COLUMBIA V.

CA

Alfredo G. Ramos, intelligence officer of the Videogram Regulatory Board (VRB), received
information that private respondent Jose B. Jinco had in his possession pirated videotapes, posters,
advertising materials and other items used or intended to be used for the purpose of sale, lease,
distribution, circulation or public exhibition of the said pirated videotapes. Ramos ascertained the
information to be true and filed a verified Application for Search Warrant dated July 28, 1986 with
prayer for the seizure of the properties described in the search warrant.

On the same date, a hearing was conducted by Judge Florentino A. Flor of the Regional Trial Court
of Pasig, Branch 168, wherein Ramos and his two witnesses, Analie Jimenez and Rebecca Benitez-
Cruz testified on the need for the issuance of search warrant.

On July 28, 1986, the prayer for the issuance of the search warrant was granted and, on the same
date, Search Warrant No. 23 was issued.

On July 2, 1987, private respondent filed a Motion to Quash Search Warrant No. 23 on the grounds
that the Search Warrant did not state a specific offense and that, even assuming it stated a specific
offense, it covered more than one specific offense. The VRB opposed the Motion to Quash stating
that Search Warrant No. 23 was issued for a single specific offense namely, violation of Section 56
and other related sections of Presidential Decree No. 49 as amended by Presidential Decree No.
1988.

On September 30, 1987, the trial court denied the Motion to Quash finding that the Search Warrant
was issued for one specific offense. A Motion for Reconsideration was filed but the same was
likewise denied.

Private respondent then filed an Urgent Motion To Lift the Search Warrant and For the Return of the
Seized Articles alleging that Search Warrant No. 23 is a general warrant, and that it was issued
without probable cause.

On May 22, 1989, the assailed order was issued by Judge Benjamin V. Pelayo, now presiding over
Branch 168 of the Pasig RTC, granting the Motion to Quash and ordering the return of all seized
articles to private respondent.

Petitioners appealed to the Court of Appeals, which affirmed the said Order in toto.

Hence, this petition.

ISSUE: Whether the 20th Century Fox decision promulgated on August 19, 1988 is applicable to the
Motion to Quash Search Warrant No. 23 (issued on July 28, 1986).

RULING: We hold in the negative.

In the recent Columbia Pictures, et al., v. Court of Appeals, et al. 4 case which resolved the same
issue involving the same petitioners but with different respondents, the Court en banc held:

Mindful as we are of the ramifications of the doctrine of stare decisis and the rudiments of fair play, it
its our considered view that the 20th Century Fox ruling cannot be retroactively applied to the instant
case to justify the quashal of Search case to justify the quashal of Search Warrant No. 87-053.
Herein petitioners' consistent position that the order of the lower court of September 5, 1988 denying
therein defendants' motion to lift the order of search warrant was properly issued, there having been
satisfactory compliance with the then prevailing standards under the law for determination of
probable cause, is indeed well taken. The lower court could not possibly have expected more
evidence from petitioners in their application for a search warrant other than what the law and
jurisprudence, then existing and judicially accepted, required with respect to the finding of probable
cause.

xxx xxx xxx

It is consequently clear that judicial interpretation becomes a part of the law as of the date that law
was originally passed, subject only to the qualification that when a doctrine of this Court is over-ruled
and a different view is adopted, and more so when there is a reversal thereof, the new doctrine
should be applied prospectively and should not apply to parties who relied on the old doctrine and
acted in good faith.

2. Ching v. Salinas G.R. No. 161295 June 29, 2005

Ching v. Salinas, Sr. (G.R. No. 161295)

Facts:

Petitioner Ching is a maker and manufacturer of a utility model, Leaf Spring Eye
Bushing for Automobile, for which he holds certificates of copyright registration.
Petitioner’s request to the NBI to apprehend and prosecute illegal manufacturers of his
work led to the issuance of search warrants against respondent Salinas, alleged to be
reproducing and distributing said models in violation of the IP Code. Respondent moved
to quash the warrants on the ground that petitioner’s work is not artistic in nature and is
a proper subject of a patent, not copyright. Petitioner insists that the IP Code protects a
work from the moment of its creation regardless of its nature or purpose. The trial court
quashed the warrants. Petitioner argues that the copyright certificates over the model
are prima facie evidence of its validity. CA affirmed the trial court’s decision.

Issues:

(1) Whether or not petitioner’s model is an artistic work subject to copyright protection.

(2) Whether or not petitioner is entitled to copyright protection on the basis of the
certificates of registration issued to it.

Ruling:

(1) NO. As gleaned from the specifications appended to the application for a copyright
certificate filed by the petitioner, the said Leaf Spring Eye Bushing for Automobile and
Vehicle Bearing Cushion are merely utility models. As gleaned from the description of
the models and their objectives, these articles are useful articles which are defined as
one having an intrinsic utilitarian function that is not merely to portray the appearance of
the article or to convey information. Plainly, these are not literary or artistic works. They
are not intellectual creations in the literary and artistic domain, or works of applied art.
They are certainly not ornamental designs or one having decorative quality or value.
Indeed, while works of applied art, original intellectual, literary and artistic works are
copyrightable, useful articles and works of industrial design are not. A useful article may
be copyrightable only if and only to the extent that such design incorporates pictorial,
graphic, or sculptural features that can be identified separately from, and are capable of
existing independently of the utilitarian aspects of the article. In this case, the bushing
and cushion are not works of art. They are, as the petitioner himself admitted, utility
models which may be the subject of a patent.

