extreme
in shock damage is usually found in mine, torpedo, and shell explo
sions. Military effects are not pertinent to this study, and it will
be shown that throughout peacetime service the Savannah will not
encounter accelerations in excess of those used as criteria for vital
machinery component design.
Collisions are of two general types, elastic and inelastic. In an
elastic collision (typified by a billiard ball collision ) , the colliding
bodies remain more or less rigid, and there is little or no deforma
tion or crushing of either of the bodies. An inelastic collision,, on
the other hand, involves bodies that are permanently deformed in a
collision.. Ships are bodies of this type; built up of comparatively
light steel plates, with a high percentage of voids, they crush
rather easily when the forces involved are sufficiently great.
Penetration in an inelastic collision could crush the Savannah's
structure, open machinery and reactor spaces to the sea , rupture the
containment vessel, and dislocate components. Thus a collision bar
rier has been developed which will prevent the propagation of such /
damage to reactor components.
In the Savannah the reactor compartment is so located and struc
turally protected as to minimize these effects. With the reactor ap
proximately amidship and at the point of maximum beam , a good
compromise between protection and damage frequency is obtained.
( a ) Shock. Attempts to define the effects of shock on various
components in ship collisions have not been completely successful.
The complexity of the ship's structure introduces unknown damping
forces, which make exact definition of the problem difficult if not
impossible. Depending upon assumptions regarding the hardness of
the ship's structure and the velocity changes at impact, a wide
range of accelerations can be obtained . Various theoretical calcu
lations have been made, approaching the problem from the two ex
tremes of fully elastic and perfectly inelastic impact. In addition ,
an investigation of some 50 recent significant ship collisions was
undertaken . Data on collision damage and circumstances were ob
tained from the U.S. Coast Guard, the U.S. Navy, the American
Bureau of Shipping, and from the records of various ship owners.
Testimony of personnel involved in collisions was also reviewed.
As a result of all these various investigations the following gen
eral conclusions were drawn :
1. Ship collisions are highly inelastic. Extensive crushing of
structure was noted in all cases, even in a collision involving two
battleships, surely the most rigid structures afloat.
2. There is no evidence whatever of shock damage to machinery

components in any collision.
Inspection of the photographs, presented as Figs. 5.16 to 5.21 bears
out these conclusions. Figures 5.16 and 5.17 show the participants
in a high -speed tanker collision. Penetration was approximately
80 percent of the beam. According to crew testimony, no shock
was felt in any part of the ship. Figures 5.18 and 5.19 show a
cargo -ship collision . The ship in Fig. 5.18 was struck in No. 1 hold
by a passenger ship. The superintendent engineer of the line was
aboard at the time and reported no shock felt in the collision .
Figure 5.19 shows the bow of the colliding ship. Again no shock
effects were reported. In all these cases, review of the American
Bureau of Shipping and the owner's damage reports showed no
damage to machinery which might have been attributable to shock .
Of more interest from the standpoint of shock are collisions in
volving specially strengthened vessels where penetrations are much
less and decelerations proportionally higher. Such a collision is
illustrated in Figs. 5.20 and 5.21 . The Coast Guard Cutter Eastwind
( Fig. 5.20) was struck at 15 knots by the tanker illustrated in Fig.
5.21. The heavy icebreaker construction of the Eastwind , which in
cludes an ice belt of 112 in. of high -tensile-strength steel, permitted
a penetration of only 12 ft in the strengthened portion of the hull.
Fig. 5.16 — Result of a high -speed tanker collision.

Fig. 5.17—Bow of other ship in the high -speed tanker collision shown in Fig. 5.16.
In spite of the very rapid deceleration that this depth implies, no

shock damage was found throughout the vessel .
Perhaps the ultimate in collision of rigid structures was obtained
in the wartime collision of the battelships U.S.S. Indiana and
U.S.S. Washington. The Washington struck the Indiana at about
18 knots near the No. 3 turret. Penetrations extended only to the
first torpedo bulkhead, a distance of less than 6 ft ; however, the
Washington suffered extensive crushing of the bow structure . Again,
after careful survey of the machinery, no shock effects were dis
covered. Testimony of the Officer of the Deck of the Washington
indicated that no shock was felt on the bridge during the collision.
Further confirmation of low accelerations in collision was obtained
from an inspection of American Bureau of Shipping and Lloyds
Marine Department damage reports for 28 other major collisions.
In the collision of the Stockholm and the Andrea Doria , particular
attention was paid to possible shock damage to the main engine
foundations on the Stockholm . In spite of the size of the main
diesel engine and the speed of impact ( about 18 knots ) , no dam
age was discovered .
613489 0–62-17
Fig. 5.18Result of cargo-ship collision. This ship was struck in No. 1 hold
by ship shown in Fig. 5.19.
Fig. 5.19 — Bow of other ship in the collision shown in Fig . 5.18.
FIG . 5.20 — Coast Guard Cutter Eastwind after being struck by the tanker shown
in Fig. 5.21.
UROR
E
Fig. 5.21 — Tanker bow after collision with the Coast Guard Cutter Eastwind
shown in Fig . 5.20.
Testimony of the crew of the Andrea Doria revealed that per

sonnel near the point of impact did not even know the collision
had taken place.
The above information is still largely qualitative. However, two
conclusions can be drawn. First, based on the battleship collision ,
it is apparent that accelerations in extreme collisions are at the
very most lower than those used as criteria for the design of naval
machinery foundations. Naval machinery is designed to withstand
the following accelerations for equipment weighing over 10,000 lb :
vertically, 16 g ; athwartships, 8 g ; fore and aft, 6 g.* These values
were determined by the requirements of resistance to underwater
explosions, missiles, etc., and have no relation to expected damage
in collision . Unfortunately, little information can be drawn from
structural behavior in collisions of merchant vessels because of a
similar overdesign of foundations. Merchant -ship scantlings are
based to a considerable degree on experience and may well be
capable of withstanding much higher g values than those of nava !
vessels.
Second, it appears that the actual g values encountered in ship
collisions are very much less than those used in naval machinery
design. In particular, the repeated testimony that no shock was
felt in collision indicates that the upsetting force is even less than
that encountered in extreme roll and pitch . Personnel are quite
often thrown off their feet in a heavy seaway ; yet in no collision was
shock of such magnitude experienced. Since the estimated g values
in extreme pitch and roll are of the order of 0.6, it is evident that
accelerations to be expected in collision will be very low.
Since the Savannah is designed in accordance with normal mer
chant-ship practice, with scantlings that have been demonstrated
to resist much higher shock loadings than 0.6 g ( probably of the
order of 1 g ) , it is obvious that shock effects in collision do not in
any way constitute a hazard to safety.
The above conclusions eliminate any possibility of damage to the
reactor plant in a collision in which Sarannah is the striking ship.
The reactor compartments and machinery spaces can only be sub
jected to accelerations transmitted through all the structure forward
of the reactor, which will be very much less than 0.6 g. Since
penetration is not a problem when the Savannah is the striking
vessel, in any such collision the reactor and machinery spaces will
not be damaged.
( b ) Penetration . Paralleling the study of shock effects, a detailed
survey was made of structural damage and penetrations in ship
* The symbol g represents the gravitational acceleration , i.e. , 32 ft/sec/sec. This
value of acceleration is commonly used to express the acceleration of moving vehicles.
collisions. The Coast Guard supplied information concerning the

circumstances of 50 severe collisions involving merchant ships; the
data included speeds, angle of encounter, displacements, drafts, load
conditions, and extent and location of damage. Further informa
tion was obtained from individual owners,as necessary. In addi
tion , the Coast Guard and the Navy Department contributed data
from accidents involving military vessels.
The collision of two ships is a case of almost wholly inelastic
impact and does not lend itself to analytical methods of calcula
tion . The structure of both ships is subject to complex progressive
failures stemming from the buckling of panels, shearing, tearing,
crushing, and bending of plates and shapes. Most of the work done
by the forces exerted upon the structure takes place beyond the
elastic limit of steel .
The greatest contributor to the energy absorption process in a
ship collision can only be tentatively identified. After a careful
survey of damage data, it was found that the best correlation was
obtained when only structural members having depth in the direc
tion of penetration , decks, flats, bulkheads, etc., were considered.
Other members, such as the shell of the vessel , having little depth
in the direction of penetration, apparently contribute little or nothing
to collision resistance. Therefore , a resistance factor was developed ,
based on the following structural members : ( 1 ) decks and flats in
both struck and striking vessel , ( 2 ) transverse bulkheads in struck
vessel, ( 3 ) longitudinal bulkheads in striking vessel, and ( 4 ) the
component in the direction of collision of the shell of the striking
ship.
The details of the calculations will not be given here, but a fairly
consistent correlation between resistance factor and lost energy was
obtained , except at low speeds, where points were rather widely
scattered . It is evident from testimony at inquiries that the masters
of striking vessels were underestimating the speeds of their ships
in collision. This speed cannot be known with great accuracy since
the striking vessel usually reverses its engines some time before
collision and coasts into the struck vessel. Underestimating the
speed by 2 knots results in a 300 percent underestimate in kinetic
energy at 5 knots but only 30 percent at 15 knots. Hence, for the
purpose of this study, the low -energy collisions do not supply much
information , and those with energies below 300,000 ton -knots 2 were
considered only for general information .
Several other collisions were eliminated because of extreme angles
of encounter. When the bow of the striking ship penetrates at a
sharp angle, the problem becomes much more complicated , with the
possibility of glancing blows and irregular damage to both strik
ing and struck ships. In addition, penetrations are generally much

less in this type of collision. Therefore, only collisions with close
to a 90 -deg angle of encounter were considered . This restriction
eliminated only one or two collisions in the high -energy range of
interest.
Further refinements in estimating loss in kinetic energy and re
sistance factors were attempted, but they resulted in no better cor
relation with the collision data than the simpler method actually
used ; indeed, the use of a simple equation giving the exact ex
pression for the loss of kinetic energy in estimating the damage to
the Savannah gave almost the same results as the more complicated
equations that were developed but with a wider spread of plotted
data. The principal interest lies in the component of energy per
pendicular to the axis of the struck vessel , and, since the most
dangerous collisions will take place along this path, considering
only those collisions that approach this condition is not over re
strictive.
The results of the calculations are plotted in Fig. 5.22. The
points along the curve represent various collisions. The highest
points on the curve are those of the Andrea Doria - Stockholm col
lision and the tanker collision illustrated in Figs. 5.16 and 5.17.
It then remained to determine the resistance of the Savannah
to collisions with other vessels. A resistance factor for the Savannah
was developed, predicated on a 90 -deg collision with the selected
vessels. The depth of penetration was taken to be the distance from
the ship's side to the longitudinal bulkhead outboard of the reactor
containment ; the length was taken to be the beam of the striking
ship . A factor of 1.33 was applied to the damaged length to ac
COLLISION
ABSORBED
ENERGY
NOTS
ON
1600
KIN
,T
-
Andrea Dorio
Stockholm
Tanker
1200
800
400
1
500 1000 1500 2000 2500 3000 3500
RESISTANCE FACTOR
Fig. 5.22-Resistance factor vs. absorbed energy.

count for the raking effect caused by the forward speed of the
Sarannah . This factor was derived from the data of collision
studies. Complete crushing of structure in the striking ship was
conservatively assumed for a length equal to the depth of pene
tration . When a resistance factor has been obtained for the struc
ture of both ships, a required energy absorption for penetration
to the collision bulkhead can be obtained from Fig. 5.22. When the
displacement of the striking vessel is known , the speed required
for such penetration can be obtained from the equation for loss
in kinetic energy .
Table 5.3 gives the speeds required for penetration to the longi
tudinal bulkhead for several types of striking vessel. The first,
the Stockholm, was a participant in one of the worst collisions of
recent years. At the draft and displacement with which she struck
and sank the Andrea Doria, it is shown that she would have to
travel at speeds ranging from 1 to 4 knots greater than her design
speed to penetrate to the Savannah's longitudinal bulkhead with
the Savannah at light, loaded , or intermediate displacement. The
second ship was the supertanker shown in Figs. 5.16 and 5.17. The
design speed of this ship is 16 knots. With the Savannah at maxi
mum draft, it can be seen that penetration to the longitudinal
bulkhead would not be obtained with a ship speed of less than
15 knots. The speed of the tanker was 15 knots at the time of
impact, and, since a speed of at least 15 knots is required to reach
the longitudinal bulkhead, it is evident that the reactor- compartment
structure would not be involved . The third vessel was a standard
T2 tanker. Here, at certain drafts, penetration to the reactor com
partment is possible at less than design speeds. However, ships
rarely travel at full design speeds, and, when collision seems immi
nent , efforts are invariably made to stop the ship. Hence a speed
of 1 knot less than design seems reasonable to assume at the time
of collision. Under this assumption the following conclusions can
be drawn :
1. The Savannah reactor compartment would be unharmed had
she been the struck vessel in either of the two worst collisions
in recent years.
2. The Savannah's containment -vessel integrity will be maintained
in any collision with any vessel developing a critical energy
less than 2.5 x 106 ton -knots 2 for a tanker ( corresponding to
a displacement of about 23,000 tons and a speed of 15 knots)
and about 3.5 x 108 ton -knots 2 for a passenger vessel (corre
sponding to a displacement of about 22,000 tons and a speed of
18 knots ) .
The last group in Table 5.3 represents collisions with hypothetical

tankers of progressively greater displacement. Obviously these and
other vessels of greater speed and displacement can penetrate to
the reactor compartment. The fraction of the world's merchant
fleet in this category was determined by deriving a " critical energy"
value, defined as the minimum energy the striking vessel must obtain
to reach Savannah's reactor compartment bulkhead, from the loss
of kinetic energy equation and the assumption of the worst case
of a 90 - deg collision . This analysis showed that the critical energy
is aa function of bow structure of the striking vessel, the displacement
of the two vessels, and the draft at which each is operating ( which
determines the structural areas included ). Obviously the load dis
placement and design speed of the striking vessel will determine its
maximum energy, and, if this is less than the critical energy for
>
the ship type , the vessel would be incapable of threatening the

Savannah .
Vessels of the first three groups in Table 5.3 comprise over 95 per
cent of the world's merchant fleet, and the probability of a collision
with one of the remaining group is quite small. In addition, such
vessls, particularly the large passenger ships, are usually operated
with greater care than ordinary merchant ships. The absolute value
of the probability of such a collision can be expected to increase
slightly with the modern trend toward larger and faster vessels.
This increase will be very small ( certainly less than a factor of 2)
and will probably have no effect within the limits of accuracy of
the probability estimate. However, methods of increasing collision
resistance with a minimum of major structural changes were studied
and some were incorporated in the ship . The deck doublers installed
between the decks were changes of this type.
It should be remembered that throughout this study no contribu
tion to collision resistance was assumed from the longitudinal bulk
head - shield - reactor compartment complex, from many other struc
tural members that may contribute to collision resistance, or from
crushing of the striking ship's bow beyond the penetration depth.
Nor was the containment shell itself considered . Hence the over- all
design is believed to be quite conservative.
The resistance of the longitudinal bulkhead, collision mat, and
shielding to collision is extremely difficult to estimate . With no
comparable structure presently on any ship, the semiempirical
method cannot be applied . Data on the buckling of steel and lam
inated wood-steel structures are insufficient to permit accurate
analysis. Estimates of behavior under static loading ( corresponding
to a condition in which the striking ship has been arrested at the
bulkhead and both ships have attained the same velocity ) based on
the lateral resistance of the struck vessel , as derived from U.S. Navy
mooring data, have been made. These indicate that distributed
loadings of the order of 300 tons can be withstood by the longitudinal
bulkhead -web frame structure. Resistance of the reinforced - concrete
shield wall below the containment mid -plane is expected to be quite
low because of the crumbling tendency of concrete.
Table 5.3 - ESTIMATED BEHAVIOR OF N.S. SAVANNAH IN COLLISION

Speed of striking vessel at
impact to reach Saran
nah longitudinal bulk
head ( 90 -deg collision ) ,
N.S , Sarannah draft* Striking vessel draft knots
Collision with M.V. Stockholm (design

speed, 18 knots)
19 ft 0 in .-- 25 ft 0 in .. 22
24 ft 0 in . 25 ft 0 in . 20
29 ft 6 in . 25 ft 0 in . 19
Collision with supertanker (design speed

16 knots)
19 ft 0 in ... 14 ft 6 in .. 19
24 ft 0 in . 14 ft 6 in . 17
29 ft 0 in . 14 ft 6 in ... 15
Collision with T- 2 tanker (design speed

15 knots
19 ft 0 in .-- 20 ft 0 in .. 18
24 ft 0 in . 20 ft 0 in 18
29 ft 6 in .. 20 ft 0 in .. 17
455
19 ft 0 in . 30 ft 0 in . 14
24 ft 0 in . 30 ft 0 in .. 15
29 ft 6 in . 30 ft 0 in ... 15
Collision with hypothetical tankers

(probable design speed in excess of 15
knots)
24 ft 0 in .--- 20,000 ton ( displacement ). 15
24 ft 0 in. 30,000 ton (displacement) . 14
24 ft 0 in . 40,000 ton (displacement) 13
* Light draft on the Sarannah is 18 ſt 6 in .; load draft is 29 ſt 6 in .
The main contribution of the laminated wood and steel plate col
lision mat, however, lies in its ability to withstand local penetration
of jagged beams resulting from the crushing of structure outboard
of the longitudinal bulkhead . This eliminates the real possibility
of local punching through the collision mat to the containment shell.
In addition, the collision mat, in the highly improbable event that
the bulkhead shifts and the containment vessel is itself involved,
serves to distribute the load over a wider area.
In case of a penetrating collision affecting the engine room , the
normal method of removing reactor decay heat through main and
auxiliary turbines and condensers could be lost, as well as the reactor

intermediate cooling system . Under this condition decay -heat
removal would be accomplished through the emergency cooling sys
tem ( described in Chap. 4 ) entirely located within the containment
shell. Power would be supplied by the emergency generator.
5-4.2 Grounding
A grounding accident can invariably be traced to navigational

errors or a failure of power or steerage, navigational errors being
the major contributor. Power or steerage failures are a problem
only if they occur in restricted channels where immediate action is
necessary. If sea room or time is available, the anchors can always
be dropped to hold the ship off the ground. Hence, grounding is
of interest primarily in restricted channels.
The effects of grounding are essentially the same as those of col
lision , but they are of a more local nature . Shock damage, pene
tration of shell , distortion of the double-bottom structure, penetra
tion of the inner -bottom plating, flooding of spaces, and rupture of
the containment vessel are all conceivable. In addition, there is a
possibility of the ships being pounded and breaking up, with attend
ant salvage problems.
( a ) Shock Effect. Shock in grounding is invariably less than
that to be expected from maximum roll, pitch , and heave. Only
occasionally have personnel reported severe jolts in a grounding
accident. The most dangerous case, that of a high-speed collision
with a rock or underwater object , usually results in extensive
crushing of structure and dissipation of shock . A case in point is
the collision involving the battleships U.S.S. Washington and the
U.S.S. Indiana mentioned earlier. This collision is almost equiva
lent to that of a ship striking a sea wall The bow of the Wash
ington, with much heavier construction than that of a merchant
ship, was crushed to such a degree that no shock at all was felt on
the bridge. Hence, from the design standpoint, shock effects in
grounding can be considered negligible.
( b ) Penetration Effects. Structural damage in grounding is ordi
narily limited to the shell and double- bottom structure, and,
although penetration of the inner bottom is not uncommon , very
little structural damage results above it . The type of grounding
accident that most often causes damage amidships in the vicinity
of the reactor compartment is usually associated with maneuvering
in restricted channels and grounding sideways on obstructions. The
slower speeds prevailing under these conditions make severe damage
unlikely. In the Savannah , a 5 - ft-deep double bottom in the way
of the reactor, with a heavy egg -crate construction and massive
containment foundations , offers adequate protection for any con

ceivable grounding accident in this region. Rupture of the con
tainment vessel is thus considered highly improbable, and radio
active components outside the shell ( demineralizers, waste storage
tanks, etc. ) , in addition to their protected position above the con
tainment support and inside the concrete shielding, can be isolated
by valving. The valves are all of the fail -safe type. Tanks located
in the double bottom will contain wastes of low activity, and it is
possible to circulate double-bottom wastes through the purification
system and return . Should the sea chests on one side be blocked
in grounding, the duplication of equipment ( sea chests, intermediate
cooling system , fresh- and salt-water cooling pumps, and associated
piping) port and starboard ensures that core cooling by normal
means is possible. The high and low sea suctions, port and star
board, are so located that circulating water flow is assured in almost
any ship position. In a grounding accident , complete loss of power
will result only if the ship should turn over on her side. In virtu
ally every case of grounding, the upper deck areas are accessible,
and the emergency generator would be available for extended
periods of core handling.
( c ) Breaking Up. A potentially serious problem in grounding is
that of the ship being grounded and breaking up on an unprotected
shore where access by salvage vessels may prove difficult if not
impossible. Over a long period of time, the ship may break up,
and the grinding action of the sea and rock may rupture the
containment vessel or the primary system. Unlike usual ground
ings, however, such an accident is invariably due to a loss of power
on a lee shore. No captain will sail so close to a dangerous shore
that he will not have time to anchor in case of power loss, and,
since there is always some shoaling of the bottom , the ship can be
held off the rocks. Hence, the probability of grounding and break
ing up on an unprotected and inaccessible shore is negligible.
Furthermore, the long time it generally takes for a ship to break up
will allow for possible emergency salvage.
5-4.3 Flooding and Sinking)

Flooding of the Savannah, without sinking, is of significance
only if the machinery or reactor space is involved . Flooding of
these spaces can occur as the result of a collision or a grounding
opening the spaces to the sea, but it will pose no problems different
from those of conventional ships in a similar predicament. Eventual
loss of main and auxiliary propulsion units, turbogenerator sets, and
switchgear may be presumed .
In case of flooding it will be necessary to remove the residual and

decay heat from the reactor system . Two methods of removing this
heat are available. Initially, heat can be transferred from the
reactor core to the steam generator by a primary coolant pump
running at low speed. The steam generated on the secondary side
can be dumped to the auxiliary condenser as long as that unit is
operable. The intermediate cooling system ( the normal decay -heat
removal mechanism ) will be operable only until the pumps are
submerged ; hence it is not an important factor in flooding. The
emergency salt -water cooling system located within the containment
shell will continue the decay -heat removal process when the machin
ery space is lost since it is provided with an independent sea suction.
Power for this system is supplied from the emergency generator.
The basic problem involved in the sinking of the Savannah is the
loss of power and the effects of this loss on reactor decay -heat
removal. These effects are primarily dependent upon accident cir
cumstances, such as rate of sinking, depth of water, and condition
of machinery .
Of these, by far the most important is the time of initial sub
mergence , that is, the time from recognition of an emergency , when
appropriate measures are taken, to the time when the last power
source is lost. In the past this period has varied from days to a
matter of minutes.
In actuality, there will be no real progressive loss of machinery.
As soon as the machinery space begins to flood , all auxiliaries, being
of the nonsubmersible type, will immediately be secured. Thus, the
entire propulsion plant will be rendered inoperative, leaving only
the emergency diesel generator as a power source . The emergency
unit would then supply power to the emergency salt-water cooling
system , which is operated by relays from both the console and the
emergency switchboard , and decay -heat removal could begin. The
time until submergence of the emergency generator would then
determine how far decay-heat removal could proceed .
Following submergence of the upper deck , present plans call for
the containment-shell flooding valves to open , permitting the con
tainment vessel to flood. Flooding the vessel will prevent its col
lapse in deep water with possible damage to the primary system ;
in addition , the salt water will serve as a heat sink to aid in decay
heat removal. This action will also eliminate the possibility of a
molten core's melting through the pressure vessel. When the pres
sure is equalized , the automatic valves close again . The fuel and
the fission products will be triply contained, i.e. , in the fuel -element
cladding, in the primary system , and in the flooded containment
shell. In shallow water the ship could be salvaged, and the radio
active components could be recovered . In deeper water, where salvage

is impossible, corrosion through the triple barrier would be so slow
that release of fission products would be delayed for years, by which
time their activity would have decayed to a very low level .
Take the Stockholm - Andrea Doria collision as an example. It
is likely that within a few minutes following the collision , emergency
measures were in force. If the Savannah were involved in such a
collision and remained afloat as long as the Andrea Doria , about
11 hr, it is probable that no core melting would occur.
If the presubmergence cooling time is too short to allow complete
cooling of the core (the more likely case ), then partial melt -down
of the core might be expected after sinking. This could result in a
release of fission products to the flooded containment shell through
the primary -system relief valves. Salvage from shallow water under
these conditions would be much more complicated. Even in this
event the containment vessel would still function as a massive and
long- lived corrosion barrier.
If the ship broke up and the containment vessel were liberated , the
containment with about 700 tons of structure and machinery and
about 600 tons of lead shielding would sink ; however, unless the
containment shell were ruptured, it would continue to serve as a
long - lived barrier to the release of radioactive contamination .
5-4.4 Storms
Storm damage to the ship presents the same type of problem as

collision and sinking but of considerably lower magnitude. In gen
eral, two manifestations can be expected . The first of these , flooding
of spaces through openings of plates, will produce the same results
as flooding from collision. The second, accelerations from rolling
and pitching, have been evaluated ; data were also obtained at the
David Taylor Model Basin ' on the motion of a ship similar to the
Savannah in a " State 5 " sea . These studies indicate maximum roll
angles of about 24 deg under worst sea conditions, with correspond
ing linear accelerations of about 0.5 g. A State 5 sea is a fairly high
sea , with most probable maximum wave heights of about 15 ft and
wind velocities of 23 to 28 knots ( strong). Since the ship's stabi
lizers will greatly reduce the amplitudes of roll, it is concluded that
storm damage is not critical in connection with reactor safety.
5-4.5 Fire and Explosions
The Savannah has been designed to the highest degree of fire pro
tection specified by the Coast Guard , American Bureau of Shipping,
and other regulatory bodies. Three fire pumps are installed , two
in the shaft alley and one outside the machinery space, with the
usual arrangement of fire main and alarm system, fire doors, and
stations. The standards defined by the regulatory bodies are written
to ensure that fire -protection apparatus and power to the fire pumps
will be available in any emergency as long as the ship remains afloat.
. The principal effect of fire at sea with respect to reactor safety
is again the loss of power. Fires of particular importance to the
reactor and power plant are those reaching areas adjacent to the
reactor and machinery spaces. The principal classes of fire in
machinery spaces are electrical and oil. The latter includes such
combustibles as rags, cleaning compounds, paint, and engine and
lubricating oils . The Savannah machinery space is adequately
equipped to detect and combat any fire of this type, and sufficient
back-up equipment is provided to compensate for loss of equipment
either by destruction by fire or from forced abandonment by the
engine-room personnel up to, and including, total loss of machinery
space.
If the main switchboard is lost , the emergency switchboard will
automatically be energized, and the emergency diesel generator will
be started . Throw -over of the bus transfer equipment will occur
when the generator reaches the proper voltage. If fire renders the
machinery space untenable, the emergency diesel generator capacity
is sufficient to supply power to the low-speed windings of the coolant
pump motors, the emergency cooling system , and the third fire pump
located in the shaft alley. It is unlikely that the shielding will be
damaged by fire in the machinery space since concrete, lead, and
polyethylene are well removed from the machinery space bulkhead.
Fire in the reactor compartment itself outside the containment
shell is unlikely because of lack of combustible material. However,
should a fire occur, portions of the secondary neutron shielding
might be destroyed. Particularly vulnerable is the polyethylene,
which could melt and flow down the outside of the containment
vessel. Although polyethylene is nontoxic, the partial loss of the
secondary shielding under these conditions might necessitate a reduc
tion in reactor power to reduce the radiation . Lead melts at about
620 ° F and loses much of its structural strength at a much lower
temperature. However, in any fire causing melting of the lead, the
reactor itself will undoubtedly be shut down, and the secondary
shielding would not be needed . Water is available from nearby fire
stations for fighting the fire and cooling critical areas.
Fire within the containment shell is considered unlikely with a
closed -circuit ventilation system , and very little combustible mate
rial is present. Electrical fires are possible, but they do not propa
gate once the power is cut off to the particular machine or cable.
The possible use of an atmosphere of CO2 in the containment vessel

is being studied.
Explosion is not considered a hazard to the safety of the Savannah
since the carriage of dangerous cargo such as explosives is forbidden
on passenger ships. Although some liquids that might be considered
explosive can be carried, they will not be present on a passenger
ship in any great quantity, and, in general, would present more of
a fire hazard than an explosion hazard. The one exception is the
hydrogen - addition system, but the storage tanks for this system are
located outdoors on the A deck, where the effects of an explosion
would be minimized and where the tanks could be jettisoned readily,
if necessary .
5-5 SUMMARY V
It should be fairly obvious from this chapter that the Savannah
has been made as safe a ship as is humanly possible. Virtually every
possible potential accident and source of danger has been considered
and guarded against, and every possible safety device and arrange
ment has been incorporated into the ship's structure . The vessel has
been built in accordance with the most rigid requirements of all the
regulatory bodies, and every detail of its structure has been sub
jected to the most thorough inspection during construction . All
details of design were the subject of exhaustive study and analysis.
In the selection of the containment vessel , for example , three differ
ent types were considered . These were as follows :
Type A : A separate enclosure designed as a pressure vessel and
fastened into position inside the hull .
Type B : Part of the ship’s structure strengthened to withstand
the pressure resulting from the flashing coolant.
Type C : Selected adjacent compartments connected to the reactor
compartment through a blowout device, thus contrib
uting to the total containment volume.
It was only after exhaustive study of these three possible types of
containment that type A was selected for the Savannah as the one
affording the greatest amount of protection.12
In conclusion , for general safety of operation at sea , the N.S.
Savannah is designed to the highest current standards and is as safe
as, or safer than, any comparable vessel . Only the most extraordi
nary conditions could possibly constitute a threat to her safety, and
virtually all these have been anticipated.
In the preparation of this chapter on hazards analysis it has been
necessary to draw heavily on the information and data presented in
the two volumes of the Final Safeguards Report prepared by the
Babcock & Wilcox Co. Atomic Energy Division for the Atomic
Energy Commission.13 These volumes contain the detailed technical
data and theoretical consideration which underlie the design of the
many safety features incorporated in the first nuclear-powered mer
chant ship .
REFERENCES
1. ARTHUR D. LITTLE, INC. , Hazards and Safety Measures Related to Nuclear

Powered Merchant Ships - An Annotated Bibliography , Report SO -6200,
Sept. 15, 1957.
2. ARTHUR D. LITTLE, INC. , Hazards and Safety Measures Related to Nuclear
Powered Merchant Ships - An Annotated Bibliography of Declassified
Literature, Report ALI-51 , Mar. 30, 1959.
3 C. P. MURPHY and ARTHUR GATEWOOD, Development of Safety Standards
for Nuclear Propulsion of Merchant Ships, paper presented before the
Society of Naval Architects and Marine Engineers, Nuclear Engineering
and Science Congress, 1957.
4. U.S. ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION, Theoretical Possibility and Consequences
of Major Accidents in Large Nuclear Power Plants, USAEC Report
Wash -740, March 1957.
5. R. S. BOYD et al . , Simulation of Various Accident considérations for a
Merchant- ship Pressurized -water Reactor, USAEC Report BMI- 1269, Bat.
telle Memorial Institute, Aug. 25, 1958.
6. W. F. ALLEN , Jr. , Flow of a Flashing Mixture of Water and Steam Through
Pipes and Valves, Trans. Am . Soc. Jech . Engrs., 73 ( 3 ) : 257–265 ( April
1951 ) .
7. J. D. EICHENBERG et al . , Effects of Irradiation on Bulk UO2, USAEC Re
port WAPD - 183, Westinghouse Electric Corporation, October 1957.
8. WESTINGHOUSE ELECTRIC CORPORATION , PWR Hazards Summary Report,
USAEC Report WAPD - SC -541, September 1957.
9. A. H. HEINMAN and L. W. FROM, Jr., Containment for EBWR, in Pro
ceedings of the Second Nuclear Engineering and Science Congress, Vol. I ,
Problems in Nuclear Engineering, pp . 234–247, Pergamon Press, Inc.,
New York , 1957 .
· 10. W. H. MCADAMS, Heat Transmission , 3rd ed ., McGraw-Hill Book Co. , Inc.,
New York , 1954.
11. NAVY DEPARTMENT, Motion of the S.S. Silver Mariner in State 5 Sea , David
Taylor Basin Report No. 1067, October 1956 .
12. NEW YORK SHIPBUILDING CORPORATION, Final Report, Contract 1571, Jan. 31,
1958.
13. BABCOCK & Wilcox Co. , Nuclear Merchant Ship Reactor : Final Safeguards
Report, Vols. I and II , Report BAW-1164, June 1960.
Chapter 6
OPERATING AND ENVIRONMENTAL CONSIDERATIONS
A nuclear-powered ship may not appear significantly different

from a conventionally powered ship , and its mechanical propulsion
system may be essentially the same as that of a fuel -fired vessel ; but
the fact that the heat source is a nuclear reactor instead of a coal
or oil - fired furnace makes it an entirely different craft in its opera
tional aspects .
A conventional ship can travel virtually anywhere, can enter any
port subject only to the customary maritime regulatory procedures,
and can refuel at any place where suitable fuel supplies are avail
able. She requires no special port facilities other than the usual
cargo-handling gear and fuel-loading equipment. A conventional
ship can discharge waste products, such as boiler blow -down water,
ash in the case of coal burners, and spent demineralizer resins, at sea
without restriction . True, safety measures have to be provided to
reduce risk of fire and explosion , but even in the event of such
disasters the damage or injury would be confined essentially to the
ship itself and to its personnel - crew and passengers. Insurance
--
rates for conventional ships are well established, and legal proce
dures for the recovery of damages in case of accident have been
worked out over a period of many years.
The operation of a nuclear- powered ship presents a number of
very different and much more difficult problems. At the present
time, nuclear ships cannot travel anywhere. Until certain interna
tional agreements are concluded , as discussed in Chap. 9, the N.S.
Sarannah's travel will be confined to domestic ports, and even in
these ports the operation of the ship will be subject to special regu
latory measures.
A nuclear ship cannot refuel in any port . As described in Chap. 7,
special facilities will be required for refueling and for the removal
of spent fuel and radioactive waste products. Extensive shore facili
ties will be necessary for the storage and decontamination of equip
ment that may have become radioactively contaminated in normal
operation or by accident. A nuclear ship will not be permitted to
discharge radioactive wastes at sea ; as they accumulate they will
have to be stored in suitable shielded containers until they can be
removed at the special shore facilities that will be provided . In addi
613489 0_6218 263
tion to the usual safety measures against fire and explosion, nuclear
ships will require radiological monitoring to maintain radiation
levels below minimum tolerance levels. Such radiological monitor
ing will extend to port facilities while the nuclear ship is in port ;
the harbor waters in which the nuclear ship is berthed will have to
be checked for radioactive content, and every precaution will have
to be taken to prevent the release of radioactive material into such
waters.
In case of a nuclear accident on a nuclear -powered ship, the con
sequences could be of the utmost seriousness if proper provisions
were not made to prevent the spread of radioactivity. Such safety
provisions form part of the design of the nuclear ship itself, but ,
in addition, special facilities and operational procedures will have
to be established to limit the spread of radioactivity in case of a
possible serious nuclear accident. Because of the peculiar nature of
the risks involved in the operation of a nuclear ship, the problem
of insurance presents difficulties not inherent in conventional marine
insurance practice. The resolution of some of these difficulties will
require international negotiations, as indicated in Chap. 9.
6-1 BASIC CONSIDERATIONS IN NUCLEAR SHIP OPERATION

v
From this comparison of the differences between the operation of
nuclear ships and conventional ships, it will be seen that many diffi
cult problems remain to be solved before nuclear ships attain the
same degree of operational freedom that corventional ships have
today. This is not to say that these problems will not be solved.
None of them are of an insurmountable nature, and some of the
problems may turn out to be less serious than they appear to be at
present. The remarkable safety record of the operation of the AEC
production plants throughout the United States provides ample
evidence of our ability to guard against the hazards of radioactivity,
and there is no reason to believe that the nuclear hazards related to
the operation of nuclear merchant vessels will not be dealt with as
successfully as has been done in the land -based installations.
It is clear that, if nuclear- powered merchant ships are to be com
mercially useful, they must be capable of functioning within essen
tially the same operational framework as their conventional counter
parts. This imposes problems of a wide variety, some of an
administrative nature, others technical and economic. They range
from the design of the nuclear reactor itself to such matters as tidal
movement of waters in world ports, radioactive-waste disposal,
radiological health , and insurance and indemnity against nuclear
damage or injury.
OPERATING AND ENVIRONMENTAL CONSIDERATIONS 265
With respect to reactor design , it is obviously desirable to establish

constructional and control features that will simplify operation and
at the same time reduce the need for repair and maintenance. Special
facilities for maintenance should provide the same degree of safety
to personnel as that attained in the over -all operations of land-based
nuclear facilities. Where special facilities are necessary, their con
struction and operation should be economically attractive to private
industry.
The time involved in developing, designing, engineering, and con
structing facilities for conventionally powered vessels extends over a
period of years. This time period is substantially increased by the
requirements the use of nuclear energy places on such facilities.
Therefore, it is desirable at an early stage in the nuclear ship pro
gram to determine what facilities will be needed to sustain the
operation of such ships. Owing to the lack of operational experience,
certain assumptions must be made in the initial stages of the program
commensurate with the existing state of nuclear technology. Al
though experience with supporting facilities for land -based nuclear
power plants will be helpful, such facilities will be quite different
from marine plants in many respects. The Savannah will travel
throughout the world and enter ports having widely varying harbor
characteristics, climatological conditions, ship regulations, traffic, and
industrial and commercial development ; consequently the variations
in operating conditions for this ship require provision for the control
of possible radioactive contamination in a manner quite different
from shore-based plants. The disposal of radioactive waste, for
example, is likely to require a different approach , first because of the
limited space for waste-storage facilities aboard ship and second
because of the mobility of the ship.
Certain requirements, exclusive of economy, have to be met in the
design of nuclear-powered ships to make them attractive to shipping
interests. Nuclear ships must be compatible with , and capable of
being integrated with, the operational patterns now governing con
ventional ships. They must be capable of operating in world com
merce, and it is desirable, though not imperative, that they be capable
of using existing conventional facilities. Where special facilities for
cargo handling, waste disposal , refueling, etc. , are required , they must
be of such size and scope that they can be integrated into existing
port facilities. Such facilities should be so designed and constructed
that they could be provided by local authorities or, when economi
cally possible, by private industry as part of the normal service
rendered for the operation of conventional ships.
To provide maximum protection in the event of a nuclear accident,
the reactor systems of nuclear ships must be enclosed in a contain
ment vessel so designed and so placed in the ship that there will be
little likelihood of its being damaged in a collision. The radiation
level outside the containment vessel should be such as to subject
personnel to total radiation dosages conservatively below the levels
established by the AEC and other organizations responsible for
radiological health measures . The nuclear propulsion systems must
incorporate a high degree of self-sufficiency, that is, they must be
designed to operate in foreign commerce independent of special
home-port facilities. This implies that a nuclear ship be so designed
and constructed that minor repairs and the maintenance of all equip
ment , conventional and nuclear, can be performed during normal
ship operation. The facilities for making major repairs, for refuel
ing, and for the removal of high -level radioactive wastes will , for
the present, be restricted to ports in the continental United States.
Spent fuel elements and machinery, such as pumps, compressors, or
fittings, that become contaminated and are replaced during normal
operation will be placed in shielded containers and stored in un
manned areas on the ship .
Existing port facilities ( where nuclear servicing will not be re
quired ) will need few additions to accommodate nuclear ships. The
only additional requirements will be in the area of health physics.
It is possible that a health physics facility could be integrated into
an existing port facility such as a fire station or harbor master's
office. The health physics personnel are responsible for sampling and
analyzing radioactivity levels in ports and contiguous areas ; en
forcing compliance with safeguard standards as related to nuclear
operation ; determining dose rates and accumulative dosage to make
certain that personnel are not overexposed to radiation ; and moni
toring and recording radioactivity in the atmosphere, on land, and
in the waters of ports and harbors. Instruments or other equipment
needed by the health physics staff for carrying out these functions
probably could be housed and maintained in existing port installa
tions. Health physics functions can be considered a type of service
that would possibly be supplied by a port or harbor authority in
cosponsorship with state and federal authorities. The operation of
this service would probably be similar to that practiced by the Coast
Guard and port authorities in relation to current safety procedures.
The health physics service described above applies only to port
facilities where no major nuclear maintenance is required. The
health physics support for major overhaul of a nuclear reactor would
involve elaborate instrumentation and large man-power pools, both for
actual work and for radiation control. In addition , vast quantities of
protective clothing, respiratory devices, etc., will be used during the
overhauling of a shipboard nuclear plant.
6-2 COLLECTION, HANDLING, AND REMOVAL OF RADIOACTIVE

WASTES FROM NUCLEAR - POWERED SHIPS
An unavoidable consequence of the operation of any nuclear reac

tor is the production of unwanted radioactive wastes, in liquid, solid,
and gaseous forms. The safe disposal of such wastes constitutes a
difficult problem with any type nuclear power plant, but it is perhaps
more difficult in the case of a nuclear-powered ship because of the
limitations of space and the varying environment to which it is
exposed during its travels. Specifically the problem involves an
evaluation of the potential capacity of the marine environment to
receive radioactive wastes originating both from the normal opera
tion of a nuclear-powered ship and as the result of a major nuclear
accident at sea or in port under a variety of conditions.
By means of suitable monitoring instruments, it is possible to
determine whether the effluents from a nuclear power plant during
normal operation fall within tolerable limits, and, if it is found that
the limits are being exceeded, suitable clean -up procedures can be
started . It is very difficult, on the other hand, to predict the con
ditions that might prevail as the result of a major accident and
what safety measures to provide for in case of such an accident. In
practice, it is reasonable to take a compromise position between the
extremes of normal operation and an accident that would release the
entire radioactivity inventory. Sufficient reliance is placed on the
protective features to remove most of the concern about the worst
conceivable accidents ; however, there is seldom sufficient confidence
in the facility safeguards to assure that all hazards have been elimi
nated . The unexpected can always happen.
A systematic search for possible causes of credible accidents often
contributes substantially to the safety of a facility either in its
design or with respect to its operation. Potential accidents having
substantial consequences and clearly credible possibility of occur
rence may be discovered in such a careful and independent review.
When such are found, safeguards against them of course are incor
porated. Thus, in nuclear installations finally approved for opera
tion , there are no really credible potential accidents against which
safeguards have not been provided to such an extent that the calcu
lated consequences to the public would be unacceptable.
The Savannah will be subject to most of the " conventional ” reactor
accidents and failures ; in addition, she will be subject to all the
hazards of a ship at sea. However, the designers of the Savannah
believe they have been successful in their attempt to preclude the
possibility of the reactor and the ship accidents being additive. The
Savannah has been designed so that virtually no ship accident in
confined waters can give rise to the maximum credible accident;
however, it is still conceivable that such an accident could occur on

the high seas where ships travel at higher speeds than in harbors.
Assuming, then, that a nuclear-powered ship is safeguarded as
completely as possible against the maximum credible accident, it is
still necessary to consider the disposal of the radioactive material
that results from both the normal operation of the nuclear power
system and from minor nuclear mishaps. The two methods of deal
ing with these wastes are : ( 1 ) containment, coupled with isolation
from man's environment, and ( 2 ) dispersion in such a manner that
the probability of return to man via food sources or other routes
is extremely small .
6-2.1 Potential Sources of Radioactive Wastes
In the normal operation of a nuclear-powered ship, radioactive

wastes are produced in both solid and liquid form ; and in addition,
certain radioactive gases accumulate in various parts of the reactor
system . Some of the wastes are high - level wastes, i.e., they are ex
tremely radioactive; whereas others have only a low level of radio
activity. The bulk of the high -level wastes accumulate in the fuel
elements of the reactor ; they are the fission products. These toxic
long-lived materials are produced in sufficient quantities to constitute
a serious potential hazard as a possible source of contamination ;
hence, every effort must be made to keep them properly contained
until the time for their removal from the ship and ultimate disposal.
Radioactive waste also results from the induced activity of corrosion
products in the primary coolant. In addition, small amounts of
fission products may be absorbed in the primary coolant as a conse
quence of failures in the cladding of the fuel elements. With proper
precautions, however, none of these sources of radioactivity need
give trouble. In practice the radioactivity in the primary coolant
is maintained at relatively low levels through the use of a bypass
purification system in which corrosion -product activity is accumu
lated on ion -exchange resins in demineralizers.
The greater part of the fission products is removed from the ship
in the spent fuel elements at the time of refueling ; present practice
is to transfer these spent fuel elements to chemical processing plants
for the recovery of the fissionable material they contain. Thus,
these high - level radioactive materials do not enter the marine en
vironment. Only in the event of a highly improbable maximum
credible accident could any significant part of these materials enter
the marine environment.
Low - level radioactive wastes are continuously created in, and re
moved from , the primary coolant during operation of a nuclear
reactor. Wastes must be removed from the coolant because they
increase the rate of corrosion and erosion within the primary system,
increase the level of radioactivity, interfere with mechanical and
thermodynamic components, and generally decrease the efficiency of
the primary reactor system . Also, the deposits of these low-level
wastes in the piping and components of the systems increase the
danger, difficulty, and expense of inspection , maintenance, and repair.
Some constituents of the reactor primary system may contribute
to the production of radioactive material . First , there are impurities
in the primary system itself, primary impurities in the coolant ,
potential activation products, and radiolytic dissociation products.
Since purification methods are not perfect, minor impurities may be
present when the coolant is first introduced into the system . These
impurities are extremely small, but trace amounts may exist. Cool
ants are also subject to dissociation when exposed to radiation, and
dissociation in some coolants is also accelerated by high tempera
tures. Second, impurities are derived from the components of the
primary system in the form of corrosion and erosion products and
from chemical reactions with the coolant. In some types of reactors,
solid moderator materials may contaminate the coolant . Fission
products normally do not enter the coolant except as a result of fuel
element rupture. Foreign matter in the form of grease or oil or
oxide deposits may accumulate on component surfaces during reactor
construction , and, although every possible effort is made to remove
such material before start-up , they are a possible source of solid
waste. Volatile impurities resulting from the effect of heat upon
reactor materials may also produce small amounts of radioactive
waste.
Reactor wastes have variable properties. Solid , liquid, and gaseous
wastes consist of radiochemical, chemical, and ionic constituents.
Mass, volume, activity, and chemical composition are often inde
pendent factors in considering the over-all effect of these materials
upon the reactor system .
The potential sources of wastes vary somewhat with different
reactor types. In a pressurized -water reactor system such as is used
on the Savannah , the primary coolant, consisting of light water of
high purity, is circulated throughout the primary system under a
pressure of 1,750 psi and at a temperature of around 500 ° F and a
velocity of approximately 9 ft / sec. The primary -system loop includes
the reactor, heat exchangers, a pressurizer, and circulating pumps.
Since the water in this primary loop functions both as coolant and as
moderator, moderator contaminants are not introduced into the sys
tem , although radioactive isotopes may form in the coolant as a
result of exposure to radiation in the reactor.
There are at least eight potential sources of radioactive waste.1

These are, briefly, as follows :
1. Coolant reactions: These involve the production of the several
isotopes of oxygen , hydrogen , and nitrogen under the action of
the neutron flux. Most of these isotopes have half lives of less
than 30 sec and, with the exception of N16, have relatively
moderate gamma energy. The N16 with a half life of 7 sec
emits 6 -Mev gamma radiation.
2. Coolant dissociation : The radiolytic dissociation of light water
induced by nuclear radiation is important in a pressurized -water
reactor because of the corrosive effects of the dissociation prod
ucts rather than their induced radioactivity. Through disso
ciation , chemical contaminants such as hydrogen peroxide and
evolved hydrogen and oxygen are introduced into the reactor
coolant, and, although these may become activated, their activity
is no greater than in the undissociated state.
3. Primary coolant impurities: The two sources of primary cool
ant impurities in a pressurized -water reactor are dissolved and
solid materials and gases. Natural water contains minor quan
tities of dissolved and solid materials which must be removed
from water supplied to reactor systems to eliminate them as
sources of induced activity. This purification is generally
effected by filtration , which removes solids, and distillation ,
which removes dissolved contaminants. The water is then
sent through ion -exchange resins ( in demineralizers) for
final purification before entering the reactor system. Water
entering the reactor plant contains less than 0.5 parts per mil
lion (ppm ) total impurities and is at the practical engineering
limit of purity for plant usage.
4. Corrosion : Corrosion in a pressurized -water reactor occurs on
the interior surfaces of the primary -loop coolant system and in
the reactor itself through the passage of atoms from the metal
lic to the ionic state. The corrosive agent is the coolant and
its impurities; the material corroded is, in the case of the
Savannah, stainless steel. Corrosion products inhibit heat trans
fer, accumulate upon reactor components, and become activated
by radiation in the reactor, thus becoming an important source
of radioactive waste .
5. Erosion : Erosion as it occurs in the primary coolant system of
a water-cooled reactor is the action of the coolant and its im
purities upon the interior metal surfaces, which causes slow
mechanical disintegration of the metal surfaces. It is distinctly
set apart from corrosion in that corrosion is chemical and ero
sion is mechanical. The mechanical elements of erosion are
friction, adhesion , abrasion , and metal fatigue. In a reactor,

the metal surfaces are macroscopically smooth and homogeneous
in composition, and it is important to note that erosion occurs
on a microscopic scale. The erosion products are usually solid
and become activated by nuclear radiation to become a source
of reactor waste.
6. Fission products: There are three mechanisms by which fission
products can enter the coolant. First, fission fragments in the
process of fission have a recoil energy and are ejected from the
fuel at the interface of the fuel- element cladding. The average
range of the fragments varies with the cladding material but
is usually not great enough to allow the fragments to pass
through the cladding. However, owing to the effects of erosion
and corrosion , the cladding thickness can be reduced to the
point where the fission fragments penetrate the cladding, allow
ing them to enter the coolant. Second, diffusion of fission
product gases through the fuel - element cladding occurs in cer
tain reactor system . This diffusion is increased by factors such
as decrease in cladding thickness, increase in temperature , and
length of reactor operation, which determines internal gas
pressure. The third mechanism by which fission products can
enter the coolant is through failure of the fuel elements. This
could be serious if a large percentage of such failures occurred
since it would increase the activity of the coolant to significant
levels, but in practice it has been found that reactor systems
can operate with a small ņumber of failed fuel elements with
out serious increase in the level of coolant activity.
7. Primary reactor debris: Another source of reactor wastes is the
foreign matter that may enter the primary system during fabri
cation and construction. Normally, because of the cleanliness
observed and the precautionary measures taken during con
struction and assembly, the amount of such foreign material is
negligible. However, if any is present, it is circulated through
the system , and results in clogging of orifices, deposition between
moving parts, acceleration of erosion , and increasing system
corrosion characteristics. Primary -system debris can also enter
the system during refueling and when primary -loop components
are replaced.
8. Coolant additives : Certain materials are added to a pressurized
water reactor system to condition the coolant. For example,
lithium hydroxide is used for control of the hydrogen -ion con
centration . Tritium is generated from lithium by radiation ,
and tritium with a half life of 12.4 years, emits weak beta
radiation. Another additive is hydrogen . This is added to
scavenge oxygen during reactor operation and thus reduce cor

rosion. Hydrazine is also used as an oxygen scavenger during
start-up, and this results in the production of nitrogen, am
monia , and ferrous oxide .
These eight potential sources of radioactive waste are characteris
tic of water-cooled and -moderated reactors. The sources of waste
and the coolant system characteristics of gas-cooled reactors, how
ever, are similar to those of water-cooled reactors. The primary
difference is that gas -cooled reactors require beryllium or graphite
moderators, and the principal coolants considered for gas-cooled
reactors are helium and carbon dioxide. The sources of waste in
gas- cooled reactors are classified in essentially the same manner as
for water- cooled systems. Corrosion due to the action of the coolant
is probably less in gas-cooled systems, particularly where helium is
used as the coolant since it is chemically inert. The only corrosion
in helium -cooled systems would be caused by impurities in the
helium , but these can be maintained at an extremely low level .
6-2.2 Collection and Handling of Radioactive Wastes
The waste - collection components of a nuclear power system serve

to remove wastes from the system and maintain high coolant purity
without impeding the over- all efficiency of the system.
Present practice in the handling of low - level liquid wastes is to
collect the effluents in holding tanks for storage , decay, and analysis
before final disposal. On a nuclear -powered ship , these effluents
will be stored in tanks before being transferred to shore facilities.
At present there is no intention of disposing of such low-level liquid
wastes overboard. Some of these wastes accumulate gradually dur
ing operation , others are formed in large quantities following
start-up operations.
Radioactive wastes that might be collected on a nuclear -powered
ship are : ( 1 ) expansion volume of primary coolant ( excess volume
created by thermal expansion in the reactor ) ; ( 2 ) operational leak
age from components of the primary and auxiliary systems, wastes
from equipment decontamination , and shower and laundry wastes ;
( 3 ) ion -exchange resins, which remove corrosion products from the
coolant; and ( 4 ) contaminated solid materials.
Shipboard reactors are designed to operate continuously for long
periods on a single loading of fuel. It would be desirable to perform
refueling operations as nearly as possible to coincide with conren
tional hull and machinery inspection and maintenance schedules,
although this is not imperative. Liquid wastes associated with re
fueling operations will generally include water from the primary
system together with effluents from decontamination of reactor com

ponents and fuel -handling gear.
The only nuclear reactors actually in use aboard ships at
present are pressurized-water reactors ; therefore, waste-disposal
practices are limited to such reactor systems. As experience accumu
lates in the operation of such systems, changes will undoubtedly be
made in design criteria, selection of materials, and other factors
influencing the character and volume of wastes. Other type reactors
presumably will be used in future nuclear -powered ships; indeed,
feasibility studies are now being made on the use of organic-mod
erated and of gas-cooled reactors for marine propulsion. The char
acter and amount of radioactive wastes that might be generated from
such future designs cannot be determined accurately now, but gen
eral conclusions can be used in formulating design criteria and
operating doctrine with respect to waste disposal .
6–2.3 Amount and Composition of Radioactive Wastes
The amount and composition of radioactive wastes from nuclear

ships will vary considerably, depending upon the type reactor used
and the size of the reactor system involved . With respect to pres
surized - water systems, some idea of the wastes produced may be
gained from the radioactive -waste production estimated for the
Savannah.
( a ) Liquid Wastes. The liquid wastes produced on the Savannah
will consist first of those resulting from start-up operations and ,
second, those which accumulate from leakage and other sources dur
ing normal operation. During start-up, in raising the temperature
of the primary coolant from 110° F to the normal operating tem
perature ( 508 °F ) , approximately 2,170 gal of water will be dis
placed from the system . After complete filling of the system , the
pressurizer, buffer-seal surge tank, and effluent condensing tank will
be partially drained to their operating levels; this will account for
an additional 1,072 gal of primary coolant transferred to the liquid
waste collection system . Thus, 3,242 gal of waste water will result
during start-up. This water can be reintroduced into the primary
system during thermal contraction when the reactor is being shut
down ; however, the drainage from the effluent condensing tank will
be held in the laboratory waste tank .
Liquid wastes produced during normal operation, from leakage
and other sources, are more difficult to estimate, but it has been esti
mated that after 100 days of operation , the liquid wastes will total
3,670 gal. This quantity includes an estimated 5 gal a day from the
laboratory. The predicted gross radioactivity in these wastes has
also been calculated. Assuming that the ship had an average of
two warm -ups a month, the total potential radioactivity in the liquid
wastes from a single ship during one year's operation would be
16 curies from the warm -up wastes and 11 curies from leakage and
other sources . The radioisotopes in the liquid wastes include Crsi ,
Co60, Fe55, and Ta182.
( b ) Solid Wastes. The principal source of solid wastes will be
the ion -exchange resins in the bypass purification system , which
remove the corrosion -product activity at the maximum rate of for
mation, 10 mg /dm²/month. Estimates indicate that each ion-ex
changer will accumulate in 50 days of operation from 100 to 300
curies of activated corrosion products and impurities, plus, in the
event of defective fuel elements, approximately 4.5 curies of fission
products per 1,530 g (equivalent to 1 fuel pin ) of fuel exposed .
Predominant elements in the corrosion products and impurities
group may include Mn " , Fe , C060, K38, Na24, Cr , and Ta182. The
chromium , tantalum , iron , and cobalt are expected to account for
approximately 75 percent of the non - fission product activity accui
mulated on the ion -exchange resins.3
It is normal practice in conventional boiler plants to regenerate
the ion -exchange resins in the demineralizers when they become
depleted ; in modern plants this is accomplished automatically. This
practice will not be followed initially on the Savannah, although
shipboard regeneration could lead to significant operating economies
in the design of future nuclear propulsion systems. With the
Savannah, complete units containing expended resins will be re
moved periodically .
As will be described in Chap. 7, a special nuclear service vessel
has been built in connection with the operation of the Savannah.
This floating service facility will accept the spent ion -exchange
resins from the Savannah for storage, packaging, and transfer to
land -based radioactive -waste facilities for ultimate disposal .
It is of interest at this point to consider briefly the attitude of
the U.S. Navy with respect to the disposal of spent ion-exchange
resins since the Navy has had considerable experience in the opera
tion of nuclear- powered ships using pressurized -water reactors. If
resin replacement is necessary in port, naval practice requires that
the spent resin be dumped into a disposable catch tank, which is
subsequently sealed and buried on land or at sea in accordance
with approved procedures. However, under certain conditions the
Navy now allows resin disposal at sea . As outlined by T. J. Iltis
and M. E. Miles 4 in a report to the Joint Committee on Atomie
Energy, U.S. Congress, early in 1959, resin discharge at sea can
take advantage of the great dilution available in the ocean . When
dumped overboard the resin will sink, and as it sinks the radio
active ions on the resins are rapidly replaced by ions of the sea
water. Thus, it is claimed , within a few minutes the radioactivity

has transferred from the resin to the sea water in the wake of the
ship where, because of turbulence, it will readily disperse. On this
basis the Bureau of Ships instruction ( 9890.5 , dated May 12, 1958,
signed by H. G. Rickover ) allows resin from naval nuclear- powered
submarines using pressurized -water systems to be disposed of in
the ocean . However, restrictions are placed on ship location with
respect to land, to other ships, and to fishing areas during the dis
charge to avoid any possibility of having such discharges increase
the radioactivity to which people are exposed. Specifically, the
permissible procedure is that “ (a ) at sea , spent demineralizer resins
may be discharged overboard when the ship is more than 12 miles
from shore, provided : ( 1 ) the ship has headway on , ( 2 ) other ships
not within 3 miles, and ( 3 ) the ship is not in known fishing areas.
( b ) Except as provided above, spent demineralizer resins should
not be discharged overboard. At dockside, resin may be discharged
to a retention tank for disposal by a shore facility .”
On the Savannah, reactor primary shielding is provided in the
form of an annular water - filled tank around the reactor pressure
vessel. This shield water will seldom , if ever, be dumped during
the life of the ship. In naval practice 0.2 percent potassium chro
mate is used in this shield water as a corrosion inhibitor, and neu
tron activation of this chemical produces small concentrations of
radionuclides. Their concentrations are very low ; however, and
no restrictions are placed on the disposal of shield -tank water .
Other solid radioactive wastes from nuclear ships result primarily
from maintenance operations. Such materials include metal scrap,
rags, plastic waste, paper, small tools, laboratory equipment, and
protective clothing. Materials that cannot be easily decontaminated
on shipboard will be appropriately stored in designated containers
for subsequent removal and processing at other facilities.
( c ) Gaseous Wastes. Gaseous wastes are produced in pressurized
water reactor systems from the radiolytic dissociation of the water
under radiation . This concentration should be minimal since an
excess of hydrogen will be available through the hydrogen -addition
system to recombine with the oxygen as water. The hydrogen
addition system is provided to reduce the corrosive action of oxygen
under operating conditions. Fission -product gases also would be
released in the event of fuel-element failure, the amount depending
upon the extent of the defect.
Within the containment vessel, the constituent elements of the
atmosphere are also subject to direct activation by reactors of oxygen ,
nitrogen , and argon , the most significant concentration being due to
A41 This has been calculated to reach a maximum of 4 x 10-7
uc /ml.
Gaseous activity also arises in the liquid -waste collection and

storage system . Such displacement gas must be vented to prevent
compression in the liquid -storage tank voids while accommodating
thermal expansion of the primary system during start-up. Normally
this vented gas will be discharged to the atmosphere ; however, if
the activity is significantly in excess of maximum permissible con
centration (MPC ) levels, the gas will be vented to the containment
vessel .
Fission gases that accumulate in the primary system are removed
by means of strippers, adsorption cartridges, and mechanical filters.
All waste gas will be mechanically filtered before high -velocity dis
charge to the atmosphere. As described in Chap. 4 , on the Savannah
the radioactive waste gas will be discharged from the top of the
hollow forward mast.
Containment -vessel purging is not necessary for routine operation
of the ship but will be required prior to opening the containment
vessel for access to the primary system for periodic inspection and
maintenance. The containment vessel will normally be purged at
sea prior to entering a port . However, prior to purging, air sam
ples will be analyzed to determine activity levels. If levels are
above tolerable limits, purging will be carried out in such a 1
manner that there will be no hazard to passengers or the general
environment.
( d ) Refueling Wastes. Special facilities, either shoreside or on
a special service vessel , will be provided to collect and retain all
wastes resulting from the refueling process. Spent fuel elements
will be shipped in shielded casks in accordance with accepted prac
tice to a reprocessing plant. Liquids and solids associated with the
refueling process will be retained at the service facility for decay
prior to removal and ultimate disposal . Owing to the variable
nature of the type and extent of maintenance to be performed on
the reactor system at the time of each refueling, detailed estimates
of waste characteristics cannot be calculated . However, if, for exam
ple, the Savannah reactor were drained down to the outlet nozzles,
this would amount to 388 cu ft or 2,910 gal of primary coolant and,
if drained to the level of the iniet nozzles near the bottom of the
pressure vessel , approximately 534 cu ft or 4,110 gal .
( e ) Future Practice. It is considered desirable that future com
mercial nuclear ship design, where feasible, include the possibility
of controlled disposal of some radioactive wastes directly into the
open ocean , as is now practiced by naval nuclear vessels. There
will be restrictions on the amount of waste containing very low
concentrations of radionuclides that can be discharged in port a reas
or other congested waters. Waste disposal at sea is under active
consideration by oceanographers and related specialists, who are
anlyzing the cumulative effects of radioactive materials naturally

present in the oceans and those added by nuclear ship operation,
the current disposal of packaged and unpackaged wastes, and the
fallout from weapons tests.
The National Academy of Sciences ( NAS ) has established a
working panel under the Committee on the Effects of Atomic Radia
tion on Oceanography and Fisheries to review the present and future
operation of nuclear vessels. The International Atomic Energy
Agency ( IAEA ) in Vienna has had these questions under consid
eration , and in May 1960 this organization issued its first conclusions.
These were that the release of highly radioactive wastes into the
sea cannot be recommended as an operational practice, but the sea
disposal of low- and intermediate- level wastes may be safe under
controlled and specified conditions.
The panel recommended that all radioactive wastes disposed of
into the sea , with the exception of those incidental to the operation
of nuclear-powered ships, be released into designated disposal sites
in conformity with conditions specified for the particular sites.
Wastes from nuclear ships should be released in such a way as not
to limit the harvest of marine products. Furthermore, each dis
posal site should be designated by responsible national or inter
national authority, which should also set out the conditions of
disposal for the site. As regards the disposal of wastes from nuclear
ships, the panel stated that a record should be maintained on
every ship for inspection by port authorities, and all disposals in
harbors and national waters should be in conformity with conditions
laid down by the local authority. Disposal in international waters
should be in conformity with conditions specified in the licensing
of the vessel or by the appropriate international authority.
The conclusions of the IAEA , it should be pointed out, are only
the conclusions of this particular agency . Other organizations are
also considering these problems, and it will be some time before a
set of international regulations for waste disposal at sea can expect
to gain international acceptance.
6-3 BIOLOGICAL IMPLICATIONS OF RADIOACTIVE WASTES
At the present time it is impossible to state with absolute cer

tainty that human exposure to ionizing radiation is harmful at very
low dose rates that are of the order of natural background radiation
rate. From the beginning of man's existence, he has been exposed
to this low-level background radiation , and , although it probably
has not been beneficial, man has managed to evolve to his present
state of development in spite of it . The influence of background
radiation on man can only be determined by observations over many
generations on large groups of men who have been exposed at

varying background radiation levels.
Studies on animals and on man have indicated that there are
probably two types of radiation damage: one requiring threshold
or minimum dose before radiation damage results and the other
increasing linearly with the dose . Typical of the first damage is
radiation sickness, which does not occur or is not perceptible at
doses of less than about 20 r, and this dose must occur in a relatively
short time ( less than 24 hr ). The second type is characterized by
radiation fatalities, which are extremely unlikely at doses of less
than 200 r, and, again , this must occur in a period of less than 24 hr.
Genetic damage has commonly been considered to vary linearly with
dose, and, likewise, many observations at high dose rates have sug
gested that the incidence of leukemia may increase in direct pro
portion to the accumulated dose. Although it is probable that
neither genetic mutations nor leukemia incidence has a true radiation
threshold , it appears likely that the slope of the curves expressing
the increase in leukemia incidence as well as the increase in genetic
mutations per millirad of accumulated dose may be less steep at
low dose rates than at the relatively high dose rates where con
vincing experiments can and have been conducted with a reasonably
large number of animals.
6-3.1 Maximum Permissible Exposure
For the present time levels of maximum permissible exposure of

the population at large to ionizing radiation must be based on
estimates involving extrapolations over two or three orders of
magnitude below the experimental data that can be considered
statistically significant. Thus, it is safe only to assume that types
of radiation damage, such as genetic mutation, leukemia incidence,
and shortening of life span , increase to some extent with any increase
in dose, taking place at any dose rate and following any accumu
lated dose ; in other words, there is no threshold. However, it cer
tainly would be conservative, especially with respect to genetic
mutation, to assume a linear relation between dose and effect all the
way from high chronic dose rates to background dose rates of about
4 rads per 30 years.*
.
The recommended levels of permissible exposure to ionizing radi
ation are set internationally by the International Commission on
Radiological Protection ( ICRP ) and nationally in the United
States by the National Committee on Radiation Protection ( NCRP ).
These two organizations have worked together for many years in
* The 30-year interval is a convenient period for considering genetic damage to man
because the average fathers and mothers have begotten half their children by this age.
establishing safe working levels, and both organizations have recently

sent to press a number of publications in which recommendations
are made for external and internal maximum permissible exposure
to ionizing radiation. The recommendations of the ICRP and the
NCRP are similar and differ only in minor respects.
When maximum permissible exposure levels are being established,
the practice has been to set a higher maximum level for occupational
workers in atomic installations than for the population at large.
Both the ICRP and the NCRP recommend that exposure to persons
living in the neighborhood of a controlled area ( defined as an area
in which radiation exposure is under the supervision of a health
physicist) should be limited to one -tenth of the occupational expo
sure values for continuous exposure. The ICRP, as well as the
NAS, has recommended that the maximum genetic exposures to
the population at large from man -made sources of ionizing radiation
should be of the order of natural background. The NAS specified
that the average exposure of the reproductive cells to radiation
above natural background should be limited to 10 r ( or rem ) from
conception to age 30. The NCRP has not as yet set a specific
figure. The ICRP has suggested that for planning purposes the
genetic dose to the population at large from all man -made sources
of ionizing radiation other than medical sources should be set at
5 rem to age 30. As indicated by Karl Z. Morgan, Director of the
Health Physics Division of Oak Ridge National Laboratory, this
is equivalent to the 10 rem specified by the NAS if we assume the
average medical exposure to age 30 to be 4.5 rem . The ICRP 7
has apportioned this 5 rem as indicated in Table 6.1.
Table 6.1 - PERMISSIBLE GENETIC DOSE * TO THE POPULATION AT
LARGE SUGGESTED BY ICRP TO SERVE AS A GUIDE
1.5 internal
0.5 external
4.5 medical (this includes medical X- 2.0
rays , radium , or other radioisotope 2.0 general to popula
treatment or diagnosis ). tion at large
5.0 other ( industrial, fallout, etc. ) . 1.0 occupational
4.5 background. 3.0 0.5 special groups
1.5 reserve
14.0 Total 5.0 Total
3.0
* Relative biological effectiveness (RBF ) dose in roentgen equivalent man (rem ) to age 30 .
There are several reasons why the permissible exposure levels for
the population at large are set at a considerably lower level than
those for occupational workers. First, the occupational workers in
the nuclear industry are a select group who receive routine medical
613489062-19
examinations and are under the strict surveillance of health physi

cists. Second, occupational workers in any industry realize that
there are certain hazards to which they are exposed but , because
of the compensation they receive for their services and because they
feel adequate in dealing with such hazards, they are willing to
accept the risk . This same attitude prevails among the workers in
the nuclear industry ; they accept the fact that there is some radia
tion exposure but feel that it is slight and that everything possible
is being done to minimze serious danger. Persons living outside
controlled areas, however, include children and pregnant women
who may have no choice other than to live in homes close to the
controlled areas. Unlike the occupational worker who works 40 hr
a week and may move on to other types of work after a few years,
some of the neighboring population may be exposed 168 hr a week
and live close by for many years.
The maximum permissible external occupational dose for an adult
man as established by the NCRP and the ICRP is 5 rem / year and
no more than 3 rem per 13 weeks. For minors under 18 years
and for others living in the neighborhood of a controlled area , the
rate must be 1/10 of 0.1 rem /week, i.e., 0.5 rem / year. This popu
lation is assumed to be a small portion of the population at large
for whom it is recommended that the average exposure from all
sources of man -made radiation not exceed twice natural background
exposure .
It is obvious that, in setting maximum permissible exposures for
passengers and crews aboard nuclear- powered ships, the NCRP and
ICRP values must not be exceeded ; and in the case of the Savannah ,
as described in Chap. 4 , allowing for movement aboard ship and
taking distance into account, the average exposure received by any
passenger will probably be about 0.15 rem , although the exact value
would depend upon the time spent on the ship. The 0.15 -rem dose
is comparable to what he would receive on land from background
soil radioactivity and cosmic radiation . In all cases where crew
members have freedom of movement aboard ship, radiation levels
will not be more than 5 rem of integrated dosage per year. These
radiation levels apply to the handling and storage of radioactive
wastes aboard the ship as well as to radiation produced by normal
operation of the reactor system .
6–3.2 Biological and Physical Processes in the Marine Environment
The disposal of radioactive material intentionally or inadvertently

is cause for concern because such material may enter the life cycle
of marine life and thus endanger an important source of man's food.
This potential hazard has been given a great amount of study by
various national organizations, in particular the NAS and the

National Research Council (NRC ). Although the problem involves
the marine environment as a whole, the areas of greatest concern
are the near -shore areas ( i.e., the harbors, estuaries, and inshore
waters ) and certain portions of the continental shelf. Most of the
food harvested from the sea comes from these waters, including the
entire harvest of sedentary forms such as oysters, clams, and sea
weed , which concentrate certain elements by very large factors.
Indeed , some important fission and corrosion products are concen
trated by certain marine organisms by factors of 100 to perhaps as
high as a million. In view of such biological processes, the disposal
into coastal waters of even low-level wastes must be regarded as a
serious potential hazard.
The fate of radioactive material introduced into ocean waters
depends upon the following considerations: ( 1 ) the physical and
chemical form in which the material occurs ; ( 2 ) initial mechanical
dilution of the waste by the receiving water ; ( 3 ) advection of the
wastes away from the source region by currents and simultaneous
turbulent diffusion ; ( 4 ) uptake of the activity by suspended silt
and bottom sediments, which removes some of the material from
the water and restricts further dispersion ; and ( 5 ) the concentration
of activity by various parts of the marine life, including shellfish
and fin fish, as already mentioned .
In connection with studies of fallout from nuclear weapons, it
has been demonstrated that plankton organisms will accumulate
large concentrations of mixed radioisotopes. At the present time
the easiest way to determine whether a particular area of the ocean
has been contaminated by fallout is to collect a sample of plankton
and examine the plankton for radioactivity. The AEC has devel
oped a detailed program to discover the effectiveness of these
organisms in the transfer of radioactivity to human food organisms.
A second objective of the AEC program is to evaluate the trans
port of elements by currents and by mixing; by the geochemical
processes of adsorption , sedimentation , and accumulation in loca
tions where they may be absorbed by bottom -dwelling marine organ
isms; and , finally, by biological transport through accumulation in
living matter and the subsequent migration, horizontal and vertical,
of marine populations. Many kinds of experiments must be designed
and carried out before questions concerning these processes can be
answered.
When radioactive materials enter the oceans, they may go into
solution , they may precipitate or coagulate, they may interact to
attain colloidal size, they may be adsorbed or absorbed by other
particles, and they may be ingested by organisms and enter into
the biochemical cycle.
Whatever the state of suspension or removal from the water, radio

elements will be subject to physical forces that affect their ultimate
distribution . Horizontal and vertical currents may transport iso
topes until they reach a water density level that temporarily or semi
permanently stabilizes them . Diffusion processes tend to equally
distribute the added elements among those already present. Migrat
ing animals ingest the particles, excrete them , die, or are eaten by
other animals to modify the tendency toward homogeneity of dis
tribution .
Some of the ( radioactive) elements are needed by organisms, and ,
because the normal elemental supply is low , these radiochemicals are
concentrated by the organisms, as already mentioned , perhaps a
million times over their natural abundance in the sea . In other
words, if the organism living in the sea has a physiological need for
an element that cannot be immediately satisfied by the elements that
are already present in the surrounding sea and if a radioisotope
of that element is added to the sea , then naturally the organism will
take up this radioisotope. Other elements are avoided or discrimi
nated against by organisms.8
It has been pointed out ' that the concentration of certain elements
by organisms, along with gravitational effects on their excreta and
dead remains, as well as their migration, results in a circulation of
these elements that is different from the circulation of the water.
Therefore, the distribution of radioisotopes in the ocean water can
not be predicted solely from knowledge of currents since the biota
play an important part in the distribution of isotopes in the ocean .
6–3.3 Subdivision of the Marine Environment
There are three separate areas of the sea to be considered in

radioactive -waste disposal into ocean water. These are : estuaries,
coastal waters, and the deep sea . In the United States the estuaries
are the kind in which the bottom water moves inshore ; therefore
there would be a tendency for radioactive -waste materials to remain
in the estuary and not be dispersed . These harbors and inshore
waters, in general, also contain many bottom -living animals that
concentrate radioactive materials; thus the dispersal of radioactive
materials from the estuaries takes place more slowly than the move
ment of the water itself would indicate.
In coastal waters, i.e. , waters within 200 miles of the coast , there
are two different situations: the shallow coastal waters of the Gulf
and Atlantic coasts, and the relatively deep waters that exist quite
close to shore off the Pacific coast . The coastal waters provide pos
sibilities for dispersal of low-level radioactive wastes only.
Finally, there is the deep sea, which lies below a virtual screen or
curtain called the " thermocline." It is isolated from the rest of the
ocean , and very few of man's food organisms come directly or in
directly from it . Although there is no clear theory on this, it is
generally believed, and there is substantial evidence for believing,
that the deep waters are isolated from the surface layer for periods
of the order of hundreds to thousands of years. If this is true, then
the use of the ocean deeps for disposal of some high - level waste may
be possible ; however, the general attitude of oceanographers and
marine biologists throughout the world is that high - level waste dis
posal to the oceans should not be permitted .
The National Academy of Sciences and the National Research
Council have several working committees preparing recommenda
tions of specific disposal problems of concern to the AEC . The work
of one of these committees involves the disposal of wastes from
nuclear-powered ships, and its recent report, Radioactive Waste Dis
posal from Nuclear -powered Ships, issued in 1959, contains specific
recommendations with respect to disposal into the three subdivisions
of the marine environment described above.3 The report gives
specific recommendations concerning the amounts of different types
of radioactive wastes that can be released safely into the sea by
nuclear-powered ships. Separate rules are given for each zone of
the marine environment. Naturally, these rules are more restric
tive for the innermost zone of harbors, estuaries, and coastal waters,
and least restrictive for the open sea outside fishing areas more than
12 miles from shore and where the bottom is greater than 200 fath
oms. The working group has attempted to make its recommendations
as precise as possible within the limits of our present knowledge of
the physics, chemistry, and biology of the oceans. Where uncertain
ties exist because of inadequate knowledge, a conservative position
has been chosen , i.e. , the calculations underlying the recommenda
tions may err on the side of safety. Each assumption and each step
in the calculations is fully described , however, so that the reader may
make an independent evaluation of the degree of conservatism of
the recoinmended rules.
One of the important conclusions of the NAC - NRC report con
cerns the necessity for monitoring and maintaining records of the
amount and location of radioactive- waste disposal by nuclear ships.
This will involve not only action by each maritime country, but also
internetional agreement and collaboration .
The Committee recommends that the monitoring program cover
all harbors in the United States and its territories entered by nuclear
vesse s, and that it be flexible enough to encompass, when circum
stances require, all marine environments where organisms are ex
ploited by man . It is recognized that the permissible concentrations

recommended for the coastal waters are quite small from the stand
point of detection and their determination would require special
counting techniques. It is, however, not the concentration in the
water phase of the environment, but rather the activity in the marine
organisms that is the controlling factor.
6-4 METEOROLOGICAL AND HYDROLOGICAL ANALYSES APPLICA

BLE TO OPERATION OF NUCLEAR - POWERED VESSELS
Thus far only the broad and more general aspects of the marine
environment have been discussed . No analysis of the hydrological
or meteorological conditions of specific harbors or inshore environ
ments has been presented, and waste disposal has been considered
only with respect to the normal operation of nuclear -powered ships.
not with respect to the radioactive concentrations that might prevail
in case of a maximum credible accident to a ship in a harbor. Al
though every effort is being made in the construction and operation
of present nuclear ships to prevent the possibility of such maximum
credible accidents, it obviously would be extremely unwise not to
attempt to analyze the consequences of such accidents with respect
to specific inshore environments and at the same time to establish
means and methods for mitigating the hazards arising as a conse
quence of massive releases of radioactive material to the environment.
A number of detailed studies of this kind have been made, par
ticularly with respect to the operation of the Savannah, but, of
course, the results of these studies are equally applicable to the
operation of other nuclear ships. Ideally, in an evaluation of the
problems concerned with contamination of harbor areas, it would
be desirable to have detailed information on the flushing times,
traffic, hydrography, and climatology for all the important and
confined waters throughout the world. Such data would be helpful
in determining the patterns of radioactive dispersion resulting from
a nuclear accident in specific harbor areas likely to be visited by
nuclear -powered ships. An ambitious step in this direction has
already been made by the U.S. Weather Bureau.10 The purpose
of this Weather Bureau study was to provide meteorological infor
mation for coastal areas throughout the world as an aid to those
planning the operations of a nuclear-powered ship. In addition,
the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers has made detailed studies of
major harbors and estuaries in the United States using harbor
models at the U.S. Army Engineer Waterways Experiment Station
at Vicksburg, Miss.11 Oak Ridge National Laboratory has made an
extensive environmental analysis of the Savannah operation at
Camden , N.J.,12 and the Chesapeake Bay Institute of The Johns

lIopkins University has issued a detailed report involving a study
of flushing in the Delaware Bay Model located at the U.S. Army
Engineers Waterways Experiment Station at Vicksburg, Miss.13
The New York Shipbuilding Corporation has conducted an environ
mental radioactivity survey of the shipyard site where the Savannah
was constructed to establish a reference base for radiological meas
urements in that area after the Savannah goes into operation. The
New York Shipbuilding study is a part of the comprehensive pro
gram organized by the U.S. Public Health Service for environmental
radioactivity studies of the Delaware River and Bay. This program
is sponsored by the New York Shipbuilding Corporation , with as
sistance from the States of New Jersey, Pennsylvania, and Delaware,
and the city of Philadelphia.
The U.S. Public Health Service completed its detailed planning
for this program in November 1958, and it was in operation by
April 1959. Eight water-sampling points were established in the
Delaware River and Bay, and plankton, silt , and shellfish collections
were provided for at appropriate stations and intervals. Air-parti
culate collection was established by an air-sampling network ; six
rainfall collection sites were set up in this region.
The collection of representative samples of root crops, seed crops,
leaf crops , and fruit crops, and potato, milk , and agricultural-soil
samples has been initiated ; rabbit thyroids are also being collected.
The radioanalytic headquarters for this work is the Taft Sanitary
Engineering Center in Cincinnati, Ohio.
Collectively, these investigations represent an immense amount of
cooperative technical and administrative effort. They indicate an
awareness of the importance of the environmental aspect of nuclear
propulsion and its significance with respect to the health and safety
of people throughout the world . It is possible , in view of the lack
of actual data, that the recommended maximum permissible concen
tration ( MPC ) values of radioactivity for the various segments of
the marine environment may prove too low ; but, until such data be
come available, it is essential that we err on the conservative side.
In view of the importance of the Savannah as the world's first
nuclear -powered commercial vessel, it is understandable that per
haps the most extensive surveys of marine environment that have
been made are on the Delaware River and Bay, the area in which
the Savannah was constructed and in which the ship is expected to
undergo its first tests and dockside trials .
In this environmental analysis of the Delaware River region , the
various hypothetical accidents were first examined to make certain
that the possible important or controlling accidents had been con
sidered . The resulting activity concentrations and the potential ex

posure as a consequence of the release of the activity to either the
atmosphere or river water were estimated . The exposure was then
evaluated and related to the area and persons affected to arrive at
a comprehensive evaluation of the hazards associated with the release
of activity .
The atmospheric releases of radioactivity following the maximum
credible accident were evaluated for typical lapse ( decrease of tem
perature with height) and inversion ( increasing temperature with
height) conditions. The consequences of deposition and rainout, as
well as of release at ground level and at stack height (both with and
without the stack filter ), were considered. The resulting exposure
data were evaluated both in terms of continuous exposure at the cal
culated concentration and in terms of the total integrated exposure
over a 24 -hr period, the latter being the more meaningful.
Fortunately, there were appropriate harbor -model data from
which to determine the concentration of activity in the river as a
function of time and position for both a continuous and an instan
taneous release. The harbor -model data involved the evaluation of
activity concentrations by means of the dispersion of dye. Some
data were available from earlier tests by the U.S. Army Corps of
Engineers on the model of the Delaware River at Vicksburg, and
these were subsequently extended through the joint efforts of D. W.
Pritchard of The Johns Hopkins University and the Corps of Engi
neers .
Among the several purposes of this environmental analysis of the

Delaware River was a desire to learn what effect the release of
radioactive material in the waters of the river might have upon the
water supply systems of communities throughout the river basin.14
In its lower reaches the Delaware River flows across outcrop areas
of the principal water-bearing formations of the Atlantic Coastal
Plain ( Fig. 6.1 ) . These formations and the river are in hydraulic
connection in many places along this stretch , and it is probable that
recharge from the river has been induced wherever moderate or
heavy pumping is occurring in nearby areas. Since many of the
populated communities along the east side of the river obtain their
drinking -water supply from these water-bearing formations, it is
important to know the nature of the hydraulic connections between
the underground -water formations and the Delaware River and the
rate of seepage into these underground -water sources from the
Delaware .
Travel time for water from areas of recharge in the river to centers
of pumping range from about 11/3 months at Beverly, N.J., to more
than 40 years at the Philadelphia Naval Base. Changes in hydraulic
N
N.J Y
.
202
206
PATTERSON
209
206 202 NEWARK

EASTON NEW YORK
22
BETHLEHEM ELIZABETH
22
ad
PLAINFIELD
ALLENTOWN 202
206
309
130
N
9
641 TRENTON
A
о
Ес
PHILADELPHIA
CAMDEN
206
CHESTER
PA L
DE NEW YORK SHIPBUILDING CORP .
WILMINGTON
с
322
I
DEL
MD
N <
ATLANTIC CITY
2
OYSTER PLANTING
GROUNDS T
SCALE - MILES
NATURAL
OYSTER BEDS
DELAWARE BAY
vo
Fig . 6.1 — Map of the lower Delaware River Valley.
gradients in the underground -water systems adjacent to the river

will cause variations in travel time. However, pumping from these
underground -water sources for many years has created hydraulic
gradients toward the present centers of withdrawal that would per
sist for some time even if all pumping from the underground sources
were to cease .
The environmental analysis of the Delaware River included in

vestigation of the consequences of accidental release of radioactivity
through a nuclear -ship accident. Two types of release mechanism
were considered : ( 1 ) leakage from the containment vessel following
a maximum credible accident after the assumed sinking of the
Savannah and ( 2 ) the deposition of air -borne contamination follow
ing a maximum credible accident on the surface of the river by rain
out and washout ( runoff from land areas after air -borne deposition ),
The main emphasis was placed on the leakage from the containment
of a sunken vessel since such leakage would give the greatest dosage.
These tests involved the release of dyes into the harbor models and
their dispersion through varying tidal cycles and over various peri
ods of time.
In the studies involving deposition from an air -borne release of
radioactivity, it was assumed that the total deposition directly or
indirectly reaches the river. The dispersion of the activity in the
river was assumed to follow that of the model data for the sunken
vessel analysis; however, the method of dosing for the model data
and for the deposition case are very different. The model was dosed
as a point source and thus would be expected to give very different
results than would be obtained from an isotropic plane source ( i.e.,
deposition on the surface of the river ) . The point-source dosing
gave a fairly homogeneous dispersal in the contaminated reach dur
ing the first tidal cycle and tended to support the use of the model
data for the deposition case .
Consequence of accidents other than maximum credible accidents
were investigated. These studies assumed various types of mishaps,
such as a puff of radioactive gas and particulate matter up the stack
as a result of excess pressure in the reactor system while contain
ment is being vented, or the release from a charcoal adsorption unit
that is dropped and ruptured while being removed or transported
to storage. Also considered was the rupture of a spent fuel pin in
the open air from the inadvertent removal of a fuel element ( 161
fuel pins) from its shield , or the accidental dropping of a fuel ele
ment into the river. Results of calculations showed that the gamma
ray dosage from an unshielded spent fuel element at various un
obstructed distances from the fuel element, in air, varied from
364 r /hr at a distance of 100 ft , to 40 r /hr at 300 ft , and 3.7 r /hr
at 1,000 ft . At a distance of 5,000 ft the gamma dose is 0.15 r /hr.
In addition to the studies conducted on the dispersion of radio
activity by water, investigation was also made of the dispersion of
radioactivity by the atmosphere. The extreme complexity of mete
orological data and the wide ranges of meteorological parameters,
together with the effects of small changes, make the prediction of
concentrations and dose rates uncertain . It appears that, except for

unsual weather conditions, the calculated dispersions from a point
source , for example, the forward hollow mast of the Savannah , are
probably correct to within a factor of 3. Furthermore, the uncer
tainties involved in the calculations of activity release by an assumed
accident must be added to the meteorological uncertainties. In the
meteorological studies various conditions were assumed ; and disper
sion during typical lapse ( daytime) conditions and typical inversion
( nighttime) conditions, wind direction, dry deposition of activity,
rainout of activity, etc., were taken into consideration. Dispersion
from an elevated source such as the hollow mast of the Savannah
( 90 ft above water line ) as well as atmospheric diffusion from water
level sources were calculated.
Harbor studies similar to those made of the Delaware River area
are being made of other major harbors and estuaries in the United
States, and the U.S. Weather Bureau has made a detailed investiga
tion of the meteorological conditions existing along the various coasts
throughout the world.
As a means of predicting the behavior of radioactive contaminants
in harbor waters, in addition to the model tests described above, a
research program has been established in cooperation with the U.S.
Coast and Geodetic Survey and the Chesapeake Bay Institute of
The Johns Hopkins University. The primary objective of this
study is to gather sufficient data to allow predictions of the net move
ment, lateral dispersion, and the chemical diffusion of instantaneous
and long-term discharge of reactor products in confined tidal waters.
Since available data for this type of analysis were considered inade
quate, the New York Harbor system was selected for detailed field
observations. Thirty -eight stations were selected for sequential series
of 100 -hr tidal-current and velocity observations. Measuring tech
niques for recording current velocities as low as 0.1 knot are used .
In addition to the Delaware River model tests to obtain basic
information on the flushing properties of a waterway, similar studies
are being conducted with available models of Savannah Harbor and
Narragansett Bay. The latter study has been completed.15 It is
tentatively planned to conduct studies with the New York Harbor
and San Francisco Bay models when they are available. The San
Francisco Bay model is located just outside San Francisco, Calif.;
the other models are all located at the Waterways Experiment Sta
tion at Vicksburg, Miss. The New York Harbor and San Francisco
Bay models, although physically completed, are now in the process
of verification .
6-5 REDUCTION OF RADIOACTIVE CONTAMINATION BY

