A New View of European Industrialization

Author(s): Rondo Cameron

Source: The Economic History Review, New Series, Vol. 38, No. 1 (Feb., 1985), pp. 1-23
Published by: Wiley on behalf of the Economic History Society
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 THE

ECONOMIC HISTORY

REVIEW

SECOND SERIES, VOLUME XXXVIII, No. I, FEBRUARY i985

SURVEYS AND SPECULATIONS

A New View of European

Industrialization*
By RONDO CAMERON

A ccording to the standard or traditional interpretation, the industriali-

1A zation of Europe and the world began with an "industrial revolution" in
England (or Great Britain) which other nations subsequently imitated. The
interpretation has a long and venerable history. Indeed, it can be traced to
Karl Marx who, looking upon Britain in the I 86os, at the peak of its industrial
supremacy, wrote: "The country that is more developed industrially only
shows, to the less developed, the image of its own future".1 For long a standard
feature of textbooks on European economic history, this interpretation has
been enshrined in the prestigious CambridgeEconomicHistory of Europe and
in David Landes's UnboundPrometheus,an extended version of his chapter in
the Cambridge series.2 Although expressed in novel form, Rostow's Stages
of Economic Growth actually represents a reinforcement of the traditional
interpretation.3 That interpretation has recently been reasserted clearly and
* Earlier versions of this article were presented at the First Research Conference of Japanese and
American Historians in Tokyo and Kyoto, 28 March-3 April i983; to the Council for European Studies
in Washington, D.C., I4 Oct. i983; to the Association of Alabama Historians in Anniston, Alabama, IO
Feb. i984; to the Washington Area Economic History Seminar on 2 March i984; and to the Seminar ffur
Wirtschafts- und Solzialgeschichte of the Albert-Ludwigs-Universitat, Freiburg, West Germany, on 2
April i984. It has benefited from criticisms and suggestions from individuals too numerous to list; some
of them, however, were kind enough to put their comments on paper: A. W. Coats, D. C. Coleman,
Franqois Crouzet, Charles E. Freedeman, Rainier Fremdling, Udo Heyn, C. P. Kindleberger, David
Landes, John P. McKay, Franklin Mendels, D. C. North, W. N. Parker, Sidney Pollard, Lars Sandberg,
Jurg Siegenthaler, and Gabriel Tortella. The fact that most of them agree with some parts of my argument
while disagreeing with others increases my determination to bring it to a larger readership.
1 Karl Marx, Capital: A Critical Analysis of Capitalist Production, Friederich Engels, ed. translated
from the third German edition by Samuel Moore and Edward Aveling (2 vols. New York, i9oi), i, p. xi.
2 David S. Landes, The Unbound Prometheus: Technological Change and Industrial Development in

WesternEuropefrom I750 to the Present (Cambridge, i969).

3 Walt W. Rostow, The Stages of Economic Growth:A Non-CommunistManifesto (2nd ed., Cambridge,

I971). See also W. W. Rostow, ed. The Economicsof Take-off into Sustained Growth (New York, i963);
idem, Politics and the Stages of Growth (Cambridge, I971); idem, How It All Began: Originsof the Modern
Economy(New York, I975); idem, The WorldEconomy:History and Prospect(Austin and London, I978).

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2 R. CAMERON

conciselyby SidneyPollard,who wrote: "The processstartedin Britainand

the industrializationof Europe took place on the British model; it was, as
far as the Continent was concerned, purely and deliberatelyan imitative
process".4
The traditionalinterpretationis venerable,but it is not beyond criticism.
My criticismsaretwofold.First, the veryconceptof an "industrialrevolution"
is misleading;I have arguedelsewherethat the termis a misnomer.5Second,
the notion that Englandserved as a "model", and that other countries(gov-
ernments?)consciouslyimitatedthe Englishexample,is so oversimplifiedas
to be seriouslymisleading.I shall elaboratethese criticismsin turn. First,
however,a few generalremarksmay be helpful.
The concern of this articleis the process of industrialization,that is, the
economicand other (social,political,etc.) changesthat occurredas European
societies ceased to be primarilyagrarianin economicstructureand devoted
proportionatelymore of their resourcesand labourto the productionof non-
agriculturalcommoditiesand services.Industrialization is not identicaleither
with economicgrowthor economicdevelopment,- althoughit is closelyassoci-
atedwith both, especiallyin what Kuznetshas termed"the moderneconomic
epoch".6The process of economicgrowth, includingin the modernera the
specialcase of industralization,involvesthe interactionof four broadclasses
or categoriesof factors:population,resources,technology,and institutions.7
The precise way in which these factorsinteractwill determinethe outcome
of the process; but since the "factors"are in reality congeries of diverse
entities, the varietyof possible outcomesis virtuallyinfinite.
In the processof nineteenth-centuryindustrializationvariousfactorsplayed
determiningroles at differenttimes and places. In this articleI shall choose
two for special attention:coal, a naturalresourcethat grew in importance
with the growthin demandfor mechanicalpowerandfor fuel in metallurgical
industries;andhumancapital,as representedby educationandliteracy,which
4Sidney Pollard, Peaceful Conquest:The Industrializationof Europe, I760-i970 (New York and Oxford,
i98i), p. v; but see below, p. 9 and n. 44.
5 Rondo Cameron, 'The Industrial Revolution: A Misnomer', in Jurgen Schneider, ed. Wirtschaftskrafte

und Wirtschaftwege:FestschriftffirHermannKellenbenz (5 vols., Stuttgart, i98i), V, pp. 367-76. A slightly

different version was published in The History Teacher, I5 (i982), pp. 377-84. The following paragraphs
draw heavily on this article. Other scholars, of course, have objected to the use and misuse of the term,
among them A. P. Usher, George Unwin, and Joseph Schumpeter. A number of years ago, D. C. Coleman
wrote an eloquent article in which he attempted to protect the "classical" industrial revolution from
semantic degradation. In it he suggested that "the term has achieved its wide application at the expense
of losing its true significance", and that "perhaps it is time for a new 'historical revision' of the 'industrial
revolution'." See Coleman, 'Industrial Growth and Industrial Revolutions', Economica (I956), reprinted
in E. M. Carus-Wilson, Essays in Economic History (i962), pp. 334-52. See also Douglass C. North,
Structureand Change in EconomicHistory (New York, i98i), p. i62: "The period that we have come to
call the Industrial Revolution was not the radical break with the past that we sometimes believe it to have
been". Michael Fores, 'The Myth of a British Industrial Revolution', History, 66 (i98i), pp. i8i-98,
argues along somewhat different lines that there was no industrial revolution.
6 Simon Kuznets, Modern Economic Growth: Rate, Structure, and Spread (New Haven and London,
i966), p. 9.
7 These factors should not be confused with the "factors of production" of classical economics, although

there is a relationship between the two groups. For an elaboration of this framework for the study of
economic growth and applications to the pre-industrial era see Rondo Cameron, 'Economic History, Pure
and Applied', Journal of EconomicHistory, xxxvI (I976), pp. 3-27; also idem 'Technology, Institutions
and Long-Term Economic Change', in Charles P. Kindleberger and Guido di Tella, eds., Economicsin the
Long View: Essays in Honour of W. W. Rostow (3 vols. i982), I, pp. 27-43.

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 EUROPEAN INDUSTRIALIZATION 3
proved capable in many instances of substituting (or compensating) for other
missing or deficient factors.

The term revolutionindustriellewas first used by Frenchmen in the early years

of the nineteenth century to emphasize the importance of the mechanization
of French industry, then in progress, by comparing it with the revolution of
I789.8 Karl Marx used the term casually in Das Kapital (though not in the
CommunistManifesto), but it acquired currency in English only with the
publication, in I 884, of Arnold Toynbee's Lectureson theIndustrialRevolution
in England. Toynbee was a social reformer, not a scholar. His principal
interest was in remedying what he believed to be the moral degradation of the
British working classes.9 Invited to lecture at Oxford, he devoted his lectures
to the interrelation of economic events and economic policy, especially to the
emergence of laissez-faire policies, which he regarded as a disaster for the
workers. Despite scholarly objections, the expression caught the public's
fancy and was eventually incorporated into historical terminology.10 Early
descriptions of the phenomenon emphasized the "great inventions" and the
cataclysmic nature of the changes. They also stressed what were assumed to
be the deleterious consequences of the new mode of production. Although
increases in productivity as a result of the use of mechanical power and
machinery were admitted, most early accounts highlighted the use of child
and female labour, the displacement of traditional skills by machinery, and
the unwholesome conditions of the new factory towns. For most of its
history, for most people, the term industrial revolution has had a pejorative
connotation.
Many of the debates were devoted to trying to determine the dates of the
"revolution". The dates implicit in Toynbee's lectures, I760 to i820, were
arbitrarilydetermined by the reign of George III, on which Toynbee had been
invited to lecture. Scholars such as H. L. Beales, aware that the rapidity of
change had been exaggerated in the conventional treatments, argued for a
longer period, such as I750 to i850, and even for no terminal date at all."l
On the other hand, John U. Nef, who decried the idea of an industrial
revolution as "essentially false", nevertheless found that an "unprecedented
acceleration of industrial progress began, not in I750 or I760, but in the
I78s".12 Nef's conclusion was taken up by Rostow and given even greater
precision by assigning the dates I783-i802 for England's "take-off".13 Still,
8 Anna Bezanson, 'The Early Use of the Term Industrial Revolution', QuarterlyJournal of Economics,
XXXVI (I922), pp. 343-9; Claude Fohlen, Qu'est-ceque la revolutionindustrielle?(Paris, I971), pp. i6-20.
9 "Our object is . . . to improve the great mass of the population"; Toynbee, Lectureson the Industrial
Revolutionin England, Popular Addresses,Notes and OtherFragments(New York, I969 reprint of the I884
edition),p. I50.
10 For a brief survey of the objections see my 'The Industrial Revolution: A Misnomer', in Wirtschafts-
krafte und Wirtschaftswege,v, pp. 368-9.
" H. L. Beales, The IndustrialRevolution, I750-1850: An IntroductoryEssay (I928; reprinted I958), p.
27.
John U. Nef, WesternCivilization since the Renaissance:Peace, War, Industryand the Arts (New York,
12
i963), pp. 276-go. Nef first proposed I785 as the initial date in 'The Industrial Revolution Reconsidered',
Jnl. Econ. Hist., III (I943), pp. I-3I.
13
Rostow, Stages, p. 38.