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(2) NO.  No copyright granted by law can be said to arise in favor of the petitioner
despite the issuance of the certificates of copyright registration and the deposit of the
Leaf Spring Eye Bushing and Vehicle Bearing Cushion. Indeed, in Joaquin, Jr.
v. Drilon and Pearl & Dean (Phil.), Incorporated v. Shoemart, Incorporated, the Court
ruled that:

Copyright, in the strict sense of the term, is purely a statutory right. It is a new or
independent right granted by the statute, and not simply a pre-existing right regulated by
it. Being a statutory grant, the rights are only such as the statute confers, and may be
obtained and enjoyed only with respect to the subjects and by the persons, and on
terms and conditions specified in the statute. Accordingly, it can cover only the works
falling within the statutory enumeration or description.

Ownership of copyrighted material is shown by proof of originality and copyrightability.

To discharge his burden, the applicant may present the certificate of registration
covering the work or, in its absence, other evidence. A copyright certificate
provides prima facie evidence of originality which is one element of copyright validity. It
constitutes prima facie evidence of both validity and ownership and the validity of the
facts stated in the certificate.

3. FAV

4. Joaquin, Jr. v. Drilon G.R. No. 108946 Jan. 28, 1999

FRANCISCO G. JOAQUIN, JR. and BJ PRODUCTIONS, INC. vs. HONORABLE RANKLIN M.

DRILON, GABRIEL ZOSA, WILLIAM ESPOSO, FELIPE MEDINA, JR., and CASEY FRANCISCO

FACTS:

Petitioner BJ Productions, Inc. (BJPI) is the holder/grantee of Certificate of Copyright No. M922
dated January 28, 1971 of Rhoda and Me, a dating game show aired from 1970 to 1977. In 1973,
petitioner BJPI submitted to the National Library an addendum to its certificate of copyright
specifying the show’s format and style presentation. In 1991, petitioner Francisco Joaquin, Jr.,
president of BJPI, saw on RPN 9 an episode of It’s a Date. He immediately protested the airing of
the show through a letter sent to Grabriel M. Zosa, president and general manager of IXL
Productions, Inc., the producer of It’s a Date. Petitioner Joaquin informed respondent, Zosa of a
copyright toRhoda and Me and demanded that IXL discontinue airing It’s a Date. Respondent Zosa
apologized to Joaquin, but continued airing the show. Zosa also sought to register IXL’s copyright to
the first episode of It’s a Date for which a certificate of copyright was issued by the National Library
on August 14, 1991. With these developments, petitioners herein filed a complaint against Zosa and
other RPN Channel 9 officers as a result of which an information for violation of P.D. No. 49 was
filed before the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City. Zosa appealed to the Department of Justice.
The Secretary of Justice reversed the prosecutor’s findings and directed the dismissal of the case.
Petitioner Joaquin filed a motion for reconsideration, but it was denied by the Secretary of Justice.
Hence, this petition. Both public and private respondents maintained that petitioners failed to
establish the existence of probable cause due to their failure to present the copyrighted master
videotape of Rhoda and Me. They contended that BJPl’s copyright covers only a specific episode
of Rhosa and Me and that the formats or concepts of dating game shows were not covered by the
copyright protection under P.D. No. 49.

ISSUE:

            Whether the format or mechanics or petitioner’s television show is entitled to copyright
protection.

HELD:

            The Court ruled that the format of the show is not copyrightable. Sec. 2 of PD No. 49,
otherwise known as the Decree on Intellectual Property, enumerates the classes of work entitled to
copyright protection. The provision is substantially the same as Sec. 172 of the Intellectual Property
Code of the Philippines (RA 8293). The format or mechanics of a television show is not included in
the list of protected works in Sec. 2 of PD No. 49. For this reason, the protection afforded by the law
cannot be extended to cover them.

 Copyright, in the strict sense of the term, is purely a statutory right. It is a new independent right
granted by the statute and not simply a pre-existing right regulated by the statute. Being a statutory
grant, the rights are only such as the statute confers, and may be obtained and enjoyed only with
respect to the subjects and by the person and on terms and conditions specified in the statute.
The Court is of the opinion that petitioner BJPI’s copyright covers audio-visual recordings of each
episode of Rhoda and Me, as falling within the class of works mentioned in PD 49.

The copyright does not extend to the general concept or format of its dating game show.

Mere description by words of the general format of the two dating game shows is insufficient; the
presentation of the master videotape in evidence was indispensable to the determination of the
existence of a probable cause.

A television show includes more than mere words can describe because it involves a whole
spectrum of visuals and effects, video and audio, such that no similarity or dissimilarity may be found
by merely describing the general copyright / format of both dating game shows.

5. Pearl & Dean v. Shoemart G.R. No. 148222 Aug.15, 2003

FACTS:

          Pearl and Dean is a corporation engaged in the manufacture of advertising display units
referred to as light boxes and these light boxes were marketed under the trademark Poster Ads.
Pearl and Dean entered into a contract with Shoemart, Inc. for the lease and installation of the light
boxes in SM North Edsa. However, due to construction constraints, Shoemart, Inc offered as an
alternative SM Makati and SM Cubao.

          After Pearl and Dean’s contract was rescinded, exact copies of its light boxes were installed in
various SM malls, fabricated by Metro Industrial Services and later by EYD Rainbow Advertising
Corporation. Pearl and Dean sent a letter to Shoemart and its sister company, North Edsa Marketing
to cease using the light boxes and to remove them from the malls, and demanded the discontinued
used of the trademark “Poster Ads”.

          Unsatisfied with the compliance of its demands, Pearl and Dean sued Shoemart which was
ruled by the trial court in their favor. On appeal, however, the Court of Appeals reversed the trial
court’s decision.

ISSUE:

          Whether Pearl and Dean’s copyright registration for its light boxes and the trademark
registration of “Poster Ads” preclude Shoemart and North Edsa Marketing from using the same.