SCAVENGING
Although it is obvious that the various meteorological and hydro

logical investigations of harbor and coastal areas are of value in
predicting the movement of radioactive material released from a
nuclear- powered ship in an accident, there still remains the problem
of reducing the hazard from such a radioactive release by whaterer
means possible. Therefore, attempts must be made to develop sys
tems capable of removing dispersed radioactive materials from both
sea water and the atmosphere, systems that can be placed aboard or
in the vicitiny of nuclear-powered ships for immediate use. Much
of the work on this phase of the nuclear propulsion program has
been done by the Armour Research Foundation ( ARF ) of Illinois
Institute of Technology under AEC contracts.16,17
The results obtained in the ARF investigations have been much
more successful in scavenging radioactive fission and corrosion prod
ucts from sea water than in scavening radioactive material from the
atmosphere. In the attempts to scavenge particulate radioactive
material from the atmosphere experiments were made involving the
coagulation of the particles by various chemical sprays. As indicated
in the reports of these experiments, one of the most striking charac
teristics of aerosols is their property of continuous coagulation,
which is largely the result of the Brownian movement, but which also
involves other factors such as electrostatic attraction and the energy
carryover from aerosol generation . If a successful meihod could be
developed for coagulating the radioactive particles in the atmosphere,
the rate of settling would be increased and thus the area of disper
sion would be reduced. Although the information and data obtained
as a result of this research are far from conclusive, they are suf
ficiently interesting to stimulate further work in this direction .
The research work on scavenging radioactive material from sea
water was much more effective. Methods of scavenging nearly all
the radioactive isotopes accumulated in a nuclear reactor by absorb
ing them as radioactive cations and anions or coagulating them as
colloids in sea water achieved a considerable degree of success. Re
moval of strontium and especially cesium presented the most difficult
problem , but the investigators claim that there are indications that
these two isotopes can be removed to a great extent, if not com
pletely. The basic idea in developing a method of coagulation is
that it would cause a rapid transfer of the radioactivity in the
water to the bottom , where it would present less of a hazard to
personnel on the ship on which the accident occurred.
The scavenging system presently under study involves the use of
potassium permanganate and either anhydrous ferrous sulfate or
ferrous chloride dihydrate. These compounds react to form manga

nese dioxide- ferric oxide hydrate, which is an effective scavenger.
For use in a practical scavenging system , these chemicals are mixed
and formed into small pellets. When these pellets are dropped into
the sea water, the falling pellets should dissolve at a uniform rate
and within a prescribed time so that the final sea -water environment
will contain the desired chemical concentration to a determined
depth . The dissolution of the pellets, however, is affected by various
factors such as size, shape, density, and the temperature of the sea
At low temperatures the rate at which the pellets dissolve
is slower than at high temperatures ; therefore, under low -tempera
ture conditions more pellets would have to be used . The research
included extensive experimental investigation, not only of various
chemical reactions, but also of various pellet-manufacturing tech
niques.
With regard to methods of using these pellets in the event of a
nuclear accident on a nuclear - powered ship, various schemes were
studied. Since the need for scavenging of radioactive materials
arises only in case of a major nuclear accident, the scavenging deliv
ery system must be operated by remote control from an auxiliary
power source . It should consist preferably of commercial equip
ment. In the event of an accident it seems evident that the area
that can be scavenged most effectively is that directly in the vicinity
of the reactor. Should the side of the ship be opened up and the
reactor damaged, the sea water can only become contaminated if it
flows into the reactor area and is discharged back through the hole
in the side of the ship. Therefore, a portion of the scavenging
material should be available for use directly in this area . Addi
tional scavening material could be dispersed over the side of the
ship both fore and aft of the damaged section .
Several methods of delivering and distributing the scavenging
material have been proposed , e.g., screw conveyors, pneumatic con
veyors, rotary slingers, and direct unloading over the side. If the
scavenging materials are in a liquid or slurry rather than in pellet
or crystalline form , pumps and nozzles could be employed. Two
other delivery concepts may be considered : the Y -gun (used to pro
ject depth charges from a ship ) and an auxiliary craft that could
be lowered into the sea and directed to the contaminated area .
With the Y -gun, the scavenging material would be in unit con
tainers, and a force from a powder charge, compressed air, or a
mechanical-energy cartridge, such as a spring unit, would be used
to propel the containers overboard . It would be desirable to have
the containers burst just before they hit the water to spread the
scavenging material over a given area . This could be accomplished
REACTOR
T
SPACE
AIR
ကုန်း SUPPLY
အခု
HOLD NO. 4
FeCl2
or
FeSO4 KMnO
4
FROM AIR SUPPLY
Fig. 6.2 — Pneumatic conveyor system for delivering scavenger agents

designed for shipboard installation.
by a timed charge within the container. In another version of this

idea, the containers would float, the containers being designed to
allow scavenging materials to dissolve and disperse.
Figure 6.2 is a diagram of a suggested scavenging system for ship
board installation using a pneumatic conveying system . The dia
gram shows five groups of blow -tank storage units, with one set of
tanks discharging directly into the reactor area . Through the use
of valves to control the air supply, all the scavenging material can
be distributed to a particular spot.
With this system several methods of discharge are feasible. The
simplest is the idea of a fishtail nozzle having the same cross-sec
tional area as the conveying tube. The conveying velocity would
be capable of dispersing the material over a wide angle through
such a nozzle .
Although further work needs to be done on this problem of
scavenging radioactive material from sea water by ion -exchange or
coagulation , the information and data resulting from the ARF
studies offer a starting point for the development of a practical
scavenging system for use on a nuclear- powered ship. The proposed
system can transfer radioactive cations, anions, and colloids from
the liquid phase ( in solution in sea water ) to the solid phase ( scav
enged by flocculated particulate matter ), and thus it would play an
>
important role in counteracting accidental release of radioactive

fission and corrosion products into a marine environment.
REFERENCES
1. GEORGE P. Dix, RICHARD C. GROSCUP, and John M. LEFFLER, The Origin and
Disposal of Power Reactor Wastes, Report MND - 1235, Nuclear Division ,
Martin Co. , Feb. 5, 1958.
2. CLARENCE C. MORSE, Waste Disposal Considerations in the Nuclear Pow
ered Merchant Ship Program , Report of the Maritime Administration ,
in Hearings before the Special Subcommittee on Radiation of the Joint
Committee on Atomic Energy on Industrial Radioactive Waste Disposal,
Vol. 4, pp. 2660–2672, 1959.
3. Radioactive Waste Disposal from Nuclear -Powered Ships, Pub . 638, National
Academy of Sciences - National Research Council, 1959.
4. T. J. Iltis and M. E. Miles, Radioactive Waste Disposal from U.S. Naval
Nuclear -powered Ships, in Hearings before the Special Subcommittee on
Radiation of the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy on Industrial Radio
active Waste Disposal, Vol. 1 , pp . 924–957, 1959.
5. Radioactive Waste Disposal in the Ocean , Handbook No. 58, National Bu
reau of Standards, Aug. 25, 1954.
6. K. Z. MORGAN, Health Physics, Sec. 7-2, pp . 7-22 to 7-59, in Nuclear Engi
neering Handbook , Harold Etherington , Ed., McGraw -Hill Book Company,
Inc., New York , 1958.
7. K. Z. MORGAN , Human Exposure to Radiation , Bull. Atomic Scientists, 15
( 9 ) : 38 ( November 1959 ) .
8. I. E. WALLEN, Oceanography in the Atomic Energy Commission, in Hear

ings before the Special Subcommittee on Radiation of the Joint Com
mittee on Atomic Energy on Industrial Radioactive Waste Disposal, Vol.
5, pp. 3114-3120, 1959.
9. The Effects of Atomic Radiation on Oceanography and Fisheries, Pub. 551 ,
National Academy of Sciences - National Research Council, 1957 .
10. Meteoro gical Analysis Applicable to Operation of a Nuclear -powered Ves.
sel, Office of Meteorological Research , Washington , D.C.
11. Contamination Dispersion in Estuaries : Delaware River, Misc. Paper No.
2-332, Report 1, U.S. Army Engineer Waterways Experiment Station ,
Corps of Engineers, April 1959.
12. W. B. COTTRELL et al . , Environmental Analysis of N.S. Sarannah Operation
at Camden , USAEC Report ORNL - 2867, Oak Ridge National Laboratory,
April 1960 .
13. D. W. PRITCHARD, A Study of Flushing in the Delaware Jodel, Chesapeak
Bay Institute, The Johns Hopkins University, Reference 544, April 1959.
14. S. M. LAND, C. N. DURFER, and R. H. TicE, Hydrology of the Delaucare
River and Aquifers in the Camden - Philadelphia Area , U.S. Geological
Survey, July 1958.
15. Contamination Dispersion in Estuaries : Narra gansett Bay Hydraulic Jíodel
Investigation , Misc. Paper No. 2–332, Report 2, U.S. Army Engineers
Waterways Experiment Station, Corps of Engineers, April 1959.
16. John Rosinski, Scavenging of Particulate Matter in Connection with Nu
clear -Powered ships, USAEC Report AECU -4110, Armour Research Foun
dation , Feb. 6, 1959.
17. John Rosinski et al ., Scavenging Particulate Matter in Connection with
Nuclear - Powered Ships, ARF Report 3119–10, Armour Research Founda
tion, Oct. 15, 1959.
Chapter 7
SERVICING NUCLEAR SHIPS
7-1 INTRODUCTION
Because of the nature of the fuel and the unique character of the
wastes produced in the operation of nuclear-powered ships, special
facilities must be provided in ports to service such ships. The nature
and extent of these facilities will vary depending upon the degree
of service required in various ports. Until nuclear-powered ships
become common , the number of ports providing such facilities will
be limited , and nuclear ships will have to depend largely upon their
home ports for major servicing. As is the case with conventionally
fueled vessels, port authorities and governing bodies will be respon
sible for ensuring that any nuclear-powered ship entering their juris
dictional waters complies with local operational requirements. At
present the operational concepts concerning the port and harbor
operations of nuclear ships are based upon information that is in
the initial stages of technical development; therefore it is not pos
sible to formulate exact specifications for nuclear service facilities
that will meet all requirements. Early requirements are likely to
be more severe than actually necessary. As progress is made in the
nuclear- powered ship program , it is possible that reactor systems
can be so designed that the need for port services and capabilities
above those normally provided for conventional vessels will be elimi
nated. Since the first nuclear-powered ships will be designed on the
premise that power -plant servicing and maintenance will be 'per
formed within domestic facilities, fuel-element transfer facilities
will be required only in domestic ports. This, of course , represents
a major service facility. Other servicing equipment items will prob
ably be modifications of existing equipment. This chapter will be
concerned largely with the servicing facilities that are being devel
oped for servicing the N.S. Savannah .
7-2 SPECIALIZED SUPPORT FACILITIES
7-2.1 Function of Specialized Support Facilities
Specialized facilities for servicing nuclear -powered ships are con

cerned primarily with the servicing and maintenance of the nuclear
613489 0_61420 295
power plant. The facilities should provide the following services

and capabilities :
1. Fueling and removal of spent fuel from nuclear reactors, in
cluding the removal and insertion of complete reactor cores.
2. Removal and installation of complete reactor power systems.
3. Modification , maintenance, and repair of reactor assemblies,
cores, and auxiliary equipment under radioactively hot condi
tions. This implies the use of equipment for remote handling
and proper shielding facilities.
4. Storage of spent fuel elements until their radioactivity has
decayed to a level at which they can be transported for re
processing
5. Storage and handling of unused fuel elements ; this involves
the use of storage cannisters or racks that will prevent the in
advertent assembly of fuel elements into a critical mass.
6. Over -all maintenance, repair, and servicing of the various com
ponents and auxiliaries of the reactor power plant system . This
facility should include a decontamination area for cleaning and
reducing activity levels of equipment removed from a ship .
7. A hot laundry for cleaning and processing radioactively con
taminated clothing and other material. This facility should
have locker rooms and showers to retain contamination within
this area .
In addition to the capabilities directly associated with power

plant maintenance, the facilities must have the capability of carrying
on certain support functions associated with nuclear operations.
Health physics facilities must be provided for the protection of
service personnel. A contaminated - waste storage and disposal facil
ity is also essential.
7-2.2 Operations at a Nuclear Servicing Facility
The procedures to be followed in servicing nuclear ships will

depend largely upon the character of the maintenance or repair or
the servicing needs of the particular vessels involved. When a ship
enters the servicing facility, health physics personnel will first make
certain that the dose rates are below maximum tolerance levels before
the ship is permitted to enter the maintenance and service area.
Following clearance by the health physics staff, any of a number of
operations can be performed. For normal periodic maintenance and
service, spent fuel elements will be removed and placed in a spent
fuel storage area . If necessary, reactor components will be removed
from the ship and transferred to the service or repair facility.
Radioactive wastes will also be removed, and means will be provided
SERVICING NUCLEAR SHIPS 297
for treatment of these wastes before packaging for ultimate disposal.

The servicing facility must provide a means for inspecting internal
reactor components to determine the cause of any malfunction in
these components. The required equipment for performing this
function properly can be rather complex : for example, facilities are
required for close viewing of highly radioactive material by remote
means, such as periscopes or boroscopes, and for cutting, machining,
or other manipulation of material so that flaws, imperfections, rup
tures, radiation damage, and other malfunctions can be studied to
determine their cause and future remedy. It has been suggested
that this type of maintenance operation be carried out at some AEC
facility that specializes in this type of radioactive work. The equip
ment provided for handling certain of the radioactive items such as
the upper grid plate of a reactor must of necessity be very large and
heavy, and provision must be made to provide proper shielding
during handling operations.
After the nuclear equipment that requires servicing has been re
moved from the ship, the normal operations for inspection and
maintenance required by the American Bureau of Shipping and other
regulatory bodies can be performed . After removal of the radio
active equipment, the ship will proceed either to a wet or dry dock
for conventional maintenance and servicing; the exact procedure,
however, will depend upon the particular needs of the ship and the
extent and arrangement of the servicing facility. Following the
completion of this inspection and after necessary repairs have been
made, nuclear components will be replaced in the vessel. Finally,
the nuclear power plant will be checked , placed in operation , and
the ship will proceed under power to operational status.
For servicing the Savannah, plans call for a combination of float
ing service vessel and shore-based servicing and maintenance facili
ties. It is not economical to make the nuclear servicing vessel large
enough to store the equipment and spare parts needed for maintain
ing the Savannah. Therefore, one of the major functions of the
shore -based facilities is to store this equipment.
A very thorough study and analysis of the shore -based facilities
for servicing the Sarannah has been made by the Electric Boat
Division of General Dynamics Corporation. The results of this
study form the basis of the design of the shore facilities discussed
in Sec . 7-4 .
The selection of a site for performing a service depends not only
on the capability of equipment but also on the qualifications of the
site operators. The special requirements of the sites for maintenance,
refueling, waste transfer, and dry docking are minimal since most of
the special facilities will be provided by the nuclear servicing vessel .
The nuclear shore facility, however, provides a number of items of

equipment which are not supplied by the nuclear servicing vessel.
7-3 SERVICING FACILITIES FOR THE N.S. SAVANNAH
7-3.1 General Description
The facilities for servicing the Savannah will form a part of the
reactor servicing system for the ship. These servicing facilities are
being provided with a maximum degree of flexibility . The routes
and ports of operation of the Sarannah are subject to change ; more
over , in case of malfunction of equipment at unexpected locations,
repair facilities that are not equipped for nuclear work may be
drafted into service. For these reasons, as already mentioned , a
portion of the servicing system has been made mobile and can be
moved to the servicing site. Several different types of shore facili
ties are to be provided, each capable of performing certain functions.
These servicing sites have been categorized as follows : ( 1 ) nuclear
ship maintenance site ; ( 2 ) nuclear ship refueling site ; ( 3 ) nuclear
ship waste -transfer site, and ( 4 ) nuclear ship dry -docking site . This
breakdown of functions is not intended to preclude one site having
the capability of performing any or all of these functions. In addi
tion to these facilities, a central facility is required . It will be a
storage location and a maintenance and testing site for the refueling
equipment. It will also provide storage, inspection , and transship
ment facilities for expended fuel elements, including ruptured ele
ments . It will act as a spare parts depot and a receiving and inspec.
tion area for Savannah spare parts. This central facility will also
provide office space for the operation of the servicing system . The
site may incorporate, if desired, the complete capabilities of mainte
nance, refueling, waste transfer, and dry docking. However, if these
facilities are provided elsewhere, the central facility can be limited
to minimum requirements.
The shore facilities will , in general, operate with the assistance
of the mobile facility. The latter not only provides space for the
storage of expended fuel elements, but it also provides for processing
low - level radioactive liquid wastes and preparing them for disposal.
Details of the servicing vessel are given in Sec. 7–5.
7-3.2 Reactor Servicing System
The purpose of this system is to provide the plans, specifications.

and procedures needed for keeping the reactor plant of the X.S.
Savannah in operating condition. This system will function through
the following subsystems: ( a ) refueling system , ( b ) waste disposal,
( c) maintenance system , ( d ) transportation system , and ( e ) health

physics system .
( a ) Refueling System . The refueling system provides plans,
specifications, and procedures for : storing and testing refueling
equipment, shipping refueling equipment to the refueling site, un
loading and checking equipment at the refueling site, operating the
refueling equipment at the refueling site, fabricating and using
special equipment provided by the refueling contractor, and pre
paring for shipping and shipping the refueling equipment from the
refueling site.
( b ) Waste -disposal System . This system provides plans, specifica
tions, and procedures for: transferring demineralizer resin from the
Sarannah to the nuclear servicing vessel or to a shore facility, trans
ferring contaminated water from the Savannah to the nuclear serv
icing vessel or to a shore facility, transferring solid wastes to the
servicing vessel or shore facility, and preparing the wastes received
and generated by the servicing facilities for shipment to a disposal
site.
( c ) Maintenance System . The maintenance system provides plans,
specifications, and procedures for handling radioactive components
that require maintenance and for performing maintenance on nuclear
system components.
( d ) Transportation System . The transportation system provides
the plans, specifications, and procedures for transporting fuel ele
ments from the servicing vessel to the fuel-processing plants, trans
porting control elements from the servicing vessel, and transporting
test sources or other radioactive items.
( e) Health Physics. Health physics provides plans, specifications,
and procedures for the radiation monitoring of all operations con
cerned with radioactive items.
The two major facilities that perform functions for all the systems
listed above are the nuclear servicing vessel and the shore facility.
In addition to these facilities, there is equipment for transportation
of radioactive items and movable equipment for performing the
various operations.
7-4 NUCLEAR SHORE FACILITY
The nuclear shore facility will act as a home base for the Savannah .
It will serve as a storage and maintenance area for the refueling
equipment and provide a test bed for testing the refueling equip
ment and for proving out procedures. It will provide storage for
spare parts and for fresh fuel elements and will act as a transship
ping point for fuel elements and radioactive wastes of the Savannah
from the servicing vessel for storage or transshipment to railway

casks. Finally, it will provide for storage of spare parts for the
nuclear servicing vessel .
The shore facility will provide berthing facilities for the nuclear
servicing vessel and a building with connecting rail facilities and
utilities for performing all the functions of the shore facility. The
general arrangement of the shore facilities building, as developed by
the Electric Boat Division of General Dynamics Corporation, is
shown in Figs. 7.1 and 7.2. The berthing facility provides a deep
water approach and pier capable of accepting the nuclear service
vessel and a crane capable of lifting 50 tons with an outreach of
25 ft inboard of the nuclear servicing vessel. The crane is capable
of swinging a load 33 ft below the hook over the fuel -pit hatch of
the vessel when she is at 8- ft draft , i.e., the hook will be about 50 ft
above the water level at high tide. Rail facilities will be available
under the hook of the crane.
The nuclear servicing building will handle and store the refueling
equipment and provide space for maintaining the refueling equip
ment. It will also provide storage, inspection, and clean areas for
spare parts of the Savannah reactor plant, and storage for fresh
fuel elements. There will , however, be no storage pit for spent- fuel
elements in this building; the spent- fuel storage pit is included as a
part of the facilities on the nuclear servicing vessel . The transfer
of radioactive wastes will take place in the servicing building.
64 ' CLEAR
WIDTH
91
'
FUTURE
EXPANSION
STORAGE
AREAS
STORAGE FOR
AREA REFUELING
FOR EQUIPMENT
20
'
SPARE
PARTS
74' APPROX .
108 '
Fig. 7.1 - End view of the shore facilities building for the Savannah.
CLOTHING
ISSUE
RAILROAD TRACKS
STORAGE
BADGES
HOUSE
HEALTH
PHYSICS
OUTSIDE LOADING PLATFORM INST .
LAUNDRY
SHOWERS
OFFICE
CLEAN
.RM K
AREA
FIRST
DR
SMALL PARTS STORAGE WB
LAB
AID
& RECEIVING AREA
LOCKER RM
.
WC
EXPANSION
WC
WC JC
FUTURE
INSPECTION
EXPANSION
STORAGE FOR NUCLEAR TOOL NEW

AREA & SOLID COMPONENT
SERVICE SHIP & ICRIB FUEL WASTE DECONTAMINATION
LOADING
FUTURE
SAVANNAH SPARE PARTS STORAGE

PLATFORM STORAGE
RAILROAD TRACKS
REFUELING
100
TE
'
REFUELING EQUIPMENT EQUIPMENT
MACHINE REACTOR
STORAGE AREA SHOP VESSEL
MOCKUP
TEST AREA
160 '
Fig. 7.2—Plan view of the ground floor of the shore facilities building
for Savannah .
Lifting equipment in the servicing building will include a 75 -ton

crane for moving items from the railroad car within the building
to the water- filled pits, decontamination area , or refueling area . The
maximum hook height required above the rails is 65 ft . A 20 -ton
crane will be installed in the sublevel area for positioning the resin
disposal drums under a trap door provided in the floor of the solid
waste storage compartment.
The radioactive-waste- disposal system will be capable of handling,
processing, and disposing of radioactive-waste products found within
the building in the following form : radioactive water, radioactive
demineralizer resin , other solid radioactive material, and radioactive
components and equipment. The radioactive -waste -disposal system
comprises a low-level system for handling the liquid wastes from
the decontamination areas, the laundry, and other areas producing
low - level liquid wastes. This low -level disposal system involves
filters, a demineralizer, holding tanks, discharge tanks, transfer
pumps, and means for vent -gas removal. The high -level waste dis
posal system is provided for the acceptance, storage, transfer, and
packaging of the resins used in the demineralizer of the low - level
waste-disposal system . Suitable lead shielding will surround the
components of the waste -disposal system to protect personnel from
radiation .
The storage area for the packaged radioactive wastes must be

large enough to hold them between the time that they are discharged
from the servicing vessel until they are shipped to the permanent
disposal site . An auxiliary function is the storage of the new con
tainers that will be used for packaging the radioactive wastes. Such
empty containers will be kept on hand to supply the nuclear sery
icing vessel.
To illustrate the quantity of radioactive wastes that will have to
be handled, the following data on the Savannah operations are of
interest. Approximately 35 cu ft of radioactive resin will be dis
charged from the Savannah every 100 days. When packaged , this
material will be contained in 12 containers, each weighing approxi
mately 32,000 lb (max .) and having a diameter of 6.25 ft . This
radioactive resin is the amount of resin contained in two deminer
alizers of the Savannah. Storage space should also be available on
shore to store at least two full ship's demineralizers containing radio
active resins. It is estimated that during each start-up of the Savan
nah reactor, 2,170 gal of contaminated water will be discharged.
If it is assumed that there will be one start -up every 20 days, this
will result in the discharge of approximately 10,850 gal of contami
nated water per 100 days. In addition to this, it is estimated that
3,660 gal of liquid wastes will come from such sources as main stop
valve leakage, pressurizer relief, leakage into the containment vessel,
and laboratory wastes. When this water is discharged from the
nuclear servicing vessel, it will be decontaminated so that the radio
activity is low enough to permit the discharge of this water into the
harbor in which the nuclear servicing vessel is stationed . The resins
from the nuclear servicing vessel demineralizer, which will retain the
radioactivity removed from the water, will then be packaged and
shipped in the disposal containers mentioned previously. It is esti
mated that from 1 to 10 barrels of miscellaneous low-level wastes
will be discharged per 100 days. Storage for these wastes must also
be provided on shore.
The decontamination area will provide for the cleaning of tools,
shipping containers, and core structural components contaminated
by radioactive deposits. This area will be separated from other
areas by a 35 - ft high wall. Access to this area for large components
will be by means of a sliding door section and a removable ceiling
section. The entire floor will be pitched to drain collection areas to
prevent the flow of contaminated water and other liquids to other
areas .
As an added precaution against the spread of decontaminating

liquids to the other regions and also for personnel protection rea
sons, all tanks using acid or caustic solutions will be placed in pits
below the ground floor elevation of the decontaminaton area . Steel

grating will be placed around such tanks to facilitate drainage to
a central collection point.
Refueling of the Savannah will be performed at the nuclear ship
refueling site. This site will function as a berthing place for the
Savannah and a rendezvous point for the nuclear servicing vessel,
the refueling equipment, a floating crane , if required , and the refuel
ing personnel. The fuel elements of the Savannah will be removed
from the ship to the nuclear servicing vessel at any location suitable
for refueling. Because of the long time span between refueling
operations, it would be impractical to maintain a crew of men who
are well practiced in the procedures of refueling by training them
on the job. Therefore, it is necessary to have available a mock -up
of the reactor vessel that can be used for performing dry runs with
the actual equipment that is to be used during refueling. This re
hearsal is important not only to minimize the length of the refueling
operation and to reduce the cost, but also to assure that every person
concerned with the operation is conversant with his duties and can
perform them in a safe manner. Space has been provided in the
servicing building for this mock -up or for its storage and erection
prior to a refueling operation.
Repair of the reactor power plant will be accomplished by com
bining the floating facility ( the nuclear servicing vessel ) with the
capability of a typical first -class shipyard. The capabilities needed
by the shipyard will depend on the particular job to be done. The
presence of the nuclear servicing vessel at the maintenance site will
considerably reduce the amount of special equipment needed for
performing maintenance and repair of the reactor plant. The nuclear
servicing vessel will supply the immediate health physies require
ments for monitoring personnel, decontaminating equipment removed
from the ship , providing protective clothing, and providing for the
necessary removal of waste liquids or radioactive resins from the
ship . It is, however, expected that the shipyard will either have,
or establish, clean areas for the receipt of primary system spare
parts and their inspection prior to installation aboard the ship. In
addition, there must be available personnel of varied skills, such as
welders qualified in stainless - steel welding, electricians and instru
ment men , machinists, and other key trades qualified in maintaining
the equipment used aboard the Savannah. Arrangements for com
ponent vendor representatives to be present during the maintenance
and repair of critical equipment will probably be required. Because
such capabilities are available in many areas of the United States,
it is expected that a number of shipyards will qualify as maintenance
sites for the Savannah.
With respect to dry -docking, this operation is essentially the same

for the Savannah as for a conventional ship of the same size and
weight. However, attention will have to be paid to the weight of
the shielding concentrated in the nuclear ship's reactor compartment;
this may be of such magnitude as to necessitate special hull support
arrangements. Reactor decay - heat removal may require a continuous
supply of sea water to the heat exchanger used for this purpose
while the vessel is dry -docked. The dry -docking facility also should
be capable of erecting temporary shielding around areas of excessive
hull radiation that may be found.
7-5 FLOATING SERVICING FACILITY
7-5.1 General
The special nuclear servicing vessel that has been built for serv
icing the Savannah has been named N.S.V. Atomic Servant. This
vessel , which is not self- propelled , is to be used in maintenance,
refueling, and waste-handling operations. It not only provides
space for the storage of expended fuel elements, but it also provides
for processing low - level radioactive liquid wastes and preparing them
for disposal. The vessel has on board space and equipment for per
forming radiation surveys during servicing operations and has film
badges and dosimeters for monitoring personnel. It has protective
clothing for personnel entering controlled areas and has showers for
decontaminating personnel. The spent -fuel storage pit on board the
vessel is large enough to contain one complete reactor load of fuel
elements and control rods from the Savannah reactor.
The servicing vessel can be towed from one location to another
to meet the Savannah wherever it is required and will carry its
packaged wastes to locations from which they can be shipped to a
final disposal area .
An outboard profile and deck plan of the N.S.V. Atomic Serrant
are shown in Fig. 7.3. The vessel has a design displacement of 650
tons, an over -all length of 129 ft , a beam of 36 ft , and a depth to
the main deck of 14 ft . It is constructed of steel with longitudinal
framing. An inner bottom is fitted for the whole length between
the fore and aft longitudinal bulkheads. Seantlings are approved
by the American Bureau of Shipping for limited coastwise service .
Other features of the barge include five watertight bulkheads sub
dividing the vessel between the fore and after peaks. This subdivi
sion is in accordance with the highest standards of the Maritime
Administration. A hold is provided approximately amidships for
use as a spent- fuel storage pit. The vessel design includes a dis
OUDT o
O
6 ' DWL
MLD BASELINE
DECK VENT EXHAUST 200 GAL.

LOCKER STACK DIE SEL OIL TAN HATCH
TOP OF
OPERATIONS HATCH TO
HATCH TO AREA HATCH TO
HOUSE WASTE
RESERVED FOR COMPONENT
FUTURE PIT FOR PROCESSING
DECONTAM
EXPENDED FUEL INATION ANCHOR
ELEMENTS
SERVICE
HATCH HATCH
TOP OF DECK HOUSE
MAIN DECK
SPACE RESERVED TRUCK TYPE CRANE

FOR FUTURE 50 FT . BOOM
DIESEL GENERATOR
Fig. 7.3—Outboard profile and deck plan of N.S.V. Atomic Servant,

the service vessel for the Savannah .
posal system for radioactive solids and liquids. Plans and elevations
of the waste processing compartments are shown in Fig. 7.4. In
addition , space and equipment are available for radiation safety
control, decontamination , and radiation surveying. The general
arrangement of the vessel below deck is shown in Fig. 7.5 . Figure
7.6 is a photograph of a model of the vessel.
The inclusion of servicing equipment on this mobile facility offers
complete flexibility to the system . In addition , this equipment
facilitates repair, maintenance , and the transfer of radioactive wastes,
as well as refueling at such locations as may be convenient or specifi
cally designated. It also provides the required facilities to enable
a number of shipyards to effect repairs and carry on maintenance
work on the Savannah , for example, radiation survey and monitor
ing equipment, decontamination areas, and protective clothing. Nor
mally the servicing vessel will be towed from port to port along
coastal waterways, but, if necessary, it can be transported over long
distances by an LSD ( Landing Ship Dock ).
Fit
ACCESS
L.
SW BALLAST - P/ S CEMENT STOWAGE AND MIXING AREA
ACCESS RESIN
HOLD TANK i. MEASURING
SUMP TANK TANK SHIP'S
RESIN CATCH DEMINERALIZER
TANK 20 (U. S. SAVANNAH )
HOLD TANK
VESSEL
SUMP TANK
HOLD TANK
SHIP'S
WASTE RESIN DISPOSAL DEMINERALIZER
TRANSFER CONTAINER - PRE - FILTER
( N. S. SAVANNAH
PUMP OWNER FURNISHED
OVERBOARD
DISCHARGE
TANK OVERBOARD
DISCHARGE PUMP
POST - FILTER ACCESS
QO NUCL. SERV. VESSEL
DEMINERALIZER
STORAGE AREA
r - 7
ACCESS
L :-)
STORAGE FOR
LARGE SOURCE
PLAN VIEW FORWARD
MAIN DECK RESIN DISPOSAL

CONTAINER OWNER
FURNISHED SHIP'S DEMINERALIZER
( N. S. SAVANNAH )
RESIN PRE - FILTER
CATCH
TANK
WASTE
TRANSFER SUMP TANK
PUMP
GRATING
LEVEL
TANK TOP
OVERBOARD POST RESIN
DISCHARGE MEASURING NUCL. SERV. VESSEL
PUMP TANK DEMINERALIZER
ELEVATION FORWARD
FIG. 7.4 — Waste -processing compartment on the N.S.V. Atomic Servant.
7-5.2 Nuclear Service System

As now planned, the floating service facility will provide the fol
lowing services :
1. Receipt and transfer of spent fuel elements and control rods
2. Receipt, packaging, and transfer of radioactive wastes
3. Decontamination of primary -system components and other con
taminated equipment
4. Radiation monitoring during the operations of refueling, pri
mary - system maintenance, and transfer of radioactive materials
2'6 "
11'6 "
WASH WATER SEALED VOID VOID S. W. BALLAST S. W. BALLAST
INBOARD PROFILE
STORAGE AREA CEMENT AREA
LABORATORY O MACHINERY SPACE LIQUID WASTE

AND STOREROOM HOLDING TANKS CHAIN LOCKER
aBt HATCH
VESSEL PIT - (FUTURE)
EQUIPMENT ( FOR EXPENDED
WASTE PROCESSING COVER
FUEL ELEMENTS) VESSEL
SEALED VOID UNDER COMPARTMENT
DISCHARGE EQUIPMENT
MAIN SWITCHBOARD TANK
S. W. S. W.
5. W. BALLAST MAINT ENG'S S. W. BALLAST
BALLAST BALLAST VOID STORAGE AREA S. W. BALLAST
WORKSHOP STORES
HOLD
CLEAN AREA — CONTAMINATED AREA

FAN ROOM
Y
DR
000
FIRST AID
UN
COT PIT COOLING EQUIP,

LA
CRANE
ISSUE FOUNDATION
WORK
ROOM
PIT - (FUTURE) SHOP
W.
WORK ANCHOR
BENCH
LOCKER
ROOM PASSAGE AND LATHE
CHANGE AREA
MAIN DECK
Fig . 7.5 — General arrangement of the N.S.V. Atomic Servant.
The vessel design provides for handling, processing, packaging,

and disposal of the waste products accepted from the Savannah in
the following forms:
1. Radioactively contaminated water
2. Radioactive demineralizer resin
3. Solid radioactive-waste material
4. Radioactivity contaminated components and equipment
The design provides for carrying out the following waste disposal
processes :
1. Concentration of radioactive particulate matter within the
waste processing components by means of filtration and ion
exchange processes
2. Transfer of demineralizer resin from the service vessel or from
the Savannah demineralizer by back -flushing procedures to spe
cial receptacles for ultimate disposal
!
3
Fig. 7.6 — Photograph of a model of the N.S.V. Atomic Servant.
3. Removal of radioactive particulate matter from the servicing

vessel and the Savannah components and equipment by decon
tamination procedures
4. Concentration of solid radioactive -waste materials for ultimate
disposal in according with accepted and approved practices
of the U.S. Atomic Energy Commission
The radioactivity contained in the waste-disposal system will be
disposed of by one or more of the following methods:
1. Packaged for shipment in accordance with Interstate Com
merce Commission and AEC regulations for at-sea or on -land
disposal in an approved and accepted manner
2. Disposal by dilution and disperson of radioactive gases and
liquids to the environment within the acceptable limits of
tolerance
3. Radioactive decay during containment
7-5.3 Low-level Liquid -waste -disposal System
The low - level liquid -waste processing and disposal system is
designed for the acceptance, storage, transfer, and purification of
fresh water of a low and intermediate radioactivity level. It con
sists of two independent purification circuits with a common supply
and discharge and a means for connecting to the Savannah liquid
waste transfer system. Each purification circuit consists of a pre

filter, demineralizer, and a post filter. Valves are provided so that
the spent demineralizer resin can be back - flushed to the high-level
waste disposal system. Also included in the system are two sump
tanks and four hold tanks. Pumps and piping are so arranged that
either pump can take suction on either sump tank or any hold tank
for discharge to either purification system and ultimately to any
hold tank not on the supply side. With the exception of the wash
water fill connection, which is equipped with a nonreturn valve,
there is no direct connection with any system that is aa nonradioactive
system . Level-indicating devices, cleanout holes, overflows, vents,
and drainage connections are also provided in the system .
7-5.4 High- level Waste-disposal System
The high-level radioactive-waste process and disposal system pro

vides for the acceptance , storage, transfer, and packaging of resins
used in the water-purification system of the servicing vessel and the
Savannah . It comprises a resin tank for accepting resin flushed
from any demineralizer ; a resin measuring tank for metering and
trapping a predetermined quantity of resin flushed from the resin
catch tank ; a series of resin disposal containers of a sufficient quan
tity to accept the total volume of resin in the Savannah demineral
izers, and the necessary piping, fittings, and valves for proper
operation.
The system contains equipment for packaging the radioactive
resins in the core of the resin disposal containers and provides the
proper shipping containers for ultimate land or sea disposal.
7-5.5 Spent-fuel Storage Pit
A very essential provision on the servicing vessel is the spent

fuel storage pit in which the highly radioactive spent fuel elements
are placed after their removal from the reactor core. This pit is
provided with a sealed void underneath to limit radiation into the
water underneath the vessel. The pit has the following features:
storage provisions for one full complement of the Savannah's spent
fuel elements and control rods; provision for removal of decay
heat ; prevention of criticality by adequate spacing and individual
canning of spent fuel within the pit; provision of a system for
reducing the activity of contaminated water within the spent fuel
element containers ; the ability to completely can fractured spent
fuel elements ; and sufficient structural allowance and shielding to
minimize radiological hazards from fire and accident.
7-5.6 Miscellaneous Systems
A vent- gas system is provided to remove and collect any off

gases from radioactive effluents in storage or processing tanks for
the purpose of analysis, monitoring, and ultimate disposal to the
environmental air through dilution . Drainage from contaminated
areas and tanks to the bilge sump is led to the low -level liquid
waste system by means of the waste-transfer pump. Means are
provided for the overboard discharge of low -level effluents after
they have been diluted with either fresh or salt water. Such dis
charge is allowed only when the activity level is at an acceptable
level, and the piping is so arranged that only deliberate discharges
are possible.
The waste processing system is provided with petcocks suitably
located so that samples can be taken from any part of the system
for chemical analysis.
7-5.7 Radiological Safety Provisions
Every effort has been made in the design of the service barge to
protect personnel from radiation . Within the vessel the nuclear
servicing systems are amply shielded by suitable thicknesses of lead.
The demineralizer, filters, sump tanks, waste-transfer pumps, resin
tanks, and hot resin transfer piping are all shielded by thicknesses
of lead varying from 0.5 to 6.5 in .; the spent- fuel storage pit has
from 9 to 12 in . of lead around it. All surfaces are designed so
they can be easily decontaminated , and expendable surface mate
rials are used wherever possible. Special care has been taken in
the design of equipment to prevent the spread of air -borne, liquid ,
or solid contamination , and access to all areas subject to contam
ination is under rigid control.
All air is exhausted from contaminated spaces through an abso
lute filter. Air within the vessel is supplied by fans to the radiolog
ically cold areas and is exhausted from the radiologically hot areas
Since the exhaust from the hot areas is at least 200 percent of the
amount supplied by the fans, the hot areas are always under a
partial vacuum . Passageway air is sampled continuously, and air
from other spaces is sampled periodically.
Water-borne radioactivity is controlled by several methods. All
contaminated -water systems are confined to areas that are designated
as contaminated or hot areas, and such systems are designed so
as to prevent any cross contamination between systems or between
the contaminated systems and non radioactive systems such as wash
water and salt -water systems. All contaminated -water drainage is
contained within the barge and is directed to the waste - processing
compartment. Spills and overflows from contaminated systems

drain to the bilge drain sump of the waste-processing compartment.
Contaminated -water tanks are equipped with sealed openings, bolted
for limited and restricted access , with a vent to the gas disposal
system and an overflow to the waste-processing compartment bilge
drain sump . Provision will be made on the overboard discharge
tank for sampling of the contaminated water so that no water will
be permitted to be discharged until its activity is reduced to the
permissible levels.
In addition to surface coatings that are easily decontaminated,
rubber mats, absorbent paper, or other expendable materials have
been specified to cover and protect surfaces from undue abrasion
from passage of personnel or damage from equipment or materials.
7-5.8 Health Physics Services
The design of the health physics laboratory aboard the service

vessel provides the necessary equipment for the detection of alpha ,
beta, and gamma radiation in liquids or solids and for measuring
the activity of particulate matter in the atmosphere. The health
physics staff will monitor all materials prior to discharge. Such
materials will include liquid and gaseous wastes, shielded containers
or casks, miscellaneous packaged wastes, etc. Health physics per
nel will also measure and keep records of personnel exposure to
radiation, monitor environmental conditions, and determine the
performance of shielding, filters, demineralizer resins, and decon
tamination procedures.
Health physics services include a personnel clothing issue room
and the laundry. The clothing issue room provides the necessary
protective clothing, personnel monitoring equipment, survey meters,
and other equipment required for all service and maintenance opera
tions. . The laundry room provides the equipment necessary for
the detection and subsequent decontamination of contaminated
protective clothing used in the maintenance and service operations.
Protective clothing includes coveralls, rubber gloves, face masks,
boots, and caps .
7-5.9 Maintenance, Repair, and Dry - docking
No special procedures will be required for general maintenance

of the service barge since all equipment containing nuclear material
is adequately shielded. However, maintenance personnel entering
the nuclear spaces will be required to wear protective clothing and
film badges or pocket dosimeters.
613489 06221
The vessel is so designed that little or no radiation hazard will

exist in the event there is damage to the vessel . Rupture of the
spent- fuel pit shielding due to a collision is an extremely remote
possibility because of the structural protection afforded in this area .
However, in the event repairs are necessary to the pit shielding, they
can be made by removing the spent fuel elements and control rods
to a shielded container.
Damage in the nuclear spaces, other than in the fuel pit area ,
caused by collision of grounding, should present no significant
radiological hazards. The dry -docking of the vessel will present
no radiological hazards, and , except for the remote possibility of
some dry-dock decontamination, all procedures will be of a con
ventional nature.
Chapter 8
TRAINING OF THE N.S. SAVANNAH CREW
8-1 INTRODUCTION
The application of nuclear science and technology to ship propul

sion introduces certain skills and techniques not heretofore required
in the construction and operation of ships. Nuclear -powered ships,
therefore , require better trained personnel for construction , main
tenance , repair, and operation than are needed for conventionally
powered vessels. Shipyard personnel in charge of construction will
not only have to understand the practical details of reactor systems
but will also have to become familiar with the more rigid require
ments of nuclear plant construction as compared with those of
conventional plants. Crews of nuclear ships, even more than ship
yard personnel, will need considerable training in nuclear tech
nology, both practical and theoretical, before they can be given
the responsibility of taking a nuclear-powered vessel out to sea.
Maintenance and repair crews likewise must have training in the
handling of nuclear equipment and must be made fully aware of
the hazards involved in working with radioactive materials.
The major difference between nuclear and conventional ship crews
occurs in the engineering department . This portion of a nuclear
ship's crew will have to be given special instruction in the operation
and maintenance of nuclear power plants and in the basic theory
of reactor technology. Although deck officers will not need the
intensive training in nuclear science required by engineering officers,
they also will have to have a general knowledge of reactor opera
tion and, in addition , will need considerable training in the areas
of radiological hazards and health physics. Nonlicensed personnel
also will need training with respect to radiological safety. Because
of the operational differences between nuclear ships and conven
tional ships, it is logical to assume that some existing job classi
fications will be reduced and new classifications will be established .
The training of crews for nuclear ships has been studied by ser
eral organizations, and study courses for different types of reactors
have been outlined. The most comprehensive activities of this kind
are the programs for training crew and support personnel of the
N.S. Savannah. Every effort has been made to make these pro
grams as complete and effective as possible. The reasons for the
313
rather rigid requirements are evident. Because the Savannah is

the first ship of its kind, it is possible that difficulties may arise
which would concern all personnel aboard the vessel; hence it is
desirable to have a highly competent crew capable of handling any
kind of emergency. Also, it is logical that the crew of this first
nuclear ship be of as high a caliber as possible.
Students in the Savannah training programs include not only the
crew of the ship but also shipyard personnel, representatives of
other shipping interests, and even representatives of foreign nations.
All these programs have been coordinated so that when the Savannah
goes into commercial service there will be available not only a
competent crew, but also adequate supporting personnel in ship
yards in the United States.
While the Savannah was being constructed, a complete comple
ment of seasoned senior officers was trained in Lynchburg, Va., and
at various reactor and industrial sites throughout the country .
These officers are all men who have had many years of practical
experience at sea, mostly on ships of the States Marine Lines, Inc.,
of Delaware, which will operate the Savannah. Attending school
with them were observers from other steamship companies, oil firms,
the Coast Guard , shipyards, and maritime academies. The course
of study, ranging from elementary science to advanced nuclear
physics, began on Sept. 29, 1958, and continued for a period of
approximately 15 months. The program provided training in all
phases of nuclear plant operation , including maintenance, repair,
refueling, and waste disposal .
Instruction was divided into five personnel categories, each rep
resenting a specific training requirement, depending upon subject
areas and degree of responsibility. The five categories were : ( 1 )
Master and deck officers, ( 2 ) engineering officers, ( 3 ) medical de
partment, ( 4 ) engine- room rated and nonrated personnel, and ( 5 )
general crew.
The responsibility for training the engineers and deck officers who
will be in command of the Savannah was assigned to the Atomic
Energy Division of The Babcock & Wilcox Company, the prime
contractor for the nuclear plant. The academic portion of the train
ing program was given at Lynchburg College. The B&W Atomic
Energy Division , including its manufacturing plant and critical
test facility , is located just a few miles outside Lynchburg, and its
critical test facility was used by the trainees.
8-2 GENERAL DESCRIPTION OF THE TRAINING PROGRAM
The initial training program comprised three classes. The first

class of 33 men took the entire 15 -month course . Of these 33 men,
TRAINING OF THE N.S. SAVANNAH CREW 315
13 were licensed marine engineers chosen from the States Marine

Lines fleet. These men will eventually fill the licensed engineering
billets aboard the Savannah. Twenty other engineers from inter
ested companies in industry, maritime educational institutions, and
U.S. Coast Guard marine inspection officers made up the remainder
of Class I. The academic phase of the course began on Sept. 29,
1958, at Lynchburg College. The course consisted of 31 weeks of
academic studies followed by 30 weeks of field training at various
reactors and laboratories throughout the country. On. Jan. 4, 1960,
the States Marine Lines engineers began additional training at the
New York Shipbuilding Corporation shipyard to qualify on the
various systems that make up the Savannah's reactor plant .
On Apr. 15 , 1959, Class II was started with 10 marine engineers
from States Marine Lines and 5 engineers representing industry
and interested foreign nations. Since all members of Class II had
received science or engineering degrees from accredited schools, the
original 31 -week course at Lynchburg College was shortened to
24 weeks. The academic phase was followed by field training with
reactors at the National Reactor Testing Station in Idaho. The
second group included men from Denmark, England, Holland , and
Japan . As with the first group, these Class II students also received
further practical training at the New York Shipbuilding Corpora
tion to qualify on the Savannah's reactor system . The men in the
second class were younger than those of the first and constituted
a more homogeneous group since all had approximately the same
educational background .
On May 4, 1959, a third class was started at Lynchburg. This
class, the Deck Officers Class, was composed of 6 well - seasoned deck
officers holding Marine master licenses. The States Marine, Isth
mian, and Matson Lines were represented in this group. The course
of study was somewhat shorter than that for the second group, its
purpose being to prepare the Master and senior deck officers in the
responsibilities inherent to the safe operation and administration
of a nuclear -propelled vessel. The academic portion of this course
ran for 13 weeks. Further field training was conducted at several
reactors and industrial establishments.
The men who will operate and command the Savannah constitute
one of the most select and thoroughly trained crews ever assembled
for a single ship. The States Marine Line screened applications
from men of its own fleet as well as from other marine interests
and conducted aptitude tests and personal interviews. The tests
were divided into two parts, each requiring 4 hr to complete, and
were administered by the Educational Testing Service of Princeton
University. The first part of the test consisted in an achievement
test equivalent to a college entrance examination ; it was essentially

the same test used for admittance to the Merchant Marine Cadet
Corps for the U.S. Merchant Marine Academy at Kings Point , N.Y.
Upon successful completion of the tests, each man was interviewed
by representatives of B&W and a selection board composed of rep
resentatives of the Maritime Administration . Selection was not
based entirely on highest scores, but also on educational background,
motivation, poise, etc. The applicants in the first group had con
siderable sea experience but 4 men from the States Marine group
were college graduates and 2 others had three years of college work.
In the non -States Marine group, there were 14 college graduates,
some with M.S. degrees.
The trainees for the Deck Officers Training Program were first
screened and recommended by the States Marine Lines ; final con
currence was made by the Maritime Administration . All these
officers were captains of their own ships in States Marine, Matson,
and Isthmian fleets. As with the engineers, each candidate had to
take an Educational Testing Service achievement and scholastic test.
Selection was based on education background, experience, and test
scores.
8-3 PHYSICAL FACILITIES FOR TRAINING PROGRAM
The facilities at Lynchburg College, where most of the academic

training was conducted, were provided through a subcontract to
B & W . These facilities included space for administrative offices,
classrooms, a study room , a radiochemistry laboratory, storage for
radioisotopes, photographic laboratory, and space to house the
Savannah simulator. The latter is an apparatus designed so that
the output from an analog computer will simulate the exact oper
ating conditions expected from the nuclear and propulsion plants
of the Savannah. The academic courses were given in the science
building of the College. In addition , other facilities were made
available to the trainees.
The radiochemistry laboratory was equipped by the Maritime
Administration to augment the classroom presentation of courses
such as nuclear physics, chemistry, health physics, and instrumenta
tion . This laboratory met the AEC requirements for the author
ized possession and use of radioisotopes and radioactive by-product
materials.
8-3.1 Pool Reactor
At Lynchburg the trainees obtained practical experience in the

operation of an actual nuclear reactor, the Lynchburg pool reactor
TRAINING OF THE X.S. SAVANNAH CREW 317
of the B&W Critical Experiment Laboratory . This reactor is a

10-kw test reactor capable of operation at power levels up to 200 kw
for short periods of time. The reactor is coupled to an autoclave,
a special hot exponential facility mounted at one end for the testing
of specimens under various combinations of pressure, temperature,
and radiation. A diagram of this reactor is shown in Fig. 8.1 , and
photographs of it are shown in Figs 8.2 and 8.3. The reactor con
sists of a support grid located at the bottom of a concrete pool of
water into which fuel elements are loaded to form critical assem
blies. A steel test vessel (the hot exponential facility ) , located in
the front wall of the pool , is used to determine the characteristics
of fuel elements at actual operating temperatures and pressures.
The pool is provided with fuel- element storage racks from which
trainees transferred fuel elements to the grid plate by means of
long metal grapples, as shown in Fig. 8.2. This view shows the
partly assembled core resting on the grid plate under the water .
WATER LEVEL
EQUIPMENT LEDGES
LIGHT
LEAD BRICK
ION
CHAMBER SHIELD TANK
TEST VESSEL
STORAGE PIT
FUEL - ELEMENT STORAGE

RACKS
Fig . 8.1 - Cutaway diagram of the Babcock & Wilcox Pool Test Reactor, show.
ing the fuel storage racks at the lower left and the steel test vessel ( the
hot exponential facility ) at the right.
Fig. 8.2 — View looking down into the Pool Test Reactor. The technician uses
a long metal grapple to move a fuel element from its storage vault, which
is built in the bottom of the pool , to the grid plate, which serves as a base
for the reactor core.
Long tubes emerging from the core contain the control rods and
special measuring instruments. The trainees performed various
experiments on the reactor as preparation for work in the low
power reactor laboratory later in the course.
8–3.2 Simulator
The Savannah simulator is considered one of the most important

training devices available in the program. The simulator is a full
scale operating model of the main control console as it is installed
on the Savannah. Electrically connected to the simulator are a
problem board and an electronic computer. The instructor uses the
problem board to establish any combination of operating conditions
he desires. These conditions then show up on the instruments and
signals on the main control board ; the trainee then solves the prob
lem by taking appropriate action.. The computer takes the place
UG
Fig. 8.3 — A side view of the Pool Test Reactor, showing the hot exponential
facility, which is used to test the properties of reactor-core materials.
of the actual reactor, duplicating all operating conditions that may

confront the operator at any time. As shown in Fig. 8.4, the sim
ulator uses a graphic representation of the entire nuclear propulsion
system of the Savannah. It is color coded, with certain colors
applicable to specific parts of the system for quick and accurate
recognition.
8–3.3 Containment Mock- up
Another training device in the program was the mock -up of the
Savannah containment vessel. As an aid to the designers of the
reactor plant in the placement of various components, the investi
gation of trial maintenance problems, and the establishment of pip
ing and wiring layouts, a full - size mock -up of the containment
vessel, along with all its internals, was constructed at the New York
DDD
၃၃ ၃၃၃
DOOD
* 0 000090
Fig . 8.4 – Training simulator and duplicate of the N.S. Savannah control console
at Lynchburg College.
Shipbuilding Corporation shipyard at Camden , N.J. Now, that its

preliminary mission has been fulfilled, it serves as an effective train
ing aid in the training program at the shipyard. With it , all
reactor systems within the containment vessel can be traced, the
position of important valves can be located, and routes for expedi
tious maintenance can be established by the trainees. The mock - up
has all the components and piping arranged exactly as on the
Savannah itself, down to the smallest detail . The over-all length
of the mock - up is approximately 70 ft, and its height is 55 ft .
The basic material of construction of the mock -up is light-gauge
sheet metal. This is used on large components such as the reactor,
steam generators, and primary piping. Cardboard and plastic tub
ing are used to simulate the piping system, and rubber and plastic
tubing are used for electrical systems. Where lighting is required,
the actual wiring is used . The containment vessel is outlined in
skeleton form to permit a clear view of the internals.
8–3.4 Other Training Aids
Numerous other training aids were used throughout the training
program to help the trainee visualize the equipment wherever it was
deemed necessary . Models, such as that of the reactor vessel , con
taining its internals, and a containment vessel were used at Lynch
burg ('ollege. Later, the model of the reactor vessel was relocated
at the N.Y. Shipbuilding shipyard for additional training at that
site .
The method of plugging the tubes in the tube sheet of the steam
generator heat exchangers is a unique method that is not common in
marine boiler practice. Personnel were trained in this procedure
through a full -size end section of the heat exchanger constructed
to simulate the actual conditions under which the engineer would
have to work. With this equipment the trainee was able to become
familiar with the methods of making temporary repairs when neces
sary .
During the academic phase of the program , a number of slides,
drawings, motion -picture films, specifications, operating manuals, in
struction books, and prepared notes were used to augment the class
room instruction.
The majority of the instructors in the academic portion of the
three classes were selected from the technical personnel of B & W .
When it was deemed necessary, other instructors were called in from
educational institutions. The professional instructors taught the
basic courses such as mathematics, physics, thermodynamics, elec
tricity, and electronics. The B&W instructors, having had experi
ence in the development , design , and engineering of the nuclear pro
pulsion system for the Savannah, taught the " hardware ” courses . In
many instances these instructors actually designed the system or
components they taught . In any case the instructors were thor
oughly familiar with the subjects both from the standpoint of the
general technology and from the standpoint of application to the
Savannah .
8-4 ENGINEERING OFFICERS TRAINING COURSES
The purpose and scope of the engineering officers training pro

gram was to provide well -trained , competent, and qualified reactor
operators for the Savannah nuclear propulsion plant. The operator
is required to understand the detailed design and operating charac
teristics of all the systems that make up the entire plant. Upon
completion of the training program , the trainee is expected to
understand and be familiar with all the controls, safety mechanisms,
instrumentation , and operation and function of the radiation -moni
toring equipment as well as the standard and emergency operating
procedures dealing with all the systems. As part of the program ,
the trainee was given various courses covering the evolution of
nuclear energy and a variety of subjects dealing with the industry.
Seminars, guest speakers, films on selected subjects, field trips, and
additional training at various reactor sites were also included as
part of his training. All the men were assigned to several of the
nuclear submarines to observe the operation of these vessels in actual

service.
Basically, the engineering officers training program was divided
into three principal categories, each of which can be subdivided in
the following manner :
1. Lynchburg Phase
( a ) Academic
( b ) Practical
2. Field Training
( a ) Hanford Atomic Works, Hanford , Wash .
( b ) SM - 1 ( formerly Army Package Power Reactor ) , Fort
Belvoir, Va .
( c ) Vallecitos Boiling Water Reactor, Pleasanton , Calif.
( d ) Naval Damage Control School, Philadelphia, Pa.
( e ) Naval Reactors Branch , AEC, Idaho Falls, Idaho
( f ) Nuclear Merchant Ship Reactor (NMSR ) Control Rod
Drive Test Facility, San Jose , Calif.
( g) Army Reactors Branch , AEC , Idaho Falls, Idaho
3. Job Training
( a ) New York Shipbuilding Corporation Maintenance Train
ing Program
( b ) N.S. Savannah Nuclear Plant Qualification Program
( c ) Simulator Training
8-4.1 Lynchburg Phase
The portion of the program conducted at Lynchburg can be con

sidered to consist of an academic phase and a practical phase. The
academic phase included formal classroom instruction , special semi
nars, and tutoring. The practical phase included laboratory work,
experiments on the B & W Pool Test Reactor, and , before the Savan
nah goes into service, it is hoped all the students will have an oppor
tunity to operate the simulator. Throughout the entire program an
attempt was made by the instructors, first, to convey an understand
ing of theory and, then, to follow the theory by demonstrating its
practical applications.
In general, the courses given to Class I and to Class II were essen
tially the same; however, since the trainees in Class II were all
graduate engineers, the course was altered to accommodate their
more advanced academic backgrounds. Much of the basic under
graduate material given to Class I was dropped, thereby shortening
the Lynchburg phase from 30 to 24 weeks. These adjustments are
incorporated in Table 8.1 , which lists the number of hours devoted
to the various subjects by the two classes.
Because Class I was so large and particularly because there was

such a wide educational difference between the trainees, it was
desirable to divide the class into two groups. Group A was com
posed of men with college backgrounds, and group B was composed
of men without college backgrounds. The program for each group
was tailored to meet the needs of that group without affecting the
other group
The course of study given to the first class of engineer officers
began with the usual introductory talks ; guided tours of the facili
ties at Lynchburg; a preliminary review of the training program
planned , analysis of the master schedule, including the organiza
tional aspects and objectives of the program ; and instruction in
the terms peculiar to nuclear reactors.
Table 8.1 - ACADEMIC CLASSROOM HOURS
CLASS I CLASS II
Course title Hour per Course title Hour per

trainee trainee
Orientation . 14 Orientation and testing 16

Introduction 36 Introduction . 32
Mathematics . 130 Mathematics 80
Physics. 130 Physics ..- 70
Propulsion, secondary system Propulsion machinery 5
( including thermodynamics) . 31 Thermodynamics. 15
Instrumentation and control Instrumentation . 80
theory (including electricity Electricity and magnetism .. 30
and magnetism ) -- 91 Reactor theory and engi
Reactor theory and engi neering - 124
neering 155 Chemistry 36
Chemistry 30 Health physics --- 20
Health physics 20 Low -power reactor, chem
Low -power reactor and chem istry laboratory, and Cri
istry laboratory - 108 tical Experiment Labora
Reactor- core design . 27 tory experiments . 89
Heat-transport system 27 Reactor - core design .. 25
Auxiliary systems ( including Heat - transport system 15
electrical system) 104 Auxiliary systems.. 64
Materials ... 13 Materials . 14
Mechanisms and handling - 42 Mechanisms . 40
Conference-tutoring 300 Supervised study 239
Total... 1 , 258 Total .. 994
Following this orientation , the trainee was given an introduction

to the field of nuclear power, its history, status, and future, with
special emphasis on marine applications. Next were the basic con
cepts and terminology of nuclear power, atomic theory, radioactive

particle emission , the energy -mass relation in nuclear reactors, neu
tron behavior, the principle of nuclear fission , the nuclear chain reac
tion and its control, nuclear reactors, reactor materials, reactor sys
tems and auxiliaries, reactor loop components, reactor heat transfer ,
and nuclear reactor design . Radiation and neutron detection and
radiation hazards were also covered .
This introductory course was primarily a lecture course , taught
with a number of visual aids. Its purposes were threefold : ( 1 ) to
orient the trainee in the nuclear field , ( 2 ) to provide him with an
over-all view of the training program , and ( 3 ) to familiarize him
with the language of the nuclear field.
The material presented was as follows :
Class 1. Group A : algebra, trigonometry, slide-rule operation ,
analytical geometry, integral and differential calculus, and special
topics such as statistics, Fourier series, and Bessel functions.
Groups B and C : algebra, trigonometry, slide- rule operation ,
analytical geometry, and differential calculus.
Class II. Review of integral and differential calculus, differential
equations, and special topics such as Fourier series and Laplace
transforms.
The amount of time given to physics was approximately the same
as that given to mathematics. The first several days of this course
for Class I involved a review of classical physics. This was fol
lowed ( for both classes) by the fundamentals of atomic structure,
the behavior of charged particles, X rays, relativity, the Bohr theory ,
elementary quantum theory, and wave particle dualism . Next , the
students studied the basic concepts of nuclear physics, including the
spontaneous-disintegration process, alpha particles, beta particles,
gamma rays, and the behavior of the neutron , with special emphasis
upon the fission process. Study procedure consisted of a 1 - hr lecture
per day followed by a 1-hr problem and tutoring session .
Thermodynamics and electricity were included as separate courses
in Class II but not in Class I ( Table 8.1 ) . Thermodynamics, how
ever, was included as a part of the course in propulsion systems in
Class I. Similarly, electricity was a subdivision of instrumentation
and control theory in the first class. Thermodynamics included a
review of the properties of steam , the use of steam tables, the Mollier
diagram , and vapor cycles, with particular emphasis on the regenera
tive cycle, and heat-balance diagrams. Major attention was placed
upon setting up heat balances for components and systems.
The course in electricity reviewed direct- and alternating -current
theory and magnetism . This was followed by a thorough study of
the electric generation and distribution system aboard the Savannah.
Instrumentation involved a study of basic electronics, basic control

theory and its applications, and a description and discussion of the
function of the following Savannah systems: instrumentation and
safety, reactor control, and radiation monitoring.
The subject of reactor theory was presented under five different
headings: ( 1 ) introduction , ( 2 ) thermal aspects, ( 3 ) nuclear aspects,
(1 ) shielding and containment, and ( 5 ) safeguards.
In the introduction an attempt was made to give the trainee an
over -all understanding of the problems encountered in the design
of a nuclear plant without going into specifics. It was felt that
once the large picture was established in a student's mind, the details
would become less difficult . The purpose of this introduction was to
give the trainee a beginning concept of the relation of the various
component parts of the reactor to the reactor as a whole.
Thermal aspects involved the basic theory of fluid flow , thermal
stresses, and heat transfer and an examination of some of the prob
lems involved in the generation of heat and its removal from reac
tors, particularly as this phenomena restricted the latitude of reactor
design .
The portion of the course devoted to nuclear aspects was designed
to impart an understanding of the nuclear processes that occur in a
reactor and to show how these processes influence the design and
operation of the nuclear power plant. The subject matter included
consideration of atomic structure, interactions of neutrons with
nuclei, release of nuclear energy in the fission process, interaction
of radiation with matter, cross sections for neutron reactors, reactor
theory (both steady state and transient ), basic theory of shielding
and containment, and hazard analysis and safeguards.
Associated with the trainees' work with the B & W Pool Test Reac
tor was the course in chemistry and the work in the chemistry labora
tory. Included in the general chemistry course was radiochemistry,
Savannah water chemistry, decontamination, and waste disposal. In
the laboratory the trainees performed experiments that included
cross-section determination, measurement of half life, use of the
scintillation method of radiation detection , operation of Geiger
Muller counters , the statistics of counting, operation of survey type
radiation detectors, and basic training in the use of film badges and
pocket dosimeters.
Since a knowledge of the materials used in a reactor system is
essential, the properties of primary -system structural materials, fuel
materials , and control materials were considered in detail. The
peculiar property requirements of each group of materials was pre
sented , and the practical consequences of radiation and corrosion
were described. The mechanical design of a reactor core , critical
factors in core design, maximum fuel temperatures, hot spots, uneven

flux distribution, proper coolant flow , etc. , were studied in the course
in reactor -core design .
A total of approximately 40 hr was devoted to the study of
mechanisms, i.e., detailed consideration of control rods, followers ,
their mounting and positioning, and drive mechanisms and their
operations and function in the over-all control scheme. The removal
and maintenance of control rods and their drive mechanisms and
methods of loading and unloading reactors were considered , and
descriptions of reactor- vessel closures were presented.
Heat-transport systems, auxiliary systems, and propulsion systems,
each received detailed attention as shown in Table 8.1 . Under
auxiliary systems were included all systems except heat transport ,
reactor, propulsion machinery, and secondary loop, which were cor
ered separately .
All trainees received 20 hr in health physics. This course involved
practice in measurement of radiation, study of radiation hazards,
working with radioactive materials and equipment, and decontamina
tion . Accident prevention and emergency procedures also were
taught. In this work the men actually operated the detecting instru
ments, and they learned to understand radiation levels and what
they mean and also what to do about them .
Finally, extensive attention was given to all aspects of operation
and maintenance. Operation and maintenance instruction was given
in the classroom , and this will later be coordinated with work on
the simulator.
The complete course of study described represents a total of over
1,250 hr ( Class I ) of classroom work . In addition, it was almost
a daily occurrence in the evening after classes for some of the in
structors that States Marine provided for their officers during the
period of training at Lynchburg to go to the lodge to answer the
trainees' questions and review special problems. When the sessions
ended , the trainees still had an hour of homework to do for the
following day.
In the academic courses quizzes and examinations were used for
trainee evaluation. They also became teaching devices through post
examination discussions, scoring with comments, and by making a
completed and scored examination paper a useful document for
future review .
So that the trainee could be evaluated accurately, every effort was
made to be objective in the written examination and to normalize the
testing and scoring procedures. Frequent oral and written quizzes
were given, and training participation in classroom and seminar
sessions was encouraged. Individual tutoring was an important fac
TRAINING OF THE N.Ş. SAVANNAH CREW 327
tor in trainee evaluation . In addition to testing methods, confiden

tial rating sheets were used by the instructors, tutors, and the Mari
time representatives to give an over -all picture of each trainee.
It must understood that this course was designed specifically for
training the crew of the Savannah. Although much of the content is
applicable to the training of crews for other nuclear merchant ships
that may be built, it is obvious that where other types of reactors
are concerned the subject matter would have to be changed to fit the
requirements of such reactors and reactor systems. Ultimately, more
generalized training courses will probably be given at the U.S.
Merchant Marine Academy at Kings Point, N.Y.
In the training of the engineering officers for the Savannah, major
emphasis was placed on practical training. Throughout the academic
phase, basic review courses , theory, and component descriptions were
slanted to the actual reactor operation. In the practical phase of
training, explanations and demonstrations of operating details were
related to, and based on, the previous academic work. The two
phases were tied together to give the trainee a better understanding
of reactor theory and operation.
Practical training began at Lynchburg and was continued with
field training at such sites as Hanford, Vallecitos, Idaho Falls, and
Argonne National Laboratory. At Lynchburg, practical training
was received in the radiochemistry laboratory and on the Pool Test
Reactor.
Although the control simulator was not operational during the
early part of the training program , it is expected that upon comple
tion of its upgrading all engineering officer trainees will have the
opportunity to become proficient in its operation . This training will
include routine and emergency procedure. Training on the simulator
is very important because it will give the prospective operator a
sense of timing and an intimate " feel" for every control knob and
instrument on the actual Savannah control console . When the trainee
finishes his course on the simulator, he will be thoroughly familiar
with the exact control panel on the ship and will be able to apply all
his learning to meet any situation that may arise when the Savannah
goes to sea. If, for example, one of the steam -generator feed pumps
should fail, from having been exposed to a simulated occurrence of
this situation on the simulator, the trainee will know exactly what
to do to meet the emergency .
The practical work in the radiochemistry laboratory has been men
tioned previously. Here the trainee was required to actually deal
with radioactive phenomena in a practical way : to measure it , to
determine safe levels, and to compile statistical information. Work
in the radiochemistry laboratory was closely associated with the work
613489 06222
on the pool reactor. The training on the reactor was designed so

that the trainee would become familiar with the proper check -out,
start-up , and operating procedures of the reactor. Academic work
received in reactor control and theory was augmented with demon
strations of various monitoring instruments , such as ion , boron
fluoride, and fission chambers, as well as a general orientation to the
pool reactor facility. In addition , the trainee performed and pre
pared a report on the following experiments : ( 1 ) critical experi
ment, ( 2 ) rod calibration, ( 3 ) flux mapping, and ( 4 ) danger-coeffi
cient analysis.
The work on the Pool Test Reactor gave the trainees actual experi
ence in building up critical-mass configurations under the supervision
of instructors. Each student was given the opportunity to load one
or two fuel elements into the reactor core .
As part of the final examination and evaluation of the trainee,
each was given a test at the controls of the B&W low -power reactor .
The trainee was required to check out the console ( containing preset
faults ) and the reactor, bring the reactor to critically, and to level
off at some predetermined power. This was followed by oral exam
ination on low -power reactor operation, safety, and associated theory.
8-4.2 Field Training
After the academic portion of the training program had been com
pleted at Lynchburg, the class was split up into small groups, which
were assigned to various facilities in the field . Since all students did
not receive identical training, a broader background of reactor opera
tion was developed , which, it is believed , will be an asset to the group
as a whole. Some trainees were assigned to Hanford, some to Val
lecitos, others to Ft . Belvoir. Field training was also given at
Argonne National Laboratory, at the U.S. Naval Damage Control
and Firefighting School in Philadelphia, and at the National Reac
tor Testing Station in Idaho. All students spent some time at sea
on naval submarines. The training at the various sites is described
below :
( a ) Hanford ( Class 1 ) . Hanford is the AEC production plant at
Hanford , Wash ., where a number of large water-cooled graphite re
actors are in operation in the production of plutonium . A plutonium
power reactor also is under construction at Hanford . Most of the
States Marine Lines trainees in Class I were assigned to Hanford as
a part of their field training. After a one -week period of orientation
and introduction , the trainees were assigned to operating crews for
four weeks of observation. During the first week lectures pertaining
to the Hanford facilities were presented . The topics covered in these
TRAINING OF THE X.S. SAVAIVAH CREW 329
lectures and discussions included the following : operating radiation

problems, radiation control systems and methods, radioactive -waste
disposal, radiation -zone maintenance, reactor process and construc
tion , reactor control, reactor physics, reactor efficiency and safety ,
and water treatment.
( b ) SII - 1 Reactor ( Class 1 ) . The SM - 1 Reactor, formerly the
Army Package Power Reactor, located at Fort Belvoir, Va ., is a
2000 -kw pressurized -water reactor power plant, which has been in
operation for several years. Training on the SM - 1 consisted of four
weeks of observing reactor operation. One trainee was assigned to
each operating shift, and, depending upon the SM - 1 schedule, the
trainee would be invited to participate actively in the operation of
the reactor. Whether or not he actually participated, he had the
opportunity of becoming familiar with the entire plant and the
processes and components involved in its operation. Each trainee
was permitted to operate the SM - 1 simulator installed at the site.
( c) l'allecitos Boiling Water Reactor ( Class 1 ) . The Vallecitos
Boiling Water Reactor (VBWR ) is one of the experimental facili
ties of the General Electric Company at Pleasanton , Calif. It is a
complete electric generating plant incorporating a 5,000 -kw electric
generator. At the VBWR, trainees received one week of orientation
in the field of boiling-water reactor technology and specifically on
VBWR, followed by four weeks of operator shift work. At this site
the trainee participated in actual operation , refueling, and general
maintenance of the plant. The orientation week included descrip
tions and tours of the plant and its laboratories . Discussions were
held for each group and covered such topics as safety procedures,
operation training, refueling procedures, and nuclear and nonnuclear
instrumentation. The VBWR control room was used for demonstra
tion .
( d ) Varal Damage Control School ( Class 1 ) . Most of the mem
bers of Class I attended a four-week course on theoretical and prac
tical damage control at the Naval Damage ( 'ontrol School at the
U.S. Naval Shipyard , Philadelphia, Pa. During their training at
this site, the trainees received instruction in ship stability and buoy
ancy , casualty control of nuclear-powered systems, corrective meas
ures after damage, and fire -fighting techniques. All instruction in
this course was pointed toward the particular problems that may be
encountered in a nuclear - powered merchant vessel.
( e ) A1W Reactor Training ( Class 1 ) . All ' is the designation for
the Large Ship Reactor Prototype located at the National Reactor
Testing Station , Idaho Falls. This prototype is the first nuclear
power plant to have two reactors powering one ship propeller shaft.
The first reactor plant of the A1W prototype achieved full -scale
operation in January 1959, and in September 1959 both reactor

plants were operated for the first time. This installation uses pres
surized -water reactor systems.
Training at the A1W site consisted of three weeks of observing
reactor operation coupled with a series of lectures dealing with the
design systems, components, and the operating characteristics of the
A1W plant. It also included motion pictures and tours of other
reactors at the National Reactor Testing Station, i.e. , SPERT,
BORAX, EBR-I, and EBR-II.
A special program was arranged in which eight members taken
from both engineering classes were selected to attend the A1W Op
erations Training Course at the Naval Reactor Facility, Idaho Falls.
The objective of this special course was to train highly competent
A1W plant operators so that with their background and experience
in all phases of operation and maintenance they could extrapolate
their knowledge and skills to other nuclear plants of similar or
comparable design. The successful completion of this 24- week course
earns for the trainee the qualifications as Reactor Operator or Chief
Reactor Operator.
( f ) Nuclear Merchant Ship Reactor Control -rod -drive Test Fa
cility ( Class 1 ) . A special control -rod test facility was constructed
at General Electric Company's San Jose plant to test the effect of
the rolling ship at sea on the operation of the control rods of a
marine nuclear reactor. This is a tilting test setup, representing one
of the Savannah's control- rod mechanisms together with a simulated
portion of the reactor pressure vessel . The one-week program at this
facility included the general and detailed review of the nuclear mer
chant ship reactor control-rod drives, as well as tours of the manu
facturing facilities at San Jose.
( g) Army Reactors Branch, Idaho Falls, Idaho. SL - 1 is the new
designation for the Stationary Low Power Plant No. 1 , formerly the
Argonne Low Power Reactor, ALPR . Operating responsibility for
this reactor was transferred from Argonne National Laboratory to
the Army on Feb. 5 , 1959. SL-1 is a low -power prototype boiling
water reactor designed to produce 300 kw of electric power and 400
kw of thermal energy for space heating. This plant was built to
obtain operating and performance data, to train operators, to deter
mine the limits of plant performance, and to obtain information for
small boiling water plants.
Many of the engineers from both training programs attended the
SL- 1 course ; however , owing to scheduling problems, Class I at
tended only 8 of the 16 weeks normally prescribed for this course.
Class II stayed on for the entire course. In general , both classes
received the same basic instruction in the operation and maintenance
TRAINING OF THE N.S. SAVAVNAH CREW 331
of boiling water power plants. Two weeks were devoted to reactor

operation, including hot and cold start-up. Trainees were allowed to
perform at least four start-ups and shutdowns of the plant. Addi
tionally, maintenance of nuclear and nonnuclear instrumentation
training was given. For Class II, the course went on to include the
specialty training offered in the program .
8-4.3 Job Training
The job training program was designed to give the trainees an

intimate working knowledge of all the components and systems com
prising the Savannah propulsion system and to acquaint them with
various aspects of radiological health practices.
( a ) New York Shipbuilding Corporation Maintenance Training
Program ( Class 1 ) . The maintenance training program at the New
York Shipbuilding Corporation yards at Camden, N.J., ranged from
two to four weeks. This program was designed to train operators
in the fundamentals of maintaining the Savannah propulsion system.
Here, emphasis was placed on familiarizing the trainee with radio
logical safety procedures and with the various components of the
reactor plant, particularly with the equipment within the reactor
compartment. The course was designed to deal specifically with
problems unique to contaminated equipment and with the working
problems of personnel in a radioactive area . The major training
aids were the full-scale mock -up of the reactor containment vessel
and the heat -exchanger section for rolling tubes. System and equip
ment drawings, as well as photographs, were used extensively in the
classroom work. Convenient access to the Savannah while still under
construction was also valuable in familiarizing the student with the
layout of the ship and its power plant.
( b ) N.S. Savannah Qualification Program . The final part of the
training program was the course that was developed at the New
York Shipbuilding Corporation yards to enable each operator, to
become thoroughly familiar with all the systems aboard the Savan
nah . Here the trainees were given oral and written examinations to
enable a board of competent and qualified individuals to certify, by
signatures, that the trainee was qualified either as ( 1 ) Reactor
Operator or as ( 2 ) Officer- in -Charge of the Watch.
A trainee certified as a Reactor Operator must demonstrate a fun
damental knowledge of the nuclear power plant, as well as of all
its systems. He must demonstrate ability to operate the complete
power plant in accordance with procedures established in the operat
ing manuals.
A trainee certified as Officer -in -Charge of the Watch must, in ad
dition, qualify as a Reactor Operator. Ile must be able to demon
strate additional technical knowledge of each system and of the

over-all power plant. He must convey to the certifying board that
he has the ability to exercise judgment in routine and emergency
plant matters.
( c ) Simulator Training. Before the Savannah goes into service,
it is hoped that each of the trainees will have an opportunity to
spend some time at the simulator console at Lynchburg. Since it was
not feasible to place the simulator in operation in time for use dur
ing the Lynchburg portion of the training program , simulator train
ing had to be omitted ; but it is expected that it will be in operation
before the Savannah is ready for service, and the plan is to give
each trainee a period of training at the simulator.
The final evaluation of each trainee will be based on his perform
ance during the Lynchburg phase of the training program , on re
ports from the various field training centers, and on his performance
during the special certification program at the New York Ship
building Corporation. Prospective officers will operate the power
plant during the tests of the plant.
8-5 DECK OFFICER TRAINING PROGRAM
The Deck Officer Training Program was also developed and con
ducted by the B&W Atomic Energy Division to supplement the
knowledge of skilled, well -seasoned merchant marine deck officers in
nuclear matters. The course given to these officers provided spe
cialized training in theory and engineering and in the operation of
the Savannah reactor, along with additional training to enable them
to carry out specific duty assignments associated with the operation
of a nuclear-powered vessel in foreign commerce . The deck officers,
quite naturally, do not receive as intensive training in nuclear tech
nology as the licensed engineers, but they will have a high degree
of familiarity with the details and the principles of operation of
the reactor plant. The six trainees, comprising Class III, completed
a three -month academic phase training program at Lynchburg and
extensive training at various reactor sites and technical centers.
8–5.1 Purpose and Scope of the Deck Officers Program
The Deck Officers Training Program had five general objectives :

1. To establish a common language peculiar to nuclear power
plants for complete communication between the deck and en
gineering department.
2. To familiarize the trainee with the ship and nuclear power
plant design and operation and with normal and emergency
procedures.
3. To give the trainee thorough grounding in radiological health

techniques, prevention of radiation hazards, radiation detec
tion , monitoring, and decontamination .
4. To promote the ability to cope with public relations and man
agement problems peculiar to the operation of a nuclear-pro
pelled merchant ship.
5. To impart sufficient prestige to the officers to inspire the con
fidence of others.
At the beginning of the course, the trainees were presented with

a broad background of nuclear power in terms of underlying tech
nology and legal significance. This aspect provided the trainee with
a good foundation for the more technical subjects that followed.
8-5.2 Selection and Qualification of Deck Officer Trainees
As previously explained , the trainees for this program were first

screened and recommended by the States Marine Lines personnel;
the final concurrence was by representatives of the Maritime Ad
ministration . Each deck officer trainee had his Merchant Marine
Captains License and up to 15 years of experience as a ship master.
Sea experience ranged from 12 to 39 years of Merchant Marine serv
ice. Two of the trainees had college degrees, and the others had a
high -school education or its equivalent. Their ages varied from 34
to 54 years.
8-5.3 Deck Officer Program Description
The basic organization of the program was essentially the same

as that of the Engineering Officers Training Program in that both
programs consisted of an academic phase and a practical phase
followed by extensive field training.
Deck officer classroom instruction was designed to orient the
trainee in the field of nuclear energy, familiarize him with the en
gineering and construction of the Savannah and its nuclear propul
sion system , and prepare him for public relations and management
problems that may be expected to arise in the operation of a nuclear
merchant ship . The classroom work prepared the trainee for prac
tical training in areas such as reactor operation, emergency pro
cedures, fuel handling, and radiological health techniques. In the
elementary introduction to methods and concepts governing the
nuclear sciences, instruction was given in basic mathematics and
physics, the composition and structure of matter, the nature of
radioactivity, and the concepts and application of nuclear fission
in reactor operation .
With respect to the Savannah, the course provided a general back

ground in reactor engineering and a description of the ship and its
power plant. It also covered reactor design , plant arrangement,
ship plans and construction , reactor types and systems, reactor ma
terials, engineering plant, reactor core, instrumentation, and operat
ing procedures. Time was also spent in observing the operation of
the B&W Pool Test Reactor and in briefly studying the design of
the Savannah simulator.
The subject of radiation hazards and health physics is of particu
lar importance to the deck officers, and the course presented was
comprehensive from both the academic and the practical standpoints.
The academic phase included an introduction to radiation hazards,
the biological effects of radiation, radiation monitoring, nuclear
power plant accidents, decontamination , and emergency procedures.
The practical phase consisted of 20 hr of laboratory work covering
scintillation methods of detection and the operation of a Geiger
Muller counter, film badges, and pocket dosimeters.
The course on the evolution of nuclear power presented a brief
history of nuclear energy, including Fermi's experiments, the Man
hattan District project, and postwar nuclear progress. Special em
phasis was given to the application of nuclear energy to ship pro
pulsion and in particular to the Savannah project. It introduced
the trainee to the nontechnical literature of nuclear energy to pre
pare him to discuss, with accuracy and intelligence, the United
States nuclear power program .
The impact of nuclear energy on ship operation was the subject of
a course designed to stress the effects of nuclear propulsion on the
training and licensing of ship's officers and on ship organization and
port clearances. This included a consideration of public reaction to
radiation and nuclear accidents and the mission of the Savannah
in implementing the Atoms for Peace Program.
A survey of pertinent U.S. and foreign laws and regulations per
taining to the nuclear industry was followed by a consideration of
significant literature on the subject. Included in this study were
the reports of such bodies as the National Committee on Radiation
Protection , the International Atomic Energy Agency, the Interna
tional Conference on Safety of Life at Sea, the American Institute
of Marine Underwriters, and many others that are concerned with
radiation regulation and indemnity problems.
The classroom work of the program was supplemented with a
series of seminars . These were similar in nature and general pur
pose to the seminars provided for the engineering officers.
As in the case of the engineering classes, special tutoring and
supervised study sessions were provided for the deck officer trainees.
Individual tutoring was available upon request by the trainee when

ever he found it necessary. It was the intent of the scheduled study
and tutoring sessions to summarize and review the over -all pro
gram , furnish guidance, assign supplementary reading, and evaluate
trainee progress as the program progressed.
8-5.4 Testing and Evaluation of Deck Officer Trainees
Since Class III consisted of only six trainees, a major part of the
testing of these men was done orally in conference with individual
trainees. The few written tests that were given were designed and
used as teaching devices and study aids. These examinations were
scored with comments and were discussed in detail with the group
after the examination . Every effort was made to make the tests
objective. At the end of the training at Lynchburg, the trainees were
given a final written comprehensive examination to determine
whether they had an understanding of the entire program . The same
type of confidential rating sheets used for the engineering officer
trainees were used in conjunction with the examination grades to
provide an over-all picture of a trainee's capability.
8-5.5 Practical Training for the Deck Officer Trainees
As a part of the Savannah engineering course , the trainees spent