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4 R. CAMERON

R. M. Hartwell, one of the most prolific and fervent advocates of the term,
admits that ". . . although the industrial revolution was a great discontinuity,
it was not one which could be identified by a sharply dated turning point or
take-off, as measured by macro-economic indexes".14
Despite efforts both to lengthen and shorten the span of the "revolution",
the conventional dating received the imprimatur of no less an authority than
T. S. Ashton, in his influential little book The Industrial Revolution, I 760-
I830.15 This is doubly ironic, because Ashton, unlike most of his predecessors,
viewed the outcome of the period as an "achievement" rather than a "cata-
strophe", and because he had no special fondness for the term. 16 (The dates
are not unrelated to the fact that the book was one in a chronological series.)
"The changes were not merely 'industrial', but also social and intellectual.
The word 'revolution' implies a suddenness of change that is not, in fact,
characteristic of economic processes. The system of human relationships that
is sometimes called capitalism had its origins long before I760, and attained
its full development long after i830: there is danger of overlooking the
essential fact of continuity. "17
But most proponents of the term emphasize discontinuity. "Whoever says
Industrial Revolution says cotton", according to Eric Hobsbawm.18 Insofar
as the statement is accurate, it also reveals the inadequacy and pretentiousness
of the term. It is true that the majorinventions in cotton spinning-Arkwright's
water frame and carding engine, and Crompton's mule-were made within a
relatively short time and quickly adopted by other manufacturers. By i802
cotton yarn and cloth displaced woollens as Britain's leading export. Even so,
the industry remained relatively small and highly concentrated. As late as
i84I, factory workers in the cotton industry constituted less than 5 per cent
of the non-agricultural labour force, and the industry as a whole produced
only IO per cent of the industrial output of Britain.19 While this is an
impressive achievement for a single industry, it is far from constituting an
industrial revolution in either of the two broad senses stipulated by Coleman.20
Far more important, in the long run, than the mushroom growth of
the cotton industry were developments in the coal, iron, and engineering
industries-and these were, in themselves, long run developments. Although
technical innovation in coal-mining proper-that is, at the coal face-was
limited, almost non-existent, two of the most important innovations of the
14 Richard [sic] M. Hartwell,
'Economic Growth in England Before the Industrial Revolution: Some
Methodological Issues', Jnl. Econ. Hist., XXIX (i969), p. i9. Cf. Simon Kuznets, Economic Growth of
Nations: Total Outputand ProductionStructure,(Cambridge, Mass., I97I), pp. 4I-2: ". . . the data are not
adequate for testing hypotheses concerning the time patterns of the growth rates. But they do not provide
support for W. W. Rostow's 'take-off' theory . .. nor . .. the Gerschenkron hypothesis . .
15 T. S. Ashton, The Industrial
Revolution, I760-i830 (Oxford, I948).
16 The words in quotation marks are
from the dust jacket of the first edition of Ashton, Industrial
Revolution.
17 Ibid. p. 2.
18 E. J. Hobsbawn, Industryand Empire: An EconomicHistory of Britain Since I750 (i968), p. 40.
19 C. Knick Harley, 'British Industrialization Before i84I: Evidence of Slower Growth During the
Industrial Revolution', J3nl. Econ. Hist., XLII (i982), p. 283; B. R. Mitchell and Phyllis Deane, Abstract
of British Historical Statistics (Cambridge, i962), pp. 6o, i87. Donald McCloskey has calculated that "The
ratio of cotton output to national income in i8oo was about o0o7"; Roderick Floud and Donald McCloskey,
eds. The EconomicHistory of Britain Since I700, I (Cambridge, i98i), p. II2.
20
Coleman, 'Industrial Growth and Industrial Revolution', p. 335.

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 EUROPEAN INDUSTRIALIZATION 5
industrial era were intimately related with the growth of the coal industry-
and occurred near the beginning of the eighteenth century. On the supply
side, the Newcomen steam pump, the first of which was erected in I7I2, made
it possible to sink deeper shafts and thus to obtain more coal. On the demand
side, the introduction of coke smelting of iron ore by Abraham Darby in
I709 freed the iron industry from its dependence on charcoal derived from
increasingly scarce and expensive timber.
Although introduced in I709, coke smelting spread slowly even within
England, and not at all abroad until late in the century. The decision to adopt
the new process depended on discriminating estimates of both costs and
revenues, and in regions where timber was abundant and coal was scarce no
incentive to adopt the new process existed. In England after I750, the rising
price of charcoal together with other technical innovations, notably the
introduction in the I780s of Henry Cort's puddling and rolling process, which
extended the use of coal fuel to the refining phase of production, greatly
accelerated both total iron production and the proportion made with coal fuel.
By the beginning of the nineteenth century pig iron output had expanded to
more than 200,000 tons, virtually all made with coke, and Britain had become
a net exporter of iron and iron products. Britain reached the peak of its
supremacy in the iron industry in about i870, when the total output of pig
iron was almost 6 million tons, or slightly more than half the world production.
The history of steam power and engineering reveals even more clearly the
lengthy nature of the process of industrialization. In its early years the
Newcomen steam pump, or atmospheric engine, was confined entirely to
pumping water from coal mines, for which it had been designed. Later, it was
extended to other mining operations, notably in Cornish tin mines, to raise
water to operate water wheels, and for public water supplies. It underwent
gradual refinement before James Watt's major improvements, in the last
quarter of the century, made steam power more widely applicable. In the
opinion of one authority, "the Newcomen engine . .. was the main factor in the
exploitation of the mineral wealth of Britain, thereby laying the foundations of
the industrial development of the country'".21
Even so, and even with Watt's and other improvements, such as high-
pressure direct-acting engines, the "triumph" of steam power was a slow
process. Such is the conclusion of Von Tunzelmann's important study.22 In
I8oo, when Watt's basic patent expired, the combined output of water power
installations was almost four times that of all steam engines.23 Moreover, the
use of water power continued to increase in direct competition with steam in
the first half of the nineteenth century. According to Arthur Raistrick, "Water
wheels in sheer numbers and variety of uses remained the dominant power
unit from I755 to i830".24 It is not widely appreciated that water wheels, like
21 H. W. Dickinson, 'The Steam Engine to i830', in Charles Singer, et al., eds. A Historyof Technology,

Iv (New York and London, I958), pp. i8o-i.

22 G.
N. Von Tunzelmann, Steam Power and British-Industrializationto i86o (Oxford, I978).
23 This is an inference from data in John W. Kanefsky, 'Motive Power in British Industry and the

Accuracy of the i870 Factory Return', Econ. Hist. Rev. 2nd ser., XXXII(I979), pp. 360-75. On pp. 374-
5 he "suggests a total of about 170,000 horsepower at that date [i8oo]", of which "perhaps 35,000" came
from I,500 steam engines. (These data come from his unpublished Ph.D. thesis, 'The Diffusion of Power
Technology in British Industry, I760-i870', (University of Exeter, 1979.)
24 Arthur Raistrick, Industrial Archaeology: An Historical Survey (I972), p. 240; see also Terry S.
Reynolds, Strongerthan a HundredMen: A Historyof the VerticalWaterWheel(Baltimore, i983), pp. 266ff.