RULING:

No, Pearl and Dean secured its copyright under the classification class “o” work. This being so, its
protection extended only to the technical drawings and not to the light box itself. Pearl and Dean
cannot exclude others from the manufacture, sale and commercial use over the light boxes on the
sole basis of its copyright, certificated over the technical drawings. It cannot be the intention of the
law that the right of exclusivity would be granted for a longer time through the simplified procedure of
copyright registration with the National Library, without the rigor of defending the patentability of its
“invention” before the IPO and the public.

          On the other hand, there has been no evidence that Pearl and Dean’s use of “Poster Ads” was
distinctive or well known. “Poster Ads” was too generic a name to identify it to a specific company or
entity. “Poster Ads” was generic and incapable of being used as a trademark because it was used in
the field of poster advertising, the very business engaged by Pearl and Dean. Furthermore, Pearl
and Dean’s exclusive right to the use of “Poster Ads” is limited to what is written in its certificate of
registration. Shoemart cannot be held liable for the infringement of the trademark.

6. FILSCAP v. Tan G.R. No. L-36402 March 16, 1987 (downloaded)

7. Habana v.Robles G.R. No. 131522 July 19, 1999

FACTS: Pacita Habana et al., are authors and copyright owners of duly issued of the book, College
English For Today (CET). Respondent Felicidad Robles was the author of the book Developing
English Proficiency (DEP). Petitioners found that several pages of the respondent's book are similar,
if not all together a copy of petitioners' book. Habana et al. filed an action for damages and
injunction, alleging respondent’s infringement of copyrights, in violation of P.D. 49. They allege
respondent Felicidad C. Robles being substantially familiar with the contents of petitioners' works,
and without securing their permission, lifted, copied, plagiarized and/or transposed certain portions
of their book CET.

On the other hand, Robles contends that the book DEP is the product of her own intellectual
creation, and was not a copy of any existing valid copyrighted book and that the similarities may be
due to the authors' exercise of the "right to fair use of copyrighted materials, as guides."

The trial court ruled in favor of the respondents, absolving them of any liability.  Later, the Court of
Appeals rendered judgment in favor of respondents Robles and Goodwill Trading Co., Inc. In this
appeal, petitioners submit that the appellate court erred in affirming the trial court's decision.

ISSUE: Whether Robles committed infringement in the production of DEP.

RULING:

YES. Under Section 177. It provides for the copy or economic rights of an owner of a copyright as
follows: “Sec. 177. Copy or Economic rights. — Subject to the provisions of chapter VIII, copyright or
economic rights shall consist of the exclusive right to carry out, authorize or prevent the following
acts: 177.1 Reproduction of the work or substantial portion of the work; 177.2 Dramatization,
translation, adaptation, abridgment, arrangement or other transformation of the work; 177.3 The first
public distribution of the original and each copy of the work by sale or other forms of transfer of
ownership; 177.4 Rental of the original or a copy of an audiovisual or cinematographic work, a work
embodied in a sound recording, a computer program, a compilation of data and other materials or a
musical work in graphic form, irrespective of the ownership of the original or the copy which is the
subject of the rental; (n) 177.5 Public display of the original or copy of the work; 177.6 Public
performance of the work; and 177.7 Other communication to the public of the work.” The law also
provided for the limitations on copyright, thus: “Sec. 184.1 Limitations on copyright. —
Notwithstanding the provisions of Chapter V, the following acts shall not constitute infringement of
copyright: (a) the recitation or performance of a work, once it has been lawfully made accessible to
the public, if done privately and free of charge or if made strictly for a charitable or religious
institution or society; [Sec. 10(1), P.D. No. 49] (b) The making of quotations from a published work if
they are compatible with fair use and only to the extent justified for the purpose, including quotations
from newspaper articles and periodicals in the form of press summaries; Provided, that the source
and the name of the author, if appearing on the work are mentioned; (Sec. 11 third par.  P.D. 49) . . .
(e) The inclusion of a work in a publication, broadcast, or other communication to the public, sound
recording of film, if such inclusion is made by way of illustration for teaching purposes and is
compatible with fair use: Provided, That the source and the name of the author, if appearing in the
work is mentioned; In the above-quoted provisions, “work” has reference to literary and artistic
creations and this includes books and other literary, scholarly and scientific works.

When is there a substantial reproduction of a book? It does not necessarily require that the entire
copyrighted work, or even a large portion of it, be copied. If so much is taken that the value of the
original work is substantially diminished, there is an infringement of copyright and to an injurious
extent, the work is appropriated. In determining the question of infringement, the amount of matter
copied from the copyrighted work is an important consideration. To constitute infringement, it is not
necessary that the whole or even a large portion of the work shall have been copied. If so much is
taken that the value of the original is sensibly diminished, or the labors of the original author are
substantially and to an injurious extent appropriated by another, that is sufficient in point of law to
constitute piracy. The essence of intellectual piracy should be essayed in conceptual terms in order
to underscore its gravity by an appropriate understanding thereof. Infringement of a copyright is a
trespass on a private domain owned and occupied by the owner of the copyright, and, therefore,
protected by law, and infringement of copyright, or piracy, which is a synonymous term in this
connection, consists in the doing by any person, without the consent of the owner of the copyright, of
anything the sole right to do which is conferred by statute on the owner of the copyright.

In this jurisdiction under Sec. 184 of Republic Act 8293 it is provided that: Limitations on Copyright.
Notwithstanding the provisions of Chapter V, the following shall not constitute infringement of
copyright: . . . (c) The making of quotations from a published work if they are compatible with fair use
and only to the extent justified for the purpose, including quotations from newspaper articles and
periodicals in the form of press summaries: Provided, That the source and the name of the author, if
appearing on the work, are mentioned. A copy of a piracy is an infringement of the original, and it is
no defense that the pirate, in such cases, did not know whether or not he was infringing any
copyright; he at least knew that what he was copying was not his, and he copied at his peril. DaAISH

In copyrighting books the purpose is to give protection to the intellectual product of an author. This is
precisely what the law on copyright protected, under Section 184.1 (b). Quotations from a published
work if they are compatible with fair use and only to the extent justified by the purpose, including
quotations from newspaper articles and periodicals in the form of press summaries are allowed
provided that the source and the name of the author, if appearing on the work, are mentioned.