16 hr at the B & W Critical Laboratory in Lynchburg. This pro
gram included a review of background information, practical health
physics and instrumentation, a tour of the Critical Experiment
facility, and observation of the reactor in operation .
8-5.6 Field Training for Deck Officer Trainees
The field training for the trainees was quite different from that
given Classes I and II, but it included training at various reactor
and industrial sites.
The first site visited after completion of the Lynchburg phase
was the Robert A. Taft Engineering Sanitary Center ( SEC ). Two
courses were presented at this center : a two -week basic radiological
health course and a special course covering selected arranged topics
of interest. The basic radiological health course provided the min
imum basic technical knowledge needed for radiological health work .
About 50 percent of the scheduled time was devoted to laboratory
work and problem sessions. Among the subjects studied in this
course were sources of radiation exposure , atomic structure and radio
activity, interaction of radiation with matter, biological effects, maxi
mum permissible levels, principles of radiation detection and
protection , survey and personnel monitoring instruments, laboratory

counting instruments, and control of radioactive materials.
The special SEC course given to the deck officers comprised lec
tures and experiments. The lectures were about an hour in dura
tion and included the following subjects: clinical evaluation of
radiation exposure ; environmental surveillance ; determination of
gross radioactivity in water, silt, and biological materials ; waste
disposal criteria ; stream survey techniques ; radiochemical pro
cedures for environmental samples ; radiation surveillance of milk
food ( radioactivity in the diet ) ; role of the Public Health Service
and other agencies in radiological health ; neutron detection and
measurement; biological effect of neutrons; and ionizing radiation
in humans.
The laboratory experiments involved the measurement of gross
radioactivity in water; counting efficiency for water samples; meas
urement of gross radioactivity in biological materials ; determina
tion of radiostrontium in biota ; and assay of an air sample.
After completing the biological health course at SEC , the deck
officers were assigned to Argonne National Laboratory for a special
three- week training program involving a variety of nuclear activi
ties. This course included lectures, tours of the various Argonne
facilities, experiments, operating practice, and several special con
ferences.
The lectures covered such things as neutron instrumentation ,
radiological physics, the International Institute of Nuclear Science
and Engineering Program , modern physics at Argonne, reactors,
radiation monitoring and survey of the Argonaut Reactor, assembly
of the Aerojet research reactor, the pressurized -water reactor in the
Savannah , reactor shielding, reclamation and waste handling at
Argonne, and meteorology.
The tours included the CP - 5 Reactor, gamma facilities, hot cells,
the International Institute of Nuclear Science and Engineering
Laboratory facilities, the Dresden Nuclear Power Station, the Ex
perimental Boiling Water Reactor ( EBWR ) , the Van de Graaf ac
celerator, reclamation and waste -handling facilities, and the biology
division laboratories.
The experiments included the Argonaut Reactor start -up and op
eration , fuel fabrication, CP - 5 Reactor flux map, radiation safety,
instrumentation , neutron detection , and experiments on the Argo
naut Reactor.
The trainees had an opportunity to work with the EBWR simu
lator, the Argonaut Reactor, and with the CP - 5 Reactor shift super
visor. Handling the Argonaut gave the trainees a good " feel " for
operating a reactor. They had several long sessions bringing it
critical, and these were considered very worth while .
The special activities consisted of two features ; ( 1 ) a deck officers

panel to discuss the Savannah program for the International Insti
tute participants and ( 2 ) a conference on the Argonne training
program and a consideration of the use of reactors and atomic
energy abroad.
Arrangements were made to have the deck officers attend the
Naval Damage Control School at the U.S. Naval Shipyard at Phila
delphia. There, the course for the deck officers was essentially the
same as that given to the engineering officers. It consisted of a
five- week program specializing in damage- control theory, buoyancy,
stability, liquid loading, and the dynamics of flooding. The course
also considered casualty control, corrective measures taken after
damage, and fire fighting. Practical training was also given by
having each member of the group perform shoring, supervise re
pair parties, conduct drills, and operate fire-fighting equipment.
Special lectures were also given on potential hazards of nuclear
propelled ships.
The deck officers were each given one week of observation duty
on an operating U.S. Navy nuclear submarine so that they could
study the performance of a mobile nuclear power plant and some
of its associated problems.
At Oak Ridge, Tenn ., a one -day tour of the facilities at Oak
Ridge National Laboratory was given to the group so that they
could become familiar with the Laboratory's part in the Savannah
project. Additionally, a general review of the activities in progress
at Oak Ridge was presented.
At Hanford , a four and one -half week program was set up for the
deck officers so that they could extend their present experience as
managers of ship's personnel and business by giving them an in
sight into the problems of management peculiar to installations us
ing nuclear facilities. In general, this program consisted of a week
devoted to orientation in Hanford reactor operations from the man
agement viewpoint; for the remaining three and one- half weeks, the
students were assigned to the production analysts and other man
agement personnel at certain reactor sites to become indoctrinated
in the day-to -day problems in the management of the facilities.
During two days at Brookhaven National Laboratory on Long
Island , N.Y., the trainees were given a tour of the meteorological
facility and participated in discussions of various topics, including
data processing in micrometeorological studies, long - range diffusion
studies, systems for rating reactors in relation to hazards, health
physics procedures in relation to air -borne hazards at BNL , etc.
A standard one-week course in radar operation was given to the
four deck officers that were not certified by the Maritime Adminis
tration as radar operators.
Finally, a four -day briefing on the subject of public relations,

conducting press conferences, etc. , was given to the deck officers.
The intent of this program was to enhance their ability and pro
ficiency in dealing with the press and dignitaries should the occa
sion arise. This was considered especially important in connection
with the foreign operations of the Savannah.
Because George C. Sharp, Naval Architect & Marine Engineers,
the original designers of the Savannah, have the contract to develop
and finalize the damage- control doctrine and write the damage
control manual for the ship , a two- week workshop session was or
ganized for the deck officers so they could help prepare the outline
for the manual.
8–5.7 Final Evaluation of Deck Officer Trainees
The final evaluation of the deck officer traineers was made by com
mittees composed of members representing the Maritime Adminis
tration and States Marine Lines. These representatives reviewed the
academic classroom work, the evaluations made by individual in
structors, and the performance of the trainees in the practical phases
of training before making final decisions. As it turned out, the
Captain, Chief Officer, and Second Officer were chosen by States
Marine Lines.
8-6 TRAINING OF OTHER PERSONNEL
Orientation for the remaining crew members, the junior deck offi
cers, the medical staff, and certain maintenance men , covering the
principles of the Savannah's unique features was divided into ser
eral categories to meet the needs of the various groups of crew mem
bers. The specific aim of the training procedure in this area was
to equip each member to efficiently perform his specialized daily
tasks.
The ship's doctor, as department head of the Medical-Health
Physics Department, is directly responsible to the Master for the
health of all persons that come aboard and for assurance that radio
logical safety procedures are properly applied in each case. The
first ship's doctor selected for the Savannah is a competent indi
vidual with four years of general practice. He is also a graduate
of the Graduate School of Public Health at the University of Pitts
burgh and has received an M.P.H. degree in occupational medicine.
Under the sponsorship of the AEC , he attended an advanced radia
tion health course at the University of Pittsburgh .
It has not yet been fully decided whether a full-time health physi
cist will be required for the Savannah, but it is planned to have a
TRAINING OF THE X.S. SAANVAH CREW 339
female nurse abroad. A registered nurse with postgradaute train

ing in radiation protection relating to a nursing program will be
employed to staff this position ; she will be given on -the-job training
as required .
For instrument maintenance, two instrument men who already
possess electronic experience have been acquired . One is a graduate
electrical engineer with U.S. Navy steam -propulsion experience, and
the other is a graduate from the two and one -half year RCA Elec
tronics Technician Program . Both these men have completed the
16- week course offered at the SM-1 Reactor at Ft. Belvoir for nu
clear instrumentation specialists.
Aboard the Savannah, technicians, such as the plumber-machinist
and the engine-maintenance men, will be required to handle and
repair pipelines and other equipment that may transport or contain
radioactive fluids. This equipment will probably be constructed of
special reactor material, i.e. , stainless steel , aluminum , and special
alloys that are not normally found in any quantity aboard conven
tional ships. These men , therefore, will be trained to recognize and
weld these materials as well as to handle the fluids without danger
of spreading radioactive spillage. These men will be given six
weeks training in the techniques of welding the special reactor mate
rials followed by four weeks training under the direction of a main
tenance crew at either a national laboratory or other approved site.
During this training they will learn the necessary precautions that
are followed . This will be further supplemented by on -the -job
training in specific Savannah requirements.
Those personnel who, by nature of their assignments, are required
to have a somewhat greater understanding of radiation hazards will
participate in a program covering the rudiments of radiation , health
safety, and basic monitoring procedures. This training will be con
ducted by the ship's deck and engineering officers and the ship's
doctor to assure a continuing training program throughout the
operation of the vessel as new crew members are assigned . Initially,
the States Marine Nuclear Engineer and his assistants will be called
upon to augment the training program . Tentatively, this course
is expected to last for six weeks and will commence about six weeks
before the Savannah's trials. The personnel to be given this train
ing will including the following : 1 third mate , 1 fourth mate,
1 boatswain, 1 carpenter, 3 oilers, 3 wipers, 1 plumber -machinist,
2 engine-maintenance men , 1 chief steward, 1 chief purser, and 1 chief
radio operator.
A second course will cover an introductory and simplified descrip
tion of nuclear propulsion plus a basic introduction to the subject
of radiation health safety. It is expected that the course will be of
about two week's duration, commencing about three weeks prior to

the Savannah's sea trials. This training will also be conducted by
the ship's deck and engineering officers, doctor, health physicist, and
the States Marine Lines nuclear engineers. This program will be
given to : 2 radiomen, 3 quartermasters, 9 seamen , 4 deck mainte
nance men , 2 watchmen , 1 assistant purser, 1 purser's clerk, 52 mem
bers of the steward's department, and 2 cadets.
8-7 TRAINING OF FOREIGN ENGINEERS
A significant part of the over-all training program under the

Savannah project is the training opportunity offered to engineers
of foreign countries. Two such groups of engineers have already
taken advantage of the training available. One group received the
24 -week academic course at Lynchburg College. This was followed
by field training at Oak Ridge National Laboratory in reactor opera
tion and at the New York Shipbuilding Corporation yard.
Another group of foreign engineers came primarily to observe the
construction of the Savannah reactor and propulsion system at the
New York Shipbuilding Corporation yard . Their program was
divided into a series of observation periods. Each observation period
consisted of 11 weeks and was limited to a maximum of four visiting
engineers. Eight weeks was spent at the shipyard ; three weeks,
visiting contractor installations. This observation program began in
April 1959.
This program gave the foreign engineers opportunity to examine
construction specifications, plans, material orders, etc. The nominal
assignment consisted of two men on the construction ways and two
men on the nuclear reactor mock -up in the shops. The observers
were advised of the schedule of significant events and had oppor
tunity to accompany the AEC -Maritime Administration inspectors
and technical men in their normal duties. Within limits and without
interfering with shipyard production and inspection , the visitors had !
opportunities to discuss the work in progress with the staff of the
shipyard and with the AEC -Maritime Administration construction
representatives.
The program involved no formally outlined schedule of events or
course of study, but, as events were changing during the construc
tion period, the observers had opportunity to review plans, reports.
and construction of the Survinnah .
The program of review and inquiry included consideration of such
things as hull design, collision -barrier design , reactor -compartment
arrangement, secondary and primary shielding, propulsion ma
chinery, instrumentation and control, and safety.
Among the various contractor sites visited by these foreign engi

neers were : the De Laval Steam Turbine Co., Trenton , N.J .; Oak
Ridge National Laboratory ; the Shippingport Atomic Power Sta
tion , Shippingport, Pa .; Argonne National Laboratory ; the Dresden
Vuclear Power Station , Morris, Ill .; the Babock & Wilcox plant,
Lynchburg, Va .; and the Vallecitos Boiling Water Reactor, Pleasan
ton , Calif.
Chapter 9
INTERNATIONAL ASPECTS OF NUCLEAR SHIP PROPULSION
One of the more complex and time-consuming aspects of the

nuclear merchant ship program is that which relates to the interna
tional operation of nuclear- powered merchant ships. International
operation involves the negotiation of agreements between nations
concerning legal and administrative matters, including liability poli
cies under which nuclear-powered ships will have entry into world
ports. Every effort must be made to guarantee the safety of nuclear
powered ships and the protection of the public while such ships are
in port. There must also be assurance of proper indemnification in
case of a nuclear accident. Local authorities would have a valid
reason for forbidding the entrance of nuclear-powered ships to their
port if there were no assurance that possible damage would be com
pensated at least up to an acceptable and internationally accepted
figure. Involved in these considerations is also the protection of
conventional ships that may be involved in collisions with nuclear
ships. Euratom ( European Atomic Energy Community ) represen
tatives have raised a question concerning the ownership features of
the Euratrom Treaty with regard to the special nuclear material on
board nuclear vessels when such vessels are in ports of Euratom
countries. Other problems in this area of international operation
which have to be resolved concern the licensing and inspection of
nuclear ships prior to entrance into foreign ports, environmental
studies of harbor areas and port facilities, the use of special flags
for nuclear ships, and certification as to competency of crews and
general safety of nuclear ships.
These and other questions of a similar nature have been under
serious consideration from the time the idea of nuclear merchant
ship operation was first proposed, and a number of meetings have
been held by representatives of various interested nations in an
effort to formulate means for their resolution . The principal object
of these meetings has been the protection of the public. In the event
of injury to persons or damage to property as a result of a nuclear
accident, there must be assurance that the injured persons or owners
of damaged property will be adequately compensated for their loss.
Moreover, such compensation must come from one clearly defined
source, namely , the operator of the installation in which the nuclear
613489 0-62 23 343
accident occurred . This guarantee implies that a fund that can

reasonably be regarded as adequate will at all times be available for
the payment of compensation. It is also desirable that this fund
shall not to any extent be applicable to any loss the operator himself
may have suffered by reason of damage to his own installation .
Although it is generally recognized that these questions concern
ing liability and indemnity require early resolution, at the same time
it is apparent that undue haste in this area of nuclear propulsion is
undesirable. Nuclear propulsion is in its early stages of develop
ment, and advances in knowledge may change the situation rapidly
and radically ; therefore it seems clear that any international agree
ments made should be flexible and should avoid undue rigidity that
would hinder development. On the other hand , it is vital that gor
ernments be able to ensure safety in the design and operation of
ships of both their own flag and those of foreign nations.
9-1 GENERAL ASPECTS OF NUCLEAR SHIP INSURANCE
The costs of insurance for nuclear -powered ships are difficult to

estimate at the present time because many questions concerning the
risks incurred in the operation of nuclear vessels still remain to be
resolved . It is not possible to express definite findings or conclusions
because no basis of experience exists for drawing conclusions in
this field .
In the spring of 1954, the domestic market, through the American
Marine Insurance Syndicate for Insurance of Builder's Risks, pro
vided insurance coverage on the first naval nuclear submarine after
the arrival on board of the nuclear fuel; the following year similar
coverage was extended to another nuclear submarine. During the
period between launching and delivery to the Navy Department, the
need for collision and for protection and indemnity coverage on
these vessels was urgent, and the risks were underwritten without
benefit of the fuller understanding needed to provide complete in
surance on nuclear-powered commercial vessels .
The question of insurance was a critical factor several years ago
in the contemplated construction of the first nuclear -powered cen
tral station in the United States. Although private insurance com
panies were prepared to write insurance on nuclear power plants
covering physical damage and injuries to employees, such companies
could not undertake to insure plants against liability damage suits
involving entire communities in case of widespread radioactive con
tamination as a result of a nuclear accident.
Insurance companies have established rates and procedures for
coverage of injury to employees working on reactors and associated
INTERNATIONAL ASPECTS OF NUCLEAR SHIP PROPULSION 345
facilities and for damage to equipment. The premiums on such

insurance should have a negligible effect on power costs ; the same
considerations no doubt would apply to nuclear-powered merchant
ships so far as the vessels themselves are concerned.
In 1955, subsequent to the passage of the Atomic Energy Act of
1954, an insurance study group was appointed to consider the over
all problem of providing insurance coverage on privately owned and
operated nuclear installations. Since that time much constructive
work has been done by the insurance industry in creating, through
insurance pools, the very large insurance capacity needed to cover
third -party liability against radiation hazard as well as property
damage to private nuclear energy reactor installations. Concurrent
with the development of insurance capacity, progress has also been
made along other lines, all of which effort has been directed toward
providing liability and property -damage insurance covering land
based nuclear reactors.
Since the type of coverage which the private insurance companies
could issue was not adequate to cover an accident involving wide
spread radioactive contamination, utility companies were justifiably
reluctant to proceed with the construction of nuclear power stations
near populated areas. The problem of providing insurance and
indemnity for the private atomic energy industry was recognized by
the Congress of the United States and was given considerable study
during the preparation of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954. The
remote possibility that a privately owned nuclear reactor might have
a catastrophic accident created the problem that private organizations
building or operating the facilities might incur a public liability
larger than could be met either by the financial structure of their
own organization or by the resources of the insurance industry.
To help clarify the problem and the possibilities for its solution ,
the AEC arranged early in 1955 to have a group of insurance execu
tives, representing the major associations of property and liability
insurance underwriters, study the prospects for providing insurance
for private atomic energy activities. The insurance representatives
concluded that workmens' compensation insurance could be provided
by existing insurance facilities ; that finances for property insurance
for private atomic energy installations could be organized ; but that,
although public liability insurance could be provided in relatively
large amounts, the private capacity to underwrite this type insurance
might not be adequate to cover the claims that could arise in the
event of a serious nuclear accident involving release of radioactive
materials over large areas, even though the probability of such an
accident was vanishingly small.2
These studies led to the formation in January 1957 of three syndi
cates or pools to provide insurance for atomic energy activities. One
of these is composed of stock companies and provides insurance on

atomic energy facilities; the second, also of stock companies, provides
public liability insurance ; and the third, of mutual companies, pro
vides both types of insurance . The liability policies would cover
the facility licensee, all his suppliers of equipment and services, and
any other who might be held liable in the event of a nuclear accident.
The AEC believed that this insurance coverage was adequate
except in the public liability field . Although the amount of liability
insurance coverage was far greater than that provided for any other
industry, it still was inadequate to cover the maximum possible
liability that could result from a catastrophic nuclear accident, no
matter how remote the probability of such an accident . The AEC
therefore recommended to the Congress that, to enable private
atomic energy industry development to proceed, the Government
provide indemnification of companies engaged in certain activities .
As a consequence of these recommendations, the Congress, acting
upon the authority of Section 170 of the Atomic Energy Act of
1954, enacted Public Law 85-256, which was signed by the President
on Sept. 2, 1957. This law is generally known as the Price- Ander
son Act.
The provisions of this Act are ( 1 ) that all facility licensees, and ,
at the discretion of the AEC , certain material licensees are required
to furnish proof of financial protection against public liability in an
amount to be determined by the Commission except “ ... that for
facilities designed for producing substantial amounts of electricity
and having a rated capacity of 100,000 electrical kilowatts or more ,
the amount of financial protection required shall be the maximum
amount available from private sources" ; ( 2 ) that such licensees, their
suppliers of materials, equipment, and services, and any others who
may be liable are indemnified in the amount of $500 million in
demnity.
Public Law 85–256 requires financial protection equal to the total
amount of private liability insurance available (approximately $60
million ) for all power reactors with a capacity of 100,000 kw ( e ) or
more . The ratio of thermal to electrical capacity varies somewhat
among different reactors ; so, for the purpose of this regulation , this
ratio has been assumed as 4 heat kilowatts to 1 electric kilowatt .
Therefore, a capacity of 400,000 kw ( t ) would require $60 million of
private insurance, or $ 150,000 per thousand kilowatts of thermal
capacity. The minimum amount of protection under this regulation
is $ 250,000. The fee on the $ 500 million policy covers a charge for
paper and administrative work only.
The reason for presenting this brief history and description of the
Price -Anderson Act here is that this law, originally enacted to cover
only land -based nuclear reactors, has recently been amended (by
passage of Public Law 85–602) to also cover the indemnity problems
associated with the N.S. Savannah. This legislation , however, covers
only the Savannah ; it was specifically noted that it was not to be
considered as precedent setting for later nuclear merchant ships.
Although the Savannah is now covered by the amendment to the
Price -Anderson Act , it is recognized that provisions must be made
to provide insurance for subsequent nuclear commercial ships, and ,
since early 1957, the AEC and the Maritime Administration have
worked closely with underwriters in an effort to establish the pattern
for providing insurance for future nuclear ships. Of principal con
cern to insurance underwriters is the pyramiding of liability and the
effects of modifying the admiralty concept of limited liability. If a
claim arising out of a nuclear accident on the Savannah is made
against the vessel and becomes a suit against the United States, the
United States would not be precluded from asserting the defense
afforded under the Limitation of Liability Act , 46 U.S.C. 183. Under
this act the shipowner's third - party liability is limited under certain
circumstances to $ 60 per gross ton plus freight earnings on cargo.
Although this act is not self-operating, it has been consistently and
uniformly claimed on behalf of the United States. If it is felt that
the United States must guarantee to a foreign country that the
limitation -of-liability defense would not be asserted in the event of
a nuclear accident, Congressional action would be required. The
possibility of having to provide such a guarantee may arise from
the refusal of foreign countries to permit entry of the Savannah if
the United States were able to limit its liability, as owner of the
Sarannah, to conventional protection and indemnity marine insur
ance or approximately $ 2,100,000. This question of limitation of
liability has been under serious consideration in the international
discussions that have taken place.
Certain other points in the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 cannot be
applied to a nuclear ship. The crew of a ship is not subject to a
workmen's compensation system ; in admiralty law the crew members
are treated very much the same as third parties.
In so far as possible the AEC -Maritime joint task group is en
deavoring to work out an approach to international arrangements
to facilitate acceptable indemnity provisions for nuclear ships within
existing international agreements; if necessary, however, it will seek
resolution of the problems through new arrangements. Thus far,
the problems considered by the joint task group fall under three
headings: ( 1 ) those associated with the operation of the Savannah,
( 2 ) those associated with national legislation prior to the construc
tion and operation of other nuclear merchant ships, and ( 3) those
associated with international conventions.
International interest in third -party liability has been shown by

the association of maritime lawyers, known as the Comite Mari
time International ( CMI) , and several national maritime law asso
ciations of Western Europe. One of these has recently circulated
a questionnaire to all Western European associations and the Amer
ican Maritime Law Association with a view toward amendment of
shipowners liability conventions. The urgent problems here are the
possibility of establishing absolute liability for nuclear damage and
the establishment of a reasonable limit of indemnification on the
part of underwriters and government. Some pattern has been set
for action on nuclear ship liability and indemnity amendments by
the action of the Organization for European Economic Cooperation
(OEEC ) with respect to land -based installations and the transporta
tion of nuclear materials.
Obviously there are admiralty laws and insurance practices that
will require some modifications to facilitate the advent of nuclear
power to the world's merchant marine.
9-2 DISCUSSIONS AND NEGOTIATIONS WITH FOREIGN NATIONS
Significant efforts are being made to solve the international prob

lems relating to the operation of nuclear-powered merchant vessels
through both individual discussions with foreign nations and the
use of international conventions. The OEEC , the International
Agency for Atomic Energy ( IAEA ), as well as the CMI and Eura
tom representatives, have had the subject of nuclear propulsion under
consideration for several years and have held a number of meetings
in an attempt to formulate rules under which nuclear ships might
operate. The OEEC is endeavoring to draft a third - party liability
convention . The six Euratom countries are , in addition , drafting
their own convention, apparently intended to supplement that of the
OEEC , which would establish a limitation of liability at a level
substantiaily higher than the one established by the OEEC con
vention .
At the request of the OEEC, the CMI, on which the shipping
industries of all major maritime nations are represented, prepared
a report on the maritime aspects of third - party liability. Also, it has
drafted , for inclusion in the OEEC draft convention , suggested pro
visions to regulate such liability in the transportation of nuclear
material.3
Although no foreign government has yet enacted legislation com
parable to the Price- Anderson Amendment, at least three foreign
governments (United Kingdom , West Germany, and Switzerland )
are considering legislation relevant to the third - party liability prob
lem The proposals differ in detail, but, in general, three basic prin
ciples emerge.
1. That an absolute liability shall be placed on the licensee or
operator or other person made responsible whether or not there
has been any negligence or fault on his part and whether or not
he has conformed with all the safety rules and regulations.
2. That the sum of this absolute liability shall be for a very sub
stantial sum , related to the degree of compensation deemed
necessary and not to the value of the nuclear installation or
substance in transit .
3. That the period of time for discovery of injury after an in
cident shall be prescribed .
Once the principle of absolute liability, whether there be negli
gence or not, has been established , then the fixing of the sum of
liability and the period of time for discovery are in effect equivalent
to a limitation of liability.
Because of the general agreement concerning the basic philosophy
involved, it seems reasonable to assume that ultimately there should
be little major difference between the recommended drafts of the
conventions produced by the international organization . Until these
conventions are ratified and signed , however, any question that may
arise concerning incidence or amount of liability for any nuclear
damage must be determined according to the relevant domestic law
or the forum having jurisdiction.
9-3 LEGISLATION PROPOSED AT THE RIJEKA CONFERENCE
The risks incurred by ships using nuclear propulsion was the

central subject of discussion by the CMI during its conference at
Rijeka , Yugoslavia, in September 1959. A draft agreement approved
by a very large majority resulted from these discussions, and this
was subsequently referred to the government of Belgium for ultimate
consideration by a Diplomatic Conference. Some delegations to the
Rijeka Conference had argued that it was too early to attempt to
draft formal legislation concerning indemnity and liability covering
accidents involving nuclear-powered merchant vessels. They claimed
that atomic propulsion has barely been tested and that its future
development cannot be foreseen because of construction costs and the
high price of nuclear fuel. They argued that the estimates of even
tual damages are still very vague and probably false ; actually the
risks are probably very low and quite unrelated to those which irra
tionally are feared so much because of the background of atomic
bombs. In the opinion of these delegations, it would be better to
wait until experience provides actual data .
These arguments did not stop the CMI. It hopefully welcomed

the possibility that dangers might be less than feared but considered
that the risk they could entail must not be neglected. The Com
mittee felt that so many international organizations would not show
interest in this risk if it were really nonexistent. Recognizing the
fact that nuclear- powered ships were not competitive with conven
tional ships today, the Committee felt that this was no reason for
assuming that they could not become competitive tomorrow , the
progress of technology and science being very rapid. Aside from
the importance of not being left behind in the field of nuclear
power development, the adoption of a convention on the indemni.
fication of nuclear risks, in the opinion of the Committee, appeared
to be a necessary step preliminary to the commercial development
and use of nuclear propulsion. Local authorities would have a
valid reason to forbid the entrance of nuclear ships to their ports
if there were no assurance that eventual damages would be com
pensated for, at least up to an internationally acceptable amount.
In appraising the work of the OEEC , Euratom , and the IAEA
in the field of indemnity and liability, the CMI indicated that,
although the drafts of these other organizations were generally
acceptable, they did not go far enough and a special convention
was needed to cover the maritime aspects of indemnity and liability .
The draft agreed upon at the Rijeka Conference does not deal
with measures that must be taken to prevent nuclear damage either
at the time of the construction of ships or during their operation .
The solution to these safety problems was left to the competence of
engineers and other technicians. The Rijeka Conference started
with the assumption that such problems will be settled through
special agreements, probably within the framework of the London
Conference for the revision of the Convention on Safety at Sea in
1960. At Rijeka, the project of drafting a convention was limited
to the question of indemnification for damages which , despite
safety measures, could be caused by a nuclear ship or, more spe.
cifically, by its reactor and the nuclear fuel it contains. Damages
caused by fissionable or radioactive material as cargo raise dif
ferent problems; these are being considered by other organiza
tions such as the OEEC and the IAEA.
The essential principles involved in the Rijeka Conference were
borrowed from the OEEC and the IAEA projects. The responsi
bility for nuclear damages is centered upon the operator of the
ship, i.e., the person whose name appears on the operating license
or authorization. This responsibility is objective and exclusive. It
is objective because it obtains by right, resulting from the bare fact
of the creation of damage. Grounds for exoneration are reduced
to a minimum , if not completely abolished. It is exclusive because
the operator is solely responsible and the only one whom the victims
may sue. Only very exceptionally is he granted even the right
to appeal.
Objective responsibility is not, per se, a legal innovation. It is
more or less admitted in various legislations. The French Code
of Civil and Commercial Aviation and, following it , the Rome
Convention both decree the responsibility by right of the operator
of an aircraft for damages to a third party on the ground. The
French Law of 1898 on injuries to workmen was based upon the
same idea. The Rijeka Conference, just as the Rome Convention,
breaks away from the fiction and false qualifications in which
much conventional jurisprudence bogs down. It uses a clear vocab
ulary that calls things by name and makes it possible, effortlessly,
to draw conclusions. The obligation of a guarantee imposed on
an operator is completely separated from the concept of fault.
Not only does the victim not have to establish the fault of the
operator, but the proof of the latter, even when it is submitted,
cannot have the slightest influence on the amount of the obligation
of guarantee. As for the operator, he cannot be exonerated from
the responsibility even by claiming circumstances beyond his control.
It was the opinion of the Rijeka Conference that in this new field
of atomic energy , where scientists still have much to learn , it would
be impossible to speak honestly of a fault in the majority of cases
or to appreciate its rationality. The resulting difficulties would
not permit an efficient and quick protection of the public. This
concept ( that in which the operator could be exonerated by claiming
circumstances beyond his control ) was, therefore, entirely rejected,
and the only notion accepted was that of exceptional risks created by
the operator. This, in turn , resulted in the idea of imposing on the
operator an obligation that belongs to the category of insurance.
These concepts are somewhat at variance with the traditional rules
of maritime law, but they result from the fact that atomic risk is
not by nature a sea peril.
There is no intention in the Rijeka draft, however , to extend the
guarantee of the operator to damages from an atomic accident
when such an event resulted directly from “ war, hostilities, civil
war, or insurrection ." The Rijeka convention exonerates the oper
ator in those cases .
Much more revolutionary is the exclusive character of the obli
gation of guarantee channeled and centered solely on the operator,
without any possibility for an appeal, except for two limited excep
tions. The fact that the operator is in all circumstances responsible
to third -party victims does away with any question regarding the
person to be sued for indemnity. The proposed legislation provides
that no other person will be held responsible for nuclear damages.
No action can be brought against the purveyor or the constructor

of a reactor operated by the purchaser. In the erent of a collision
between an atomic ship and a conventional ship , the former will
be solely responsible for the resulting nuclear damages, even if
the collision was the fault of the latter. The operator is eren
deprived of the right of recourse for nuclear damage either against
the purveyor or against the ship that caused the collision. A claim
of this kind against a third party is granted to the operator only
if ( 1 ) this claim was provided for in the contract and ( 2 ) if the
damage was deliberately caused by the third party.
The proposed legislation clearly rejects the subjective notion of
fault as applied to the process of indemnification of the victims and
is based on the objective idea of an insurance against the risk. The
obligation of guarantee is imposed on the operator, who, under the
control of public authorities, will have to take out and maintain an
insurance policy or other adequate financial guarantee. The pro
tection of victims is assured if such insurance is provided . If an
action or claim against a third party were permitted, all parties
would be forced to seek individual insurance against the risk, and
there would result an ineffectual accumulation of such insurance
which the international market might not be able to absorb. The
total of premiums would impose a heavy economic burden without
appreciable benefit for the victims.
Another interesting aspect of the legislation proposed by the
Rijeka Conference is the limitation with respect to time. A time
limitation had to be imposed because the insurer cannot be required
to keep funds indefinitely for the indemnification of victims who
neglect to put in their claims. In addition, as long as new claims
may be expected, the distribution of disposable funds is delayed
and made complicated . An appropriate deadline for claims is
somewhat difficult to set ; so , following the other projects, the Rijeka
Conference adopted a maximum deadline of 10 years. Such a long
period was agreed upon because injury or damage from radioactive
contamination may not be immediately apparent; it may manifest
itself only after a period of several years. The ruling, however,
provides for the possibility of setting a shorter deadline if the vie
tim is aware of the injury or may be reasonably assumed to have
been aware of it .
The draft drawn up at the Rijeka Conference also admits a
limitation in the amount of indemnity. The amount is established
per accident and not per ship or nuclear plant. It has been argued
that this principle is contrary to the common law of punishable
responsibility , in which most legislation does not admit any limita
tion because in this field of jurisprudence responsibility is based on
the concept of fault. In the nuclear legislation , however, the notion
of risk is substituted for that of fault, and, since the domain of mis
demeanor responsibility is abandoned for the domain of insurance
responsibility, limitation of amount becomes normal and necessary.
Further justification of the principle of limitation of amount is
found in the fact that the risk in nuclear accidents is greater and
more difficult to control than in nonnuclear areas and the activity
that it entails presents a greater public interest. A new enterprise
such as nuclear propulsion should not be put in danger of being
crushed by excessive burdens. The setting of a maximum for the
amount of indemnity appeared to be a necessary measure at the
Rijeka Conference for the financing of the guarantee for the victim .
It is obvious that the principles presented at the Rijeka Confer
ence cannot be expected to provide an easy solution to all difficulties
that may be encountered . The financing of indemnities constitutes
one of the problems that none of the projects under discussion has
been able to resolve. Since the economic development and financial
possibilities of commercial markets and states vary in various coun
tries, it is very difficult to find a common solution that is acceptable
to all . The preliminary draft of the Conference submitted to the
CMI provided for the maximum established within the limits pos
sible for a private enterprise and likely to be absorbed by the com
mercial insurance market. The figure of $ 15 million, borrowed from
the project of the OEEC, was suggested, but the Conference unani
mously agreed that this maximum could appear too low in view of
the possible amount of damage which might result from particularly
severe conditions. Unless a higher amount was provided, nuclear
ships could be barred from entering foreign ports. It was the opin
ion of several delegates that a supplementary guarantee, above the
$ 15 million suggested, must be provided from public finance.
This suggestion concerning the contribution from public finance
poses other questions. How large an amount may be requested from
public finance ? Who will provide the supplementary guarantee : the
state that grants the license or a specially created international
fund ? How will this public guarantee operate ? Will the victim
have to bring direct action , or will the state guarantee to the oper
ator the reimbursement of a sum exceeding his commercial financing
capabilities ? It is obvious from the answer to the last question that
the maximum to be established by the Convention will vary consid
erably, from $15 million maximum for private responsibility and
from a possible $100 million to $150 million for a state guarantee.
The CMI was of the opinion that it was not appropriate for a
nongovernmental organization to settle these questions and that they
should be answered by the governments concerned . Since govern
ments are not represented in the CMI, the maximum amount of in
demnity was left blank, to be filled out by the Diplomatic Confer

ence . It was generally recognized, however, that the continuing
uncertainty with regard to amount and, even more, the division be
tween the private and the public guarantee are annoying questions
because their resolution may have repercussions on other more or
less secondary matters.
Among the problems of secondary nature, the one involving the
simultaneous participation of several nuclear ships in causing nu
clear damage is closely related to the problem of a maximum guar
antee. The Conference wisely distinguished between two similar
but different possibilities as follows:
The first possibility is that in which damages are caused by ser
eral nuclear accidents involving the responsibility of several opera
tors. In this case the CMI Convention provides that each one is
responsible within the limits established by the Convention . The
logic of this provision may be explained in this way : since the
maximum is set per accident, there obviously will be an accumulation
of maximums, but, since it might be impossible to determine which
part of the total damage was caused by each accident, all operators
are declared jointly responsible to all the victims, and the total
amount of indemnities granted eventually will have to be borne
equally by the various operators.
The second possibility deals with the situation where an indemnity
claim is filed against several operators as the result of only one nu
clear accident. A practical example is provided by a collision be
tween two nuclear ships, resulting in nuclear damage caused by both
reactors. It was first decided that in an accident of this kind there
would be no cumulation of guarantees. This decision was based on
the principle that insurance is provided and the maximum is estab
lished per accident and not per ship or reactor. However, the
drafting committee preparing the test provided that in a case where
the part of damages to be attributed to each operator cannot be
determined they shall all be jointly responsible, each one up to the
maximum amount.
Although the final legislation resulting from the deliberations at
the Rijeka Conference will need modification, the basic principles
underlying indemnity and liability seem to have been established
and on the whole have been generally approved .
9-4 CONFERENCES WITH FOREIGN NATIONS COVERING

N.S. SAVANNAH OPERATIONS
The formulation of international legislation relating to the opera

tion of nuclear -powered merchant vessels will involve a considerable
INTERNATIONAL ASPECTS OF NTCLEAR SHIP PROPI'LSION 355
period of time, and such legislation will not have been enacted by
the time the Surinnah is ready for commercial service. For this
reason a number of informal and formal discussions have taken
: place between representatives of the United States and other coun
tries to make possible visits by the Sarannah to foreign ports. An
agreement has been drawn up between the l'nited Kingdom and the
United States setting forth , in general terms, the conditions and
broad procedures under which the Savannah may be expected to
operate in United Kingdom waters.
In addition to the rather detailed negotiations with Great Britain ,
a task group from the United States visited Belgium , the Nether
lands, Denmark , Norway, Sweden, and France from Sept. 1 to Sept.
17, 1959 , to discuss with those countries the question of acceptance
of the Savannah into their ports. These discussions were of an in
formal nature and were intended to elicit the attitudes of the various
countries toward the acceptance of the Sarannah. No commitments
were made, and no commitments were sought. During the course of
each of the meetings held with foreign representatives, the task
group, representing the joint AEC - Maritime Administration group
on legal and administrative questions, presented a brief history of
the Savannah project and outlined in some detail the considerable
amount of work that had been done in the field of hazards analysis.
The task group indicated that it hoped to obtain on an informal
basis information on a number of questions during the course of
its visit .
As a consequence of these discussions, the task group reached cer
tain generally applicable conclusions that, without reference to
specific countries or slight variations in points of view , can be sum
marized as follows :
A government-to -government acceptance agreement will be neces
sary in the case of each country visited . Such an agreement can be
in the form of an exchange of notes between the U.S. State Depart
ment and the appropriate foreign office and would set forth , in most
cases, understandings on the following significant matters : ( 1 ) in
demnification and the application of the conventional shipowner's
limit of liability ; ( 2 ) purpose and use of the Sarannah's safety
assessment ; ( 3 ) port-entry certificates and rights of inspection ; ( 4 )
licensing requirements or other central-government authorizations
required for nonroutine servicing; ( 5 ) ownership of special nuclear
material; ( 6 ) responsibility for radiological control in harbors ; ( 7 )
4
responsibility and requirements of local port authorities; ( 8 ) ports
to be visited initially; ( 9 ) rights of accepting government to infor
mation on the Sarannah and rights of official and general-public
access ; ( 10) in general terms, the procedures to be followed and the
responsibilities of the United States and the respective foreign gor

ernment in the event of a nuclear accident.
Indemnification and shipowner's limitation of liability present the
most difficult problems. The initial reaction of each country visited
was that the United States should indemnify against third -party
liability arising from a nuclear incident involving the Sarannah
without regard to the conventional shipowner's limitation of liability
and that such indemnification should be effected upon proof that
damage or injury was caused by the nuclear incident with no re
quirement of establishing fault or negligence. The Price - Anderson
legislation indemnifies persons who are held legally liable for public
injury arising out of a nuclear incident involving the Savannah ; it
does not determine the theory upon which persons may be found
liable, nor does it preclude such persons from asserting all available
defenses, such as the conventional shipowner's limitation of liability.
The concern of the countries visited stems from the fact that OEEC
and Euratom considerations of the third -party liability question as
it relates to land -based reactors has been along lines of channeling
liability to the reactor operator and holding him absolutely liable
up to a specified limit. This approach was felt to be far more satis
factory than the Price - Anderson method .
It is thought that the proposed Savannah safety assessment would
provide sufficient information to serve as the basis for an evaluation
of the ship by appropriate central - government regulatory bodies.
Reviewing officials reserved the right, however, to request clarifying
information , if necessary .
Some form of entry certificate that would set forth the results of
inspection by reactor and public health specialists prior to harbor
entry is desired by all countries on the initial visit. Foreign repre
sentatives felt that a ship inspection could be performed expedi
tiously and that it should include a verification check to see that
the vessel had operated in accordance with the conditions set forth
in the safety assessment.
A central- government authorization or license will be required for
any repair work on the Savannah which involves a potential nu
clear hazard.
In those countries not a party to the Euratom Treaty , there is no
problem concerning the United States retaining title to special nu
clear material used in connection with the operation of the Saran
mah , but the exchange of notes with these countries should contain
recognition of the United States ownership. The question was raised
by Euratom representatives as to the application of the ownership
features of the Euratom Treaty to the special nuclear material on
board the Savannah when it sails into territorial waters of Euratom
countries; this question will have to be clarified in the acceptance

agreements with those countries.
Radiological control in port will be a joint responsibility of the
national regulatory authorities and the Master of the Savannah.
The task group felt that, although there are a number of signifi
cant points to be negotiated in the acceptance agreements, with the
exception of the indemnity and limit-of-liability points and possibly
the question of ownership of special nuclear material under the
Euratom Treaty, there does not appear to be any demand or desire
on the part of the countries visited which could not reasonably be
negotiated and essentially satisfied .
The third -party liability presents two questions for examination :
What position can the United States take within the limits of its
existing legislative authority ? How firm are the views expressed
by the countries visited ? The first question is being explored, and,
when a position has been reached , the second question will be ex
plored in further discussions. Unquestionably, the third - party lia
bility provisions must be uniform for all countries with which agree
ments are made.
9-5 UNITED STATES - UNITED KINGDOM NEGOTIATIONS ON

N.S. SAVANNAH OPERATIONS
When the initial operations of the Savannah were being planned,

from the beginning it was the desire of the United States that after
visiting ports in the United States the ship's first visit to a foreign
nation would be to Great Britain . Because of this desire a number
of informal and formal discussions took place between the two coun
tries, and, as mentioned previously, an agreement has been drawn up
setting forth the conditions under which the Savannah may be ex
pected to operate in British ports. Indeed , it is hoped that the
United States -United Kingdom agreement on the acceptance of the
Savannah may serve as a model in further negotiations with other
nations, leading in each case , to a bilateral agreement. This pro
cedure seemed to be the only practical way of negotiating for the
operation of the Savannah in the absence of any multilateral agree
ment drawn up under the auspices of an international body, al
though it is felt that in due course such an agreement will super
sede bilateral agreements.
After the Savannah has undergone extended tests and sea trials,
she will make extended voyages to various U.S. ports. Following
this period of operation, which probably will cover a period of some
what less than a year, it is expected that the ship will make its first
visit to a British port. A number of meetings were held during
1958 and 1959 bet ween representatives of the United States and the
United Kingdom in an effort to work out the details of an agree
ment covering this initial period of foreign operation .
In preliminary discussions the British insisted that, as a condition
to the operation of the Savannah in United Kingdom waters, the
United States must agree to ( 1 ) consent to be sued in the local
courts of the United Kingdom , ( 2 ) not rely, with respect to claims
for nuclear damage, upon the limitations of shipowner's liability
available under British law or any other law , and ( 3 ) not rely,
with respect to such claims, upon the statute of limitations until
10 years after the date of any nuclear incident involving the
Savannah .
It was quite understandable during these preliminary talks, which
were held in November and December 1959, that there was little
chance of resolving the difficult questions relating to indemnity and
absolute liability without specific executive or legislative action on
the parts of both governments concerned. Despite these difficulties
a draft of an agreement outlining the conditions of operation was
concluded at a joint U.K.-U.S. meeting held in London on Dec. 7
and 8. 1959, but this agreement covers only operation and safety,
not liability and indemnity. Also, the agreement applies only to
the Savannah , not to other nuclear -powered ships.
There were substantial differences between the drafts on operation
and safety submitted by each nation . In general, the United King
dom had retained broad authority both in the central government
and in the port authority in terms of prior approval and emergency
powers. These differences, however, were not too difficult to resolve,
and, by the presentation of alternative language from the United
States position, it was possible to resolve most of the points in ques
tion and to arrive at a joint draft for consideration by both gov
ernments.
On the matter of third - party liability and indemnity five princi
pal problems involved : ( 1 ) absolute liability of the owner without
regard to negligence, ( 2 ) channeling of liability to owner, ( 3 ) ex
tension of the statute of limitation to 10 years rather than the usual
2 or 3 years available under United Kingdom maritime law, ( 4 )
United States agreement not to plead sovereign immunity, and ( 5 )
United States agreement not to take advantage of the shipowner's
limitation of liability.
No general agreement was reached on these five items in the De
cember 1959 negotiations, but it was agreed that each side would
proceed immediately to get clear authority on the five matters.
The spirit of the agreement relating to operation and safety of
the Savannah is evident from the preamble, which reads as follows :
“ The Governments of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and

Northern Ireland and the United States of America ( being Con
tracting Parties to the International Convention for the Safety of
Life at Sea 1948 ) hoping that an international multilateral agree
ment relating to the operation of nuclear-powered merchant ships
may be concluded at an appropriate time; desiring, in the spirit of
cooperation characterized in their existing agreement for coopera
tion in the peaceful uses of atomic energy, to conclude an agree
ment for the purpose of establishing conditions in which the
United States nuclear -powered ship Savannah may in the mean
time use ports in the United Kingdom and in United Kingdom
territories; recognizing that as operational experience is acquired
it should be possible to modify the conditions now established to
conform more closely to those pertaining to conventional merchant
>
ships have agreed as follows : .
This preamble is followed by 20 separate articles specifying the

conditions under which the Savannah may enter British ports. The
agreement applies only to the Savannah and not to other nuclear
powered ships; also the agreement is an interim action , one that
will enable the Savannah to operate in British ports until a more
permanent multilateral agreement is concluded .
Essentially the agreement provides the British authorities with
every means for assuring themselves of the safety of the ship , in
cluding reasonable inspection access to the ship and its operating
records. It ensures that no disposal of radioactive materials, in
cluding wastes, will be made without prior approval of the British
government. The agreement does provide, however, that the United
Kingdom Government would, upon specific request, accept radio
active waste removed from the Savannah, provided all such wastes
have been packaged in accordance with United Kingdom procedures.
Although radiological control on the Savannah and environmental
monitoring will be the responsibility of the Master of the Savannah ,
the British Government and port authorities concerned have the
right to undertake such radiological monitoring on the ship as may
be considered necessary. No structural repair work and no other
work that might give rise to a nuclear incident ( including fueling
and defueling) would be undertaken within United Kingdom ports
without the express sanction of the United Kingdom Government.
In the case of any accident to the ship or other incident that
might affect the safety of persons in the United Kingdom or its
protectorates, it becomes incumbent upon the Master of the Savan
nah to immediately inform both the Government of the United
Kingdom and the port authorities and to consult with them on the
action to be taken .
613489 0-6224
In the event any general multilateral convention relating to nu

clear -powered merchant ships to which both contracting parties are
bound is concluded, the present agreement is to be amended to con
form with the provisions of such convention or , failing agreement
to amend, the present agreement " shall be terminated within 90 days
provided either party finds the agreement in conflict with conven
tion terms.">
9-6 ACTION BY OTHER INTERNATIONAL BODIES
In addition to the meetings between the United States and the

United Kingdom and the conferences of the OEEC. Euratom ,
IAEA , and CMI, the international Union of Marine Insurance has
also held conferences at which the operation of nuclear-powered
merchant ships was considered . At a meeting in London on Sept.
13 to 17, 1959, the subject of nuclear fission and marine insurance
was a topic of considerable interest and discussion . A special study
group appeared to agree that underwriters already can and should
cover loss or damage to nuclear cargos, loss or damage to conven
tional cargos through a nuclear accident or radioactivity, and lia
bility to the cargo owner provided there is a limit of liability not
greater than £5 million ( $ 14 million ) or its equivalent and a time
limit of not more than 10 years for bringing claims. It was recog
nized at this meeting, however, that the greatest problem is that of
providing insurance in adequate amounts, amounts that would re
quire going far beyond any combination of hull protection and in
demnity insurance heretofore known in the marine field. It was
pointed out that marine underwriters could not make final plans for
the insurance of nuclear - powered vessels until they knew what re
quirements were adopted by international convention , specifically,
the treaties and conventions being drafted by the OEEC, Euratom ,
IAEA , and CMI. It was felt that the draft treaty considered that
same month by the CMI at Rijeka, Yugoslavia, dealt adequately
with these matters ; it would place absolute and exclusive liability
on the operator of a nuclear -powered vessel for all nuclear damage
emanating from its reactor, nuclear fuel, or radioactive wastes.
Thus the builder, designer, etc., as well as the owner of a nonnuclear
ship that collides with a nuclear ship, would be protected.
In view of the complexity of the legal aspects of nuclear ship
operation as presented in this chapter, it is obvious that there can
be no easy or quick solution to the problems that arise in this field.
As far as the safety and operation of nuclear-powered ships is con
cerned , there is little reason to suppose that agreements acceptable
to all maritime nations cannot be reached . The problems of in
demnity and limitation of liability, however, are far more difficult
to resolve, and their ultimate resolution will require national legis

lation on the part of the countries concerned. In the meantime, the
bilateral agreement between the United States and the United King
dom with respect to the operation of the Savannah will undoubtedly
have a substantial influence upon the actions taken by other nations
in this new area of marine operation.
REFERENCES
1. CLIFFORD G. CORNWELL, Marine Insurance for Nuclear-powered Merchant

Vessels, in Nuclear - powered Ships for American Ship Operators : A Sym
posium held at Washington , D.C., July 30, 1957, USAEC Report TID - 7539,
pp. 51-56, September 1957.
2. C.S. Atomic ENERGY COMMISSION , Atomic Industrial Progress and Second
World Conference, Twenty -fifth Semiannual Report to Congress, July
December 1958, pp . 53–56.
3. U.S. ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION, AEC Report on Indemnity Act and Ad
visory Committee on Reactor Safeguards to Joint Committee on Atomic
Energy, Congress of the United States, April 1959.
4. Paul CHAUVEAU, Atomic Ships at the Rijeka Conference, La Semaine Jurri
dique ( Paris ), No. 46 (Nov. 11, 1959 ).
Chapter 10
SUITABILITY OF DIFFERENT REACTOR TYPES
Since the idea of operating merchant vessels by means of nuclear

power was first proposed , various types of nuclear reactors have
been considered from the standpoint of their technical and economic
feasibility .
There are currently only two nonmilitary nuclear- powered ships
in existence, the N.S. Savannah in the United States and the ice
breaker Lenin in Russia. The Lenin is not typical of cargo vessels
since its structure incorporates features not necessary nor desirable
in cargo ships. The Savannah, although built as a passenger - cargo
ship, should not be regarded as typical with respect to costs because
it is the first of its kind and since it has been built as a demonstra
tion ship its design may be overconservative. Both the Lenin and
the Savannah use the pressurized -water reactor, which has proved
so successful in naval submarines.
Other countries have also made extensive studies of the possible
application of nuclear power to commercial ships. The design
studies listed in Table 1.1 , Chap. 1 , cover proposed applications as
well as proposed reactor types. The nuclear- powered commercial
ship programs of other nations are discussed in Chap. 13 .
10-1 TECHNICAL FEASIBILITY VS. ECONOMICS
10-1.1 General
In any determination of the suitability of various nuclear re

actors for shipboard application, it is virtually impossible to sepa
rate the factors of technical or practical feasibility from economic
considerations. For example, as far as the practical feasibility of
the pressurized -water reactor is concerned , naval submarines have
demonstrated its successful application in ship propulsion. How
ever, naval submarines are not commercial vessels, and it has not
been demonstrated that the pressurized -water reactor is economically
practical for commercial ships, the question of economies being far
more important with respect to commercial vessels than it is for
naval vessels. It is possible that the boiling water reactor or the
organic -moderated reactor may eventually prove superior for this
class of ship.
363
Present technology and cost data for nuclear systems for ship
board installation are quite limited, and, aside from a number of
design studies, little information is available to permit detailed com
parison between specific reactor types or between nuclear -powered
and conventionally powered commercial ships. By far the most
analytical study of the economics of nuclear propulsion that has
been made is the study made by the Atomic Energy Division of
American Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corp. In this study four
different types of reactors were studied over various ranges of size,
application , and trade routes ; economic predictions were made as of
1957, 1965 , and 1970. The analysis covered some 30,000 different
combinations. The economic conclusions of this study with respect
to nuclear ships are presented in Chap. 11 , and the details involved
in the comparison of the different reactor types are discussed in
Sec. 10–2 of this chapter. A general discussion of the study follows.
It must be understood, however, that this study was made in 1957
and 1958. Additional studies are being conducted by various organi
zations, but results were not available in time for inclusion in this
book.
The four different reactor types considered were the pressurized
water reactor, the boiling water reactor, the gas -cooled reactor , and
the organic -moderated reactor. Figures 10.1 to 10.4 indicate the
general shielding and containment arrangements for these four types
as might be used aboard ship. The diagrams indicate that the basic
design philosophy employed for all the reactor installations is the
same except for the organic-moderated reactor. This ultilizes a low
LEAD
LEAD
STEEL
LEAD THERMAL
INSULATION
1/8" BORAL
3 " THERMAL 12" WATER
INSULATION
THERMAL SHIELD -6" POLYETHYLENENLEAD
10 " STEEL
THERMAL
INSULATION
LEAD PRESSURE VESSEL
6 " WATER 1/8 " BORAL

STEEL 1/8 " BORAL
2 " STEEL
FLOOR PLATE OIL STORAGE
-2" STEEL HULL PLATE
FIG . 10.1 - Shielding and containment arrangement for the pressurized-water

reactor for shipboard installation.
SUITABILITY OF DIFFERENT REACTOR TYPES 365
LEAD
‫ܐܐܐܐܬ‬
LEAD
1/8 " BORAL

THERMAL INSULATION
12 " WATER
LEAD
6 " POLYETHYLENE
THERMAL
LEAD
SHIELD
4 " STEEL
1/8 " BORAL

THERMAL
INSULATION
-1/8 " BORAL THERMAL INSULATION
LEAD
2 " STEEL HULL AND

OIL STORAGE FLOOR PLATES
Fig. 10.2 — Shielding and containment arrangement for the boiling-water reactor
for shipboard installation.
LEAD THERMAL INSULATION
6 " STEEL
17 3/4 " WATER
1/8 " BORAL
THERMAL LEAD
INSULATION
6 " POLYETHYLENE
4 " STEEL
1/8 " BORAL

THERMAL
SHIELD THERMAL INSULATION
LEAN
1/8 " BORAL

LEAD
6 " POLYETHYLENE
2" STEEL HULL AND OIL STORAGE
FLOOR PLATES
Fig. 10.3 — Shielding and containment arrangement for the organic -moderated
reactor for shipboard installation .
6 " WATER
2 " STEEL
1/8 " BORAL
20 " WATER
THERMAL INSULATION
20 " WATER
STEEL THERMAL
INSULATION
THERMAL
SHIELD
-1/8" BORAL
LEAD
4 " STEEL
6 " WATER
1 " STEEL
15 " WATER
1/8 " BORAL
LEAD
3 " STEEL
2 " STEEL HULL OIL STORAGE

AND FLOOR
PLATES
Fig. 10.4 — Shielding and containment arrangement for the gas-cooled reactor
for shipboard installation.
pressure system and therefore does not require the same degree of
containment for the possible energy release resulting from a reactor
coolant-system rupture as that which must be provided for the
other three types .
In this study, reactor vessel and core requirements were deter
mined at a number of different power ratings, ranging from 10 to
200 Mw ( thermal). All reactor -system auxiliary equipment was
sized with respect to the different plant power ratings, and costs
were estimated for this auxiliary equipment, which included reactor
instrumentation , control rods, water- purification systems, reactor
coolant pumps, steam generators, piping and valves, and other equip
ment directly associated with the reactor. After the equipment
costs had been determined, installation costs were estimated and
added to the totals. Actual estimated labor costs were used rather
than a percentage of the total costs. Engineering costs were then
added to the material and labor costs .
Figure 10.5 shows the total construction cost for the entire nuclear
plant of each type analyzed in the project compared with that of
the conventional power plant as installed in an ore carrier in 1957.
As indicated by a comparison of these curves, the nuclear power
plant with the least expensive propulsion system is the organic
moderated reactor . The most expensive plant is the gas-cooled re
actor system , which, according to the estimates, costs approximately
25
,MILLIONS
20
DOLLARS
COST
GCR
OF
PWR
BWR
OMR
CONVENTIONAL
5
0 11 11 1
0 10 20 30 40 50 60
NOR MAL SHP/ 1000
Fig. 10.5 — Construction cost of reactor and machinery .
percent more than an organic-moderated unit of the same power

rating. Between these two extremes are the boiling water reactor
plant, with its direct- cycle steam turbine ( approximately 15 percent
more expensive than the organic -moderated system ), and the pres
surized -water reactor plant, with its indirect-cycle steam turbine
(approximately 20 percent more expensive than the organic-mod
erated system ) . It should be recognized , however, that the cost
estimates for the gas-cooled and organic -moderated systems are not
as accurate as those for the boiling water and pressurized -water
systems since the former systems represent future promising con
cepts about which little is known ; whereas the latter are currently
developed and operational.
The cost analyses made in this study assumed that more than one
ship with a given reactor type would be built ; that is, the engineer
ing costs reflect only the effect of recurring engineering on a multiple
plant design . This assumption has a significant effect on the costs
results. As an example, the absolute values of various pieces of
equipment are lower than they would be if based on the design and
installation of a single unit. A manufacturer of pressure vessels
may quote a relatively high figure for the first containment vessel
in order to write off his development cost and to include contingen
cies that are larger than usual. If a number of these units are con
structed, however, it is expected that the unit cost would be ma
terially reduced.
Research and development ( i.e. , the effort that must be espended

to obtain information needed before a detailed design of a nuclear
reactor can proceed ) costs were not included in the cost of the nu
clear systems involved in the study. Research and development in
formation includes heat-transfer characteristics, the fuel elements.
fluid- flow problems, nuclear physics data , and evaluation of reactor
materials for use in the reactor systems.
Since pressurized -water and boiling -water reactors are currently
operating in land -based power plants, a minimum of development
would be required to introduce them into merchant-ship propulsion
systems. The Maritime Nuclear Propulsion Program is closely re
lated to the AEC's Civilian Power Reactor Development Program .
and the very extensive development program that the AEC has in
connection with nuclear power central stations will have a direct
bearing on nuclear progress in the maritime field .
The five - year Civilian Power Reactor Development Program has
begun to bear fruit. The period of pessimism as to the possibility
of reaching early competitive nuclear power is giving way to a more
realistic appraisal of all the problems involved, and it is now gen
erally conceded that competitive nuclear power can be achieved, at
least in certain high - fuel- cost areas of the United States, within the
present decade; indeed, many feel confident that it will be achieved
within five years. As pointed out by the Chairman of the Atomie
Energy Commission in his testimony on the nuclear propulsion pro
gram before a Congressional hearing in February 1959 : " A nuclear
ship can carry more cargo than a conventional ship , and, therefore.
has a credit which is not available to the central station power appli
cation of nuclear energy. That, in my opinion and in the opinion
of the Commission , is a very important point because, in cargo ships
and most particularly in tankers, we are always obliged to shut out
cargo to make room for fuel and that is not a necessity in the case
of a nuclear -powered ship .”
Since much of the practical experience in the design, construction,
and operation of nuclear power plants under the Power Reactor
Development Program has been related to pressurized-water and
boiling -water reactors, it is obvious that the cost estimates for the
application of these plants aboard ships would be more accurate
than those for types that have not yet been developed. The organie
moderated and gas-cooled reactors require considerably more devel
opment effort than the two water-moderated reactors. In the case
of the gas-cooled reactor, a substantial amount of technology exists
for low -pressure systems; England's nuclear power program is basedis
primarily on the low - pressure gas-cooled reactor. Development
required, however, for the high - pressure system used in a closed.
cycle gas-turbine arrangement. Major research and development

effort will be required to bring the organic -moderated and gas-cooled
reactor system to a state of development assumed in present cost
estimates. The hydrodynamic, thermodynamic, mechanical, and nu
clear properties of the reactors must be determined with much
greater accuracy than the present state of technology provides.
10-1.2 Variation in Capital Cost with Reactor Types ✓
Each type reactor now being seriously studied has potential ad
rantages and disadvantages as compared with other types. Some
factors, safety, for example, cannot be evaluated by the estimated
cost of nuclear power. Of considerable value in estimating nuclear
plant and power costs for commercial nuclear ships is the recent
report of the AEC on the costs of nuclear power. Although this
report is concerned with the costs of land -based plants, many of the
factors discussed apply to nuclear power systems for shipboard use .
As indicated in the AEC report, although capital cost is a very im
portant item in the total cost of nuclear power, it is, however, only
one item ; lower capital cost may be offset by higher fuel or oper
ating costs.
Knowledge and experience to date do not enable firm , quantitative
statements to be made, but the following discussion indicates in a
qualitative way some factors that are important in determining
relative capital costs .
Water -cooled and -moderated reactors can draw on a large amount
of engineering and operating experience with equipment handling
water and steam under a wide range of temperatures and pressures.
Several pressurized light-water reactors, military and civilian, have
been operated , and this reactor is now known to be feasible. Much
of the experience gained can be applied directly to pressurized
heavy -water reactors as well . Therefore, costs of research and de
velopment of new units may be reduced. The high heat-carrying
capacity of liquid water permits the attainment of high power
densities. However, existing pressurized -water reactors produce
steam of substantially lower temperatures and have lower thermal
efficiencies and higher turbine costs than do conventional thermal
plants of modern design . The high pressures required to produce
satisfactory steam conditions in the nuclear system would increase
the size of and hence the costs of the pressure vessel and associated
equipment and would limit the size and power level of reactors.
These limitations of pressurized -water reactors, however, are of less
importance in plants for shipboard installation , first , because the
power rating of shipboard plants is usually considerably lower than
that of large central stations and, second , because steam pressures

and temperatures in conventional ship propulsion plants also are
somewhat lower than those prevailing in the most modern central
stations. It would, however, be desirable to use higher pressures
and temperatures for nuclear ship propulsion than those currently
obtainable from the pressurized -water reactor.
The limitations concerning temperature and pressure can be
avoided by the use of the pressure-tube design described in Chap. 3 .
This design will be tried out in the reactor of the Carolinas - Virginia
Nuclear Power Associates, Inc., at Parr, S.C., and in the NPD-2 in
Canada, both of which are small heavy -water reactors . Nuclear or
fossil - fuel superheat could raise the temperature of the steam and
improve the thermal efficiency. The Indian Point Station of the
Consolidated Edison Co. of New York and the Carolinas - Virginia
plant will use oil-burning superheaters for this purpose . Such fossil
fuel- fired superheaters would not be feasible aboard ship since it
would defeat the very purpose for which nuclear power is being
applied in maritime plants, i.e., to eliminate the need for carrying
large amounts of fossil fuel aboard ship and to provide a greatly
extended range of travel. Therefore, if superheated steam is to be
obtained from nuclear plants aboard ship, it will have to be pro
duced in nuclear superheaters. At least one integral nuclear super
heat reactor for commercial use is being built, that for the Path
finder Station of the Northern States Power Company near Sioux
Falls, S.Dak . This, however, is a boiling -water reactor system , not
a pressurized -water system .
Heavy water provides considerably better neutron economy than
light water. However, the volume of moderator required is generally
greater for heavy water than for light water ; so the size of the
reactor and its capital costs are increased. In addition, the heavy
water inventory for a large reactor moderated and cooled with heart
water may be in the neighborhood of $15 to $75 per kilowatt .
Finally, precautions taken to reduce losses of heavy water during
operation tend to increase plant construction costs. All these con
siderations apply to marine nuclear power plants as well as to land
based plants.
Boiling water reactors using light water have been demonstrated
in small sizes, and the new Dresden Station of the Commonwealth
Edison Co. near Chicago, which was formally dedicated on Oct. 19.
1960 , is a 180,000 -kw ( electric) boiling water plant. Boiling water
reactors have the advantage of operating at a much lower pressure !
than pressurized -water reactors while producing steam of the same
or higher temperature. For certain designs the presence of vapor
bubbles in the coolant -moderator may serve as an automatic safety
feature in that the bubbles represent an absence of moderator and

thus reduce reactivity. The use of natural convection in boiling
water reactors reduces the costs of pumps for coolant circulation .
Boiling heavy -water reactors, because of a much more rapid decrease
in reactivity with percentage of steam in the moderator, may re
quire forced circulation ; some of the designs currently under con
sideration are of this type. The elimination of the steam generator
between the reactor and the turbine reduces capital costs but places
a more severe requirement on fuel-element integrity to prevent
severe radioactive contamination of the turbine by steam flowing
directly from the reactor. In actual practice, however, as demon
strated by the experience at the EBWR and at Vallecitos in Cali
fornia, the severity of such radioactive contamination is far less
than expected because of the great reduction in radioactivity at the
interface between the water in the reactor and the steam immediately
above it . Boiling-water reactors appear to be more readily adaptable
than the pressurized -water reactors to nuclear superheating, and , as
already mentioned, the Pathfinder Station of Northern States Power
Co. will provide for nuclear superheating by recirculating the steam
through a central superheater section of the reactor.
The advantage of organic-cooled reactors is that they can operate
at pressures of one- eighth to one-tenth of those for boiling-water
reactors, while producing steam at the turbine of about the same
temperature and quality. The radioactivity induced in the coolant
is low ; so use can be made of ordinary carbon steels and some items
of conventional equipment. However, decomposition products may
cause fouling of the fuel elements and other heat-transfer surfaces,
making it necessary to provide continuous bypass coolant purification
systems to remove decomposition products. Also, about 1 lb of
highly radioactive wax from coolant decomposition per megawatt
day of operation is produced. For a ship the size of the Savannah,
this would amount to 1 ton per month that would have to be disposed
of. The heat-transfer properties of organic materials are inferior
to those of water ; so the heat exchangers will be larger than those
for water reactors. Also, the specific power and the power density
of organic reactors are lower than for light-water reactors, resulting
in larger fuel inventories and larger reactor cores. However, the
lower cost of structural materials and equipment may more than
balance the higher cost resulting from the greater size of the core ,
compared with water reactors . Additional considerations enter
into the total cost of power, such as the cost of make-up of organic
material on the one hand and the savings in the cost of fuel- element
fabrication on the other hand.
Sodium -cooled reactors operating at relatively low pressures can
generate steam of temperature and quality comparable with the
steam conditions in modern fossil- fuel plants. Steam at 1,000 ° F

was actually produced at the Sodium Reactor Experiment ( SRE )
at Santa Sussana on May 22, 1959. This reactor operating at 6.9 Mw
(thermal) maintained an average temperature of 900°F for eight
days. The heat-removal characteristics of sodium are excellent, per
mitting high specific powers. Sodium has disadvantages in that it
reacts violently with water, and this imposes rigid requirements on
the design of leak - proof systems, which add to the capital costs.
Its high induced radioactivity also makes necessary heavy shielding
of the entire primary -coolant loop. Unless sodium is kept free of
oxygen , corrosion may be severe . Although many relatively inexpen
sive structural materials are resistant to corrosion by sodium , the pres
ent lack of large-scale commercial experience with sodium as a coolant !
means that development costs for special equipment will result in
increased manufacturing costs. Sodium is not readily compatible
with good moderators. If graphite is used, the graphite may have
to be canned to prevent absorption of sodium ; and, if heavy water
is used , problems of chemical incompatibility will arise. With
respect to the use of sodium -cooled reactors for marine purposes,
it is of interest to note that the only attempt to use sodium on a !
ship was in the U.S.S. Seawolf ; owing to difficulties in the heat
exchangers, the system was later replaced with aa pressurized -water sys
However, this experience did not prove that there was any
thing inherently wrong with the sodium reactor ; the difficulties,
as reported , were in the heat exchangers, not in the reactor. That
sodium can be used successfully as a coolant in a nuclear reactor
is further demonstrated by the operation of the SRE by Atomics
International, at Santa Sussana, Calif. Sodium is also used in the
Fermi fast -breeder reactor being constructed near Monroe, Mich .,
and in the Dounreay fast reactor in the north of Scotland . The
latter unit achieved criticality late in 1959 .

The principal advantage of the sodium -cooled fast - breeder reactor
is in the high breeding gain possible. The high power density of
the core of a fast breeder requires the use of a coolant with the
excellent heat- removal properties of sodium . The disadvantages of
sodium as a coolant in аa fast breeder are the same as discussed
above, except that there is no moderator to pose compatibility prob
lems. As far as is known at present, there is no design to study
under way with the object of using a sodium reactor for marine
propulsion.
Gas-cooled reactors, operating at pressures of one -half to one
fourth of those for boiling water reactors, may permit the genera
tion of superheated steam comparable to that generated in modern
fossil- fuel plants. Poor heat-transfer and heat- carrying properties 1
of gas result in large, and consequently expensive, reactor vessels

and heat exchangers. The reactor vessels are particularly large if
graphite is used as the moderator. Pressure- tube designs using
heavy water as a moderator are considerably smaller. Gas -cooled
graphite -moderated reactors can be designed so that their reactivity
decreases markedly with increasing temperature, thus providing
very important safety factor. Graphite-moderated and, to a greater
extent, heavy -water-moderated reactors can be designed to operate
on natural uranium with a reasonable fuel life before reactivity
limits are reached.
Although the Savannah as the first nuclear-powered merchant ship
will prove the technical feasibility of the application of atomic
power to commercial shipping, it was not contemplated that the
pressurized-water system used on this vessel would crystallize the
application of this particular type reactor to merchant marine serv
ice nor that it would be the most economical to build or operate.
It was believed that experience would be gained in the construction ,
operation, and legal and regulatory areas , and thus it would enable
the introduction of other nuclear ships that would more nearly
approach the economic status of conventional ships. The Depart
ment of Commerce has , therefore, through the Maritime Adminis
tration and in conjunction with the AEC, undertaken engineering
studies for the purpose of closing the gap between the Savannah
and conventional merchant ships.
There is little doubt that, with present knowledge and technology,
any of the more common reactor concepts could be successfully
adapted to the propulsion of merchant vessels. The pressurized
water and boiling-water reactors, for example, would require con
siderably less effort and expenditure than the gas-cooled and organic
moderated reactor concepts , but, technically , the latter two concepts
do not appear to present any insurmountable problems. A com
parison of the suitability of the various reactor types for marine
propulsion, therefore, is essentially one involving costs, both capital
costs and operating costs. An economic comparison of the various
reactor types is a complex and involved proceeding, and the follow
ing discussion of the subject is presented largely to indicate the
nature of the many factors involved ; an exhaustive treatment is
beyond the scope of this book . The procedure outlined here is that
used in the study referred to previously .
10-1.3 Methods of Comparing Reactor Types
In any comparison of the suitability of different reactor types for
merchant ship propulsion, it is, of course , necessary to evaluate them
in terms of common levels of fuel- element cost, heat output, shield
ing weight, auxiliary systems, etc. A specific propulsion system

involving a certain shaft horsepower determines the corresponding
reactor heat output. After the selection of a reference fuel- element
design, an average heat - flux value for the core is calculated , based
upon nominal values for the type reactor under consideration.
From this information the core size and internal arrangement are
established . After these parameters have been evaluated , heat-trans
fer, reactor-physics, shielding, and capital-cost calculations can be
made. A range of operating characteristics and conditions is then
selected which yields the best combination in terms of maximum
performance and minimum cost . From this work a cost estimate
can be made for each of the components in each power plant, in
cluding the following items:
( 1 ) Reactor pressure vessel; ( 2 ) heat exchangers; ( 3 ) core costs ;
( 4 ) pumps, piping, and valves ; ( 5 ) control rods and drive systems;
( 6 ) instrumentation ; ( 7 ) shielding and containment ; ( 8 ) turbines
and propulsion machinery ; ( 9 ) shipboard-installation costs ; and
( 10 ) miscellaneous equipment.
Weights are then tabulated for major system components, and
cost curves are prepared. Operating costs are also determined for
each reactor system . Fuel costs are based on inventory, processing,
enrichment, refabrication, core loading, and plutonium credit. A
comparison of each reactor type can then be made.
( a ) Reactor Core Design. After the basic fuel material and the
geometrical arrangement of the core have been chosen, a number of
design parameters have to be established. These include power
density (heat energy per unit volume), average heat flux , moderator
to - fuel ratio, and several specific geometrical factors, for example,
the size of individual fuel elements. Some limitations have to be
imposed on core performance before these can be established . For
example, fuel element size must be chosen so that at operating tem
perature the temperature at the center of the element does not ex
ceed the melting point of the fuel material.
The design limits of major importance fall into two categories:
heat-transfer and nuclear. The major heat -transfer limits are fuel
melting, burn -out ( e.g., where two-phase flow exists ) , corrosion , and
structural strength vs. temperature. The major nuclear factors are
enrichment, reactivity, control, and neutron - flux distribution . A
major factor associated with both is the power distribution through
out the core .
The design of a specifie core by a competent nuclear design en
gineer with experience in the field will involve the use of a large
number of factors that have already been reiterated through his
design system many times in order to optimize the many variables.
The design of a specific core by engineers who did not possess such
a background of experience would require arbitrary assumptions of
certain design goals followed by a series of successive approxima
tions to optimize the variables.
Fuel enrichment is a factor that requires careful consideration in
the design of a reactor since the enrichment represents a compromise
between minimum capital costs (which would result from smaller
cores if fully enriched uranium were used ) and minimum fuel cycle
costs (which would result if low enrichment were used ). Safety
characteristics of some reactors also favor a low -enrichment core ,
and, since the permanent and world-wide availability of fully en
riched uranium is not assured for merchant -ship reactors, low -en
riched - fuel reactor types are most favorable for propulsion systems
at the present time. All light-water- and organic -moderated reactors
require some enrichment , but heavy -water -moderated and graphite
moderated gas-cooled reactors can operate with natural uranium .
( b ) Physics, Heat Transfer, Shielding, and Other Factors. Many
factors other than those already considered enter into the economic
comparison of different reactor types. Some of these involve com
plex nuclear and thermal problems that will not be discussed here.
The nature of some of the more important considerations will be
indicated, however. With respect to reactor physics, for example,
in the economic study under consideration , it was necessary at the
outset to assume that criticality would be maintained by an ideal
burnable poison so that the various reactors could be considered to
operate with all control rods withdrawn . Also , it was assumed that
the neutron flux would be constant with respect to its radial distri
bution and as a cosine curve axially, neither component becoming
distorted with time. These assumptions, while very restrictive, were
deemed necessary to obviate the calculation of critical rod positions
throughout the life of the core and isotopic changes in three dimen
sions.
In the boiling water reactors, the coolant density varies over the
core length , and the flux shape is consequently skewed from the
cosine. It was not possible to account properly for these features,
and boiling-water reactors were therefore treated as being homogene
ous with the average coolant density reduced to correspond to 10
percent steam by volume. This approximation , while certainly in
troducing significant error, was not considered to be of serious
importance.
Similar assumptions are necessary with respect to heat flux in
comparing reactors. The rate of heat generation in a reactor is pro
portional to the thermal -neutron flux . For this study the heat flux
was assumed to follow the thermal-neutron - flux distribution . In the
613489 0-62 -25
HEAT FLUX
EQUIVALENT
CORE
LENGTH
ACTIVE CORE LENGTH
FUEL ELEMENT
Fig. 10.6 — Assumed axial heat- flux pattern used in comparing reactor types.
axial direction, this heat- flux pattern is aa " chopped cosine, " as illus
trated in Fig. 10.6 . The cosine distribution does not apply in the case
of the boiling -water reactor, but it can be used as a first step in
obtaining an approximation of the actual distribution .
The radial distribution is assumed to be flat . In practice, a flat
radial flux would be achieved by the use of a burnable poison in the
fuel elements or by control - rod programming.
It is obvious that the shielding requirements for different reactor
types might differ considerably, but it can be assumed that the shield
ing arrangement and basis for design for a specific reactor type is
the same for all ship types. It should be recognized that on ships
carrying passengers the radiation tolerance in areas to which pas
sengers have access must be no greater than 0.5 rem /year. Current
design criteria , however, allow a maximum radiation level of 5 rem
year in the crew's quarters.
For a calculation of the radiation level in the crew's quarters, it
can be assumed that the radiation intensity varies inversely as the
square of the distance from the outer shield . In general, the crew's
quarters will be at least 25 ft from the shield , and on this basis, if
the radiation level at the surface of the outer shield is 5.36 mrem /hr,
the radiation level at the crew's quarter will be no greater than
5 rem/year.
For the pressurized -water and the organic-moderated systems, the
equipment associated with the primary coolant is confined within the
containment vessel or machinery compartment. Shielding of this
equipment is included in the compartment shield . For boiling water
reactors, however, equipment associated with the primary coolant and
steam system is installed outside the containment vessel. If the
dosage rate in the machinery room is to be reduced to a level equiva
lent to pressurized -water and organic -moderated systems, additional
shielding must be installed around this equipment. In the economic
study this shielding was assumed to be installed 6 in. from the equip
ment, and the dose rate was assumed not to exceed 8 mrem /hr at the
surface of the shield .
For the gas -cooled reactor, helium was assumed as the reactor
coolant , with continuous purification of gas during operation. Calcu
lations performed by General Motors 3 indicate that after one year
of reactor operation the radiation level from a point source of the
coolant will be approximately 0.5 mr/hr 15 ft from the source. As
a result of this low radiation level , no shielding was assumed for
the primary coolant piping or other power plant equipment.
Fuel -element fabrication costs, fuel -reprocessing costs, and fuel
conversion (UF6 to UO , or metal) costs make up a large fraction
of the total operating charges assigned to each reactor type. Fuel
fabrication costs vary, but general assumptions can be made for UO2
elements. Fabrication costs of $ 135 per kilogram of uranium today,
$ 100 per kilogram of uranium in 1963–1964 ; and from $ 70 per kilo
gram of uranium in 1965–1966 may be assumed, based upon cylin
drical rods 0.410 in . in diameter. Rods of varying diameter will have
relative costs proportioned to the relative number of feet of tubing
required to contain the same amount of uranium as contained in the
rods 0.140 in . in diameter.
With regard to fuel reprocessing, it is difficult to make accurate
est imates. A variety of fuel elements are reprocessed in the United
States in large- scale plants at Hanford, Wash ; Savannah River,
Ga .; and at Idaho Falls, Idaho. Production experience is limited
to aluminum - clad uranium or uranium -aluminum dispersion elements,
even though much development work is in progress on the processing
of zirconium- and stainless -steel -clad elements . Thus, the only avail
able cost data relate to the large single -purpose government plants.
Data for other types of fuel-reprocessing plants have to be estimated .
If the quantity of a particular element that is to be reprocessed is

large enough, a single- purpose plant can be built. Otherwise a multi
purpose plant, such as proposed by the AEC, would be utilized .
The cost then would be considerably higher because of the greater
investment and the plant clean -up necessary after each run . As in
any chemical plant, unit costs decrease rapidly with increasing plant
size. In the present economic study for the maritime project , a
multipurpose plant was assumed to be most applicable. This assump
tion was based upon consideration of the small quantity to be re
processed in most cases and the possibility that ships will be refueled
at widely separated locations. If at some future time there is a great
amount of one kind of fuel to be reprocessed in a certain area , a
single -purpose plant should be built; unit costs would then decrease .
The 1,000-kg plant proposed by the AEC 4 was used in the economic
study as a basis for fuel-reprocessing costs. As would be expected,
the reprocessing costs varied considerably, depending upon the en
richment of the initial fuel and its depletion in the reactor and upon
the quantity reprocessed per year. For example, in the case of CO2
in tube elements, the fuel having an initial U235 content of 3.6 per
cent and a final content of 3.06 percent after depletion in the reactor,
the cost of reprocessing per ton at the rate of 10 tons per year is
$ 28,700. If, however, this fuel is reprocessed at the rate of 500 tons
per year, the per -ton reprocessing cost is only $17,700. On the other
hand, if the initial U235 content of the fuel is 7.2 percent and the
final content 6.12 percent, the respective reprocessing costs, per ton,
for the 10- and 500 -ton annual quantities are $ 439,100 and $ 27,100.
Final products of the reprocessing operations must be specified in
order to put costs on a comparable basis. The AEC buys plutonium
only as metal buttons and uranium as uranium hexafluoride; whereas
the normal products of a fuel-processing plant are nitrates. The cost
of converting nitrates into the hexafluoride has not been released,
but it is estimated to be $ 1.50 per pound for low enrichments (ap
proximately 1 percent) and $6.00 per pound for 20 percent , increas
ing linearly between these enrichments. These costs should decrease
with quantity, but at present no information is available.
Much more detailed information than is now available is required
to account for all the variables that affect reprocessing costs. How
ever, much operating experience will be necessary before these varia
bles can be evaluated . In estimating future costs, it is assumed that
the main change will be in the quantity of materials reprocessed,
i.e., that larger plants will be used. The assumption is that by 1965
fuel will be reprocessed in a plant three times: larger than presently
assumed . For 1970, a plant eight times larger is assumed. These
changes correspond to a reprocessing cost factor of 0.72 for 1965 and
0.54 for 1970.
( c ) Optimization Procedure. When the four reactor types in

volved in the American Standards 1 economic analysis were com
pared, a general system for each type was first determined by refer
ence to various existing designs for similar reactor systems which
could be adapted to a nuclear ship. The best possible system for
economic shipboard installation was then selected, and an approxi
mate layout sketch was prepared for use in determining containment
vessel physical size requirements, piping runs, and pressure drops.
The term " reactor system ” includes the reactor, its cooling system,
and auxiliaries, specifically excluding propulsion -system equipment.
The reactor system is almost completely located within its contain
ment enclosure.
Five reactor power ratings, ranging from 10 to 200 Mw (t ), were
established as reference power ratings for each reactor type. Cost
curves for the subsequently determined optimum reactor systems were
extrapolated to the minimum required rating of slightly less than
5 Mw (t) and to a maximum of 220 Mw ( t ). Extrapolation beyond
220 Mw ( t) was not considered dependable. This restriction results
in a severe economic penalty for ships requiring reactor capabilities
higher than 220 Mw (t) since multiple units would thus be required ;
whereas with larger individual reactor systems the capital cost per
thermal megawatt drops sharply with increasing size.
The optimum reactor-system coolant conditions and propulsion
system steam conditions were next determined concurrently by ana
lyzing only the variable components at various conditions, primarily
from the standpoint of economics. Usually three sizes were used in
these cycle investigations, 10 and 200 Mw (t) and one intermediate
size. In all cases the estimated costs were determined for those
items that vary with reactor coolant and steam conditions. This, of
necessity, includes the effect of the consequent propulsion -system
cycle coefficiency on reactor-system size, fuel inventory, and variable
fuel sts.
In selecting the over -all power-plant cycle, the reactor
systems investigated (with their respective cycle efficiencies ) were
sized to produce identical net shaft horsepower.
Next , the daily costs or cost differences of all the variable items
were determined. Capital charges for incremental reactor -system
capacity were estimated , based on preliminary reactor-system costs
for the reactor size used in the investigation and the next larger size.
Reactor-system amortization charges were based on a 20- year system
life, at 6 percent interest and zero salvage value. For similar reactor
system types and sizes, varying only in pressure, operating costs are
essentially constant ; consequently such costs were not considered in
the optimization procedure. Variable fuel and fuel- inventory charges
were also approximated from an analysis of each system.
Reactor-system component and total capital costs, variable fuel

cost , and fuel-inventory charge were determined for each reactor
geometry and flux for each of the reactor ratings at the steam and
coolant conditions selected previously. In many cases, piping sizė
and heat-exchanger arrangement were first optimized for each of the
reference ratings by considering the costs of such equipment and the
incremental reactor-system capacity and power costs due to friction
in the piping and heat exchangers. Operating weights for each of
the individual reactor systems were calculated, including the total
weight of all vessels, piping, and equipment and all contained mate
rial ( coolant, water, fuel, etc. ) . Although the cargo capacity varies
widely with the type ship and its trade route, the loss of cargo
capacity due to higher system weights was charged at $210 per year
per short ton for 100 percent use factor. This charge, however, had
little influence in the selection of most optimum reactor systems.
Average daily operating charges were determined for each reactor
system operating at 50 , 70 , and 90 percent average use of the design
power. The average daily variable fuel cost and the ( relatively in
significant) loss -of-capacity charge are calculated for each reactor
system at 50, 70, and 90 percent average use ; they constitute the
reactor-system variable costs . Daily amortization charges (again
based on a 20-year life, 6 percent interest , and zero net salvage ) and
daily fuel-inventory charges were calculated for each reactor system ;
these constituted the fixed costs independent of ship usage. The total
daily costs for each reactor system at 50, 70, and 90 percent usage
were then considered to be the sum of these fixed charges and variable
costs. These costs were used to compare systems for each specific
reactor type. A typical comparison ( for the pressurized -water re
actor system ) is shown in Table 10.1 . In most cases one reactor
geometry and flux is optimum at all use factors.
Installation costs were included in the cost tabulations for the vari
ous reactor systems. As compared with a land -based power plant,
correspondingly more difficult and less efficient installation operations
aboard ship were considered in determining the installation costs.
Estimated installation man -hours were used in many cases rather
than percentages of costs. It is quite obvious, for example, that a
stainless -steel pump costing three times as much as an otherwise
identical carbon -steel pump does not require three times as much
installation labor.
Estimated engineering costs for each reactor system were based
on complete engineering design of all components of the reactor sys
tem , including equipment foundations but not including the tie -in to
the main ship structure , which was considered part of the ship
design. However, engineering was not considered to include internal
design of such items as heat exchangers, steam drums, and pumps,
Table 10.1 – CAPITAL COST SUMMARY OF PRESSURIZED -WATER

REACTOR SYSTEM *
1957 cost ($ 1,000)
10 Mw (t) 25 Mw ( t) 50 Mw ( t) 85 Mw (t ) 200 Mw (t)
Component:
Reactor vessel . 128 185 269 400 600
Reactor internals ( less fuel) 109 143 204 281 393
Control rods. 110 162 190 205 220
Instrumentation .. 295 298 299 302 305
Primary coolant pumps and mo
tors. 38 62 120 180 254
Primary coolant piping and
valves... 18 100 190 290 520
Steam generator (s) and drum (s) - 165 220 300 384 655
Pressurizer system .-- 16 20 26 31 85
Purification and seal system 30 55 90 132 245
Excess hydrogen system .. 15 15 15 20 25
Auxiliary cooling, misc. piping
and control valves.. 20 24 33 46 77
Temporary waste -holding tanks. 5 8 12 15 25
Containment vessel including air
conditioning - 165 187 250 312 492
Reactor shielding--- 199 239 312 372 484
Containment shielding 358 467 557 684 901
Total installed cost .. 1 , 671 2, 185 2, 867 3, 654 5 , 281

Engineering design . 600 620 645 685 765
Total ( including engineering) . 2, 271 2, 805 3 , 512 4 , 339 6 , 046

Profit, overhead, contin
gency - 1 , 022 1 , 262 1 , 580 1 , 953 2, 721
Grand total .. 3 , 293 4, 067 5, 092 6, 292 8, 767
* High flux.
which is the primary responsibility of the fabricator. Engineering

costs were found to vary less between 10- and 200 -Mw nuclear plants
than between equivalent conventional plants. Nuclear instrumenta
tion is as complex for small reactors as for large ones . Also the
reactor core design for a 10 -Mw reactor requires nearly as much time
as for a 200 -Mw unit. However, many phases of piping are much
simpler for small plants, and physical smallness itself reduces struc
tural problems.
The total capital cost of the reactor system was calculated by add
ing 45 percent to the sum of the direct-installed cost and engineering
costs as profit, overhead, and contingency.* The contingency, in
*The figure of 45 percent has been criticized as being too low for normal shipyard
operations . A figure of 60 percent has been suggested as being more realistic.
addition to its normal application, also includes those small, known

miscellaneous items required for the completion of the plant, as well
as minor functional systems which , of necessity, may be added during
detailed design of the reactor system .
Of particular interest in the study was the method of analysis
concerning instrumentation. The principal restriction of the study
was that reactor instrumentation systems would not be designed ;
therefore it was necessary that the published literature be studied
so that a reference design could be selected for the instrumentation
of the four reactor types chosen for the project. This approach ,
however, proved impractical since : ( 1 ) some of the reactors de
scribed were built for experimental purposes and, as a consequence,
were over - instrumented ; ( 2 ) the reference design reflected various
personal backgrounds of the designers; and ( 3 ) a wide range of
instrumentation costs is obtained by various groups analyzing the
same or very similar reactor systems.
Because of this situation , the preliminary design of the 85 Mw ( t ) *
pressurized -water reactor for the Savannah was used as a reference
since it was readily adaptable to the Maritime project and an inde
pendent cost estimate could then be made for its instrumentation .
From this estimate subsequent cost estimates were derived for all the
reactor types and ranges of power studied by an analysis of the
differences in reactor- coolant and power cycle operating conditions.
With this method it was found that 1957 instrumentation costs for
the four reactor types for the power ranges considered were all
within 10 percent of $ 286,000. Absolute accuracy is approximately
+25 percent. A summary of the 1957 and projected basic instru
mentation costs for each reactor system is presented in Table 10.2.
Table 10.2 - SUMMARY OF INSTRUMENTATION COSTS
Reactor Mu ( t) 1957 1965 1970
PWR . All $ 305 , 000 $270, 000 $249 , 000

BWR . 10-50 290, 000 260, 000 238, 000
BWR 100-200 315 , 000 271 , 000 248 , 000
OVR . All 257, 000 206 , 000 177 , 000
GCR .. All 311, 000 266 , 000 251 , 000
This method of approach allows a number of simplifying assump

tions to be made which facilitate instrumentation cost determination .
These are as follows :
1. Nuclear instrumentation . This system , which represents 30 to
40 percent of the total instrumentation , is assumed to cost the
same regardless of reactor type and power range since a normal
three -channel system is used for all types. Each channel has
* Actually , the Sarannah reactor has a maximum thermal rating of 74 Mw.
a start -up , an intermediate, and a power and safety range.