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6 R. CAMERON

wooden sailing ships, reached their peak technical efficiency after i850,
whereas hydraulic turbines and column-of-water engines were nineteenth-
century inventions. As late as i870 the industrial utilization of steam engines,
even in GreatBritain, was confined largely to mining, textiles, and metallurgy;
several industries relied as much, or more, on water power. The greatest
absolute increase in steam power, amounting to almost a ten-fold rise, came
between i870 and the end of the nineteenth century.25 Nonetheless, the first
Census of Production of I907 recorded significant amounts of water power
still in use.
The most recent research and analysis support the view, implied by this
evidence, that industrialization in Britain was gradual during the "classic"
industrial revolution period. After a careful and penetrating re-examination
and re-estimation of the indices of industrial production on the basis of
available quantitative evidence, C. Knick Harley reached the "principal
conclusion" that "the growth of industrial production was much slower
betweenI 770 and I 8 I 5 than eithermost narrativeaccounts. . . or [previous]
quantitative research . . . have suggested".26 In similar vein, N. F. R. Crafts,
in an equally detailed "review of the evidence", concluded that "Growth
was substantially slower during the years I780-i83I than is believed by
conventional wisdom. . . . The economy did not experience a 'take-off' in the
last two decades of the eighteenth century. The pace of growth quickened at
that time, but not dramatically so. "27
The census of i85i reveals clearly the extent to which the British economy
had been "revolutionized" by the middle of the nineteenth century. Agricul-
ture was by far the largest occupation, followed by domestic service. Workers
in the building trades outnumbered cotton workers of "every kind". Shoemak-
ers were more numerous than coal miners, blacksmiths than ironworkers.
More than half a century ago, Clapham-who, incidentally, did not employ
the term industrial revolution-deduced from that census that "The course
was set towards the 'industry state', but the voyage was not half over" 28

II
By analogy with Great Britain, the term industrial revolution has also been
applied to the onset of industrialization in other countries, although without
25 A. E. Musson, The Growth of British Industry (I978), pp. i67-8. This ratio may require slight

modification in the light of Kanefsky's findings, but the order of magnitude is the same: Kanefsky, 'Motive
Power', p. 374.
26 Harley, 'British Industrialization Before i84I', p. 285.
27 N. F. R. Crafts, 'British Economic Growth, I700-i83I: A Review of the Evidence', Econ. Hist. Rev.

2nd ser. xxxvi (i983), p. i99. Commenting upon the findings of Harley and Crafts, Peter Lindert has
written, "The latest guesses thus have growth much slower from I700 to i83I than Deane and Cole had
surmised. . . . There may be no acceleration left before i8I5 (Harley) or i83I (Crafts) to deserve such
labels as 'Revolution' or 'take-off'. Perhaps the real acceleration of growth and industrialization was early
Victorian . . ."; 'Remodeling British Economic History: A Review Article', Jnl. Econ. Hist., XLIII (i983),
pp. 989-go. Jeffrey E. Williamson, 'Why was British Growth so Slow during the Industrial Revolution?',
ibid., XLIV (i984), pp. 687-7I2, appeared after this article went to press.
28 J. H. Clapham, An EconomicHistoryof ModernBritain, II, Free Tradeand Steel, i85o-i866 (Cambridge,
1932), p. 22; see also Peter Mathias, The First IndustrialNation (2nd ed. i983), pp. 224-5.

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 EUROPEAN INDUSTRIALIZATION 7
generalagreementon dates.29For example, the Americanhistorian,A. L.
Dunham, assigned i8i5 and i848 as the inclusivedates of his study of the
"industrialrevolution"in France,but admittedthat the periodmarked"the
infancyand the beginningof the adolescenceof the industrialrevolution,but
not its maturity,which was not attaineduntil after i86o".30 In a critiqueof
this work the French historianClaude Fohlen remarked,"The industrial
revolution in France . . . covers a period of approximately a century, from
I750 or I770 to i870 .... The term revolution is ill-suited to a phenomenon
that occurredover such a long period of time."'31
By assigning specific dates for "take-off" in various countries (as, for
example, i830-I86o for France and i833-I86o for Belgium) Rostow implied
a specious accuracyfor his analysis,but in almostevery case his dates have
beendisputed-even whenhis terminologywasaccepted-by scholarsfamiliar
with the detailedhistoryof their countries.The economistJean Marczewski
wrote: "If this precise phase of economicdevelopmentis to be called take-
off, then take-off in France occurredaroundthe middle of the eighteenth
century, or, at the latest, towardsI799. Personally,I am inclined to choose
the earlierdate, because the share of industryin physicalproduct actually
began to increase steadily from I7I5-20 onwards."32 Marczewski thus aligns
himself with Fohlen. Their view is also sharedby FranqoisCrouzetwho, in
comparingeconomicgrowthin FranceandEnglandin the eighteenthcentury,
observed that "The growth in average real output and income per head
might thereforehave been roughlyof the same orderof magnitudein both
countries",33a view also sharedby the Americaneconomichistorian,Richard
Roehl, who wroteemphatically,"I wish insteadto maintainhere the proposi-
tion that . . . modern economic growth in France has its beginning [in the
eighteenthcentury]"'.34
The nineteenth century statisticianNatalis Briavoinne(one of the early
users of the term revolutionindustrielle)wrote in i838 that the Belgians
"marchedimmediatelyafterEnglandin the way of discoveriesand progress;
for a long time they have occupiedthe first place industriallyon the Conti-
nent".35The historian,Jan Craeybeckx,believes that "it was above all the
29 E.g. W. 0. Henderson, The State and the Industrial Revolution in Prussia (Liverpool, I958); The
IndustrialRevolution on the Continent(i96i); RudolfBraun,WolframFischer,HelmutGrosskreutz,and
HeinrichVolkmann,eds. Industrielle Revolution:WirtschaftlicheAspecte(Koln and Berlin, I972); Jean-
PierreRioux,La revolutionindustrielle,I780-1880 (Paris,I971). Volume3 of theFontana EconomicHistory
of Europe, edited by Carlo Cipolla, is entitled The IndustrialRevolution;vol. VI of the CambridgeEconomic
History of Europe is entitled The Industrial Revolutions and After, implying a plurality of industrial
revolutions.The Italianjournal,Studi Storici, devoteda specialissue in i96i to Studi sulla rivoluzione
with separatearticlesdevotedto each country.
industriale,
30 A. L. Dunham,The IndustrialRevolution in France, 81iS-1848 (New York, I955), p. 433 (A French
translationwas publishedin i953, beforethe Englishoriginal.)
31 ClaudeFohlen, 'The IndustrialRevolutionin France',in Rondo Cameron,ed. Essaysin French
EconomicHistory (Homewood,Il., I970), pp. 203, 225.
32 JeanMarczewski, 'The Take-OffHypothesisand FrenchExperience',in Rostow,ed. Economics of
Take-Off, p. I38.
33 Franqois Crouzet,'Englandand Francein the EighteenthCentury:A Comparative Analysisof Two
EconomicGrowths',in R. M. Hartwell,ed. The Causes of the IndustrialRevolution in England (i967), p.
I54.
34 RichardRoehl, 'FrenchIndustrialization: A Reconsideration',
Expl. Econ.Hist. I3 (I976), p. 238.
35 N. Briavoinne,'Surles inventionset perfectionnements
dansl'industriedepuisla fin du XVIIIesiele
jusqu' a nos jours', M'tnoires couronnespar l'Acadenie Royale des Sciences et Belles-Lettresde Bruxelles,
xiii (I838), pp. I86-7.

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8 R. CAMERON

30 years that preceded independence [in i830] that served as a point of

departurefor the industrializationof Belgium",36a view that is generally
sharedby Belgian historians,althoughsome would date Belgium'smodern
economic growth, like that of France, from the middle of the eighteenth
century.37
In datingthe "beginning"of Germany'sindustrialrevolutiona wide choice,
rangingfrom the late eighteenthto the late nineteenthcentury, is available.
Majorityopinionseemsto favourthe middledecadesof the nineteenthcentury;
even so, there is no general agreement on whether it was the i830s, the i840s,
or the i850s. Richard Tilly remarkedon scholars'inclinationsto "reject
the watershednotion of developmentattachedto concepts like 'industrial
revolution' or 'take-off'. Perhaps aggregateinterpretationsof Germany's
industrializationthat stress discontinuityrequirerevision,afterall."38Simi-
larly, for the Habsburgdominions, or at least the Austrian(Cisleithanian)
half of the Dual Monarchy,every majorcyclicalupswingin the economyin
the latter half of the nineteenth century-i850-57, i867-73, i896-i903-has
its advocates;yet, increasingly,it appearsthatno "greatspurt"occurred,and
thatthe rootsof Austrianindustrialgrowth,like thoseof FranceandBelgium,
are to be found in the eighteenthcentury.39
Turning to Scandinavia,we find similarcontradictionand confusion. In
each of the countries the cyclical upswings of the i850s, the i870s, and the
i89os have theirproponents,yet in each of them the resultof the most recent
researchis to push the beginningsof industrializationfurtherback in time
andto reduceits disruptiveeffects. For Sweden,for example,LennartJorberg
leans towardthe i870s for the beginningof the "true"industrialrevolution,
but sees significantindustrialgrowth taking place from at least i830.40 For
Norway, Sima Liebermanreportedthat "The availabledata fail to show a
Rostow-likeindustrial'take-off' or a Gerschenkron-like economic'spurt'in
nineteenth-centuryNorway" .41 Finally, after an exhaustive survey of the
literatureon Denmark,SvendAageHansencomesto the conclusionthat "the
fact that Danish industryseems on the whole to have experienceda tranquil
and protractedevolutiondoes not makeit easierto pinpointanythingthat can
be called a revolution. . . . Danish industrialization took place in the form of
a relativelysmooth and evolutionaryprocessof development."42
36 Jan Craeybeckx,'The Beginningsof the IndustrialRevolutionin Belgium',in Cameron,ed. Essays
in French Economic History, p. i88.
See for example,PierreLebrun,MarinetteBruwier,JanDhondt, and GeorgeHansotte,Essaisurla
37

(Brussels,I979). This volumeis partof an ambitiousmulti-

revolutionindustrielleen Belgique, I770-i847
volume, multi-authoredprojecton the "Histoirequantitativeet developpementde la Belgique".
38 Review of Wolfgang Hoth, Die Industrialisierung
einerrheinischenGewerbestadt:Dargestelltam Biespiel
Wupperthal(Cologne,I975), in American Historical Review, 85 (i980), p. 4I5.
3 See sourcescited below, notes 62-4.
40LennartJorberg,'StructuralChangeand EconomicGrowth:Swedenin the NineteenthCentury',
Economy and History, VIII (i965), pp. 3-46, reprintedin Franqois Crouzetet al., eds. Essays in European
Economic History (i969), pp. 259-80. See also idem, Growth and Fluctuations of Swedish Industry, i862-
I9I2 (Stockholm,196I).
41 SimaLieberman,The Industrializationof Norway, i800-I9I2 (Oslo, I970), p. i6o.
42 SvendAageHansen,Early Industrialisationin Denmark(Copenhagen, I970), pp. 8, I5. Hansenadds
as definedby Cameronis moreprecise,andtherefore
(p. I0), "Infactthe conceptof 'earlyindustrialization'
a farbettertool to workwith, thanthe term'industrialrevolution'whichhasbeenthe one mostcommonly
employedhithertoin the debateon Danish industrialization".