On page 404 of petitioners’ Book 1 of College English for Today, the authors wrote:

Items in dates and addresses:

He died on Monday, April 15, 1975.

Miss Reyes lives in 214 Taft Avenue, Manila

On page 73 of respondents Book 1 Developing English Today, they wrote:

He died on Monday, April 25, 1975.

Miss Reyes address is 214 Taft Avenue Manila

On Page 250 of CET, there is this example on parallelism or repetition of sentence structures, thus:

“The proposition is peace. Not peace through the medium of war; not peace to be hunted through
the labyrinth of intricate and endless negotiations; not peace to arise out of universal discord,
fomented from principle, in all parts of the empire; not peace to depend on the juridical determination
of perplexing questions, or the precise marking of the boundary of a complex government. It is
simple peace; sought in its natural course, and in its ordinary haunts. It is peace sought in the spirit
of peace, and laid in principles purely pacific.

— Edmund Burke, “Speech on Criticism.”

On page 100 of the book DEP, also in the topic of parallel structure and repetition, the same
example is found in toto. The only difference is that petitioners acknowledged the author Edmund
Burke, and respondents did not.

In several other pages the treatment and manner of presentation of the topics of DEP are similar if
not a rehash of that contained in CET.

We believe that respondent Robles’ act of lifting from the book of petitioners substantial portions of
discussions and examples, and her failure to acknowledge the same in her book is an infringement
of petitioners’ copyrights.

8. ABS-CBN v. Phil.Multimedia System G.R. No. 175769-70 Jan. 19, 2009

FACTS: Philippine Multi-Media System, Inc. (PMSI), operator of Dream Broadcsating System,
delivers a digital direct-to-home (DTH) television satellite to its subscribers all over the Philippines,
was granted a legislative franchise under Republic Act 8630 and was given a Provisional Authority
by the National Telecommunications Commission (NTC) to install, operate and maintain a
nationwide DTH satellite service. When it commenced operations, it offered as part of its program
line-up, together with other paid premium program channels, ABS-CBN Channels 2 and 23, NBN,
Channel 4, ABC, Channel 5, GMA, Channel 7, RPN, Channel 9, and IBC, Channel 13, pursuant to
Memorandum Circular 4-08-88 which mandated all cable television system operators, operating
within the Grade “A” and “B” CONTOURS to carry out the television signals of the authorized
television broadcast stations.

ABS-CBN Broadcasting Corporation (ABS-CBN), a licensed television and radio broadcasting

network, demanded PMSI to cease and desist from “rebroadcasting” Channels 2 and 23. In its reply,
PMSI contended that the “rebroadcasting” was in accordance with the authority granted by NTC
under its obligations under NTC MC 4-08-88.

Negotiations were ensued between the parties in an effort to reach a settlement; however, the same
was terminated by ABS-CBN allegedly due to PMSI’s inability to ensure the prevention of illegal
“retransmission” and further “rebroadcast” of its signals, as well as the adverse effect of the
rebroadcasts on the business operations of its regional television stations.
ABS-CBN filed with the Intellectual Property Rights Office (IPO) a complaint for “Violation of Laws
Involving Property Rights, with Prayer for the Issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order and/or Writ
of Preliminary Injunction” alleging that PMSI’s unauthorized rebroadcasting of Channels 2 and 23
infringed on its broadcasting rights and copyright. The TRO was granted by the Bureau of Legal
Affairs (BLA) of IPO. PMSI, pursuant to the TRO, suspended the retransmission of PMSI of
Channels 2 and 23 and likewise filed a petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals. The Court of
Appeals granted the petition of PMSI and reversed the decision of the BLA. ABS-CBN filed its
appeal however it was dismissed by the Court of Appeals. Furthermore, ABS-CBN’s motion for
reconsideration was denied.

Issue:

1. Whether or not PMSI violated the Laws on Property Rights.

2. Whether or not the issuance MC 4-08-88 by the NTC is a valid exercise of the police power of the
State.

Held:

1. NO. PMSI did not violate the Laws on Property Rights because it is not engaged in rebroadcasting
Channels 2 and 23. Rebroadcasting has been defined as “the simultaneous broadcasting by one
broadcasting organization of the broadcast of another broadcasting organization.” It is also “the
transmission by wireless means for the public reception of sounds or of images or of representations
thereof; such transmission by satellite is also ‘broadcasting’ where the means for decrypting are
provided to the public by the broadcasting organization or with its consent.” PMSI is only engaged in
the carrying of signals of ABS-CBN coming from ABS-CBN and transmitting signals. PMSI is not the
origin nor does it claim to be the origin of the programs broadcasted by the ABS-CBN. PMSI did not
make and transmit on its own but merely carried the existing signals of the ABS-CBN. When PMSI
subscribers view ABS-CBN’s programs in Channels 2 and 23, they know that the origin thereof was
the ABS-CBN.

The nature of broadcasting is to scatter the signals in its widest area of coverage as possible. On
this score, it may be said that making public means that accessibility is undiscriminating as long as it
is within the range of the transmitter and equipment of the broadcaster. That the medium through
which the PMSI carries the ABS-CBN’s signal, that is via satellite, does not diminish the fact that it
operates and functions as a cable television. It remains that the PMSI’s transmission of signals via
its DTH satellite television service cannot be considered within the purview of broadcasting.