The range of reactor power considered in the Maritime project
is small compared to the range available in three channels;
so there is no increase in the number of instruments from 10 to
200 Mw .
Safety considered in the project was in terms of reactor run
away, component failure, and personnel hazard ; and the degree
of safety required was assumed the same for all types and
sizes of reactors studied . Thus, all reactors are provided with
a three -channel nuclear control system with coincidence scram
capable of a 50 -msec response.
2. Control. The aspects of control considered were restricted to
the automatic controller and measurements necessary for opera
tion , such as flux , coolant flow and temperature, and control
rod position. The cost of an automatic controller for the pres
surized-water reactor was applied without modification to all
reactor types and power ranges. This controller is essentially
a small analog computer, which receives signals representing
flux , flow , level , etc. , and transmits signals to change the posi
tion of control rods or valves.
3. Process instrumentation . This represents approximately 25 to
40 percent of the instrumentation system cost. The previous
assumption of similarity cannot be applied in this case since
the process varies considerably for the different reactor types
considered . Therefore it was necessary to consider the details
of each system , such as fluids, temperatures, and pressures,
to determine costs for this part of the instrumentation system .
4. Miscellaneous. Console, metering, switch gear, cabling, and
conduit represent approximately 15 percent of instrumentation
system costs. The cost of these items was assumed to be inde
pendent of reactor type and power range.
( d ) Problem Areas. The uncertainty of 25 percent in total instru
mentation cost is due to several factors, chief of which is the infancy
of the nuclear industry. Little information has been developed as
to the actual costs of power reactor instrumentation , and what in
formation is available is difficult to break down into meaningful
prices because of different methods of cost accounting used. Nuclear
instruments are very costly and in a state of continuous development.
Although firm prices can be obtained today, the price might be much
less tomorrow .
( e ) Future Costs of Reactor Systems. Changes in capital costs for
1965 and 1970 were assumed to result from decreased costs resulting
from improved technology and from higher real costs for labor and
equipment. All cost forecasts were based on the real value of the
1957 dollar. With such a constant dollar, present trends show that
real- labor costs are increasing at the rate of 3 percent per year, and
real costs for finished equipment are increasing at the rate of 2 per
cent per year, compounded annually.
Improved fabrication methods and experience, fewer control -rod
openings, and ( in 1970 ) decreased cladding requirements should de
crease reactor vessel costs by 8 percent in 1965 and by 15 percent
in 1970. For similar reasons, costs for reactor internals will also
decrease slightly .
Instrumentation costs will decrease by as much as 32 percent in
1965 and 45 percent in 1970 for several reasons : ( 1 ) as production
of nuclear power plant instrumentation increases, unit prices will
approach those for more conventional instrumentation, ( 2 ) nuclear
power plant instrumentation will be simplified, ( 3 ) fewer control
rods will be required, and ( 4 ) safety-system requirements should
decrease somewhat as confidence in reactor operation grows.
Piping costs and costs of reactor coolant pumps will be reduced
by the use of less expensive steels and alloys than the stainless steels
now used .
( f ) Summary of Comparison Methods. It is seen from the fore
going discussion of the methods of comparing reactor types from an
economic standpoint that the process is an involved , complex pro
cedure necessitating many assumptions, particularly with regard to
future costs. Until a number of these reactor types are actually in
operation aboard merchant ships, it will be difficult to accurately
estimate capital and operating costs. However, with the existing
state of nuclear power technology, the method of comparing the vari
ous factors that influence the over - all costs of nuclear propulsion
systems presented above is believed to provide sufficiently reliable
data for use in planning at least the initial stages of nuclear pro
pulsion programs for merchant shipping.
10-2 REACTOR POWER CYCLES
Although no radical change from standard conventional design is

anticipated in the propulsion and auxiliary machinery on nuclear
vessels, certain minor alterations will be required to attain the high
est operating efficiency and economy from muelear power.
10-2.1 Steam Cycles
The high vapor pressure of water limits the operation of water

cooled reactors to temperatures considerably lower than those com
monly associated with good steam -turbine efficiency. Designers of
13,000
1. SATURATED STEAM ONE SEPARATOR
2. SATURATED STEAM ONE REHEATER
3. SATURATED STEAM - ONE SEPARATOR AND
ONE REHEATER
12,000 4. SUPERHEATED STEAM
5. SATURATED STEAM - TWO SEPERATORS
HEAT
BRATERHP
, TU
EXHAUST AT 2- IN, Hg ABS

H-/S
11,000 ! MOISTURE - AT 12 % OR LESS
10,000
9,000
5
8,000
420 440 460 480 500 520 540 560 580 600
TEMPERATURE, OF
Fig . 10.7 — Steam - cycle theoretical heat rates, non regenerative.
land -based nuclear plants are resorting to complicated steam cycles,

liquid -metal coolants, and other means of overcoming this handicap .
Land-based plants are virtually unlimited as to space and weight;
they are also usually connected into distribution systems where an
other station can pick up the load in case of breakdown. A marine
plant, on the other hand , must be compact , relatively light in weight,
and absolutely reliable. For this reason the cycle and equipment
must be kept as simple and dependable as possible.
Numerous steam cycles have been examined in the search for the
simplest and most efficient cycle for marine propulsion under the
limitations set by present technology. Nonregenerative heat rates for
five such steam cycles are shown in Fig. 10.7.
One requirement in these cycles is that the moisture in the steam
shall never exceed 12 percent at any point within the turbine. This
limit is imposed to avoid excessive erosion of the blading or the use
of expensive Stellite blading to resist such erosion.
Cycle 1 is for saturated steam and is characterized by the use
of a moisture separator at the crossover between the high- and low
pressure turbines. With a cycle efficiency of 80 percent, the heat
rate decreases as temperature increases up to about 460° F. Beyond
this point efficiency must be sacrificed to maintain less than 12 per
cent moisture in the exhaust, and the heat increases rapidly.
Cycle 2, also for saturated steam , uses a reheater at the crossover
to reevaporate the moisture at that point. In this cycle lower heat
rates are made possible at relatively higher temperatures by the
addition of enough superheat in the reheater to maintain low mois
ture content at the exhaust. Reheaters, however , are large and
expensive.
Cycle 3 combines the use of separator and reheater, thus obviating

reevaporation by the reheater. This installation provides somewhat
better cycle efficiencies.
Cycle 4 indicates that superheated steam is less efficient than sat
urated steam when placed on a temperature - limitation basis instead
of a pressure-limitation basis within the temperature range available
in present nuclear technology. This cycle is calculated by adding
just enough superheat to maintain a 12 percent moisture content in
the exhaust and 80 percent cycle efficiency.*
Cycle 5 is similar to cycle 1 , except that two separators are in
volved in equal intermediate positions between three turbine expan
sions. In this case, heat rate continues to decrease as the temperature
is increased from 555 to 570° F at approximately 1,200 psia. At
this point the steam entering each separator and the steam entering
the exhaust are each at approximately 12 percent moisture. With
further increase in temperature, efficiency must be sacrificed to main
· tain low moisture content in the exhaust.
The two-stage separation can be accomplished by a total extrac
tion from the high -pressure turbine with reentry after separation,
or by the use of three turbines with one separator between the high
pressure and intermediate -pressure turbines and the other between
the intermediate-pressure and low -pressure turbines. The latter is
illustrated in Fig. 10.8, which is a schematic flow diagram for the
boiling- water reactor and propulsion machinery system . Here, the
direct cycle is used for the propulsion system , steam going directly
from the reactor to the turbines. This introduces some additional
weight because of the necessity for shielding the condenser well,
feed -water heaters, and associated equipment. This weight , however,
is offset by the absence of large secondary steam generators that
contain large quantities of radioactive liquid water which must be
shielded. In boiling water reactor systems using the direct-cycle,
non radioactive steam for the ship's services and some auxiliary
machinery is usually generated in small secondary steam generators.
Generally, boiling water reactor systems use primary steam for elec
trical generating equipment.
10-2.2 Gas -cycle Comparisons
In nuclear reactor systems using gas turbines, air is the only

working fluid with which any actual operating experience has been
gained in closed -cycle gas turbines. This experience has been ob
tained with turbines operating on air, heated in fossil - fuel- fired
* In current design studies temperatures of 620 to 635 ° F are used , based on present
technology . Under these conditions the conditions would be reversed , with slightly
superheated steam having the advantage.
MOISTURE
MOISTURE 240
PSIA SEPARA
PSIA
35 TOR
M
%
9,5 SEPARATOR
F°397 M
%
8.8 °F
259
PSIA
800
°F
518 BTU
1122.0 1196.5
BTU BTU
1085.0 BTU
1162.0
1195.0
BTU
FLASH TURBINE
HP TURBINE
IP TURBINE
LP
TANK
1162.0
BTU
REGENERATIVE 11.6
M
%
EXCHANGER
HEAT BTU
980.7
227.9
BTU
BTU
372.1
STEAM
©
DRUM
COOLERS
COOLING REACTOR
WATER
MAIN
STEAM CONDENSER
AUX
.TO
Q AUXILIARY
STEAM
P
6SIA
°F
170
FEED BTU
1072,4
GENERATOR CONDENSATE PUMP
FILTERS FROM
AUX
.
240 °
F162
PSIA °F250 129.9
BTU
ION CONDENSATE
BTU
218.8 PUMP
EXCHANGERS STAGE
3rd HEATER
C.
D. STAGE
1st
RECIRCULATION HEATER °F
397 HEATER °F
170
PUMP
BTU
371.6 BTU
138.0
ONLY P
S)-U( TART
LBS
FLOWS
HOTEL
F../HTYPICAL
)(EULL
RXCLUDING
LOAD
°F
350 Mw
(s) NS
HP А B с D
BTU
321.6 10,000
28.73 00
,492,250
25,000
4,188
4,500
CHARGE
PUMPS 20,000 7,629,

7,500
40,000
57.21 900
183.560
40,000
14,387
366.000
114.14,100 80,000 14,000
21,000
60,000
547,920
18,604,900
120,000
170.93
HEAT
/NOTE
BTU
IN
.LUNITS
:ABLL
machinery
and
.propulsion
reactor
ater
-w—BFIG
10.8
oiling
387
superheaters where efficiencies are low because of excessive stack

losses. The use of a nuclear heat source makes it possible to utilize
to the fullest the high efficiency of the closed -cycle gas turbine by
eliminating these stack losses. This heat cycle, however, poses prob
lems in the selection of a working medium .
For closed -cycle gas turbines, it is desirable to operate the system
at the highest possible temperature within practical limits. In pres
ent nuclear technology, it is believed that the fuel -element surface
temperature should not exceed 1,600 ° F . With this limitation , the
maximum gas temperature allowable is approximately 1.300 ° F .
The ideal gas for closed -cycle gas-cooled reactor systems must not
only have good thermodynamic properties and thermal stability for
the power cycles used but must also have good heat -transfer char
acteristics and nuclear stability in the reactor. It must also have
a low neutron -absorption cross section to avoid being parasitic in
the reactor, and it must not become radioactive enough to create a
health hazard or require excessive shielding of the turbine and heat
exchangers. Moreover, it must be relatively inexpensive and in ade
quate supply. No gas has all these properties to the highest degree.
After careful consideration of one or more of these properties, the
field has been narrowed down to three gases, nitrogen , carbon dioxide,
and helium .
Numerous comparisons of these gases have been made. It is
obvious that helium has the best nuclear properties, but beyond this
point there seems to be no general agreement as to which is better
suited to the over- all purpose. Carbon dioxide and nitrogen both
have decided economic advantages over helium , being readily and
universally available at low cost . For shipboard use, reserve helium
would have to be carried in heavy pressure vessels; whereas either
carbon dioxide or nitrogen can be generated as needed in simple
light-weight inexpensive equipment.
Ileat -transfer considerations favor helium . The required heat
transfer surfaces for carbon dioxide are about 25 percent greater
than those for helium . On the other hand , the higher densities of
carbon dioxide and nitrogen give greater heat-transport capabilities
when considered on a volume basis, thus reducing the size of piping
and turbomachinery .
Turbine and compressor design are much simpler for the hearier
gases. Compressors operating with nitrogen will require about
20 percent more stages than those used with carbon dioxide ; those
operating with helium will require more than twice as many. Helium
turbines will require three to four times the number of stages re
quired for either of the other two gases. Helium is not generally
available throughout the world and is consequently expensive.
As previously indicated, air is the only gas on which any oper

ating data are available . Considerations of other media are, there
fore, on a purely theoretical basis and will require a considerable
amount of development work to prove their feasibility. Investiga
tions that have been made, however, have shown slight differences
in basic cycle efficiencies for the three gases, depending on what
variables were considered . In a specific comparison, assuming a
compressor efficiency of 86 percent, a turbine efficiency of 90 percent,
and a regenerator effectiveness of 90 percent , the results showed no
decided advantage of one medium over the others from a basic
thermodynamic consideration . Theoretical cycles were examined
over a maximum pressure range of 750 to 2,000 psia and a tempera
ture range of 900 to 1,300 ° F. Nitrogen seemed to give slightly
higher efficiencies than carbon dioxide or helium , particularly at
the higher pressures and temperatures. Helium and carbon dioxide
efficiencies are almost identical at tempeartures above 1,100 ° F. Effi
ciencies increase rapidly with temperature increase and slightly with
pressure increase.
10-3 SPECIFIC REACTOR SYSTEMS
10-3.1 Boiling -water Reactor Systems
Two types of boiling -water reactor systems have been considered

for application to merchant vessels; the direct-cycle system, in which
the steam from the reactor passes directly to the propulsion turbine,
and the indirect-cycle system , in which a secondary steam generator
produces the steam for the turbine. The direct -cycle system is
shown in Fig. 10.8.
Like the pressurized -water reactor system , the boiling-water sys
tem has the benefit of considerable operating experience. The
Experimental Boiling Water Reactor ( EBWR ) at Argonne National

Laboratory has been in successful operation for over three years
with results that exceed original expectations. The EBWR, which
began operation at a power level of 20 Mw ( t ) , was later operated
at over 60 Mw (t) with complete stability. The boiling water reactor
at the Vallecitos Plant of the General Electric Co., operating at a
steam pressure of almost 1,000 psi, also has had an excellent per
formance record.. Both these plants are experimental plants, but
they have been consistent enough in their operation to prove the
practical feasibility of the direct-cycle boiling water reactor. The
fact that the steam in this type system is slightly radioactive has
proved less detrimental than first considered , and even a partial
fuel- element failure in the EBWR imposed no serious problems
either in operation or subsequent maintenance procedure. The con
trol of the direct- cycle boiling water reactor system is simple, and
the inherent safety characteristics of the reactor are an extremely
desirable feature.
For these reasons, the boiling water reactor is considered a desir
able type for application to nuclear merchant ships. Its use aboard
ship should present no serious difficulties. The possible effect of the
sloshing of the water surface in the reactor due to the motion of
the ship has been investigated and found to be of insignificant
importance. The fact that the boiling-water reactor is somewhat
less compact than the pressurized -water reactor is compensated for
by the absence of the secondary steam generator ( in the direct -cycle
concept ) . Another advantage of the boiling water reactor is that it
appears to be easier to design this type of reactor for the production
of superheated steam than it would be in the pressurized -water type.
If such an integral superheat reactor proves practical, considerably
higher efficiencies for both land -based and shipboard installations
can be obtained .
Before a fuel -element design for boiling water reactors can be
established , it is necessary to consider reduced moderation resulting
from coolant voids, i.e. , steam bubbles. An increase in the moder
ator - to - fuel ratio over that for the pressurized -water systems will
compensate for this loss . The mechanism of the production and
behavior of steam bubbles ( voids) in boiling water reactors has been
an important consideration from the beginning.
Aside from the simple demonstration of operation , the early ex
periments with this type reactor revealed three characteristics which
were of fundamental importance to the concept of the boiling
reactor and which, in fact, constituted the major assurance that the
boiling reactor had practical promise. These characteristics were :
1. The time lag associated with the formation of steam at the
fuel - plate surface was sufficiently short to be practically neg
ligible in determining the characteristics of the steady -boiling
reactor. This characteristic in effect guarantees that there can
be no large -scale collapse of steam bubbles so long as the
reactor continues to produce power.
2. The behavior of the reactor in both transient and steady-state
tests was consistent and repeatable. This characteristic gave
assurance that the gross behavior of the steam in the reactor
core was not subject to fluctuations beyond the control of the
reactor designer.
3. The random power fluctuations present during steady -state
operation were not of serious magnitude. This characteristic
demonstrated that the local fluctuations in steam density were
not of sufficient magnitude to constitute a serious barrier to
the steady operation of the boiling reactor.
At the time the boiling water reactor was first proposed, it was
recognized that such reactors would probably have to operate with
relatively large amounts of reactivity compensated by steam if eco
nomically attractive power densities were to be attained. Theo
retical analyses of stability based on the best models of steam for
mation and steam flow that could be constructed at time indicated
that there was little chance that the reactors would be unstable as
long as no reactivity fluctuations approaching the magnitude of the
delayed -neutron fraction occurred . In these early stability models,
the time lag in transferring heat from the fuel elements to the water
and the time delay in removing steam from the reactor were taken
into account. Hydrodynamic motions involving the inertia of the
water in the reactor were not considered . It was quite evident that
the power of the boiling reactor would be self-regulating, but the
analyses did not , and could not, predict the effectiveness of power
regulations because little was known about the transient production
and flow of steam.
From another point of view, the situation might be described as
follows: It was expected that the boiling water reactor would have
to operate with a steam content that represented a relatively large
amount. of negative reactivity, that is, it had the same effect as
control rods. If the steam content of the core could change by a
large fraction , then evidently the reactor could be subjected to a
large amount of excess reactivity. This might be dangerous. There
was no obvious mechanism to cause the sudden disappearance of
steam from the core, but neither was there assurance that the rates
of steam production and flow out of the reactor would be constant.
Observation of the boiling phenomenon leads to the belief that such
a reactor might be subject to rather large fluctuations. However,
calculations indicated that, if there were no large time lags in the
formation of steam at the fuel-element surface, the self -regulating
property of the reactor would be sufficiently effective to maintain
control in spite of reasonably large fractional fluctuations in steam
content. This expectation and the analyses that indicated stability,
provided reactivity fluctuations did not exceed the delayed -neutron
fraction , gave some measure of confidence that the boiling reactor
would operate up to some void fraction that, in terms of reactivity,
was of the order of the delayed - neutron fraction. It seemed prob
able that the limit might well be a few times the delayed -neutron
fraction.
As a result of the experience gained with boiling reactors, there
is no longer a fear that some unknown mechanism could cause col
lapse of steam bubbles or a sudden unexpected transition from stable
to unstable operation. The question of boiling - reactor stability is
recognized as a complex one but one that is amenable to understand
613489 0-62 26
ing and analysis. Recent experimental and theoretical work has

done much to clarify the behavior of the boiling water reactor and
to put this type on a firm practical foundation. Indeed , the excel
lent power performance of these reactors and the limitations on heat 1
output from fuel elements, which have resulted from the adoption
of oxide fuel elements for water - cooled reactors , suggest that in the
future the power -density limitation in boiling reactors may be set
by temperature-drop limitations in the fuel elements rather than by
stability considerations.
1
There are, of course, other design limitations on the boiling re

actor, notably the requirement of attaining the proper steam -void
reactivity coefficient , which puts certain limitations on the fuel-to
!
moderator ratio that may be used , as mentioned previously. How
ever, a comparison of current designs of boiling- and nonboiling
water - cooled reactors indicates that the fuel- to -moderator ratios
used are not greatly different, and this restriction probably will
not have a large effect on the attainable power density.
Although the direct-cycle boiling reactor system is the simplest
of all reactor power systems, the fact that the steam to the turbine
and other major equipmert is slightly radioactive is a disadvantage.
It makes necessary additional shielding, which to some extent off
sets the saving in weight resulting from the absence of secondary
generators and their shielding and introduces certain maintenance
problems.
The indirect boiling cycle evolves from the desire to reduce these
maintenance and design problems by eliminating the radioactive
carryover from the reactor to the major equipment. This is accom
plished through the use of two distinct loops, linked thermally
through a condensing-evaporating heat exchanger. As in the pres
surized -water reactor, steam generated in the secondary loop is non
radioactive ; consequently the entire secondary system may be of
conventional design , requiring no shielding whatever. The load
response characteristics of the indirect-cycle are somewhat better
than those of the direct-cycle because of the time lag inherent in
the heat exchanger.
Whether the radioactive carryover in the direct-cycle system con
stitutes a significant disadvantage to the use of this type reactor
for nuclear propulsion remains to be seen , but, if the performance
of the boiling-water reactor in land -based nuclear power plants
provides any criterion , there is little reason for believing that the
radioactive carryover will constitute a serious problem . The sim
plicity of the direct cycle has much to recommend it for shipboard
use. The direct-cycle boiling water plant occupies less space than
other nuclear plants of the same capacity.
Shielding for the direct -cycle system is divided into three types,
the reactor shield , the containment shield, and the power plant
equipment shield . The first two shields are essentially the same as
for the pressurized -water system. However, since the reactor cool
ant steam is used by power equipment located outside the contain
ment vessel, additional shielding is required for this equipment.
Assuming that the shield is placed 6 in . from the equipment, approx
imately 2 in . of lead is required for equipment containing coolant
steam . Six inches of lead is required for equipment containing the
steam condensate to limit maximum residual radiation to 8 mrem /hr
at the outer surface of the equipment shield . No shielding need be
furnished for the turbine, however, because the 2 -in . steel casing
and large volume fraction of steel in the turbine provide excellent
self -shielding characteristics.
The flow diagram for a direct -cycle boiling water reactor pro
pulsion system is shown in Fig. 10.8. This shows the calculated
steam flows for four different size units and also the temperatures
and pressures at various points in the system . As will be noted ,
an auxiliary steam generator is included to provide nonradioactive
steam for certain auxiliaries and ship's services.
All auxiliary equipment in the boiling-water system is operated
from the secondary steam cycle, either by electricity from the turbo
generators or by the direct steam -driven turbines. Turbogenerators
are smaller than those required for a pressurized -water system
because of the smaller power requirements ; they are selected in
accordance with standard practice for conventional ships. Choice
of other auxiliaries also corresponds to conventional practice.
The use of secondary steam for the auxiliaries confines shielding
and leakage -containment problems to the main propulsion system .
The secondary system (which really constitutes an indirect boiling
water system ) supplies steam to the turbogenerators, turbine- driven
pumps, etc.
Reactor heat removal in the boiling water propulsion system is
maintained by natural circulation only; consequently no pumping
power is required for this purpose . Power requirements of the
purification system are practically negligible and are absorbed in
the normal auxiliary load. However, a small amount of power is
required for coolant circulation during reactor start-up. This is
supplied by a small diesel generator or some other source independent
of the main power source. In contemplating the use of a natural
circulation boiling -water reactor for shipboard use, the question of
the effect of the ship's motion on the operation will have to be
investigated.
In contrast to the pressurized -water system described in Sec.
10-3.2, no emergency equipment is needed for reactor shutdown. A
small intermittent-duty diesel generator can handle the reactor

start-up requirement, and this generator will also serve for emer
gency lighting and instrumentation power until the emergency boiler
is brought up to pressure. Because of its multiple purpose, the
generator will have an output power rating of approximately four
times the power required for the start -up circulation pumps.
For emergency " take -home” power, it is assumed that an emer
gency power source will be provided as a safety precaution and
as is necessary on all types of nuclear ships having only one reactor.
In conventional steamship operation, a plurality of boilers and
flexibility of the turbines by interconnections provides a high degree
of reliability. Thus far in the considerations of nuclear power for
merchant ships, multiple reactor installations have not been regarded
as necessary or desirable except in the higher power levels, namely,
above 200 Mw ( t ). Thus it becomes necessary to provide an alter
nate source of power to bring the ship into port in the event of
reactor failure. This may be supplied by any one of several meth
ods. A diesel engine can be mounted to be clutched into the pro
pulsion gear train . A more flexible arrangement utilizes an electric
motor mounted on the reduction gear housing, with power supplied
by a diesel generator . The latter system furnishes emergency
lighting, steering power, and other emergency needs, in addition to
propulsive power.
A more effective method for furnishing the emergency power than
the diesel -electric system just described is the steam system referred
to above, involving the use of an oil- fired boiler of the "package
boiler" type. A steam boiler of this type has many advantages
over diesel operation, particularly in steamships. The boiler usually
would have a generating capacity of approximately 10 percent of
the ship's normal requirement and would provide all emergency
power, including heating. In addition, this system does not require
the use of a large electric motor and clutching arrangement ar
lighter and less expensive than an equivalent diesel generator. The
boiler is connected into the propulsion system to supply steam to
a point in the main turbine ( depending on its pressure rating) and
to one auxiliary turbogenerator to supply lighting, heating, steering
power, and other necessary auxiliaries.
Ten percent of the ship's normal power rating is considered a
nominal emergency boiler rating, on the assumption that at 10 per
cent of normal power a vessel should be able to maintain at least
35 percent of its normal speed . This assumption is deduced by
extrapolation of published performance data for several ships,
namely , the S.S. Atlantic Seaman, the S.S. Esso Suez , and the
S.S. Old Colony Mariner.5,6,7 The values so obtained at 10 percent
normal shaft horsepower are as follows: Atlantic Seaman, 50 per
cent of normal speed ; Esso Suez, 47 percent ; and Old Colony Mar
iner, 49.5 percent. In the case of the Atlantic Seaman , the extrapo
lation extends only 0.5 knot below the published data. Therefore,
the assumption of 35 percent is considered quite conservative. With
such an emergency steam system , fuel capacity should be provided
for operation of the emergency boiler at rated capacity for a period
of 300 hr.
10_3.2 Pressurized-water Reactor Systems
As with the boiling water reactor system , there is no question con

cerning the practical feasibility of the pressurized -water system
for the propulsion of merchant vessels. Even more than the boil
ing-water reactor, the pressurized -water reactor has demonstrated
its excellent performance in propulsion systems on the naval
submarines.
The compactness of the pressurized -water system , especially where
highly enriched fuels are used, lends itself well to shipboard instal
lation, where space is valuable. The technology of pressurized
water reactors is well developed, and the recent use of oxide fuels
eliminates certain corrosion problems associated with the use of
metallic fuel elements. The design problems are well understood,
but another generation of pressurized -water reactors such as are
being developed by today's PWR technology will have to be under
taken before sizeable gains are made with regard to capital cost.
Because of the high pressures for which these reactors have to be
designed, the pressure vessels have to be constructed with very thick
walls ; this makes them costly and makes the fuel loading and un
loading closure awkward . Two schemes for loading and unloading
are commonly employed , either separately or together. In one
scheme, a modified version of the MTR method , the fuel element is
handled by an offset crane and is dropped into a discharge channel ,
as shown in Fig. 10.9. The other method is to remove the entire
top of the pressure vessel . Since the core life of the reactor runs
from one to two or even three years, unloading will not be very
frequent, and a shutdown can be tolerated . Scheduled unloading
can be limited to definite periods, depending upon the rate of burn
out. The main problem arises from unscheduled unloadings due to
fuel- element failure. For any unloading method , it is difficult to
determine which fuel element failed . Most reactors have fuel ele
ments that are designed to last several weeks after rupture without
introducing too much radioactivity into the coolant. In the pres
surized-water reactor such an increase in primary coolant activity
is not as serious as it is in the boiling -water reactor since the pri
mary coolant loop is entirely contained in the containment enclosure
and, thus, constitutes no biological hazard .
FUEL - ELEMENT
HANDLING
MECHANISM
PRESSURE
VESSEL FUEL ELEMENT
REACTOR
CORE
DISCHARGE
CHANNEL
CONTROL
RODS
TO SPENT FUEL
STORAGE
Fig. 10.9 - Large throw manipulator unloading scheme.
A flow diagram of a pressurized -water reactor and propulsion

system is shown in Fig. 10.10. As in the case of the flow diagram
for the boiling-reactor system , Fig. 10.8, this diagram indicates
the calculated steam flows for a number of different size plants,
ranging from 3,000 to 60,000 shp.
Most of the pressurized -water reactors that have been built thus
far have been designed to operate at pressures between 1,500 and
2.000 psi . The reactor at the Shippingport station uses a pressure
of 2,000 psi in the primary coolant loop, and, as described in Chap. 4,
the reactor system on the Savannah uses a pressure of 1,750 psi
in the primary coolant system . The pressurized -water system shown
in Fig. 10.10 therefore is somewhat unique in that it is designed for
a pressure of only 885 psi in the primary loop. It operates with a
180 ° F inlet and a 520 ° F outlet temperature. For this reason, the
reactor vessel is considerably lighter and has thinner walls than
would be the case had it been designed for pressures such as used
on the Savannah and at Shippingport. The reactor vessel for the
system shown in Fig. 10.10 is designed for 1,100 psig at 550 ° F and
for a hydrostatic test at 1,650 psig with cold water. The vessel
would have an inside diameter of 9 ft 10 in. and an over-all height
of 22 ft 6 in . It would be constructed of carbon -steel plate with
AUXILIARIES
TO
MOISTURE
PSIA
450 SEPARATOR PSIA
45
°F
456 %M
11.1 °F
274
PRESSURIZER 00.0
12BTU BTU
1068.1 BTU
1167,0
CHARGE
PUMPS HEATING STEAM
ELEMENTS DRUM
Ooo TURBINE
HP TL
P URBINE
OOO
ооо 1167
BTU
STEAM P8SIA
PSIA
GENERATOR170 12.2
BTU
1078 %
M
BTU
1142.0 BTU
243.4
835
psi BTU
973.2
ION F°
520
EXCHANGERS °F
480
REACTOR
REACTOR
FILTERS COOLANT MAIN
LOOP CONDENSER
.)(2REQ'D
CONDENSATE
PRIMARY ea
PUMP
PURIFICATIONH₂O 3rd 1st
COOLANT
LOOP STAGE STAGE
P
MAKE
-U PUMPS
FLASH HEATER HEATER
TANK
PURIFICATION 350
°F 170 °F
250 °F
162
COOLERS COOLING 30 8
20 BTU
321.6 PSIA FEED BTU
218.8 PSIA BTU
129.9
PSIA
WATER
COOLING PUMP FROM
D OWN
)-(SHUT HEATER
C.
D. AUXILIARIES
WATER
°F183
150.8
BTU
REGENERATIVE TYPICAL
EFLOWS
HOTEL R
ULL
XCLUDING
)(F.)./HLBS
LOAD
EXCHANGER
HEAT NSHP (
)1Mw B с D
3,000
30,380
685,700
9.54
1,800
6,700
PURIFICATION
UU STORAGE
10,000
21,960
100,000
2,255,000
31.40 4,000
20,000
4,493,000
199,040
43,920
62.53
PUMPS TANKS 7,400

124.648,
40,000
14,700
396,880
87,400 955,600
60,000
186.17
10,643,200
594,120
129,240
18,000
HEAT
/NOTE
BTU
IN
LUNITS
-ABLL
reactor
10.10
-w—PFIG
ressurized
ater
machinery
propulsion
.and
397
a stainless-steel liner. The straight- shell section would have a wall

thickness of 3.10 in. This thickness compares with a thickness of
6 in. of carbon-steel plate and stainless -steel lining for the Savannah
reactor. It is obvious, therefore, that a reduction in primary pres
sure in a pressurized -water system vitally reduces the cost of the
reactor vessel.
Temporary limitations of the pressurized -water system (approxi
mately 600° F in the reactor system at 2,000 psia pressure) prac
tically eliminate the possibility of the use of superheated steam,
unless the superheat is added by a separate nuclear or fossil - fuel - fired
superheater. Assuming a nominal difference in temperature of
50° F between the water in the primary system and the steam at the
outlet of the steam superheater and a 5º drop between the super
heater and the turbine throttle, a throttle temperature of ( 600 –
50 + 5 ) 545 ° is attained. At this temperature, 140° of superheat is
required to maintain an exhaust steam condition of less than 12 per
cent moisture, assuming a cycle efficiency of 80 percent and an abso
lute exhaust pressure of 2 in . Hg. This requirement results in a
throttle pressure of 265 psia and a temperature of 545 ° F, and
under these conditions the nonextractive heat rate ( no feed- water
heating) is greater than 10,000 Btu /shp-hr. The best possible ex
traction heat rate is approximately 9,000 Btu / shp -hr, even assuming
full attainment of the optimum feed - water enthalpy obtainable from
three feed - water heaters .
On the other hand, if steam is supplied to the throttle at 545° F
and 1,000 psia, dry and saturated, and if two moisture separators
are used in the cycle , a comparable theoretical heat rate of less than
8,000 Btu /shp -hr is obtained. This is comparable to the boiling
water reactor cycle shown in Fig. 10.8 , which operates at 800 psia
and 518 ° F . However, the operation of a pressurized -water reactor
propulsion system at such a high turbine pressure results in exces
sive weight and capital cost, particularly in the reactor system . For
this reason , the pressurized -water reactor system shown in Fig.
10.10 provides a much more practical system from an economic
standpoint. This system operates with a throttle steam pressure of
450 psia at 456° F, with an assumed moisture content of 0.5 percent.
The cycle results in a theoretical turbine water rate of 9.84 lb / shp -hr
and a heat rate of 8,646 Btu /shp -hr, which corresponds to a thermal
efficiency of 29.4 percent. This compares with corresponding theo
retical values for the 800 - psia boiling -water cycle in Fig. 10.8 of
9.08 lb /shp -hr and 7,928 Btu / shp -hr with a thermal efficiency of
32.1 percent. It is obvious from this comparison that the pres
surized -water system cannot match the thermal efficiencies of the
direct -cycle boiling-water reactor system.
Figure 10.10 shows a moisture separator installed between the

high- and low -pressure turbines. It is assumed that this separator
will deliver steam of 99.5 percent quality. Various manufacturers
are willing to guarantee steam qualities ranging from 99.5 to 99.9
percent; so this assumption is conservative. The use of various
arrangements of reheaters and separators in this pressurized -water
system would result in only a slight increase in efficiency and, since
the equipment is bulky and expensive, it would not be worth while.
Ship’s services and machinery auxiliary equipment items in the
pressurized - water system are assumed to be the same as those nor
mally supplied in steamships with conventional power plants. The
only exception is that slightly larger turbogenerators are supplied
to handle the power requirements of the reactor coolant pumps and
other reactor appurtenances.
In the event of emergency shutdown, the water must be kept
circulating in the reactor system to cool the reactor. Therefore,
power must be provided on a standby basis for the circulating
pumps, and this power must be instantly available. Emergency
diesel generators are required for this purpose. Emergency cooling
is necessary for approximately one hour following a shutdown, and
the power required decreases rapidly during this period. This
equipment may be built for light intermittent duty.
As in the case of the boiling water propulsion system , emergency
take -home power is required for the pressurized -water system , and
the same considerations apply. If diesel-electric power is used for
this purpose, additional emergency cooling power generators can
be eliminated . However, it is believed that any advantage gained
by using diesel-electric power in a dual-purpose capacity would be
out weighed by the advantages of steam operation of the emergency
take -home system, described in Sec. 10–3.1 .
In addition to the steam generators required by the pressurized
water system which are not needed in the direct -cycle boiling water
system , the pressured -water system requires reactor coolant pumps
and a pressurizer. These equipment items, like the reactor vessel,
have to be built or clad with stainless steel wherever parts come in
contact with the coolant. The pressurizer system maintains a nor
mal operating pressure ( in the case shown in Fig. 10.10, at 885 psia )
at the reactor outlet and keeps the pressure within allowable time
limits during normal load changes by accommodating the resulting
thermal expansion and contraction in the coolant system . The pres
surizer is fitted with electric immersion heaters and provision for
spraying coolant into the steam during pressure surges. A surge
line connects the pressurizer to the coolant system through one of
the main coolant lines . The electric heaters are arranged in three
banks , one continuously providing most of the minimum heating
requirements during steady -load operations, a second providing

heating in response to system -pressure control equipment, and a
third large group providing additional heat during start -up and
major load changes. During normal operation system pressure is
maintained by flashing or condensing steam in the water-steam mix
ture in the pressurizer whenever pressure fluctuations occur. Posi
tive pressure surges beyond the capacity of the pressurizer, should
they occur, are relieved by multiple spring-loaded relief valves and
an electrically operated relief valve.
Although slightly higher turbine operating pressures are used in
the boiling-water system than in the pressurized -water system , these
higher pressures cause only negligible differences in marine turbine
costs and weights. In addition , the disadvantage involving the
inclusion of the separate auxiliary-steam generator is offset in
weight, and more than offset in cost , by the reduced size of emer
gency diesel generators as compared to the pressurized -water system .
The pressurized -water system , however, possesses an advantage over
the boiling water system with respect to control. Pressurized
water reactors are largely self -controlling under load swings, re
quiring small control- rod movements. Boiling -water reactors re
quire larger and more frequent control-rod movements.
The cost of piping and gland leak -off systems in the main pro
pulsion steam cycle are higher for the boiling -water system than for
the pressurized -water system because of the necessity of containing
radioactive leakage. No attempt is made to eliminate leakage
entirely by the use of such expensive items as canned - rotor pumps
and diaphragm valves, but an enclosed drainage system is provided
to collect leakage for safe disposal. Suitable instrumentation and
alarms in conjunction with this drainage system reflect slightly
increased instrument costs for the boiling-water system .
10–3.3 Organic- moderated Reactor Systems
Organic materials as coolant, moderator, or both have been con
sidered by many reactor engineers as having distinct advantages
over other materials. In general, these advantages are ( 1 ) high
temperature capabilities at low pressures because of their low vapor
pressure ; ( 2 ) compatibility with fuel, canning, and structural mate
rials, resulting in low corrosion rates; ( 3 ) low induced radioactivity ;
and ( 4 ) no hazardous chemical reactions.
A reactor using an organic material could therefore be expected
to have a relatively low capital cost since carbon steel or low -alloy
steels and standard pumps and valves could be used and reasonably
high temperatures could be achieved in a low -pressure system .
However, one of the major unknowns has been the effect of radia
tion and high temperature on the properties of the organic mate
rials. Thus much research and development has been expended on
the selection of an organic that would be stable in a reactor environ
ment. Much of the preliminary work in this field is summarized
in two unclassified AEC reports.8, 9 Since the early experiments
indicated that several aromatic materials, in particular, the poly
phenyls, exhibited fair stability, the major effort has been placed
on the study of polyphenyls. Recognizing that the feasibility of
the organic -moderated reactor concept was dependent on the behavior
of the organic under operating conditions, the AEC contracted with
Atomics International, a division of North American Aviation ,
Inc., to construct an organic -cooled and -moderated reactor. The
contract resulted in the construction of the Organic Moderated
Reactor Experiment ( OMRE ), a pressurized -organic -cooled and
-moderated reactor having a maximum thermal output of 16,000 kw.
This reactor was specifically designed as a test facility for organics,
and no provision was made for the generation of electricity.
The particular core design used in the OMRE has a positive
temperature coefficient below 450° F and a negative coefficient above
480 ° F . Thus, at the proposed operating temperature ( over 700 ° F ),
this reactor does have a relatively large negative temperature coeffi
cient, which represents a stabilizing function to the reactor since
approximately 1 percent reactivity can be held by a temperature
change from approximately 480 to 700 ° F . However , for a moderator
temperature rise from 240 to 480° F, an increase of 1 percent reactivity
occurs ; any hazard resulting from the positive coefficient could be
circumvented by limiting reactor operation to temperatures above
180 ° F . The temperature coefficient is, of course, a function of the
specific reactor design , and a positive coefficient is not a necessary
characteristic of an organic -moderated reactor.
A very significant advantage of an organic coolant is the low in
duced radioactivity in the pure material. Limited operation of the
OMRE described at the SRE -OMRE Forum 10 indicated that the
radioactivity induced in the coolant (modified Santowax O - M ) was
due to impurities and consisted mainly of the short -lived gamma
emitters shown in Table 10.3.
Typical radiation levels obtained around the OMRE facility ( op
erating at 10,000 kw ) indicated that the radioactivity problem is
small.10 The following levels were measured in the organic - coolant
reprocessing room , 80 mr / hr (max. ) ; at the coolant exit pipe, 320
mr /hr; above the reactor tank , 1,000 mr /hr (max. ) ; and in the
control room , 0.4 mr /hr.
If no large build -up in activity by accumulated foreign deposits
occurs after long operation, this low contamination should result in
large weight savings ( relative to the pressurized -water reactor ) by

requiring little, if any, shielding of the primary coolant loop under
normal conditions. However, even in the case of low activity, an
evaluation must be made of the hazard produced by a fuel-element
failure resulting in fission -product contamination of the coolant.
Because of the compatibility of the coolant with the fuel materials,
this may not be a problem , especially in the case of oxide fuel ele
ments. Besides the savings in weight, the low activity, if realized
after long-term operation, will allow easy access for maintenance.
Table 10.3 - RADIOISOTOPES IN ORGANIC COOLANT
Isotope Half life Concentrations, ppm
Na24 15 hr . 0. 10
Mn58 2.58 hr .. 0. 03
C138 37.3 min . 2. 00
Cu04 12.8 hr ! 0. 20
Cu66 5.1 min /
All piping and hydraulic components of the organic-moderated

reactor, with the exception of the cladding of the fuel elements and
the pressure vessel , are of carbon steel and are commercial types.
This is a direct result of the good materials compatability of the
organic moderator - coolant and results in a substantial saving in
capital cost relative to that of reactors requiring the use of stain
less steel throughout. The pressure vessel of the OMRE is made
of low- alloy steel and retains a pressure of only 200 psi for coolant
temperatures of 700 ° F . Thus the vessel is significantly cheaper than
those of high -pressure water reactors, which, as previously indicated,
may be designed for pressures as high as 2,000 psi and employ high
alloy steels in their construction .
It appears also that corrosion and wear problems will be low with
the organic-moderated reactor and that high reliability and long
life of the reactor components may be expected. This is, of course,
subject to modification by the long-term effects of the irradiated
coolant on these materials and components.
An important element in the operation of any type nuclear re
actor system is the accumulation of corrosion products as a result
of the action of the coolant on the structural materials of the sys
tem . In an effort to determine the corrosion characteristics of or
ganic moderators and coolants, in -pile corrosion tests have been made
in which mild -steel, aluminum , stainless-steel, magnesium, and zir
conium specimens were exposed to the action of organic polyphenyls.
The results of these tests show that magnesium and zirconium under
go some corrosion by oxide formation in the case of the magnesium
and by hydride formation in the case of zirconium . Stainless steel
and aluminum exhibited insignificant weight change and a slight dis

.coloration of the surface. The mild steel did not gain a significant
amount of weight, but the surface of the specimen was blackened
considerably by the hydrocarbon. Corrosion behavior of various ma
terials in organic coolants is currently fairly well understood, based
on experience with the OMRE plant. It appears that, although the
corrosion rate of fuel-element cladding is not a cardinal problem,
the fouling of fuel-element surfaces by corrosion products does pre
sent difficulties that have not yet been precisely resolved ; this after
math problem of corrosion is currently under study. In general, it
can be said that corrosion problems are not serious.
The compatibility of organic liquids with other reactor materials
eliminates the possibility of hazardous internal chemical reactions.
The hot organic liquid does not represent a large amount of stored
mechanical energy at the operating temperatures visualized. There
fore, the only rapid release of energy that would result from a hypo
thetical accident would be that of the nuclear reaction. The prob
ability and magnitude of a possible nuclear-energy release will vary
according to the particular reactor design, but the magnitude in any
case would probably not be large. The question of whether any
secondary containment would be required can be answered only in
relation to a specific reactor design and location.
The organic materials used are combustible and burn with dense
black clouds of smoke, which would make fire fighting difficult
around the reactor. Provisions would probably have to be made in
the reactor area for an automatic fire extinguisher system . How
ever, the dust-cloud ignition temperature of the organic is quite
high ( 1,200 ° F ).
It is obvious from the many advantages that the organic -mod
erated reactor possesses that it has attractive possibilities for ship
propulsion systems. Since comparatively light material can be used
in the pressure vessel and since virtually no containment is necessary,
the organic system makes possible a significant saving in weight over
that of other types of reactor systems.
The basic flow diagram for an organic -moderated and -cooled
reactor propulsion system , designed for use in a commercial mer
chant ship, is shown in Fig. 10.11. It consists of a forced -circula
tion reactor using a mixture of terphenyl isomers as coolant and
moderator. Both diphenyl and terphenyl have been considered as
organic moderators, but terphenyl seems to have somewhat greater
stability. Although only one unit is shown in the schematic diagram,
the system includes two vertical shell-and -tube steam generators
( heat exchangers ). Primary coolant circulating pumps are also
used.
AUXILIARIES
TO
VACUUM
404
TO
VENT ,COND
AUX
.TO SEPARATOR
MOISTURE
SYSTEM
.STOR TURBINE
TO PSIA
240 PSIA
35
TANK PRESSURIZER 9.5
M
% . °F397 .
8.6
M
% °F259
ОЮ SHUTDOWN BTU
1122 BTU
1196.5 BTU
1065 BTU
1162
. XP
E
&
COND
. TANK .ST
GEN
AUX HP LP
FEED TURBINE TURBINE
TURBINE
WATER
372.1 1162
BTU BTU
M
%
11.6
BTU
960.7
MELT'G
TANK REACTOR
STILL COOLANT
PUMPS
MAIN
STEAM STEAM .
COND
REACTOR 227.9
9 GEN
REACTOR BTU
WASTE COOLANT
LOOP 6SIA
P
PURIFICATION
LOOP
OF
170
1072.4
MELT BTU
.STOR
°F
250
BTU
218.8
FEED C.HEATER
D. COND
PUMP
LBS
FLOWS
).H(E)F/TYPICAL
LOAD
ULL
RXCL
OTEL PUMP
MwA
(t) NSHP B с
D
STAGE
3rd PSIA
240 6
2,250,000
7,000
28,000
3,000
17
8.94 HEATER PSIA STAGE
Ist
30
6,850,000
23,800
92,300
10,000 PSIA HEATER
29.69
50
11,310,00
59.04
183,600
47,100
120
20,000 0 F
397 °F
162 F°170
-ABLL
/LNOTE
BTU
IN
UNITS
HEAT BTU
371.6 129,9
BTU BTU
138
O
m . 0.11
rganic
oderated
1-FIG reactor
propulsion
machinery
.and
The reactor and the complete coolant system are designed for 150
psig, but the system is designed to operate at only 35 psig. This, it
will be noted , is far less than the pressures used in either the boil
ing -water or the pressurized -water systems described previously.
Coolant is circulated upward through the fuel-element passages , re
moving heat from the fuel elements. The heated coolant then flows
from the reactor upper plenum chamber through two coolant loops
to the shell of the separate heat exchangers. Feed water returned
from the propulsion system enters the double -tube side of the ex
changer at about 800 psia and 350 ° F , where it is heated to satura
tion temperature and evaporated. The reactor coolant pumps in
each loop take suction from the steam generator shell outlet and
return the terphenyl to the reactor lower plenum chamber for an
other cycle. Steam produced in the steam generators rises and enters
a steam drum ( or drums), where its moisture content is reduced to
approximately one-quarter percent before flowing to the ship's pro
pulsion turbine. An auxiliary coolant loop is provided for use when
the reactor is shut down ; it provides coolant flow and heat exchange
necessary for removal of decay heat.
A pressurizer and expansion tank connected to the coolant loop
compensate for changes in coolant volume. At times when the cool
ant level in the expansion tank is excessive, coolant overflows into
a storage and hold -up tank. From this tank coolant is continually
being pumped to the purification system and then returned to the
primary coolant system . Whenever the expansion tank level is be
low normal, coolant is pumped directly from the storage tank to
the expansion tank. The terphenyl that polymerizes in the reactor
and is removed as waste polymer in the purification and redistilla
tion process is periodically replaced by new terphenyl coolant .
No containment vessel is required with this propulsion system
owing to the low vapor pressure of the coolant at the operating
temperature.
For a 70 Mw ( t ) organic -moderated reactor, a pressure vessel 6
ft 9 in . in diameter and 13 ft 9 in . high would be required . This
would be constructed entirely of carbon - steel plate without cladding.
The fuel elements would consist of an assembly of uranium metal
plates clad with aluminum . The feasibility of aluminum cladding
in a high -temperature organic medium has not been definitely
established , but indications are that it will be usable .
Shielding of the organic-moderated reactor is divided into the re
actor shield and the compartment shield . The shielding arrange
ment is shown in Fig. 10.3. Radiation sources for the organic sys
tem are similar to those in the pressurized-water system, except for
neutron-capture gamma radiation. Parasitic neutron capture in the
1
core will occur in the structural steel, aluminum cladding, and

terphenyl coolant -moderator. It is assumed that 20 percent of the
parasitic capture occurs in the structural steel and aluminum clad
ding and that each capture liberates one 7 -Mev gamma. The re
maining 80 percent of the parisitic capture occurs in the terphenyl ,
and each capture liberates a gamma with an average energy of 6.4
Mev.
A containment vessel, in the usual sense of the word, is not used
with the organic-moderated plant since there is little stored energy in
the system . However, owing to the biological shielding require
ments, the reactor and associated equipment in the primary loop
would be housed in a compartment consisting of steel bulkheads and
overhead , covered with lead, as indicated in Fig. 10.3. The com
partment would be sized to include the reactor plus the associated
equipment in the coolant loop, with a minimum clearance for pur
poses of maintenance and equipment removal. An access hatch and
a covered opening in the overhead would be provided for refueling.
The low vapor pressure of the organic coolant permits the use of a
flat -walled containment compartment instead of the cylindrical con
tainment vessels used in other systems.
The auxiliary reactor cooling system enables removal of reactor
decay heat after shutdown in the event trouble develops in the main
coolant loops. It consists of a steam generator, a steam drum , a
single coolant pump, and associated piping similar to, but smaller
than , equipment used in the main coolant system. During normal
reactor operation the auxiliary cooling will be inoperative and
drained of its terphenyl.
All vessels, heat exchangers, pumps , piping, and other containers
that contain terphenyl coolant will have to be kept warm by wrap
ping with electric heating cable under the thermal insulation to
prevent solidification of the terphenyl. Terphenyl solidifies at 70° F.
Above that temperature it becomes a slurry and turns to a liquid
at around 200 ° F .
It is interesting to compare the characteristics of an organic
coolant with those of other coolants. Such a comparison ( Table
10.4 ) shows that the organic coolant ( diphenyl) has much poorer
heat -transfer properties than either sodium or water. Although the
data in Table 10.4 are for diphenyl, they do not differ greatly from
the data for terphenyls. The poorer heat-transfer properties with
respect to water may be offset by other characteristics of the or
ganies. For example, the compatibility with a wider range of ma
terials may make possible the use of extended surfaces on fuel
elements.
Table 10.4 – COMPARISON OF SOME COOLANTS 8

(Conditions : Flow parallel to an array of fuel rods ; equivalent diameter of flow
channel = 0.5 ; flow velocity = 20 ft /sec ; mean coolant temp. = 500 ° F )
Diphenyl
Sodium Water
Normal Twice
viscosity normal
viscosity *
Pressure, psia ... 14. 7 2, 000 250 250

Heat-transfer coefficient, Btu /hr/sq ft /° F . 1 , 500 6 , 030 1 , 420 1 , 080
Heat removal from 0.75-in.-diameter
uranium rod relative to that of sodium 1. 00 0. 93 0. 67 0. 61
Pumping power relative to pumping
power for sodium ..... 1. 00 0. 76 0.87 1. 0
Pumping power per unit of heat removal
relative to that for sodium 1. 00 0.82 1. 30 1. 64
Coolant temperature rise relative to
sodium .. 1. 00 0. 29 0. 36 0. 33
* Twice normal viscosity is shown because of the increase in viscosity that occurs with irradiation .
Since the basic advantage of the organic materials lies in their

use at high temperatures, the decomposition of these materials at
high temperature under irradiation and the effect of radiation on
their properties are probably the most important limiting factors in
determining the application of organic-cooled and moderated re
actors to power systems.
The operating temperature of organic-moderated reactor systems
is limited to 700 ° F or less because of the materials used in the re
actor fuel elements and the thermal instability of the organic heat
transfer medium . The maximum allowable cladding temperature
for aluminum is 750 ° F.
With a 700 ° F reactor outlet temperature, superheated steam at
650° F could be obtained in the propulsion system with the use of
large superheaters. This temperature would allow operation at about
450 psia with a heat rate of 8,250 Btu / shp -hr, using three feed
water heaters at optimum conditions.
Use of 800 - psia saturated steam , however, would permit operation
at 7,928 Btu / shp -hr, the elimination of the large superheaters, and
a lower operating temperature of the organic coolant. The lower
temperature reduces fouling problems in the reactor and decreases
coolant make-up costs (make- up required as a result of coolant
degradation ) . The 800-psia cycle shown in Fig. 10.11 for the or
ganic system is the same as that used in the boiling-water system
illustrated in Fig. 10.8.
613489 0–62—27
Reactor auxiliary power requirements for the organic system are

somewhat higher than in the pressurized -water system.
10_3.4 Gas- cooled Reactor Systems
The gas-cooled reactor has played a historically important role

in the annals of nuclear energy . The so-called " Daniels Pile” of
1946, which undoubtedly reflected the performance of the still earlier
air-cooled X- 10 Pile at Oak Ridge in 1944, was among the very first
reactors seriously proposed for the production of power. The astute
ness of the designers of this earliest reactor lay in their recognition
of the advantages of achieving very high coolant temperatures and
in their prediction of achievement of such high temperatures. The
gas-cooled reactor is presently the cornerstone of the British nuclear
power program . The Calder Hall type of gas -cooled reactor has
been developed to the point where it is said to be an economically
practical type for base load operation in the United Kingdom. The
French nuclear power effort has also centered around the same basic
reactor type. Unquestionably, much of the attraction of this reactor
type lies in the fact that it is the only type using relatively familiar
materials that can be constructed and operated without isotope sep
aration of some kind, either for fuel or for moderator. The require
ment of operation with natural uranium is a very restrictive one.
With graphite as a moderator, the uranium must be used in a very
dense form , and parasitic absorbers must be held to a very low level .
The only form of uranium that will provide sufficient reactivity in
the graphite-moderated reactor appears to be uranium metal.
Despite the restrictions imposed by natural uranium , a combina
tion of materials has been evolved which has made possible the
British and French reactors currently in operation and under con
struction. The basic materials are graphite as moderator, uranium
metal as fuel, magnesium alloys as fuel jackets, and carbon dioxide
as coolant . Although considerable variation has been evident in the
solutions of the engineering problems of such reactors, the restric
tions imposed by the materials set rather rigorous limitations on
performance. Rapid progress has been made through careful and
ingenious design in approaching the boundaries set by these limita
tions, and the need for circumventing the limitations by basic changes
in reactor materials has been emphasized.
Meanwhile, there has been aa burgeoning of the more easily achieved
reactor concepts, such as the pressurized -water and boiling water
types, and , since these reactor programs have achieved some measure
of success, it is reasonable to ask whether it is desirable to spend the
money and time in an endeavor to develop still another concept
with new and somewhat more difficult problems to be solved. The

1 answer lies in the fact that the gas-cooled reactor is one of the few
types that is not limited by engineering considerations from achiev
ing the high power plant efficiencies and good economic perform
ance which are industry's goal , whether for use on land or at sea.
All the gas-cooled reactor plants in operation at present are low
temperature plants. The Calder Hall reactors operate with a cool
ant (CO2) exit temperature of 637 ° F and produce steam at 200 psia
and 590 ° F. These low-level steam conditions are not conducive to
good thermal efficiency ; hence, the desire to develop gas-cooled re
actors capable of operating at considerably higher temperatures.
The AEC's Maritime Reactors Branch has had the study of gas
cooled reactors for merchant vessels under consideration for a num
ber of years and at present has under way a project to develop, de
sign, build , and test a prototype closed -cycle gas-cooled reactor and
gas -turbine power plant suitable for propelling commercial merchant
vessels. The broad objective is to expand and advance the technology
of gas-cooled systems and components, particularly in the tempera
ture range above 1,300 ° F .
The physics of the existing gas-cooled reactor designs has been
dominated by the need for making the reactor critical with natural
uranium as fuel. The fuel -to -moderator ratio must be chosen near
the value that will give maximum reactivity for the particular re
actor design in question . It should be noted, however, that the
Marine Gas-cooled Reactor design being studied by the AEC's Mari
time Reactors Branch will use enriched uranium as fuel, and this
will remove some of the limitations inherent in the use of natural
uranium .
The most obvious limitation on the thermal performance of the
gas-cooled reactors is the temperature limit of the magnesium -alloy
jacket of the fuel elements , presently about 850°F. Working to this
limit , coolant exit temperatures in the range of from 700 to about
750 ° F can be attained , the higher values being attained at the ex
pense of some decrease in specific power. The specific power of the
reactors is relatively low, ranging from 1.52 Mw per ton of fuel for
the Calder Hall reactors to 2.29 Mw per ton of fuel at the Hinkley
Point Station . It has been stated that with the construction of
thicker walled pressure vessels and with improvements in heat-trans
fer design, the limitation is no longer due to gas heat- transfer con
siderations but to excessive central temperatures in the fuel element.
The limitations of the natural-uranium graphite reactor, which
appear to be inherent, are then : relatively low temperatures, low spe
cific power, and rather short fuel lifetime. Agreement seems to be
general that the most attractive way of improving these character
istics is through the use of uranium dioxide as fuel . Adoption of

this fuel implies that enriched fuel will be used. Once the decision
has been made to adopt this course, the procedures for improving
reactor performances are evident. It is first necessary that fuel
jackets be developed which will withstand considerably higher op
erating temperatures. The oxide fuel can be operated at any tem
perature up to the limiting temperature of the jacket. Subdivision
of the fuel will be necessary, but it is feasible if enriched uranium
is used . Specific power ( the heat generation per unit mass of fis
sionable material) can be increased also by subdivision and if neces
sary by decreasing the over-all reactor size to make possible higher
gas pressure with given pressure -vessel wall thickness. At some
point, specific power per se ceases to be of great importance, and
power density (heat generation per volume of reactor core ) , which
affects the capital cost of the plant, becomes the major consideration .
Further enrichment can make possible increases in power density
through decreases in moderator -to -fuel ratio.
Once the enriched oxide fuel approach has been adopted, the re
maining important question is what to use for fuel jackets. Among
the low -cross -section materials, there appear to be only two possi
bilities : beryllium and zirconium ; and there are serious reservations
as to the ability of zirconium to operate in very hot gases. Beryl
lium appears very promising from the standpoint of performance,
but the fabrication of beryllium - jacketed fuel elements presents prob
lems. Both the British and the French appear to have confidence
in the development of such elements, at least of the unfinned variety.
The alternative to the use of low -cross-section fuel jackets is the
use of jackets made of medium -cross -section materials, and of such
materials stainless steel is an obvious one . If it is assumed that
beryllium jackets will be developed, then the choice between beryl
lium and steel involves balancing the considerably better neutron
economy achievable with the beryllium jackets against a somewhat
higher temperature capability of steel , the presumably lower fabri
cation cost of steel , and possibly differences in performance of the
two materials which may show up in actual use. In a nuclear fuel
economy that is geared to the large -scale separation of isotopes, it
is possible that the advantages of steel will make it economically
attractive, at least for a number of years.
All the existing nuclear power plants using gas-cooled reactors,
as well as some of the designs for advanced gas-cooled reactors un
der investigation , use the conventional steam -turbine cycle. In these
systems the hot gas passing through heat exchangers transfers its
heat to water, and the steam so produced is fed to the turbines. With
the use of high temperatures such a system would produce high
thermal efficiencies. However, the real attractiveness of the high

temperature gas-cooled reactor lies in its ability to make use of the
gas turbine, and almost all gas-cooled reactors considered for use
in ship propulsion systems include gas turbines. The fundamental
advantage of the gas -cooled reactor system lies not only in its ability
to attain higher temperatures from a nuclear heat source but also
in its ability to utilize these higher temperatures more efficiently
through the use of the gas turbine. The high coolant temperature
is used more efficiently because at temperatures of 1,300 ° F and
above the thermodynamic -cycle characteristics favor the gas-turbine
cycle over any steam cycle practical for maritime application. The
importance of high reactor coolant temperature on power plant
efficiency is shown in Fig. 10.12.
The general arrangement of a marine propulsion plant using a
gas- cooled graphite-moderated reactor in conjunction with a closed
cycle gas turbine is shown in Fig. 10.13. The basic reactor system
includes a graphite -moderated reactor with partially enriched fuel
elements cooled by high- pressure helium circulated by a gas-turbine
driven compressor. Helium is supplied to the reactor at 970 psia
O
and 783 ° F through the outer annulus of a double concentric pipe

nozzle. The gas flows upward in the annuli between the graphite
moderator, thermal shields, and reactor vessel wall into the reactor
upper plenum chamber, maintaining the vessel wall at approximately
the incoming gas temperature. It then flows downward through the
individual core channels, emerging from the core at 1,300° F and
exiting from the lower plenum chamber through the inner pipe of
the two concentric pipes mentioned above.
50
EFFICIENCY
40
CENT
,PER
30
20
11
10
800 1000 1200 1400 1600 1800 2000
TURBINE INLET TEMPERATURE, OF
FIG . 10.12 — Efficiency of closed -cycle gas turbine.

412
INTERCOOLER
°F1300 °F
223 °F
100
PSIA
940 PSIA
632 PSIA
630
BTU
2212 BTU
867 BTU
703
CW
GENERATOR
LP
Compres sor HP
Compres sor Turbine
HP Turbine
LP
18
°F1004
100
°F °F
229 PSIA
560
PSIA
400 PSIA
1000 BTU
1842
BTU
707 BTU
874
ACCUMULATOR
REACTOR
P
BY
- ASS
COOLER
REGENERATOR CW
0 AFTERCOOLER
°F293
PSIA
403
952
BTU
°F
856
PSIA
412
BTU
1658
CW
°F783 °F791
BTU
1570 PSIA
970 LOAD
(EXCLUDING
FULL
FLOWS
TYPICAL
)HOTEL
BTU
1580
W. nm -LBS
/HFLOW
R
NSHP (6)
Mw
3,000 7.97 14.125 42,375
10,000 26.28 13.979 139,790
°F600 SERVICE
SHIP'S
TO
STEAM
20,000 52.33 13.919 278,380
1335
BTU PSIG
250
40,000 104.43 13.887 80

555
,4
STEAM 60,000 156.40 13.865 831,900
GENERATOR
LUNITS
BTU
IN
/HEAT
-ABLL
NOTE
CONDENSATE
machinery
cpropulsion
and
reactor
.1ooled
FIG
-—G0.13
as
The nature of the pressurized -water, boiling -water, and organic

moderated systems is such that the reactor is, in many respects, inde
pendent of the propulsion system , although these reactors do respond
to variations in the load. In a closed -cycle gas-cooled system, however,
the reactor is an integral part of the thermodynamic cycle and cannot
be treated independently. Once the thermodynamic cycle is estab
lished, the reactor must be designed to operate within fixed tempera
tures and pressures.
For closed -cycle gas turbines, it is desirable to operate the sys
tem at the highest possible temperature, within practical limits.
In present nuclear technology , it is believed that the fuel -element
surface temperature should not exceed 1,600 ° F. With this limita
tion, the maximum gas temperature allowable is approximately
1,300 ° F ; this value is used in the system shown in Fig. 10.13. A
1,000- psia operating pressure is chosen as a compromise between bet
ter heat transfer (accompanied by slightly higher efficiency ) and
the added complexity and cost of design and construction for higher
pressures.
Two compressors with intercooling are used as a compromise be
tween the additional efficiency obtainable by adding more compressors
and intercoolers and the simplicity and smaller size of a two-com
pressor system . From an efficiency standpoint, the two-compressor
system gives a cycle efficiency of approximately 35 percent compared
to 30 percent for aа . single -compressor system ; whereas the addition of
a third compressor and second intercooler only increases the cycle
efficiency to approximately 37.5 percent. Further complexity would
result in no practical advantage. Under these conditions cycle effi
ciency for helium rises rapidly (with increasing pressure ratio ) to
a peak at a pressure ratio of approximately 2.4 to 2.8 and then
falls off sharply with further increase.
From the compressors the gas enters the high-pressure side of the
regenerator. A simple cycle without regeneration has such low effi
ciency that it is not practicable from the standpoint of economy or
equipment size. Past experience with closed-cycle air systems indi
cates that 90 percent regenerator effectiveness is feasible without ex
cessively large equipment or high-pressure losses. A portion of the
coolant is bypassed from the regenerator discharge and used to gen
erate steam for heating and other auxiliary and hotel requirements.
This portion is returned to the main stream before the gas enters the
reactor.
After being heated to the operating temperature ( 1,300° F ) in
the reactor, the gas passes directly to the high -pressure turbine
throttle. In the high - pressure turbine, sufficient energy is taken from
the gas to drive the compressors and auxiliary generators. The
balance of energy is then given up in the low-pressure turbine to

supply propulsive power, except during periods of low-power ma
neuvering or idling conditions. During these periods, a portion or
all of the stream is throttled through a bypass cooler.
The low -pressure -turbine discharge is still at a rather high tem
perature. The bulk of the heat remaining in this exhaust is returned
to the cycle in the regenerator. The small amount remaining there
after is discarded by means of an aftercooler to return the gas to
the compressor inlet temperature. An accumulator is provided for 1
control purposes. 1
The use of helium as the coolant medium imposes some problems,

but, compared to CO2 , which might be considered as an alterna
tive coolant, helium has decided advantages. The induced radio
activity of CO2, as compared to the negligible helium activation, is
the dominant factor favoring the selection of helium . Shielding is
required for the propulsion system as a result of this induced ac
tivity. The weight penalty associated with CO2 appears to vary 1
from about 150 to 400 tons in the power level range from 10 to 200
Mw . Stated in another way , at 20,000 shp the added weight for a
CO2 system is about 20 lb per shp.
The large containment vessel for this gas-cooled reactor system
necessitates a considerable rearrangement of engine- room machinery
compared with other reactor systems. A large amount of the rotat
ing machinery is installed within the containment vessel, however,
and the over -all space required is no greater than that for the other
nuclear plants, with the exception of the boiling-water system .
The use of a helium turbine virtually limits astern operation to
the use of a variable -pitch propeller or reversing gears and a
clutching arrangement. Variable -pitch propellers have proved quite
successful at relatively low power levels, and manufacturers feel
that larger units can be built. Reversing gears would be cumber
some and quite expensive. Reversible radial-inflow turbines have
been proposed for use with nitrogen.11, 12 These should work as well
with carbon dioxide, but they could not be used with helium because
of the greater number of stages required. The propulsion system
shown in Fig. 10.13 is based on the use of a variable- pitch propeller.
An emergency take -home boiler would be used in the gas-cooled
system , as in the steam cycles; but in the gas- cooled system it is
necessary to install an emergency auxiliary steam turbogenerator and
a steam turbine that can be clutched into the propulsion gear train .
This turbogenerator also would supply power for the gas coolant
circulating system . The emergency boiler is connected into the
auxiliary steam generator in such a manner that feed water to the
steam generator passes through it, keeping the boiler constantly
filled with hot water to operating level . This enables it to be brought

up to pressure sufficiently fast to supply emergency power for reactor
cooling during reactor shutdowns.
1024 SIGNIFICANT FACTORS IN DESIGN AND OPERATION OF

NUCLEAR PROPULSION SYSTEMS
It should be apparent from the preceding discussion of the various

reactor systems that those most feasible for use in marine propulsion
plants are the water-cooled and -moderated plants since these are the
only systems for which a considerable amount of practical operating
experience is available. Although gas-cooled reactors have been used
extensively in England, they have all been low -temperature systems,
and these are not considered suitable for shipboard use. If gas
cooled reactors are to be applied successfully in the propulsion of
ships, they will inevitably have to be high -temperature units, pref
erably operating in conjunction with gas turbines.
Thus far, no large closed-cycle gas-turbine plants have been built.
The largest to date is a 13,000-kw coal -dust-fired plant in Germany
designed by Escher Wyss. It is anticipated, however, that closed
cycle gas-turbine plants will continue to improve as more experience
is gained in their construction and operation . The first Escher Wyss
2,000 -kw unit , designed and built prior to 1945, was over 31 ft long
and weighed 25 tons ; whereas the 1954 model of the same power
rating was less than 10 ft long and weighed 71/2 tons. It is believed
that these improvements will continue but perhaps not to this same
degree. However, improved technology and experience should tend
to reduce the cost and weight of gas-cycle marine power plants by
approximately 20 percent by 1965 and 25 percent by 1970. Over -all
efficiencies will also improve as higher temperature systems are devel
oped . If, during this same period of development, the high -tempera
ture gas- cooled reactor is also brought to the point of practical
success, the union of the gas-cooled reactor and the closed -cycle gas
turbine should make possible a very efficient nuclear propulsion plant
for maritime use.
Examination of the cost component comparisons of the nuclear
reactor plants that presently are being considered for marine use
indicates that nearly all items of the organic -moderated systems are
less expensive than corresponding items in other reactor systems.
There are three items in the organic system which will have a pre
dominant effect upon resulting costs, namely, the reactor pressure
vessel, reactor internals, and containment. Because of the very high
boiling point and low corrosion damage characteristics of the ter
phenyl moderator, it is possible to use carbon-steel reactor internals
and a carbon-steel pressure vessel designed to withstand only 150 psi.

Added to these advantages is the fact that, since the moderator will
not flash into vapor upon rupture of the reactor system , it is possible
to eliminate the high -pressure containment enclosure . Other parts
of the organic system are also affected by these moderator charac
teristics. The control rods, for instance, are less expensive since
high -pressure seals are not required . The reactor piping is less ex
pensive because the terphenyl fluid in the system becomes only mildly
radioactive, thus reducing the shielding requirements. All these cost
reductions result in a considerable decrease in the total reactor sys
tem cost , even though a steam generator is required for the propul
sion system . The principal disadvantage at present of the organic
system is the uncertainty concerning the stability of the organic
fluids under continued exposure to high neutron and thermal flux.
Costs of the component parts of the gas-cooled system are substan
tially higher than corresponding costs of the other reactor systems.
Again , as with the organic systems, there are three significant items
exerting a major effect upon these costs, namely, the reactor pressure
vessel , reactor internals, and shielding. It has been estimated that
the gas-cooled reactor vessel is approximately 7 times more expensive
than the organic -moderated vessel , the reactor internals ( including
graphite) are approximately 10 times more expensive than those for
the organic -moderated type, and the shielding is some 15 percent
more expensive."
A limiting condition for the gas-cooled reactor is the fuel-pin sur
face temperature, 1.600 ° F . A second limiting factor is the pressure
drop through the core, 30 psi maximum , due to over-all cycle effi
ciency considerations. Since gas is a poor heat-transfer medium, the
limiting surface temperature of the fuel element restricts the quan
tity of heat which can be transferred from a given size pin. As a
result, large fuel surface areas are required ; this means that to
obtain sufficient neutron moderation the graphite moderator and
reflector must be large in size. Since the specific volume of gas
coolant is high , a large volume must pass through the core to remore
a given quantity of heat. This, in turn , results in rather large
coolant passages to keep the pressure drop to a reasonable value.
These combined factors result in a much larger reactor system
than the corresponding steam , water, and organic systems. The
pressures and temperatures of the gas are also very high ( 970 psia
and 1,300 ° F for the systems considered ), and this increases the
already high prices (owing to size considerations) of the pressure
and containment vessels. The large pressure vessel also results in
extensive and costly shielding.
The cost of the propulsion system associated with the gas -cooled
reactor is approximately twice that of the organic -moderated system .
The gas -cooled system is slightly more efficient than the steam cycles,
but this factor is offset by the difference in the technology of the
steam cycles vs. closed gas cycles. No operating closed -cycle gas
turbines of the sizes required for marine plants are in existence, and
the costs reflect this lack of development.
With regard to the boiling-water reactor, its costs are approxi
mately 20 percent greater than those of the organic -moderated sys
tem . These additional costs are due to the high pressure of the
steam system and to the materials corrosion problem . The pressure
vessel is a high -pressure unit clad with stainless steel ; the internals
are stainless steel, and a large pressure-tight carbon -steel contain
ment enclosure is required. The control rods and primary piping
are more expensive, again because of pressure and corrosion prob
lems. Owing to N16 activation carried into the propulsion system ,
additional shielding is required , and this shielding cost is fairly sub
stantial. The effect of all these cost additions is reduced somewhat
by the elimination of a secondary steam generator. Finally, the
propulsion system of the boiling water reactor is slightly more ex
pensive than the organic system owing to the small auxiliary steam
generator that supplies nonradioactive steam to the auxiliaries and
ship services.
The pressurized -water reactor system and propulsion system are
very similar to those of the boiling water reactor. The principal
cost differences are caused by the indirect cycle of the pressurized
water system and consequent additional steam -generating equipment
required. The reactor vessel also is slightly more expensive because
of the higher pressures in the reactor system , and the containment
enclosure is higher in price since a stronger vessel is needed to con
tain the additional stored energy in the water system which might
be released in the event of a reactor system rupture. Fuel costs of a
pressurized -water reactor are higher than for a boiling water reactor
owing to lower efficiency, thicker fuel-element cladding, and greater
neutron leakage.
Most reactor system capital costs are expected to decrease some
what as development continues, even though labor and material costs
are expected to increase. Fuel costs on nuclear ships are expected to
decrease considerably between 1965 and 1970 owing to improvements
in technology and increased production ; whereas the cost of fossil
fuels will be steadily rising in the same period. In addition to the
cost reductions mentioned , certain other items, such as nuclear super
heat, may assist in decreasing costs. Although it is doubtful that
economic nuclear superheat will be available for shipboard use dur
ing the next few years, there is a fair possibility that it will be
available after 1967 or 1968, after the feasibility of nuclear super
heat has been demonstrated in land -based nuclear plants. It is an

ticipated that nuclear superheat studies now in progress will result
in a power reactor with an integral nuclear superheater within the
next few years. Successful demonstration of this concept will result
ultimately in the inclusion of superheaters in power reactors in the
maritime field , provided the capital cost increase for the superheater
is not excessive. In any event, the use of nuclear superheat is not
likely to result in large cost reductions because only slight increases
in cycle efficiency will be attained by its use. Major cost improve
ments will result from reducing capital costs, but increased fuel costs
may balance increased efficiency in small maritime applications.
Improvements in fabricating techniques, reduction of complexity,
better understanding of reactor operations, and selection of less ex
pensive materials will permit future cost reduction of the reactor
vessel and internals, instrumentation , pumps, piping, and purifica
tion systems, and perhaps even the elimination of the containment
vessel or at least a considerable reduction in the cost of containment.
The recently proposed use of pressure suppression containment, in
which cold water absorbs the energy of a steam release , is a prom
ising concept that may bring about a considerable reduction in both
the size and the cost of containment enclosures.
Further possibilities for cost reduction of the boiling- and pres
surized -water reactors lie in the area of heat transfer and reactor
stability. Better understanding of the burn -out mechanism, improve
ment of UO , thermal conductivity ( by compacting, inclusion of
wires, or other methods ), and inclusion of a thermal bonding medium
between the oxide fuel and the jacket are all areas in which sub
stantial cost decreases could occur. This is especially true of the
boiling water reactor, where much is yet unknown about boiling
heat transfer.
Similar considerations concern possible future cost reduction of
other reactor systems since both the organic-moderated reactor and
the high -temperature gas-cooled reactor lend themselves to techno
logical and manufacturing improvements owing to their early state
of development. Although an experimental organic-moderated re
actor has been operated, there is still no practical experience avail
able with this type of system to adequately measure its future poten
tial; the same consideration, of course, applies to the high-tempera
ture gas -cooled reactor.
REFERENCES
1. D. L. CONKLIN et al., Economics of Nuclear and Conventional Merchant

Ships, Superintendent of Documents , Government Printing Office, Wash
ington 25, D.C., June 30, 1958.
2. Costs of Nuclear Power, USAEC Report TID -8506 , Office of Operations
Analysis and Forecasting, July 1959.
3. Final Report on Study for 20,000-8hp Nuclear Propulsion System for Tanker,
Vol . III , General Motors Corp., Research Staff, April 1957.
4. Symposium on the Reprocessing of Irradiated Fuels, USAEC Report TID
7534 , May 25, 1957.
5. LESTER M. GOLDSMITH , S.S. Atlantic Seaman, Mech . Eng ., 73 : 377–385 (May
1951 ) .
6. M. L. IRELAND, M. D. WHEELER, and L. E. SPENCER, The Performance and
Design of Machinery for the 26,800 -ton Esso Supertankers Built at New
port News Shipbuilding & Drydock Co. , Paper presented at Nov. 30, 1950,
meeting of the Chesapeake Section of the Society of Naval Architects and
Marine Engineers.
7. F. L. Russo and E. K. SULLIVAN , How Mariners Perform on Sea Trials,
Marine Eng., 58 ( 5 ) : 111-113 ( May 1953 ) .
8. H. P. SMITH , Compilation of Organic Moderator and Coolant Technology,
USAEC Report TID - 7007 ( Pt . 1 ) , Jan. 24, 1957.
9. H. P. SMITH , Compilation of Organic Moderator and Coolant Technology,
USAEC Report TID - 7007 ( Pt. 2 , Del. ), Jan. 24 , 1957 .
10. C. A. TRILLING, R. H. GERCKE, and E. F. WEISNER, Proceedings of the SRE
OURE Forum , Los Angeles, Calif. , Feb. 12-13, 1958, USAEC Report
TID-7553, May 1958.
11. R. P. GIBLON and G. H. Kurz, Closed -cycle Gas -turbine Nuclear Propulsion
Plants for Merchant Ships, Motor Ship ( London ), 37 ( 442 ) : 518-522
( March 1957 ) .
12. Nuclear Propulsion , Escher Wyss Closed - cycle Gas -turbine Proposal, Ship
ping World and World Shipping, Sept. 29, 1950.
1
1
1
1
Chapter 11
ECONOMICS OF NUCLEAR PROPULSION
)LUI INTRODUCTION
Although the various practical and economic problems in the
application of nuclear energy to the propulsion of commercial ships
remain to be solved, there is ample reason to believe that the economic
advantage of nuclear power over conventional power in this field is
sufficient to warrant the investigations and development programs
being carried on in the United States and in other countries. 1The
principal economic advantages are :
1. Elimination of the space and weight requirements for fuel oil ,
resulting in increased cargo -carrying capacity , particularly in
tankers and ore carriers .
2. Longer cruising range, making nuclear -powered ships virtually
independent of fuel supplies outside home ports.
3. Operation at higher speeds than those now economically feasible
for conventionally powered ships.
At present the high capital cost of nuclear ships and the high cost
of fuel prevent the immediate attainment of these advantages. For
tunately, there are many reasons for believing that as nuclear tech
nology develops both capital and fuel costs will decrease. At the
same time it is expected that conventional fuel costs will tend to
increase. These factors, working in opposite directions, should give
nuclear -powered ships a considerable economic advantage in future
years. Certain studies and cost analyses of nuclear and conventional
ships indicate an economic advantage even at the present time ( Sec .
13-3 ). As in all economic comparisons of this kind, the accuracy of
the conclusions depends upon the selection of proper basic premises.
Many economic analyses of nuclear vs. conventional ships are open
to question, largely because of the almost complete lack of construc
tion or operating experience with nuclear ships.
(11-2 COMPARATIVE ECONOMIC STUDIES

11-2.1 Early Studies
J
Economic investigations of the nuclear propulsion of merchant
ships have been sponsored by the AEC for a number of years. As
421
early as 1953, the Newport News Shipbuilding & Drydock Co. began
for the AEC a study whose results have been presented to the AEC
in a two - part report.1, 2 The first part considered mixed dry -cargo
ships; the second part , oil tankers.
For the first section of this study, preliminary reactor plant designs
were prepared for ships of 12,000, 22,500, and 50,000 shp per shaft.
The machinery weights and space requirements for each were com
pared with corresponding data for their oil- fired counterparts. Then
the 22,500 -shp reactor plant was selected for refinement into a refer
ence design for use in a study of the nuclear power problems that
appear unique to merchant ship propulsion.
Once the reference design had been completed, the over-all study
was implemented by a study of American merchant ship economics.
The economic study was restricted to merchant cargo operations in
the three main categories: mixed cargo , oil , and ore. For mixed
dry -cargo operations the ships considered were the C2, 6,000 shp ; the
C3, 8,500 shp ; and the Mariner, 22,500 shp. The study of oil -tanker
operation considered five classes of ships, varying in size from 19,000
to 39,000 dead -weight tons. The ships were studied at various
speeds, and machinery was rated to correspond to the size and speed
of the ship. All ships except the smallest were designed to carry
a full load of gasoline, although they normally would carry crude
oil from the producing area to the refinery. A 22,500-shp reactor
was considered as the power plant for all ships.
The oil-carrying trade was investigated because it was evident that
tankers can take better advantage of the inherent capabilities of a
nuclear plant since their port time is very small in relation to over
all voyage time. However, the fact that the cargo moves in only one
direction was given due consideration. In the course of the work
several major oil companies owning or chartering large tanker fleets
cooperated by supplying average industry cost data on the trade
routes selected for analysis.
Although the results of this study are difficult to evaluate in terms
of dollars and cents, the conclusions are in accord with those of some
later economic investigations and with present-day thinking. The
study indicated that oil tankers have an inherent advantage over the
mixed dry -cargo vessels in providing investment possibilities for a
nuclear plant owing to the larger fuel -oil cargos carried. In the
dry -cargo class of ships, the study indicated that only the Mariner
class appeared to offer a high enough investment to be attractive for
a nuclear plant.
11-2.2 1958 Report on Economics of Nuclear and Conventional Ships
A much more involved and comprehensive study of the economics

of nuclear and conventional merchant ships was made during 1957
ECONOMICS OF NUCLEAR PROPULSION 423
and 1958 by the Atomic Energy Division of American Radiator &