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 EUROPEAN INDUSTRIALIZATION 9
As a matterof intellectualhistory,it is not easyto accountfor the persistence
in scholarlydiscourseof the termsindustrialrevolutionand take-off,particu-
larlytheir applicationto countriesother than Britain.In part, it is probably
simplya matterof habit;scholarstaughtin theiryouthto believein the reality
of sudden, discontinuouschange in economiclife find it difficult to adjust
their vocabularyto the new knowledge. In part, especiallyfor scholarsin
"follower"countries,it may be a matterof nationalpride which encourages
identificationof industrial revolutions in other countries, too. Or, more
charitably,scholarseducatedto believein the realityof anindustrialrevolution
in Britainmight logicallyassumethat, alwaysand everywhere,industrializa-
tion took the form of discontinuousdevelopment.For that is the heartof the
matter:the beliefin sudden, discontinuouseconomicchangeas the necessary
prerequisitefor a modernindustrializedeconomy.That belief is, of course, a
canon of Marxist historiography,but it is surprisingand curious to see
such staunchnon-Marxists(or anti-Marxists)as Walt Rostowand Alexander
Gerschenkronadoptit as well. In fact, gradualindustrializationhas been the
norm, explosivegrowth the exception.

III
The question whether continental industrializationfollowed "the British
model" has receivedcategoricaldenialsfrom two historians.In a perceptive
study of Swedish economic growth, Lennart Jorbergwrote: "Neither in
Sweden nor on the Continent of Europe did the pattern follow that of
England".43Likewise, in a brilliantand stimulatingarticle, Sidney Pollard
averredthat, "Europeanindustrializationshouldnot be seen as the repetition
of a model, but as a single, if complex, process".44
Whatwasthe Britishmodel?The mainoutlinesarequiteclear:the primacy,
among consumergoods, of cotton textiles; among producergoods, of iron,
steel and engineeringproducts;and-above all-among intermediategoods,
of coal. We must also define the meaning of "continentalemulation",the
term used by David Landes.45Apparentlyit can mean one, or both, of two
things:(I) The governmentsof continentalcountrieswantedto catchup with,
or surpass,Britain'sindustrialand commercialpower, and institutedpolicies
to that end, such as industrial spies, protective tariffs, and government
constructionof (or subsidiesto) industrialplantsand railways;(2) continental
entrepreneursrecognizedthe superiorityof British technology,and wanted
to profitby introducingit to theirown limited, and often protected,markets.
Suchresponsesare, of course, perfectlynatural,and not limitedto Europe
43 'StructuralChangeand EconomicGrowth'in Crouzetet al., eds. European Economic History,p. 259.
44 'Industrialization
and the EuropeanEconomy',Econ. Hist. Rev. 2nd ser. XXVI (I973), p. 646. It
wouldappearthat Pollardchangedhis mind betweenthe date of that articleand the publicationof the
bookcitedin n. 4. Perhapshe will changeit again,as he wrotein the latterregardingindustrialization in
the secondhalfof the nineteenthcentury,"thereis now not merelya singlemodelto be followed,thatof
GreatBritain, but a choice of models offeringmore or less apt alternatives"(p. 22I). In personal
correspondence with me afterthe publicationof the book he wrote, "PerhapsI could admitat once that
the Britishoriginis not meantto imply a modelin the sequenceor speed, but in the kind of technology
andsocialinstitutionscreated"(Pollardto Cameron,I2.io.82). I am still dubious;I preferthe formulation
in the articlecited above.
45 Landes, UnboundPrometheus,p. I24.

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IO R. CAMERON

in the late eighteenthand nineteenthcenturies. They occur wheneverand

whereversignificanttechnologicaladvanceoccurs;the attemptsof FranqoisI
to naturalizeVenetiantechniquesof glassmakingandof Japanesemanufactur-
ers of computersto secure IBM's developmentalplans are cases in point.
Moreover,such efforts operate in both directions. At the very time that
continentalgovernmentsand industrialistswere endeavouringto masterthe
British techniques of cotton spinning, iron production,and so on, British
industrialistsstroveto naturalizenew techniquesintroducedon the continent,
such as the Leblanc process for artificialsoda. It is necessary,therefore,to
distinguish between the mere diffusion of technology and the distinctive
patternsof industrializationthat occurredon the continentas a resultof that
diffusion.
With respectto the standardinterpretation,onlythose regionsand nations
that had similar resource endowmentsto Great Britain-mainly abundant
coal-followed the British pattern.46All other regions and nations either
followeda differentpattern,or failed to industrializeto a significantdegree.
There were, in fact, severalidentifiablepatterns,each with individualvaria-
tions by countryandby region,depending,amongotherfactors,uponrelative
resourceendowments;amountsof human capital (as indicatedby levels of
literacyand formaleducationalinstitutions);degreeof marketorientationand
obstacles to marketing arrangements,particularlyin the agrariansector;
the associatedpace and pattern of agriculturaldevelopment;demographic
behaviour;and governmentpolicies.
The Belgiancase is the closest exampleof a country(region)followingthe
British model. A coal mine near Liege obtainedthe first Newcomen steam
pump on the continentin I720, only eight yearsafterthe firstone introduced
in England.47Industrialgrowth in the eighteenthcentury was gradualbut
fairlysteady,led by the coalindustryandthe associatedmetallurgicalconcerns
of the Sambre-Meusevalley.48A fine woollen industry using some water-
powered machinery developed in the eastern part of the country around
Verviers,and a rurallinen industrygrew vigorouslyin Flanders.49The pace
acceleratedsubstantiallyafterannexationby France,with the openingof the
Scheldtand, more importantly,the French market.The latterwas of signal
importancefor the establishmentof a cotton-spinningindustryusing British
technology,andfor the expansionof the woollen,metallurgical,andespecially
coal industries.A machineryindustryof some significancealso took root in
the vicinity of Liege. During the Dutch regime (i8I5-30) both foreign and
46 Pollardis entirelycorrectin stressingthat industrializationis basicallya regional,not a national
phenomenon;Pollard,Peaceful Conquest,pp. 3-I2, idem, Region und Industrialisierung(Gottingen,i980);
'Industrializationand the EuropeanEconomy'.Much of the argumentof the last-mentionedarticleis
similarto that of this one, and I gladlyacknowledgemy indebtedness.See also RichardRoehl, 'Britain
and EuropeanIndustralization: PathfinderPursued?',Review, VI (i983), pp. 455-73.
47 Anne Van Neck, Les debutsde la machine 2 vapeur dans l'industriebeige, i8oo-I85o (Brussels,1979),
P. 77.
48 Lebrunet al. Revolution industrielleen Belgique, pp. 352-60, 414-24; HubertWatelet,Une Industrialis-
ation sans developpement:Le Bassin de Mons et le charbonnagedu Grand-Hornudu milieu du XVIIIe sikle
au milieu du XIXe sicle (Ottawa,i980), p. 477.
49 Pierre Lebrun, L'industriede la lane a Vervierspendant le XVIIIe et le debut du XIXe sicle (Liege,

I948); Franklin Mendels, Industrializationand Population Pressure in Eighteenth-CenturyFlanders (New

York, i98i).