Furthermore, there is no rebroadcasting on the part of the PMSI of the ABS-CBM’s programs on
Channels 2 and 23, as defined under the Rome Convention, which defines rebroadcasting as “the
simultaneous broadcasting by one broadcasting organization of the broadcast of another
broadcasting organization.” ABS-CBN creates and transmits its own signals; PMSI merely carries
such signals which the viewers receive in its unaltered form. PMSI does not produce, select, or
determine the programs to be shown in Channels 2 and 23. Likewise, it does not pass itself off as
the origin or author of such programs. Insofar as Channels 2 and 23 are concerned, PMSI merely
retransmits the same in accordance with Memorandum Circular 04-08-88. With regard to its
premium channels, it buys the channels from content providers and transmits on an as-is basis to its
viewers. Clearly, PMSI does not perform the functions of a broadcasting organization; thus, it cannot
be said that it is engaged in rebroadcasting Channels 2 and 23.

Therefore, the retransmission of ABS-CBN’s signals by PMSI – which functions essentially as a

cable television – does not constitute rebroadcasting in violation of the former’s intellectual property
rights under the IP Code.
2. YES. The law on copyright is not absolute. The carriage of ABS-CBN’s signals by virtue of the
must-carry rule in Memorandum Circular No. 04-08-88 is under the direction and control of the
government though the NTC which is vested with exclusive jurisdiction to supervise, regulate and
control telecommunications and broadcast services/facilities in the Philippines. The imposition of the
must-carry rule is within the NTC’s power to promulgate rules and regulations, as public safety and
interest may require, to encourage a larger and more effective use of communications, radio and
television broadcasting facilities, and to maintain effective competition among private entities in
these activities whenever the Commission finds it reasonably feasible.

The “Must-Carry Rule” is in consonance with the principles and objectives underlying Executive
Order No. 436, to wit:

The Filipino people must be given wider access to more sources of news, information, education,
sports event and entertainment programs other than those provided for by mass media and afforded
television programs to attain a well informed, well-versed and culturally refined citizenry and
enhance their socio-economic growth.

Moreover, radio and television waves are mere franchised which may be reasonably burdened with
some form of public service. It is a privilege subject, among other things, to amendment by Congress
in accordance with the constitutional provision that “any such franchise or right granted . . . shall be
subject to amendment, alteration or repeal by the Congress when the common good so requires.”

The must carry rule is a valid exercise of the police power of the State. It favors both broadcasting
organizations and the public. It prevents cable television companies from excluding broadcasting
organization especially in those places not reached by signal. Also, the rule prevents cable television
companies from depriving viewers in far-flung areas the enjoyment of programs available to city
viewers. In fact, this Office finds the rule more burdensome on the part of the cable television
companies. The latter carries the television signals and shoulders the costs without any recourse of
charging. On the other hand, the signals that are carried by cable television companies are
dispersed and scattered by the television stations and anybody with a television set is free to pick
them up.

10. United Features v. Munsingwear G.R. No. 76193 Nov. 9, 1989

This is a petition for review on certiorari filed by United Feature Syndicate Inc., seeking to set aside
the Resolution of the Seventh Division of the Court of Appeals * dated September 16, 1986 dismissing the appeal of
petitioner-appellant for having been filed out of time and denying its Motion for Reconsideration for lack of merit in its Resolution dated
October 14, 1986.

The Resolution dismissing the appeal, reads as follows:

We agree with the Philippine Patent Office and respondent appellee that the decision
of the aforementioned office dated October 2, 1984 had already become final and
executory at the time the Notice of Appeal was filed.

Our reasons for this conclusions are borne out by the following facts:

a) On October 2, 1984, the decision sought to be appealed was

rendered by the Philippine Patent Office and a copy thereof was
received by counsel for petitioner-appellant on October 3, 1984
 — not October 9, 1984 as stated in the Notice of Appeal. There can
be no doubt about the decision having been received by petitioner-
appellant's counsel on October 3, 1984 for this is clearly written in the
Notice of Decision (p. 61, Original Record), and in point of fact the
date of receipt cannot be October 9, 1984, as declared in the Notice
of Appeal (p. 1, Rollo), because in the motion for reconsideration
subsequently filed by petitioner-appellant it was stated that a copy of
the decision was received on October 4, 1984 (p. 80, Original
Record).

b) On October 18, 1984 — as shown in the stamp mark of the

Philippine Patent Office (p. 80, Original Record) or on the 15th and
last day either for appealing or for moving for reconsideration,
petitioner-appellant filed a motion for reconsideration.

Sadly and unexplainably for a veteran law office, said motion did not contain or
incorporate a notice of hearing.

c) Possibly realizing the fatal defect in its motion for reconsideration,

petitioner-appellant subsequently filed a motion to set for hearing its
motion for reconsideration. This was done, however, only on October
31, 1984 (p. 162, Original Record).

The motion for reconsideration filed on the last day, fatally failing as it did to contain a
notice of hearing, said pleading did not interrupt the period for appealing, for the
motion was nothing but a piece of scrap paper (Agricultural and Industrial Marketing,
Inc. v. Court of Appeals, 118 SCRA [1982] 492; Republic Planters Bank v.
Intermediate Appellate Court, 13 SCRA [1984] 631).

This deadly and moral deficiency in the motion for reconsideration, therefore,
resulted in the decision of the Philippine Patent Office being final and executory
on October 19, 1984, the day after the motion for reconsideration was filed, said
motion having been filed on the 15th and last day for appealing.

WHEREFORE, the motion of respondent appellee is hereby granted and the appeal
dismissed.