Standard Sanitary Corp.3 In this study four different reactor types
were examined over ranges of sizes, application, and trade-route
variables ; economic predictions were made as of 1957 and for 1965
and 1970. The entire analysis covered some 30,000 ship, power-plant,
and trade - route combinations.
The approach used was to determine the capital and operating
costs for ships with nuclear and conventionally powered propulsion
plants, exclusive of any research and development that might be
required for the nuclear ships. This determination was made in
detail for the following major types of ships: ( 1 ) general-cargo
ships, ( 2 ) tankers, ( 3 ) ore carriers, ( 4) passenger ships, and ( 5 )
passenger - cargo ships.
The nuclear propulsion plants considered were : ( ) 1 ) pressurized
water reactor with saturated steam turbine ; ( 2 ) boiling water reactor
with saturated steam turbine; ( 3 ) organic -moderated reactor with
saturated steam turbine ; and ( 4 ) gas- cooled reactor with gas turbine.
These reactor types were selected after analysis of many reactor
systems on the basis of technical feasibility , advanced stage of devel
opment, and promise for shipboard application. 1
Four basic studies were made in the project : ship design ; ship
cost and cost projection ( cost in future years) ; nuclear power plant
design and cost ; and propulsion system optimization for ship
board use . Y
The purpose of the ship-design study was to predict trends for
both nuclear and conventionally powered vessels. A concept of " ship
families” was developed to determine the effects caused by changes
in propulsion plant types and operating and design characteristics
such as speed and ship size. With these ship families, speed -length
ratios, block coefficients, and other ship -design characteristics were
adjusted . In this manner each ship and power plant combination
was shown to its best advantage, and adjustments were made to the
ship -design characteristics to compensate for the differences between
the conventional and nuclear plants.
The procedure followed consisted in utilizing the cost and the
performance characteristics of various ships and power plants by
the methods outlined above and in simulating mathematically the
series of events the ships would experience in sailing on specific trade
routes. A computer was used to obtain the results from this simula
tion procedure because approximately 30,000 separate complete com
binations were involved, representing some 5 to 10 million individual
computations. The actual mathematical operations performed on the, ?
original data were not particularly complicated, however, and pro
duced two kinds of results : ( 1 ) the cost per ton of cargo ( or cost
613489 0-62 28
C
per passenger) and ( 2 ) the relative net revenue per unit carried
which is required to give a fixed annuat percentage return on origi
nal invested capital.
Some of the main conclusions reached in this study are quoted in
the following :
1. Nuclear ships can compete economically ( in 1957) with conven
tional ships on long trade routes at high speeds.
2. The competitive position of nuclear ships will improve in 1965
and 1970.
3. Nuclear fuel costs are, in most instances, lower than conventional
fuel costs.
4. Nuclear ship capital costs are 10 to 50 percent higher than capi
tal costs for conventional ships ( except for gas-cooled reactor
powered ships).
5. Capital costs for nuclear ships will decrease with respect to
capital costs for conventional ships in 1965 and 1970.
6. Ore carriers and tankers have the best potential for the economic
application of nuclear power to merchant ship propulsion.
7. Nuclear power is particularly attractive in trades that require
small ships on long trade routes.
8. Ore carriers powered with organic -moderated or boiling water
reactors ( in 1957) can move cargo on 16,000- to 20,000 -mile
round-trip routes at 19 to 22 knots at the same unit cargo cost
as conventionally powered ships. By 1965, large nuclear ore
carriers operating at 21 to 22 knots on long trade routes will be
able to carry cargo at about nine -tenths the unit cargo cost
incurred by counterpart conventional ships at the same speed.
Moreover, these large nuclear ships will be competitive on a
cost per ton basis at 18 to 19 knots on the long trade routes,
and at 19 to 20 knots on routes as short as 12,000 miles round
trip .
9. After ore carriers, tankers are the next most promising applica
tion for nuclear power in merchant ships. Large nuclear
tankers (in 1957 ) can carry cargo on 20,000-mile round -trip
routes at lower unit cargo costs than conventionally powered
tankers, at speeds greater than 22 knots. In 1965, the area of
competitiveness for such ships will begin at 12,000-mile trade
routes at any speed over 17 knots, and the large nuclear tankers
will be economically attractive on routes as short as 8,000 miles
round trip. 1
Third in economic attractiveness for nuclear propulsion are gen
eral cargo ships. Over the range of distances, speeds, and ship sizes
analyzed , there appeared only one application in 1957 wherein the
nuclear cargo ships were economically competitive with their con
ventional counterparts. This applied to a 20,000-mile trade route

at the fastest speeds for which these ships are designed. In 1965 ,
however, the analysis indicated that there would be applications both
at 20,000 miles and 16,000 miles where competitive unit cargo costs
can be attained by nuclear ships.
Nuclear passenger ships were shown to be competitive in 1957 at
round -trip distances of 16,000 to 20,000 miles. The break -even point
is achieved first with the smallest ship. In 1965 and 1970 the analy
sis showed a trend to slower speeds as far as the break -even point
is concerned . Again, the smallest ship in any given trade route
combination is economically the best application for nuclear power.
The nuclear-powered passenger-cargo ships analyzed did not achieve
as low an operating cost as conventional ships, except in 1965 and
1970. At these times, there appear to be only two applications at
20,000 miles where the break -even point is attained, and these can
be attained only with the smallest ship size.
Quoting further from the report :
" The particular nuclear propulsion systems which offer the earliest
opportunity for achieving a competitive position with fossil- fueled
powered plants are the organic -moderated and boiling-water reactor
systems. In all the cases mentioned above, these two types ofreactor
propulsion systems are the ones that are able to compete with con
ventional vessels. Both reactor types present a promising potential
for the early economic introduction of nuclear technology into the
field of merchant ship propulsion . From the standpoint of their
comparative developmental status, the most attractive system for
nuclear ships in the immediate future is the boiling water reactor ,
and the most attractive system for the near future is the organic
moderated reactor."
1
In general, the analysis showed that nuclear ships are increasingly
more competitive with conventional ships as trade- ronte length and
speed increase. This results from the fact that nuclear propulsion
plants can deliver large amounts of power and travel great distances
without sacrificing cargo space for fuel requirements. In addition,
as the amount of power required increases, nuclear fuel costs become
lower in relation to conventional fuels. ]
Although this analysis was extremely comprehensive and although
some of its conclusions agree with those of some later investigations,
some of the conclusions may be questioned. The conclusions as to
the relative economies of different propulsion systems are based upon
direct comparisons between ships with different payloads (cargo
carrying capacity ). Because ship economies are very sensitive to
differences in pay load , economic comparisons normally are based
upon ships carrying the same cargo the same distance at a given
speed ; otherwise misleading conclusions are reached. Checks made

on the data used in the analysis indicate that if payload is equalized,
it would substantially improve the relative position of the conven
tional cargo carriers ( general, ore, oil ) as compared to the nuclear
versions, while having little or no effect on the passenger -carrying
ships.
It has also been pointed out that the design and operating costs
used are based upon an unrealistic fueling practice, which results in
the carriage of abnormally large quantities of fuel oil and small
amounts of cargo. This has a significant effect upon the economic
comparison of the conventional and nuclear ships on long voyages
and accounts in part for the disparity mentioned above.
In the case of the conventional ships, in the analysis the assump
tion is made that fuel for the entire round trip is taken at the load
ing or dead -weight point in the voyage. The reason for this assump
tion was, as stated in the report, that the computational method could
not simulate refueling at more than one point in the trade routes.
This assumption virtually doubles the amount of fuel carried as
compared to a ship that refuels at each end of the run , which is
common practice on long trade routes and is an economical practice
on all lengths of route when cargo is plentiful. For example, in the
round -the -world service with a route length of 27,000 miles, the long
est leg ever contemplated without refueling is about 12,000 miles.
European diesel ships are designed for a fuel capacity of about
16,000 miles, which is used only when cargo conditions are poor and
fuel can be purchased at a low -price port. When cargo is plentiful
and dead -weight capacity is being utilized, fuel normally would be
purchased as often as every 3,000 miles. Even in the case of tankers,
calculations show that at a normal charter rate for the route from
the Persian Gulf to New York , the profit from additional cargo
carried as a result of fueling at both ends of the trip is more than
10 times the added value of purchasing half the fuel oil at a higher
price.
The assumed fueling practice has a very significant effect upon the
payload capacity and consequently on the transportation cost per
ton . In a particular case, the payloads given in the study for a cer
tain size ship at slightly over 21 knots are 9,700 tons for the nuclear
ship and 6,350 tons for the conventional ship. These payloads are
based upon fueling once per round trip. However, if it is assumed
that the ship would be fueled twice instead of only once per round
trip, then , at the highest speed point, the comparison of cargo car
ried and costs per ton is as follows :
Nuclear ship Conventional ship Perised conrentional
9,700 tons of cargo, 6,350 tons of cargo, 8,550 tons of cargo,
about $ 16.28 per ton . about $ 17.21 per ton . about $ 13.00 per ton .
Thus, instead of the nuclear ship's transportation cost being $1 per
ton cheaper, it is actually some $3 per ton more expensive.
The basic objective in ship economics, as well as in the economics
of most transportation systems, is a comparison of the costs of alter
native systems performing identical functions. In ships it should be
considered that the identical function is to carry the same cargo the
same distance at the same speed, or to carry a gross amount of cargo
at a regular frequency over a given distance. Other things, such as
the type of propulsion plant, may be economically compared in two
ships only if the three basic characteristics are maintained. Other
wise the differences in construction costs, operating costs, earning
power, and return on investment are meaningless. These three basic
characteristics were not maintained in the economic study under con
sideration ; all the data except those relating to passenger ships are
based upon comparisons of ships that are not true counterparts since
they are not equal in pay load .
The ship family concept used in the analysis provided an array of
ship sizes and speeds for a given type to be utilized in the study
of the relative costs of the two types of propulsion. Each family is
based upon a parent vessel of reasonable characteristics, but many
of the variations are not practical , feasible ships, as conceded in the
report. The ships developed in the study are based upon a concept
of conversion rather than integrated design. Following this prin
ciple, alternate propulsion systems (one conventional, four nuclear)
of a selected horsepower are substituted in one basic hull. The re
sulting changes in cargo space and weight are then estimated, and
the depth of the ship is varied in an attempt to keep the volume and
weight changes comparable. This procedure is repeated for a series
of horsepowers and hull forms for each of three hull sizes of each
ship type .
Emerging from this process are few designs that could be con
sidered optimum or practical, except for the " parent " conventional
ship of each type. Some of the designs arrived at are unstable and
could not remain afloat .
Despite these critical observations, the report of this investigation
is of considerable significance in demonstrating the interrelation of
the many factors that govern the economies of nuclear propulsion.
Although some of its conclusions may be questioned , the method of
analysis used should be of value in making future economic compari
sons between nuclear and conventional ships. It is by far the most
extensive analytical study of nuclear ship propulsion that has been
made, and there is considerable technical data in the report that
should be useful to others working in this area of nuclear power
development. Perhaps the most informative results for the reactor

designer are those that specify the major performance and cost
characteristics of the reactors which were arrived at in the analysis.
These may be considered as targets that must be attained if the eco
nomic relations predicted in the analysis are to hold . In the case of
the ore carrier, for example ( judged to be the most promising appli
cation ), the nuclear reactor and machinery cost for a boiling water
plant of 45,000 shp was estimated to be $13 million or $289 per shaft
horsepower. This corresponds to $387 per electric kilowatt if the
power output is converted to electrical units. This cost applies to
a natural-circulation plant provided with a containment structure
that would contain all the primary coolant in the event of a rupture
of the reactor primary system .
For the boiling water reactor in 1957, the fuel cost is estimated
to consist of a unit variable cost of 0.92 mills /kw ( t) -hr plus a fixed
cost ( inventory ) of $ 720 per day, for a 45,000 -shp vessel .
At the power level of 45,000 shp, the operating weight of the
boiling -water reactor plant, including reactor, containment, shield
ing, and propulsion machinery, is estimated at about 70 pounds per
shaft horsepower. This figure compares with 365 pounds per shaft
horsepower for the N.S. Savannah.
11-3 ECONOMIC ANALYSES OF INDIVIDUAL NUCLEAR PROPULSION

CONCEPTS
11-3.1 General
[ In addition to the general comparisons of the economics of nuclear

and conventional merchant ships made early in the Maritime Nuclear
Propulsion Program , a number of economic studies have been made
of individual nuclear ship concepts, such as described in Chap . 13
on nuclear tankers. These analyses cover the costs of various reactor
systems for propulsion application , usually with respect to a par
ticular size and type vessel . Economic analyses of nuclear and con
ventional merchant ships have also been made in Great Britain and
Japan .
11-3.2 Economics of Closed- cycle Boiling -water Reactor Plant for
Tanker
This analysis, by the American Machine & Foundry Co.,' was made
primarily to establish the economics of a tanker powered by a closed
cycle boiling water reactor, to compare the transportation costs of
the nuclear tanker to the conventional design, and to determine the
important parameters affecting this economic analysis. The analysis

was based upon the cost data developed for the reference design,
a 38,000 -dwt tanker powered by a 22,000 -shp propulsion plant of
either nuclear or conventional design (Sec, 12-3.3 ). The develop
ment and first-ship engineering costs involved in construction were
not included in the evaluation of the two types of ships. The con
ventional-design construction cost was based on an “ operational
ship , ” i.e., a ship the design of which is in existence . The nuclear
design was based on a “ second ship ,” i.e., the ship built after the
prototype has been developed . The engineering features of this ship
are briefly presented in Sec. 10-3.3. Various size vessels and power
plants were investigated from an economic standpoint to determine
the most favorable economic size ship for the nuclear application.
This investigation indicated that without government subsidy the
operating cost for the nuclear ship is consistently higher than for
the conventional ship. For a 38,000 -dwt tanker the transportation
cost on a typical voyage was estimated at $1.954 per barrel of cargo
as against $ 1.675 per barrel for a conventional tanker. The main
reason for the higher cost of nuclear transportation is the higher
capital equipment cost for nuclear ships.
The extrapolation toward larger vessel sizes showed that optimum
conditions for a nuclear ship are approximately 65,000 dwt and
26,000 shp, with a sea speed of 17.3 knots. Based on current prices
for nuclear equipment and nuclear fuel, the transportation cost for
such a ship would be $ 1.44 per barrel as compared to $ 1.28 for
an optimum conventional ship having the same weight but only
20,000 shp.
This study pointed out that in order to reach a point in nuclear
technology and equipment standardization where nuclear ships can
compete economically, it may be necessary to subsidize the construc
tion of nuclear ships as long as they remain at an economic disad
vantage. The report + covering the analysis suggests a means for
such a subsidy. It is shown that, on the basis of present costs, to
be competitive a 65,000 -dwt tanker with a 22,000-shp nuclear pro
pulsion plant would require a construction subsidy that makes up
89.5 percent of the incremental construction cost for a nuclear ship
as against a conventional ship. As nuclear transportation costs
decrease through improvements in technology, the percentage for this
subsidy could be reduced .
A comparison of the effect of different factors, fuel cost , shielding
weight, etc., upon the transportation cost as obtained in this investi
gation is given as follows:
1. Effect of variation in fuel cost ( for a 38,000 -dwt 22,000-shp

tanker on a 23,662 -mile round -trip voyage ) :
Transportation cost per barrel
Description Conrentional Nuclear
Fuel costs based on current prices . Nuclear fuel
costs at $30 per megawatt-day and conventional
fuel costs at $2.60 per barrel. Minimum shield
ing weight. Capital costs based on current quo
tations with no research and development.
Engineering included .. $0. 675 $ 1 . 954
Nuclear fuel costs at $21 per megawatt -day and
conventional fuel costs at $2.88 per barrel . Min
imum shielding weight. Capital costs based on
current quotations with no research and develop
ment. Engineering included .. 1. 721 1. 833
2. Effect of variation in plant shielding weight :

Transportation cost per barrel
Description Conventional Nuclear
Nuclear fuel costs at $30 per megawatt-day. Cap
ital costs based on current quotations with no re
search and development. Engineering included . $ 1 . 954 $2. 010
3. Effect of variation in construction costs : The detailed analysis

demonstrated that interest and amortization charges on the
capital equipment comprise almost 50 percent of the total an
nual costs in transporting cargo. It is apparent that a reduc
tion in the cost of construction of the nuclear-powered vessel
will do more to reduce the transportation costs than any other
single factor.
4. Effect of size and speed on transportation costs : The cost data
required to perform the analysis of various size tankers and
their horsepower requirements were obtained by extrapolation
of the detailed cost analysis performed for the reference 38,000
dwt 22,000 -shp design . The transportation cost of a family of
ships ranging in size from 32,000 to 100,000 dwt was performed .
The horsepower rating of the power plants for these tankers
range from 14,000 to 30,000 shp. The results of this analysis
indicated that the optimum conventional tanker is about 65,000
dwt and 20,000 shp. The corresponding sea speed for this
tanker is 15.8 knots. For the nuclear vessel, the optimum condi
tions were shown to be approximately 65,000 dwt and 26,000
shp, with a sea speed of 17.3 knots. Transportation costs for
the conventional and nuclear ships are $ 1.28 and $ 1.11 per barrel ,
respectively.
The analysis performed in this study, therefore, does not show a
nuclear ship to advantage as compared to a conventional design. In
an attempt to approach the problem from a different point of view,

an additional comparison using twin - screw designs was made. This
analysis was based on vessels from 65,000 to 100,000 dwt powered by
two 22,000-shp plants. In general, it was found that twin -screw
designs appear to offer no economic advantage as opposed to single
screw designs.
11-3.3 Economic Performance of 60,000-dwt Direct-cycle Boiling
water Reactor
A more recent economic investigation of a 60,000-dwt 27,300-shp

tanker utilizing a direct -cycle boiling water reactor propulsion sys
tem shows an operating cost for the nuclear ship only slightly above
that for its conventional counterpart.5 This analysis is based upon
the reference design (Maritime boiling water reactor) provided by
the Maritime Administration . A comparison of the 1963 annual
operating costs for this ship , assuming United States construction
and operation, is given in Table 11,7.
Based on the assumption employed in this investigation, the direct
cycle natural-circulation boiling -water propulsion system installed
in a 60,000 -dwt tanker and operating in 1963 will be within 8 per
cent of the economic performance of the conventional ship of similar
size. The capital costs for the reference design as developed for the
T7 tanker nuclear system were $ 160 per shaft horsepower, and the
fuel cost was 3.9 mills per shaft horsepower.
Table 11.2 is a tabulation of the major plant characteristics and
the expected goals of the boiling water reactor, The T7 design, as
developed in May 1959, is presented along with projected results
from development work that, in part, is now under way or would
be conducted in parallel with a ship design and construction sched
ule to start in 1960 and to be completed in 1963 or 1964. In addi
tion, characteristics are shown for a second ship , obtained by com
bining the best features of the first ship and innovations resulting
from the research and development work now in progress aimed at
reducing capital and fuel costs.
11-34 Economics of the Organic-moderated and -cooled Reactor
Atomies International has estimated the cost of the organic -moder
ated and -cooled reactor tanker, i.e. , the 60,000 -dwt T7 tanker ( Sec.
12–3.4 ) . All costs in this investigation are based on a four -year
construction schedule, assuming an initial design -study contract, in
cluding research and development, the ship to be accepted by about
- July 1963
Tablet1 - COMPARISON OF 1963 ANNUAL OPERATING COSTS FOR

T7 TANKER
Item Conventional MBUR
Crew's wages . $435, 000 $435 , 000
Subsistence 35, 000 35 , 000
Stores and supplies- 70, 000 70, 000
Maintenance and refueling 288, 000 305,000
Insurance . 240, 000 * 300, 000
Port and canal fees . 135 , 000 135, 000
Interest and depreciationt- 1 , 352, 000 1 , 905, 000
Miscellaneous I .. 21 , 000 21 , 000
Total cost , excluding fuel .. 2, 576, 000 3, 206, 000

Annual fuel cost g.. 822, 000 807, 000
Total annual operating cost .. 3 , 398, 000 4, 013, 000
Long tons cargo per year - 368, 220 402, 560

Cost per ton of cargo. $ 9. 24 $9.97
*Based on current rates for land - based plants, plus 10 percent contingency. Assumes availability ofequir
alent N.s. Saran nah indemnity coverage from U.S. Government.
Conventional tanker capitalized at $ 16,900,000 complete. Nuclear tanker capitalized at $ 23,800,100.
Interest and depreciation computed at 8 percent per year.
* Includes annual radiation surveys for nuclear ship.
$ Bunker C fuel oil at $2.70 per barrel. Specific fuel rate : 0.50 lb per shaſt horsepower- hour. Nuclear fuel
fabrication cost at $68 per pound of uranium , $12 per gram of plutonium credit; all uranium lease charges and
reprocessing costs included . Shaft horsepower -hour per year, 207,000,000 .
Table 11.2 - MARITIME BOILING -WATER REACTOR DEVELOPMENT

INCENTIVES
Item Peference T7 Improred Potential
Weight, lb /shp . 170 140 < 125

Height, ft . 52 43 < 35
Capital cost installed per shaft horsepower. $ 460 $ 150 < $ 130
Fuel cost, mills/ shp -hr--- 3. 9 3. 5 < 3.0
( a ) Capital Costs. Estimated costs for the major items of equip

ment in the reactor and steam systems are evaluations based upon
quotations or estimates from manufacturers. The DeLaval Steam
Turbine Co. furnished preliminary quotations on the conventional
propulsion equipment. The engineering, design, and start-up cost
applies to the reactor and propulsion machinery only. It includes
preliminary engineering, final engineering, field engineering, operator
training, start -up, initial operation ( including consumable materials
but excluding fuel), and the charge for manuals. Engineering of the
ship is not included in this charge. The cost of the initial core load
ing (plus nine spare fuel elements ), including escalation , packaging,
and shipping, is $ 905,600. This cost is not capitalized as part of the
construction cost of the plant .
The capital -cost summary for the reactor and propulsion system
is presented in Table 113. All costs are contingent upon the research
and development program now under way.
( b) Fuel Costs. For the first core, it has been calculated that an
enrichment of 3.7 percent will give a reactivity life sufficient to
achieve an average exposure of 10,000 Mwd / ton . Because the neu
tron flux is somewhat higher in the center of the core at the end of
core life, the central core is exposed to an average burn -up higher
than 10,000 Mwd / ton upon removal. If the remaining fuel is shifted
toward the center and a fresh batch of fuel is inserted on the
periphery, additional energy can be extracted from the remaining
two- thirds of the original charge.
The fabrication charge for the first set of fuel elements is esti
mated to be approximately $ 118.10 per kilogram of contained ura
nium . This figure includes all handling charges, material losses,
escalation, packaging, and shipping to an East Coast ( U.S. ) site,
but it does not include the cost of working capital.
Burn -up charges are based upon the price schedule for partially
enriched uranium published by the AEC. Plutonium contained in
the spent fuel is credited toward the uranium burn -up cost in the
amount of $ 12 per gram of plutonium minus $ 1.50 per gram for
reducing the plutonium nitrate to metal. During steady -state opera
tions the average exposure of the fuel removed from the reactor is
estimated to be 14,000 Mwd / ton. At this exposure the uranium
enrichment has dropped to 2.36 percent, and the fuel contains 6.77 g
of total plutonium per kilogram of uranium .
Spent fuel is held in storage six months for cooling before being
shipped to the chemical plant for reprocessing. Shipping charges
are estimated at $5 per kilogram of uranium . Total insurance
charges are estimated to be about 0.5 percent of the original value
of the fuel shipped in each direction .
Charges for processing the spent fuel are based upon the hypo
thetical processing plant specified by the AEC. Each batch of spent
fuel elements requires one day of plant operation per thousand kilo
grams of uranium plus three days for plant cleanup. The charge
for each day of operation is $ 15,300. Approximately one third of
the core is reprocessed every 16 months, assuming a plant utiliza
tion factor of 85 percent. Reclaimed uranium nitrate is converted
into UF6 at the standard charge of $ 5.60 per kilogram of uranium .
The following material losses are included in the processing
charges: ( 1 ) 1 percent uranium loss in processing to nitrate, ( 2 )
1 percent plutonium loss in processing to nitrate, ( 3) 0.3 percent
uranium loss in conversion to UF6, and ( 4 ) 1 percent plutonium
loss in conversion to metal.
Inventory charges are calculated with a 4 percent per annum as

sessment on the value of the uranium at its initial enrichment. The
residence time for estimating fuel-cycle costs, assuming one-third of
the core is refueled every 16 months, is shown in Table 11.4 . The
net fuel cost is the sum of the costs for fuel preparation and fabri
cation , net fuel burn -up , shipping, reprocessing, insurance, and a
use-charge for the entire period that the uranium is not in AEC
possession. Thus, as shown in Table 9., the net fuel cost corre
sponding to a 16 -month operating cyclé is $967,000.
able na
Table car
11 3 + CAPITAL-COST SUMMARY OF ORGANIC -MODERATED
AND -COOLED REACTOR PROPULSION SYSTEM
( 1.2
Engineering , design , and start-up, including operator training,
manuals , and initial operation. $3 , 491, 900
Reactor equipment . 3 , 762 , 700
Installation .. 1 , 795, 800
Propulsion -machinery equipment 2, 938, 900
Installation .. 1 , 469 , 500
Refueling -barge equipment 151 , 600
Installation . 72 , 400
Total capital cost of reactor power plant without contin

gency- 13 , 682, 800
Contingency 500 , 000
Capital cost of reactor power plant 14, 182 , 800
Table 11.4 - RESIDENCE TIME FOR ESTIMATING ORGANIC -MOD

ERATED AND -COOLED REACTOR FUEL CYCLE COSTS
Item Time, years Quantity, cores
Fabrication 12
Spares .. 118 11o
Reactor .. 13
Cooling - 11
Reprocessing 14
1.2
Table 11.5 -- ORGANIC -MODERATED AND -COOLED REACTOR FU'EL
CHARGES BASED ON 16 - MONTH FUEL CYCLE
Fuel-element fabrication . $270, 000
Uranium burn -up --- 484, 000
Shipping charges 11 , 400
Insurance 10 , 800
Reprocessing 88 , 650
Chemical conversion . 16 , 240
Uranium inventory 248, 300
Total.. 1 , 129, 390

Plutonium credit .. 162 , 000
Net fuel cost .. $967, 000

Net fuel -cycle charges are $725,000 per year, which corresponds
to 3.57 mills / shp -hr based upon a fabrication cost for the first core.
No charges were included for amortizing the cost of fabricating the
first core . This charge can be retired in the first few years of re
actor operation and should not influence the steady -state fuel-cycle
burn -up. Charges are not included for working capital. In the
steady state, fuel burn -up charges may be deferred until spent fuel
is returned to the AEC for credit. This deferred payment offsets
the advanced payments for the new fuel elements, permitting the
plant operator to pay fabrication charges out of operating revenue.
The fuel-cycle costs corresponding to the first core will be slightly
higher than for the steady-state condition because the first charge
of fuel elements removed from the core will not achieve a burn-up
of 14,000 Mwd / ton , and the inventory charges will increase owing
to the preoperational testing period.
Optimization of the plant steam cycle and the turbine plant
equipment could conceivably result in a 4 percent reduction in plant
heat rate. The steady -state fuel cost for this improved cycle con
dition is estimated to be about 3.43 mills /shp -hr. Also, the organic
moderated and -cooled reactor fuel costs are expected to decrease
significantly during the first 10 years of reactor operation owing to
technological developments combined with the advantages of mass
production techniques. Fuel-element fabrication should decrease ap
proximately 40 percent during the first five years of plant opera
tion . This reduction in fabrication cost should reduce fuel costs to
approximately 3.07 mills /shp - hr. During the second five years of
plant operation, technological developments should permit burn -up
of at least 20,000 Mwd / ton , and this increased burn -up would further
reduce the fuel cycle costs to 2.73 mills / shp -hr. A summary of the
steady -state fuel-cycle costs for varying operating conditions is
shown in Table 11.6 .
( c ) Operating Costs for the Organic-moderated and -cooled Re
actor Propulsion Plant. The major effort in this project has been
directed toward developing the conceptual design of the organic
moderated and -cooled reactor and propulsion system for the class
T7 tanker. Although little attention was given to the design of the
ship, it is possible to compare the cargo capacity of the organic
moderated and -cooled reactor tanker with those of a conventional
tanker for the same service . Such a comparison is presented in
Table 11.7.
The capital cost of the complete tanker was estimated by adding
the cost of the reactor and propulsion system to the estimated cost of
steel and outfit for a conventional tanker. Steel and outfit costs for
the conventional ship were estimated by subtracting the cost of the
boiler and propulsion machinery from the cost of the completed vessel
escalated to the mid -construction date of about November 1961. The
capital cost of the organic -moderated and -cooled reactor tanker is
presented in Table 11.8.
Depreciation and interest of the capital cost of both vessels was
evaluated at 8.02 percent per year. Fuel -oil cost for the conventional
tanker was assumed to be $2.70 per barrel. Nuclear fuel costs were
estimated at 3.57 mills /shp -hr. The yearly operating cost summary
is given in Table 11.9.
It is seen from Table 11.9 that the cost of hauling oil from Kuwait
to Philadelphia with the first 60,000 -dwt organic -moderated and
-cooled reactor tanker is approximately 18.4 percent greater than
with a conventional tanker. Although this higher cost is not favor
able to the nuclear-propelled ship at the present time, many cost
savings can be anticipated in future organic-moderated and -cooled
reactor tankers. The second organic -moderated and -cooled reactor
tanker should be approximately $5,000,000 cheaper than the first
tanker. This cost reduction is estimated by assuming: ( 1 ) the cost
of engineering and design is reduced by 67 percent, ( 2 ) charge for
manuals is eliminated , ( 3) barge costs are eliminated, ( 4 ) service
reserve is reduced by 80 percent, and ( 5 ) equipment and installation
costs of the steel , outfit , and machinery are reduced 10 percent.
Fuel costs should be reduced significantly for subsequent cores.
Assuming a 10 percent reduction in fuel - fabrication cost , the fuel
costs should be reduced from 3.57 mills / shp -hr to 3.07 mills / shp-hr.
This reduced fuel cost, combined with the lower capital cost , should
reduce the cost of hauling cargo in the second organic -moderated
and -cooled reactor tanker to $ 10.00 per ton . This operating cost
is only 5.8 percent greater than for the conventional tanker, which
consumes fuel oil worth $2.70 per barrel. Fuel-oil cost must increase
to $3.20 per barrel before the second organic -moderated and -cooled
reactor tanker will become effective .
Table 11.6- -STEADY -STATE FUEL -CYCLE COSTS FOR THE ORGANIC
MODERATED AND -COOLED REACTOR Fuel cos !.
Operating conditions mills shp - hr
( ' tilizing a 450 -psig 650 ° F steam cycle and fabrication cost correspond
ing to initial core. 3. 57
Utilizing an improved steam cycle and fabrication costs corresponding

to initial core 3. 13
Utilizing improved steam cycle and 40 percent reduction in fabrication
costs .. 3. 07
(' tilizing improved steam cycle, 40 percent reduction in fabrication costs,
and increased burn -up to 20,000 Mwd /ton . 2. 73
1-3.6 Preliminary Cost Estimates of 43,000 -dwt Tanker Program

As described in Chap. 12 (Sec. 12-2,2), the Maritime Administra
tion has recently developed a reference design tanker that is to be
used in developing the design of a prototype reactor for nuclear
tankers. This program involves three different reactor concepts, i.e.,
the pressurized -water reactor, the indirect-cycle boiling water reac
tor, and the direct-cycle boiling-water reactor. Preliminary com
parative costs of the three reactor concepts are shown in Table 11.10.
The costs for the direct-cycle boiling-water reactor are lower than
those for the other two, both as to capital expenditure and first -of
kind costs. Table mii shows the comparative annual operating ex
penses for the three reactor concepts and a conventional tanker of
the same size .
.
Table 11.11 -ANNUAL OPERATING EXPENSES, 43,000 -DWT TANKER *
Item Pressurized Boiling -water Boiling -water Conventionalt
water reactor reactor (indirect reactor ( direct)
Fixed charges . $764, 000 $ 976 , 200 $713 , 000 $650, 000
Port and canal fees,
overhead , and mis
cellaneous.. 175 , 000 175, 000 175 , 000 175, 000
Interest , depreciation ,
and insurance ( 10
percent capital costs) 2, 264 , 900 2 , 558 , 200 2, 171 , 970 1 , 670, 000
Fuel costs . 879, 600 775, 412 622, 000 1850, 000
Total annual
cost . $4 , 083 , 500 $4 , 484 , 812 $ 3, 681 , 970 $3 , 345, 000
Total cargo per year,
tons... 289, 600 290, 555 291 , 960 270 , 000
Cost per ton . $ 14. 10 $ 15. 44 $ 12. 61 $ 12. 40
*Ship operating under American flag with American crew .

Order of magnitude costs . Detailed estimates in preparation .
Based on $2.70 per barrel for oil,
11-4 BRITISH ECONOMIC STUDIES
11-4.1 General
In the years preceding 1957, several feasibility and design studies

of marine reactor systems were made by various groups in the
United Kingdom . It was apparent from these and other studies that
it would prove difficult to show that nuclear propulsion would be
come economically acceptable to commercial ship operators in the
613489 0-62 -29
440 NUCLEAR PROPULSION FOŘ MERCHANT SHIPS
near future. In view of its experience with gas-cooled reactor
technology , however, the U.K. Atomic Energy Authority and the
British Admiralty agreed in 1957 that an investigation should be
made into the possibilities of the gas-cooled reactor for tanker appli
cation . This study was to provide realistic cost estimates and en
able the factors most influencing capital and fuel costs to be analyzed .
With the cooperation of the shipbuilding and marine industry , a de
sign team experienced in designing for marine application was
established to provide a background of experience on which to base
further investigations. It is against this background that the study
presented here was made.
It was clear at the beginning of the study that it was important
that the time scale for the development of economic marine nuclear
propulsion be known. It was therefore necessary as a first step to
examine those reactor systems currently developed for land - based
operation on which most experience had been obtained and on which
the development potential for the marine application could most con
fidently be applied. It was decided that the examination of reactor
systems must include the light-hydrogen -moderated systems ( water
moderated ), which had been developed in the United States with
which Britain had had little experience. In the following descrip
tions of these systems use was made of published information in
the Atom .
11-4.2 Description of Systems
Schematic diagrams of the five systems studied by the British are

shown in Fig. 11.1 . Each has been taken in the context of a propul
sion unit of 22,000 shp for a 65,000 -dwt tanker. In addition, more
limited consideration was given to a 12,000 - shp boiling water reactor
for a 32.000 -dwt tanker.
Each arrangement has an isolated primary coolant system with an
intermediate heat exchanger providing nonradioactive steam to the
turbines, and each is typical of present-day reactor concepts. The
two gas -cooled designs provide superheated steam to the turbines
at 850° F and 615 psi, and the organic -moderated reactor provides
superheated steam at 559 ° F and 225 psi . The two light-water sys
tems ( a boiling water reactor and a pressurized -water reactor ) pro
vide saturated ' steam at 600 psi and 150 psi, respectively.
11-4.3 Gas - cooled Graphite- moderated Reactor
The gas ( CO2 ) cooled graphite -moderated reactor follows very

generally the arrangement of the British Atomic Energy Authority's
Advanced Gas- cooled Reactor experiment but with two basic differ
6
1
5
3
2
(a ) (b) (c)
LEGEND
IDI
REACTOR CORE
PRIMARY CIRCUIT
2 6
SECONDARY CIRCUIT
1 CONTAINMENT VESSEL
2 REACTOR VESSEL
1000001 3 HEAT EXCHANGER
4 COOLANT CIRCULATOR
5 SUPERHEATER
3: 6 STEAM DRUM
7 CONDENSING - WATER
HEATED BOILER
8 PRESSURISED - WATER
HEATED BOILER
(d) (e)
FIG. 11.1 - Schematic diagram of the five systems studied in the British eco
nomic analysis of nuclear propulsion . ( a ) Gas-cooled graphite -moderated
reactor. ( b ) Organic -liquid -moderated reactor. (c) Gas-cooled heavy
water -moderated reactor. ( d ) Boiling -water reactor . ( e ) Pressurized-water
reactor.
ences in engineering treatment. As shown in Fig. 11.2, a flat - ended

pressure vessel is used to conserve height, and steam -turbine drives
to the blowers replace the more conventional electric drives to avoid
additional generators. The blower -turbines are located outside the
containment structure and are coupled through viscosity plate glands
to the blowers mounted integrally within the heat exchangers. The
containment structure is 46 ft in diameter. Steel and water primary
shielding is used , and the shield tank provides the main support for
the pressure vessel. A " charge face " is provided within the cupola
to permit the removal of defective fuel elements from the main gas
circuit into a storage space within the pressure vessel while the
ship is at sea . The risk of graphite fire is minimized by filling the
space within the containment structure with CO2. This also pro
vides a facility for recovering Co , leakage from the primary sys
tem and minimizes the make-up requirements. Beryllium - clad ura
nium oxide fuel is used .
16" POLYTHENE CUPOLA SECONDARY

6 " LEAD SHIELDING
POOP CONTAINMENT
DECK ACCESS FUEL ELEMENT
HANDLING SPACE
MAIN
DECK
CONTAINMENT
SPACE CONTAINMENT
(CO, ATMOSPHERE) STRUCTURE
TOP SHIELD
STEAM TURBINE
BLOWER UNIT
TO HOT BOX
INTERNAL
COLLISION BARRIER
NEUTRON
SHIELD
-HEAT EXCHANGER
27 " WATER 14 " STEEL
PRIMARY SHIELD
REACTOR
CORE
HEAT 14 " STEEL SHOT CONCRETE
EXCHANGER CONTAINMENT SHIELDING
PRESSURE WATER
VESSEL SHIELD
TANK
WATER
SHIELD COMBINED FLAT END SPECIAL BOTTOM
TANK & BOTTOM SHIELD STRUCTURE +
Fig. 11.2 — Arrangement of 22,000 -shp advanced gas -cooled reactor

in 65,000 -dwt tanker.
11-4.4 Gas- cooled Heavy -water-moderated Reactor

The gas-cooled heavy-water-moderated arrangement is shown in
Fig. 11.3. It is based on an earlier small power reactor study made
by the Atomic Energy Authority. The core is of the calandria and
pressure-tube type and has the so -called " hyperbolic " form. This
provides an increasing pitch between the pressure tubes as they
leave the core and allows more space for the individual coolant-tube
attachments .
The coolant gas ( CO2) is fed to each of the reentrant type pres
sure tubes from two circular- ring main headers. The over -all diam
eter of the containment structure is approximately 52 ft. A charge
face over the reactor core is provided to permit the handling of
defective fuel elements while at sea . Stainless -steel -clad uranium
oxide fuel in the form of multirod clusters is proposed.
11-4.5 Pressurized -water Reactor
The general arrangement of the pressurized -water installation,

shown in Fig. 11.4, is typical of the many that have been described
POOP DECK
MAIN DECK CONTAINMENT STRUCTURE

CONTAINMENT
ACCESS
COLLISION BARRIER
14 " STEEL SHOT CONCRETE
COOLANT SECONDARY SHIELDING
RING MAIN
MODERATOR
14" STEEL SHOT TANK
CONCRETE
CONTAINMENT, CHARGE
SHIELDING FACE
STEEL SHOT
CONCRETE PRIMARY
SHIELD HEAT EXCHANGER
HEAT EXCHANGER
COOLANT DUCT
STEAM TURBINE
19 " STEEL & 25 " BLOWER UNIT
REACTOR
WATER PRIMARY
CORE
SHIELD
COOLANT WATER SHIELD

RING MAIN TANK
WATER SHIELD SPECIAL BOTTOM

STRUCTURE
TANK
Fig. 11.3 — Arrangement of 22,000 -shp gas-cooled heavy -water reactor

in the literature. The primary coolant circuit operates at a pressure

of 2,000 psi and demands a pressure vessel of 7-ft inside diameter
1 and 614 -in . thickness. Control- rod drives are brought through the
head of the pressure vessel, which can be removed for fuel handling.
The containment structure is a horizontal cylinder 35 ft in diam
eter and approximately 50 ft long. Water shields are provided
adjacent to the reactor vessel and additional concrete biological
shielding is provided outside the containment structure. The layout
is similar in many respects to that of the Savannah . Uranium di
oxide in the form of circular rods clad with Zircaloy are used.
11-4.6 Boiling water Reactor
The arrangement of the boiling -water installation, shown in Fig.

11.5, was taken largely from information published in the USAEC
publication TID-7539. The primary circuit operates at a pressure
of 915 psi ; the pressure vessel for the 22,000-shp unit is 3.85 in.
thick, internally clad with stainless steel . Forced circulation of
primary coolant is employed, the feed being sub-cooled to 250° F.
POOP DECK
CONTROL ROD DRIVES

MAIN DECK
CUPOLA
6 " LEAD CONTAINMENT & CUPOLA

6 " POLYTHENE SHIELDING
REACTOR PRESSURE VESSEL

STEAM DRUM
REACTOR CORE
24" COLLISION BARRIER

STEEL & WOOD LAYERS
HEAT EXCHANGER
PRIMARY SHIELD
WATER TANK
14 " CONCRETE
CONTAINMENT SHIELDING
HEAVY SPECIAL
BOTTOM STRUCTURE
WATER SHIELD TANK
Fig. 11.4 - Arrangement of 22,000 -shp pressurized -water reactor

in 65,000-dwt tanker.
The containment structure is a vertical cylinder 30 ft diameter

and 45 ft high . The fuel is uranium dioxide in the form of solid
circular rods clad with Zircaloy.
11-4.7 Organic-moderated Reactor
The organic-liquid -moderated reactor, shown in Fig. 11.6, is based

on an earlier Atomic Energy Authority design study suitably modi
fied in the light of later information and experience. The primary
circuit operates at the relatively low pressure of 150 psi , and thus
the pressure-vessel weight and cost are significantly less than for
other systems. The vessel is approximately 10 ft in diameter and
114 in. thick, constructed of carbon steel . The organic liquid is as
sumed to be " Santowax R " and is operated at 30 percent polymer
content; replacement is calculated at 18 lb /Mwd.
The containment structure is a horizontal cylinder 35 ft in
diameter and approximately 50 ft long. The shielding arrangements
are similar to those assumed for the boiling water reactor. Uranium
dioxide fuel rods clad with stainless steel are employed ; they are
located in hexagonal stainless -steel modules .
ACCESS SECONDARY
SHIELDING REFUELING PLATFORM
6" POLYTHENE
REFUELING
6 " LEAD SHIELD WATER TANK
STEAM DRUM
WATER SHIELD
CONTAINMENT
PLUG STRUCTURE
THERMAL HAT
INSULATION CONDENSING WATER
HEATED BOILER
24 COLLISION BARRIER
STEEL 4 WOOD LAYERS
TOP WATER
SHIELD
-CONDENSATE TO
WATER CIRCUIT
STEAM
B PRESSURIZED WATER
CORE RISERS WATER HEATED BOILER
D
TO PRIMARY
CIRCULATING PUMPS
REACTOR CORE
REACTOR PRESSURE VESSEL
FROM
PC PUMPS PRIMARY SHIELD 15 " LEAD
PRIMARY SHIELD
33 " WATER CONTROL ROD GEAR
10 " STEEL 14 " STEEL SHOT CONCRETE
3 " LEAD CONTAINMENT SHIELDING
REACTOR & TANK

SUPPORT
WATER SHIELD TANK
Fig. 11.5 — Arrangement of 22,000 -shp boiling -water reactor in 65,000 -dwt tanker.
11-4.8 Containment Design
Each reactor lends itself to a particular form of containment

vessel . The gas-cooled graphite-moderated, the gas-cooled heavy
water moderated, and the boiling water reactors prefer vertical
cylinder containments ; the pressurized-water and the organic -mod
erated reactors prefer the horizontal cylinder. The preference may
be of some significance in considering the integration of the con
tainment into the ship’s hull, the horizontal arrangement being more
suitable from this point of view.
As might be expected, the two gas-cooled reactors are the largest,
the advanced gas -cooled design also being the heaviest and most
expensive. The lower design pressure of the gas-cooled heavy -water
reactor containment in fact leads to the lowest cost. With the ex
POOP DECK
MAIN DECK
6 " POLYTHENE CUPOLA SECONDARY
6"LEAD SHIELDING
CONTAINMENT
STRUCTURE
14" STEEL SHOT
-CUPOLA CONCRETE CONTAINMENT
SHIELDING
STEAM DRUM EXPANSION

EXPANSION TANK
TANK
REACTOR
PRESSURE 14 " COLLISION
VESSEL BARRIER
REACTOR
STEEL & WOOD LAYERS
CORE
PRIMARY
SHIELD
WATER
TANK
모
HEAVY SPECIAL
BOTTOM STRUCTURE
WATER SHIELD
TANK
FIG. 11.6 — Arrangement of 22,000 -shp organic-liquid -moderated reactor

ception of the advanced gas-cooled reactor, this cost is in the region

of £100,000 to £ 150,000 ( $280,000 to $ 120,000 ) and is clearly a sig
nificant proportion of the total cost of the installation .
11-4.9 Ship Design
In the context of the 65,000- dwt vessel , there would appear to be

no great difficulty in conveniently placing any of the three light
hydrogen -moderated systems within the ship's hull. In the case of
the two gas-cooled systems, however, the larger size may involve
putting the reactor compartment further forward to provide ade
quate wing space for collision damage protection . This is demon
strated in Fig. 11.7. This may then require that a cargo fuel tank
be placed aft of the engine room, which is not a desirable feature.
Only in the case of the gas-cooled graphite -moderated reactor is
there likely to be difficulty in installing the pressure vessel in the
ship , and this limitation can only be removed as fuel ratings can
be increased and thus the core size of this type reactor can be
reduced .
PUMP
FRESH WATER
TURB.
STORE REACTOR COFFER

STEERING GEAR ROOM DAM
CONTROL
CARGO OIL BOILER ROOM
TANK ROOM A. G. R.
AFTER
CONTAINMENT
PEAK
G. C. H. W.
PROPELLING MACHINERY CONTAINMENT
SHAFT
ROOM
TUNNEL
PUMP
ROOM
Fig. 11.7 — Typical installation of 22,000 -dwt ship advanced gas-cooled reactor
and gas -cooled heavy -water -moderated reactor in a 65,000 -dwt tanker.
11-4.10 Comparative Economics of the British Design Studies
The operating cost of an oil tanker is influenced by many vari

ables. These include the route, the cargo, the method of chartering,
the speed, the time at sea, the size of the vessel , and the cost as well
as the capital charges and the overheads.
( a ) Method of Chartering. Although the major oil companies
build and operate their own tankers, 60 to 70 percent of the world's
oil is carried in chartered ships. Two methods of chartering ships
are common. An oil company can agree to time- charter a ship at
a fixed rate per ton of cargo delivered per month for the period of
the charter, i.e., for a period that may be as long as 16 years. The
rate is variable, but on the average it represents a return on capital
of about 14 percent.
Alternatively, a ship may be chartered for a single voyage. In
this case the owner charges the oil company a fee, the freight rate,
for each ton of oil transported. Freight rates are very variable
and may rise to several times the average when the demand for
ships is high ; however, when the demand is low , freight rates may
represent a financial condition only marginally better than laying
up .
In the study under consideration the nuclear ship is compared
with a conventional one operating with a return on capital of 15
percent. Overheads have been taken as similar to those for a con
ventional ship.
( b) Route. The two routes studied were chosen as being typical
of a long and a short voyage. They are from the Persian Gulf to
the United Kingdom via the Cape of Good Hope and from the
Eastern Mediterranean to the Thames.
( c ) Speed . It is assumed that the speed of the nuclear ship

would be that of a conventional one of the same size , although it is
clear that its higher capital cost would demand a higher optimum
speed . However, separate studies show that the difference in speeds
is small and the error in the assumption of equal speeds is offset
by the assumption of equal utilization times for the two classes of
ships.
( d ) Time at Sea. Both the conventional and nuclear ship have
been assumed to spend 300 days a year at sea . This implies that
refueling can be carried out during the normal annual refit. An
economic penalty is incurred if extra time for refueling is necessary .
( e ) Size of the Vessel. The present state of development of
nuclear power is such that only high -powered ships offer any pros
pect of economic operation . All studies reported here consider a
65,000-dwt tanker with a 22,000 -shp propulsion unit on the assump
tion that this will represent the largest size tanker in common use
during the next 20 years .
( f ) Fuel Costs . Conventional fuel costs in the study are based
on oil at 140 shillings ($ 39.20Y a ton and an all -purpose fuel rate
of 0.55 lb /shp -hr equivalent to an all-purpose fuel cost 0.41 pence /
shp -hr ( 9.55 mills / shp -hr).
11-4.11 Nuclear Fuel Cycles and Costs
An extensive investigation into the calculation of fuel costs for

the various reactor concepts was made. Two sets of fuel costs were
calculated covering a range of fissionable material prices between
£5,000 and £8,000 ( $ 14,000 and $ 22,400 ) per kilogram of 93 percent
equivalent U235.
Preliminary work indicated the need to investigate more fully
the difference in total fuel costs between theoretical continuous
charge and discharge cycles and the more practical batch refueling
cycles. Consequently , for the two sets of fuel prices used , the fuel
costs were calculated on the basis of three refueling programs :
1. The theoretically ideal case of continuous charge and discharge
of fuel with radial and axial reshuflling, requiring continuous
access to the core to ensure that all discharged fuel has been
uniformly irradiated to the permissible maximum . Although
unattainable in practice, this gives the lower limit to the fuel
costs.
2. One - core batching in which access to the core is required only

for complete replacement of the core, when the most highly
irradiated portion of the fuel reaches the maximum permissible
burn -up. This is a completely practicable method of refueling
but incurs an upper limit to the fuel costs.
3. 100 -day batching, in which access to the core is made every

100 days, when those fuel elements that have reached ( or will
reach during the next 100 days) the maximum irradiation are
removed . No reshuffling is considered in cycles 1 and 2.
These three refueling cycles permit an assessment of the reduc
tion in fuel costs, which is possible as the “ ideal ” continuous charge
and discharge cycle is approached. The batching cycles chosen were
based on the conclusion that, with current designs, continuous
charge and discharge of the fuel at sea is impractical, and the 100
day cycle probably represents the shortest possible period for which
it would be practicable and economic to operate a nuclear ship
between shore- based refueling operations.
For the purpose of calculation, the maximum permissible irradia
tion was fixed at 9,000 Mwd / tonne * as being a fuel life for which
operating experience would begin to accumulate in 1959.
The theoretical continuous charge and discharge cycle with axial
and radial reshuffling and a maximum irradiation of 9,000 Mwd /
tonne of uranium gives fuel costs in pence per shaft horsepower
hour ranging from 0.246 pence ( 5.73 mills ) for the advanced gas
cooled reactor to 0.348 pence ( 8.10 mills) for the organic-liquid
moderated reactor. These costs are increased by up to 30 percent
in the 100- day batching cycles, where the average irradiation of the
discharged fuel is reduced from 9,000 to about 5,000 Mwd / tonne.
A further increase of about 35 percent in fuel costs is incurred in
the one - core batching cycle in which the average irradiation of the
discharged fuel falls to about 3,500 Mwd / tonne.
The difficulty of achieving uniform irradiation in reactors using
the one -core cycle is reflected in these high fuel costs, although in
liquid -cooled reactors American experience of control-rod program
ming and the use of burnable poisons suggests that some improve
ment is possible.
The analysis shows that the advanced gas -cooled reactor with
beryllium -clad fuel elements has the lowest fuel cost both in terms
of pence per shaft horsepower -hour and in initial fuel investment.
Within the liquid -cooled reactor category, the ascending order of
fuel cost is the pressurized -water reactor , the boiling water reactor,
and the organic - liquid -moderated reactor, with initial investment in
the same order.
Although the initial investments of the pressurized -water reactor
and the boiling-water reactor are only slightly in excess of that of
the advanced gas-cooled reactor, the particular organic-liquid -mod
erated reactor reference design has a fuel investment about twice
that of any other liquid -cooled system . In this particular case the
* Tonne is the metric ton frequently used in England . It is equal to 2,204.6 lb.
relatively high enrichment is due to the quantity of stainless steel

used in the reference design core. It is believed that a significant
reduction in fuel costs could be achieved by reducing the amount of
structural material in the core and possibly using alternative 1
materials .
The 12,000 and 16,000-shp boiling water reactor fuel costs show
slight increases over those of the 22,000 -shp system , based on con
tinuous charge and discharge. The increases are, respectively, 16
percent and 14 percent.
11-4.12 Capital Costs
The capital costs for the various reactor concepts are shown in
Table 11.12 and include the cost of materials, fabrication, and instal
lation of the complete reactor system , with the exception of the fuel
elements. These costs are estimated from sketch designs and include
contingency allowances to cover lack of detail . Although some
uncertainty must exist until detailed designs are made from which
more accurate cost estimates can be made, the figures shown are
believed to reflect with reasonable accuracy the reflective net cap
ital costs of the five systems. The main difference between the costs
of the liquid and gas systems are those resulting from size and
weight. The influence of core size extends throughout the whole
system and generally affects the size, weight, and cost of pressure
vessel internals, primary shield , containment structure, and second
ary shielding
Since the reactor capital costs also increase with increasing
weight , the lighter liquid -moderated systems tend to have the
advantage of lower capital costs coupled to that of greater cargo
capacity. Even so, the total capital costs of ships powered by liquid
cooled reactor systems are still about 40 percent in excess of h
conventional.
The cost of the 12,000 -shp boiling -water reactor also shows an
approximate relation to weight, and, since the size and weight for
this power is not much below the 22,000-shp unit, the reduction in
cost ( of the reactor as opposed to the ship ) is not significant. This
is a result of the relatively small reduction in core size.
The analysis shows that the liquid -cooled systems have capital
costs of the order of £ 1.7 million ( $4,760,000) , excluding research
and development, which is about one -half the cost of either of the
two gas-cooled systems.
11-4.13 Operating costs
Table 11.12 also shows the annual operating costs, computed on

the basis of the foregoing discussion. The values for annual fuel
C
— APITAL
11.12
Table
Conven C onven
- iquid
lOrganic -s12,000
hp
Item tional Advanced
gas cGas
- ooled
heavy Pressurized Boiling tional
moderated -water
boiling
t65,000
- on reacto
cooledr reactor
water reactor
water reactor
water on
t32,000
-reactor reactor
tanker
ship
:
investme
Capital nt
M
£
outfit
.,and
Hull 90
2. 90
2. 90
2. 90
2. 90
2. 90
2. 1.72 1.72
.,£
M
machinery
Propulsion 20
1. 1.07 1.07 12
1. 07
1. 1.12 0.85 0.77
M
£
containment
.,and
Reactor 33
3. 03
4. 1.98 1.53 58
1. 32
1.
,£M.
cost
capital
Total 10
4. 00
8. 6.00 50
5. 60
5. 57
2. 81
3.
7.30
conven
over
increase
Percent
78 95 46 34 37 48
.
tional
costs
:toperating
Annual
profit
, nsurance
iDepreciation
capi
of
percent
(1to 5
owner (a) (6) (a) (6) (a) (@ ) (6) (a) (0) (a) (0)
0
)
(
.,£Xtal
) 103 615 1,095 01, 95 1,200 1,200 900 900 825 825 840 840 385 572 572
,overhead
Repairs
,
Wages s
etc.
charges
canal
and
,port
-X£ 103 167 184 184 184 184 184 184 184 184 184 120 132 132
184
shill
140
at
oil
Fuel
ton
per ings
.1),£
X
hpence rhp
.413
-/s(003 273
on
fission
(based
fuel
Nuclear
£8000
of
able
cost
material
93
equiv
percent
kilogram
per
),php
U23s
-h/salent
....
ence
r 437
0. 437
0. 549
0. 0.549 0.561 0.561 0.535 0.535 0.568 0.568 565
0. 0.565
(one
cost
fuel
nuclear
Net
core
%X),£ 10
batching 279 290 350 362 348 370 332 352 360 375 192 205
-u
make
Moderator
charge
,p
10
X
%£ 31.7 33
annual
operating
,Total
cost
M
£ 1.055 558
1. 569
1. 734
1. 746
1. 432
1. 454
1. 341
1. 361
1. 416
1. 432
1. 0.654 0.896 0.909
ECONOMICS OF NUCLEAR PROPULSION
increase
Percent
conven
over
48 49 64 65 36 38 27 29 34 36 37 39
.
tional
mton
-: ile
cargo
per
Cost
. 108
X)(/yCargo
-mear
ton
iles 8
33. 9
32. 34.0 1
33. 2
35. 33.4 6
35. 33.7 1
35. 17.3 15.7 16.7
35.5 32.6
ile
-mCost
/cargo
pence
in
ton 0713 111
0. 127
0. 0.123 0.104 099
0. 0.096 0.092 0.101 0.098 0910
0. 0.137 0.131
0. 115
0.
increase
Percent
conven
over
56 78 72 46 39 35 29 41 37 50 44
tional 61
451
m.•M= illions
power
,aat
year
300full
per
days
and
assumes
refueling
period
the
tfor of gnores
bi.Cduring
earnings
loss
account
solumn
a† akes
cship
a. onventional
cost that have been used assume annual utilization is reduced by

the refueling period ; i.e., assume refueling can be done during the
normal outage period .
The total capital investment in the nuclear ship lies in the range
34 to 95 percent higher than the conventional ship. The annual
return of 15 percent on capital demanded in tanker operation there
fore results in significantly higher operating costs for the nuclear
ship. Operating costs lie in the region of 30 to 80 percent in excess
of the conventional ship. These figures are based on one-core re
fueling and take no account of the savings in fuel cost which might
accrue .
Such savings could lead to a significant reduction in fuel costs

as compared with the conventional oil - fired ship , and it is therefore
important to take account of the additional capital expenditure
that can thus be permitted and still yield economic parity. Even
if nuclear fuel costs could be reduced to 0.25 to 0.3 pence /shp -hr
( 5.8 to 6.9 mills ), the margin allowable for extra capital cost of
the nuclear ship is still not very large . This situation is likely to
exist so long as fuel oil maintains its present price level. Thus, the
extra permissible capital cost for a boiling-water reactor or an
organic - liquid -moderated reactor installation would be in the region
of £500,000 ( $ 1,400,000 ), a substantial reduction from their present
estimated cost of about £ 1,500,000 ( $ 1,200,000 ).
11-4.14 Potential for Further Development
The fuel -cost components of a nuclear ship's operating costs may

be reduced in the future by improvement in the following factors :
( 1 ) reduction in the cost of fissionable material, ( 2 ) reduction in
the cost of fabrication and processing of fuel elements, ( 3 ) longer
irradiation of fuel , ( 1 ) higher average rating of the fuel, and
( 5 ) improvement in the neutron economy of the core.
11-4.15 Conclusions of United Kingdom Nuclear Ship Propulsion
Studies
The British investigation of the economies of nuclear propulsion

for commercial ships indicates that even if the most advantageous
fuel cycle and refueling procedure can be developed for the marine
installation and if operating costs of the order of 0.25 to 0.3 pence /
shp can be achieved , the relative savings as compared with 0.4 to 0.45
pence /shp-hr for the conventional 65,000 -dwt ship are still inade
quate to offset the present estimated capital cost of any of the
reactor systems studied. This conclusion may not, however, neces
sarily apply to installations of higher power in larger ships, such
as high -speed passenger liners.
Most advances in nuclear technology expected to develop over

the next few years are likely to be applicable to all reactors con
sidered for marine propulsion . This could lead to a general lowering
of present estimated fuel costs of all the systems employed in the
British study. No one system stands out markedly in this respect,
although there may be differences in the benefits that each acquires
from specific developments.
11-5 GENERAL CONSIDERATION OF NUCLEAR SHIP ECONOMICS ✓

It is obvious from the presentation of the foregoing economic
studies that virtually all the investigations indicate a higher total
cost for nuclear ship operations than for conventional ships. The
only exception to this is the study made by the British General
Electric Co.-Simon Carves group on an advanced type of gas
cooled graphite-moderated reactor for large tankers and passen
ger liners ( Sec. 13-3 ). This study, more recent than those described
above, showed a lower cost in terms of cost per ton of delivered
cargo for the nuclear tanker than for its conventional counter
part ; i.e., £ 2.42 for the conventional ship vs. £2.31 for the nuclear
ship. Similarly, in the case of the large passenger liner, the
total annual operating cost was lower for the nuclear ship than for
the conventional ship. In this case the comparative total annual
operating costs were , for the conventional liner, £ 7,156,250 and, for
the nuclear line, £6,810,000. The case of the passenger ship assumes
the installation of two 75,000 -shp propulsion units in a ship carrying
5,000 passengers and a crew at a speed of about 30 knots. Making
one voyage across the Atlantic each week , such a vessel would steam :
about 150,000 miles or more a year. In this case the fuel cost per
shaft horsepower of a conventional ship would be high since fuel
oil could not be bought in a cheap market .
The GEC -Simon Carves design study indicates the closest ap
proach to competitive nuclear propulsion for commercial ships of
any of the economic investigations made thus far. ( As explained
in Sec. 13-3 , It involves a highly developed, extremely compact
high-temperature gas-cooled reactor with a steam system developing
600 psig 850° F superheated steam and having many unique con
structional features.
Other countries besides the United States and the United Kingdom
have made economic studies of nuclear propulsion, particularly
Japan. In general, these studies indicate a higher cost for nuclear
ships at present, but they also indicate that by virtue of techno
logical development and experience certain classes of ships, such as
oil tankers and ore carriers, can be expected to become economically
feasible in the near future.
It is to the simplification of reactor design and engineering that

most attention must be given. The systems with the greatest poten
tial for reduction in complexity offer the most favorable opportu
nities for reduction in capital costs. The question of fuel costs,
however, is equally important. In the area of fuel costs nuclear
plants are potentially cheaper than conventional plants, and , unless
this potentiality is realized, it may be said that there is little hope
of nuclear propulsion competing successfully with conventional
propulsion. There is every reason to believe, however, that nuclear
fuel costs can be reduced substantially in the near future.
REFERENCES
1. W. J. BURNS , Jr., Preliminary Economic Report on the Application of Atomic

Power to Merchant Ships. Part 1. Mixed Dry Cargo Ships, USAEC Re
port AECU-3166 ( Pt. 1 ) , April 1956.
2. W. J. BURNS, Jr. , Preliminary Economic Report on the Application of Atomic
Power to Merchant Ships. Part. 2. Oil Tanker Ships, USAEC Report
AECU - 3166 ( Pt. 2 ) , April 1956.
3. D. L. CONKLIN et al. , Economics of Nuclear and Conventional Merchant
Ships, Superintendent of Documents, Government Printing Office, Wash
ington 25, D.C. , June 30, 1958.
4. Feasibility Investigation of a Closed -cycle Boiling-water Reactor for the
Propulsion of a Merchant Ship , Addendum 1, Report AMF -GR - 27–57,
American Machine & Foundry Co. , September 1957.
5. V. A. Mize and B. G. VOORHEER, Development of Boiling -water Reactor for
Marine Propulsion , paper delivered at a Symposium on Nuclear Ship Pro
pulsion, Oslo, Norway , Dec. 10, 1959.
6. Maritime Organic Moderated and Cooled Reactor, Report NAA -SR - 3859,
Atomics International Division , North American Aviation, May 27, 1959.
7. Feasibility Report : Gas-cooled Reactor for Ship Propulsion, Report GA - 87
( Pt . I ) , General Atomics Division , General Dynamics Corp., Apr. 8, 1957.
8. HARRY L. BROWNE, The Maritime Gas-cooled Reactor Propulsion Plant of
the Future, Report GA-1040, General Dynamics Corp. , Nov. 2, 1959.
9. R. P. KINSEY et al . , Study of Marine Reactors, Atom , No. 39 : 10–31 ( Janu
ary 1960 ) .
Chapter 12
NUCLEAR TANKER DESIGN
12-1 INTRODUCTION
Among the various types of commercial vessels considered for

nuclear propulsion under the AEC -Maritime Administration Nu
clear Propulsion Program, the commercial tanker offers attractive
possibilities in terms of economic operation. Valuable cargo tonnage
in nuclear ships of this kind is not sacrificed to fuel space. In addi
tion , these ships are usually large and require a large amount of
power, which nuclear plants can supply. It is generally believed that
nuclear tankers will become competitive with conventional tankers
sooner than other classes of commercial vessels.
Since no nuclear-powered tankers have actually been built, how
ever, no accurate predictions concerning the cost of building or
operating them can be made. A number of studies that have been
made indicate that nuclear tankers will be able to compete with
conventional tankers in the near future ; however, all such cost esti
mates are subject to the same uncertainties that characterize nuclear
power cost estimates in general . Certain studies made early in the
nuclear propulsion program indicate that large tankers will be
able to carry cargo on 20,000 -mile round -trip routes at lower cargo
costs than conventionally powered tankers and at · speeds greater
than 22 knots with certain types of reactors now available. Ac
cording to these studies, by around 1965 the area of competitive
ness for such ships will begin at 12,000-mile round-trip routes. In
1970, these studies predict, tankers propelled by nuclear power will
be more economical than conventional ships on 20,000 -mile trade
routes at speeds of over 17 knots. Larger nuclear tankers may be
economically attractive on routes as short as 8,000 miles, round trip.
Although the validity of these predictions remains to be proved,
it is obvious that nuclear-powered tankers will have certain eco
nomic advantages over conventionally powered tankers. At the pres
ent time an oil-carrying supertanker operating between the Persian
Gulf and the East Coast of the United States consumes bunker fuel
equivalent to approximately 7 percent of the ship's total cargo
capacity . This same ship making the voyage around the Cape of
Good Hope rather than through the Suez Canal would consume
613489 0-62-30 455
bunker oil equivalent to 10 percent of its cargo capacity. In con

trast , a nuclear -powered tanker would operate with virtually the
same cargo capability whether its route led through the Suez
Canal or around the Cape of Good Hope. A nuclear tanker, there
fore, has an additional margin for becoming competitive which a
land - based nuclear power plant cannot utilize.
Nuclear tanker operation will also be subject to certain disad
vantages. Load - line limitations, for example, can work for, or
against, nuclear -powered ships. On some voyages, i.e. , from the Per
sian Gulf to Philadelphia, the ship's allowable draft may be less
toward the end of the cargo-hauling trip than at the beginning. In
this case all additional cargo capacity gained by a nuclear tanker
compared to a similar conventional tanker will not be realized
since the conventional ship could load deeper at the beginning of
the voyage. On the other hand, if the harbor at the beginning of
the voyage was shallower than the harbor at the termination of the
voyage, the draft conditions would be reversed and the cargo sav
ings for the nuclear -propelled ships would be increased.
One other condition imposed by nuclear propulsion is the neces
sity of refueling at one port, but this is not a condition that limits
the desirability of nuclear propulsion since a ship may have to re
fuel only 20 times or less during its entire life . Also, the additional
costs of a special shore-refueling facility may be small. when dis
tributed over a tanker fleet .
If the advantages of a nuclear ship are to be fully realized , the
ship should ( 1 ) spend a major part of the time at sea and a mini
mum amount of time in port and ( 2 ) operate on long voyages at
high speed. These conditions fit oil , ore, or grain carriers. Dry
cargo carriers usually do not meet these conditions; in addition, they
are limited in most cases by cubic capacity rather than by displace
ment. An important advantage in the oil carrier is its capability of
loading or unloading outside crowded harbors through the means
of submarine pipe lines or by lightering.
12-2 DESIGN STUDIES
As discussed in Chap. 10 the Department of Commerce has,

through the Maritime Administration and in conjunction with the
AEC , undertaken engineering and economic studies to determine
the type and size of vessel and reactor system offering the greatest
promise of closing the gap between the N.S. Savannah and con
ventionally powered merchant ships. Because of the attractive eco
nomic potential of nuclear tankers, and possibly of passenger ships.
and because these carriers are of such importance to our national
NUCLEAR TANKER DESIGN 457
economy, all the studies thus far carried out under the AEC -Mari
time Administration Nuclear Propulsion Program have been on
nuclear tanker design .
12-2.1 Preliminary Studies
The first phase of this advanced reactor concept study program ,

initiated in 1956, involved five separate design studies by five con
tractors on a nuclear propulsion plant of 20,000 shp for a 38,000-dwt
tanker.
1. General Electric Company: Design study of a direct-cycle

boiling-water reactor propulsion system .
2. American Machine & Foundry Co.: Design study of a closed
cycle boiling water reactor propulsion system .
3. Atomics International, a Division of North American Aviation ,
Inc.: Design study of an organic -moderated and -cooled re
actor propulsion system .
4. Ford Instrument Co. Division of Sperry Rand Corp. , in co
operation with Nordberg Mfg. Co.: Design study of a closed
cycle gas -turbine propulsion system with a gas-cooled reactor,
using nitrogen as the coolant.
5. General Motors Corp .: Design study of a closed -cycle gas-tur
bine propulsion system with a gas- cooled reactor, using helium
as the coolant.
These studies were all completed by the end of 1958, some as early
as 1957. Two additional design studies have been made : one by the
General Atomic Division , General Dynamics Corporation , on a high
temperature ( 1,300–1,600 ° F ) gas-cooled reactor system with gas
turbine propulsion plant and the other by the General Electric
Company on a direct-cycle boiling water reactor plant of 27,300 shp
capacity for a 60,000 -dwt tanker.
Evaluation of these design studies indicates that, although the
gas-cooled reactor with closed - cycle gas turbine offers great potential
advantages in economy, weight, compactness, simplicity, and inher
ent safety, considerable research and development must be done
before a practical reactor can be built. Consequently a long- range
program leading to the eventual construction of a gas- cooled reactor
system suitable for marine application has been initiated . Devel
opment work on the Maritime Gas -Cooled Reactor (MGCR ) is be
ing conducted by the General Dynamics Corporation. This work
involves the use of several experimental facilities including out-of
pile test loops to test experimental fuel elements, the construction of
turbomachinery test models, heat-exchanger test loops, etc. Ana
lytical work covering core, containment vessel , shield, and component
design and plant arrangement is presently under way. Eventually

this MGCR study is expected to lead to the construction of a land
based prototype plant.
12–2.2 Recent Tanker Reactor Studies
Although the high -temperature gas-cooled reactor concept has the

most attractive long-range possibilities, detailed evaluation of the
various studies indicates that the most suitable, practical ship for
reference purposes would be a water-cooled reactor propelled tanker
of about 43,000 dwt with a service speed of about 18.5 knots. This
conclusion was based upon the following criteria :
1. This ship is considered to be the largest that can be operated
effectively in the domestic Gulf of Mexico to the East Coast
( U.S. ) trade route.
2. It is large enough to be attractive in the longest run from
the Persian Gulf to the East Coast of the United States.
3. The horsepower is considered to be the maximum that can be
provided for a ship this size by a single propeller and will
result in an average sea speed of about 1842 knots.
On the basis of this information, the Maritime Administration has
developed a reference design tanker that is to be used in developing
the design of a prototype reactor for nuclear tankers, in accordance
with an authorization to the Atomic Energy Commission by the
Congress of the United States.
The three most promising reactor concepts applicable to a tanker
of the tonnage and horsepower under consideration are the direct
cycle boiling water reactor, the indirect-cycle boiling -water reactor,
and the pressurized- water reactor. Accordingly three contractors
were selected to make engineering studies of the three reactor con
cepts in accordance with the Atomic Energy Authorization Act for
the fiscal year 1960. Combustion Engineering, Inc., was selected to
prepare a design and engineering study for an advanced pressurized
water reactor system ; General Electric Company, for the direct-cycle
boiling water concept; and Westinghouse Electric Corporation, for
the indirect-cycle boiling-water concept. The technical and economic
feasibility of installing an already developed naval nuclear propul
sion plant is also being studied .
The studies are based upon the criteria of a 30,000-shp ( max. )
propulsion system applied to a tanker of about 43,000 dwt. A com
parative evaluation of these studies has been made by the AEC and
the Maritime Administration , and a report of this evaluation, to
gether with a recommendation as to the reactor system most suited
for further development work, has been submitted to the Joint
Committee on Atomic Energy of the Congress of the United States

for further action. The firm of George G. Sharp, Inc., has been
engaged by the Maritime Administration to provide naval architec
tural and marine engineering assistance to the AEC. Each con
tractor making this study worked toward an assumed nuclear plant
operational date of 1964 in order to take advantage of recent proven
developments but at the same time to avoid unrealistic design features
that might be incorporated with less surety if the research and de
velopment phases of the project were extended beyond that date.
The following are the objectives and requirements of the design
studies :
1. Design a reference system that can be installed in the reference

tanker within a 40-month schedule, beginning Jan. 1, 1960.
2. All required research and development on the reference system
must be compatible with this schedule.
3. Future potential for improvements must be outlined.
4. Ship construction cost estimates should be based upon : ( 1 )
first of kind and ( 2 ) duplicate nuclear tanker to be built at
another U.S. shipyard.
5. All systems are compared on the economic basis of the reference
tanker carrying oil from the Persian Gulf to the East Coast
of the United States.
With these points in mind, each contractor optimized the concept
under review. The systems proposed are described in the following
sections.
12–2.3 Pressurized -water System
This concept, developed by Combustion Engineering, Inc., incor

porates single -pass forced circulation of 2,000 -psi light water as
coolant and moderator with limited hot -channel bulk boiling at a
normal power rate of 75 Mw (t ). The reactor coolant outlet ( 620° F )
is pumped through a superheater to a steam generator and back to
the reactor by two controlled -leakage pumps via a single primary
piping loop containing no valves other than the check valves at the
pumps. Secondary nonradioactive superheated steam at 600 psi and
600 ° F is generated to drive the propulsion turbine at an over- all
thermal efficiency of 27.3 percent. This secondary steam also sup
plies ship's hotel services.
12-2.4 Indirect-cycle Boiling -water System
The Westinghouse indirect boiling water concept uses single -pass

natural circulation of 2,000 -psi (635 ° F ) light water for producing
saturated steam at a normal power rate of 70 Mw ( t ) . The saturated

steam is fed to dual condenser-evaporator, superheater, and sub
cooler heat exchangers in a dual loop system where secondary 600
psi 600 ° F superheated steam is generated to drive the propulsion
turbine at an over-all thermal efficiency of 28.9 percent.
12-2.5 Direct- cycle Boiling-water System
General Electric's direct-cycle boiling water concept consists of

the single -pass natural circulation of 1,000 -psi light water produc
ing saturated steam at a normal power rate of 72 Mw (t) and an
over-all thermal efficiency of 28.5 percent, including ship’s hotel
services. The saturated steam is fed directly to the propulsion tur
bines and main condenser via a single loop, and the condensate is
passed through full - flow resin -bed demineralizers prior to being re
turned to the reactor by the main feed pump.
12-2.6 Summary of Studies
The details of the three systems and the specific parameters of the
selected tanker are given in Table 12.1 .
Table 12.1— COMPARATIVE DATA ON TANKER REACTOR STUDIES
PWR PWR BWR BWR
Item Savannah tanker (indirect) ( direct )
tanker tanker
Length , ft .. 595 750 750 750

Beam , ft . 78 102 102 102
Dead weight , tons . 9, 990 42, 776 43, 125 42,918
Speed , knots 20. 25 18.3 18.3 18 3
Reactor power, Mw ( t) (maximum ) . 70 82 77.4 78.5
Over-all efficiency , percent (normal power ). 22. 2 27.3 28. 9 28. 5
Maximum shp 22 , 000 30,000 30,000 30.000
Fuel... UO2 UO2 UO : to :
Cladding . Ss Ss Ss Ss
Number of zones .. 2 2 2 3
Enrichment, percent. 4. 2-4.6 4. 35-6. 16 3. 21 3. 11

Burn -up, Mwd /ton . 7,352 13,000 11 , 820 13, 2010
Reactor outlet, ° F 519 620 635 545
Reactor pressure , psi . 1,750 2,000 2,000 1,000
Steam temperature, ° F . 462 600 600 345
Fuel cost, mills /shp -hr .. 5.9 4. 15 3. 69 2. 98
Although the figures in Table 12.1 admittedly contain some dis

crepancies due to a lack of accurate data and although others may
be revealed after a more thorough analysis has been made, it is
expected that these discrepancies can be eliminated in the more
thorough analysis under way at the present time. A preliminary
review of the studies indicates that all three concepts have attrac
tive future potential.
The most obvious improvement in the boiling-water systems would
be the application of nuclear superheat. Closer at hand is the re
duction of design contingencies as experience is gained in the opera
tion of the marine application of the boiling water reactor.
A major improvement in the pressurized -water reactor would be
the utilization of a self-pressurized main coolant loop operating at
saturated conditions and thus becoming self- regulating. It should
be noted , however, that to assure comparative studies amenable to
the analysis, the reference design innovations were initially limited
to those that can be verified by a research and development program
in keeping with the 40 -month construction period. Naturally , if a
ship is authorized as a result of this work, the schedule as well as
the research and development program , including the need for a
land -based prototype, would be resolved at that time.
12-3 COMPARATIVE STATUS OF REACTOR TYPES IN THE MARITIME

PROGRAM
The fact that the prototype reactor studies now in progress are
limited to water - cooled and -moderated reactors does not imply that
other reactor types will not receive further consideration in the
AEC - Maritime Administration Nuclear Propulsion Program . As
already noted, the merits of the gas-cooled gas -turbine reactor sys
tem have been recognized, and the research and development pro
gram on this reactor concept may eventually result in a superior
propulsion system for commercial ships which may provide higher
efficiencies than the water - cooled systems considered for the imme
diate future. The high -temperature possibilities of the gas-cooled
reactor have been attractive to power engineers from the earliest
days of reactor development, the design of a practical gas-cooled
reactor being largely dependent on the development of suitable
materials.
The same holds true for the organic -moderated reactor ; this con
cept has similar good prospects for high -temperature operation pro
vided suitable materials can be developed .
The technology of water -cooled reactors, however, is much more
developed than that of other reactor types in the United States ;
consequently the chance of success in the development of a suitable
marine reactor system are greater for the water -cooled reactor than
for either the gas -cooled or the organic-moderated reactor con
cepts at the present time. For this reason the first efforts of the
nuclear propulsion program are being directed toward the develop
ment of a tanker using either the boiling water or the pressurized

water reactor.
12–3.1 Direct-cycle Boiling- water Reactor Plants
The design work completed by General Electric on marine boiling

water reactor systems has been encouraging ; it indicates that for
certain ship applications the gap between conventional and nuclear
ship costs is narrowing rapidly. Design work on the 20,000 - shp
38,000-dwt tanker was completed in 1958, and General Electric is
now continuing with the design of the 43,000-ton tanker system
referred to in Sec. 12-2.2.
The feasibility of the boiling water reactor system for a 38,000
ton tanker was indicated in the initial design study involving a
20,000 -shp plant. Subsequent design studies for a 27,300 -shp ( 30,000
shp max .) boiling -water system for a 60,000 -ton tanker ( the T7
class tanker) indicated further improvements and emphasized the
economic potential of the boiling reactor. In parallel with this de
sign work, development programs were undertaken to verify key
design areas, including the effects of ship's motion on boiling re
actor performance and the performance of major items of equipment
in the propulsion system .
Results of the first detailed work indicated that operating costs
for the nuclear -powered T5 tanker ( 38,000 tons) were within 15
percent of the conventionally powered T5 tanker. Subsequent studies
on a boiling -water reactor powered T7 tanker (60,000 tons ) indi
cate plant performance that is economically within 8 percent of the
conventionally powered equivalent. These same T7 tanker studies
indicate further improvements that hold promise of coming below
conventional plant economic performance at a future date. Because
the marine boiling-water reactor design is based on a solid tech
nological foundation , it has been possible to plan in detail a pr
gram of design improvement and technological development aimed
at achieving competitive power for merchant vessels.
In the marine application of the boiling water reactor, it was
recognized that the ship's motion would have some effect on the
performance of the reactor system . A major experimental and
analytical program was therefore conducted to obtain an understand
ing of the design margins necessary. Preliminary results of this
work indicated that the ship's motion would not unduly affect re
actor performance. Subsequently, more rigorous analyses were made.
Based on acceleration changes of 0.7 g due to ship's motion, these
analyses indicated that the neutron - flux peaks will not exceed 140
percent of normal and that the corresponding central fuel tempera
ture rise would not exceed 120 °F. Since these rather moderate fluc
tuations would occur only in the rare instance in which the reactor
was operated at maximum power and the ship was in the worst
anticipated sea conditions, there appears to be considerable basis
for confidence in the reliability of the boiling water reactor for
marine applications .
Those unfamiliar with the successful operation of direct- cycle
boiling- water reactors have expressed concern over the safety and
reliability of this system . The Vallecitos Boiling Water Reactor
( VBWR ) at Vallecitos, Calif., has been operated over a period of
over 31/2 years. During this period there has been an insignificant
build -up of radioactive contamination. When the VBWR turbine
was opened after 900 and 3,000 hr of operation, the activity levels
measured throughout the turbine were low, averaging 1 to 2 mr/hr
of gamma radiation. Of further significance is the fact that there
has been negligible build -up of fission - product activity despite peri
ods of operation with known fuel -element ruptures. Experience with
the Experimental Boiling Water Reactor ( EBWR ) at Argonne Na
tional Laboratory has been similarly satisfactory.
The question of boiling water reactor cycle selection has received
continuing attention at General Electric. For a marine installation
the reactor thermal rating is relatively small , and the natural-circu
lation direct cycle has been selected because of its simplicity and
inherently low capital costs.
12–3.2 Reference Design, Marine Boiling -water Reactor
After the selection of the plant cycle yielding the lowest capital
and fuel costs had been made, the design of a reference propulsion
system requiring no major research and development was completed
for the T7 tanker.2 A simplified flow diagram of this system is
shown in Fig. 12.1.
This propulsion system is designed to furnish 30,000 shp on a
maximum continuous basis ( 27,300 shp normal) together with suffi
cient steam for the operation of all power- plant and ship auxiliaries
under normal steam conditions. The design of this plant was based
on a preliminary design for a reference 60,000-ton tanker prepared
by the Maritime Administration . The turbines are designed to op
erate at normal power with 980-psig saturated steam at the throttle.
The specifications of the T7 tanker as prepared by the Maritime
Administration are given in Table 12.2.
The boiling water reactor supplies steam at 1,000 psig, saturated
through a steam drying drum , directly to the propulsion turbine.
Recirculation flow is by natural circulation within the reactor vessel .
STEAM
285,000 Lb / HT 20,000 Lb / HT To Ships
DRYING
1000 PSI W. Hers
DRUM
546 ° F
HP TURBINE
To Standby
Turbogenerator
400 psi MOISTURE
Condenser
SEPARATOR 30,000
SHP
Boiler
Seals
REACTOR LP TURBINE
2000 kw
72,000 Lb / HT Turbogenerator
80 MWT F. W. HTR
CONDENSER
1.5" Hg ABS
PUMP
(
265 F
PUMP
Cleanup
Demin ,
Fig. 12.1 — Simplified flow diagram of the direct-cycle boiling -water

reactor system .
The fuel is slightly enriched uranium dioxide in tubular Zircaloy

elements. The reactor is provided with 24 cruciform boron - stainless
steel alloy control rods. The operating mechanisms for the control
rods are at the bottom of the reactor. The rods are designed to be
withdrawn from the core in a downward direction to increase the
reactivity and to be inserted in an upward direction to decrease the
reactivity.
The reactor system is provided with primary shielding, a steam
drying drum , condenser- boilers, water -purification equipment, radio
active -waste-handling equipment, controls and instrumentation, ra
diation -monitoring equipment, and other equipment necessary for
safe and reliable operation. Secondary shielding will be provided
for the most part by cargo oil or salt -water ballast. A small amount
of secondary shielding will be provided for local hot spots. All
condensate is passed through a full - flow demineralizer and pumped
back to the reactor vessel. Two stages of regenerative feed- water
heating and a drain cooler, utilizing turbine extraction, are used.
The electric -generating system for the ship consists of two 2,000
kw turbogenerators. The main set is supplied with reactor steam
at 980 psig ; the stand -by set is supplied with steam from the con
denser -boiler at 375 psig. The main set exhausts to the main con
denser ; the stand -by set , to its own condenser.
The reactor and certain closely associated auxiliaries are located
within a steel containment vessel designed to withstand the internal
Table 12.2—SPECIFICATIONS FOR THE T7 TANKER
Principal dimensions :
Length (over-all) , ft--- 832
Length ( between perpendiculars) , ft . 770
Breadth (molded) , ft--- 104
Draft ( molded , design draft) , ft 43
Depth (molded to main deck at side) , ft- 58. 5
Freeboard forward (approx .) , ft. 32
Gross tonnage (approx .) - 39 , 000
Net tonnage (at 43 ft molded (design draft) in sea water at 35 cu ft per
ton ) ---- 79, 900
Shaft horsepower (normal). 27, 300
Shaft horsepower (maximum continuous ) -- 30, 000
Capacity of cargo-oil tanks 100 percent full, bbl . 542, 000
Capacity of fuel oil tanks, cu ft.- 25, 100
Capacity of ballast tanks 100 percent full, bbl .. 127, 000
Capacity of fresh-water tanks , tons. 330
Trial speed at design draft, knots. 18. 5
Design sea speed (at 80 percent normal), knots. 17. 6
Dead weight and capacities :
Dead weight, tons. 60, 000
Light ship , tons. 19 , 900
Displacement load, tons . 79 , 900
Cargo oil, tons. 58 , 880
Fuel oil , tons . 675
Lube oil , tons 15
Fresh water, tons. 100
Available for clean ballast, tons . 20, 400
pressure from accidental release of the hot water and steam in the
system . The propulsion turbine and gears, main condenser, ship's
turbogenerator sets, and most propulsion machinery are located out
side the containment vessel in the engine room .
Back-up equipment is provided for liquid -poison hold -down of the
reactor and for removal of reactor heat in case the normally used
equipment becomes inoperative. An oil-fired stand -by steam gener
ator is installed for emergency use and take-home power. This oil
fired unit will be capable of providing sufficient steam to the propul
sion turbine and necessary auxiliaries for ahead operation at 3,000
shp and astern operation at 1,200 shp.
Ship's heating, ship's evaporator, and cargo and Butterworthing
heating will be supplied by pressurized hot water which, in turn ,
will be heated by reactor or turbine extraction steam in auxiliary
heaters located in the engine room .
The reactor plant arrangement is shown in Fig. 12.2 . This sim
plified drawing shows the location of the reactor and the contain
ment with respect to the cross section of the ship. The reactor pres
sure vessel is placed in the center of the containment and is sur
rounded by the primary shield. The condenser-boilers are located
POOP
DECK PASSAGEWAY
STEAM
UPPER
DRYER
DECK CARGO OIL TANK CARGO OIL TANK
STEEL
STEAM LINE
TO TURBINE WATER
CHIMNEY
........
4 " FEED WATER COOLING
CORE A COIL
REACTOR COFFER DAM

COFFER DAM
CONTAINMENT
VESSEL
ACCESS OPENING CONTROL

ROD DRIVE
Fig. 12.2—Arrangement of the direct-cycle boiling-water reactor plant

in the tanker.
above and outboard of the reactor, and the steam dryer is located
>
above and aft of the reactor at a point midway between the con
denser boilers, as shown in Fig. 12.3. The 12 control-rod drive sta
tions are spaced in a circle surrounding the primary shield and at
a level slightly above the control- rod drives.
The reactor vessel is supported on the water shield tank structure
by brackets attached to the reactor vessel , slightly below the head
flange. Suitable bearing surfaces at the brackets provide for radial
movement ( approximately 1/2 in. ) resulting from the thermal expan
sion and contraction of the reactor vessel . Provision is to be made
to prevent horizontal movement in any other direction so that forces
on the reactor resulting from the ship's motion can be transmitted
to the water tank structure. The water tank structure forming the
inner part of the primary shield is made up of concentric cylinders,
10 ft and 16 ft 6 in . in diameter. These cylinders are tied together
with horizontal and vertical diaphragms to give the desired rigidity
as a structural support . This also gives compartmentation for the
water and steel used for shielding.
The entire primary -shield and reactor -vessel load is supported
from two circular girders, one at the top and the other near the
bottom of the reactor shield tank . These two circular girders are
supported from the cylindrical wall of the containment vessel by
eight radial fin girders, spaced 45 deg apart. Each fin is given
lateral support by pairs of girders which transmit the horizontal
forces on the containment vessel internals, resulting from the ship's
motion, to the cylindrical sides of the containment vessel. A bracket
ER
E NS
ND
CO
ER
IL
BO
R
STEAM
DE NSE
CON
DRYER
ER
IL
BO
AIR
LOCK
PLAN
61FT.
60FT.
STEAM
DRYER
50
CONDENSER
BOILER
40
=
REACTOR
‫ ז‬-' ‫ר‬
CHIMNEY
30
CORE
20 WATER WATER
AIR
此 LOCK
10
el
BASE LINE
ELEVATION
Fig . 12.3 — Elevation and plan of the boiling water reactor showing equipment
installed in the containment vessel.
is attached to the exterior side of the containment vessel directly

opposite, and in line with, each fin girder. The containment vessel
is externally supported from these brackets.
The reactor auxiliary systems are located around the lower por
tion of the containment vessel , the condensate and clean -up systems
being grouped on the port side of the containment at the tank top
level. Each pair of demineralizer tanks is separately shielded . With
the exception of the resin sluice valves, all valves are outside the
shield. Access will be possible during full -power operation for man
ual operation of these valves to initiate the regeneration of the
demineralizer resins. Generally, the regeneration of these resins will
be automatically controlled from a panel located in the same region .
The resin -regeneration tank and regenerated -resin storage tank are
located above the condensate -demineralizer tanks, the resin -regenera
tion tank being in a shielded compartment. Other auxiliary equip
ment, such as the clean-up heat exchangers, off- gas storage tanks.
and off-gas compressors, located in this general area is shielded or
not depending upon the activity of the materials involved . In gen
eral, the piping from equipment to the condensate and clean -up
demineralizer systems and the liquid- and solid-waste system will
not require shielding.
Regulating and safety control of the reactor is provided by 24
combination shim -safety hydraulic control rods. Four of these drives
can be automatically positioned ; the remaining 20 are manually
positioned. The control rods enter from the bottom of the core,
scramming upward . The drives penetrate the bottom head of the
reactor vessel through control-rod drive nozzles.
A piston operating in a conventional hydraulic cylinder provides
the basic rod drive. Circumferential latches, which act as mechani
cal locking devices, are incorporated to hold the control rod at a set
position whenever a control or unlocking pressure is absent. For
regulating control, an unlocking pressure is supplied through exter
nal porting for releasing the lock when operating the drive. The
speed of insertion or withdrawal will be controlled by a flow - control
device in the hydraulic circuit .
The drive mechanism will be capable of raising or lowering the
control rod at a slow , controlled rate as well as providing scram or
rapid control-rod insertion. All drives will be capable of positioning
in approximately 3- in. increments of stroke to achieve control and
optimum neutron - flux distribution in the reactor core. Those drives
having a regulating control feature will operate as a vernier to
maintain a steady -state condition .
During normal operation cooling water at slightly above reactor
pressure will continually flow through the drive . During seram
operation a scram signal will deenergize the valve maintaining the

pressure above the piston , venting this region to a scram dump tank,
thus allowing the rod to be inserted rapidly. Pressure to the under
side of the piston is supplied from accumulators. Once the drive
is inserted , withdrawal will be prevented by the lock mechanism
until a reverse hydraulic pressure is applied to the mechanism .
Twelve separate scram accumulators are provided , one for each
pair of rods. The pairs are so chosen that failure of any one
accumulator system will not involve adjacent rods. Even in the
event of a failure that prevents one rod from being inserted in the
core , the reactor can be shut down. The core is designed to permit
shutdown from its most reactive configuration ( cold and clean ) with
any one control rod fully withdrawn. In the hot or operating con
dition , the control system is stronger, and the reactivity is somewhat
reduced . At such times several adjacent control rods may be lost
without endangering the shutdown capability. The liquid - poison
system could then be used to bring the reactor to a cold shutdown
condition. The function of the back -up liquid -poison system is to
provide an alternate, independent means for shutdown and hold
down of reactor power.
Allowable radiation levels and required shielding are based on a
maximum dose to ship's personnel and refueling crew of 5 rem / year.
The regions within the ship and its immediate vicinity will be divided
into two access classes, controlled and uncontrolled. Access to the
controlled areas will be restricted to less than full time and require
personnel monitoring and other health physics supervision . Access
to the uncontrolled areas will be continuous. The controlled areas
include the containment vessel , the engine room , the deck over the
engine room, the inner -bottom region beneath , the cofferdam region ,
and certain regions in the cargo -oil and fuel -oil tanks surrounding
the engine room . The uncontrolled access areas will include the
main control room, the auxiliary machinery room, and all regions
aft of these, the passageway around the engine room , all operating
stations and quarters forward , all forward cargo tanks, inner-bottom
regions, deck regions, etc. ( except the aft portion of the first cargo
tank forward of the engine room ), and all regions outboard of the
ship's sides and above and below the ship. The uncontrolled access
doses aboard ship will be less than 10 mrem /week during operation
and negligibly low during shutdown.
Secondary shielding for the propulsion machinery will be provided
where necessary to ensure an average access time of more than 1 hr
per week to the engine room at full power. Full advantage will be
taken of machinery arrangement and self-shielding. Longer access
times for non routine maintenance may require operation at reduced
power or plant shutdown . ( The radiation levels in the engine rec

will be approximately proportional to the square of the reaca
power level and will decay to negligible values following shutdo
and a delay of about 20 min . ) Access within the containment ve
sel will not be required at full power but will be possible for period
in excess of several hours at reduced power and for extended period
after shutdown. If increased access time to engine -room equipme
is required, it may be desirable to use local shielding near certain
equipment items, such as the propulsion turbine and the main con
denser. Provision has been made in the weight list for such pres
ently unallocated shielding.
The direct-cycle boiling-water reactor system described , as ex
plained, was designed for use in a 60,000 -ton 17 tanker. Since this
study was completed, new reactor studies for'a 43,000 -ton tanker
have been undertaken . Although the results of these new studies
have not been reported, it is unlikely that the direct -cycle boiling
water reactor system used for this ship will differ materially from
the one described here since the maximum shaft horsepower is essen
tially the same, i.e., 30,000. The steam pressure and temperature of
the two systems are also the same.
12–3.3 Closed - cycle Boiling -water Reactor Studies
In addition to the studies on the direct -cycle boiling-water reactor
described above, extensive studies have also been made on the appli
cation of the indirect or closed -cycle boiling reactor for maritime use.
During 1956 and 1957 the Nuclear Engineering Laboratory of the
American Machine & Foundry Co, made detailed studies of this type
reactor for use in a 38,000 -dwt tanker. This work was done under
contract with the U.S. Maritime Administration .
The design characteristics of the tanker selected for this investiga
tion were 38,000 dwt and 22,000 shp. The application of standard
propulsion equipment in the design of the power plant , where pos
sible, also was considered as a primary target. The over -all approach
in the studies consisted in replacing the conventional oil - fired boiler
with a 75 Mw (t) closed - cycle boiling water reactor plant. The sat
urated steam at 600 psig and 488 ° F generated by the nuclear plant
is supplied to the main propulsion turbine and ship's auxiliary
equipment.
The primary system , shown in Fig. 12.4 , consists of the reactor
core, piping, primary circulating pumps, and heat exchangers. The
demineralized reactor water and the saturated steam taken from the
steam space in the upper part of the reactor vessel are referred to
as the primary fluid. The secondary fluid is the feedwater return
from the turbine ( condenser ) , which is heated from 249 ° F to satu
129,025 LB/HR. STEAM 129,025 LB/HR .