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 EUROPEAN INDUSTRIALIZATION II

nativeentrepreneurstook the initiativein introducingthe puddlingprocess

and coke smelting of iron ore, as well as establishinglead, zinc, and glass
industries.50 Subsequently, in the I83os and I840s, most firms in these
industries,as well as those in the coal industry,adoptedthe joint stock form
of organization;this developmentoccurredwith the assistanceof the Societe
Generalede Belgiqueand the Banquede Belgique(bothprivatelyownedjoint
stock banks), which was accompaniedby a remarkablewave of expansion.51
The metallurgicalindustriesin Belgium,zinc andlead as well as iron, were
largerrelativeto the size of the countrythan in GreatBritain,and acquired
a greaterbias towardsheavy industryover time. The textile industries,on
the other hand, were somewhatsmaller. Nevertheless, industrializationin
Belgiumdid follow, to some extent, "the Britishmodel" and made Belgium
the first industrialnation on the continent. The reasonsare not difficultto
discover.Proximityto Britainwasa factor(aswasalsoproximityto the French
and Germanmarkets). Small size, together with relativeease of transport
(riversand canals, early railways),facilitatedthe process. Most important,
Belgium had abundant,easily accessiblecoal deposits. As Fig. ia shows,
Belgiumhadthe largestproductionper capitaof anycontinentalcountryuntil
afteri9io. This relativeabundancesuppliedotherBelgianindustries,almost
all of whichwerefuel-intensive,with cheapfuel, and even provideda surplus
for export, as in the case of Britain.
Looking beyond Belgium, what we see is "not . . . a series of mere
repetitions of the 'first' industrialization but a . .. system of graduated
deviationsfrom that industrialization",in Gerschenkron'swords-but not
necessarilyrelatedto the "degreeof backwardness"of the economies,as he
wouldhave it.52 At first sight, Germanyappearsto have followedthe British
model,but the perceptionis distortedby the heavyweightof the Rhine-Ruhr
and Silesiancomplexes in indices of Germany'sindustrialization.53 Those
areaswith abundantcoal developedinto centresof heavy industry, and the
coincidencewith the adventof railwaysresultedin the mutualreinforcement
of both sectors.54When regionaldifferenceswithin Germanyare taken into
account,however,the picturelooksquitedifferent:morevaried,less uniform.
Althoughit is generallyknown that the agrarianeast laggedbehind the west
in industrialization,
it is not as widely appreciatedthat manypartsof central
andsouthernGermanyeitherdidnotparticipatesignificantlyin theindustrializ-
ation processin the nineteenthcentury, or did so accordingto a different
50 Lebrun et al., Revolution industrielleen Belgique, passim; W. 0. Henderson, Britain and Industrial
Europe, I750-i870 (Liverpool, I954), pp. io6-34; Rondo Cameron, France and the EconomicDevelopment
of Europe, i800-i914 (Princeton,i96i), ch. xi.
51 Lebrun et al., Revolution industrielleen Belgique, pp. 28I-93, 386-40I, 433-59; Cameron, France and
Europe, ch. xi.
52 Alexander Gerschenkron, EconomicBackwardnessin Historical Perspective(Cambridge,Mass. i962),
p- 44.
53 Statistics
of theoutputof heavyindustriesaremorecommonandmoreeasilyaccessiblethanproduction
figuresfor otherindustries,and hence are frequentlyused in internationalcomparisonsof the extentof
industrialization. In a textbookthatI co-authored,the firsteditionof whichwaspublishedin i965, I used
the outputof coal, pig iron, and steel as indicatorsof the "progressof industrialization";
JeromeBlum,
Rondo Cameron, and Thomas G. Barnes, The EuropeanWorld:A History, 2nd ed. (Boston, I970), p. 700.
I now knowbetter,but manyotherwritersof textbooksperpetuatethe error.
54 Rainer Fremdling, Eisenbahnenund deutschesWirtschaftswachtum,i840-i879 (Dortmund, I975), esp.
pp. 60-82.

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I2 R. CAMERON

Figure Ia. Per Capita Productionof Coal, i820-I9I3

8-
Belgium: production per capita
7_France:_productionpe
Gerance:production per capit
capita
Germany: production per capita 1_\
United Kingdom: production per capita
6-

5- ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ A f

4-J
Q ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ An./~~~~~~~~~~~~~
~ ~ \
=4 -/ /'S~~~~~~~~~~~~

3-

7
2- ~ ~

1820 1830 1840 1850 1860 1870 1880 1890 1900 19100 1920

Figure ib. Per Capita Consumptionof Coal, i820-I9I3

Belgium: consumption per capita
7-7 - .... France: consumption per capita
..d.....................................................
Germany: consumption per capita
United Kingdom: consumption per capita
6-

W4~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~I
04

H3-

2 _ /

0*
1.820 1830 1840 1850 1860 1870 1880 1890 1900 1910. 1920
Sources: Belgium-L'Annuaire Statistique de la Belgique, i87i and I9I4; France-Annuaire Statistique
de la France, i965; Germany-Walter G. Hoffman, Das Wachstumder deutschenWirtschaftseit der mittedes
i9. Jahrhunderts(New York, i96i); United Kingdom: B. R. Mitchell and Phyllis Deane, Abstractof British
Historical Statistics (Cambridge, i962).

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 EUROPEAN INDUSTRIALIZATION I3

pattern. In Bavaria,for example, "The majorityof the populationeven by

the end of the nineteenthcentury were [sic] still employedin the primary
sector.The fact that agriculturecontinuedto functionon a largelysubsistence
basis is of crucial importance. . . . Moreover, as late as the i840s approxi-
mately 6o per cent of the adult populationof Bavariawas illiterate,in sharp
contrastto the high literacyrates in Prussiaand some other states.56Other
centraland southGermanstates, such as Saxonyand Wurttemberg,although
they turned to manufacturingmore quickly than Bavaria, did so chiefly
with water as the motive power. For example, Saxony, the most highly
industrializedGermanstate in i840, with a substantialcotton industry,had
no more than fifty steamengines, in contrastto the PrussianRhine province
with more than two hundred.57The persistenceof artisanalindustry (Ge-
werbe),employinglittle or no mechanicalpower,wasalsowidespreadin many
parts of Germany.
Among the early industrializersFrance remainsthe most aberrantcase.
That fact gave rise to a large literature,both in the nineteenthcenturyand
more recently, devoted to explanationsof the supposed"backwardness"or
"retardation"of the French economy. Still more recently, however, new
empiricalresearchand theoreticalinsightshave shownthatthe earlierdebates
were basedon a false premise.58In fact, althoughthe patternof industrializa-
tion differedfromthat of GreatBritainand the otherearlyindustrializers,the
outcomewas not less efficientand, in terms of socialwelfare,may have been
more humane. Moreover, when one looks at the patterns of growth of
successfullate industrializers,it appearsthat the French patternmay have
been more "typical"than the British.
Two factors in the French situation account in large measure for its
unjustifiedreputationfor "retardation":the dramaticfall in maritalfertility,
which reducedthe growth rate of populationto less than half that of other
majornations;and the scarcityandhigh cost of coal, whichresultedin a lower
output of the heavy industries (iron and steel in particular)than in other
largenations, such as Britainand Germany.Moreover,these two factorsin
55 W. R. Lee, Population Growth, EconomicDevelopmentand Social Change in Bavaria, I750-1850 (New

York, I977), pp. 356-7, 377, 383.

56 Ibid.

57 Knut Borchardt, 'The Industrial Revolution in Germany, I700-I914', in Carlo M. Cipolla, ed. The
Fontana EconomicHistory of Europe, iv(i), p. I04.
58 See Rondo Cameron and Charles E. Freedeman, 'French Economic Growth: A Radical Revision',
Social Science History, 7 (i983), pp. 3-30, and sources there cited. Other recent contributions to this
discussion include Roehl, 'French Industrialization'; idem, 'Britain and European Industrialization';
Patrick O'Brien and Caglar Keyder, Economic Growth in Britain and France, I780-i9I4 (I978); and Don
R. Leet and John R. Shaw, 'French Economic Stagnation, I700-i960: Old Economic History Revisited',
Journal of InterdisciplinaryHistory, VIII (Winter I978), pp. 53 I-44. The assessment of O'Brien and Keyder
is most favourable to France, but their quantitative methods and estimates have been severely criticized,
particularlytheir finding that industrial productivity was higher in France than in Britain. See, e.g. Volker
Hentschel, 'Produktion, Wachstum und Productivitat in England, Frankreich, und Deutschland von der
Mitte des i9. Jahrhunderts bis zum Ersten Weltkrieg', Viertelsjahrschrift fur Sozial- und Wirtschaftsgeschi-
chte, 68 (i98i), pp. 457-5i0. A recent article by N. F. R. Crafts seeks to find a middle ground between
the "retardationists"and the revisionists. Crafts concludes that "French economic growth was respectable
but certainlynot outstanding during the nineteenth century. European countries did indeed follow different
paths of economic development, and comparisons of France and Britain that take Britain as a norm are
misleading"; 'Economic Growth in France and Britain, I830-I9I0: A Review of the Evidence', Jnl. Econ.
Hist. XLIV (I984), p. 67.