SO ORDERED. (Rollo 42-43)

This case arose from petition filed by petitioner for the cancellation of the registration of trademark
CHARLIE BROWN (Registration No. SR. 4224) in the name of respondent MUNSINGWEAR in Inter
Partes Case No. 1350 entitled "United Feature Syndicate, Inc. v. Munsingwear Creation Mfg. Co.",
with the Philippine Patent Office alleging that petitioner is damaged by the registration of the
trademark CHARLIE BROWN of T-Shirts under Class 25 with the Registration No. SR-4224 dated
September 12, 1979 in the name of Munsingwear Creation Manufacturing Co., Inc., on the following
grounds: (1) that respondent was not entitled to the registration of the mark CHARLIE BROWN, &
DEVICE at the time of application for registration; (2) that CHARLIE BROWN is a character creation
or a pictorial illustration, the copyright to which is exclusively owned worldwide by the petitioner; (3)
that as the owner of the pictorial illustration CHARLIE BROWN, petitioner has since 1950 and
continuously up to the present, used and reproduced the same to the exclusion of others; (4) that the
respondent-registrant has no bona fide use of the trademark in commerce in the Philippines prior to
its application for registration. (Petition, p. 2, Rollo, p. 8)
On October 2, 1984 the Director of the Philippine Patent Office rendered a decision in this case
holding that a copyright registration like that of the name and likeness of CHARLIE BROWN may not
provide a cause of action for the cancellation of a trademark registration, (Petition, p. 4; Rollo, p. 10 )

Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration of the decision rendered by the Philippine Patent Office
which was denied by the Director of said office on the ground that the Decision No. 84-83 was
already final and executory (Petition, Rollo, pp. 11-12).

From this decision, petitioner-appellant appealed to the Court of Appeals and respondent court in its
resolution dated September 16, 1986 denied the appeal. While the Motion for Reconsideration was
filed on time, that is, on the last day within which to appeal, still it is a mere scrap of paper because
there was no, date, of hearing stated therein.

Subsequently, petitioner-appellant filed a motion for reconsideration which public respondent denied
for lack of merit( Annex "B", Rollo p. 45)..

Hence this petition for review on certiorari.

In the resolution of April 6, 1987, the petition was given due course.

In its petition (Rollo, p. 10) and in its memorandum (Rollo, p. 97), petitioner-appellant raised the
following legal issues:

WHETHER THE RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS ACTED IN EXCESS OF

JURISDICTION AND/OR COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION WHEN IT
BASED ITS RESOLUTION IN DISMISSING ITS APPEAL ON STRICT TECHNICAL
RULES OF PROCEDURE AS ENUNCIATED IN RULE 15 OF THE RULES OF
COURT INSTEAD OF RELYING ON THE POLICY OF THE PHILIPPINE PATENT
OFFICE AS STRESSED IN RULE 169, AS AMENDED, OF THE RULES OF
PRACTICE IN TRADEMARK CASES.

II

WHETHER THE RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED GRAVE

ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO EXCESS OF JURISDICTION WHEN
BY DISMISSING THE APPEAL TO IT FROM THE DECISION OF THE DIRECTOR
OF PATENTS, IT KNOWINGLY DISREGARDED ITS OWN DECISION IN AC-GR.
SP. NO. 0342, WHICH WAS AFFIRMED BY THIS HONORABLE SUPREME
COURT TO THE EFFECT THAT A COPYRIGHTED CHARACTER MAY NOT BE
APPROPRIATED AS A TRADEMARK BY ANOTHER UNDER PRESIDENTIAL
DECREE NO. 49.

III

WHETHER, ASSUMING ARGUENDO, BUT ONLY ASSUMING, THAT THE

DECISION OF THE DIRECTOR OF PATENTS IN THE CASE AT BAR HAD
ALREADY BECOME FINAL WHEN IT WAS APPEALED TO THE COURT OF
APPEALS, THE LATTER, BY REASON OF THE SUPERVENING FACTS AFTER
THE DECISION APPEALED FROM WAS RENDERED, SHOULD HAVE
 HARMONIZED THE DECISION WITH LAW, THE DEMANDS OF JUSTICE AND
EQUITY.

The petitioner is impressed with merit.

Petitioner's contention that the purpose of a notice of hearing to the adverse party is to afford him an
opportunity to resist the motion, more particularly the motion for reconsideration filed by its company
is well taken. Said purpose was served when Munsingwear filed its opposition thereto on November
20, 1984 and cured the technical defect of lack of notice of hearing complained of (Rollo, p. 52).
Otherwise stated such shortcomings of petitioner as to compliance with procedural requirements in
taking its appeal cannot be deemed sufficient to deprive it of a chance to secure a review by this
court in order to obtain substantial justice; more so where liverality accorded to the petitioner
becomes compelling because of the ostensible merit of petitioner's case (Olango v. Court of First
Instance of Misamis Oriental, 121 SCRA 338 [1983]).

Moreover, in Siguenza v. Court of Appeals, (137 SCRA 570 [1985]) the Court stressed that the right
to appeal should not be lightly disregarded by a stringent application of rules of procedure especially
where the appeal is on its face meritorious and the interest of substantial justice would be served by
permitting the appeal.

As enunciated in the case of Castro v. Court of Appeals (123 SCRA 782, [1983]) the importance and
real purpose of the remedy of appeal was stressed as follows:

An appeal is an essential part of oar judicial system. We have advised the courts to
proceed with caution so as not to deprive a party of the right to appeal. (National
Waterworks and Sewerage Authority v. Municipality of Libmanan, 97 SCRA 138) and
instructed that every party-litigant should be afforded the amplest opportunity for the
proper and just disposition of his cause, freed from the constraints of technicalities.
(A-One Feeds, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, 100 SCRA 590).