STEAM 600 PSIG DRUM 600 PSIG
DRUM
ER
488 ° F. CONDENSING WATER DO 488 ° F,
M HEATED BOILER WN
CO CO
WN R RI
SE SATURATED SATURATED SE ME
RI
DO STEAM STEAM R
R
REACTOR GATE VALVE
WATER
254x 106 BTU / HR W

EED
F°249
1
95,500 LB/ HR. 95,500 LB / HR.
900 PSIG 900 PSIG
534 ° F. 534 ° F.
WATER
°FFEED
CONDENSATE
249
534 ° F.
CONDENSATE
534 ° F
*** *
SATURATED LIQUID SATURATED LIQUID
534 ° F. Х 534 ° F.
PRESSURIZED 2x 106 LB/ HR 2x106 LB/ HR. PRESSURIZED
WATER WATER
50 9 ° F. 509 ° F .
HEATED BOILER HEATED BOILER
PUMP PUMP
PUMP PUMP
CHECK
VALVE
CONTROL
DRIVE
Fig. 12.4Schematic diagram of the reactor primary system in the closed-cycle

boiling water reactor system.
rated steam at 600 psig and 488°F on the shell side of the heat
exchangers, as shown in Fig. 12.4. The saturated steam removed
from the top of the reactor core is passed through the tubes of the
heat exchangers, where it is subcooled, and returned to the bottom
of the reactor vessel along with the condensate. The radioactive
primary fluid is separated from the secondary fluid by the heat
exchanger tube wall.
The entire primary system is contained in a steel containment
vessel , the purpose of which is to contain any material released by
the unlikely accident of a rupture of the reactor primary system.
All vessels, piping, and equipment containing primary fluid are
housed in the containment vessel .
The saturated steam generated by the plant is supplied to the
main propulsion turbine at the rate of 260,000 lb /hr ( 600 psig ) when
the plant is operating at maximum capacity. The propulsion turbine
consists of one high- and one low-pressure turbine with astern ele
ments incorporated in the low-pressure turbine casing. There is a
steam separator in the crossover pipe between the high -pressure and
low -pressure turbine. This steam separator is designed to remove
23,000 lb /hr of moisture from the steam going to the low - pressure
. turbine.
The design approach used in the selection of the propulsion ma
6134890—62 31
chinery was constant steam pressure at the turbine throttle for

various load conditions and a variation in steam flow rate to attais
changes in power delivered by the turbine. Likewise, selection of
the ship's auxiliary systems, such as cargo heating *, turbogenerators.
pumps, and piping systems was based upon a constant-pressure stear:
supply of 600 psig. The basic philosophy of the control system is
to set the secondary steam pressure at 600 psig and allow the load
demand to determine the reactor steam pressure. The full -load
design conditions are 600 psig on the secondary side, which estab
lishes the reactor system pressure at 900 psig.
The over-all primary piping is arranged into two separate , com
plete operational loops that are mirror images of each other ; thus
with one loop in an inoperative condition , the reactor plant can be
operated at one -half power level. Each primary loop consists of
four piping circuits, namely : ( 1 ) a primary steam circuit that con
veys saturated steam from the top of the reactor core by natural
circulation to the condensing -water -heated boiler; ( 2 ) a primary
steam condensate circuit in which condensate flows by gravity from
the condensing -water-heated boiler to the inlet piping system con
nected to the pressurized -water-heated boiler ; ( 3 ) a primary coolant
supply to the pressurized -water -heated boiler in which 534 ° F satu
rated liquid is taken from the top of the reactor core and circulated
to the inlet of the pressurized -water -heated boiler ; and ( + ) the
coolant water return from the outlet of the pressurized -water -heated
boiler to the inlet of the reactor core through a forced - circulation
pump . The relative arrangement of these circuits is shown in
Fig. 12.4.
The primary circuit in only one loop conveys 95,000 lb of saturated
steam per hour from the top of the reactor core to the condensing
water -heated boiler. Ten -inch pipes were selected for this circuit.
resulting in a pressure drop of 0.67 psi through this 7+ -ft length
of pipe.
The primary steam condensate circuit conveys 238 gal of conden
sate per minute at 533 ° F from the condensing-water-heated boiler to
the piping system connected to the pressurized -water-heated boiler.
Six- inch pipe was selected for this circuit, resulting in a pressure
drop of 0.1 psi due to 4 ft length of pipe. The primary coolant
supply circuit transmits 2 million lb of 534 ° F saturated liquid per
hour from the reactor outlet to the inlet of the pressurized -water
heated boiler. There is an equivalent length of 55 ft of piping in
this circuit, resulting in a friction pressure drop of 1.93 psi.
Each circuit of the primary water return conveys 2 million lb of
* To reduce the viscosity of the cargo oil in cold weather, it is heated to facilitate
pumping.
509 ° F primary coolant per hour from the pressurized -water -heated
boiler to the reactor core inlet. This water flows through 12 - in . pipe
from the pressurized -water-heated boiler to the inlet of the primary
circulating pumps. Two canned rotor pumps are connected to the
inlet header to pump the water into the reactor core. Normal opera
tion requires one pump, the other is kept on stand -by. The pump
forces the water through a check valve into the pump discharge
header, which is connected by 12-in. pipe to the reactor core inlet.
This entire circuit from the pressurized -water boiler through the
primary circulating pumps to the core has an equivalent length of
273 ft and results in a 9.5 -psi pressure drop.
The design proposed for the steam generators of the closed-cycle
boiling-water reactor system is shown in Fig. 12.5. It consists of
three horizontal carbon - steel cylindrical shells as shown. The two
lower units, namely, the pressurized -water-heated boiler and the con
densing-water-heated boiler, house stainless - steel tube bundles welded
SECONDARY STEAM TO STEAM DRUM &

PROPULSION TURBINE SEPARATORS
FEEDWATER INLET
CONTAINMENT
VESSEL
CONDENSING WATER
HEATED BOILER
DOWNCOMER
PIPING
RISER PIPING
PRESSURIZED WATER
HEATED BOILER
Fig. 12.5 — Steam -generator design for the closed-cycle boiling water
reactor system .
to stainless-steel tube sheets. The stainless-steel tube bundles are of

the hairpin type in which thermal expansion is taken by the U bends,
thus eliminating the need for expansion joints in the shell. Stain
less- steel cladding ( 18 in . thick ) is used wherever the shell comes
in contact with the primary fluid. If the necessary natural circula
tion in the secondary loop is to be obtained, certain vertical dimen
sions are required between the various components of the steam
generator. Minimum distances are as follows : 10 ft between the
center lines of the steam drum and the condensing -water-heated
boiler ; 11 ft between the center lines of the condensing -water-heated
boiler and the pressurized -water-heated boiler. A minimum vertical
height of 3 ft is required between the uppermost water level in the
reactor and the under edge of the condensing-water-heated boiler to
ensure natural circulation in the primary steam loop.
The primary loop ( the tube side of the pressurized -water -heated
boiler and of the condensing-water -heated boiler) operates at 900
psig and 534 ° F ; the secondary loop (the steam drum and the shell
side of the pressurized -water -heated boiler and of the condensing
water -heated boiler) operates at 600 psig and 488 ° F.
The reactor vessel consists of a 7- ft - I.D. steel container clad on
the inner surface with stainless steel for corrosion resistance, Ther
mal shields are located between the core support cylinder and the
inner wall of the reactor vessel to reduce radiation to the vessel wall
and to the exterior surrounding area . The top of the reactor vessel
is closed off by a hemispherical head secured in position by bolts .
The lower head of the vessel is a hemispherical head through which
the penetrations for the control -rod drive mechanisms pass.
The primary shield tank is an annular tank of shielding water
surrounding the reactor vessel . The tank also provides structural
mounting for the reactor vessel. The inner wall of the primary shield
tank is adjacent to the reactor vessel , and the thickness of the shield
ing water annulus is approximately 60 . in . A cutaway drawing of
the reactor and primary shield is shown in Fig. 12.6.
The fuel used in the AMF closed -cycle boiling water reactor is a
mixture of uranium dioxide and thorium dioxide. The individual
fuel elements are circular in shape and consist of a Zircaloy tube,
0.125 in . in outside diameter, filled with short cylindrical pellets of
the urania - thoria mixture. The individual fuel elements are spaced
apart by structural spacer bars and are supported in an assembly
at the top and bottom of the complete fuel assembly. Water flowing
up around the Zircaloy tubes, parallel to the direction of the tube
axis, heats to saturation temperature and boils.
The selection of the fuel material was governed by the fuel oper
ating costs. The Th232 contained in the thorium dioxide ( ThO2) is
converted into fissionable ( 1233 in the reactor by the capture of a
-PRIMARY SHIELD
TANK PLUG
PRIMARY SHIELD TANK

UPPER
THERMAL HAT
INSULATION
REACTOR COOLANT
(STEAM) OUT
REACTOR COOLANT
(WATER) OUT PRIMARY SHIELD TANK
LOWER
REACTOR VESSEL
THERMAL
INSULATION
LEAD SHIELDING .
MAT REACTOR COOLANT IN
PRIMARY SHIELD TANK

FOUNDATION
CONTROL ROD
ACTUATOR
CONTROL ROD
ACTUATOR
DRIVE ke
du
Fig. 12.6 — Closed -cycle boiling-water reactor primary shield tank

containing reactor vessel.
neutron, as explained in Chap. 3. This conversion process will pro

long the life of the fuel elements and thus reduce the over-all fuel
costs. The ceramic fuel components, at 93 percent density, will have
a composition of 31.3 percent by weight UO, and 68.7 percent by
weight Tho , if the U235 enrichment is restricted to 9.5 percent.
The reactor core is built up of 112 fuel assemblies. These are
guided and supported on a lower grid support plate ; the upper ends
of the fuel assemblies are guided by an upper support grid. Nuclear
calculations indicate that the uranium fuel inventory may be 160 kg
of U235 .
Control of the reactor is effected by means of 16 cruciform control

rods located on 958- in . center line spacing in the active section of the
reactor core. The inner four control rods are made of hafnium and
remain partly in the high -neutron - flux region during normal core
operation. The peripheral control rods, which will be removed from
the core during normal operation , are made of stainless steel con
taining boron . This will place the boron rods out of the high -neu
tron - flux region during the normal operation of the core. The drive
mechanisms, which are located underneath the reactor vessel, drive
the control rods upward out of the core to increase the reactivity
level. They pull the control rods into the core to decrease the reac
tivity. A scram signal in the reactor control system results in the
control rods being released by the drives ; a spring forces them into
the reactor core. Also, with this arrangement, the control rods more
in the direction of decreasing reactivity under gravity.
As previously explained , the reactor, together with the two pri
mary loops and associated equipment, is contained in a steel contain
ment vessel. The 150 -psi design pressure of this containment was
based upon the pressure that would be produced by the release of
all the thermal energy of the primary and secondary fluids within
the containment vessel. Consideration was given to the use of the
ship’s structure as a containment vessel , but this was found to be
uneconomical because the pressure remained quite high, even if the
volume were increased considerably, and the ship's structure would
require reinforcing.
The entire reactor primary system must be shielded to protect
personnel from radiation during operation. Where feasible, this
shielding ( secondary shielding ) is effected principally by the use of
cargo or ballast. In other areas lead is used , and it can often be
best supported by the containment vessel. Where shielding is used
over cylindrical parts of the containment vessel , it is attached di
rectly to the wall. Where the shape is such that it is difficult to
attach the lead shielding, special walls or decks may be built off the
containment vessel to support the lead.
The containment vessel is approximately 50 ft high with an inside
diameter of 32 ft . It is made of 11/0 -in. steel plate and will be fabri
cated in the field by welding. Under all normal conditions there
will be essentially no pressure difference across the vessel wall; the
150 -psi design pressure would occur only under a most extreme and
unlikely accident condition . The 11 ,-in . thickness on a 32 - ft inside
diameter gives a membrane stress of approximately 19,200 psi. Al
though this is somewhat high for carbon - steel plate in a vessel that
is continuously stressed, it is considered satisfactory for this vessel
which is seldom , if ever, stressed .
CONTAINMENT VESSEL
ACCESS OPENING
POOP
DECK -STEAM DRUM
SECONDARY STEAM
TO TURBINE
MAIN DK .
CONTAINMENT
VESSEL WALL
REACTOR
CORE PRIMARY
OUTLINE PIPING
MAIN
PRIMARY
CONTROL CIRCULATING
PANEL PRIMARY
PUMPS
SHIELD
TANK
ION
CHAMBER
THIMBLES
450 V CONTROL ROD

SWITCH ACTUATORS
BOARD
CONTROL ROD
ACTUATOR DRIVES
Fig . 12.7—Containment vessel for closed -cycle boiling-water reactor.
The vessel is also subject to stresses from other sources. It must

support its own weight and that of shielding and other equipment
that might be partially or completely supported by it . For the pur
poses of stress calculations, it is assumed that these masses must be
supported under accelerations equal to twice that of gravity in any
direction .
Support for the containment vessel is obtained by building the
lower semi-ellipsoidal head into the ship's structure. The head will
fit down into the tank top , as shown in Fig. 12.7, and will be welded
to vertical webs running both fore and aft and athwart ship. The
location of the containment vessel with respect to the ship's structure
and the propulsion machinery is shown in Fig. 12.8 .
COFFERDAM
SIDESH
BALLAST
AT
ENGINE ROOM
W.
S.
AFT PEAK
TANK
TANKS
S. W. !
B BALLAST
FUEL OIL FUEL OIL
Fig. 12.8Arrangement of the aft end of the ship showing location of con
tainment vessel and propulsion machinery ( closed -cycle boiling water reactor
system ) .
The design study described above establishes the technical feasi

bility of a nuclear tanker of 38,000 dwt and 22,000 shp ( max. )
using the closed -cycle boiling water reactor . The cost analysis of
this design, however, indicates that the operating cost for the nuclear
ship is consistently higher than that for a conventional ship . For a
38,000-dwt tanker, on the basis of current price quotations, the trans
portation cost on a typical voyage was estimated at $1.954 per barrel
as against $ 1.675 per barrel for a conventional tanker. This spread
is narrowed as one looks into the near future since conventional fuel
costs are increasing and nuclear fuel costs may be expected to de
crease. If the changes expected in the next five years are taken into
account, the nuclear transportation cost is reduced to $1.833 per
barrel, and the conventional transportation cost is increased to
$ 1.721 per barrel.
Extrapolation toward larger size vessels showed that optimum
conditions for a nuclear ship are approximately 65,000 dwt and
26,000 shp with a sea speed of 17.3 knots. Based on current prices
for nuclear equipment and nuclear fuel, the transportation cost for
such a ship would be $ 1.44 per barrel as compared to $1.28 for an
optimum conventional ship having the same weight but only 20,000
shp. If the construction cost for the nuclear ship could be reduced
to 75 percent of the cost estimated now , through standardization of
nuclear components, the transportation cost for a nuclear 65,000-dwt
vessel could be reduced to $ 1.268. This could be accomplished by
building several ships using the same nuclear components. This last
figure would certainly be within the range of competitive cost for
a nuclear tanker. The economic aspects of this ship, as well as those

of other designs, is considered in greater detail in Chap. 11 .
12–3.4 Reference Design, Maritime Organic-moderated and -cooled
Reactor
The results of this design study by Atomics International indi

cated that a 60,000-dwt tanker ( T7 class ) propelled by a 30,000-shp
organic-moderated and -cooled reactor can be built and operated at
a cost that is only slightly higher than that of a conventional
tanker. The reactor design is predicated on a four-year construction
schedule with preliminary engineering starting July 1 , 1959. This
construction schedule was set by the Atomic Energy Commission to
permit a two-year research and development program prior to the
construction of the ship. The designers are of the opinion that the
actual construction schedule could probably be shortened .
The steam generated by the organic-moderated and -cooled reactor
power plant is at a pressure and temperature fairly close to the steam
conditions normally used in maritime practice. Therefore, off-the
shelf steam propulsion equipment was incorporated in the plant
design. The design illustrates the confidence in, and inherent safety
and future potential of, this type nuclear power plant for maritime
application.
Since the T7 tanker was designed specifically for a nuclear appli
cation, the space set aside for the reactor and propulsion machinery
was held essentially constant , and the organic -moderated reactor
propulsion system was located within these spaces. The equipment
was arranged within the reactor compartment to satisfy the func
tional requirements of the components, minimize shield weights,
minimize capital costs, and provide sufficient accessibility for main
tenance operations. The arrangement of the ship is illustrated in
Fig. 12.9. The T7 tanker has been designed to carry oil from
Kuwait to Philadelphia via the Cape of Good Hope and return
HATCHES CONTROL RM.

MAIN DECK
AUX . SERVICE DECK
TURBINE DECK
CONTAINMENT LIMITS
CONDENSER DECK
TURBINE AREA REACTOR

AREA
Fig. 12.9 - Longitudinal section of the organic -moderated reactor

in the T7 tanker.
under ballast through the Suez Canal. The round trip covers 21,350
miles. The principal design features of the nuclear ship are given
in Table 12.3.
A single organic -moderated reactor furnishes all the power to
drive the propeller, furnishes the ship's electrical load, and supplies
the heating load . The reactor is designed to follow the load demand
in accordance with normal ship's practice and can follow load
swings from 20 to 80 percent of nominal power in 10 sec as a result
of its inherent characteristics. Also , the load on the reactor system
can be dropped from full load to 20 percent of full load instan
taneously with no adverse effect on the ship's machinery or reactor
system .
The main propulsion turbine is divided into a high- and a low
pressure section. Each section is capable of driving the propeller
shaft independently of the other section . Take- home power is fur
nished by an oil - fired boiler that can supply steam to the main tur
bine at a sufficient rate to drive the ship at about 8.5 knots.
Table 12.3_DESIGN FEATURES OF ORGANIC -MODERATED REACTOR
CLASS T7 TANKER
Length between perpendiculars, ft. 770

Beam , ft. 104
Draft, ft . 43
Displacement, tons . 77 , 100

Dead weight, tons . 60, 840
Maximum power, shp 30, 000
Normal power , shp 27 , 250
Design ship speed at 27,250 shp, knots .. 17. 7
Design ship speed at 30,000 shp, knots . 18. 2
Adequate shielding has been provided to limit the annual dose

received by the crew to 5 r. Also, the shielding will prevent the
cargo from becoming radioactive by neutron capture. During nor
mal operation no radioactivity is released to the sea water. Radio
activity is vented to the atmosphere when the ship is at sea , but
when it is at dock side all radioactive gases from the process systems
are held up .
The reactor vessel , heat exchangers, and auxiliary reactor equip
ment are located within a reactor compartment. This compartment
is surrounded by a cofferdam to separate the cargo from the reactor
machinery. The inner walls of this cofferdam are used as a con
tainment structure surrounding the reactor system . In the event of
a ship collision, this containment structure is protected by a barri
cade constructed of large structural-steel stringers between the ship's
hull and the cofferdam . It has been assumed that the integrity of
this containment structure will not be violated in the event of a
ship collision, although the equipment inside the containment struc

ture may be deranged during collision conditions owing to shifting
of the equipment's foundations.
All the ship's superstructure, including the crew's quarters, is
located amidships above the cargo tanks. The machinery spaces are
aft, and the reactor compartment is located at the forward end of
the machinery space. The equipment within the reactor compart
ment is heavily shielded, and the whole structure is supported by
a system of decks and girders on the double bottom underneath . A
cofferdam space is arranged around the sides and ends of the reactor
compartment. The cofferdam space between the reactor compart
ment and machinery space is intended to store fuel oil for the
auxiliary take-home boiler.
The organic -moderated reactor vessel is centrally located within
the reactor room and on the center line of the ship. The vessel is
surrounded by a primary biological shield consisting of iron , lead ,
and borated water to attenuate and capture neutrons escaping from
the reactor core. This shield also reduces the gamma radiation .
Fuel used in the reactor is uranium dioxide enriched to 3.7 per
cent U235. This fuel is contained within extended surface tubes fab
ricated from an alloy of aluminum powder metal. There are 88
fuel elements in the core and each element consists of 100 fuel pins.
Twenty -one cruciform control rods are employed to control the
reactor. These control rods are actuated by drive mechanisms lo
cated in a sub -pile room beneath the reactor. The upper reactor
vessel head is designed specifically for refueling. The use of the
aluminum powder metal alloy for the fuel cladding is interesting.
These alloy products are characterized by unusually high strengths
above 600° F, and they are superior to the best conventional wrought
aluminum alloys.
Heat is removed from the reactor by two heat -transfer loops.
Each loop consists of a circulating pump, steam generator, and super
heater. These loops are placed symmetrically about the center line
of the ship and are of opposite hand . Hot organic fluid ( a mixture
of terphenyls commercially available as Santowax -R ) circulates from
the reactor core to a superheater, where some of its heat is given
to superheating steam that has been generated in the steam gen
erator. The organic material then circulates to the steam generator,
where the bulk of its heat is transferred to boiling water. Finally,
the cool organic liquid from the steam generator circulates back to
the reactor core . The steam conditions at the superheater outlet
are 450 psig and 650 ° F . ('onstant steam pressure is maintained at
varying reactor loads by bypassing some of the hot organic fluid
around the superheater and steam generator. Each loop can be
isolated from the reactor by isolation valves. The steam generators

are located above the reactor core ; this arrangement provides nat
ural circulation of the coolant to remove decay heat from the reactor
core in the event of complete power failure. The steam generators
are arranged to provide decay heat removal by natural circulation
in either loop at a 15 deg permanent list. A third, smaller loop for
decay -heat removal is also located in the reactor compartment . This
decay -heat removal loop is provided with a circulating pump to
remove heat to a small steam boiler. The steam generated in this
boiler circulates by natural convection to an air condenser located
on the main deck. The condensate drips back into the decay - heat
boiler.
Purification of the organic coolant is accomplished by vacuum
distillation. Higher boiling- point compounds are concentrated in
the distillation unit and are collected in a storage tank provided
specifically for this purpose ; the distillate is returned to the reactor
system .
The entire reactor compartment is enclosed within a vaportight
enclosure containment structure. The sides of this structure com
prise the walls of the cofferdam surrounding the reactor compart
ment. The double bottom constitutes the floor, and the upper shield
ing deck forms the top of the compartment. Access to the reactor
compartment is through air locks. The reactor compartment is
designed to contain an internal pressure of about 15 psig, which
corresponds to the maximum pressure anticipated during a complete
failure of the reactor and the steam generators.
The main circulating pumps in the heat-transfer loops are vertical
turbine process types with individual sump tanks. They are rated
at 12,900 gal/min at a total discharge head of 115 ft and are driven
by vertical solid -shaft 500 -hp 440 - v 3 -phase 60-cycle motors. The
pumps are constructed of low - carbon steel castings, stainless - steel
fitted, and with stainless-steel impellers. The components in the heat
transfer loops are connected by 18 -in . - diameter pipe, and the loops
are provided with 16 -in . power-operated valves at each inlet and
outlet connection to the reactor. The valves are located as close to
the shielding as possible ; however, they are accessible for normal
maintenance and manual operation. The valves are instrumented
and powered for automatic quick closing and have remote operating
features. An interlock prevents accidental closing off of more than
one loop at any time to retain emergency convective cooling
capability.
Each heat- transfer loop is provided with a 16 -in. gate valve down
stream of the steam generator bypass and with a 12-in . Venturi ball
valve in the bypass line. These valves are modified to prevent 100
percent closure in order that a small stream of coolant will flow
through each section of the loop at all times, thereby maintaining

system temperature. The valves are positioned in response to a
flow signal from the main steam line, thus regulating the flow of
coolant through the steam generators in proportion to the turbine
plant load.
The steam for the turbine is generated in two boiler-superheater
units, each connected to one of the primary organic-coolant loops.
Except for the common feed-water supply lines and steam headers
with unit isolation valves, the steam generators are in no way inter
connected, either on the organic or steam side and, as previously
mentioned, can be shut down individually for control purposes or
maintenance. The boiler is a conventional vertical heat exchanger
with a U -tube bundle to avoid thermal expansion problems with the
tubes. The superheater is a vertical exchanger with straight tubes
in fixed tube sheets. As indicated in Fig. 12.10, the superheater and
boiler vessel are positioned vertically with the superheater located
at a lower elevation to facilitate piping and equipment layout.
Under full-load conditions the organic coolant enters the superheater
at 675 ° F and leaves the boiler at 620 ° F . The coolant flows through
the shell side of the superheater and the tube side of the boiler.
Feed water is supplied to the boiler at the same elevation as the
normal water level. An integral downcomer supplies the water to
SATURATED STEAM
MOISTURE
SEPARATING
EQUIPMENT
TYTTY
WATER LEVEL SUPERHEATER
FEEDWATER
INLET
ORGANIC
BOILER COOLANT
FROM REACTOR
ORGANIC
COOLANT SUPERHEATED STEAM
TO REACTOR TO TURBINE
ORGANIC
COOLANT
Fig. 12.10 - Steam generator and superheater for the organic-moderated reactor.
the heat -transfer area. The steam generated in the boiler passes
through the moisture separators and steam dryers before entering
the superheater. Each boiler and superheater unit is designed to
generate 150,000 lb of steam per hour at 450 psig and 650 ° F at
the superheater outlet, with an organic -coolant flow rate of 5,650,000
lb/hr, and boiler feed water at 330 ° F .
The main condensate and feed -water system is arranged as a
closed three -stage feed -heating system and will fully deaerate all
the feed water . It consists of condensate pumps, air ejectors, direct
contact deaerating feed-water heater with vent condenser, high -pres
sure feed-water heater, and feed-water pumps. The main turbine
will develop 27,250 shp at approximately 109 rpm and 30,000 shp
at approximately 113 rpm when operating with steam at 425 psig
and 650° F. Two turbogenerators rated at 2,000 kw per unit are
supplied for each ship. Each turbogenerator exhausts to separate
auxiliary condensers. There are two main condensate pumps each
having sufficient capacity to handle the condensate from the main
condenser under maximum power conditions.
Each main propelling unit consists of a double - reduction geared
compound marine turbine. The turbines consist of one high -pressure
ahead turbine and one low -pressure ahead turbine, each in a casing
of its own , connected to one double - reduction gear. The astern tur
bine is located in the forward end of the low -pressure turbine
casing. The power is divided approximately equally between the
two turbines at full power .
The turbine compartment is located in the stern of the ship , and
it is separated from the reactor compartment by a cofferdam . All
the conventional propulsion machinery and the auxiliary power
equipment is located in this area .
The design objective for the reactor is continued operation with
failed fuel pins in the reactor core. This means that it will not be
necessary to shut down the plant in the event a small portion of the
fuel pins within the core develops weld failure or pinhole leaks
which release fission products into the coolant. Operation will
continue up to a maximum level of activity, at which point the plant
will be shut down for removal of the fuel elements containing the
defective pins. During operations the core will be monitored for
failed fuel pins by the fuel-element- failure detection system, and the
coolant will be periodically sampled for determination of fission
product concentration . This information , together with a realisti
cally established maximum value for specific coolant activity, will
permit removal of failed elements during regularly scheduled shut
downs in port .
When the ship is at sea, the waste gases will be passed through a
scrubber to remove radioactive gases and discharged to the atmos

phere through the stack . The radioactive gases released through
this system are in trace quantities and represent no hazard.
The organic -moderated and -cooled reactor concept described here
represents a significant advance over other organic-moderated re
actor designs. As such , several well -defined basic areas require an
extension of the present development effort. These areas are ( 1 ) a
complete experimental investigation of nucleate boiling heat trans
fer with organics, including fouling and burn -out studies; ( 2 ) fuel
element materials and design studies, including irradiation and
postirradiation evaluation of materials ; and ( 3 ) determination of
pressure build -up characteristics during the suppression of organic
fires in confined areas.
Preliminary studies have established the technical feasibility of
utilizing nucleate boiling with organic fluids as a means of heat
transfer, but further investigation is necessary to define the limits
of nucleate boiling to enable some of the present design conserva
tism to be eliminated .
12-3.5 Maritime Gas- cooled Reactor Studies
As mentioned previously, the design of a tanker using a gas

cooled reactor in combination with a gas turbine as the propulsion
machinery has been the objective of several studies by different
contractors. Three preliminary studies with respect to a 38,000--dwt
20,000-shp tanker were made, each involving the use of a closed
cycle gas-turbine system but each predicating the use of a different
coolant gas. The first two studies by the Ford Instrument Co. and
the General Motors Corporation employed nitrogen and helium , re
spectively. The third system , by General Atomies Division of Gen
eral Dynamics, was based on the use of helium as the coolant. The
reactors in these studies are all graphite moderated .
Although these three designs differ considerably in the arrange
ment of equipment and the temperatures and pressures used, in
general, they employ the same basic arrangment, namely, a single
loop system with a high -pressure gas turbine receiving high-tem
perature gas from the reactor, driving the gas compressors, and
exhausting directly to a low -pressure gas turbine driving the ship
propeller. This type system , in which the inert working medium
passes directly from the reactor to the machinery of the closed -cycle
gas turbine, is inherently simple and has many advantages. The
inert working medium (helium , CO2,, or nitrogen ) is noncorrosive,
stable, and has very desirable nuclear properties, such as a low
neutron -capture cross section . Additionally, attractive efficiencies
can be realized with a compact, simple gas cycle of few components
that operates at quite moderate pressures ; very high efficiencies will
ultimately be possible as metallurgical research yields reactor and

turbine materials that permit an increase in system temperature
above the levels currently being used for gas turbines.
Although the use of nitrogen was considered as the coolant ir
one of the design studies, at the present time the working fluids of
principal interest for the Maritime Gas-cooled Reactor (MGCR)
are carbon dioxide and helium . Other gases, including nitrogen.
air, water vapor, and hydrogen, have been ruled out for immediate
application because of poorer thermal properties, because of prob
able limitations due to materials compatibility, or because of greater
difficulties in developing the turbomachinery. Of the two gases now
being considered, helium is believed to be the most acceptable gas
for the usual nuclear and metallurgical conditions existing within
the reactor. Carbon dioxide has the important logistical advantage
of being readily available whenever and wherever coolant replace
ment may be necessary, and it is probably easier to contain at high
temperatures and pressures than is helium . It is an established
fact that, in spite of extreme care in design, manufacture, and
assembly, there will be some leakage of whatever coolant is used.
However , the gas inventory and expected leakage rates are low
enough with either helium or carbon dioxide that the cost of the
gas itself makes only a negligible addition to the cost of the plant.
40
-
38
GAS TURBINE
CARBON DIOXIDE
36
EFFICIENCY
THERMAL
STEAM
34 CYCLE
,%
32
1
30
GAS TURBINE
HELIUM
28
1
-
26
I
800 900 1000 1100 1200 1300 1400 1500
REACTOR OUTLET TEMPERATURE , °F .
FIG. 12.11 -- Thermal efficiency for gas turbine and steam plants as a
function of reactor outlet temperature .
Gas-turbine efficiencies for both helium and carbon uioxide are

shown in Fig. 12.11 . Even when compared on the basis of the same
pumping work to overcome frictional losses, carbon dioxide shows
a greater thermal efficiency than helium . This is a consequence of
the departure of carbon dioxide from a perfect gas : its greater
compressibility at lower temperatures places less work demand on
the compressor .
Design studies indicate that the choice between helium and carbon
dioxide as the working fluid will have little effect on the total plant
weight. The cost of coolant inventory and replacement is not
expected to be appreciable for either carbon dioxide or helium .
Specification of the moderator for the MGCR is of comparable
importance to the selection of coolant. Moderators that have been
considered are graphite, beryllium oxide, light water, heavy water,
and zirconium hydride. Graphite is a good structural material at
high temperatures; in fact , its strength actually increases with tem
perature. Graphite moderators were considered for use in the
earlier MGCR studies, but the choice has shifted to beryllium oxide
in the more recent studies.
12–3:6 Advanced MGCR Concept
As a result of the preliminary studies on the application of the

gas-cooled reactor gas-turbine system in the propulsion of a large
tanker, a more advanced concept has been developed , involving a
30,000-shp plant using a 64 Mw (t) reactor. The goal of this study
is the construction of a prototype plant by early 1964.
A flow diagram of this advanced concept is shown in Fig. 12.12.
The working fluid (helium ) is heated in the reactor. It is then
expanded through the high -pressure turbine, which drives the com
pressors, and the low -pressure turbine, which provides the power
output. Leaving the low -pressure turbine, the working fluid enters
the hot side of the regenerator, where it is reduced in temperature.
From the regenerator the fluid enters the water-cooled precooler,
where part of the cycle waste heat is rejected. The regeneration
process enables the waste heat to be rejected at a lower average
temperature, thereby increasing the efficiency of the process. The
working fluid leaves the precooler and enters the low -pressure com
pressor, where its pressure is raised to an intermediate level. After
the heat of compression is rejected to the intercooler, the working
fluid enters the high -pressure compressor, where it is raised to the
peak cycle pressure. Upon leaving the high -pressure compressor,
the working fluid passes through the cold side of the regenerator,
where it absorbs the heat given up by the fluid on the hot side. It
then returns to the reactor, thus completing the cycle.
613489 0462 -32
1. C.
HIGH PRESSURE 85° F

TURBINE 518 psi 236 ° F
520 psi
HIGH PRESSURE LOW PRESSURE

COMPRESSOR COMPRESSOR
207 ° F 85° F
1005 ° F
800 psi 308 psi
446 psi
SECONDARY
SHIELD
1300 ° F
(MAX 1500 ° F)
739 psi P.C.
RED .
GEAR
REACTOR
22,000 S. H. P. L. P. T.
THROTTLE
VALVE SPEED
CONTROL
753 ° F
835 ° F 778 psi
294 ° F
311 psi
BYPASS 310 psi
REGENERATOR
BOILER
Fig. 12.12—Flow diagram for the prototype maritime gas -cooled reactor
with constant -speed compressor.
SEAL ROD DRIVES

ROD CONTAINER
CORE SUPPORT GRID CONTROL ROD
24-1"
SEALS
REFLECTOR REFLECTOR SUPPORT

ACTIVE CORE INSULATION
MODERATOR BLOCK THERMAL SHIELD
SUPPORT TUBE
TA
MODERATOR
BLOCK
SUPPORT TUBE
CONCENTRIC DUCT
FUEL BUNDLE
SECTION A - A
Fig. 12.13 — Vertical cross section of the advanced maritime gas -cooled reactor.
A simplified diagram of the reactor under development is shown

in Fig. 12.13. The reactor core is 6.4 ft in diameter and 6.4 ft
high. It is surrounded by a reflector having an average thickness of
1 ft. The core is made up of moderator elements containing the fuel
elements. The moderator was originally scheduled to be graphite,
but recent advances in the technology of beryllium oxide, combined
with a very substantial reduction in its cost, now seem to favor
this more efficient moderator material. The reflector will be either
graphite or beryllium oxide.
The helium coolant enters the reactor vessel through the outer
annulus of the concentric duct at the bottom of the vessel . The gas
then flows up outside the reflector, cooling the thermal shields and
the vessel wall, and enters the core from the top. The flow through
each fuel channel is orificed to maintain the temperature rise and
hot -spot temperature in each channel within safe limits. The hot
gas flows out of the pressure vessel through the inner section of the
concentric duct.
By far the most formidable problem faced by the MGCR designers
is the development of fuel elements capable of operating reliably
at high temperatures for long enough periods to achieve economical
burn-ups of the nuclear fuel that they contain . Two types of fuel
elements, one heterogeneous and the other semihomogeneous, have
been considered for the MGCR. The heterogeneous fuel element con
sists of a bundle of 19 rods, shown in Fig. 12.14. Each rod is
CABLE DEVICE TO OPEN AND
KEEP LATCH OPEN
FUEL ELEMENT LIFTING
DEVICE
12 " TOP REFLECTOR ACTIVE FUEL LENGTH 12 " BOTTOM REFLECTOR
LENGTH LENGTH
B
Olo
LA LB
LATCH RELEASE SPIRAL SPACERS
LATCH MECHANISM
CABLE 0.025 DIAMETER CYLINDER
5 - INCH SPIRAL PITCH
ON 19 FUEL RODS
SECTION A - A
SCALE 4 TO I
SECTIONB - B
SCALE 2 TO 1
F10. 12.14 — Heterogeneous fuel element for the gas-cooled reactor.

approximately 1/4 in. in diameter and is made up of a stainless

steel or other metal tube containing the uranium dioxide fuel in
pellet form . The tube provides the required mechanical strength
and acts as a container for the fission products. Rod separation
within a bundle is maintained by helical spacers. Each of the 19 - rod
a
bundles is inserted into a moderator element, as shown in Section
A-A. Fig. 12.13.
The maximum power density of the heterogeneous fuel element is
somewhat limited by the safety considerations pertaining to a loss
of- coolant accident. The maximum coolant temperature is deter
mined by the creep strength of the cladding.
A more homogeneous fuel element provides additional thermal
capacity for the fuel and thereby provides increased safety in the
event of a loss-of-coolant accident. Such a fuel-element design is
under study as a back-up effort to the heterogeneous design . One
type of homogeneous element under consideration consists of a
cylindrical tube filled with a solid homogeneous uranium - graphite
mixture. Another type of homogeneous fuel element may be made
by inserting metal coolant tubes in holes which pierce the uranium
graphite structure. Extensive tests, both with and without reactor
irradiation, are required to develop any of these fuel-element con
cepts to the point where reliable long-lived operation under MGCR
conditions is assured.
An important consideration in the design of a gas-cooled reactor
is the problem of obtaining sufficient heat-transfer surface. For a
fuel rod of minimum acceptable diameter for fabrication , there is
a corresponding fuel volume. At the present time it appears that
this volume is consistent with a reasonable fuel inventory and a
low enrichment using undiluted UO2, which would result in favor
able fuel-cycle costs. Dilution of the fuel with an insert material
such as BeO or Al2O3 would, however, result in greater safety
because of increased thermal capacity and possible improvement in
fission -product retention, even though there might be some sacrifice
in economy. An extensive materials-development program is cur
rently under way to determine fuel -body fabrication techniques,
dimensional stability, and fission -product retention for such diluted
fuels.
The U235 loading for the MGCR core is currently specified as
208 kg. This loading results in an enrichment of 5 percent and
an estimated core lifetime ( assuming uniform burn - up ) of over
five years at full power.
The MGCR turbomachinery consists of four separate components :
low -pressure compressor, high -pressure compressor, high -pressure
1
turbine, and low -pressure turbine. The high -pressure turbine sup
plies power to drive the two compressors and is coupled directly to
them. The low - pressure turbine provides the propulsion power
and is mounted on a separate shaft that is in line with , but not
coupled to, the high -pressure turbine -compressor shaft. This is
commonly called a “free turbine ” arrangement. It has the advan
tage of allowing the low-pressure turbine to rotate at any speed
required by the load, while the compressor-turbine set is permitted
to run independently at the speed that corresponds to its highest
efficiency.
The present tentative design of the turbomachinery calls for the
compressor -turbine set to turn at 12,200 rpm. There are 38 com
pressor stages, of which 17 are in the low -pressure compressor.
Each turbine has 8 stages. The design speed of the power turbine
is 8,000 rpm. This is a compromise between higher speeds, which
would be better from the standpoint of turbine design , and lower
speeds, which favor the reduction gear. The entire turbomachinery
package for the MGCR prototype will be approximately 32 ft long
over- all and 8 ft in diameter across the flanges at the widest point.
Astern operation of the MGCR -powered tanker probably will be
obtained by means of a reversible-pitch propeller.
The general characteristics of the MGCR plant are shown in
Table 12.4. As will be noted , the system contemplates an outlet
gas coolant temperature of 1,500° F and an operating pressure of
1,200 psig. One of the principal operational advantages of the
MGCR cycle is its ability to maintain an almost constant high effi
ciency over a wide range of power levels. This is shown in Fig.
12.15 . Control of modern steam turbines is accomplished either
by throttling the steam to the first-stage nozzles or by controlling
the number of inlet nozzles. In either case, a decrease in the effi
ciency of the steam turbine occurs when it is operated at " off
design” points.
A gas turbine, on the other hand, can be controlled by varying
the density of the fluid flowing through the machine. In the closed
cycle gas turbine, the flow rate is controlled by varying the inven
tory ( and, therefore, the pressure level ) of the working fluid without
altering the volumetric flow . In this way the distribution of energy
release through the machine remains practically constant and the
efficiency remains high. The gas inventory can be decreased by
bleeding helium from the high -pressure compressor to an accumu
lator. Helium is returned to the cycle by bleeding from the accumu
lator to the section of the low --pressure compressor. In this case
the volume of the accumulator determines the power range of high
40
VARIABLE INVENTORY
38 CONSTANT INVENTORY
MGCR MARK I
30
34
EFFICIENCY
32
CYCLE
30
,%
26
850 - PSI
STEAM CYCLE
24 , 1800
22
20
-PSI
1
STEAM CYCLE
18+
16
10 20 30 40 50 70 80 90 100
FULL - LOAD SHAFT HORSEPOWER , %
FIG. 12.15 — Cycle efficiency vs. shaft horsepower for gas- cooled reactor
closed -cycle and high-pressure steam cycles.
efficiency operation . For example, three 250-cu ft accumulator

flasks will permit high -efficiency operation of the 20,000 -shp MGCR
down to 50 percent of full power. By enlarging the accumulator
capacity or by pumping gas into high -pressure storage tanks, high
efficiency can be maintained down to much lower power levels.
Operation at power levels below the capability of the accumulator
is accomplished by decreasing the reactor outlet temperature, result
ing, of course, in reduced cycle efficiency. This wide range of high
efficiencies is of particular importance when ships must operate
under partial power conditions for extended periods of time, as
during a storm or in confined waters.
Another advantage of the closed -cycle gas -turbine system is its
extreme flexibility. The output power can be varied from full
power to zero, or vice versa , in a matter of seconds because of low
transient thermal stresses in the power- plant components. Typically,
the MGCR tubromachinery can be safely started from cold con
dition much faster than existing steam plants, including those on
nuclear-powered ships, which require several hours for such start -up .
In the first MGCR system rapid power changes during maneuver
Table 12.4 - MGCR PLANT DATA

Cycle :
Shaft horsepower ... 30,000
Reactor thermal output, Mw .. 64
Reactor coolant .... Helium .
Fluid temperature at reactor outlet , ° F . 1,500
Fluid temperature at reactor inlet , ° F . 881
Reactor vessel :
Operating pressure, psig- 1,200
Inside diameter, ft .. 9.67
Inside length , ft.- 15.1
Material of construction... Mn-0.5 wt . % Mo steel .
Reactor core assembly :
No. of fuel assemblies . 292
No. of control elements .. 24
Core diameter, in .. 76. 5
Core length , in .- 76.5
Reflector material.. Graphite or BeO.
Moderator material . Beo .
Main propulsion turbine :
Over - all length, ft----- 32
Maximum continuous rating, shp- 30,000
Working fluid . Helium .
Inlet fluid pressure, psi .- 1,123
ing will be accomplished by bypassing the power turbine and reject

ing energy to a heat dump. Future plants may use even simpler
and probably more efficient methods.
12-3.7 MGCR Program
Since the MGCR represents the wedding of two advanced sub

systems, the gas-cooled reactor and the closed -cycle gas turbine, it
is planned to follow the practice that is normal to the proof-testing
of many single and even prosaic systems, that is, a prototype of
the plant will be built for test operation. Information obtained
from this test operation not only will be used to confirm the safety
and reliability of the separate systems and the systems in combina
tion, but also will permit subsequent sea-going plants to be built
more efficiently and to be operated more economically.
Although much information can be obtained from calculations
or from separate tests of individual components, there are many
things that can be best determined by testing the power plant as
a whole. If the prototype is located on land and thereby divorced
from the special operational and reliability requirements of a sea
going power plant, it can be built and put into operation approxi
mately one year sooner than could a shipboard plant. Although it
would be possible to install the power plant in a ship or a portion
of a ship for the test program , this procedure would limit the choice
of test sites and would impose serious logistic problems of service

and supply. The reactor core structure, fuel elements, control rods
and drives, and turbomachinery cannot be tested under actual oper
ating conditions by any practical means other than by the prototype
plant. It is expected that operation of the prototype will also
provide information on shielding requirements, fuel-element integ
rity, and system contamination, if any. The operating character
istics determined from the prototype will permit superfluous instru
mentation and controls to be eliminated from the shipboard plant
and the simplest operating procedures to be established.
The prototype will be geared to operate at a maximum pressure
of 800 psi and at a reactor outlet temperature in the range of
1,300 to 1,500° F. At the lower temperature the reactor will achieve
a basic efficiency of 32 percent. According to the present schedule,
test operations on the reactor are planned for early 1964.
The first sea -going version of the MGCR , identified as Mark I,
would profit from experience with the land-based prototype but
would operate with higher reactor outlet temperature and operating
pressure. This version of the MGCR will achieve a basic cycle
efficiency of 37 percent. This first application of the MGCR will
provide a vehicle for the actual operational testing of the MGCR
as a propulsion system, and it is expected to be competitive with 1
the then current oil- fired ships. If confidence in this system con
tinues at the present high level during the development and con
struction stages of the prototype, the initiation of construction of
the Mark I vessel could parallel final testing of the prototype so
that it could be operational at an early date, if desired.
The MGCR Mark II design , which would follow the Mark I,
will result from a rational extrapolation of current technology in
materials and turbomachinery and will also utilize the operating
experience gained from the Mark I. The 40 percent or higher
thermodynamic efficiency of MGCR Mark II power plants will be
greater than that of any other marine power plants of comparable
power rating. Power-plant weight in terms of pounds per shaft
horsepower will be comparable to that of conventional maritime
power plants if fuel weight is not included and will be much lighter
if fuel weight for any reasonable trip is included.
As advanced as the Mark II system may appear to those who
have intimate knowledge of the marine field, it must be recognized
that it represents no more than an orderly and practical extrapola
tion of today's technology Also, it should be recognized that the
designs and economics considered for these first plants represent
rather conservative engineering design practice as well as simple
fuel - cycle assumptions. Major components, such as pressure vessels,
SPECIFIC
WEIGHT
POWER
PLANT
S/FUEL
,LPLUS
BHP
OF 500
400
ED
L EL IP
OI - FU SH
300
OMR
200 BWR
MGCR MK 1
100 MGCR MK II
BASIS :
POWER , SHP 30,000
DWT 60,000
SPEED, KNOTS 18.9
1
2000 4000 6000 8000 10,000 12,000
LOADED RETURN TRIP DISTANCE, NAUTICAL MILES
Fig. 12.16—Comparison of specific weights of propulsion plant plus fuel

for nuclear and oil - fired tanker.
heat exchangers, and rotating machinery, have been designed accord

ing to present codes for materials and stress levels. Furthermore,
no account has been taken of possible reductions in cost, size, and
weight which may result from improved design of heat exchangers
and pressure vessels.
With respect to fuel elements, there is room for considerable devel
opment and improvement. There is evidence from work on fuel
body materials currently under way that uranium dioxide fuel bodies
encased in high -temperature ceramic material will retain fission
products without requiring metal cladding. When such fuel bodies
can be made sufficiently reliable to keep the working -fluid stream
free of fission products, cycle temperatures and efficiency can be
raised and fuel costs can be reduced.
The compactness and low weight of the over -all power plant
achieved by the use of a moderate -size reactor and compact pro
pulsion machinery and by the elimination of a bulky boiler plant
will permit an increase in the available cargo space A comparison
of the machinery - plus -fuel weight per shaft horsepower for oil
fired systems with the MGCR and with other nuclear systems illus
trates a marked superiority for the MGCR , as shown in Fig. 12.16.
The compactness of the MGCR system is illustrated by a comparison
with the pressurized -water reactor. Such a comparison shows a
saving of more than one-third in machinery space ( Fig. 12.17) .
PLAN
PWR 7
MG CR
ELEVATION
Fig. 12.17—Comparative space requirements for the gas-cooled reactor

and the pressurized-water reactor.
5
REFERENCES
1. D. L. CONKLIN et al., Economics of Nuclear and Conventional Merchant Ships,

Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington ,
D.C. , June 30, 1958 .
2. Nuclear-powered Tanker Design and Economic Analysis, Direct-cycle Boil
ing-water Reactor, USAEC Report GEAP - 3294, General Electric Company,
Dec. 15, 1959.
3. Feasibility Investigation of a Closed-cycle Boiling-water Reactor for the
Propulsion of a Merchant Ship, USAEC Report AMF -GR -5-57, American
Machine & Foundry Co., Apr. 8, 1957 .
4. Feasibility Investigation of a Closed-cycle Boiling -water Reactor for the
Propulsion of a Merchant Ship , USAEC Report AMF -GR - 27–57, American
Machine & Foundry Co. , Sept. 30, 1957.
5. Maritime Organic-moderated and -cooled Reactor, USAEC Report NAA - SR
3859, Atomics International Division , North American Aviation , May 27,
1959.
6. Harry L. BROWNE, The Maritime Gas-cooled Reactor Propulsion Plant of
the Future, USAED Report GA - 1040, General Dynamics Corporation,
Nov. 2, 1959.
Chapter 13
WORLD NUCLEAR SHIP DEVELOPMENT
The possibility of using nuclear energy for the propulsion of

merchant ships has been of interest to shipbuilders and owners in
many countries other than the United States. This interest on the
part of other nations has, quite naturally, been augmented by the
construction of the N.S. Savannah, and a number of maritime
nations have made studies and plans for the development and
construction of their own nuclear-powered vessels. Thus far, how
ever, few of these programs have emerged much beyond the early
design stage, and the only other nation beside the United States to
have actually built a nuclear-powered ship is Russia. The Soviet
icebreaker Lenin, which was launched Dec. 5, 1957, sailed on its
maiden voyage on Sept. 15, 1959, becoming the first nuclear- powered
surface vessel in the world to go into service. Obviously, the Lenin
is a special type ship and not a merchant vessel .
The fact that other maritime nations have not built nuclear pow
ered merchant ships is readily understandable ; the reason lies pri
marily in the realm of economics. Technical knowledge has also
been a factor, but enough technical knowledge is now available to
enable foreign nations to design and construct nuclear ships.
Although there is no convincing evidence that such ships will be
competitive with conventional merchants ships in the near future,
a number of foreign shipping interests seem sufficiently confident
in the future solution of the economic problems to give their support
to extensive development programs. Important interests in Japan
and Germany, for example, have given nuclear propulsion for
merchant vessels serious and sustained attention . In so far as
information is available, these foreign nuclear ship development
programs are described in this chapter.
13-1 USSR NUCLEAR - POWERED ICEBREAKER LENIN
13–1.1 Economic Importance of Nuclear- powered Icebreakers
The economic importance of the nuclear -powered icebreaker

Lenin lies in Russia's special interest in , and plans for, the devel
opment of the Arctic basin . As explained by A. P. Alexandrov
497
and his colleagues at the Second United Nations International Con

ference on the Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy at Geneva in
September 1958,1 the economic development of the Soviet northern
regions necessitates the construction of a new, powerful, and
advanced icebreaker fleet for speedy piloting of ship caravans along
the northern sea route, for extending the route into higher latitudes,
and for increasing freight turnover and the volume of Arctic
transportation.
Existing coal- and oil-burning icebreakers and transport ships
of the icebreaker type need frequent refueling and therefore cannot
navigate the whole Arctic basin ; they are restricted to a compara
tively narrow coastal strip, where navigation, as a rule, is limited
by adverse ice conditions. With conventionally fueled ships, the
constant threat of getting stuck in the ice without fuel compels
captains to consume fuel extremely cautiously ; consequently ice
breakers are often forced to work at speeds which limit their ice
breaking capacity and handicap their efficiency. It was to overcome
these adverse conditions that Soviet engineers undertook to construct
a nuclear-powered icebreaker. Nuclear power made possible a pow
erful icebreaker that has a practically unlimited range of travel
without refueling and presumably is capable of operation in any
zone in the Arctic. According to a statement by the deputy chief
of the Board of the Northern Seaway, which is a department of
the Soviet Ministry, in Sovietsky Flot shortly before the Lenin
made its maiden voyage , Russia aims to keep the Arctic Sea open
to shipping the whole year round by the end of the current seven
year plan. This would mean that a train of ships would be able to
shuttle back and forth between Murmansk and Vladivostok through
the Arctic Circle in the trail broken by the nuclear- powered ice
breakers for 12 months every year. The distance between Vladi
vostok, in the Far East, and Murmansk, the northernmost port in
European Russia, is only 5,805 miles via the Arctic Ocean. But ,
if a ship travels from Vladivostok to Murmansk by way of the
Suez Canal, the distance is two and one-half times as far, or 12,829
miles. The tremendous saving in time and money from such an
Arctic operation is obvious.
Another advantage of a nuclear-powered icebreaker claimed by the
Soviet authorities is that it can heat large quantities of water that
can be used to weaken ice that its armored - steel prow is unable to
crush . According to the article in Sovietsky Flot, the Lenin , with
its combination of heavy ram and jet of hot water, will be able to
spearhead ships through ice several yards thick.
WORLD NUCLEAR SHIP DEVELOPMENT 499
13-1.2 Specifications
The specifications of the Lenin are presented in Table 13.1. The

ship has a displacement of 16,000 tons, is 440 ft long, 91 ft wide,
and has an outboard height at midship of 52.9 ft. Her draft is
31 ft . The choice of these dimensions was determined not only by
specific features generally peculiar to an icebreaker, but also by
requirements of normal operation , namely : a small ratio of length
to width, for better maneuverability in ice ; the need to accommodate
the vessel in existing drydocks ; stability ; and damage resistance.
Special attention was paid to the design of the bow shape since it
is the prime factor affecting the icebreaking qualities of aa ship. The
shape selected yields a 15 percent increase in normal icebreaker pres
sure over that of existing icebreakers. The final choice of the bow
shape was preceded both by tests of models in an ice basin and by
full- scale tests in ice fields.
When the stern of the vessel was designed, the principal object
was to provide protection to the propellers and rudder and to permit
astern operation through the ice. The Lenin has three stern pro
pellers, the power being distributed among them in the ratio of 1 :2 :1 .
In the design of the propellers, the primary aim was to obtain maxi
mum thrust while running in ice. At full capacity running forward,
Table 13.1 -SPECIFICATIONS OF THE ICEBREAKER LENIN 1
Type icebreaker ... Turbeolectric.
Length ( maximum) , ft ..
) 440
Width (maximum) , ft .- 91
Power on turbine reduction gear, hp ... 44,000
Displacement, tons . 16,000
Maximum speed in clear water, knots .. 18
Cruising speed in ice 7.87 ft thick , knots.. 2
Number of propellers . 3
Propeller speeds:
Middle propeller , rpm... 185
Outboard propellers , rpm.. 205
Weight of nuclear power plant ready for operation ( including
biological shielding) , tons ... 3,017
Total weight of mechanical plant ready for operation (includ
ing propeller motors and powerplants but without the
nuclear plant ), tons.- 2,750
Weight of biological shielding, tons.. 1,963
Total steam output , lb /hr.. 720,000
Steam conditions:
Temperature , ° F ... 590
Pressure, psig --- 400
Main turbogenerators steam consumption, lb/hr. 408,000
Auxiliary power plant capacity , kw .. 6,200
Auxiliary steam boiler capacity, lb /hr .. 20,000
the propeller thrust equals 330 tons. Calculations of the ice-break

ing ability made on the basis of data obtained from full -scale tests
carried out mainly on the icebreaker Ilja Murometz indicated that
at a thrust of 330 tons the Lenin will be capable of a constant for
ward speed through an unbroken ice field over 2 meters ( 6.56 ft )
thick. These data, admittedly, are provisional; however, an idea of
the running capacity of the Lenin in ice fields can be gathered from
Table 13.2 .
Table 13.2-COMPARATIVE CHARACTERISTICS OF ICEBREAKERS 1
Ermak D. Therrille Labrador Glacier Lenin

(USSR) (Canada) (Canada) (USA) (USSR)
Ratio, installed capacity to

total displacement (specific
capacity ), hp / ton .-- 0. 95 1. 22 1. 96 2. 20 2. 75
Ratio, installed capacity to
width along water line, hp/
meter ... 350 550 556 900 1 , 640
For increased performance in the ice fields, the Lenin is equipped

with a special heeling and trimming system, maintained by revers
ible-impeller electric pumps with a capacity of 650,000 gal /hr, each .
These pumps have an automatic centralized control. They can pump
thousands of tons of water into the forward hull, thus adding weight
to break the ice.
For adequate strength of all hull joints, a highly resistant steel
was developed which has high resilience and good weldability as
well as good resistance to crack spreading at low temperatures. The
shell is 1.42 in. thick in the middle section, 2 in. in the bow , and
1.75 in. in the stern . The hull is claimed to be strong enough to
withstand any compression that might possibly occur from Arctic
ice jams .
Owing to their considerable width , icebreakers always have a large
transverse metacentric height, which causes violent rolling in open
seas. The transverse metacentric height of the Lenin is less than
that of other icebreakers; at full displacement it is 5 ft. As a con
sequence the rolling cycle of the Lenin should be no less than 10 sec .
This has been borne out by the results of model tests. The cycle of
pitching is expected to be from 7 to 8 sec.
The icebreaker hull is divided into sections by 11 main transverse
watertight bulkheads. Owing to such sectioning of the hull , for any
operating conditions the ship may encounter, the icebreaker is said
to be unsinkable even when any two adjacent compartments are
flooded .
In outward appearance the Lenin is a flat decker with a moderate

sheer, prolonged superstructure, and two masts. Launches and life
boats are located on the open portion of the boat deck, and in the
stern section a platform is provided for helicopter landing and take
off . On both sides of the ship, between the main longitudinal bulk
heads and cabins, the main passages are laid out to connect all the
principal rooms along the length of the vessel in a manner that
makes it unnecessary for ship's personnel to pass through the open
deck sections.
Because of the long voyages the ship is expected to make, special
attention was given to the design of the crew accommodations to
ensure a high degree of convenience and comfort. Single and double
cabins are provided , and all cabins have heating units, hot and cold
running water, and daylight type lamps. For the entertainment of
the crew on the long polar voyages, both the messroom and ward
room are provided with motion-picture projection equipment. Other
features include a library, reading room , smoking room, and a music
salon. Bathrooms and showers are located at convenient places away
from the living quarters. A very necessary feature on this type
ship, which will be away from port for lengthy periods, is a complete
medical department.
13-1.3 Propulsion Machinery
The Lenin's nuclear power plant consists of three pressurized -water

nuclear reactors, each supplying heat to a separate steam - generating
system. These systems furnish steam at 400 psig and 590° F to four
turboelectric assemblies, which generate direct current for driving
three motors, each of which is connected to one of the ship's three
propellers.
( a ) Nuclear Reactors. In selecting the pressurized-water type
reactor, the designers were concerned primarily with achieving a
propulsion system that was reliable, safe, stable in operation, and
easy to maintain . The pressurized -water system , they felt , meets all
these requirements to a high degree.
From the standpoint of reducing the weight and size of a nuclear
steam-generating plant , it is advantageous to concentrate the entire
capacity in a single reactor. However, in a ship, particularly an
icebreaker, greater reliability is obtained by the use of two inde
pendent sources of power, and so, in the Lenin, the designers decided
to install two reactors for normal operation. For even greater reli
ability, a third reactor was provided for use in case of extreme
emergency. The addition of this third reactor did not increase the
size or weight of the ship. The Lenin's nuclear generating plant,
involving a total of 44,000 hp, complete with biological shielding,
weighs 3,017 tons. The specific weight of the plant is 150.7 lb /hp.
The reserve reactor is intended for use only in heavy -ice naviga
tion, when the ship is required to operate continuously at maximum
power. Thus, with the third reactor, if one of the regular reactors
should suffer a breakdown, the ship will lose neither speed nor ice
breaking capacity.
A cross section of one of the Lenin's reactors is shown in Fig. 13.1.
The core, which is about 3.2 ft in diameter and about 5.1 ft high,
is contained in a pressure vessel about 6.4 in inside diameter and
16 ft high. The pressure vessel is made of low-alloy high-strength
carbon steel and is provided with a stainless-steel liner to reduce
corrosion.
CONTROL RODS
mancaran
TOP CLOSURE
COOLANT
-d
COOLANT
CHANNELS
16 FT
APPROX .
SHIELDING
PRESSURE
FUEL VESSEL
BEARING
CORE
LOUVER PLATE
117
COOLANT
6 FT 4 IN
FIG . 13.1 - Cutaway section of one of the icebreaker Lenin's reactors.1

The fuel is enriched sintered uranium dioxide in zirconium or

stainless -steel tubular elements. Although it was known that the
oxide fuel was not as desirable as metallic uranium because of its
lower density and lower uranium content, it was selected because of
its greater corrosion resistance. The core is designed for full capac
ity operation for approximately one year, which makes it possible
for the icebreaker to operate without refueling for several years.
The core may be reloaded channel by channel or as a whole. It is
expected that various types of cores will be tried and that the final
choice will be made only after these cores have been tested under
actual operating conditions. The core specifications are given in
Table 13.3 .
A mixture of boron isotopes is used in the central channels of the
core to reduce the initial excess reactivity when the calculated fuel
burn-up exceeds 25 percent of the initial U235 loading. The boron
burns out gradually, thus compensating for the burn-up of fuel.
The core is designed so that at the beginning of the operating
cycle the temperature coefficient is negative over the entire tempera
ture range. Toward the end of the cycle, as the fuel burns up and
the isotope composition of the core changes, the temperature coeffi
cient becomes negative only in the region of operating temperatures.
When the core was being developed it was necessary to take into
account its considerable heat inertia due to the use of uranium diox
ide fuel , which has a much lower heat-transfer rate than metallic
uranium. Because of this low thermal conductivity, the fuel attains
internal temperatures of 2,000° F and higher ; of course, this accumu
lation of heat represents a hazard in case of interruption to the flow
of coolant through the core. For maximum reliability no less than
two primary coolant pumps, fed by different power supplies, are in
operation whenever the reactor is running at normal load.
The power level of the reactor is controlled automatically by three
control rods. A duplicate set of three rods is held in reserve for
use in case the first set breaks down . No rods are provided for man
ual control, but the reserve set can be operated manually if desired .
Table 13.3--- CORE SPECIFICATIONS
Core diameter , ft . ~ 3.2

Core height, ft .. ~ 5.1
Fuel..na Sintered UO ,
Fuel enrichment by U235, percent .. 5
Uranium - 235 loading, kg- . 85 ( 187 lb)

Fuel-element canning material . Zirconium alloy
Poisoning material.. Natural mixture of boron
isotopes
Reactor thermal capacity , kw .. 90,000
Maximum thermal load , Btu /hr/sq ft ..... 369,000
613489 0-62 33
Under emergency conditions the reactor capacity can be reduced

quickly by means of safety rods which are introduced into the core
in 0.6 sec .
The control-rod mechanisms are at the top of the reactor and are
operated by electric motors through gearing and racks. A friction
coupling controlled by an electromagnet is provided between the
driving motors and the racks. When the power to this electromagnet
is interrupted , the coupling is disconnected and the rods are forced
>
into the core by springs.

A set of steel shields with layers of water between them, having a
total thickness of 8.9 in., is used as the core side reflector. The
coolant enters the reactor from below , passes upward through the
fuel channels, and leaves the pressure vessel at the top, as indicated
in Fig. 13.1.
( b) Steam - generating Plant. The steam-generating plant consists
of three complete and separate systems, each comprising a reactor
with all associated equipment. Water in the primary system is
pumped through the reactor by motor -driven centrifugal pumps at
a pressure of 2,940 psi . The water enters the reactor at 478 ° F and
leaves at 616 ° F. The heat energy in the primary system is trans
ferred to the secondary circuit by means of heat -exchanging boilers
in which steam is generated at 400 psi and 590 ° F . The primary
system is equipped with pressurizers to maintain a constant pressure
under fluctuating loads.
The secondary circuit consists of a steam generator, turbogenerator
with its condenser, and condensate and feed pumps. The steam pro
duced in the steam generator is fed to the main turbogenerators, the
auxiliary turbogenerators, the turbopumps, and other ship services.
Each of the three reactors serves two primary loops, each consist
ing of a steam generator, two main circulating pumps, an emergency
pump, and a filter with cooler. For repairs in case of failure of any
piece of equipment or in case of leakage in the piping, one entire
primary loop can be shut off by means of gate valves, and the reactor
can then continue to operate at reduced capacity.
One of the two main circulating pumps is a reserve unit ; it can
operate in parallel with the other, but normally one pump has ade
quate capacity to carry the load. The reserve pump, however, is
supplied from a different power source, thus ensuring continuous
service in case of failure of the power supply to one pump.
The emergency pump is also connected in parallel with the two
main circulating pumps, but it is smaller and is used to remove the
residual heat from the reactor should both main circulating pumps
fail , an extremely unlikely event. The emergency pump starts auto
matically the instant the main pumps stop.
When the system is started up, or under conditions of changing

load , the volume of water in the primary system changes. This
volume change is compensated for by means of pressurizers, which
are large enough to eliminate large fluctuations in the primary cir
cuit and also to store water for use in case of severe leakage. The
pressurizers are high -pressure vessels; the lower part is filled with
water and the upper part with steam . Electric immersion heaters
in the lower part evaporate water to increase pressure.
Each steam -generating plant, consisting of a reactor, two steam
generators, main and emergency coolant pumps, pressurizer, filters
and coolers, together with all connecting piping, is installed in a
containment vessel. There are three containment vessels, one for
each steam - generating system . Figure 13.2 is a schematic drawing
of one-half of one of the steam - generating plants. It shows a reac
tor with steam generator and the associated circulating pumps, filters,
volume compensators, and coolers. The piping leading off to the
right of the diagram goes to another steam generator with associated
equipment. All this equipment contains radioactive water and,
therefore, is installed in the containment vessel ( Fig. 13.3) . Besides
the circuits already mentioned , there are two more auxiliary low
pressure circuits filled with highly purified water. One of these is
provided to remove the heat that is released in the containment vessel.
The possibility of corrosion -product activation made it necessary to
put this entire system within the containment vessel.
The steam generators are of the uniflow vertical type, consisting
of an economizer zone, where the incoming water is heated to boiling
temperature, a vaporization zone, and a superheating zone. The
steam output is controlled by varying the water flow in the secondary
circuit.
After giving up its heat in the steam generator, the primary water
is drawn into the suction side of the main circulating pumps and
MAIN CIRCULATING
PUMPS
VOLUME
FILTER
FILTER COMPENSATORS
COOLER
1
EMERGENCY
PUMP
‫المهم‬
NUCLEAR
STEAM REACTOR
GENERATOR
FIG. 13.2 — Diagram showing one-half of one of the three steam -generating
systems on the Lenin.1
STEAM CONTROL RODS REACTOR STEEL SHIELONG
OUTLET 12 TO 16 IN
THICK
MAIN
IDI
CIRCULATING
PUMP
24,3
COOLER
FT
PRIMARY
LOOP PUMP
FEED WATER
INLET
33.2 FT STEAM
GENERATORS
FILTER
FIG. 13.3 — General layout of the steam - generating equipment on the Lenin .
forced back into the reactor. The circulating pumps are centrifugal
units of the canned-rotor type. The motors are 3 - phase squirrel
cage motors, rated at 250 kw. The motor stator is separated from
the rotor by a Nichrome jacket; and the stator case is hermetically
sealed . The emergency pump used for the removal of residual heat
is also of the centrifugal type and is installed in one case together
with the closed gasketless electric motor. The construction is similar
to that of the main circulating pumps, except that special plastic
bearings are used instead of hydrostatic bearings.
Gate valves for cutting off a primary loop in case of equipment
failure are provided in pairs and are equipped with electric drives
for normal use. They can also be operated manually if necessary .
Normally the gate valves are open . In that state the valve seal is
relieved of the high pressure by setting the spindle upon a special
seat in the gate- valve case.
The equipment and piping in the primary circuit containing radio
active water is separated from the other portions of the mechanical
plant by steel walls 12 to 16 in. thick . This shielding is designed
to keep radiation 10 ft from the steam - generating plant to a level
10 to 30 percent of the maximum permissible dose .
( c ) Propulsion System . The propulsion system of the Lenin con
sists of four turboelectric generating units driving three propeller
motors. A unique feature of this electric system is the use of direct
current at 1,200 volts. Through the use of direct-current it is pos
sible to feed the three propeller motors from four turbogenerator
units operating at constant speed and to distribute the turbogener
ator capacity to the propeller shafts in the ratio of 1 :2 : 1 . This
method makes it possible to supply half the total capacity to the
REMOTE
CONTROL
PANEL
OUTBOARD MAIN
PROPELLER TURBOGENERATORS
DRIVES
CENTER
PROPELLER
DRIVE REMOTE
CONTROL
STATIONS
90R
모모
EX CITATION
UNITS
Fig. 13.4 – The icebreaker Lenin's propulsion system.1
middle propeller, which is the most protected of the three against

damage. In the event one of the outboard propellers is lost , 75 per
cent of total propeller capacity is still available . The generators
are of the double -winding type, rated at 1,920 kw per winding, 600
volts, and operate at 595 rpm . In one of the generators of each
assembly, both windings are connected in parallel to form a single
3,810 - kw electrical unit.
Thus each turbine, in effect, drives (through reduction gears ) two
1,920-kw and one 3,840-kw electric generator. The 1,920-kw gener
ators are arranged to supply power to the outboard propeller m rs,
while the 3,810-kw generator supplies the inboard propeller. In this
manner each turboelectric assembly simultaneously supplies power
to all three propeller motors.
A diagram of the propulsion system is shown in Fig. 13.4. The
four turboelectric units are shown at the right . Since the main
turbogenerators are not tied rigidly to the propellers, they are located
in the upper part of the machinery space, with the condensers and
steam and air ejectors directly below them . Still lower in the
machinery hold are the other steam auxiliaries and the water-distilla
tion plants. In the bow group under the turbogenerator, in a sepa
rate compartment, one of the two independent power plants for ship
electrical service is installed . Underneath the stern group of main
turbogenerators are installed the two outboard propeller motors to
gether with their exciting units and other auxiliary equipment. This
arrangement of machinery not only reduces the length of the ship.

but also improves the operating conditions of all pumps by providing
a greater suction head pressure.
The main turbines are single case units driving two double-winding
electric generators through a single -stage reduction gear. The single
case turbine design permits the elimination of an intermediate reduc
tion gear, thus decreasing the number of bearings and gaskets. Even
though this arrangement may be somewhat less efficient, it is more
reliable ; hence the reason for its selection. Reactive type turbine
blading was selected since it provides simpler construction and
reduces axial clearances, features important when loads change ab
ruptly.
The large relative consumption of condenser cooling water for the
steam turbine compared to that required by a diesel-powered ship
raised the question of continuous sea-water supply . The designers
feared that intake openings might become closed up or partially
choked with ice. Consequently tests were conducted with models in
an experimental ice basin. As a result of these tests, it was deter
mined that the fears were not justified , that all the sea water needed
for the mechanical plant as a whole could be supplied by one of the
outboard intakes, even under the most adverse conditions.
An icebreaker in maneuvering requires frequent and rapid changes
in load. To ensure that this operation would be smooth , a by - pass
was installed around the main turbines so that high -pressure steam
can be dumped directly into the main condensers ( Fig. 13.5 ) .
MAIN TURBOGENERATOR
THROTTLING TURB. DRIVES STEAM STEAM
FOR AUX , COOLER
BYPASS GENERATOR
OU
FW
PROPELLER
DRIVE
MOTOR
1
SURGE FEED WATER

TANK HEATER
었
AUX . w
TURBOGEN
CONDENSATE
PUMP 1 FEED PUMP
AUX , COND. SERVICE

STEAM
GENERATOR
FIG. 13.5 — The steam -condensate system in the Lenin's propulsion plant.1
( d ) Propulsion Motors. The electric propulsion motors are closed

double -winding units. They have a closed ventilating system and
forced -lubrication bearings. The motor driving the center propeller
has a continuous rating of 19,600 hp ( 9,800 hp per winding ) and
operates at 1,200 volts d-c. The outboard propeller motors are rated
at 9,800 hp each ( 4,900 hp per winding ), and these also operate at
1,200 volts d -c. The propeller motors are supplied from the main
turbogenerating units, as shown in Fig. 13.4.
Three excitation units are installed for each propeller system,
two for normal operation and one for reserve. Each exciter unit
is composed of four elements: an exciter for two generators, an
exciter for one motor, a constant-voltage generator for the control
circuit supply, and an a-c driving motor . Double-stage amplidynes
with large gain are used as generator and motor exciters. The use
of amplidynes as exciters ensures smooth starting and reverse opera
tion and provides constant capacity during changes from operation
in ice to operation in free water . Owing to the small capacity
required for the control of the amplidynes, it is possible to utilize
compact selsyns in the control-panel boards.
( e) Miscellaneous Features of the Lenin's Mechanical Plant.
Maximum reliability and durability of all units of the Lenin's
mechanical plant and safety and convenience of operation - in some
instances even at the cost of economy - were the principal require
ments in the design and construction of the mechanical systems. All
main equipment, such as condenser circulating pumps, feed pumps,
oil pumps, and some auxiliary apparatus, is provided with a 100
percent reserve. The turbine- driven feed pumps are connected in
parallel to ensure an uninterrupted supply of feed water to the
steam generators. These pumps are provided with automatic con
trol to maintain constant pressure drop on the feed valves ; if one
pump fails, the speed of the other is automatically increased to
maintain constant plant operation. Circulation and condensate
pumps, which are also turbine driven , can be operated in parallel or
separately, depending upon the needs of the occasion . The reserve
electric oil pumps for the main turbines are automatically started
when the lubricating oil pressure in the system drops to a dangerous
level .
The mechanical plant is divided into two autonomous groups, one
located forward of the nuclear steam -generating plant and the other
aft of the nuclear plant. All main steam , condensate, and steam
generator feed piping is in the form of closed loops, permitting
delivery
mach
of the working medium reliably in any direction for either
inegr oup.
Electric power is supplied by two independent power plants, each
consisting of a 1,000-kw turbogenerator supplying alternating cur
rent at 380 volts, 50 cycles. This makes it possible to use simple

squirrel-cage induction motors for many ship services. These motors
are simpler, cheaper, and more reliable in operation than de motors
The use of 380 volts permits a reduction in weight and in the cos'
of cables and also makes possible the direct starting of most of the
drives. For lighting, a voltage of 127 was selected in order to per
mit the use of incandescent lamps with high light efficiency and
fluorescent lamps of small dimensions.
In addition to the two 1,000 -kw turbogenerating units for general
power service, a reserve unit , also of 1,000 kw but driven by a
diesel engine, is installed in one of the power plants for starting
the plant when no steam is available. Finally, two emergency 100
kw diesel-engine-driven generators are provided, and these are ar
ranged to start automatically upon loss of voltage in the main elec
trical system .
Double-tube sheets are used for all heat -exchange equipment con
nected to the steam -condensate cycle to reduce the penetration of i
salt water into the various systems aboard the Lenin. In the main
and auxiliary turbogenerator condensers, the space between the tube
sheets is provided with a water gasket .
Radioactive material is prevented from entering the piping to the
bathrooms, showers, laundries, and ventilating equipment by sup
plying these systems with steam from special heat exchangers heated
by steam from the secondary system , i.e., the system supplying the
main generating units. During periods when the nuclear steam
generating plant is not operating, i.e., when the ship is at anchor.
steam is supplied by an auxiliary boiler plant consisting of two oil
fired water - tube boilers.
For greater reliability the main turbogenerator circulating and
condensate pumps and the main feed pumps are provided with
steam -turbine drives. All other auxiliary apparatus is electric -motor
driven . The steam -generating plant, designed to provide the ice
breaker steam requirements with a large reserve, and the three com
plete nuclear reactor systems make unnecessary any other sources
of energy for navigation.
The frequent and great fluctuating load changes in icebreaker
plant operation make impossible the usual regenerative heating of
the feedwater with steam bled from intermediate stages of the tur
bines. As a consequence , there is a single -stage feed - water heater.
supplied with exhaust steam from the auxiliary turbines, that drives
pumps and other equipment.
13-1.4 Communication and Control
Two radar sets ( short-range and long -range) are installed on
the Lenin . The short-range radar is designed for navigation ; the
long- range one, for weather and ice -condition detection and for heli
copter operations. The long - range radar partially duplicates the
short-range radar under rain and snow conditions.
Equipment for radio communication is installed in the fore and
a ft radio houses. This provides reliable communication on ultra
short, short, medium , and long waves with all possible stations
( coastal bases, ports, ships, airplanes, etc. ) . In addition , a powerful
electromegaphone is provided for voice communication with ships
and with the coast.
The modern navigation instruments-- gyrocompasses, logs, echo
sounders (two sets each ) , an automatic course recorder, a direction
finder, a radio coordinator, and other navigation devices were spe
cially developed for icebreaker operations, according to A. P. Alex
androv's report at Geneva.1
Ship communication is provided by an automatic telephone sys
tem , designed for 100 stations, and a series of separate telephone
circuits.
13–1.5 Safety
The usual sea dangers, collision with another ship, ice jamming,
stranding, etc. , may have less effect upon the icebreaker than upon
other ships because the former is provided with an unusually sturdy
hull. However, even with extensive hull damage, such as that
which would flood any two main watertight sections, it is not ex
pected that the Lenin would sink . Should the vessel sink , however,
it is claimed the steam -generating plant, consisting of units designed
for 225 atm ( 3,307 psi) would remain undamaged to very great
depths. This would prevent contamination of the water by fission
products. Also, the entire primary system of this plant is sur
rounded by the steel walls of the containment vessel , 12 to 16 in.
thick, thus providing additional protection against the release of
radioactivity.
The biological shielding of the nuclear plant is such that the
level of radiation does not exceed 10 to 30 percent of the maximum
permissible level for an 8 - hr working day. In most of the living
quarters the radiation level corresponds to the natural background .
Radiation in the rooms near the steam -generating plant is monitored
by stationary detectors which send signals to the central radiation
detection station in case the standard level for these rooms is ex
ceeded. These detectors are also arranged to send warning signals
to the entrances of the rooms in which they are installed .
A pressure slightly below atmosphere is maintained in all the
steam - generating plant rooms in which radioactivity may be ex
pected. The greater the danger of radiation in a room , the lower
the pressure that is maintained . The ventilating air pumped out

of the steam -generating plant containment vessels is purged from the
ship through the hollow main mast after first being passed through
filters to remove radioactive particles.
Radioactive water that has to be stored on the icebreaker is held
in shielded storage tanks for removal from the ship only at special
service bases. By means of filters it is expected to be possible to
reduce the activity of the water to 5 x 10-9 curies /liter before dis
posal ashore.
13-2 DEVELOPMENTS IN JAPAN
As a leading maritime nation , Japan has been greatly concerned

for several years with the prospect of developing nuclear -powered
commercial ships. This interest stems from the scarcity of conven
tional fuel resources in Japan on the one hand and from the ex
pectation of marked improvements in the performance of commercial
vessels with the adoption of nuclear propulsion on the other hand.
Japan must constantly face severe international competition in the
shipping and shipbuilding field ; consequently she finds it necessary
to make every effort to advance this new source of energy.
13-2.1 Japan's Activities
Strong government support and active participation by industry

has resulted in the formulation of plans to build several different
types of nuclear -powered commercial ships in the near future.
Specialized groups in Japan's shipping and shipbuilding industry
are studying the preliminary design of nuclear tankers, ore carriers,
3, 4
and cargo -passenger ships. Japanese engineers presented papers
on the design of a nuclear submarine tanker and an emigrant ship
at the Second Geneva Conference in 1958.
At the end of 1957 , the Nuclear Ship Specialists Committee was
organized under the Atomic Energy Commission of Japan, and the
basic policy and development program for nuclear ships has been
discussed at length . It was concluded that the most effective ap
proach to the development of nuclear ships would be to build an
experimental ship that would serve as a vehicle for comprehensive
studies and experiments. With this idea in mind, the Special Com
mittee developed preliminary specifications for five different types of
nuclear ships believed to be feasible in the near future, namely, a
cargo -passenger vessel; a small nuclear ship of 780 dwt; a 45,000
ton tanker ; and two 20,000 -ton tankers, one of 10,000 hp and the
other of 20,000 hp. The principal features of these proposed ships
are given in Table 13.1.
Table 13.4-SHIPS PROPOSED BY JAPAN'S AEC SPECIALISTS