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I4 R. CAMERON

combinationhelp to accountfor severalother featuresof the French pattern

of industrialization,such as the low rate of urbanization,the scale and
structureof enterprise,and the sourcesof industrialpower.
As Fig. ia makes clear, at the beginning of the twentieth century coal
productionper capita in France was about one-thirdthat of Belgium and
Germany,and about one-sevenththat of GreatBritain-even though France
wasexploitingits knownreservesat a muchhigherrate(andhighercost) than
the other countries.Per capitaconsumption(Fig. ib) was somewhathigher,
thanksto imports. Franceimported,on average,about one-thirdof its total
consumptionin the nineteenthcentury,but that in itself imposedconstraints
on the use of coal. Consequently,France relied on water power to a much
greaterextent than its coal-richneighbours.French scientistsand engineers
(for example, Burdin, Fourneyron,Poncelet)made importantcontributions
to water-powertechnology, including the invention of the highly efficient
turbine. Thanks in part to improved technology, water power remained
competitivewith steamuntil the middleof the centuryevenin GreatBritain.59
On the continent it retainedits importancefar longer. In France as late as
i899, 56 per cent of the horsepowerof newly installedprime movers came
fromhydraulicmotors.60But the characteristicsof wateras a sourceof power
imposed constraintsupon its use. The best locationswere generallyremote
from centres of population;the number of users at any given location was
limitedto one or a very few; the size of the installationswas similarlylimited.
Thus, importantthough water power was for French industrialization,the
resultingpatternincludedsmallfirmsize, geographicaldispersionof industry
and slow urbanization,characteristics displayedalsoby othercoal-poorindus-
trial nations.
A striking example is that of the Austro-Hungarianempire. Although
comparablewith the western great powers in territoryand population,the
Habsburgmonarchylaggedbehind the othersin industrializationin general,
and in heavy industry in particular.Fig. 2, which charts the per capita
productionandconsumptionof coalin Germany,France,Austria(Cisleithania
only), and Russia, vividly depicts the situation. Per capita productionin
France and Austriawas virtuallyequal, especiallyfrom i88o onwards, al-
though French consumptionwas somewhathigher, and Austrianproduction
includeda large shareof inferiorlignite.61Productionin both countrieswas
well below Germany(and of course Great Britain), although substantially
higher than in Russia.
Until recently the Habsburg monarchy suffered both the neglect and
contumely of economic historians. The empire that failed politically, as
evidencedby its dissolutionimmediatelybeforethe end of WorldWarI, was
also deemed to have failed economically.In the last decade or so, however,
researchhas led to considerablehistoricalrevision.Now it appearsthat in the
Czechlandsand Austriapropermoderneconomicgrowthbegan,as in France
See above, p. 8.
59
France, Statistique de l'industrie minerale, Ripartition des forces motrices2i vapeur et hydrauliquesen
60

i899 (Paris, i9oi), cited by Walter Endrei, 'Energie hydraulique et revolution industrielle', unpublished
paper prepared for XV Settimana di Studio, Prato, Italy, I5-20 April i983, p. 8.
61 Nachum T. Gross, 'Economic Growth and the Consumption of Coal in Austria and Hungary, i83I-

I9I 3', 7nl. Econ. Hist. 3 I (I97I), pp. 899-goo.

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 EUROPEAN INDUSTRIALIZATION I5

* Figure 2. Productionand Consumptionof Coal, i820-i9I3

Austria: production per capita
Austria: consumption per capita
o France: production per capital
France: consumption per capita
Germany: production per capita
Germany: consumption per capita
Russia: production per capita
Russia: consumption per capita

1. /
Cc

1820 1830 18B40 1 850 1860 1870 1880 I 890 1900 1910 192
Source:B. R. Mitchell,EuropeanHistoricalStatistics,I7S0-I970.

and Belgium, in the last two decades of the eighteenth century, and possibly
earlier.6 It is indubitable that very respectable growth occurred in the first
half of the nineteenth century; estimates of per capita growth of industrial
productionfor Austriarangefrom I-7 to 3.6 per cent per annum, and those
rates accelerated somewhat in the second half of the century.3 Nevertheless,
although the overall picture is not as bleak as formerly depicted, there is no
doubt that modern industry in the Austro-Hungarian empire lagged behind
that in the more western nations, especially Germany.4
Regional disparity existed within the empire to an even greater extent than
in France and Germany, and that, too, served to create an exaggerated
impression of backwardness. There was a marked difference between the
western or Austrian (Cisleithanian), and eastern or Hungarian (Translei-
thanian) "halves" of the empire. Fig. 3, showing per capita coal production
for each, as well as joint imports and exports of coal, makes this clear: Austria
was well in advance of Hungary. But disparity was also striking within each
constituent part. In Cisleithania, just before World War I, Bohemia and
62 RichardL. Rudolph,'The Patternof AustrianIndustrialGrowthfrom the i8th to the Early20th

Century',AustrianHistoryYearbook,II (1975), 3-25. See also ArnostKlima,'IndustrialDevelopmentin

Bohemia,i648-178i', Past andPresent,ii (i957), pp. 87-99;idem, 'TheRoleof RuralDomesticIndustry
in Bohemiain the i8th Century',Econ.Hist. Rev. 2nd ser. XXVII (1974), pp. 48-56.
63 DavidF. Good, 'ModernEconomicGrowthin the HabsburgMonarchy',EastCentral Europe,7, Pt.
2 (i980), p. 255. See alsoJohnKomlos,TheHabsburg Monarchy as a CustomsUnion:Economic
Development
in Austria-Hungary in theNineteenthCentury(Princeton,i983), pp. 90-I.
64 NachumGross,'Austria-Hungary in theWorldEconomy',in JohnKomlos,ed. Economic Development
in theHabsburg Monarchyin the 19thCentury: Essays(New York, i983), p. 39.

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i6 R. CAMERON

Figure 3. Coal Production, Exports and Importsfor Austria and Hungary,

1.2 i850-i913

1. 0- Austrian production per capita

Hungarian production per capita
............................. .........................................................__
Austrian and Hungarian exports
0. 0.8 _- _- Austrian and Hungarian imports
- - - _--_ _ _ As'

0. 6
cez ,~~~~~~~~~~~~/

0. 4 -~~~~~~~~~~~

0. 2 -

188 1856 1864 1872 1880 1888 1896 1904 1912 1920
Source: B. R. Mitchell, European Historical Statistic'15-90

Moravia accounted for 56 per cent of "Austrian"industrial production;

Austria, proper, for 30 per cent; Galiciaand Bukovinafor 9 per cent; and
Dalmatiafor less than 5 per cent; althoughthe last three accountedfor 40
per cent of the population.65In Transleithaniathe disparitieswere no less
marked,with Hungaryproper(the Budapestregionin particular)being well
in advanceof the other regions.
No doubt there are many reasonsfor this lag. The difficultiesand cost of
transportationas a result of the terrain,the limitedaccessto the sea, and the
low rate of urbanizationare frequentlycited as obstaclesto industrialization.
Therecan be no doubtof theirimportance,althoughthe low rateof urbaniza-
tion is, as in France, a reflectionof the slow pace of industrializationand the
rurallocationof manyindustries.Populationgrowthwas also lower than the
Europeanaverage, althoughnot as low as that of France. The only other
factorthat can comparewith the paucityof coal, however,is the low level of
humancapital,as reflectedin'the low levelsof literacy.Theseweredistributed
within the empire in roughlythe same proportionsas industryitself, which
add force to the correlation.Table 3 indicatesthe literacyratein Cisleithania
as a wholeto havebeenaboutthe sameas in FranceandBelgium.The regional
variationswere enormous,however,rangingin 1900 from 99 per cent literate
in Vorarlbergto 27 per cent in Dalmatia.66Unfortunately,we do not have
comparabledata for Transleithania,but it is known that the literacyrates
there were substantiallylower than in the westernareasof the empire.67
65 Ivan T. Berend and Gy6rgy RAnki, EconomicDevelopmentin East-CentralEurope in the i9th and 20th

Centuries(I974), pp. II7-8, 121-2.

66 See CarloM. Cipolla,Literacy and Developmentin the West (Harmondsworth, i959), pp. i6, 8i.
67 Ibid. p. I I4.

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 EUROPEAN INDUSTRIALIZATION I7

IV
By contrastwith the majorcoal-richand the coal-poorindustrialnations,the
successful late industrializersincluded some small nations almost totally
without domestic supplies of coal: the Netherlands,Switzerland,Denmark,
Norway, and Sweden. The justificationfor describing these countries as
Table I. ManufacturingOutputPer Capita: Europe, I9I3
(Ten leading nations, in rank order)
Lewis Bairoch
I. United Kingdom i. United Kingdom
2. Belgium 2. Belgium
3. Germany 3. Switzerland
4. Switzerland 4. Germany
5. Sweden 5. Sweden
6. France 6. France
7. Denmark 7. Denmark
8. Netherlands 8. Austria-Hungary
9. Norway 9. Norway
I0. Austriaa I1. Netherlands
a Lewis lists Austriaseparatelyfrom (andaheadof) both Czechoslovakia
and Hungary,even for I9I3.
Sources:W. ArthurLewis, Growthand Fluctuations, i870-I9I3 (I978), p. i63, Table7. I; PaulBairoch,
'International Industrialization Levels from I750 to 1980',Journal of EuropeanEconomicHistory, II (i982),
p. 28i, Table 4, and p. 330, Table I5.