The rules of procedure are not to be applied in a very rigid and technical sense. The
rules of procedure are used only to help secure not override substantial
justice. (Gregorio v. Court of Appeals, 72 SCRA 120), therefore, we ruled in Republic
v. Court of Appeals (83 SCRA 453) that a six day delay in the perfection of the
appeal does not warrant its dismissal. And again in Ramos v. Bagaso, 96 SCRA
395, this Court held that the delay of four (4) days in filing a notice of appeal and a
motion for extension of time to file a record on appeal can be excused on the basis
of equity.

It was further emphasized that we allowed the filing of an appeal in some cases where a stringent
application of the rules would have denied it, or when to do so would serve the demands
of substantial justice and in the exercise of our equity jurisdiction (Serrano v. Court of Appeals, 139
SCRA 179 [1085].)

In the case at bar, the petitioner's delay in filing their record on appeal  should not be strictly
construed as to deprive them of the right to appeal especially since on its face the appeal appears to
be impressed with merit. (Emphasis supplied). All aforementioned cases are cited in G.R. No.
76595, Pacific Asia Overseas Shipping Corporation v. NLRC, et al., May 6, 1988.

Procedural technicality should not prevail over substantive rights of a party to appeal (NEA v. CA,
126 SCRA 394).
Moreover, a judgment of the Court of Appeals that become final by reason of the mistake of the
herein petitioner's lawyer may still be reviewed on appeal by the Supreme Court particularly where
the Supreme Court already gave due course to the petition for review (Ernesto v. Court of Appeals,
116 SCRA 755 [1982]).

Where strong considerations of substantial justice are manifest in the petition, this Court may relax
the stringent application of technical rules in the exercise of equity jurisdiction. In addition to the
basic merits of the main case, such petition usually embodies justifying circumstances which warrant
our heeding the petitioner's cry for justice, inspite of the earlier negligence of counsel (Serrano v.
Court of Appeals et al., 139 SCRA 179 [1985]).

In a number of cases, this Court in the exercise of equity jurisdiction decided to disregard
technicalities in order to resolve the case on its merits based on the evidence (St. Peter Memorial
Park, Inc. et al. v. Cleofas, 121 SCRA 287, [1983]; Helmuth, Jr. v. People of the Philippines, 112
SCRA 573 [1983]).

This case was brought before this Court for the resolution of the dismissal of the appeal filed by
petitioner-appellant from the decision of the Director of the Philippines Patent Office for being filed
out of time. The normal action to take thereafter, would be to remand this case to the Court of
Appeals for further proceedings. However, in line with jurisprudence, such time consuming
procedure may be properly dispensed with to resolve the issue (Quisumbing v. Court of Appeals,
122 SCRA 709 [1983]) where there is enough basis to end the basic controversy between the
parties here and now. In the case at bar dispensing with such procedural steps would not anyway
affect substantially the merits of their respective claims as held in Velasco v. Court of Appeals, (95
SCRA 621 [1980] cited in Ortigas & Co. Ltd. v. Ruiz, 148 SCRA [1987] hence the need for this Court
to broaden its inquiry in this case land decide the same on the merits rather than merely resolve the
procedural question raised (Dorado v. Court of Appeals, 153 SCRA 420 [1987]; De Lima v. Laguna
Tayabas Co., 160 SCRA 70 [1988]).

Petitioner contends that it will be damaged by the registration of the trademark CHARLIE BROWN &
DEVICE in favor of private respondent and that it has a better right to CHARLIE BROWN & DEVICE
since the likeness of CHARLIE BROWN appeared in periodicals having worldwide distribution and
covered by copyright registration in its name which antedates the certificate of registration of
respondent issued only on September 12, 1979. (Petition, Rollo, p. 21).

Petitioner further stresses that Decision No. 84-83 (TM) promulgated by the Philippine Patent Office
on October 2, 1984 which held that "the name likeness of CHARLIE BROWN may not provide a
cause of action for the cancellation of a trademark registration," was based in the conclusion made
in the case of "Children's Television Workshop v. touch of Class" earlier decided by the Director of
Patent Office on May 10, 1984. However, when the latter case was appealed to the then
Intermediate Appellate Court, docketed as A.C. G.R. SP No. 03432, the appellate court reversed the
decision of the Director holding said appealed decision as illegal and contrary to law. this reversal
was affirmed by this Court on August 7, 1985 in G.R. No. 71210 by denying the petition of
respondent Touch of Class.

The Court of Appeals in reversing the Director of Patent's decision in Touch of Class, Inc. succintly
said:

The Patents Office ruled that a trademark, unlike a label, cannot be copyrighted. The
"Cookie Monster" is not, however, a trademark. It is a character in a TV series
entitled "Sesame Street." It was respondent which appropriated the "Cookie Monster"
as a trademark, after it has been copyrighted. We hold that the exclusive right
 secured by PD 49 to the petitioner precludes the appropriation of the "Cookie
Monster" by the respondent.

Pertinently, Section 2 of Presidential Decree No. 49, otherwise known as the "Decree on Intellectual
Property", provides:

Section 2. The rights granted by this Decree shall, from the moment of creation,
subsist with respect to any of the following classes of works:

xxx xxx xxx

(O) Prints, pictorial illustrations, advertising copies, labels, tags and box wraps. ...

Therefore, since the name "CHARLIE BROWN" and its pictorial representation were covered by a
copyright registration way back in 1950 the same are entitled to protection under PD No. 49.

Aside from its copyright registration, petitioner is also the owner of several trademark registrations
and application for the name and likeness of "CHARLIE BROWN" which is the duly registered
trademark and copyright of petitioner United Feature Syndicate Inc. as early as 1957 and
additionally also as TV SPECIALS featuring the "PEANUTS" characters "CHARLIE BROWN"
(Memorandum, Rollo p. 97 [211]).