COMMITTEE ( 1957)
Cargo 45,000 -ton 20,000-ton 20,000- ton

passenger Small nuclear tanker tanker tanker
Type ship ship ( flush ( three ( 10,000 -hp (20,000-hp
( shelter) decker) islander ) three three
decker) islander) islander)
Length (over -all ), meters.. 179.5 109.0 225.0 176.5 176. 5

Length ( between perpendiculars),
meters . 165,0 100.0 216.5 168.0 168.0
Breadth (moulded ), meters .. 24.5 15.6 30. 2 23. 2 23.6
Draft (moulded ), meters ... 13.4 9. 2 15.6 12.7 12.8
Draft ( full load ) , meters .. 8.5 5. 71 11.3 9.5 9.5
Gross tonnage, tons ... 17,000 4, 100 29, 400 13, 600 14,000
Dead weight, tons.. 5, 400 780 45, 200 20,000 20,000
Full -load displacement, tons . 19, 830 5, 350 60, 450 28, 610 29, 250
Service speed , knots .. 21.25 17.5 16.8 15.25 17.5
Maximum speed , knots. 22. 5 18.5 17.8 16.25 18.5
Passengers . 1 , 800
Crew .. 250 75 68 65 65
Reactor .. PWR PWR or BWR PWR • BWR * BWR
Reactor output, Mw ( t ) . 75 30 79 45 70
Main engine ( steam turbine ). 1 1 2 1 1
Maximum rating, hp . 22,000 8,000 20,000 10,000 20,000
Normal rating , hp .. 20,000 6,800 18,000 9,000 18,000
* Direct cycle.
13–2.2 Ministry of Transportation
The Ministry of Transportation is the governmental administra

tive agency in Japan which determines policies concerning maritime
transportation, ships, ports and harbors, seamen , maritime safety,
etc. Thus the Ministry is concerned with nuclear ship develop
ment and operation. A Nuclear Energy Liaison Conference has
been established within the Minister's Secretariat to further work in
this field . This Conference examines basic policies concerning nu
clear ship development, radioisotope utilization, radiation measure
ment, and protection. The Conference has among its suborganiza
tions, the Nuclear Ship Subcommission, Subcommission on Trans
portation of Radioactive Materials, and Subcommission on Nuclear
Ship Navigation.
Immediately after the First International Conference on the
Peaceful U'ses of Atomic Energy in Geneva in September 1955 , the
Shipbuilding Technics Council, an advisory body to the Minister of
Transportation , made its first recommendation to the effect that it
was urgently necessary to establish an organization of the shipping
and shipbuilding industries which would conduct research and in
vestigations on the peaceful application of atomic energy to ship
propulsion . With this as an impetus, the Atomic Marine Propul
sion Panel , incorporating representatives from major shipping and
shipbuilding industries of Japan, as well as academic bodies, was

established . During the next three years, the Panel carried out an
energetic program , including the preliminary design of four nuclear
tankers with the following tonnage, shaft horsepower, and reactors:
( 1 ) 80,000-dwt, 40,000-shp, pressurized-water reactor ; ( 2 ) 40,000
dwt, 20,000-shp, pressurized-water reactor ; ( 3 ) 40,000 -dwt, 20,000
shp, boiling water reactor ; and ( 4 ) 40,000-dwt, 20,000-shp, gas
cooled reactor.
Later the work of the Panel was turned over to the Nuclear
Powered Ship Research Association of Japan, which is continuing
studies in this field .
13–2.3 Private Organizations Concerned With Nuclear Propulsion

In addition to the various government agencies involved in nu
clear ship development, private industry and nongovernment bodies
have been active in the field . The Japan Nuclear Ship Mission
was organized and sent abroad under the sponsorship of the Japan
Atomic Industrial Forum , which was established in 1956. With the
cooperation of the government, the Japan Nuclear Ship Mission
visited the United States and several countries in Europe to survey
the development of nuclear ship propulsion and to help the Japa
nese government formulate policies in this field . Under the Forum
also, a Special Committee for Nuclear Ship Propulsion was estab
lished . This Committee is composed of representatives of 47 com
panies and 8 institutions from such related industries as shipping,
shipbuilding, fisheries, instrument fabrication , refineries, financial
and insurance firms, as well as of councilors representing relevant
government administrative agencies.
Another important nongovernment body in Japan is the Nuclear
Powered Ship Research Association of Japan , which took over the
work of the Atomic Marine Propulsion Panel. The Nuclear Powered
Ship Research Association conducts activities in the following areas :
( 1 ) investigation and research into nuclear -powered ships; ( 2 ) de
sign of nuclear -powered ships; ( 3 ) collection and dissemination of
the data and publications on nuclear -powered ships ; ( 4 ) submis .
sion of recommendations on problems concerning nuclear-powered
ships; and ( 5 ) promotion of training and education of nuclear ship
building and ship operating engineers.
Finally , the various shipbuilding companies and heavy industries
in Japan have been involved in extensive programs for the devel
opment of nuclear shipping, and many of these organizations have
been engaged in the design of various types and sizes of nuclear
propelled commercial ships . At least six nuclear -powered merchant
ships are at some stage of design. These include a 65,000-ton tanker,

an ore-carrier, two emigrant ships, a submarine tanker, and a coastal
guard ship. All these designs call for the pressurized -water reactor.
A target date of 1968 has been indicated for the completion of the
first ship, although an earlier date of 1965 has been used. The total
number of Japanese nuclear merchant ships in the program is 11.
According to a recent announcement in Japan, the first nuclear
powered vessel to be built in that country will be an oceanographic
survey ship that will also serve as an experimental facility. Plans
are for a flush -deck ship, 285 ft long and 45 ft wide, with a dead
weight tonnage of 332. It will use a pressurized -water reactor
powering a pair of 4,000-hp steam turbines. The speed is 19 knots.
13-3 DEVELOPMENTS IN THE UNITED KINGDOM
In Great Britain an Admiralty committee has been established

to study the use of nuclear energy for the propulsion of merchant
vessels. This committee, the Admiralty's Civil Lord's Committee,
has had eight merchant-ship reactor proposals under technical review
for over a year. Seven of these competitive reactor designs were
submitted by private firms; the eighth is a design proposed by the
U.K. Atomic Energy Authority.
Three of the eight proposals involve gas -cooled reactors, one of
them being the design submitted by the UKAEA . The remaining
five include two boiling water reactors ( AEI - John Thompson and
Mitchell Engineering, Ltd.), one organic -moderated design ( Hawker
Disseley Nuclear Power Co. ), one pressurized -water design ( Bab
cock & Wilcox Ltd. ) , and a steam -cooled heavy -water reactor
( Vickers Nuclear Engineering ). As soon as the technical designs
of these various reactors have been evaluated , Britain plans to pro
ceed with the construction of its first nuclear-powered merchant
ship. All the proposals claim comparable or even cheaper fuel costs
per shaft horsepower than oil- fired ships.
The Atomic Energy Authority's proposal involves a modification
of the Advanced Gas- cooled Reactor prototype which is under con
struction at Windscale. The De Havilland nuclear group and the
General Electric Co. -Simon Carves Atomic Energy Group also
have submitted gas- cooled reactor designs. The De Havilland de
sign is based on the High -temperature Gas -cooled Reactor being
developed in England in its long -range nuclear power program . Of
particular interest , however, because of its unique features, is the
reactor design submitted by the General Electric Company -Simon
Carves Atomic Energy Group. The more important features of this
reactor are described below .
GEC Gas -cooled Marine Reactor. The gas-cooled graphite-mod

erated reactor designed by the General Electric Company - Simon
Carves group is unusually compact ( see Table 13.5 ) . The reactor
pressure vessel is less than 25 ft long and only 15 ft 7 in . in diameter.
This compact design was achieved by a new design of fuel element
Table 13.5 - LEADING PARAMETERS FOR THE 20,000-SHP MARINE

REACTOR INSTALLATION STUDIED BY BRITISH *
Number of reactors .. 1
Reactor heat output, Mw 55
Moderator and reflector:
Nominal core diameter, ft . 7
Core length , ft .-- 7
Reflector thickness, ft. 2
Machined weight of graphite, tons. 44
Pressure vessel :
Diameter (0.D.) . 15 ft 7 in .
Thickness, in 372
Coolant circuit :
Gas .... CO2
Maximum working pressure, psia 400
Total maximum flow, lb / sec . 371
Reactor inlet temperature, ° F . 500
Reactor outlet temperature , ° F. 1,020
Steam - raising units:
Number . 2
Maximum evaporation (each unit) , lb/hr. 80,555
Temperature at superheater outlet, °F 850
Pressure at superheater outlet, psig - 600
Feed temperature, ° F . 240
Pressure shell :
Inside diameter . 7 ft 6 in .
Thickness, in ... 134 in .
Length ( including domed head ) - 34 ft 4 in .
Containment :
Wall thickness, in . 11
Over -all length over access covers, ft. 44
Over - all height, ft . 37
Over- all width , ft . 35
Summary of weights, tons:

Pressure vessel 135
Pressure -vessel contents 171
Steam -raising units (total) and ancilliaries . 115
Turbines and circulators. 14
Charge machine and structure . 80
Biological shield and header tank .. 1,234
Containment and shielding - 161
Miscellaneous 70
Total weight.. 1,980

* Reprinted from M.C. Hartnell-Beavis, GEC Journal.
developed by the GEC - SC group. By the use of this new fuel ele
ment, the British say it is possible to obtain core volume power rat
ings of the same order as those achieved in water -moderated re
actors. The choice of about 270 kw per cu ft at 400 psia reactor
inlet pressure used in the marine installation , though dictated largely
by economic considerations, has been shown to be reasonably con
servative in the studies of the transient behavior of the reactor.
The description of the reactor system presented here is taken from
Ref. 5 .
The new fuel element represents a departure from previous prac
tice with gas-cooled reactors in that the coolant will flow across the
element instead of longitudinally. Each element consists of a cylin
drical graphite sleeve in which a large number of individual fuel
capsules are arranged at right angles to the gas flow . The capsules
are of lenticular cross section , each made up of a number of slightly
enriched uranium oxide fuel pellets sealed in a stainless steel can
0.01 in . thick. Dished -end caps are seam welded to the can , porous
magnesia inserts serving to protect them from excessive tempera
ture during operation. A number of these capsules are welded be
tween two thin steel guide strips to form a ladder -shaped assembly ;
six such assemblies are inserted into each graphite sleeve.
As shown in Fig. 13.6 the core and moderator - reflector, built of
hexagonal graphite blocks, form a hexagonal structure that rests in
a Vee support in the pressure vessel. There are 54 fuel channels and
7 control -rod channels on a triangular lattice pitch of 11 in. in the
core. The cylindrical pressure vessel of 31 ,-in. wall thickness has
dished ends and weighs 135 tons.
The construction of the shield is cellular, the voids being filled
with demineralized water, which is circulated through an external
cooling circuit. The inner cylindrical shell supports the pressure
vessel; on the outside of this shell a boron -steel layer absorbs back
scattered neutrons thermalized in the outer layers of water.
The gas coolant, CO2, enters the reactor channels through ports
in standpipes at the cold end. At the reactor -outlet end it passes
into the hot manifold, which is sealed to the end support plate,
which , in turn , is sealed to the moderator blocks. Two internally
insulated hot ducts pass from the manifold , through the pressure
vessel and shield , and through the steam - generator shells to the rec
tangular ducts that house the tube banks of the steam generators.
After flowing over these banks, the coolant returns via the annulus
between the duct and the shell to the circulators. The return ducts
from the circulators to the reactor pressure vessel join in a Y layout
to a single duct entering the pressure vessel at the same end as the
hot ducts. The cold gas returns around the outside of the reflector
STEAM DRUM
(Similar steam COLD DUCT CONTAINMENT VESSEL STEAM RAISING UNIT
generator on
other side )
HOT DUCT
PRESSURE
VESSEL
REACTOR
-MODERATOR
CORE
RESTRAINTS
35 FT
H
Fig. 13.6 — Transverse cross section through center of GEC marine reactor.
( Reprinted from M. C. Hartnell-Beavis in GEC Journal. )
to the inlet -end standpipe ports. With this arrangement, both steam
raising unit and reactor pressure vessels ( and their internal sup
port and restraint systems ) are maintained near the coolant- gas
reactor inlet temperature.
The arrangement of the reactor, steam generators, and associated
equipment is shown in Figs. 13.6 and 13.7. The steam plant consists
of two water -tube boilers, each subdivided into economizer, evapora
tor, and superheater units. As shown in the diagrams, the reactor
installation is mounted horizontally in the ship. As a general rule,
minimum installation volume is obtained when core and steam -unit
axes are parallel. Comparative studies of vertical and horizontal
layouts showed overwhelming advantages for the latter. With the
reactor core horizontal, access to the fuel channels is possible from
both ends of the pressure vessel . The discharge of faulty fuel ele
ments during operation would be extremely difficult in a vertical
layout; with the horizontal core , however , the control rods can
conveniently be operated from one end, while the normal discharge of
fuel elements takes place at the other end of the core. In a marine
PERSONNEL AIR LOCK HYDROBOARD SHIELDING TRANSPORT COFFIN
WATER GAS VALVE HEADER TANK
01
COLD DUCT
INLET
END
CORE RESTRAINT RESTRAINT
UNIT
HOT DUCT CHARGE

OUTLET MACHINE
37
FT
CONTROL
MECHANISM
BCD
ACCESS COVER
BORON STEEL
SHIELD
44 FT
Fig . 13.7—Longitudinal cross section through GEC marine reactor .

( Reprinted from M. C. Hartnell-Beavis in GEC Journal. )
installation with the channels in a fore and aft orientation , mini

mum acceleration imposed by shock conditions acts in the direction
of the fuel- element discharge and control- rod travel . Full shielding
is not required underneath the reactor, and this layout gives a sub
stantial reduction in the shield weight. A further important ad
vantage is that with the steam units above the reactor a maximum
differential head between hot and cold gas ducts is available to
promote natural circulation .
It is clear from a study of Figs. 13.6 and 13.7 that an extremely
compact layout is achieved and the containment structure is greatly
simplified.
A notable feature of the design is the provision for charging and
discharging during operation. The remotely controlled charge ma
chine is contained in an outer shielded pressure vessel and mounted
on a slide that runs on fixed vertical guides. The internal charge
machine pressure vessel houses the charge chain , grab mechanism
and drive, and the storage magazine containing 14 storage holes .
When the channel is discharged during operation , the seal is first
made between the charge -machine containment and the main con
tainment over the appropriate plug. After the machine containment
has been purged with CO, and after the plug has been removed, a
second seal is made on the standpipe before pressurizing the ma
chine pressure vessel to reactor pressure and removing the standpipe
plug to gain access to the channel contents.
613489 0-62-434
The reactor is controlled by the insertion of boron-steel cylinders

driven by electric motors. An independent shutdown system con
sists of semiflexible boron - steel rods sheathed in stainless steel and
housed inside the normal control -rod cylinders. These are driven
into the core pneumatically.
Ingress of air into the core in the event of fracture of a primary
coolant duct is prevented by maintaining an atmosphere of Co , in
the containment. There is, therefore, no fire hazard associated with
such a fault.
This marine gas- cooled reactor has many unique features that
make it extremely attractive. Actually, it is an advanced version
of an established system for which a great deal of cost -analysis
experience has been obtained by General Electric, and the possible
margin of error in estimating capital costs is thereby greatly re
duced . About 62 percent of the total weight and 25 percent of the
total cost of the 20,000 -shp installation lies in the biological shield ;
unfortunately this is almost independent of output; so capital costs
vary relatively slowly with installation size. As explained by M. C.
Hartnell-Bevis in the GEC Journal, the cost of the first marine in
stallation was carefully worked out to form a basis for subsequent
modifications. The present estimates of capital costs are : 50,000 -shp
installation , $ 7,000,000 ; 20,000-shp installation , $ 5,751,200.
It is estimated that fuel costs for the two installations will not
vary greatly since the reduction in output from 50,000 shp to 20,000
shp was used to optimize the nuclear conditions rather than to give
minimum installation size. There is, therefore, a negligible difference
in fuel enrichment for a given burn -up in the two cases.
For high load factor installations, such as a tanker or fast pas
senger vessel, the larger unit, according to the designers, is already
competitive with conventional power plants, and the lower limit of
size for economical operation is expected to be reduced with design
improvement and technical innovations, particularly when fuel
element cans of lower neutron -capture cross section become prac
tical.
• The economic aspects of the larger installation have been consid
ered in a detailed comparison of the operating performance of the
nuclear ship and a conventional ship. A suitable use for the 50,000
shp unit would be to power a tanker with a carrying capacity of, say,
100.000 tons, including its own fuel. This vessel would be employed
on the route from the Persian Gulf to the United Kingdom via the
Cape of Good Hope. With a speed of 20 knots, the tanker could
complete five round trips a year. With normal relationship between
Persian Gulf and United Kingdom fuel-oil prices, the conventional
tanker delivers crude oil to the United Kingdom at the lowest cost
per ton when the ship burns only oil bought in the Gulf, although
this reduces its delivery capacity.
The economic comparison between the nuclear and conventional
tanker is made on the basis of the cost per ton of crude oil delivered,
the conventional tanker being able to deliver only about 84,000
tons per trip, compared with 100,000 tons for the nuclear ship with
negligible fuel weight. The conventional fuel cost would be at
least 0.29 cents per shaft horsepower -hour, depending upon the cur
rent level of fuel-oil prices. The nuclear fuel cost, assuming en
riched uranium containing about 3 percent U235, at the published
prices of the U.S. Atomic Energy Commission with fuel fabrication
and processing carried out in the United Kingdom and burn-up of
about 10,000 Mwd / ton would be 0.23 cents per shaft horsepower
hour .
The comparison of costs per ton delivered is shown in Table 13.6.
Additional insurance for nuclear risks has not been taken into ac
count.
A second possible economic use for a nuclear ship propulsion unit
in the near future is in a fast passenger liner. In this case two
75,000 -shp units could be installed in a ship to carry, say , 5,000
passengers and crew at a speed of about 30 knots. Making one voy.
age across the Atlantic each week, such a vessel would steam about
150,000 miles or more a year. In this case the fuel cost per shaft
horsepower -hour of a conventional ship would be high since fuel oil
could not be bought in a cheap market. The economic comparison ,
shown in Table 13.7, is made at equal speeds; however, the much
lower fuel cost per shaft horsepower -hour of the nuclear ship and
the fact that reactor costs per shaft horsepower -hour fall as the
required power output is raised might make a higher speed for the
nuclear vessel more economic , in spite of higher initial cost for the
nuclear plant.
A main advantage of reactors with power outputs in the range
considered is that the sizes of the components make them suitable
Table 13.6 — COMPARISON OF COSTS FOR CONVENTIONAL AND

NUCLEAR - POWERED LARGE OIL TANKERS *
Conventional Nuclear
Total capital cost including propulsion unit. --- £ 5 , 000, 000 £ 6, 750, 000
Annual cost of amortization, maintenance, and
insurance 550, 000 742, 500
Annual fuel costs ( 375 X 10% shp -hr) 390, 600 312 , 500
Other operating costs --- 75, 000 100 , 000
Total annual costs . £ 1,015, 600 £ 1 , 155, 000
Tons of crude oil delivered . 420 , 000 500 , 000
Cost per ton delivered ... £ 2. 42 £ 2. 31
* Reprinted from M. C. Hartnell-Beavis, GEC Journal.
Table 13.7—COMPARISON OF COSTS FOR CONVENTIONAL AND

NUCLEAR-POWERED PASSENGER LINERS *
Conventional Nuclear
Total capital cost , including propulsion unit --- £ 25, 000, 000 £ 28, 500,000
Annual cost of amortization, maintenance , and
insurance 2, 750, 000 3, 135, 000
Annual fuel costs ( 750 X 100 shp-hr) . 1 , 406, 250 625 , 000
Other operating costs , including food and stores . 3, 000, 000 3 , 050, 000
Total annual cost... £ 7, 156, 250 £ 6, 810, 000
* Reprinted from M. C. Hartnell-Beavis, GEC Journal.
for factory production. They would thus be subject to economies of

production which cannot be applied to the types of nuclear power
reactors at present being built.
13-4 PLANS OF OTHER NATIONS
Several other nations besides the United States, Japan, and Great
Britain have made studies concerning the possibility of applying
nuclear power to the operation of merchant shipping and some are
developing detailed designs.
13-4.1 France
Several French industrial organizations are doing design work on

nuclear-powered merchant ships. These include Indatom and France
Atome, which are working on competitive designs for a 40,000-ton
20,000 -shp tanker. Three designs have been prepared : a gas -cooled
reactor ( Indatom ) ; a pressurized -water reactor (France Atome
Chantiers de l'Atlantique ); and a boiling water reactor ( France
Atome, Societe des Forges et Ateliers du Creusot ) .
Indatom comprises a group of nine industrial firms and a bank.
It has established its own engineering and research teams and uses
the laboratories of its members. France Atome comprises a group
of 22 industrial firms and banks.
The final choice of the reactor system to be adopted for the 40,000
ton tanker will be determined by the French Commissariat a' l'Ener
gie Atomique and the Merchant Marine. The French Government
is also giving high priority to the development of a nuclear-powered
submarine, and the new 55,000 -ton liner France will be built to allow
for possible future conversion to nuclear power.
13-4.2 West Germany
Several West German concerns are interested in nuclear power for

merchant ships. Siemans -Schuckert werke and the Howardtswerke
shipyard are studying a 70 Mw ( t) pressurized -water reactor, possibly

of the Lenin ( Russian icebreaker) type, with governmental financial
assistance. The shipyard of Blohm and Voss and German Babcock
& Wilcox are interested in a maritime gas-cooled reactor ; Brown
Boveri and Krupp are also interested in gas-cooled reactors. AEG,
a licensee of General Electric Company, with the cooperation of
>
Deutsche Werft, will concentrate on boiling water reactor work .

A West German concern, known as "Interatom” ( Internationale
Atomreaklorbau GmbH ) , a joint subsidiary of Demag A.G. in Ger
many and Atomics International in the United States, has developed
a design for an organic-moderated reactor for ship propulsion . The
coolant and moderator for this reactor will be a mixture of ter
phenyls. With this coolant it is possible to use normal materials of
construction ( e.g., carbon steel and aluminum ) and components with
a long history of experience in the chemical and petroleum industries.
Development is being carried out on a cooperative basis, the respon
sibility for the reactor portion of the plant lying with Interatom
and the responsibility for the conventional portion of the project ly
ing with Kernenergie. Financial support for the program , which
has been underway since the beginning of 1959, is provided by the
Federal Republic of Germany, the four north German coastal
states, and interested industrial concerns. To save time and money,
the group has adopted the policy of using as many results as pos
sible from the organic-moderator program of Atomics International's
Piqua reactor project in the United States. The Germans will con
centrate their efforts on special problems that arise as a result of
the application of the reactor plant to marine propulsion .
This organic-moderated reactor is designed for a thermal power
of 40 Mw. For propulsion with 10,000 shp and for the normal power
requirements on a ship , approximately 30 Mw is required. Ten
megawatts is therefore available for tank cleaning and other pur
poses. Since the core is conservatively designed, it is the sponsors'
hope that a considerably higher power can be reached.
The fuel elements for the organic -moderated reactor consist of
two thin uranium -alloy cylinders clad with an aluminum -magnesium
alloy. Inner and outer stainless - steel tubes separate the coolant from
the moderator. This design provides good flux distribution in the
fuel and reduces the amount of coolant flow required. The uranium
enrichment is 2 percent. Work has also been done on the design
of a uranium oxide element with stainless-steel cladding. The oxide
elements are interchangeable with the metal elements and can be
substituted if the economics appear better.
The core consists of 85 fuel elements ( total uranium weight,
6.9 tons ). The core diameter is 4.8 ft , and the height is 4.1 ft.
Nineteen safety control rods containing boron carbide are located

in the center of appropriate fuel elements. The final number may
be less, depending upon the Piqua critical experiment . Calculations
indicate that the fuel elements and the control safety rods as pres
ently designed can withstand the maximum forces expected from
ship motion ( 1.2 g in the vertical direction and 1.0 g in the hori
zontal direction ). Specifications for a stand to test the elements
under simulated shipboard conditions have been completed , and
thorough testing of prototype elements will be carried out through
out 1960.
The coolant enters the core of the reactor at 300° C and streams
downward past the fuel elements, reaching a temperature at the
bottom of the core of 322 ° C for a power level of 40 Mw . At this
power the rate of flow is 3,080 tons /hr.
Two primary cooling systems, each containing a steam generator,
and the auxiliary cooling system remove the thermal energy from
the reactor. The group, working under Professor Illies, indicates
a maximum efficiency with saturated steam at 55 atm (808.5 psi) :
steam generators have been designed accordingly. The auxiliary
coolant system , available for the removal of decay heat , is designed
to handle 5 percent of the reactor power. The ship can travel at
nearly full speed while one of the two primary coolant circuits is
being repaired .
For the first reactor a simple and therefore very robust control
system has been designed. This system uses a bypass around the
turbine so that it is only necessary to maintain the reactor at a
constant power level during normal operation. Changes in reactor
power are effected manually over relatively long time periods.
Coolant flow is maintained constant up to 30 Mw and is increased
stepwise at this point if additional power is needed for tank
cleaning.
Provision has been made for the testing of another control system
in the ship ; the piping is laid out so that a system using a bypass
around the steam generators can be installed. As before, constant
flow of coolant up to 30 Mw with a stepwise increase at this power
level will be utilized . Approximate constant steam conditions at
the turbine will be maintained through a signal from the steam
flow measurement devices to the control rods and to the valves on
the bypass lines around the steam generators. Reactor outlet tem
perature is held constant.
The arrangement of the primary portion of the plant in the con
tainment vessel is shown in Fig. 13.8. Installed in this vessel are
the reactor and coolant systems, including the steam generators.
The containment vessel is 32 ft in diameter and has a wall thick
ness of 1.3 in. It is the opinion of the designers that, in view of
ROTATING
FUEL -HANDLING
MECHANISM
15131
TANK DRAIN STEAM REACTOR CORE

GENERATOR
Fig. 13.8Views of the West German containment vessel containing the

reactor, steam generators, and other primary - loop equipment.
the low system pressure of the reactor, a gastight room instead of

a containment shell would be adequate. The present design includes
a containment vessel to provide unusual safety for the first
installation.
Figure 13.9 shows the arrangement of the reactor plant in the test
ship Exso Bolivar. This 16,000 -ton tank ship, although 20 years
old , is in good condition and is available in case the West Germans
decide to furnish a ship with nuclear power. The reactor and the
purification and degasification system are located in the former oil
tanks. Cofferdams separate the reactor portion of the plant from
the machine room aft and from the other tanks forward. The
location of the reactor is favorable because it is in the neighborhood
0
20
Olo0
900
MACHINERY REACTOR PURIFICATION
ROOM ROOM EQUIPMENT
Fig. 13.9 - Arrangement of the German organic -moderated reactor plant

in the tanker Esso Bolivar.
of the node for ship vibration . Collision mats are provided on

both sides. The mast is used as a stack .
With regard to the Siemens -Schuckert werke-Howaldtswerke study
mentioned at the beginning of this section, on Feb. 20, 1960, the
Federal Atomics Ministry announced that Howaldtswerke Hamburg
AG (owned 100 percent by the Federal Republic ) was granted
1,500,000 DM as a 50 percent federal contribution toward the design
of a ship propulsion reactor to be prepared jointly by the shipyard
and Siemens -Achuckert werke AG, Erlangen . The design planned
is a pressurized -water reactor developing 20,000 shp or 70 MW ,
fueled with enriched UO2 and moderated and cooled with light
water. The main purpose of the design project will be to determine
whether or not this reactor can be operated and produced econom
ically and compete with conventional ship propulsion installations
in commercial navigation. In contributing 50 percent toward the
design costs of 3,000,000 DM , the Federal Atomics Ministry followed
a recommendation of the Reactor Working Group of the German
Atomic Energy Commission , which deemed the development of
pilot reactors for ship propulsion within the framework of the Fed
eral Atomic Energy Program and federal furtherance of these
developments particularly desirable .
13-4.3 Italy
In Italy ,' an organization composed of FIAT and other Italian

industrial concerns has prepared designs for a propulsion reactor
for a 68,000- ton 32,000 -shp tanker of the Agrigentum type. The
reactor selected is a 74 Mw ( t) pressurized -water type.
The new 31,500-ton 60,000 -hp Leonardo da Vinci is reportedly
being constructed with a view toward future conversion to nuclear
propulsion.
13-4.4 The Netherlands
In the Netherlands, activities in nuclear marine propulsion are

being carried out by three groups:
1. The Foundation for Propulsion for Merchant Ships ( SKK ) ,
which reports plans to purchase a nuclear reactor for installa
tion in a tanker .
2. The Institute for Ship Propulsion of Rotterdam, which is de
signing a 30,000- ton nuclear tanker calling for the installation
of a pressurized -water reactor.
3. The Netherlands Navy Ministry, which has set up a working
group to study construction of a nuclear submarine.
The first group, SKK ( Stichting Kernvoortstuwing Koopvaardi

jschepen ), has as its objective the commissioning of a nuclear tanker,
which , as a floating laboratory, will supply practical data to parties
interested in this type propulsion. The SKK , which cooperates
with Dutch ship owners and shipbuilders, the Technical University
of Delft, the Institute TNO, and the Reactor-Centrum Nederland ,
originally planned to work out the design of a completely new
nuclear tanker, but this project was abandoned because of the cost .
The Society now intends to convert an existing tanker of moderate
dimensions to nuclear power by the installation of a reactor, while
retaining the existing propelling machinery, including the conven
tional boiler plant.
Two types of tankers are being considered ; type A has a single
turbogenerator supplying full power to the propeller motor and
type B has two turbogenerators each supplying half the electricity
needed for propulsion . The Society prefers type B if such a vessel
can be obtained since, even with one generator out of service , the
other could operate the ship at partial power.
The plans are to locate the reactor with accessories and shielding,
involving a total weight of 1,100 tons, somewhat aft of midship
in the center of one of the original cargo tanks. This location,
close to, but not underneath , the midship personnel quarters, offers
advantages with respect to the crew's safety and provides easy
access to this part of the ship in a heavy sea .
The instrumentation for the reactor can be located in a side tank
adjacent to the center tank ; the turbogenerator, together with
auxiliaries, would be installed in the other side tank. The arrange
ment proposed is shown in Fig. 13.10 . This drawing shows the
reactor containment vessel installed in the central tank. The
central tank and the two side tanks are separated from the fore
and after parts of the ship by cofferdams. Because the center tank,
together with the two side tanks, normally would contain some
1,100 tons of oil , the distribution of weight in the revised arrange
ment will not be materially changed. Reports issued by the Re
actor-Centrum -Nederland indicate that a reactor of one of the
existing types capable of supplying thermal energy sufficient to
provide 4.000 to 4,500 shp can be accommodated. If, however, a
reactor were specially designed , it is thought that a considerably
larger unit could be put in the center tank . For the type A vessel ,
i.e., one having a single turbogenerator, a plant of 6,300 shp can
be installed.
If a reactor of the pressurized -water type is chosen , the nuclear
installation will comprise the reactor vessel, shielding, heat ex
changers, pumps, pressurizer, demineralizer, and containment vesse ).
The containment vessel would be 32 ft high and 26.4 ft wide.
CONTAINMENT
VESSEL TA TURBOGENERATOR
DEAERATOR
CONDENSER
LB
TRANSVERSE SECTION
TURBOGENERATOR
SWITCHBOARD
CONDENSER
CONDENSATE CIRCULATING
PUMPS PUMPS
SECTION A - B
FIG . 13.10 - Details of reactor installation on Dutch tanker.
The B type tanker is attractive because, with a reactor supplying

over half the power for propulsion, the ship can be operated by its
conventional plant ( using the original steam boilers) before the
reactor is brought to criticality and later whenever the reactor is
shut down .
This type of installation is unique in that it involves both a nuclear
plant and a conventional plant aboard the same ship. It ensures
great elasticity and, among other things, will permit, if desired ,
all kinds of reactor tests to be made at sea without interfering with
the ship's operation.
The capital charges for the whole project, involving charter of an
existing vessel, will be 16 million guilders ( approximately 4 million
dollars ). Of this, 7.5 million guilders ( $ 1,700,000 ) would be the
cost of the reactor plus an additional million guilders for margin .
Erection of the installation would cost about 3.5 million guilders,
and another 4 million guilders is to be included for unknown
contingencies.
The intention is to operate the ship as a tanker in the normal
way, i.e. , mostly a voyage with a full cargo of crude oil or oil prod
ucts from the West Indies to Europe, followed by a return voyage
in ballast. It is assumed that the nuclear tanker will run, on the

average, 30 days less than a similar conventional tanker, allowing
time to carry out work in port in connection with the reactor. Also
to be considered is the loss of revenue in the loss of transport of
about 1,100 tons of oil representing the volume occupied by the
reactor installation.
Assuming that the reactor would supply eventually half the
energy required for propulsion, a saving in cost of conventional
fuel would be realized ; however, the high cost of the nuclear fuel
>
would involve a considerable additional charge. After all pertinent

data involved in the project have been analyzed, it appears that the
annual cost of running this nuclear tanker will exceed by some
700,000 guilders that of running a conventional tanker .
The principal dimensions and characteristics of the two types
of vessels being considered in this Dutch project are given in Table
13.8. The type A vessel is shown in Fig. 13.11 .
x
MACHINERY REACTOR
SPACE COMPARTMENT
Fig. 13.11 – Outboard profile and plan of type A SKK Dutch tanker.
Table 13.8 — DIMENSIONS AND PRINCIPAL EQUIPMENT IN DUTCH

NUCLEAR TANKERS
Type A Type B
Length (over-all ) --- 523 ft 6 in . 557 ft 0 in .
Length (between perpendicu- 503 ft 0 in . 530 ft 0 in .
lars) .
Beam . 68 ft 0 in . 69 ft 3 in .
Depth . 39 ft 3 in . 39 ft 0 in .
Draft 30 ft 2 in 29 ft 9 in .
Dead weight, tons . 16,616 . 18,101 .
Gross tonnage .. 10,296 12,152 .
Net tonnage . 6,154 6,935 .
Machinery output . 6,000 shp at 90 rpm 7,500 shp at 100 rpm .
6,300 shp at 93 rpm 8,300 shp at 103 rpm .
Number of generators - 1. 2.
Number of main engines . 1. 1 double unit.
Number of boilers 2 2.
Pressure, psig 450 . 450 .
Steam temperature, ° F 730 . 750 .
Output, lb /hr .. 44,436 , 45,000.
13-4.5 Norway
The Rederiatom organization, an association of 19 major ship

owners in Norway, is working on preliminary specifications for a
nuclear- powered ship using a boiling water reactor. The Jener
Center at Kjeller is utilizing a pool type research reactor to carry
out research and training activities related to nuclear propulsion
for ships .
Several large Norwegian ship owners are making inependent stud
ies on the feasibility and economics of nuclear -powered ships.
Although spokesmen for the Norwegian Government indicate
that there is no immediate need for nuclear ship propulsion, Norway
feels that it must keep abreast of research in this field . The
heavy building costs that characterize present nuclear reactor instal
lations make necessary thorough studies before any decision is
reached concerning the actual start of construction of a nuclear
ship power plant. A Government report to the Norwegian Parlia
ment, however, cites the development of an economical nuclear
reactor for merchant ship propulsion as the most important aim
of atomic research in Norway. The report, which is based upon
recommendations from the State Atomic Energy Council, reveals
that experimental work is in progress to study the stability of a
boiling-water reactor plant in heavy seas.
13-4.6 Sweden
The Swedish Shipbuilding Research Foundation has made a sur

vey of the application of nuclear propulsion to merchant ships. It
is now studying different reactor types, shielding problems, etc.
Ships, Inc., an affiliate of the Cities Service Company in the
United States, is collaborating with Gotaverken Shipyards on the
design of a 65,000 -ton 22,000 -shp nuclear tanker. This is the first
detailed plan for such a vessel presented in Sweden.
All superstructures on the projected vessel are placed aft , and
the nuclear reactor is placed amidships at a distance of 288 ft from
the crew's quarters. This distance is considered adequate protec
tion for the crew in the unlikely event that radioactive gases or
particulate matter should issue from the reactor enclosure . The
ship will use the turboelectric system of propulsion . This will
make possible the separation of the areas around the reactor where
the turbogenerator is located from the other machinery areas where
the crew works. The machinery in the reactor rooms will be con
trolled remotely from the after part of the ship. The entire tur
bine system is much simplified by the use of the boiling water
reactor since no intermediate heat exchangers are needed .
The project calls for the use of diesel engines for generating
auxiliary power and for powering the ship when in harbors where
the operation of nuclear reactors may not be permitted. These
auxiliary diesels will be able to run the ship at 9 knots ; the speed
at sea under nuclear power is expected to be 18 knots.
The fuel used in the reactor will be natural uranium enriched with
1 percent of "235 or with plutonium , and it is planned to design the
core so that the ship can operate under normal conditions for two
and one -half years .
Although this ship is expected to perform effectively from a prac
tical and technical standpoint, it is admitted that it will not be
able to compete economically with vessels of conventional type. The
purpose of the project is to demonstrate the technical feasibility of
nuclear propulsion , not the economic feasibility. The latter, the
designers admit, still involves many difficult problems, and they await
with great interest the operation of the Savannah, since the operation
of this first nuclear -powered merchant ship will clear up many eco
nomic questions that for the present cannot be answered.
13-4.7 Canada
Canadian interest in nuclear propulsion for ships centers around

the development of aa nuclear -powered icebreaker.6 Some preliminary
discussions have been held between the United States and Canada
concerning an icebreaker, but plans for such a vessel are very tenta
tive . The success of the Russian icebreaker Lenin , however, has
spurred renewed interest in the project by Canadians. The Canadian
Transport Department indicates that nothing as large as the Lenin
is being considered, however, because Canada's ice -choked Arctic
waters are much shallower than Russia's.
13-4.8 East Germany
Work in East Germany on nuclear propulsion centers around a

15,000-ton dry -cargo vessel that is to be equipped with a conventional
steam plant and can subsequently be modified to utilize a nuclear
reactor as a heat source. The East German group is reported to be
cooperating closely with the Soviet Union in this field of nuclear
development.
13-4.9 Poland
The Polish Institute for Nuclear Research , in conjunction with the

Maritime Institute and the Central Bureau of Ship Construction , is
actively studying the application of nuclear energy to ship propul
sion . Work is being done on an organic -moderated reactor for a

35,000 -ton 24,000 -shp merchant vessel.
13-4.10 Yugoslavia
The Yugoslavian Federal Commission for Nuclear Energy is pre

paring designs for a 40,000- to 50,000 -ton nuclear tanker.6
REFERENCES
1. A. P. ALEXANDROV et al . , The Atomic Icebreaker Lenin , Second U.N. Inter

national Conference on the Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy, A /Conf.
15/P-2140, 1958.
2. HOWARD NORTON, Russia Sets Arctic Goals , Baltimore Sun , Mar. 11, 1959.
3. SEIICHI TAKEUCHI et al., Nuclear -pouered Emigrant Ship, Second C.N.
International Conference on the Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy , A /Conf.
15 / P - 1319, 1958.
4. MICHIYA SHIGEMITSU, A Nuclear - powered Submarine Tanker, Second U.N.
International Conference on the Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy, A/Conf.
15 / P - 1320 , 1958.
5. M. C. HARTNELL -BEAVIS, A Nuclear Reactor Installation for Marine Use,
G.E.C. Journal, 26 ( 4 ) :131-137 ( Autumn 1959 ) .
6. Atomic Shipbuilding Program , Hearings before Committee on Merchant
Marine and Fisheries, House of Representatives, 86th Congress, pp. 31-33,
Feb. 17 and 18, 1959, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington , D.C.
Appendix A
CLASSIFICATION OF SHIPS IN THE U.S. MERCHANT

MARINE
The ships of the U.S. Merchant Marine are classified according to

their size , weight, type of propulsion, and class of service. The
present system of classification , consisting of a combination of letters
and numerals in groups, was adopted in 1944. This system is based
on three letter and number groups that outline the general charac
teristics of the vessels. The first group indicates the type of vessel,
whether cargo, passenger, tanker, etc., and its approximate size ; the
second group indicates the type of machinery and the number of
propellers; and the third group indicates the particular design of
the vessel and successive modifications. Table A.1 lists the charac
teristics of the principal types of ships in the U.S. Merchant Marine,
and Tables A.2 and A.3 give sizes and propulsion designations, re
spectively.
The nature of the classification system is explained by the follow
ing example : C2 - S - AJ1.
For the first group a letter is used in conjunction with a number .
In the example above, C2 stands for a cargo ship between 400 and
450 ft long ( Table A.2 ). The second group is as outlined in Table
A.3, with the appropriate symbols shown. Continuing the classifica
tion , the example is now C2 - S, standing for a single -screw cargo
ship, steam machinery, of a length between 400 and 450 ft . Since
there are many variations of length and form in the range of 400
and 450 ft , it is necessary to have a design letter that will fix the
particular vessel under consideration . A third group is therefore
used to designate the design. The AJ1 given in the example means
that the ship is the first arrangement of the tenth basic design
( J being the tenth letter in the alphabet ). Since 1950 , however, basic
designs have been numbered, not lettered as outlined above; thus the
J in the example would now be the number 10 .
533
534
MARINE
MERCHANT
U.S.
THE
IN
TYPES
VESSELS
OF
PRINCIPAL
C
- HARACTERISTI
A.1
Table
Length Dead Gross Service No.

of No.
of
Ship o)-a( ll
ver Beam Draft weight tonnage Machinery speed passengers
crew
tonnage
.In .
In
FI .
Fl .
In Knots
S4SI
P6
-D
States
United
S.S. 990
0 6
101 53,000 Turbine 3>4 2,000 1~ ,000
..
America
S.S. 723
0 393 32 6 6,1283 2614
,3 .Turbine 22 0
1, 49 675
A
S2merican
P3 L2
export
)(-D 683
0 0
89 30 0 12,310 , 20
723 Turbine 22.5 1,007 577
.-D
S1N1
P2 0
536 0
73 29 6 260
10. 13,000 .
Turbine 19 230 185
Sassenger
P2
cp-().-R 3E2
argo 609 6
75 30 0 4 31
,10 3
,1559 Turboelectric 19 550 338
SBargo
p)-(cC3 assenger
Ri 738
494 6
69 27 9 6
, 27
9 ,528
9 Turbine
... 16.5 119 124
MC4-8-1a
() ariner 560
10 0
76 29 9 9
, 10
12 7
, 00
9 Turbine
. 20 12 53
..
().B
Dland
-S
C3
S.
S.S.
XI 478
1 0
66 28 6 5,1000 8
, 00 Turbine 18.5 12 52
-SAarge
cargo
)(lC4 4 1042
522 6
71 32 9 8
, 63
14 ,61085 Turbine 16.5 4 56
cargo-SAarge2
).(lC3 0
492 69
6 28 6 3
, 00
12 ,900
7 Turbine 16.5 12 53
cC2 1
-S)(Bargo 3
459 0
63 25 9 2
, 00
9 ,200
6 Turbine 15.5 8
-Bargo
c).(CI 9
417 0
60 27 6 900
,1 7
, 00
6 turbine
or
Diesel 14 8 49
-SAictory
V)(VC2P3 455
3 0
62 28 6 8 00
,10 7,600 Turbine 17 52
-SCiberty
L)(EC2I 6
441 10:34
58 27 7 810
, 00 1
7,70 reciprocating
.Steam 11 40
A VI
-M oastal
)(cC1
cargo 824
338 0
50 21 0 1
, 00
5 8
, 00
3 Diesel 11 36
-SAoastal
ccargo I
).(N3 258 42
1 17 11 92,00 1,790 reciprocating
Steam 10 36
Sanker
T2
-A
).(t IE 6
523 68
0 30 1 7
, 00
16 ,200
10 Turboelectric 14.5 51
tanker
Private 722
644 84
2 33 0 4
, 30
29 6
, 00
18 Turbine 16.5 42
-SAiberty
).(LEC2
collier
WI 441
6 1012
56 28 644 11,040 6
, 40 reciprocating
Steam 11 40
Seefer
R2
)(r-ATUI 5
455 0
61 27 0 9
, 80
6 7,074 Turbine 18.5 12 62
Acean
-M
otug I
).(V4 4
194 376 15 6 786 1,118 ..
Diesel 14 36
-SA1
L6
)(G
carrier
ore
Lakes
reat 620
0 0
60 24 0 815
, 25 78,58 Steam
reciprocating 10.5 33
Savannah
N.S. 6
595 0
78 29 6 , 90
9 ,220
12 turbine
steam
Nuclear 20.
25 60 109
APPENDIX A 535
Table A.2-LENGTH RANGES OF VARIOUS U.S. MERCHANT SHIPS
Length designation, ſt
Type of vessel
2 3 5 6 7
с (cargo, unlimited service, un

der 100 passengers) . 400 400-450 450-500 500-550
P (passenger, unlimited service,
over 100 passengers ) . 500 500-600 600-700 700-800 800-900 900–1,000 1,000
B (barge ) . 100 100-150 150-200 200-250 250-300
G ( Great Lakes cargo ). 300 300-350 350-400 400-450 450-500 500-550 550-600
H ( Great Lakes passenger ). 300 300-350 350-400 400-450 450-500 500-550 550-600
J (inland cargo groups III, IV,
V B.M. In) .. 50 50-100 100-150 150-200 200-250 250-300
K ( inland passenger, groups III,
IV, V B.M. In ) ... 50 50-100 100-150 150-200 200-250 250-300
L (Great Lakes tanker, ore or
grain ) .. 400 400-450 450-500 500-550 550-600 600-650
N ( coastwise cargo ) . 200 200-250 250-300 300-350 350-400 400-450 450-500
Q (coastwise passenger ) 200 200-250 250-300 300-350 350-400 400-450 450-500
R (refrigerator ) . 400 400-450 450-500 500-550
s* (special). 200 200-300 300-400 400-500 500-600 600-700
T ( tanker ) . 450 450-500 500-550
U ( ferries ) . 100 100-150 150-200
V † ( towing vessels ) . 50 50-100 100–150 150-200
*This special designation will take care of certain Department of the Navy vessels built by the Maritime
Administration and those falling outside any of the designations given in Table A.1 .
fThis letter will be assigned to plans received from outside companies. If designs are developed from
these for contracts, a design letter will be assigned .
Table A.3—PROPULSION DESIGNATIONS FOR VARIOUS TYPE SHIPS

Passengers
Machinery Number of
propellers
Under 12 Over 12
Steam . 1 S Si
Motor . 1 M M1
Turboelectric . 1 SE SE1
Diesel electric . 1 ME ME1
Gas turbine . 1 G G1
Gas turboelectric .. 1 GE GE1
Steam . 2 ST S2
Motor .. 2 MT M2
Turboelectric 2 SET SE2
Diesel electric 2 MET ME2
Gas turbine . 2 GT G2
Gas turboelectric .. 2 GET GE2
Steam . Stern wheel SW SO
Motor . Stern wheel MW MO
6134890_62 3.5
Appendix B
N.S. SAVANNAH REACTOR DESIGN CONSIDERATIONS
B- 1 THERMAL AND HYDRAULIC DESIGN
The core design of the N.S. Savannah reactor is the end product
of extensive consideration of thermal, hydraulic, mechanical, nuclear,
and economic factors ( see Table B.1 ) . A multipass reactor with two
passes in the core was selected to optimize the hydraulic design. This
arrangement was chosen because it offers many advantages, two of
which are as follows :
1. A multipass reactor permits improved utilization of the coolant
because the fluid flows in succession through the regions of low ,
intermediate, and high heat generation. In the Savannah reac
tor at least 85 percent of the fluid passes through the central
16 fuel elements. To approach the same result in a single-pass
system , the coolant must be orificed preferentially to the indi
vidual fuel elements. The latter is not an entirely satisfactory
approach because of the variations in power distribution over
the core lifetime .
2. For a specified operating pressure, the flow velocity over the
fuel- rod surface must exceed some minimum value to satisfy
heat- transfer requirements. As a result, the primary coolant
flow rate for the multipass system is approximately one-half
that of a single-pass design. It can be shown that under the
additional constraints imposed by economic piping design, the
total plant pumping power is less for a multipass system than
for a single - pass core .
One of the major objectives of the Savannah reactor design is safe,
reliable operation. To assure the fulfillment of this objective, all
design and operational parameters have been based on the " hot
channel ” concept. The hot channel is that channel in the highest
flux region of the core which has the worst possible combination of
adverse manufacturing and assembly tolerances, lowest possible
channel flow rate, and poorest heat -transfer and material properties.
Peak power loads, which occur during normal transient operations,
will not lead to damage of materials adjacent to the hot channel .
537
A, 0
Table B.1 - N.S . SAVANNAH REACTOR DESIGN AND PERFORMANCE

CHARACTERISTICS ( Thermal, Hydraulic, and Nuclear)
Core dimensions :
Over- all length , in .-- 90.24 .
Active fuel length, in . 66.00.
Equivalent core diameter, in .. 62.06 .
Fuel- element data :
Fuel . UO .
Cladding Stainless steel .
Ferrules . Stainless steel .
Springs Inconel- X .
Can . Stainless steel .
Straps. Stainless steel .
Fuel-pellet diameter (nominal), in . 0.4245 .
Cladding 0.D. (nominal), in .. 0.500.
Cladding thickness (nominal), in . 0.035 .
Fuel-rod spacing (square lattice ) (nominal), in . 0.663 .
Fuel rods per element.-- 164 .
Ferrule 0.D. (nominal), in .. 0.4375 .
Ferrule I.D. (nominal), in . 0.3975.
Length of ferrule, in .. 1.0 .
Fuel elements in core . 32 .
Fuel-element can thickness , in. (outer pass)-- 0.109 .
Fuel element can thickness, in . ( inner pass). 0.094 .
Heat -transfer area, sq ft. 3,778.
Thermal and hydraulic data :
Reactor maximum operating power, Mw 70 .
Reactor normal operating power , Mw . 64.7 .
Design pressure, psia ---- 2,000 .
Operating pressure, psia ... 1,750 .
Total reactor coolant flow rate, lb /hr.. 8,640,000 .
Coolant velocity (average, second pass ) , ft /sec.-- 10.0 .
Coolant velocity (average, third pass) , ft/ sec 9.0 .
Leakage flow (second pass) , % ---- 5.
Leakage flow (third pass) , % ---- 10 .
Total leakage flow , % ---- 15 .
Number of passes within reactor vessel .. 3.
Bulk coolant inlet temperature at maximum operat- 496.3 .
ing power , ° F
Bulk coolant outlet temperature at maximum oper- 519.7 .
ating power, ° F .
Average coolant temperature at design power (sec- 499 .
ond pass), ° F .
Average coolant temperature at design power (third 512 .
pass ) , ° F.
Core average coolant temperature at normal power , 508 .
° F.
Design power distribution factors :
Maximum to average (radial) 2.0
Maximum to average (axial) 1. 5
Maximum to average (local) . 1. 25
Over -all product . 3. 75

APPENDIX B 539
Table B.1—N.S . SAVANNAH REACTOR DESIGN AND PERFORMANCE

CHARACTERISTICS ( Thermal, Hydraulic, and Nuclear ) —Continued
Average heat flux at maximum operating power, 63, 500

Btu/hr/sq ft :
Maximum heat flux at maximum operating power,
Btu /hr/sq ft :
Nominal channel . 238, 000
Hot channel ... 277, 000
Hot channel
Nominal * with flur
channel peaking
(inner pa88) ( inner pass)
Maximum coolant temperature, ° F . 534 541
Maximum surface temperature, ° F . 603 623
Maximum fuel temperature, °F . 3 , 310 3, 794
Nuclear data :
Metal/H2O ratio ... 0.76
Volume fractions :
Water .... 0. 567
Control rods 0. 041
Fuel ... 0. 247
Stainless steel 0. 145
1. 000
Typical inventory and fuel burn-up data for 52,000 -Mwd
core life :
Initial average enrichment, wt. % -- 4. 4
Initial U235 loading, kg 312. 4
Initial U238 loading , kg- 6, 787. 5
Average burn-up, Mwd/ton .. 7, 352. 00
Final enrichment, wt . % U235 3. 63
Final U235 loading, kg 254. 8
U 235 consumed , kg- 57. 6
Final Pu239 loading, kg - - 17. 2
Final total Pu23: loading, kg 19. 9
Uranium burn-up, at . % -- 1. 06
Average thermal-neutron flux . 7. 2 X 1012
* The nominal channel is assumed to be located in the region of maximum flux ; but the effect of manu
facturing tolerances is not included .
The thermal design criteria of the reactor are as follows:

1. No bulk boiling will be permitted in the core during steady
state operation .
2. The local heat flux at the outside surface of the cladding shall
not exceed the design value of burn -out heat flux, either during
steady-state operation or during any transient operation, re
gardless of the duration of the transient.
3. Local values of the internal temperature of the oxide fuel shall
not exceed the melting temperature of the fuel under the worst
possible combinations of manufacturing tolerances, neutron - flux
distribution , and fluid flow effects during steady-state or tran:

sient operations.
The possibility of flow reversal in the second pass with resultant
steam formation and burn - out could exist if high power density, a
large gradient in power density, and a low pressure drop occurred
simultaneously . Analysis shows, however, that spontaneous flow re
versal will not result ( even with a single pump running at half
speed ) with as much as a factor of 2 in power density between any
two fuel elements in the downward pass. This conclusion applies
for the worst possible combination of pitch and roll of the ship. If
all pumps fail , the reactor is scrammed . During decay -heat removal
by emergency cooling, the heat generation rates are too low to cause
burn -out even if flow reversal in the outer fuel elements does not
introduce any significant restrictions on the operational integrity or
flexibility of the reactor.
B-2 REACTOR PHYSICS
One of the major objectives in the design of the Savannah reactor

was the achievement of a core design that would yield a reactivity
lifetime of approximately 52,200 Mwd on a single core loading. This
was recognized as the major problem in the nuclear design of the
plant. More specifically, the major problem was that of providing
enough reactivity control to permit the core to be loaded with an
initial excess reactivity sufficient to achieve the target lifetime. This
objective was to be achieved , if possible, without the use of other
control schemes to supplement the reactivity hold -down of the con
trol rods.
In the absence of directly applicable critical experiment data, the
early design work proceeded on analysis alone. Many possible core
designs were investigated in the attempt to evolve a core that would
meet the thermal, hydraulic, and mechanical requirements and, at
the same time, provide sufficient reactivity control to satisfy the
long-time objective. This objective was attained through the design
of a relatively large low - power -density core.
The use of slightly enriched uranium dioxide fuel introduced into
the core fertile [ 238, which , by conversion to Pu239, extends the core
lifetime. At the same time, the absorption introduced into the core
by the fertile material increases appreciably the fuel inventory that
can be loaded into the core for a given excess reactivity.
The Savannah reactor is the first to demonstrate the high degree
of safety and the inherent stability characteristic of low -enrichment
oxide-fueled cores having a large negative fuel temperature coefficient.
The analytical procedures used in the nuclear design of the reactor
BACAAB
APPENDIX B 541
20000
2000
42 4.2 4.2
42 4.2
42 42
4.2 4.2 4.6
um
9 FT 2 IN .
FIG. B.1-Enrichment distribution for the Savannah reactor core.

Numbers indicate weight per cent U235.
were later experimentally verified by data obtained from extensive

critical experiments at the Babcock & Wilcox Co. Critical Experi
ment Laboratory at Lynchburg, Va . These critical experiments,
which were made concurrently with the design , extended over a
period of more than six months.
The reference design that resulted from the studies and experi
ments requires an average U235 enrichment of 1.4 wt . % . As shown
in Fig. B.1 the center 16 fuel elements are loaded with UO, having
an enrichment of 4.2 wt. % and the 16 outer elements, with UO2
having an enrichment of 4.6 wt . % . Figure B.2 is a curve showing
how the multiplication factor decreases throughout the life of the
reference core. Because of the low U 235 enrichment, the core exhibits
a strong negative fuel temperature coefficient of reactivity of about
-2.3 X 106. This corresponds to about 1 percent excess reactivity
under control by the Doppler effect * at operating temperature.
* The Doppler effect involves the change in neutron absorption with increasing tem
perature. As the temperature rises , the random motion of the nuclei increases, and
this can appreciably increase the neutron absorption and thus make a marked nega
tive contribution to the nuclear temperature coefficient. Any nonfissionable material
present in the reactor could cause this to happen by decreasing the thermal utilization ,
that is, the percentage of the total neutrons available that is actually utilized in pro
ducing fission .
MULTIPLICATION
K)EFFECTIVE
FACTOR
( eff
1.07
1.05
1.03
1
1.01
1
0 20,000 30,000 40,000 70,000

10,000 50,000 60,000
LIFETIME , MEGAWATT - DAYS
Fig. B.2 -- Reactivity vs. core lifetime.
The strong Doppler effect also helps to control possible start-up

accidents and limits the peak reached in a given power surge. If
the reactor instrumentation fails ( there is a fast control- rod insertion
at 26-sec period and a scram at 8.7-sec period ) , the power excursion
will enter the operating power range and will be turned around by
the Doppler effect . The Doppler effect will also permit the coolant
temperature high -level scram to provide adequate back - up for the
neutron -flux high -level trip ; thus it will prevent melting of the fuel
cladding and also mitigate the possibility of a cold -water accident.
( Sudden influx of cold water tends to increase the positive coefficient
of reactivity . )
In the transition from ambient to operating temperature, the reac
tivity of the core decreases owing to the temperature effect. Further
more, during the increase from zero power to full power, at the
operating temperature of 508 ° F , the reactivity of the core decreases
because of the increase in average fuel temperature ( power Doppler
effect) . Finally, during the early days of operation, xenon and
samarium gradually build up and poison out an additional amount
of reactivity. The reactivity that remains is available for lifetime.
The reference design reactivity requirements at room temperature
can be summarized as follows:
kell
Temperature ( 68° F to 508° F ) 0. 032

Equilibrium Xe and Sm -- . 020
Power Doppler (zero to full power) - .013
Fuel burn -out and isotope build -up . . 047
Total.. 0. 112
The reactivity required to override transient xenon following a

decrease from full power to zero is less than 0.2 percent kel ; this
item is neglected in the above reactivity requirements.
APPENDIX B 543
With the nominal loading, the lower enrichment in the center

( Fig. B.1 ) shows a lifetime of 930 days at normal power of
59,100 Mwd .
B - 3 HYDRAULIC SYSTEM FOR CONTROL- ROD DRIVE
The hydraulic equipment for maintaining pressure on the hydraulic

control rods of the Savannah reactor consists of three high -pressure
hydraulic pumping units, any one of which will supply sufficient
capacity to the system. One of the units is operational, and a second
unit is available for operation in the event of failure of the first unit.
Transfer to the second unit is automatic with no interruption of
pressure. The third unit is a reserve unit that can be switched in
to operate with either of the other two units.
Individual scram accumulator units are provided for each drive
mechanism . Also, if the pressure in any accumulator falls below a
preset value, the drive will be scrammed ; hence only a very serious
and sudden rupture of scram accumulators could prevent a scram
of the reactor.
The pilot pressure to a scram valve itself is controlled by a sole
noid -operated valve, which is normally energized and will scram on
loss of electric power. A curve of control-rod position during a
scram is shown in Fig. B.3. The maximum velocity of the control
70
60
50
TRAVEL
.ROD
-Safety Circuit Voltage Starts To Drop

,IN
0.08 Scram Relay Operates

30
Rod Motion Begins
20
1
-
10
0
-0.1 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.0 1.2
0 0.1
TIME , SECONDS
FIG . B.3 — Curve showing control -rod position during scram .

rod during a scram is controlled to a predetermined value by a

hydraulic flow-control valve. The final deceleration of the control
rod during a scram is controlled by the size and location of the
orifices through which the hydraulic fluid below the piston is allowed
to escape.
A minimum reactor pressure of 600 psi is required to position the
control rods. The full hydraulic pressure is maintained any time
the drives are operating and is unaffected by reactor pressure. If
at any time it is desirable to operate the drives at pressures below
600 psi for critical testing, the system can be temporarily altered to
provide a net upward hydraulic force of supplemental reactor pres
sure. The required scram pressure is maintained in the scram ac
cumulators during this time for safe operation .
The hydraulic equipment for this hydraulic system on the Savan
nah is located in three basic areas : ( 1 ) the hydraulic power supply
room is located a short distance away from the drive mechanisms.
( 2 ) the drive mechanisms cluster and supporting structures are
immediately adjacent to the drive mechanisms, and ( 3 ) the reactor
pressure sensing unit is located near the reactor vessel . In the power
supply room are the three separate hydraulic power supplies already
mentioned, each consisting of an electrically driven high -pressure
piston pump, main relief valve, heat exchanger, reservoir, low -oil
level alarm , high -oil -temperature alarm , suction strainer, in -line
filter, isolating check valve, and manual isolation valve. These three
hydraulic power supplies are connected to a common high -pressure
header , which is monitored by three pressure switches. The high
pressure header is also monitored to provide a signal so that in the
event of failure of the two power supplies and a continuing falling
of the hydraulic pressure, corrective action may be taken before an
unsa fe condition is reached .
From this high -pressure header in the hydraulic power supply
room , oil is carried to a high -pressure header at the drive cluster ,
which supplies all 21 control-rod drives. High-pressure oil is con
ducted from this header at the drive cluster to a drilled steel panel.
All interconnections between components located on this panel are
of welded -steel-pipe
- construction. Upon entering the drilled steel
panel, the high -pressure oil flows through an isolating check valve,
which prevents backflow into the hydraulic header, thus assuring
21 separate and distinct systems beyond this point, one for each of
the 21 control rods in the reactor.
The lower end of each of the individual accumulators provided for
each drive mechanism is filled with nitrogen gas to reduce oil leakage
and to monitor such leakage. The piston type accumulator was
chosen for this application because of its greater reliability when
compared to the bag type accumulator. Although there is finite
APPENDIX B 545
leakage of oil to the gas side of the piston and a finite amount of
gas leakage to the atmosphere and to the oil side of the piston, both
of these leakages are extremely small and will not seriously affect
safe operation of the scram system . The wiping action of the piston
packing against the wall of the cylinder is the primary cause of oil
leakage to the gas side of a piston type accumulator. The cycling
of this piston has been reduced to an absolute minimum by the appli
cation of a constant-pressure system . In effect, the only motion of
the piston of the hydraulic accumulator is the result of minor
hydraulic -system pressure changes caused by fluctuations in the high
pressure relief valve of the power supply ( discounting the cycling
caused by scram operation ) .
1
1
1
Appendix C
HEAT -TRANSPORT AUXILIARY SYSTEMS ON N.S.

SAVANNAH
C - 1 PRESSURIZING SYSTEM
The pressurizing system maintains the required primary -system

pressure during steady-state operation, limits the pressure fluctuations
caused by thermal expansion and contraction of the primary-system
volume during power -plant load transients, and prevents the primary
system from being overpressured. The system consists of a pres
surizer vessel , containing 160 replaceable cartridge type electric re
sistance heaters, and a spray nozzle, together with interconnected
piping, valves, and instrumentation. The pressurizer vessel is con
nected directly to the main primary loop, as indicated in Fig. C.1
and Fig. 4.19.
TO GASEOUS WASTE SYSTEM
FROM PRIMARY SYSTEM
TO RELIEF SYSTEM
SPRAY NOZZLES PRESSURIZER
ELECTRIC HEATERS
PRIMARY SYSTEM
Fig. C.1 - Simplified diagram of primary pressurizing system .
The internal volume of the pressurizer is 154 cu ft, of which the

normal steam space is 92 cu ft . Of the remaining 62 cu ft, 34 cu ft
is necessary to submerge the heaters and 28 cu ft of water is above
the heaters for an out- surge and minimum heater cover under pitch
and - roll conditions. A bafiling arrangement is provided in the ves
sel to minimize cooling of the entire contents of the pressurizer
during a series of cyclic surges.
547
A spray nozzle, located in the upper head, is fed by a spray line

from one of the two reactor inlet pipes. A control valve controls
the amount of flow to the nozzle. The spray line also contains a gate
valve so that it can be closed if the spray control valve should not
close. During an in -surge, the spray water condenses steam , thus
preventing an excessive pressure rise . If the pressure should ap
proach 2000 psi , the safety valves on the pressurizer will relieve the
pressure .
The electric heaters located in the lower portion of the pressurizer
are connected in five groups so that they can be energized in suc
cessive steps. Total installed heater capacity is 222.0 kw, which is
sufficient to produce a steam pressure of 100 psia ( 327 ° F ) in 2 hr
from start -up with 70° F water. These heaters are also capable of
raising the temperature (and corresponding pressure ) of the pres
surizer and its contents by more than 50° F per hour during warm - up
of the system .
The primary -system charge line is regulated by the pressurizer
level controller to maintain the desired water level in the pressurizer.
As the water level in the pressurizer drops below normal level , the
controller will open the charge line valve to provide an inflow to the
primary system . If the water should reach the low-level set point,
the level controller will deenergize the electric heaters to prevent
them from being uncovered while energized.. On extreme low and
high water levels, the purification-system blow -down valve may be
manually closed or opened by remote means. The level control sys
tem is not capable of maintaining the normal level during transient
surges ; however, these surges produce only temporary changes in
level . Control of the heaters, spray, and level is automatic during
operation ; during start-up and shutdown they are controlled either
automatically or manually from the control room .
By means of the pressurizer, the primary -system pressure is main
tained at 1,750 psia during steady -state operation by regulating the
heat input or spray water flow to the two-phase mixture of steam
and water. During power -plant load changes, the heat input from
the reactor and the heat removed from the steam generators are un
equal, causing a change in average primary - system temperature and
a resultant net change in primary water volume. Following a drop
in primary steam temperature, water flows out of the pressurizer,
but an excessive pressure decrease is prevented by the flashing of
water into the steam space within the pressurizer as the heaters go
on . During an in -surge, the pressure rise is minimized by the
quenching action of the spray system . In this marner pressure fluc
tuations during normal load transients are limited to plus 50 psi
during an in -surge and minus 55 psi during an out-surge. During
APPENDIX C 549
the most severe transient ( reduction in steam flow from 100 percent
to 20 percent in 3 sec ) , the 21 cu ft primary volume change results
in a pressure rise of no more than 75 psi . Thus, the wide variation
in spray flow required for the normal and maximum transients neces
sitates allowing the pressure to rise to 1,930 psia during the most
severe transient .
C-2 RELIEF SYSTEM
The function of the relief system shown in Fig. C.2 is to prevent

the pressure at any point in the nuclear portion of the plant from
exceeding that for which it was designed and to collect and condense
effluent that may be radioactive. It is comprised of the following
components :
1. Safety valves located on the steam generators, the pressurizer,
and the purification system let -down piping.
2. Manual stop -check bypass valves around one of the main stop
valves in each primary loop.
3. The necessary piping and fittings to convey the discharge from
the safety valves on the pressurizer and let -down piping to the
system effluent condensing tank .
4. A 135-cu ft effluent condensing tank containing 60 cu ft of
water, sufficient to receive and condense the discharge from
either the pressurizer or the purification system relief valve for
a period of at least 5 min . Since these discharges may be radio
active, the tank reduces the possibility of contaminating other
equipment in the containment vessel.
One of the safety valves on the pressurizer is diaphragm actuated
and will be the first to be opened by an excessive pressure surge
( 1,930 psia ). This valve was added to the system because of the
PRESSURE CONTROLLED
THROTTLE VALVE
HOD
RUPTURE DISK
PRESSURIZER
BOILER
STEAM
DRUM
DRAIN SYSTEM
H
PURIFICATION
SYSTEM
TO EFFLUENT
CONDENSING TANK
Fig . C.2 - Simplified diagram of relief system .

accuracy with which it can be set and because it can open repeatedly
without excessive wear. A remotely operated isolation valve is pro
vided in series with the diaphragm -operated relief valve.
In addition to the diaphragm -actuated valve, there are two spring
loaded self-actuated relief valves set at 2,000 psia . Either of the
self-actuated valves is capable of limiting a pressure surge if the
diaphragm valve is isolated. A three-way electric-motor-operated
shutoff valve is located between the pressurizer and the self-actuated
valves to permit isolation of either, but not both , of the self-actuated
safety valves. Each of the three safety valves is designed to pass
approximately four times the flow required to limit the pressure
transient for the most severe maneuvering rate ( 100 to 20 percent
power in 3 sec ).
There is a manual stop -check valve that bypasses the main stop
valve nearest the pumps in each loop. These valves will permit a
small bypass flow during all periods of pump operation but will
permit no flow to an isolated loop because of the installed direction
of the valve check . With this arrangement it would be impossible
to overpressure an isolated loop as a result of heat input from
accidental starting of the pumps. The stop portion of the valve will
allow positive isolation in the event a hydrostatic test is performed
on only one loop of the plant.
The two conditions considered in sizing the primary -system safety
valves are given below . In calculating the required valve size for
both conditions, it was assumed that the pressurizer spray valve was
totally inoperative.
1. It was assumed that a scram had occurred and no decay heat
had been removed from the reactor , the result being an increase
in temperature, volume, and pressure, which causes the safety
valve to open . The safety valve required for this condition is
smaller than that for condition 2 below .
2. The results of the preliminary transient studies indicate that
the maximum rate of primary -system temperature increase and
the maximum total rise occur during a steam load change from
100 percent to 20 percent in 3 sec. The two safety valves on
the upper drum of each of the steam generators are set to
relieve at 800 psig and have been sized so that the combined
maximum relieving capacity of each pair of valves at this pres
sure is 108,000 lb /hr.
Low -pressure rupture disks are installed in the discharge piping
from the steam -generator safety valves to prevent escape of inter
mittent leakage to the containment vessel. A small drain pipe con
nected to the low -pressure side of the safety valves, ahead of the
APPENDIX C 551
rupture disks, will convey any leakage to the containment drain

tank .
A safety valve is also installed on the purification system blow
down pipe just downstream of the pressure -reducing valves, and
the effluent from this valve will be conveyed to the effluent con
densing tank. Since the heat and storage capacity of the effluent
condensing tank may be exceeded in an extreme emergency , the tank
is equipped with a relief valve set to open at 100 psi. The discharge
from this relief valve will pass directly to the containment vessel .
The effluent from the condensing tank may be vented through a
remotely operated stop valve to the containment ventilation system ,
as needed . This tank is also provided with a level indicator. An
excess of water in the tank can be transferred to either the contain
ment drain tank or the external waste storage tanks by suitable
piping and remotely operated valves . In compliance with the U.S.
Coast Guard Code, an expansion joint is connected to the discharge
piping, thereby eliminating any rigid connection to the safety valve.
C - 3 PRIMARY - LOOP PURIFICATION SYSTEM
The primary purification system removes impurities from the

primary cooling water. These impurities consist of dissolved and
undissolved corrosion products, fuel and fission products from de
fective fuel rods, and residual impurities in the make -up water.
Certain inert gases, such as argon , xenon , krypton , radon , helium ,
and neon (which may accumulate from the fission products ), will
not be removed by the water purification system . The primary
water is stripped of these gases by a gas removal arrangement at
the buffer - seal surge tank .
The essential equipment comprising the primary purification sys
tem is shown in Fig. C.3. It is a low -pressure system consisting of
four ( only two are shown in Fig. C.3) let -down coolers, three de
mineralizers, and two filters. During reactor operation the water to
be purified is drawn from the primary system , cooled in the let
down coolers, and depressurized by a flow - control valve. Following
pressure and temperature reduction , the water flows to the demineral
izers and filters outside the containment vessel . The purified water
returns to the primary loop through the buffer-seal system .
Each demineralizer is designed to give 50 days of service in re
moving corrosion products formed at the maximum rate of 10 mg /
dm ? /month ; thus, if they are used in sequence , the plant may be
operated for at least 150 days before replacement is required . This
lifetime estimate, however, is a minimum estimate ; it is fully ex
FROM PRIMARY SYSTEM

TO TO GASEOUS WASTE
EMERGENCY DISPOSAL SYSTEM
COOLING
LE TDOWN ION EXCHANGER

COOLERS
te TO DRAIN AND WASTE COLLECTION SYSTEM
GASEOUS WASTE DISPOSAL SYSTEM

FROM
DRAIN 8 WASTE
COLLECTION TO DRAIN & WASTE COLLECTION SYSTEM
SYSTEM
FROM CONDENSATE PUMP DISCHARGE
FROM BOILER FEED

WATER PUMP BUFFER
DISCHARGE SEAL
SURGE
TANK
TO PRIMARY SYSTEM
Fig. C.3 — Simplified diagram of primary purification system .
pected that a service lifetime of 100 days for each demineralizer

will be attained.
Normal flow through the purification system is 20 gal/min ; how
ever, a maximum flow of 60 gal /min can be obtained , when needed,
to reduce excessive concentrations of impurities in the primary sys
tem . The demineralizers are designed to operate at 40 psia and
110° F ; the primary side of the let -down coolers is designed for
a maximum of 2,000 psig pressure and 650 ° F.
Make-up to the primary system is added in the purification sys
tem at a point upstream of the demineralizers. The make-up water
supply flows directly from the boiler feed pump discharge. A tem
perature -indicator controller is located downstream of the make-up
addition point so that the combined temperature of let-down and
make -up water can be maintained at 110 ° F . Excessive emergency
make -up requirements can be supplied from the expansion storage
water by the 50 gal/min waste -transfer pump.
When the resin in each demineralizer becomes spent , the entire
unit is removed and replaced by a new charge.
C - 4 HYDROGEN - ADDITION SYSTEM
The hydrogen -addition system ( Fig. C.4 ) maintains 20 to 40 cm 3

of hydrogen per liter of water (at STP ) in the primary system
to recombine with oxygen formed from dissociation of the water hy
radiation. This system consists of hydrogen cylinders, pressure
regulators, valves, and connecting piping. The reduced oxygen in
IIIIIIIIIII
APPENDIX C 553
III INIISII
BUFFER
SEAL
SURGE
TANK
Doa
18
vu V
S
Det
PRESSURE
CONTROL
STOP VALVE
MISIIN
FROM HYDROGEN STORAGE
( SOLENOID OPERATED -
PRESSURE CONTROLED )
Fig. C.4 — Simplified diagram of hydrogen-addition system.
the cooling water reduces the corrosion rate and the amount of
radioactive material that must be removed by the purification sys
tem . Initially, a charge of 200 cu ft of hydrogen at standard pres
sure and temperature will be injected into the primary system be
fore start-up, and sufficient cylinders will be carried on board to
supply not only the initial charge but also additional charges re
quired for a 100 -day period of operation. All equipment is located
on the forward weather deck with the exception of the piping to the
distribution nozzles in the buffer- seal system surge tank . The dis
tribution nozzles will evenly distribute the hydrogen gas in the
surge -tank water thereby forming a uniform concentration of hy
drogen with a partial pressure of 45 psia .
A relief valve is provided to relieve the pressure in the charge
line should the pressure regulator fail . A set of two check valves is
provided on the discharge side of the supply header to prevent any
flame from reaching the hydrogen supply cylinders. Suitable valves
and pressure and flow indicators are installed to provide for safe
operation of the system . As an additional precaution , hydrogen de
tectors are located at strategic points so that any leakage from the
system can be detected . The piping from the hydrogen bottles to
the buffer-seal surge tank is enclosed , and the enclosing air is moni
tored . Detectors are also provided for monitoring the air inside the
containment vessel and the secondary shielding.
This hydrogen -addition system is operated manually but is
equipped for automatic operation also if the need arises.
C- 5 BUFFER - SEAL SYSTEM
This system , shown schematically in Fig. C.5, supplies high

pressure purified water to the control-rod -drive buffer seals, thereby
6134890—62 ---- 37
REACTOR
CONTROL- ROD
BUFFER SEALS
MAKE - UP FOR
PRIMARY LOOP
REACTOR PRESSURE PRIMARY LOOP
DIFFERENTIAL
PRESSURE
CONTROL VALVE
BUFFER
SEAL
SURGE
TANK
CHARGE
BOOSTER PUMP
PUMP
Fig. C.5 —Simplified diagram of buffer-seal system.
preventing outward leakage of primary cooling water. It is also

arranged to inject purified make-up water into the primary system
when needed . Water for the control-rod buffer seals is obtained from
the purification system , as shown in Fig. C.3, flowing into the buffer
surge tank . Three buffer charge pumps supply water to the seals .
Flow to the seals is controlled automatically by means of a bypass
control valve, which maintains the seal inlet water pressure 50 psi
above the reactor pressure ( i.e. , 1,800 psia, normally ). Only one
pump will operate under normal conditions with new seals. Two
pumps will operate toward the end of seal life when flow through the
seals increases. The stand -by pump is provided with controls to start
automatically in the event of a pump failure or increased flow re
quirements. All three pumps are connected in parallel so as to
operate at maximum capacity to supply the primary system in case
of a leak and yet maintain the desired pressure differential, 50
psi above the reactor pressure.
Two booster pumps take suction from the buffer - seal surge tank
and discharge to the suction of the charge pumps, thus maintain
ing the required charge pump suction pressure under all conditions
of operation. The surge tank also serves as the point at which the
radioactive gases are stripped from the water flowing from the
purification system . The seal water is pumped to each control-rod
drive seal. If the purification flow rate is such that it equals the
inward leakage to the primary system through the control-rod seals,
no direct flow into the primary system will be required. If, how
ever, the purification rate exceeds the seal water leakage into the
primary system , the water level in the pressurizer will decrease.
APPENDIX C 555
The pressurizer water level control will automatically open the valve
in the charge line, which connects to the primary piping between the
main inlet gate valve and the reactor vessel, permitting flow directly
into the primary system to restore the pressurizer water level and to
balance the purification blowdown rate. Flow to the buffer seals is
uninterrupted under this condition .
Two coolers ( one operating ) are automatically controlled to main
tain seal water temperature below 130°F as a result of energy added
to the water by the charge pump .
The buffer charge pumps, the booster pumps, the coolers, and the
bypass control valve are all located outside the secondary shield
and are accessible for maintenance.
C -6 EMERGENCY COOLING SYSTEM
After a nuclear power reactor is shut down , a considerable amount

of decay heat is generated as a result of the radioactive decay of the
fission products formed in the core, and, unless this is removed, the
temperature will exceed safe limits. The emergency cooling system
is provided to remove this decay heat.
The emergency cooling system , shown in Fig. C.6 , consists of two
loops, one involving the circulation of primary-system water through
a small emergency cooler and pump and then through the reactor
and the other the circulation of sea water by a special sea - water
pump through the low -pressure side of the cooler. The primary
circuit of the emergency cooling system consists of a small canned
rotor pump, which will pump primary water through the reactor
and emergency heat exchanger. The sea -water circuit consists of a
SEA WATER
FROM REACTOR (PRIMARY SYSTEM )
OVERBOARD FROM SOLUBLE POISON
ADDITION SYSTEM
CANNED PUMP
PUMP COOLING
an
10
SEA CHEST
EMERGENCY
TO REACTOR
( PRIMARY SYSTEM )
I CONTAINMENT
COOLING COIL
SEA WATER OVERBOARD
FIG. C.6 - Simplified diagram of emergency cooling system .

pump and the necessary piping to transfer the water to the emer
gency cooler, an air-conditioning unit, and the cooling coils in the
emergency canned rotor pump. The air- conditioning unit is pro
vided to remove the heat from inside the containment vessel. The
coils used in the air -conditioning unit are smaller than those used
for normal operation. The reason for this decreased size is that
the salt water will enter the units at approximately 10°F lower
temperature and the heat load will be less than during normal
operating. The sea - water circuit in which flow distribution is re
quired contains balancing orifices that are set to close prior to closing
the containment vessel so that only stop-valve operation will be
required.
The emergency cooler is designed so that the heat -removal ca
pacity is sufficient to prevent a rise in the primary -system tempera
ture during the production of maximum decay heat and yet not
permit an excessively rapid cool-down rate. Its design heat load of
4 million Btu /hr will adequately handle all the decay heat that
is generated during the first hour, and , consequently, since the decay
heat steadily decreases, it will also handle anything after the first
hour. In addition , since approximately 200,000 Btu of heat must be
removed to cool the primary loop 1 ° F, it is obvious that the maxi
mum cool-down rate, even with the high temperature difference
which will initially exist in the cooler, will be 20 ° F per hour, a
value well within the stress limitations of the loop.
In addition to the two loops just described , it is possible by the
use of a small 0.5 gal/min make-up pump outside the containment
vessel to add make -up water which would be stored in the propulsion
system direct -contact heater . The ability to add make- up water to
this system will permit making up either for minor leakage or for
the contraction of this system as it is cooled down.
All controls for the operation of the emergency cooling system
are located in an area near the controls for the 300-kw diesel gen
erator on the navigation deck . In as many cases as possible, the
controls are limited to very simple push -button operation , and as
many of the stop valves as possible are operated simultaneously from
a single push button. This one push button is located on the main
console to initiate system operation during an emergency. Con
tinued operation of the system , however, will be handled from the
emergency control center. The very basic parameters of the primary
system which are absolutely necessary for the addition of make -up
water to the primary system as it cools down will be reproduced on
this emergency control center.
Appendix D
SUPPORTING SYSTEMS FOR N.S. SAVANNAH
The supporting systems associated with the N.S. Savannah power

plant consist of the following : The sampling system , the inter
mediate cooling system , the containment air-conditioning system , the
drain and waste -collection system , the gaseous -waste- collection sys
tem , and the decay -heat removal system . In addition, the electrical
system described in Sec. 4–6.6 is also regarded as one of the sup
porting systems.
D- 1 SAMPLING SYSTEM
The sampling system has the following functions: ( 1 ) to supply

representative liquid samples for analysis to indicate the effectiveness
of the primary -loop purification system , ( 2 ) to supply liquid samples
of the drains collected in the laboratory waste tank, high- and low
activity waste -storage tanks, and the inner-bottom tanks, ( 3 ) to
supply a continuous flow of primary water to a fission - product moni
tor and deionized water to a radiation monitor, and ( 4 ) to supply
representative samples for analysis of contained hydrogen and other
dissolved gases in the primary system .
The two sampling lines, one from the filters carrying purified
water ( at the left in Fig. 1.1) and the other carrying water direct
from the high -pressure primary system ( at the right in Fig. D.1 ) ,
connect to sampling bombs, which are removed after a sufficient flow
has passed through them to assure a truly representative sample.
FROM WASTE TRANSFER
PUMP DISCHARGE
+ FROM PURIFICATION SYSTEM

FROM PURIFICATION SYSTEM (ION EXCHANGER DISCHARGE )
(LET - DOWN COOLER
DISCHARGE )
FISSION SAMPLING SAMPLING RADIATION

PRODUCT TANK OR TANK OR
MONITOR MONITOR
FILTER FILTER
TO PURIFICATION SYSTEM TO BUFFER SEAL

( ION EXCHANGER INTAKE ) SURGE TANK
TO WASTE TRANSFER
PUMP SUCTION
Fig. D.1 - Simplified diagram of the reactor plant sampling system .

557
Each line is provided with shutoff valves to prevent the escape of

primary water in the event of a line rupture. The sample line
that conveys the unpurified samples of primary water contains a
block orifice and a remotely controlled throttle valve to regulate the
flow and pressure at the sampling station . A pressure- control valve
set to open at 186 psig is provided between the throttle valve and
the containment penetration to prevent high - pressure liquid from
passing through the containment wall.
The sampling bombs will be located in a sink equipped with a
hood and blower to prevent exposure of the operator to radioactive
water or gas. The block orifice, valves, and piping in the unpurified
sample lines upstream of the sampling station are designed for
2.000 psig and 140° F. The sampling bombs and all other piping
and valves necessary for transporting sample water are designed
for 186 psig.
D-2 INTERMEDIATE COOLING SYSTEM
The main function of the intermediate cooling system is to fur

nish clean cooling water to the various components in the reactor
system . The system also provides an intermediate barrier between
the primary system and the sea .
A simplified diagram of the intermediate cooling system is shown
in Fig. D.2. It includes two sea -water circulating pumps, two fresh
water circulating pumps, a surge tank , control valves, isolating stop
valves, and connecting piping. Figure 1.2 shows only one of each
of the two pumps. There are two separate flow circuits, sea water
and fresh cooling water.
HYDRAULIC POWER SUPPLY COOLERS +
LET - DOWN COOLERS +

SEA WATER
FROM OVERBOARD EFFLUENT CONDENSING TANK
SEA
CHEST COOLING COILS SHIELD TANK
COOLING COILS CONTAINMENT →
PRIMARY PUMPS
OVERFLOW BUFFER SEAL COOLERS +

TO LAB
WASTE TANK GAS LIQUIFIER UNIT
TO DRAIN GASEOUS WASTE AFTER COOLER
SYSTEM
NON NUCLEAR INSTRUMENTATION
MAKE - UP FROM SURGE AFTER COOLERS AND AIR COMPRESSOR
CONDENSATE TANK
WASTE COLLECTION AND DRAIN SYSTEM
Fig. 1.2 - Simplified diagram of the intermediate cooling system.