"successful"industrializersis presentedin Table I: two separatelists of what

two authors regardas the ten most highly industrializednations (on a per
capita basis) in Europe in I9I3. Although the methods involved in the
constructionof the lists are not beyondcriticism,they are quite independent
of one another,and include the sameten countriesin roughlythe samerank
order.Both lists containthe namesof the aforementionedfive smallnations,
as well as the five countriespreviouslydiscussed.68
It would be helpful to have similardata for earlierdates. Only Bairoch
suppliessuch, and he is disarminglycheerfulin admittingthe largeprobable
marginof error.69Nevertheless,for what they are worth, Table 2 presents
his estimatesof the ten most highly industrializednationsin i8oo and i86o.
The countrieslisted are the same as in I9I3, althoughthe rank order is
slightly different. That raises the question of the degree of backwardness
present in the small countries before the onset of industrialization.Lars
Sandberghas describedSwedenas an "impoverishedsophisticate",claiming
that it was "one of the very poorestcountriesin Europein the middleof the
nineteenthcentury".70 This view is open to challenge,but few will deny that
"Swedenhad the highestrateof growthof per capitaGNP . . . betweenI 86o
68 Alfred Maizels, Growthand Trade:An AbridgedVersionof IndustrialGrowthand WorldTrade
(Cambridge,I970), p. 299, Table B4, 'Estimatesof net valueof manufacturing productionper head of
totalpopulationin selectedcountries,I899-I957',providesa rankorderin I9I3 for someof the countries
listed in Table i. They are in terms of U.S. dollarsat I955 prices, and range as follows: Belgium-
Luxembourg,240; United Kingdom, 200; Germany,i8o; France, i65; Sweden I45; Norway, I20;
Netherlands, I05.
Industrialization
69 Bairoch,'International Levelsfrom I750 to i180', Jnl. Eur.Econ.Hist., II (i982),
pp. 326ff.
70 LarsG. Sandberg,'TheCaseof the ImpoverishedSophisticate: HumanCapitalandSwedishEconomic
GrowthBeforeWorldWarI', Jnl. Econ.Hist., XXXIX (I979), p. 225.

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 i8 R. CAMERON

Table 2. Per Capita Levels of Industrialization, i8oo and i86o

(U.K. in i900 = ioo)
i8oo i86o
I. UnitedKingdom i6 I.UnitedKingdom 64
2. Belgium Io 2. Belgium 28
Switzerland IO 3. Switzerland 26
4. France 9 4. France 20
Netherlands 9 5. Germany I5
Norway 9 Sweden I5
7. Germany 8 7. Norway II
Sweden 8 Netherlands II
Denmark 8 Austria-Hungary II
IO. Austria-Hungary 7 IO. Denmark IO

p. 28i, Table 4, and p. 330, Table I5.

Industrialization',
Source: Bairoch,'International

... and I9I3".71 The other Scandinaviancountries,and Switzerlandand the

Netherlands,recordedsimilarexperiences;how did they do it?
Figure 4. Coal ConsumptionPer Capita, I820-I9I3*
2. 4- Denmark:consumptionper capita
Italy:consumptionper capita
Nethrlans:_cnsumtionperapit
Netherlands:
...... consumpti
Sween.. -- per-!*per capita
consumption
capita-- ---.....
0- consumption per capita
S~~witzerland:
Sweden: consumption per capita
Spain:consumptionper capita
Russia:productionper capita
1. 6

com

1. 2-

0. 8.

0. 4 - ...............

1820 1830 1840 1850 1860 1870 1880 1890 1900 1910 1920
Source: B. R. Mitchell, European Historical Statistics, I750-I970.
* Norwayhas been omittedto ensureclarity;the patternfor thatcountrywas quite similarto thoseof
Denmarkand Sweden.

Figure4 showstheirper capitaconsumptionof coal (virtuallyall imported)

and presentsseveralfeaturesof interest. First, even at the peak of i900 or
i9io, their consumptionwas only aboutone-fifththat of GreatBritain,about
one-third that of Belgium and Germany,and about the same as France.
Obviously,coalmusthavebeeneconomized,mainlyin the primaryconversion
of iron ore into pig iron. Althoughall developedsophisticatedmetal-working
71 Ibid.

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 EUROPEAN INDUSTRIALIZATION I9

andmachineryindustries,theydid so (exceptSweden,with abundantcharcoal

and high gradeiron ore) on the basis of importedpig iron and steel, mainly
from Britain and Germany.The other main uses of coal were as fuel for
locomotives, steam ships, and stationarysteam engines. Norway, Sweden,
and Switzerlandhad abundantwater power, of which they made good use
even before the advent of hydroelectricity in the i88os and i89os. (The slight
decline in per capitacoal consumptionin Switzerlandafter i900 reflectsthe
electrificationof Swissrailways,begunaboutthattime.) The higherpercapita
consumptionof the Dutch throughoutthe period, and of Denmark until
around I890, reflectsthe ease with which those countriescould obtain coal
from Britain'snorth-easterncoalfields(and the Dutch river-bornecoal from
the Ruhr);the Netherlands,in fact, could importcoal from Tynesidealmost
as cheaplyas London.
Second, by comparisonwith Italy, Spain, and Russia (the two latterwith
domestic supplies of their own), the steep rise in coal consumptionof the
otherfourfromaboutI870 is a reasonableindexof the paceof industrialization.
All five of the smallercountriesdependedheavily on internationalmarkets
forbothimportsandexports,andall developedspecializedexportindustries.72
Of the five, Swedenwas the leastheavilydependenton internationalmarkets.
In I870 exportsaccountedfor i8 per cent of nationalincome;in I9I3, for 22
per cent of a much larger nationalincome. At the beginning of its rapid
industrializationSwedish exports consisted almost exclusively of primary
products, especiallytimber and oats, with some iron ore and pig iron. As
industrializationproceeded,intermediateproductsandfinishedmanufactures
becamemoreprominent:especiallywood pulp for paper,paperitself, electri-
cal machinery,and ball bearings.
Norway'sexports of timber, fish, and shippingservicesaccountedfor 90
per cent of total exports-about 25 per cent of nationalincome-as early as
the I870s; by the early twentiethcenturythose exportsaccountedfor more
than 30 per cent of nationalincome, with shippingservicesaloneresponsible
for 40 per cent of foreignearnings.Denmarkspecializedto an even greater
degreein the exportof processeddairyand animalproducts,importingcheap
grainfor animalfood. In the earlytwentiethcenturyit exported63 per cent
of its total agriculturalproduction,principallybutter, pork products, and
eggs. The Netherlandsspecializedin processingimportedraw materials-
wheat flour, tobacco, chocolate,and sugar-for re-exportto the Continent.
The Dutch also depended heavily on the service occupationsfor foreign
earnings.In I909, I I per cent of the labourforcewas employedin commerce,
7 percentin transport;the servicesectoras a wholeemployed38 percentof the
labourforce and produced57 per cent of the nationalincome.73Switzerland,
possessing no natural resources to speak of (unlike Sweden), with little
arableland in relationto its area and population(unlike Denmarkand the
Netherlands),and lackingcomparableopportunitiesfor transittrafficenjoyed
by the Netherlands,relied to an even greaterextent than the others on the
72 S. B. Saul, 'The Economic Development of Small Nations: The Experience of North West Europe

in the Nineteenth Century', in Kindleberger and Di Tella, eds. Economicsin the Long View, II, pp. I I I -
3'.
73 J. A. Dejonge, De industrialisatiein Nederland tussen i85o en 1914 (Amsterdam, i968), p. 296.

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20 R. CAMERON

ingenuityof its entrepreneursand the skills of its labourforce. Swiss exports

consistedmainlyof intricatespecializedmachineryand metalproducts,fancy
textiles (embroideredcottons and silk), clocks and watches, chemicalsand
pharmaceuticals,and processedfoods and beverages.Despite its small size,
Switzerlandwas the centre of the world's second largest organicchemical
industryat the beginningof the twentiethcentury,producingonly a fifth as
much as Germany;nonethelessSwiss output equalledthat of the rest of the
world combined, and 90 per cent was exported.
Sandberghas made a convincingcase for the importanceof humancapital
in Sweden'seconomicgrowth, althoughhe probablyexaggeratesthe extent
of Sweden'spovertybefore I850.74Similarargumentscan be made for each
of the other countries.It would be desirable,as W. N. Parkerhas suggested,
to "disaggregate"humancapitalinto its components,of which education(or
literacy)is only one, albeit large. Such a task is far beyondthe scope of this
article, in which literacy rates and educationalachievementwill serve as
proxiesfor that highly useful and importantmetaphor.
Largelyfor non-economic(religiousand cultural)reasons,all of the coun-
tries consideredin this sectionalreadyhad high levels of adultliteracybefore
the onset of industrialization.Already all possessed, or quickly acquired,
comprehensiveeducationalsystems, rangingfrom broadlybased elementary
schoolsto long establisheduniversitiesandnewlycreatedspecializedtechnical
institutes.Humancapital,unlikephysicalcapital,is difficultto quantify,and
evenmoredifficultto fit into a productionfunction,but it affectsthe economic
processin myriadways; by influencingthe decisionsof consumersas well as
producers;by contributingto labourproductivityand managementperform-
ance;and not least by informing(or misinforming)the decisionsof economic
policy makers. The outstandingindustrial performanceof the five small
nations consideredhere can be neither understoodnor explainedwithout
taking into accounttheir large relativestocks of humancapital.

V
The remainingcountries of Europe-the Mediterraneancountries, south-
eastern Europe, and ImperialRussia-can be disposed of more briefly for
presentpurposes. One of their commoncharacteristicsis that they failed to
industrializesignificantlybefore I914, with resultinglow levels of per capita
income and a high incidenceof poverty.
To be sure, if one looked not at national aggregatesbut at individual
regions, regional variationwould emerge, as with Germany,France, the
Habsburgmonarchy,and even GreatBritain.For example,the pronounced
differencesbetween north and south in Italy existed long before the advent
of the twentiethcentury.75Had the Kingdomof Sardinia(withoutthe island
74 Sandberg,'Impoverished Sophisticate';see alsoidem, 'Ignorance,Poverty,andEconomicBackward-
ness in the early Stagesof EuropeanIndustrialization: Variationson AlexanderGerschenkron'sGrand
Theme',Jnl. Eur. Econ. Hist., II (i982), pp. 675-97, for a more wide-rangingtreatmentof the same
subject.Sandberg'sconclusionswith respectto southernand easternEurope,as well as to Scandinavia,
are essentiallythe sameas those presentedhere.
75 ShephardB. Clough and Carlo Livi, 'EconomicGrowthin Italy: An Analysis of the Uneven
Development of North and South', Jnl. Econ. Hist., XVI (I956), pp. 334-49.

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 EUROPEAN INDUSTRIALIZATION 2I

of Sardinia;i.e., Piedmontand Liguria)still existedin I900 or I9I3, no doubt

Sardiniawould have rankedclose to France and Switzerlandin per capita
income and indices of industrialization.Had Lombardy-Venetiastill been a
part of the Habsburgempire, no doubt that entity's averagesin the same
categorieswould have been higher. Spain, despite general backwardness,
containedsomeeconomicallyprogressiveareas,suchas CataloniaandViscaya.
In ImperialRussia the GrandDuchy of Finland more nearlyresembledits
Nordic neighboursthan it did the Slavicor Asian provinces.76The Moscow
region boastedan importanttextile industry,and in the last decadeor so of
the nineteenth century a major centre of heavy industry developed in the
Ukraine, based upon the coal depositsof the Donetz Basin and the iron ore
of the Krivoi Rog, and employing foreign capital, technology, and entre-
preneurship.77One could, in fact, makea caseforthe Donbashavingfollowed
the "Britishmodel", based on abundantcoal and importedhumancapital.
Table 3. Adult Literacy, Selected Countries(per cent)
circa i85o circa i900
Sweden 90 (99)
United States (white only) 85-90 94
Scotland 8o (97)
Prussia 8o 88
England and Wales 67-70 (96)
France 55-60 83
Austria (excl. Hungary) 55-60 77
Belgium 50-55 8i
Italy 20-25 52
Spain 25 44
Russia 5-I0 28

Source:CalculatedfromCarloM. Cipolla,Literacyand Developmentin the West(Harmondsworth, i969),

Tables 2I, 24, and 30; figuresin parenthesesfrom MichaelG. Mulhall,Dictionary of Statistics (i899,
reprinted i969), p. 693, are almost certainly exaggerated.

Nevertheless,these "islandsof modernity"remainedsurroundedby seas

of backwardness.One of the reasonsthey did so is explained,in part, by a

Table 4. Primary School EnrolmentRate, Selected Countries

(per i1,ooo population)
i830 i85o I900
United States I,500 i,8oo i,969
Germany I,700 i,6oo I,576
United Kingdom 900 I,045 I,407
France 700 930 I,412
Spain 400 537 I,038
Italy 300 463 (i86o) 88i
Rumania 214 (I870) 6I7
Serbia 303 (I882) 420
Russia 98 (I870) 348

Source:RichardA. Easterlin,'Why Isn't the WholeWorldDeveloped?',Journalof EconomicHistory,

4I (I98I), p. i8.

76 LennartJorberg,The Industrial Revolution in Scandinavia, i850-i9I4 p. 7, passim. (This

(I970),
bookletwas subsequentlyrepublishedas a chapterin CarloM. Cipolla,ed. FontanaEconomicHistoryof
Europe,IV(2)).
77 See, for example, John P. McKay, Pioneersfor Profit:ForeignEntrepreneurship
and RussianIndustrializa-
tion, I885-I9I3 (Chicago,I970).

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22 R. CAMERON

second common characteristic:abysmally low levels of human capital.78

Tables 3 and 4 present crude indices of the quantitiesof human capitalin
variousnations:adult literacyratescirca i850 and i900, and primaryschool
enrolmentrates between i830 and i900. By both criteria,Italy, Spain, and
Russiarankedat the bottom amongthe largernations,and thereis no doubt
that the Balkancountriesrankedno higher. In primaryschool enrolments,
Rumaniaand Serbiawere above Russia, but lower than Spain and Italy.
The laggardcountriesshareda thirdcommoncharacteristic whichseriously
affectedtheirpossibilitiesfor economicdevelopment:the lackof anymeaning-
ful agrarianreform, and consequentlow levels of agriculturalproductivity.
Discussionof the successfulindustrializersdid not includea referenceto the
agrariansector (except for Denmark),since all had-achievedrelativelyhigh
levels of agriculturalproductivity.But, of course,any detailedanalysisof the
reasonfor the success of the latterand the failureof the formerwould have
to include an investigationof agriculturalproductivity.79

VI
One shortarticlecannotdo justiceto all of the determinantsof sucha complex
socialprocessas that of industrialization,which explainsthe focus here upon
what I regardas the prime determinantsof that process, coal and human
capital-with incidentalmentionof agrarianreform.Othershavebeendeliber-
ately omitted, internationalinvestmentand the role of financialinstitutions,
for example, which have been the subjectof my researchelsewhere.80Both
of those were important,but their importanceis neitherso indisputablenor
their role so unidirectionalby comparisonwith coal and humancapital.For
example,Russia'stotalcapitalimportswerethe largestin EuropebeforeI9I4,
yet Russiawas not a majorindustrialpower. The Scandinaviancountries,on
the other hand, with much smaller totals, recordedthe largest per capita
imports of capital, which certainly facilitated their smooth transition to
industrialnation status. Belgium before i850, and Germanyin the i840s,
i850s, and i86os received importantinjections of foreign capital in their
strategicminingandmetallurgicalindustries.Foreign,mainlyFrench,capital
financeda largeproportionof the railwaysof Belgium,Spain,Portugal,Italy,
78 Sandberg,'Ignorance,Povertyand EconomicBackwardness'.
79 For example,insteadof producinga classof peasantproprietorsengagedin market-oriented
agricul-
ture, as had agrarianreformin Swedenand Denmark,the desamortizaci6n of churchand communallands
in Spainfurtherincreasedthe concentrationof landownershipamonga class of absenteelandlordsand
contributedto thegrowthof a landlessagriculturalproletariat-withadverseconsequencesforproductivity.
See JordiNadal, El fracaso de la revoluci6nindustrialen Espana, i8I4-I9I3 (Barcelona,I975), pp. 62-7,
8i-6, and GonzaloAnes Alvares,'La agricultureespafoladesdecomienzosdel siglo XIX hastai968', in
Banco de Espafia, Ensayos sobre la economiaespafiola desde comienzosdel siglo XIX (Madrid, I970), pp.
240-6. SeealsoDavidR. Ringrose,Madrid and theSpanish Economy, iS6o-i88o (Berkeley andLos Angeles,
discussionin the Spanishcontextof thedebilitatingeffectsof a backward
i983), pp. 325-30, fora perceptive
agricultureon the entireeconomy.
80 Rondo Cameron, France and the Economic Developmentof Europe: idem, et al. Banking in the Early
Stages of Industrialization;idem, ed. Banking and EconomicDevelopment(New York, I972); see also idem,
europeennefut-ellesi indgale?'in PierreLeon et al., eds. L'Industrialisation
'Pourquoil'industrialisation
en Europe au XIXe siecle: cartographicet typologie (Paris, I972); and 'The International Diffusion of
TechnologyandEconomicDevelopmentin the ModernEconomicEpoch',in 5 Themes,SixthInternational
Congresson EconomicHistory,Copenhagen,August, I974.

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 EUROPEAN INDUSTRIALIZATION 23

Switzerland,Austria-Hungary,the Balkans, and Russia-with very mixed

results.Muchthe samecouldbe saidforfinancialinstitutions;someperformed
admirablyin the transitionto industrialsociety;others-whatevertheirprofita-
bility to their owners-made little or no contribution.81

VII
In conclusion:therewas not one modelfor industrialization in the nineteenth
century-the British-but several.Coalandhumancapitalwerethe two basic
ingredients, but in combinationwith one anotherand with other elements
they produceda variety-a spectrum,in fact-of patternsof industrialization.
To takean importantexampleoutsidethe Europeanexperience,industrializa-
tion in the United Statespriorto about I870 dependedupon humancapital
and abundantnaturalresourcesother than coal (but includingwaterpower);
after I870 coal was added to the others, resultingin the spectacularleap by
the United Statesto the forefrontof the industrialpowers.
The customarydepictionof an "industrialrevolution"in GreatBritainand
its repetition in continental Europe and elsewhere distorts the historical
record.It alsoconcealsthe distinctivevarietiesof industrialization,
andignores
the ingenuityand achievementsof the men and women who contributedto
it.
Emory University
81 In additionto the works cited in the previousnote, see RichardTilly, FinancialInstitutions
and
Industrializationin the Rhineland, 18i5-1870 (Madison,i966); GabrielTortella-Casares, Los origenesdel
capitalismoen Espana (2nd ed. Madrid, i982); Richard Rudolph, Banking and Industrializationin Austria-
Hungary(Cambridge,I976); JohnR. LampeandMarvinR. Jackson,Balkan EconomicHistory, i550-i950
(Bloomington,i982), ch. 8; and Udo E. G. Heyn, Private Banking and Industrialization:The Case of
Frankfurtam Main, i825-i875 (New York, i98i).

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