APPENDIX D 559
The sea -water circuit consists of two intermediate coolers, two

pumps, a suction sea chest, an overboard discharge, isolating stop
valves, and piping. The two coolers are arranged in parallel, with
one as a stand -by. The parallel arrangement also permits either
pump to deliver sea water to either cooler. The sea water flows
inside the tubes to facilitate cleaning.
The fresh cooling water circuit consists of the two intermediate
coolers, two circulating pumps , a surge tank, control valves, relief
valves, isolating stop valves, other valves, shield -tank cooling coils,
strainers, and piping. As in the sea -water circuit, the coolers and
pumps are arranged in parallel circuits, enabling either pump to
deliver fresh cooling water to either cooler. The intermediate
coolers were designed for the sea water to enter at 85 °F and leave
at 106 ° F . The fresh water enters at 143 ° F and leaves at 95 ° F .
Flow of fresh cooling water from the coolers is distributed
through a number of headers, some supplying equipment inside the
containment area and some outside. Inside the containment , cooling
water is furnished to the following components: ( 1 ) let -down
coolers, ( 2 ) neutron shield -tank cooling coils, ( 3 ) containment air
conditioning, and ( 4 ) primary pumps. Cooling water is furnished
outside the containment to the following components: ( 5 ) buffer- seal
coolers, ( 6 ) control-rod -drive hydraulic power supply coolers, ( 7 )
gaseous adsorption process equipment, and ( 8 ) instrument air com
pressors and after coolers.
All these components require continuous cooling water flow during
normal operation. The let-down coolers and buffer- seal coolers
will require cooling water following reactor shutdown to remove
decay heat or continue purification.
At the suction side of the fresh -water pump, a surge tank is
connected into the main flow line. The surge tank will accommodate
thermal expansion of the water during start -up and serve as a point
at which chemical addition may be made.
D - 3 CONTAINMENT AIR - CONDITIONING SYSTEM
As shown in Fig. D.3 air flows through the two legs of the duct
work at the top of the containment vessel and down into the air
conditioning unit . A portion of this air bypasses the cooling coils.
The air that flows over the cooling coils leaves the coils at 110° F
and 100 percent relative humidity and is then mixed in the correct
proportions with the bypassed stream to obtain the desired outlet
conditions of 115 ° F and 80 percent relative humidity. This air,
directed by a fan through the two outlet legs of the duct work to the
bottom of the containment vessel and discharged through distrib
INTUITITII CONTATO |||||||||01 181CW10101111110 IN CIMIT 011A TOTI CINTURE

11111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111
के HOT AIR INTAKE

FROM TOP OF
CONTAINMENT
EMERGENCY COOLING SYSTEM
INTERMEDIATE COOLING SYSTEM
AXIAL FLOW FANS

FAN FAN
CONDENSATE
AINITTITUII
TO DRAIN SYSTEM
COOL AIR SUPPLY
TO BOT TOI
CONTAINMENT
문드
101010101110111111 C11|||||||||||||||||||||||||| 10111011C HUIDITTA1111110111111 |||||||||||| IIII C IIII ||||||||||||||||||||||II II CII
Fig . D.3 — Containment-vessel air-cooling system .
uted registers, maintains an average air temperature of 130° F and

a maximum relative humidity of 80 percent.
D - 4 EQUIPMENT DRAIN AND WASTE - COLLECTION SYSTEM
The dominant source of gamma activity in the water of the pri

mary system is the conversion of 016 to N16 by the absorption of a
neutron accompanied by the emission of a proton . This activity
decays with a 7.35 -sec half life, and 82 percent of the decay results
in the production of 6.1-Mev gamma rays. The short half lives
result in a rapid reduction of this radioactivity to 200 mr /hr after
30 min .
While pure water itself does not acquire long-lived radioactivity
in a nuclear reactor, any corrosion products that might form do
become radioactive, and every precaution must be taken not only
to maintain rates of corrosion at a minimum but to remove corrosion
products from the system before they can accumulate to an appre
ciable degree.
Two waste -collection systems are installed to remove radioactive
wastes from the Savannah system , one for handling liquid wastes
and the other for handling gaseous wastes.
The equipment drain and waste-collection system , shown in Fig.
1.4, is designed to collect from the reactor system all drainage that
might be radioactive. Fluid entering this system could come from
any of the following sources :
APPENDIX D 561
( 1 ) Both loops of the primary system ( chiefly from primary gate

valve glands ) , ( 2 ) secondary side of the steam generator, ( 3 ) puri
fication system, ( 4 ) intermediate cooling system , ( 5 ) buffer -seal
system , ( 6 ) containment cooling system , ( 7 ) effluent condensing
tank, ( 8 ) sampling system , ( 9 ) laboratory, and ( 10 ) safety -valve
leakage.
Drainage from these points may be required during initial fill and
testing, normal operation, and shutdown. Provisions have been made
to collect floor drainage from the area inside the secondary shield
in the drain wells. These drain wells will be emptied by sump
pumps to the waste storage tanks. The level of the radioactivity
can be ascertained by sampling. The system includes a containment
drain tank , four waste storage tanks, and a laboratory tank , with
capacities as follows :
Volume ( each) , Total volume,
No. Tank cu ſt cu ft
1 Containment drain tank . 33. 5 33. 5
2 Waste-storage tanks .. 275 550
2 Waste tanks in inner bottom .. 350 700
1 Laboratory waste tank. 70 70
Total .. 1 , 353. 5
Sampling provisions are made for any of the five storage tanks
outside containment. After having been sampled, the contents of the
tank may be puniped to either the overboard sea chest or the dock.
The two 275 cu ft waste -storage tanks will be used to store expansion
drainage from the primary system during plant warm - up. This
drainage varies from 290 to 425 cu ft for a warm - up from 70 ° F
STEAM DRUM RELIEF VALVES CONTAINMENT BUFFER SE AL SYSTEM
DRAIN
LEAKAGE -PRIMARY LOOP STOP VALVES - TANK CONTAINMENT COOLING SYSTEM CONDENSATE
LAB WASTE
+ PRIMARY LOOP
FROM PURIFICATION
SYSTEM FILTERS + LET - DOWN COOLERS
C FROM EFFLUENT
CONDENSING TANK + SHIELD TANK EXTENSION
+ CONTROL ROD DRIVE

LAB WASTE CONTAINMENT
DRAIN PUMP
WASTE STORAGE + PRIMARY HEAT EXCHANGERS
+ BUFFER SEAL COOLERS

WASTE
TRANSFER + ION EXCHANGERS
PUMP
INTERMEDIATE COOLING
FROM TO SAMPLING SYSTEM
LEAKAGE FROM
SAMPLING BUFFER SE AL
SYSTEM BOOSTER PUMPS
INNER | SUMP
BOTTOM | PUMP
TANK DOCK SIDE OVERBOARD
Fig. D.
4Basic diagram of drain and waste collection system .
depending upon the initial water level in the pressurizer and buffer
seal surge tank . This drainage would be used as make -up during
plant cool-down and could be added to the primary system by the
waste transfer pump as emergency make -up. Since both waste
storage tanks will not be completely filled by expansion drainage,
it will be possible to store other operational drainage in these tanks.
The use of operational drainage for make -up will be subject to a
chemical analysis of a sample.
The laboratory tank receives drainage from the effluent condensing
tank , the laboratory , and the back -wash water from the effluent fil
ters. One of the two inner bottom tanks will receive drainage from
the sampling tank , the drain wells, buffer charge pump gland -seal
leakage, and any leakage that collects in the bottom of the con
tainment vessel. The contents of the containment drain tank will
be collected in either of the inner bottom tanks. The containment
drain tank receives leakage from the relief and safety valves on
the steam generators, condensate from the containment cooling sys
tem, and leakage through the primary gate-valve packing.
D-5 GASEOUS - WASTE - COLLECTION SYSTEM
The gaseous-waste -collection system consists of piping, ductwork,

valves and instrumentation , blowers, filtration equipment, and ad
sorption process equipment and is designed for operation of the
nuclear power plant even though defects should develop in the
fuel -rod cladding which would result in exposure of the fuel itself
to the primary water. The system is put into operation only when
fission products are detected in the primary system . The general
arrangement of the system is shown in Fig. 1.5. Figure 1.6 is a
simplified diagram of the system . The adsorption equipment of
this system operates on the vent gas from a stripping column located
on the buffer -seal surge tank. The vent gas is purified by combining
any oxygen present with a portion of the hydrogen flow and hy
adsorbing the fission -product gases on charcoal maintained at a re
duced temperature. The vent gas, after being purified , returns to
the surge tank for another stripping cycle. It is expected that the
majority of the fission -product gases will be removed from the coolant
and concentrated in this manner.
Another point of degasification on the primary system is a vent
line from the pressurizer void to the purification blowdown stream
between the let- down coolers and the throttle valves. The vent line
functions to suppress radioactive-gas build up in the pressurizer by
providing for a complete change of the pressurizer void at periodic
intervals when it becomes necessary . The gases vented from this
-
-----
-------
PRESSURIZER
EFFLUENT
CONDENSING
TANK
BLOWER BLOWER
1500
CFM 4000
CFM LEGEND
# S
0
VALVE
OPEN
NORMALLY
VALVE
NORMALL
CLOSED Y
VALVE
NORMALL
THROTTLED
0
Y
CHECK
VALVE
REACTOR
Manifold
VALVE
FLOAT
DIAPHRAG
OPERATED
VALVE
STOP M
CONTAINMENT ELECTRIC
MOTOR
DRAIN
TANK OPERATED
VALVE
Lon ?
PRESSURE
VALVE
CONTROL
sogget
PREHEATER
Loc
-OXO
DE
BEDS N(0_B.OT0TLE
HEAT
EXCHANGER
CONDUCTION LIQUID
NORELCO
APPENDIX D
COOLED N5
ITROGEN
CONDENSER
- Tu
RESERVIOR
Demo
OXO 00
07
paulico
L-L 080000
.
LAB WASTE
STORAGE
OX
TANKS ADSORPTION
COMPRESSOR
UNITS
BILGE REGENERATIVE
BILGE
COOLERS
T
S ANK TANK
DFig
T
gaseous
w
system .5
he
aste
.-c—. ollection
563
MANIFOLD
COLLECTION TO ATMOSPHERE
FROM ION EXCHANGERS
FROM EFFLUENT FILTERS
FROM LAB WASTE TANK DISCHARGE

BLOWER
FROM WASTE STORAGE TANKS
FROM INNER BOTTOM TANKS VALVE

PRESSURE
FROM BUFFER SEAL TANK CONTROLLED
FROM INSIDE
SECONDARY
SHIELD
PRIMARY HEAT EXCHANGER
PRIMARY PUMPS CONTAIN FROM

MENT
CONTAINMENT
DRAIN
EFFLUENT CONDENSING TANK TANK VESSEL
PRIMARY PRESSURIZER TO INSIDE CONTAINMENT VESSEL
FIG. D.6 - Simplified diagram of gaseous -waste- collection system.
source serve to increase the gas content of the purification flow to

the stripper column.
Areas and gas voids in the auxiliary systems may be exposed to
primary coolant containing some gaseous activity. This system pro
vides the necessary piping, ductwork , and valves to purge or vent
such areas or voids. Vent lines from various equipment are brought
together in a manifold, and gases from the manifold are discharged
in the containment vessel or the stack at a point upstream of the
filters. A radiation monitor on the discharge side of this manifold
provides for an alarm if activity release exceeds preset levels. Fol
lowing the operation of this alarm , the vents may be selectively
closed to isolate the source of activity and allow for additional
decay before release.
The secondary-shield area is continuously ventilated to prevent the
accumulation of activity. The containment is purged prior to entry
of personnel to dilute and remove possible accumulations of radio
activity. Air flow through these two areas is maintained at 4000 cfm
and discharges through the top after end of the superstructure.
Filters installed in the ducts upstream of the blower, but outside
the secondary -shield area, provide for removal of particulate mat
ter from the exhaust air flow . A radiation monitor samples the
gas flow just ahead of its release to the atmosphere thus providing
for continuous indication of radioactivity levels and the effectiveness
of particulate matter removal.
Appendix E
MAIN AND AUXILIARY MACHINERY OF

N.S. SAVANNAH
Table E.1-LIST OF PRINCIPAL EQUIPMENT IN POWER PLANT

MAIN TURBINE AND THROTTLE VALVE
No. Item Description
1 Main turbine... Cross -compound type with main condenser hung from
the low -pressure unit. Fitted with take- home motor:
Shaft horsepower (normal load) . 20,000
Shaft horsepower (maximum ahead ) . 22,000
Astern torque, percent ahead at 50 % rpm . 80
Throttle steam pressure (dry and saturated ), psig .. 430
Exhaust vacuum (ahead ), in . Hg ..... 28. 45
Guaranteed steam rate , normal load, nonextracting, 8. 85
1b /shp -hr.
2
Number of extractions
Take- home motor, hp 750
Each element of the turbine is fitted with hydraulic

speed -limiting system and low lube-oil pressure shut
down device, controlled nozzle valves, oil sight flow
indicators, and thermometer with drainer. The unit
is arranged for right-hand rotation .
1 Throttle valve. Incorporating steam strainer, ahead main steam valve
and speed - limiting valve, and astern main steam valve.
Astern guarding valve is fitted in steam line to astern
element . Throttle valve and astern guarding valve
are operable from control station .
1 Main reduction gear ..-- .. Double-reduction double helical articulated type with
separate segmental thrust bearing:
Normal propeller speed , rpm .. 107
Maximum continuous propeller speed (approx . ) , 110
rpm .
1 Turning gear Double -reduction , reversible , one revolution of shaft,
10 min :
Motor (approx . ) , hp . 10
Motor type .. 440 v, 3 phase, 60 cycles
SHAFTING
6 Line shafts . Solid forged steel:
Diameter, in 2214
Length ( approx . ) , ft . 2714
1 Propeller shaft . Solid forged steel with bronze , composition " M " sleeves
in way of bearings:
Shaft diameter, in .. 26 ! 4 to 2639
Shaft length , ft. 2914
Diameter over liner (approx .), in .. 20
9 Line shaft bearings ...... Steel , ring or disk , oiled :
Bearing load (max .), psi. 4714
Ratio length times diameter (min .) . 1. 7
1 Stern tube bearing. Bronze bushed with lignum vita bearing:
Forward bearing length , ft .. 3 ,
Aft bearing length , ſt .. 83,
PROPELLER
1 Propeller Right hand of solid high - strength nickel manganese
bronze . Bronze fairwater cap , solid type :
Tensile strength (min . ) , psi .. 80,000
Propeller diameter, ft . 22
Number of blades .. 5
Weight (approx . ) , Ib . 65,000
565
Table E.1—LIST OF PRINCIPAL EQUIPMENT IN POWER PLANT —Con .

CONDENSING EQUIPMENT
1 Main condenser ... Shell and straight tube type:
Surface, sq ft ...... 22, 360
Length between tube sheets, ft . 20.0
Number of passes . 1
Pressure, 75° F sea water, in . Hg (abs) . 1.5
Tubes, 34 in . 0.D.X18BWG - 70-30 Cu-Ni .... 5, 696
Cooling water, gal/min .. 32, 600
Steam condensed , lb /hr . 138, 900
Heat rejected to cooling water, Btu /lb steam .. 916.6
Shell material..... Welded steel
Steam dump capacity, lb /hr, 1,205 Btu /lb steam and 190.000
20,000 gal/min of 75° F cooling water.
2 Auxiliary condensers .... Shell and straight tube type :
Surface, sq ft..... 2,000
Length between tube sheets, ft ... 14
Number of passes . 2
Pressure, 75° F sea water , in. Hg (abs) . 2.0
Cooling water, gal/min. 2, 490
Steam condensed , lb /hr . 21 , 300
Heat rejection to cooling water, Btu /lb steam .. 845
1 Main air ejector ... Twin element, two-stage type mounted on an inter
condenser section and /or combined after - condenser
and gland seal section of surface type:
Capacity, dry air removal, lb /hr... 33. 8
Capacity, air vapor removal , lb /hr . 108. 8
Suction pressure , in . Hg ( abs ) ... 1.0
Steam pressure (normal ) , psig.. 150
MAIN PUMPS AND SCOOPS
1 Main circulating water Welded steel inlet without lip, outlet with partially 20. 25
scoop . extended lip : Design speed , knots.
1 Main circulating pump... Vertical, mixed flow , single stage, motor driven ( capac
ity, gal/min ) :
Bilge . 8,500
Normal . 20,000
2 Aux . circulating pumps ... Vertical, single stage, centrifugal, motor driven : Capac 2, 800
ity, gal/min .
2 Intermediate salt -water Vertical, single stage, centrifugal, motor driven : Capac 1 , 491
cir . pumps. ity , gal/min ,
2 Main condensate pumps.. Vertical, two stage, centrifugal, motor driven :
Capacity (normal), gal /min . 285
Capacity (rated ), gal/min . 400
2 Aux. condensate pumps .. Vertical, two stage, centrifugal, motor driven :
Capacity (normal) , gal/min .. 28
Capacity ( rated ), gal/min .. 60
2 Main feed pumps..---- Horizontal, multistage , centrifugal, steam -turbine
driven , complete with lube -oil system , speed -limiting
governor, and over -speed trip.
PUMP Normal Rated
Capacity, gal/min ..... 650 735

Total dynamic head , psi. 615
Temperature feed , ° F 269 269
TURBINE
Steam pressure, psig .. 465 430

Steam temperature, ° F . 463 455
Exhaust pressure, psig .. 125 125
Turbine borsepower . 333 367
APPENDIX E 567
Table E.1- LIST OF PRINCIPAL EQUIPMENT IN POWER PLANT — Con .

FEED SYSTEM
1 Deaerating feed heater .... Vertical, direct- contact type with spray type vent con
denser . Fitted with remote level indicator and level
control valve :
Maximum capacity ( outlet) , lb/hr . 256, 700
Normal capacity (outlet) , lb /hr.. 237, 700
Feed temperature (outlet ) , ° F 269
Feed inlet temperature (normal) , ° F . 200
High -pressure feed drains, lb / hr . 17, 500
High -pressure feed drain tem ., ° F 353
Steam pressure , psig -... 26. 5
Storage capacity ( to max . water line) , gal ... 5,000
1 First-stage ſeed beater .... Closed, horizontal, multipass, shell and straight tube
type :
Steam pressure , psia . 13. 3
Feed flow (max . ) , lb /hr ... 185,500
Feed flow (normal ) , lb/hr .. 170,000
Inlet feed temperature. ° F 101
Outlet feed temperature, ° F . 199
1 Third - stage ſeed heater... Closed , vertical, multipass, shell and U tube type :
Steam pressure , psia .. 105
Feed flow (max . ) , lb /hr .. 256 , 700

Feed flow ( normal ) , lb /hr .. 237, 700
Inlet feed temperature, ° F . 270
Outlet feed temperature, °F .. 322
GENERATING UNITS
2 Turbogenerator units .... Alternating -current generator with direct -connect ex
citer driven through reduction gear by steam turbine .
Each unit is complete with strainer, combined trip and
throttle valve , oil relay type speed governor , automatic
valve gear, back -pressure trip and low oil pressure
protection , synchronizing devices, and complete lubri
cation systems. Generator is air cooled and fitted
with a salt -water circulated air cooler .
GENERATOR
Capacity (normal ) , kw . 1,500

Capacity (normal), kva. 1,875
Voltage 450
Phase and cycles . 3-60
TURBINE AND GEAR
Throttle steam pressure, psig ... 430
Exhaust vacuum , in . Hg (abs). 2.0
2 Diesel generators... Direct - connected diesel-driven generator and exciter
mounted on common bed plate.
DIESEL ENGINE
Туре.... Full diesel

Horsepower (rated ) . *1 , 200
Type starting .. Air
GENERATOR
Capacity (normal rated ) , kw .. 750

Capacity (normal rated ), kva . 940
Volts . 450
Phase and cycles . 3-60
1 Emergency diesel genera- Direct-connected diesel-driven generator and exciter
tor . mounted on common bedplate Diesel engine:
"With 10 percent overload rating .
Table E.1-LIST OF PRINCIPAL EQUIPMENT IN POWER PLANT - Con

GENERATING UNITS - Continued
DIESEL ENGINE
1 Emergency diesel genera- Horsepower ( rated ) .
tor . Type starting Hydraulic
GENERATOR
Capacity , kw . 320
Capacity, kva . 375

Volts ...
Phase and cycles.
Appendix F
CONTROL AND INSTRUMENTATION OF N.S. SAVANNAH
As explained in the general discussion of the N.S. Savannah

control and instrumentation system in Sec. 4-8, the nuclear instru
mentation for the reactor system consists of 10 neutron-flux measur
ing channels that in 4 measuring ranges cover the entire flux range
of the reactor from source power through 150 percent maximum
power. The four measuring ranges are covered by three basic chan
nel groups, the source -range, intermediate-range, and power -range
channels.
The neutron detectors for the various flux measuring channels
are mounted in instrument wells in the shield-water tank, which sur
rounds the pressure vessel, at an angle of 612 deg to the vertical,
>
and close to the wall of the reactor vessel. This location minimizes
the gamma gradient across the detectors. It is essential that neutron
detectors discriminate as much as possible against gamma radiation
in favor of neutron radiation since it is the neutron flux that is
important. Figure F.1 shows the flux distribution along the hori
zontal axis of the reactor for full-power operation . The magnitude
of the flux is proportional to the power level.
Any change in flux distribution in the reactor core may affect the
flux distribution at the detector locations. It is conceivable that this
flux change at the detector locations can appear as a change in
period indication.* The effect will be more predominant if the de
tectors are located in or near the reactor core . The change in the
core - flux distribution is a function of the control -rod positions,
which are varied throughout the core lifetime. As the fissionable
fuel in the core is used up in the production of power, it becomes
necessary to gradually remove the control rods from the core to
maintain the required degree of excess reactivity. However, initial
calculations indicate that rod shadowing will be of little consequence
in the Savannah reactor.
• A period is the time required for one cycle of a regularly repeated series of events .
In a nuclear reactor in which the neutron flux is rising or falling exponentially , a
period is the time required for the flux to change by a factor of e ( 2.718 ) .
569
1
1012
DI
REACTOR
VESSEL
10 " 107
SHIELD WATER
QEUTRONS
TANK (Water Filled)

FLUX
/, EC
SCM
N
111
RATE
DOSE
,RI
HR
Thermal
Flux
TTTTTTTTT
THERMAL
os
GAMMA
Gamma
MUT
Dose Rate
108
10 ?
120 130 140 150 160 170 180 190
DISTANCE FROM REACTOR CENTER ,. IN .
FIG. F.1 – Thermal- flux rates and gamma-dose rates at full power.
F- 1 SAFETY AND RELIABILITY OF THE INSTRUMENTATION

was
The nuclear instrumentation is designed to provide maximum re
liability and safety with a minimum of false reactor shutdowns.
This is accomplished through the use of multiple channels within
each measuring range, operating in a coincident arrangement such
that at least two channels out of a group of like channels must agree
that an unsafe condition exists to initiate a scram or fast control
rod insertion. This arrangement reduces the possibility of a false
APPENDIX F 571
reactor shutdown resulting from equipment failures or localized

transients within a channel. Increased reliability is obtained in the
reactor safety system through the use of solid - state devices or mag
netic amplifiers rather than electron tubes and mechanical relays.
A high degree of operational reliability and flexibility is ensured
by the requirement that two out of three channels be at the seram
initiating level before any action takes place in the safety system .
A comparison of system failures in coincidence and noncoincidence
systems shows that failures resulting in reactor shutdown are much
less likely with a coincidence system .
With the exception of the start-up channels, any one channel may
be checked for maintenance during reactor operation as long as the
system is operated in coincidence. The removal of a second channel
will automatically scram the reactor. Maintenance is orpected to be is
extremely low in this system compared to previous systems using
electron tubes; however, the combination of multiple channels oper
ating in coincidence demands greater maintenance flexibility.
F - 2 LOW-LEVEL START- UP CHANNELS
The low-level start-up channels are shown in Fig. F.2. As will be

noted, channels 1 and 2 consist of multielement BF3 proportional
counter, pulse integrator, log microammeter, log count -rate meter,
and period meter. Channels 3 and 4 are the same except that a
fission chamber is used instead of the BF ; detector element. A
multielement counter is one having a number of electrodes instead
of merely two electrodes , as is the case in simple ion chambers such
as the Geiger counter . The multielement BF3 proportional counter
has sufficient sensitivity to supply output pulses proportional to the
flux level at subcritical multiplication . The rate at which these
pulses are produced is proportional to the flux level of the reactor.
The fission chambers used as the detectors for channels 3 and 4
also produce such output pulses but are less sensitive to gamma
radiation than the BF , proportional counters. Fission chamber
counters make use of the ionization resulting from the fission frag .
ments. They consist essentially of two surfaces coated with U 235
sealed in a gas -filled container and connected to the external circuit
by a gas -filled cable. The neutron flux in the reactor causes fission
in the U 235 on the surfaces of the electrodes in the chamber, and the
fission fragments cause ionization of the atoms between the elec .
trodes.
As indicated in Fig. F.2 a period trip signal is fed to the enfety
system through an insertion panel to cause insertion of the control
613489 06238
METER
MICROAM
LOG
572
TEST
BF3 1-105 PULSE VIBRATOR

MULTI RATE
COUNT PERIOD
LOG
D.C. OUTPUT
1 DIODE
DISCRIMINATOR D.C.AMP
AMP
DIODE AMP
MAG
. RATE
COUNT
LOG
DETECTOR
CPS AMP
CONSOLE
CONTROL
SELECT
SWITCHES
SYSTEM
SAFETY
TO LEVEL
LOG SIGNAL
PERIOD EITHER
CHANNEL
-O SAFETY
TO
CRITICAL
FOR TRIP
LOGN PERIOD SYSTEM PERIOD
MEASURMENTS
ONLY
хо
TEST
BF3 RATE
COUNT
VIBRATOR
MULTI
PULSE PERIOD
DC
LOG OUTPUT
DETECTOR AMP DISCRIMINATOR
DIODE DIODE
AMPDCAMP .MAG
AMP NOTE
:
N
FOR
AVAILABLE
X- UTPUT
O
TRIP
TO
SYSTEM
SAFETY
TO
LEVELO
LOG
CRITICAL
FOR
SIGNAL
PERIOD
SAFETY
TO
1 .CHART
STRIP
DRIVING
ONLY
MEASURMENTS N
LOG PERIOD SYSTEM
хо
TEST 1
1
FISSON PUL
SE MULTI
RATE
COUNT
VIBRATOR PERIOD
C.
D.
LOG OUTPUT N
LOG 北
3 AUCTIONEER
CHAMBER AMP DIODE
DISCRIMINATOR AMP
D.C.
|AMP
DIODE AMP
.MAG
.
COUNT
LOG
RATE
SYSTEM
SAFETY
TO LEVEL
LOG
CRITICAL
FOR
SIGNAL
PERIOD
TRIP SAFETY
TO SWITCHES
BUTTON
PUSH
ONLY
MEASURMENT SYSTEM SPRING
RETURN
N
LOG PERIOD NORMAL
IN
EXCEPT
Хо POSITION
AUCTIONEER
TEST
PERIOD
FISSON PULSE RATE
COUNT
VIBRATOR
MULTI PERIOD
D.C.
LOG OUTPUT PERIOD
CHAMBER AMP DISCRIMINATOR
DIODE AMP
DIODE
D.C.AMPMAG
. AMP
. AUCTIONEER
SYSTEM
SAFETY
TO
CRITICAL
FOR LEVEL
LOG 0 SIGNAL
PERIOD
ONLY TRIP TO
SAFETY
MEASURMENT
SYSTEM
N
LOG PERIOD
хон
channels
start
—L
lF.-u p
evel
ow
.2
FIO
APPENDIX F 573
rods on a short period during start -up. Thus, if during start-up,

the time in which the neutron flux increased by a factor of e ( 2.718 )
was too short, the safety rods would automatically shut the reactor
down. The period is displayed on indicating and recording instru
ments with a zero center representing an infinite period ( zero re
activity ) and calibrated to periods of +1 or 0.1 sec at the ex
tremes.
F- 3 INTERMEDIATE - RANGE CHANNELS
The essential components of the intermediate-range channels are

shown in Fig. F.3. These channels, 5 , 6, and 7, use what are known
as " compensated” ion chambers, that is, they are compensated for
gamma radiation. Such compensated ion chambers usually have two
ionization volumes, one is neutron sensitive and the other is not.
Both volumes are sensitive to gamma radiation, of course, and the
two volumes are connected so that their output currents subtract
from each other. Adjustment for compensation of the gamma cur
rents is made by varying the voltage on the compensating electrode.
Information developed in these channels is indicated as period and
as the log of the ion chamber current. Period information is also
sent to the safety system to cause rod insertion or a reactor shut
down on coincidence depending on the decrease in the period.
F- 4 POWER - RANGE CHANNELS
Uncompensated ion chambers are used in the power - range chan

nels (channels 8, 9, and 10 ) because the ratio of gamma to neutron
radiation can be neglected. A block diagram of the power-range
channels is shown in Fig. F.4. As indicated in Fig. 4.25 , these
channels operate over a range of approximately 0.0001 of full power
to 1.5 maximum power. The signals from these chambers enter the
power- range panel where they are amplified by magnetic amplifiers
to produce neutron - flux level information , which is displayed as
percent of maximum power. AA scram - level trip signal is sent to
the coincidence panel in the safety system .
574
AMP
10"-10 NSATED
COMPE METER
MICROAM
LOG
5
CHAMBER UP
START
AS
SAME CONSOLE
CONTROL
TEST N
LOG SYSTEM
SAFETY
TO
"AMP
10
.LEVEL
MIN
PERIODLOG
Tox TRIP CRITICAL
FOR
MEASURMENT AUCTIONEER
N ONLY LEVEL
LOG
SAFETY
TO
SYSTEM
N
LOG
10
M0P
COMPENSATEDA-1 MICROAMMETER
LOG
6 CHAMBER UP
START
AS
SAME 1 SWITCHES
BUTTON
PUSH
RETURN
SPRING
TO
7 AUCTIONEER
SIGNAL
TEST AUCTIONEER
AMP
10 LOGN SYSTEM
SAFETY
TO
Tox PERIOD
LEVEL
MIN TRIP CRITICAL
FOR
PERIOD
LOG MEASURMENT
N ONLY
o
SAFETY
TO PERIOD
SYSTEM
*10-9
COMPENSATEDA MP 0 LOG
MICROAMMETER
7 CHAMBER UP
START
AS
SAME
TEST
N
SYSTEM
SAFETY
TO
.10AMP LOG
MIN
.L EVEL TRIP CRITICAL
FOR
PERIOD LOG MEASURMENT
N ONLY
SAFETY
TO
SYSTEM
channels
r
I ange
ntermediate
.3
F.-—FIG
%FP
30
OVER
TEST TRIP
100
%F
.P
ADJ
8 UNCOMPENSATED
CHAMBER AMP
MAG
.LINEAR .AMP
MAG
.BISTABLE AMP
TRIP
LEVEL 1 CONTROL
CONSOLE
1
TO
O- LOW
FCOMPUTER
%P
F
SAFETY
TO AUTOMATIC
TO
COMPUTER
SYSTEM
SWITCHES
BUTTON
PUSH
RETURN
SPRING
OVER
30
%FP AUCTIONEER
TO
TRIP
TEST %F.PDJ
100
A
..
O
A
9 UNCOMPENSATED LINEAR
MAG
.
.AMP BISTABLE A
MAG
. MP .
AMP
TRIP
LEVEL AUCTIONEER
CHAMBER
EP
.% SAFETY
TO
SYSTEM F%
.P.
APPENDIX F
JOVER
%
30
EP
TEST TRIP
100
ADJ
.%FOP
10 UNCOMPENSATED .AMP
MAG
LINEAR BISTABLE .AMP
MAG .
AMP
TRIP
LEVEL
CHAMBER
1
I
F
%P SAFETY
TO
SYSTEM
r
F.4
FIG
.-Pange
ower
channels
575
GLOSSARY
The list of nuclear and ship terms given below is provided for
the convenience of the nontechnical reader who may not have ready
access to more comprehensive reference material on nuclear and ship
terminology. It defines most of the technical terms used in this book,
but much more comprehensive lists of terms are available to those
who may desire them . *
Active deposit. ( 1 ) The radioactive decay products deposited on a
surface exposed to radon , actinon, or thoron gas. ( 2 ) By exten
sion, any radioactive decay products deposited on a surface ex
posed to a radioactive gas. ( 3 ) Any radioactive material deposited
on a surface .
Activity ( radioactivity ). The strength or intensity of a radioactive
material. It is expressed in various ways. In practice, activity is
often expressed in terms of observable effects, such as counts per
minute, or roentgens per hour. The unit of radioactivity is the
curie, 3.7 x 1010 disintegrations per second .
Activity curve . A curve, usually derived from experimental data,
showing the activity of a radioactive source as a function of time.
Alpha particle. A positively charged particle emitted from the
nuclei of radioactive atoms in the process of disintegration. Con
sisting of two neutrons and two protons, it is essentially the
nucleus of the helium atom .
Atomic number. The atomic number of an element represents the
number of protons in the nucleus of that element. Thus, the
atomic number expresses the value of the positive charge of the
nucleus.
Background. In nuclear science " background " refers to the ever
present level of radiation issuing from the radioactive materials
in the earth and from the cosmic radiation from outer space. In
other words, it is the degree of radioactivity that is naturally
present in our normal environment.
Ballasting. Ballasting refers to the weight of solid or liquid ma
terial that is loaded into a light or partially loaded ship to give
it the desired stability . Formerly, the ballast commonly used con
sisted of sand, rubble, stone, or whatever material was available,
* One of the most complete glossaries of nuclear terms is that compiled by the Na
tional Academy of Sciences, entitled " A Glossary of Terms in Nuclear Science and Tech
nology ." It is published by The American Society of Mechanical Engineers, 29 West
39th St. , New York , N.Y
577
1
but the introduction of tanks built into or forming part of the

ship’s structure has led to the almost universal use of water as
ballast.
Beta particle . A negative electron or a positive electron emitted
from the nucleus of an atom during the process of beta decay.
Biological shield . A shield used to reduce the intensity of radia
tion transmitted to an amount physiologically permissible.
Blanket. A layer of fertile material placed external to the core of
a nuclear reactor.
Block coefficient. In comparing the displacement or underwater
form of one vessel with another, it is not sufficient to say that
one is long and the other short, one deep and the other shallow,
etc. A more comprehensive means of comparison is by means of
various coefficients. The block coefficient is the ratio between the
immersed bulk of a vessel and a quadrangular prism having the
same length , breadth , and draft.
Breeding. The process in nuclear reactor operation whereby the
amount of new fissionable material produced is greater than the
amount of fissionable material consumed .
Breeding ratio . The number of fissionable atoms produced per fis
sionable atom destroyed .
British thermal unit ( Btu ). A heat unit; the quantity of heat re
quired to increase the temperature of 1 lb of water 1 ° F at at
mospheric pressure.
Burn -out poison . A high -cross-section element intentionally placed
in a reactor ( sometimes alloyed with the fuel ) to minimize long
term reactivity changes. The burning out of the poison compen
sates for the loss of fuel due to burn -up.
Burn -up. The depletion of fuel by fission .
Capture. A process in which an atomic or nuclear system acquires
an additional particle; for example, the capture of electrons by
positive ions, of electrons by nuclei, or of neutrons by nuclei.
Central station. An electric -generating plant generating electricity
for domestic, industrial, and commercial consumption , usually a
large size plant.
Channel (reactor engineering ). A passage, especially through the
core of a reactor, for movement of heat -transfer fluid or to contain
fuel slugs.
Cladding. A process of coating one metal with another,, which
usually consists of bringing the carefully prepared surfaces to
gether, and rolling, extruding, or drawing or swaging the com
posite until a bond is produced . In reactor technology, the clad
ding is a thin metal coating over the nuclear fuel to prevent
corrosion and the escape of fission products.
GLOSSARY 579
Closed cycle. Cycle of operation of a heat engine in which the same

power fluid is used repeatedly, as a steam engine that condenses
the steam for reuse, instead of being used once and then discarded,
as in a rocket or jet motor. Also applicable to a cooling system
in which the coolant is cycled repeatedly through the source of
heat, itself being cooled in another part of the cycle.
Coffin (reactor engineering). A box of heavy shielding material,
usually lead, used for transporting radioactive objects and having
walls thick enough to attenuate radiation from the objects within
it to an allowable level. Also called casket.
Cold , clean reactor. A reactor having no induced radioactivity and
no poisons other than those present as it was constructed. Prac
tically speaking, this means a reactor in which a chain reaction
of any appreciable power has never been established.
Collision . In nuclear science, a close approach of two or more atomic
particles ( neutrons, protons, nuclei, etc. ) during which an inter
change of quantities such as energy, momentum , and electric
charge takes place.
Containment, reactor. The system by which all radioactive matter
associated with a nuclear reactor is contained from uncontrolled
release to the atmosphere under all conditions up to, and includ
ing, the maximum credible accident. It is not necessarily a code
constructed pressure vessel .
Containment vessel, reactor. A code -constructed pressure vessel used
to provide reactor containment.
Contamination , radioactive. ( 1 ) A condition in which an undesir
able radioactive substance is mixed with a desired substance.
( 2 ) A condition in which radioactive material has spread to
places where it may harm persons, spoil experiments, or make
products or equipment unsuitable or unsafe for some specific use.
( 3 ) (Reactor engineering) Radioactive material on the walls of
vessels in used -fuel reprocessing plants ; radioactive material that
has leaked into a ' reactor coolant.
Control rod. Any rod used to control the reaction rate in a nuclear
reactor. The rod accomplishes this by changing the effective mul
tiplication constant and hence the reaction's rate time derivative.
It may be a fuel rod or part of the moderator ; in thermal re
actors it commonly is a neutron absorber. Cadmium and boron
( in the form of boron steel ) are suitable absorbing materials.
Sometimes absorbing control rods are made of fertile material to
utilize the neutrons absorbed in control. The term includes power
control rod, regulating rod , safety rod , and shim rod .
Coolant. A substance, gas or liquid , used for cooling any part of a
reactor in which heat is generated. Such parts include not only the
core but also the reflector, shield , and other elements that may
be heated by absorption of radiation .
Core . The body of fuel or moderator and fuel in a nuclear reactor.
It does not include the fuel outside the active section in a re
actor through which coolant circulates.
Counter. A device for counting ionized events. The terms may
refer to a complete instrument or, loosely, to the detector.
Critical. Capable of sustaining ( at a constant level ) a chain reac
tion . Prompt critical is capable of sustaining a chain reaction
without the aid of delayed neutrons.
Critical assembly. A system consisting of the fuel material and
moderator, in the desired proportions, which can gradually be
built up until it approaches the critical dimensions of a self
sustaining nuclear reactor. This technique is usually applied for
preliminary experiments for a new reactor design of reasonably
small proportions.
Critical experiment ( reactor engineering). Experiment in which
fissionable material is assembled gradually until the arrangement
will support a self-sustaining chain reaction ; its purpose is to
determine the critical size and operating and control features of a
proposed reactor or of a new reactor prior to operation. It is
carried out at substantially zero power so that forced cooling is
unnecessary and fission -product activity is negligible. Such quan
tities as critical mass, temperature coefficient of reactivity, and
control-rod effectiveness are often measured.
Critical size. Any one set of physical dimensions of the core and
reflector of a nuclear reactor maintaining a critical chain reaction ,
the material and structure of the core having been specified.
Cross section. A measure ( o ) of the probability of occurrence of a
given reaction . For a particular nuclear reaction , o may be
greater or smaller than the geometric cross section 72. If the
reaction cannot take place, the cross section is zero. For any col
lision reaction between nuclear or atomic particles or systems, o
is an area such that the number of reactions taking place is
equal to the product of the number of incident particles that
would pass through this area at normal incidence and the number
of target particles or systems.
C'ubic. A term used in ship construction to denote volume.
Curie. ( 1 ) A
A unit of radioactivity equal to 3.7 X 1010 disintegra
tions per second. It is approximately the activity of 1 g of ra
dium . ( 2 ) A quantity of a nuclide having an activity of 1 curie.
Dead weight. This term should be clearly understood. The total
weight of the ship at any draft is equal to the displacement at
that draft only . Dead weight is carrying power only , over and
GLOSSARY 581
above the actual weight of the ship and her equipment, and com
prises cargo and fuel. The dead weight of a ship floating at a
particular draft is the difference between the displacements at that
draft and in a light condition .
Decay heat. The heat generated in a reactor following shutdown.
Immediately after shutdown the major heating is caused by fis
sions from the delayed -neutron fraction until it decays to a neg
ligible value compared to the much longer term heating created by
the absorption of beta and gamma radiation associated with the
radioactive decay of fission products in the reactor.
Decontamination . ( 1 ) The removal of unwanted radioactive sub
stances from a desired material, e.g. , removal of fission products
from plutonium or uranium . ( )
2 ) The removal of undesired dis
persed radioactive material from personnel, instruments, rooms,
equipment, etc. In the case of physical objects, this may involve
thorough washing, often with chemical solutions ; and in the case
of fluids such as air, it may involve filtering and washing.
Displacement. The volume or weight of water displaced by a ship,
the weight of the displaced water being equal to that of the dis
placing ship.
Dose. According to current usage, the radiation delivered to a
specified area or to the whole body. Units for dose specifications
are roentgens ( r ) for X or gamma rays, reps (see roentgen )
for beta rays. The subject of dose for particulate radiation and
for very high -energy X rays has not been settled. In radiology
the dose may be specified in air, on the skin , or at some depth
beneath the surface ; no statement of dose is complete without
specification of location .
Dose, permissible. The amount of radiation which may be received
by an individual within a specified period with expectation of no
harmful result to himself. ( Supersedes the term “ tolerance
dose.” ) For long-continued X- or gamma-ray exposure of the
whole body, it is 0.3 r per week measured in air. ( For detailed
information see National Bureau of Standards Handbook 59. )
Dose rate. Radiation dose delivered per unit of time.
Electron . An elementary particle of rest mass me equal to 9.107 X
10-28 g and charge equal to 4.802 X 10-10 stat - coulombs. Its charge
may be either negative or positive. The positive electron is usu
ally called the positron ; the negative electron is sometimes called
the negatron. Most frequently the term electron means the nega
tron. The negative electron is a constituent of all atoms. In the
neutral atom the number of electrons is equal to the number of
protons in the nucleus.
Electron -volt. A unit of energy equal to the energy gained by a

particle having one electronic charge when it passes in a vacuum
through a potential difference of 1 volt.
Emergency cooling. That system by which reactor decay heat is
removed in the event the normal heat -removal method fails.
Enriched reactor. A nuclear reactor in which the fuel may be
uranium increased in U235 content beyond the normal isotopic con
centration , or other concentrated fuel such as plutonium or U233,
or a combination of these.
Enrichment. Increasing artificially by any of several processes the
proportion of the fissionable isotope U235 to the fertile U238. The
enrichment is expressed as a weight percentage of U235 in the mix
ture . Natural occurring nonenriched uranium contains 0.7 percent
of the isotope U235.
Fail safe. The concept of integrating into a system those compon
ents that will take automatic remedial action in the event of a
power or alternate component failure.
Fast fission . Fission resulting from the collision of a nucleus and a
high -energy neutron, usually at least 1 Mev. There are some
nuclei that will fission when the incident neutron strikes with
considerable kinetic energy but do not fission upon the absorption
of a slow neutron . For example, fast fission of U238 is an im
portant factor in the high breeding ratio available in a fast
reactor.
Fast reactor. A nuclear reactor in which there is little moderation
and fission is induced primarily by fast neutrons that have lost
relatively little of the energy with which they were released.
Fertile. Capable of being transformed into a fissionable substance
by capture of a neutron . Thorium - 232 and U238 are examples of
fertile nuclei.
Film badge. An appropriately packaged photographic film for de
tecting radiation exposure of personnel; usually dental-size X - ray
film , worn on the person, and frequently combined with an iden
tification badge. The badge may contain two or three films of
different sensitivity, and it may contain a filter which shields part
of the film from certain types of radiation .
Filter. A term widely applied to many kinds of devices that permit
selectively the passage through them of some kinds of matter or
energy. ( Reactor engineering) Different respective classes of
filters may be used to transmit selectively different types of radia
tion energy , nuclear particles, frequencies of electromagnetic or
acoustic vibration , or the like, or to remove suspended particles
from a fluid . ( Radiology ) Primary filter, a sheet of material ,
usually metal, placed in a beam of radiation to absorb, as far as
GLOSSARY 583
possible, the less penerating components. Secondary filter, a sheet

of material of low atomic number relative to that of the primary
filter, placed in the filtered beam of radiation to remove charac
teristic radiation produced in the primary filter.
Fissionable. Capable of being fissioned by the capture of a particle
such as a neutron .
Fuel assembly. ( Reactor engineering) A structure of fuel and (usu
ally ) other material used in some reactors. Its main purpose is to
facilitate fabrication and the assembling of the core or active lat
tice , which contains a number of fuel assemblies.
Fuel element. Fissionable material formed and clad for use in the
core of a heterogeneous reactor. This term refers to the individual
containers that are usually grouped to form subassemblies.
Fuel rod. A rod -shaped body of nuclear fuel or a long slender fuel
assembly prepared for use in a reactor. Very thin fuel rods are
also called pins.
Gamma ray ( y ray ). Electromagnetic wave emitted by ‘ a nucleus
as a result of energy changes between nuclear particles. Spe
cifically, a quantum of electromagnetic radiation emitted by a
nucleus, each photon being emitted as the result of a quantum
transition between two energy levels of the nucleus.
Gas scrubbing. The contacting of a gaseous mixture with a liquid
for the purpose of removing gaseous constituents or entrained
liquids or solids.
Graphite. A form of carbon in which the atoms are hexagonally
arranged in planes. (Reactor engineering) The form of carbon
commonly used for moderators because it can be made in com
pact , fairly strong blocks and can be machined easily to close
tolerances and because the prolonged baking at high temperature
used in its manufacture contributes to elimination of impurities
that might absorb neutrons.
Gross tonnage. This term expresses the total capacity of the ship
in tonnage units.
Half life. The time required for the decay of one -half the atoms
of a sample of a radioactive substance.
Hazards evaluation . An evaluation of the hazards that will exist
up to, and including, the maximum credible accident.
Ileavy water. Water composed of deuterium , the heavy isotope of
hydrogen , and oxygen . It occurs naturally, comprising about
0.015 percent of ordinary water.
Heterogeneous reactor. nuclear reactor in which the fissionable
material and moderator are arranged as discrete bodies ( usually
according to a regular pattern ) of such dimensions that a non
homogeneous medium is presented to the neutrons.
Homogeneous reactor. A nuclear reactor in which the fissionable

material and moderator ( if used ) are evenly dispersed either as
a true solution of fuel in moderator or as a mixture of discrete
particles having dimensions small in comparison with the neutron
mean free path.
Hydrofoil ship. A craft equipped with vanes or planes beneath the
hull so arranged that, as the vessel gains speed, the hull rises
above the water level and rides on the water such as an airplane
rides on the air. The foils are usually attached to the hull by
means of narrow struts.
Inventory. The total amount of any quantity of fuel present in
a reactor at some instant of time. The neutron inventory is the
total number of neutrons present; the fissionable -material inven
tory , the total amount of fissionable material present; etc.
Ionization. The process of stripping an atom of one or more of
its electrons causing it to take on an electrical charge. This
process frequently occurs when a material undergoes irradiation .
Irradiation . ( 1 ) The exposure of material to X or gamma radia
tion or slow neutrons. ( 2 ) The exposure of material in a nuclear
reactor.
Isotope. One of several nuclides having the same number of pro
tons in their nuclei, and hence belonging to the same element, but
differing in the number of neutrons. For example, 6C12, 6C13, and
6C14 are isotopes. They are all carbon atoms and exhibit the
same chemical characteristics, but their atomic weights are dif
ferent owing to the difference in the number of neutrons con
tained in the nuclei.
Lattice. In a nuclear reactor, structure of discrete bodies of fission
able material and nonfissionable material (especially moderator)
arranged in a regular geometrical pattern . Most heterogeneous
reactor cores have a lattice structure.
Leakage. (( Reactor engineering) ( 1 ) Loss of neutrons by out
ward diffusion from the core of a reactor. When there is a
reflector, leakage refers to net loss of neutrons that leave the core
and are not reflected back into it . The leakage spectrum is the
energy distribution of neutrons leaving the reactor. ( 2 ) Escape
of neutrons or radiation through a shield , especially by way of
holes or cracks through the shield .
Megawatt-day per ton (Mwd /ton ). This unit represents the energy
that a mass of fuel material would have produced in the reactor
had it been 1 metric ton . Since approximately 1 g of U " 235 is
consumed in producing 1 Mwd, some 4,000 g of U235 would be
consumed per metric ton of fuel if the burn -up were 4,000
Mwd /ton .
GLOSSARY 585
Metacenter. The point of intersection of the vertical through the

center of buoyancy of a floating vessel with the vertical through
the new center of buoyancy when the vessel is inclined.
Metacenter of stability. The stability of a ship depends upon the
position of the metacenter with respect to the center of gravity.
When the metacenter is above the center of gravity, the ship is
stable ; when it is below the center of gravity, it is unstable.
Mev . Million electron volts.
Millicurie (mc). One thousandth of a curie.
Missile . Any object, or part thereof, within the reactor contain
ment system which has been given a velocity, owing to a system
failure, in such a manner that it is hurled at or against the con
tainment wall .
Moderator. Material used in a nuclear reactor to moderate, i.e. ,
slow down, neutrons from the high energies at which they are
released . Neutrons lose energy by scattering collisions with
nuclei of the moderator. A good moderator has high scattering
cross section and low atomic weight. In each collision there is
a chance of absorption. To reduce this loss of neutrons during
the slowing-down process, the moderator atoms also should have
low neutron -absorption cross section. High scattering cross sec
tion implies frequent collision ; these give the neutron a better
chance of being slowed down before it is captured and also
reduce the average net distance traveled in slowing down so that
leakage is reduced. Low speed of moderator atoms results in
a large average energy loss per collision ( requiring few collisions)
and so reduces both opportunities for capture and distance trav
eled . Some practical moderator materials are carbon ( in the
form of graphite ), beryllium and its compounds, and water.
Heavy water is preferable to light water in some cases because,
although its heavier hydrogen atoms reduce the neutron energy
less per collision than light hydrogen atoms do, it has a lower
neutron -absorption cross section .
Molded breadth. The distance taken over the frames of a ship at
its greatest breadth .
Monitor. An instrument to measure continuously or at intervals a
condition that must be kept within prescribed limits, e.g. , radio
activity in the coolant of a reactor or radiation levels in the
working areas of the building. Also used as a verb .
Multiplication constant ( k ). The ratio of the number of neutrons
present in a reactor core at a given time to the number present
one neutron generation earlier. Sometimes called the effective
multiplication constant.” For a homogeneous medium the infinite
( k) multiplication constant refers to the multiplication constants
in a medium of infinite size. The multiplication constant minus

one is called the " excess multiplication constant."
Neutron. A nuclear particle of zero charge and mass number 1 .
It is a constituent of all nuclei of mass number greater than 1 ,
i.e. , light hydrogen. Having no electric charge, the neutron is not
repelled by the coulomb forces surrounding all nuclei and is there
fore able to approach and penetrate nuclei even when moving at
low velocities. The neutron is unstable, the half life being esti
mated between 10 and 25 min . It emits a beta particle, thus be
coming a proton. Neutrons produce no detectable ionization in
their passage through matter, but ionization is produced by
products of neutron collisions ( recoil nuclei, gamma rays from
inelastic scattering) and from neutron capture. Neutrons in a
medium with kinetic-energy distributions comparable with the
kinetic -energy distribution due to thermal agitation of nuclei
comprising the medium are termed thermal neutrons. An epi
thermal neutron is a neutron having an energy in the range imme
diately above the thermal range, that is, having an energy
between a few hundredths and 100 ev. Neutrons having energies
in a roughly defined range that is often considered to extend
from about 100 to 100.000 ev are intermediate neutrons. Thus
they are more energetic than epithermal neutrons but less ener
getic than fast neutrons, which have energies much greater than
the arbitrary lower limit of about 100,000 ev.
Neutron economy. In reactor engineering, the degree to which neu
trons are used in a desired way instead of being lost by leakage
or useless absorption .
Neutron flux. A term used to express the intensity of neutron radi
ation. The number of neutrons passing through a unit area in
unit time. For neutrons of a given energy, the product of neutron
>
density and speed.

Neutron source . In reactor engineering, any material that emits neu
trons, e.g. , a mixture of radium and beryllium . A neutron source
may be introduced into a nuclear reactor as part of the start -up
procedure. The use of a neutron source is a safety measure to
ensure having at the outset a neutron flux large enough to be
distinguished from background and measured quickly. Other
wise, as control rods are withdrawn, the reactor might reach a
critical condition before its flux has risen high enough for the
control system to operate.
Nuclear reactor. An apparatus in which nuclear fission can be sus
tained in a self-supporting chain reaction . It includes fissionable
material ( fuel ), such as uranium or plutonium , and moderating
material ( unless it is a fast reactor ) , and usually includes a reflector
GLOSSARY 587
to conserve escaping neutrons, provision for heat removal and

measuring, and control elements. The terms pile and reactor
have been used interchangeably , with reactor now becoming more
common . They usually are applied only to systems in which the
reaction proceeds at a controlled rate, but they also have been
applied to bombs. Reactors sometimes are designated according
to the moderator used ( e.g., graphite or beryllium reactor) , or
the coolant ( e.g.. gas-cooled , liquid -metal cooled ) . A thermal
reactor is a nuclear reactor in which fission is induced primarily
by neutrons of such energy that they are in substantial thermal
equilibrium with the material of the core. A moderator is an
element of a thermal reactor. In an epithermal reactor a sub
stantial fraction of fissions are induced by neutrons of more than
thermal energy . In an intermediate reactor fission is induced
predominantly by neutrons whose energies are greater than
thermal but much less than the energy with which neutrons are
released in fission . A fast reactor is a nuclear reactor in which
there is little moderation and fission is induced primarily by
fast neutrons that have lost relatively little of the energy with
which they were released .
Nucleon. A constituent particle of the atomic nucleus, therefore,
according to present theory, a proton or a neutron .
Nucleus. The positively charged core of an atom, with which is
associated practically the whole mass of the atom.
Nuclide. A species of atom characterized by the constitution of its
nucleus. The nuclear constitution is specified by the number of
protons Z, number of neutrons N, and energy content; or alterna
tively, by the atomic number 2 , mass number A ( = N + 2 ) , and
atomic mass. To be regarded as a distinct nuclide, the atom must
be capable of existing for a measurable lifetime ( generally greater
than 10-10 sec ) .
Olefin. Open -chain hydrocarbon having one or more double bonds.
Period . The time required for the flux or power level in a reactor
to change by a factor of e ( 2.71828 ... ) .
Polymerize. The process of combining molecules to form substances
having similar percentage composition but higher molecular
weights.
Prompt critical. Capable of sustaining a chain reaction without
the aid of delayed neutrons.
Prompt neutrons. Those neutrons released coincident with the fis
sion process, as opposed to the neutrons subsequently released .
Protective equipment. Those garments and / or that equipment used
to prevent the radioactive contamination of individuals while
within restricted areas.
613489 062 -39
Proton . A positively charged elementary particle of mass number 1

and charge equal in magnitude to the charge of the electron. It
is one of the constituents of every nucleus; the number of protons
in the nucleus of each atom of an element is given by the atomic
number 2 of that element.
Psi. Abbreviation for pounds per square inch . Psig is pounds per
square inch , gauge , i.e. , above atmospheric pressure. Psia is
is pounds per square inch , absolute, i.e. , above vacuum .
Rad. Unit of absorbed radiation dose equivalent to an energy
deposition of 100 ergs / g. The rad is a measure of the energy
imparted to matter by ionizing radiation per unit mass of irradi
ated material at the place of interest.
Radiation. ( 1 ) The emission and propagation of energy through
space or through a material medium in the form of waves, for
instance, the emission and propagation of electromagnetic waves,
or of sound and elastic waves. ( 2 ) The energy propagated
through space or through a material medium as waves, for exam
ple, energy in the form of electromagnetic waves or of elastic
waves. The term radiation , or radiant energy, when unqualified ,
usually refers to electromatic radiation ; such radiation com
monly is classified, according to frequency , as Hertzian, infrared,
visible ( light ), ultraviolet, X ray, and gamma ray. ( 3 ) In heat
transfer, the reference is usually to the infrared spectrum . (4 ) By
extension , corpuscular emissions, such as alpha and beta radiation,
or rays of mixed or unknown type, as cosmic radiation.
Radioactivity. Spontaneous nuclear disintegration with emission of
corpuscular or electromagnetic radiation.
RBE. Relative biological effectiveness. This term depends not only
on the rate or total dose , but also upon the specific ionization along
the path of the incident particle. RBE is the ratio of the absorbed
dose in rads of X rays or gamma rays ( of a specified energy ) to
that of the rads of the given radiation having the same biolog
ical effect. The value of the RBE for a particular type of
nuclear radiation , e.g. , alpha or beta particles or neutrons, depends
upon a number of factors, such as the energy of radiation, the
kind and degree of biological damage, and the nature of the
organ or tissue under consideration .
Reactivity. A measure of the departure of a reactor from critical,
such that positive values of reactivity correspond to reactors
above critical and negative values to reactors below critical.
Often represented by ( a ) the multiplication constant minus one,
( b ) a quantity proportional to the inverse asymptotic period.
Sometimes used interchangeably with the term multiplication
constant.
GLOSSARY 589
Reactor prototype plant. A reactor prototype plant is one designed ,

constructed , and operated to obtain information that will provide
a sound basis for extrapolating to the technical and economic
performance of a full-scale plant of the same type. Its size varies
according to reactor type and the nature of the information
being sought. Generally, it is intermediate in size between an
experimental reactor and a plant of full-scale commercial size.
While obtaining technical and economic information is its prin
cipal purpose, the prototype plant usually produces electricity,
perhaps in significant quantities. The prototype is generally a
step forward technically from a preceding experimental reactor
although it may be less flexible in make -up. Because its prin
cipal purpose is to obtain information, it is likely to be more
highly instrumented than a full-scale plant.
Reflector. A layer or structure of material surrounding the core of
a reactor to reduce the escape of neutrons. It is located between
the core and the shield. Neutrons entering the reflector are scat
tered randomly, some many times ; and a large fraction of them
ultimately return to the core. It is possible to design a reflector
by which more than 90 percent of neutrons that would be lost
may be returned .
Rem . Roentgen equivalent man . Because the absorption of quan
tities of differing ionizing radiation which provide the same
amount of energy may not have the same biological effect in the
human body, the rem was introduced as a more useful unit. The
rad is useful as a physical quantity that can be measured, but
ultimately it is the biological changes produced by the absorbed
radiation which are important.
Rep. Roentgen equivalent physical. This term was originally de
fined as the quantity of radiation which upon absorption in the
body liberated the same amount of energy as 1 r of X rays or
gamma rays, i.e., 86 ergs/g of tissue. However, it was found that
exposure to a dose of 1 r of X rays was accompanied by some
thing more like 97 ergs in a gram of soft tissue. The rep there
fore is now defined to be a dose of 97 ergs of any nuclear radiation
absorbed per gram of body tissue.
Restricted areas. Those areas where entrance and work is limited
and controlled owing to the presence of a radioactive source or
radioactive contamination .
Retaining basin . A reservoir used to hold low - level radioactive
water until the level has decayed to a sufficiently low value to
permit its discharge into natural bodies of water.
Roentgen ( r ) . A unit of dose for X or gamma radiation. The
ionization associated with 1 r deposits 83.8 ergs in 1 g of air.
Laboratory tolerance for human beings is 7.5 mr /hr., which is

0.0075 r /hr.
Safety assessment. A description for the use of regulatory bodies
in the construction and operation of the nuclear ship.
Safety rod . A control rod controlling a large amount of reactivity
and capable of bringing the reactor below critical in a very short
time. It is used in emergencies and during shutdown.
Scram. Sudden shutting down of a reactor, usually by dropping of
safety rods. This may be arranged to occur automatically at a
predetermined neutron flux or under other dangerous conditions,
the reaching of which causes the monitors and associated equip
ment to generate a scram signal.
Self-regulation. Stability of a nuclear reactor in which deviation
from аa certain power level affects reactivity so as to tend to restore
power to the previous level without intervention of the control
system. An example is the stability that may be associated with
a reactor that has a negative temperature coefficient.
Shield. ( Reactor engineering ) A body of material used to pre
vent or reduce the passage of radiation. A shield may be desig
nated according to what it is intended to absorb, as a gamma- ray
shield or neutron shield , or according to the kind of protection
it is intended to give, as a background, biological, or thermal
shield. The shield of a nuclear reactor is a body of material
surrounding the reactor to prevent the escape of neutrons and
gamma radiation into a protected area, which frequently is the
entire space external to the reactor. It may be required for the
safety of personnel or to reduce radiation sufficiently to allow
use of counting instruments for research or for locating contam
ination or airborne radioactivity.
Shutdown. Procedure of stopping a chain reaction by bringing the
a
reactor to a subcritical condition (effective multiplication constant

less than one ) . State of a reactor after being shut down.
Shutdown procedure. Sequence of operations used for shutting
down a nuclear reactor. It includes reducing the effective mul
tiplication constant to less than unity by insertion of safety rods
or the equivalent and , usually , reducing the flow of coolant to
the amount required for removing the heat of residual activity.
Specific power. The heat generation per unit mass of fissionable or
fissionable plus fertile material. The usual units of specific power
are : ( 1 ) megawatts per kilogram of fissionable material ; ( 2 )
megawatts per ton ( 2,000 lbs) or metric ton ( 1,000 kg ) of fuel:
or ( 3 ) watts per gram of fuel.
Start-up procedure. Specific procedure for bringing a given nuclear
reactor into operation at a desired power level . This may include
GLOSSARY 591
establishing flow of coolant , starting reaction in the counter

range, increasing reaction in the counter range, increasing con
trol , and leveling off at the reaction rate into the instrument range,
approaching criticality, and shifting from manual to automatic
required power.
Temperature coefficient. One of a group of coefficients relating
changes in reactivity of a nuclear reactor to changes in tempera
ture of its components ; the derivative of reactivity with respect
to temperature. If the effect of these coefficients is negative so
that a change in power level ( hence in temperature) produces an
opposite change in reactivity, the reactor may hold a nearly steady
power level with very little further regulation.
Thermal neutron . These are neutrons in thermal equilibrium with
the substance in which they exist ; most commonly, neutrons of
kinetic energy about 0.025 ev, which is the mean kinetic energy
of aa molecule at 15 ° C.
Thermal reactor. A nuclear reactor in which fission is induced
primarily by neutrons of such energy that they are in substantial
equilibrium with the material of the core .
Thermal shield . A shield used to reduce the intensity of radiation
to a component such as the pressure vessel to prevent heat gen
eration within the component from creating severe thermal
stresses.
Trim . Trim refers to the position of a ship in the water, particu
larly with respect to the horizontal plane. This can be changed
by proper ballasting or adjustment of cargo.
Xenon override. The reactivity required to compensate for the
increase in reactor poisoning due to Xe135 build -up in the reactor
for some time after reactor shut down. Since the neutron - capture
cross section of Xe135 is very high, the flux in an operating reactor
maintains an equilibrium Xe135 concentration below that which
would result in simple radioactive decay. The Xel35 is precursed
by 1135 ; so the source remains for some time after the reactor is
shut down. These properties result in the Xe135 reaching a maxi
mum in about 12 hr after shut down , then decaying away with
the half life of the 1135 precursor (6.7 hr ). Some reactors have
such low reserve reactivity that if not restarted immediately after
shutdown they cannot be restarted for a few days.
INDEX
A1W Reactor, operator training, 329 Becquerel, Henri , 1 , 2, 3

Accidents, reactor, 213, 226–228, 238 Beta decay, 3, 70
cold -water, 233 Biological and physical processes in
control-rod failure, 242 marine environment, 280
electrical-power loss, 243 Biological implications of radioactive
loss of flow , 230 wastes, 277
maximum credible , 233 Block obsolescence, 11
mechanical, 227 Bohr, Niels , 70
reactivity, 216 Boiling- water reactors, 81 , 111 , 389–390,
start -up, 217 459, 463
ship, 243, 256 , 25 British designs, 443
Andrea Doria - Stockholm collision , closed -cycle type, 470
247, 252, 253 costs, 417, 483
effects of collision and shock , 244 design incentives, 432
245 direct-cycle type, 462
fire and explosion , 208, 259 Dresden nuclear plant, 115, 370
flooding effects, 257 EBWR plant, 58 , 112
U.S.S. Indiana - U.S.S . Washington Vallecitos plant, 329
collision, 247 BORAX experiments , 81
Advanced maritime gas-cooled reactor, Breeder reactors, 85
487-490 Breeding, 83
Advanced reactor concept, maritime
study program , 457 Calder Hall reactors, 118, 408
Alpha rays, 3 Canadian nuclear propulsion interests,
531
American Bureau of Shipping, 209
American Machine & Foundry Co. mari- Capital costs of reactor systems, 369,
time reactor studies, 470 379, 381 , 450, 451
American merchant ships, characteris - Cargo capacity, of nuclear ships, 46, 47
tics of, 130 of nuclear vs. conventional ships, 437
American Radiator & Standard Sani- Chadwick, James, 66
tary Corp. economic study, 364 Chain reaction, nuclear, 76
Andrea Dorea - Stockholm collision, 247, Characteristics, of American merchant
252, 253 ships, 130
Aqueous homogeneous reactors , 122 of nuclear and conventional ships, 137
Armour Research Foundation, radia- | Chartering merchant ships, 447
tion -reduction studies, 290 Chemicals, in - transit processing of, 30
Atom, structure of, 66 Chesapeake Bay Institute, 285
Atomic Energy Act of 1954, 345 Chicago chain - reacting pile, 71 , 75
Atomic Servant, N.S.V., 304 Civilian Power Reactor Program , AEC ,
368
health physics services, 311
maintenance, repair, and drydocking, Classification of U.S. Merchant Marine
311 vessels, 533
movement of, 304 Cold -water accidents, 223
radiological-safety provision, 310 Collection and handling of radioactive
waste disposal systems, 308 wastes, 272
Atomics International maritime, OMR , Collision effects, 214
design study, 480 Combustion, principle of, 3
593
594 INDEX
Comite Maritime International ( CMI ) , Economic analysis of nuclear propulsion

348 concepts - Continued
Commercial shipping, passenger -cargo, factors of nuclear propulsion , 54
52 importance of nuclear- powered ice
ship capacities, 53 breakers, 497, 498
tankers and other bulk carriers, 51 nuclear and conventional ships, 422,
trends in , 51 427
Containment design , for British plants, organic -moderated reactors , 431
445 performance of 60,000 -dwt boiling
of N.S. Savannah reactor plant, 146 water reactor ship, 431
mock -up at New York Shipbuilding study of nuclear propulsion , 364
Corp. yards, 319 Economics, nuclear ship , 453, 421
Control and instrumentation of N.S. | Einstein , Albert, 69
Savannah , 190, 569 Electric power from nuclear energy , 16 ,
Control of power reactors, 99, 101 17
Control-rod mechanism failure, effect Energy, release in fission , 73
of, 242 world resources, 17
Coolant additions in reactor systems, Environmental considerations , 263
270-271 analysis of harbors, 288
Coolants for nuclear reactors, 90-94, Emergency power for nuclear ships, 394
123, 403, 407, 486 , 487 Epithermal reactors, 87
Corrosion in reactor systems, 270 Erosion in reactor systems, 270
Costs, factors for nuclear ships, 364- Experimental Boiling Water Reactor
366, 430 ( EBWR ) , operation of, 58 , 112
for conventional and nuclear tankers, Experiments at Columbia University, 77
521 Experimental Breeder Reactor ( EBR ) ,
for maritime boiling-water reactor 85
plants, 432
reduction of, in nuclear plants, 418 Factors in nuclear ships costs, 364 , 36),
Crew training for nuclear ships, 313 , 366, 430
316, 322, 329, 332, 335 Fast reactors , 87
Critical size, meaning of, 75 Fermi, Enrico, early experiments, 68, 71
Critical speeds of ships, 244 Fertile materials, characteristics of, 98
Criticality and start-up , 196 Fission , 7
Cross section, neutron , definition of, 89 as heat source, 78
Curie, Marie and Pierre, 1 discovery of, 4, 65
Fission products, in reactor systems, 82,
Dead weight, definition of, 7 271 , 288
Deck officers training program , 332, 335 release in reactor accidents , 236
Delaware River environmental analysis. Fissionable materials , characteristics
286 , 287 of, 97
Delayed neutrons, effect of, 101 Financing of indemnity in nuclear-ship
Design , of nuclear ships, 46 accidents, 353
of organic -moderated reactors, 40.5 Fire and explosions on nuclear ships,
Direct -cycle boiling-water reactor 259
plants, 462 Flooding and sinking following nuclear

Doppler coeffiicent, 220, 227 , 542 ship accidents, 2.57
Dresden nuclear power station , 11.5, 370 Ford Instrument Co. study of gas - cooled
reactors , 485
Economic analysis of nuclear propulsion French nuclear-propulsion activities,
concepts, 428 522
boiling water reactor plants for Frisch , Otto , 68
tanker , 428 Fuel costs for maritime boiling -water
British design studies, 447 reactor , 483
INDEX 595
Fuel, costs of nuclear, 448 Instrumentation , nuclear, 193, 382
fossil reserves, 18 of N.S. Savannah, 190, 569–571
loading practices of ships, 426 Insurance for nuclear ships, 344
nuclear, concentration of energy in, International aspects of nuclear pro
20 pulsion , 343, 354
reprocessing costs, 377 International Atomic Energy Agency
Fuel-element failures, 227 ( IAEA ) , 277, 348
Fuse , nuclear safety, 57 International Convention for Safety of
Fused salts as reactor coolants, 93 Life at Sea , 213
International Commission on Radio
Gamma rays , 3 logical Protection ( ICRP ) , 278
Gas coolants, 91 , 486 , 487 In -transit processing on nuclear ships,
Gas -cooled reactors, 372, 373, 386, 408, 29
417, 485, 515-517 Italian nuclear-propulsion activities,
Colder Hall plant , 118, 408 526
economics of, 438, 485 , 493
heavy -water -moderated , 442 Japanese nuclear -propulsion activities,
Gas-turbine systems, 411 , 413 512, 514
Gaseous radioactive wastes, 275
Lenin ( Russian icebreaker ), 7, 8, 48,
monitoring on N.S. Savannah, 206
363, 497-512
General Atomics, study of gas -cooled
communication and control, 510-511
reactors, 485
mechanical features, 509
General Motors, study of gas-cooled re
actors, 485
propulsion machinery, 501-509
Liability, third party, 40
German nuclear-propulsion activities , Liquid -metal reactor coolants , 92, 123
522
Liquid radioactive wastes, 273
Glossary, 577 disposal of, from N.S.V. Atomic Serv .
Ground - effects ships, 28 , 29 ant, 308
Grounding accidents, effects of, 256 Loss of coolant flow accident, 230, 237
Hahn, Otto, 69
Lynchburg training facilities, 314, 316,
317
Harbor studies, 288
Hazards analysis, 207 , 213 Main and auxiliary machinery, N.S.
Health physics, services on N.S.V. Savannah, 565
Atomic Servant, 311
Mass - energy equivalence, 69
systems for N.S. Savannah, 299 Maintenance system for N.S. Savannah,
Heavy water as a reactor coolant, 91 299
Helium , use in gas turbines, 414 Marine environment, radioecology of,
Heterogeneous reactors, 88 280-282
Homogeneous reactors, 59, 60 , 82, 88, Marine hazards, 150
95 Marine organisms, absorption of radio
Hovercraft, 29 activity by , 282
Hydrofoils, 26-28 Maritime Administration , design
studies, 456
Icebreaker ( see Lenin ) direct- cycle boiling water reactor
Impurities in reactor systems, 269 system , 460
Indemnifi'ation and shipowner's limita- indirect-cycle boiling water reactor
tion of liability , 356 system , 159
Indemnity Act, modification of, 39 pressurized -water system , 459
Industry, opinion of, regarding nuclear reactor program , 462
propulsion, 45 Maritime Gas Cooled Reactor ( MGCR )
Initial start-up of reactors, 103 program , 193
Inorganic coolants, 93 Maximum credible accident , 233
596 INDEX
Maximum permissible exposure, 278 Nuclear propulsion - Continued

Mechanical accidents, 227 in foreign nations, 522, 497, 512, 515
Meitner, Lise, 68 international aspects, 343
Meteorological and hydrological analy. prospects for, 20 , 21
sis , 284 significant factors in, 415
Multipurpose vessels, 29 suitability of reactor types, 363
Missile formation due to accident, 228 | Nuclear reactors ( see Reactors )
Mock-up of N.S. Savannah Contain- Nuclear service systems, N.S. Savannah ,
ment, 319 306
Moderator , 73, 75, 89 Nuclear servicing facility for N.S.
Monitoring systems for N.S. Savannah, Savannah , 298
204 Nuclear ship program , U.S. , inter
Multiplication factor, 76 national cooperation, 38
support program , 42 43
National Academy of Sciences ( NAS ) ,
Nuclear ships, cargo capacity, 46
277
design , 46
National Committee on Radiation Pro
development program , 51
tection ( NCRP ) , 278
economics, 48, 453
Natural resources , conservation of, 13
insurance, 346–347
Natural-uranium reactors, 410
operational problems, 50 , 264
Naval damage - control school, 329
Negative-reactivity effects, 217 personnel considerations, 47
Netherlands nuclear-propulsion personnel training, 45
pro
servicing, 295
gram , 526
Neutron, delayed , 101 specialized support facilities, 295 , 296
discovery of, 66, 67 Nuclear superheat, need for, 370
nature of, 68 Nuclear tankers, 455–458
release in fission , 74, 86 Nuclear vessel types, 25
sources, 103
thermal , 74 Obsolescence rate of U.S. ships , 14
Neutron absorbers, 82 Oceanography, nuclear energy in, 32
Norwegian nuclear -propulsion program , Operation of nuclear servicing facili
530 ties, 296
Nuclear energy , applications in mining Operation of nuclear ships, 263-264
and dredging, 31 Organic coolants, 94, 403
applications in transportation , 23 Organic -cooled and -moderated reactors,
first power from , 21 120, 371 , 400 , 405
historical background , 65 British design , 444
in the fishing industry, 31 capital costs, 434
maritime applications, 22 fuel costs, 434435
Nuclear fission, basic principles, 72 maritime studies, 479-480
Nuclear fuel costs, 448 Organic Moderated Reactor Experi
Vuclear instruments , 191 , 382 ment (OMRE ) , 401
Nuclear power plants, characteristics | Organization for European Cooperation
of, 22-23 ( OEEC ) , 348
Vuclear -powered ore carriers, 424 Operating costs of reactor systems, 4.50
Nuclear -powered passenger liners, cost Operational aspects of nuclear tankers,
comparisons, 522 453, 156
Vuclear propulsion, analysis of eco- Overhead in ship operation, 448
nomic factors, 54 Oxide fuel, benefits of, 227
analysis of technical feasibility, 58
attitudes toward , 10 Parasitic neutron capture, 76
economics of, 6 , 8, 421 Passenger liners, effect of speed on op
hazards analysis, 207, 213 eration , 52
INDEX 597
Pay load of ships, effect on economics, Reactors Continued

426 BORAX experiments, 81
Period , reactor, definition of, 569 breeders, 83, 85
Plutonium , buy-back credit, 55 Calder Hall , 118, 408
production of, 83 Chicago pile, 71 , 75
Polish nuclear ship studies, 531 classification of, 82
Population growth , 14-15 comparison of types, 373, 374
Power cycles, reactor, 384 containment, 57, 146, 319, 445
Power flattening in reactors, 62 control, 99 , 101
Power reactors, types, 107 converters, 84
Pressurized water reactors, 108–109 coolant additions, 270, 271
British design, 442 coolants, 90–94, 123, 403, 407, 486 , 487
for marine propulsion, 373, 459 core design, 374
Price-Anderson act , 346 corrosion problems, 270
Prompt critical , definition of, 102 cost considerations, 369, 379, 381, 382,
9
Propulsion designation for various 383, 417, 438 439, 447-448 , 450 451,
ships, 535 485 , 493
Propulsion system , for icebreaker design , 96 , 370 , 374, 537
Lenin , 501 , 506, 509 Dresden power station, 115, 370
for N.S. Savannah, 152 epithermal, 87
Public reaction to radiation, 334 erosion problems, 270
Putnam , Palmer, forecasts, 15, 19 Experimental Boiling Water Reactor,
operation , 58, 112
Radiation dose rates, N.S. Savannah, Experimental Breeder Reactor, 85
189 fast reactors, 85 , 87
Radiation levels, maritime reactors, 469 fission -product release, 236
Radiation monitoring system , N.S. fuel elements, failures, 227
Savannah , 203 fused -salt coolants for, 93
Radioactive contamination , reduction fuses for, 57
of, 290 gas coolants for, 91 , 486 487
Radioactive material, behavior in ocean gas-cooled , 59 , 117, 372–373, 408, 417,
Waters , 281 439–440, 47, 485, 517
Radioactive wastes, biological implica- gas-cooled , advanced concept, 487-490
tions of, 277 heavy -water coolants, 91
collection and handling of, 272 heterogeneous, 82, 88
disposal of, 177, 267 homogeneous, 59, 60, 82, 88, 95, 122
from N.S. Savannah , 309 liquid -metal coolants for, 92, 123
gaseous, 275 liquid-metal cooled , 92, 122–123 , 371
in refueling, 276 372
potential sources of, 268-269 loss -of - flow accidents, 230 , 237
properties of, 268, 273 moderators for, 73, 75, 89
Radioactivity, discovery of, 1 natural-uranium , 410
in water, 114 on icebreaker Lenin , 501
permissible genetic dose, 279 operation of, 102, 221
Radioisotopes in organic coolants, 402 organic coolants for, 94, 403
Radium , discovery of, 1 organic - cooled and moderated , 120,
Reactivity accidents , 216 371, 400_401, 405, 434 435 , 444, 479–
480
Reactors, accidents, 213, 216, 217, 226–
228, 230 , 233, 236 , 238 , 242-243 oxide fuels, 227
as power source , 80 physics of, 375, 540
basic principles, 65, 81 , 86 power cycles, 384
boiling water, 58, 111 , 112, 114, 115, power flattening, 62
329, 389, 390 , 417, 443, 459, 462, 470 , pressurized - water, 108, 109, 373, 395,
483 417, 442, 459
598 INDEX
Reactors — Continued Savannah, N.S. Continued

regenerative, 85 heat- transport auxiliary systems, 174 ,
Safeguards Committee, AEC, 211 547
shielding, 24 , 107, 148, 187, 377 hull and weight characteristics , 137
start-up, 103, 193, 217 inspection in foreign ports, 359
structural materials, 106 insurance under Price -Anderson Act ,
superheat, considerations of, 370 346, 347
TRIGA research reactor, 6 job training, 331
types, 87, 107, 373, 374 legislative history, 128
Vallecitos boiling -water plant, 329 liquid -waste collection system , 560
( see also Savannah , N.S., reactor ) machinery and emergency power, 149
Refueling, N.S. Savannah, 299, 303 machinery -space ventilation , 184
wastes, 276 main and auxiliary circulating -water
Relief systems for N.S. Savannah , 549.
systems, 182
Reprocessing, costs of, 377 main and auxiliary machinery , 565
Resonance -escape probability , 98 maneuvering capabilities , 151
Rijeka Conference , legislation proposed nuclear servicing facility, 298, 306
objectives of, 40
at, 349–350
operating program , 41, 42
Rutherford , Sir Ernest, 3, 66, 67
operational flexibility, 149
Safety and reliability of N.S. Savannah plant functional monitoring , 205
instrumentation , 570 propulsion system , 141
protection in case of sinking, 257
Safety, criteria for nuclear ships, 214
features of icebreaker Lenin , 511 radiation dose rates, 189
standards, development of, 208 radiation -monitoring system, 203
systems, N.S. Savannah, 198 radioactive -waste disposal , 177
refueling operations, 303
Savannah , S.S. , 125
repair service facilities , 303
Savannah , N.S. , 5
resistance to collision , 252
basic arrangement, 139
resistance to grounding , 256 , 257
behavior in collision , 253, 255 safety assessment, 40-41
boiler feed system , 182
safety features, 143
basis of containment design, 230 safety in storms, 259
containment air- conditioning system , shielding, 184, 261
559
steam -generator design, 169
containment and shielding, 184, 261
supporting systems, 557
( ontainment mock -up, 319
training of crew , 313
crew , field training, 328 of foreign engineers, 340
deck arrangement, 133
program , 321 , 323
deck officers training program , 332
waste -collection system , 560
design of propulsion system , 152 Savannah , N.S. , reactor, 153
electrical system , 179 buffer - seal system , 523
engineer officers training program , 321
equipment drain and waste-collection control and instrumentation , 165 , 190 ,
194 , 197 , 243, 569–573
system , 560 control-rod drive, 161
feasibility studies, 128
core design , 153
floating service facility , 304
design and performance data , 538
fuel-carrying capacity , 130 emergency cooling system , 555
gaseous -waste , collection system , 562
fuel elements, 158
monitoring system , 200
hydraulic system for control-rod
general arrangement of power plant
machinery, 141 drives, 543
general design and construction, 32, hydrogen addition system , 552
133 intermediate cooling system, 558
health-physics monitoring, 204 life of initial fuel loading, 160
INDEX 599
Savannah, N.S. , reactor - Continued Subdivision of marine environment, 282

mock -up facility , 133 Submerged cargo vessels, 25
Summary of maritime reactor studies,
physics, 540
pressure vessel, 160 460
pressurizing system, 547 Swedish nuclear -propulsion activities,
primary -loop purification system , 551 530
primary system, 168 Taft Sanitary Engineering Center, 285
pumps and piping, 172 Tanker, boiling water reactor for, 428
relief system, 549
comparative costs for 43,000 dwt, 437
safety system, 198 cost comparisons between conven
shielding , 148 , 187
tional and nuclear, 521
simulator, 327, 332
Tanker program , preliminary cost esti
start -up, 196
supporting systems , 176 mates , 439
T-7 tanker, comparison of operating
sampling system, 557
secondary system , 174 costs, 432
speci fications
, 465
servicing system, 298
Scavenging systems for radioactive ma- | Thermal reactors, 87
classification of, 90
terials, 290, 292
Scram signals, 202 Third - party liability, 348
Thorium cycle, 85
Sea trains, advantages of, 25
Training, A1W Reactor operators, 329
Servicing nuclear ships, 295
Lynchburg phase, 322
Shielding, reactor, 107, 187, 377 of foreign engineers , 340
use of cargo as, 24
of N.S. Savannah crew , 313–316
Ship accidents and collisions , 208, 243–
Transportation , nuclear energy in, 23
247, 252–257, 259
TRIGA research reactor, 6
factors involved in , 250
frequency of, 215 U.K.-U.S. agreement on N.S. Savannah
kinetic energy in , 252 operations, 359
penetration of hull , 250 United Kingdom nuclear -propulsion ac
Ship classification in U.S. Merchant tivities , 452
Marine, 533 economic studies, 439, 447
Ship critical speeds, 244 gas- cooled reactor design , 515-517
Shipping requirements for nuclear ship design , 446
powered ships , 265 Uranium , fission of, 69
Shore facility for N.S. Savannah , 299 Cranium -233, production of, 85
Simulator for N.S. Savannah, 318, 327, | U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, 284
332 U.S. Coast Guard, 208–210
SM - 1 reactor, use in N.S. Savannah | U.S. Merchant Marine ship classifica
training program , 329 tion , 533 , 534
Society of Naval Architects and Engi- Us. Merchant ships, length ranges of,
neers , 210 535
Sodium -cooled reactors, 92, 122, 371- | U.S. nuclear-propulsion program, 215
372 U.S. ships, list of, 13
Soddy, Frederick , 2, 33 obsolescence rate of, 14
Solid radioactive wastes, 274 U.S. Weather Bureau study, 284
Specific reactor systems for nuclear U.S.S.R. nuclear -powered icebreaker
ships , 389 Lenin , 497
Spent-fuel storage pit, N.S.V. Atomic
Servant , 309 Vallecitos reactor, use in training pro
Start -up accident , 217 gram , 329
Steam cycles, 384 Vicksburg , Miss., U.S. Army Corps of
Storms , effects on N.S. Savannah , 239 Engineers Experiment Station , 284
600 INDEX
Waste disposal from nuclear powered | World nuclear ship development, 497
ships, 267
Waste disposal, 272 Xenon reactor poisoning, 104
X rays, 3
from nuclear-powered ships, 267
N.S. Savannah system, 299 Yugoslavian nuclear-propulsion activi
( see also specific type of waste ) ties, 532
U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE : 1962 0-613489
5845
1
-
UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN
3 9015 00207 0996

SIT OF MIC
FIR
M
IN
1811
SE
ALI
OF
M
DIHO

Nuclear Propulsion For Merchant Ships

Uploaded by

Document Information

Original Title

Copyright

Available Formats

Share this document

Share or Embed Document

Sharing Options

Did you find this document useful?

Is this content inappropriate?

Copyright:

Available Formats

Nuclear Propulsion For Merchant Ships

Uploaded by

Copyright:

Available Formats

A propos de ce livre

À propos du service Google Recherche de Livres

Prepared under auspices of

DIVISION OF TECHNICAL INFORMATION

U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 1962

For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, V.S. Government Printing Office

essential. Fueling nuclear ships, very different from taking on fuel

At the New York Shipbuilding Corporation, Harborough I. Lill ,

CHAPTER 1 Why NUCLEAR PROPULSION ? 1

‫زا‬ 9–2 Discussions and Negotiations with Foreign Nations

WHY NUCLEAR PROPULSION?

Anyone who has maintained even a partial interest in techno

shipowners of the maritime nations have always been alive to ad

people with imagination speculated both on the nature of and the

radiation emanating from uranium compounds was capable of dis

this aspect of continuous emission of energy because of the minute

they required, could never be carried aboard ship. They had in

1-1 GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS

The technical feasibility of nuclear propulsion for ships has

tons of radium . Therefore reactors have to be provided with heary

The economic advantages of nuclear fuel over conventional fos

2. An extension of the cruising range, which would make nuclear

1-2.1 Studies on Nuclear Propulsion for Commercial Ships

Various aspects of the economics of nuclear propulsion for ships

at high speeds nuclear ships will be able to compete with conven

As in the case with almost any new concept or development ,

The question of a new type of propulsion for merchant ships is

particularly true if United States naval forces were largely con

1-3 CONSERVATION OF NATURAL RESOURCES

Despite the advantages of long cruising range and possible

Type Number Gross tons Dead -weight tons

Combination passenger and cargo . 40 445 , 000 334, 100

Total . 1 , 138 9, 645, 500 14 , 339, 800

Combination passenger and cargo . 212 1 , 869, 800 1 , 361 , 300

Total .. 2, 117 15 , 292, 600 20, 767 , 700

There are several reasons for developing this new source of

source of energy must be developed. This is certainly true if we

Table 1.3—OBSOLESCENCE RATE BY TYPE OF SHIP ( AS OF DEC . 31 ,

Privately owned fleet Government-owned fleet

pects of our industrial civilization, present and future. On the

1-3.1 Effect of Population Growth

The population increase is of recent origin. During the first 700

Fig. 1.1-Past and predicted population for the United States.

was placed at 2.734 billion . A recent estimate makes the astonish

earth's crust than will ever be used.] It is not a question of empty .

power program , which has as its object an electricity -generating

potentialities for reduction of the cost of nuclear fuels offers great

1-4 TECHNICAL PROGRESS

Perhaps the most stimulating reason for United States partici

1. Very high energy output potential per unit of weight and

3. Ability to operate without oxygen ; important for undersea

The application of nuclear energy to the field of commercial

It is more difficult to guarantee that there would be no problems

be a sausage or light collapsible container made of Teflon , for

connection with the hydrofoil ship concept. Hydrofoil ships are

vealed that the feasibility of the principle has been definitely

equivalent capacity to a conventional power plant. This would

In connection with foodstuffs, in -transit irradiation may allow

The use of a nuclear-powered tanker for transporting liquified

of large rock masses and removal of their ores, collection of min

These are some of the unusual applications of nuclear power in

as the world's first nuclear - powered merchant ship , it is hoped she

1. FREDERICK SODDY, The Interpretation of Radium , G. P. Putnam's Sons, New