An examination of the records show that the only appreciable defense of respondent-registrant is
embodied in its answer, which reads:

It uses, the trademark "CHARLIE BROWN" & "DEVICE" on children's wear such as
T-shirts, undershirts, sweaters, brief and sandos, in class 25; whereas "CHARLIE
BROWN" is used only by petitioner as character, in a pictorial illustration used in a
comic strip appearing in newspapers and magazines. It has no trademark
significance and therefore respondent-registrant's use of "CHARLIE BROWN" &
"DEVICE" is not in conflict with the petitioner's use of "CHARLIE BROWN" (Rollo, p.
97 [21]).

It is undeniable from the records that petitioner is the actual owner of said trademark due to its prior
registration with the Patent's Office.

Finally, in La Chemise Lacoste S.A. v. Hon. Oscar Fernandez & Gobindram Hemandas Sujanani v.
Hon. Roberto V. Ongpin, et al. 129 SCRA 373 [1984]), the Court declared.

In upholding the right of the petitioner to maintain the present suit before our courts
for unfair competition or infringement of trademarks of a foreign corporation, we are
moreover recognizing our duties and the rights of foregoing states under the Paris
Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property to which the Philippines and
(France) U.S. are parties. We are simply interpreting a solemn international
commitment of the Philippines embodied in a multilateral treaty to which we are a
party and which we entered into because it is in our national interest to do so.

PREMISES CONSIDERED, the Resolutions of the Court of Appeals dated September 16, 1985 and
October 14, 1986 dismissing petitioner's appeal are hereby SET ASIDE and Certificate of
Registration no. SR-424 issued to private respondent dated September 12, 1979 is hereby
CANCELLED.
SO ORDERED.

11. Microsoft v.Hwang G.R. No. 147043 June 21, 2005

The Facts

Petitioner Microsoft Corporation (“Microsoft”), a Delaware, United States corporation, owns the
copyright and trademark to several computer software. [3] Respondents Benito Keh and Yvonne Keh
are the President/Managing Director and General Manager, respectively, of respondent Beltron
Computer Philippines, Inc. (“Beltron”), a domestic corporation. Respondents Jonathan K. Chua,
Emily K. Chua, Benito T. Sanchez, and Nancy I. Velasco are Beltron’s Directors. On the other hand,
respondents Alfonso Chua, Alberto Chua, Judy K. Chua Hwang, Sophia Ong, and Deanna Chua are
the Directors of respondent Taiwan Machinery Display & Trade Center, Inc. (“TMTC”), also a
domestic corporation.[4]

In May 1993, Microsoft and Beltron entered into a Licensing Agreement (“Agreement”). Under
Section 2(a) of the Agreement, as amended in January 1994, Microsoft authorized Beltron, for a fee,
to:

(i) xxx reproduce and install no more than one (1) copy of [Microsoft] software on each Customer
System hard disk or Read Only Memory (“ROM”); [and]

(ii) xxx distribute directly or indirectly and license copies of the Product (reproduced as per Section
2(a)(i) and/or acquired from Authorized Replicator or Authorized Distributor) in object code form to
end users[.] xxxx[5]

The Agreement also authorized Microsoft and Beltron to terminate the contract if the other fails to
comply with any of the Agreement’s provisions. Microsoft terminated the Agreement effective 22
June 1995 for Beltron’s non-payment of royalties.[6]

Afterwards, Microsoft learned that respondents were illegally copying and selling Microsoft software. 
Consequently, Microsoft, through its Philippine agent, [7] hired the services of Pinkerton Consulting
Services (“PCS”), a private investigative firm. Microsoft also sought the assistance of the National
Bureau of Investigation (“NBI”). On 10 November 1995, PCS employee John Benedic [8] Sacriz
(“Sacriz”) and NBI agent Dominador Samiano, Jr. (“Samiano”), posing as representatives of a
computer shop,[9] bought computer hardware (central processing unit (“CPU”) and computer monitor)
and software (12 computer disks (“CDs”) in read-only memory (“ROM”) format) from respondents.
The CPU contained pre-installed [10] Microsoft Windows 3.1 and MS-DOS software. The 12 CD-
ROMs, encased in plastic containers with Microsoft packaging, also contained Microsoft software.
[11]
 At least two of the CD-ROMs were “installers,” so-called because they contain several software
(Microsoft only or both Microsoft and non-Microsoft). [12] Sacriz and Samiano were not given the
Microsoft end-user license agreements, user’s manuals, registration cards or certificates of
authenticity for the articles they purchased. The receipt issued to Sacriz and Samiano for the CPU
and monitor bore the heading “T.M.T.C. (PHILS.) INC. BELTRON COMPUTER.” [13] The receipt for
the 12 CD-ROMs did not indicate its source although the name “Gerlie” appears below the entry
“delivered by.”[14]

On 17 November 1995, Microsoft applied for search warrants against respondents in the Regional
Trial Court, Branch 23, Manila (“RTC”). [15] The RTC granted Microsoft’s application and issued two
search warrants (“Search Warrant Nos. 95-684 and 95-685”). [16] Using Search Warrant Nos. 95-684
and 95-685, the NBI searched the premises of Beltron and TMTC and seized several computer-
related hardware, software, accessories, and paraphernalia. Among these were 2,831 pieces of
CD-ROMs containing Microsoft software. [17]

Based on the articles obtained from respondents, Microsoft and a certain Lotus Development
Corporation (“Lotus Corporation”) charged respondents before the Department of Justice (“DOJ”)
with copyright infringement under Section 5(A) in relation to Section 29 of Presidential Decree No.
49, as amended, (“PD 49”)[18] and with unfair competition under Article 189(1) [19] of the Revised Penal
Code.  In its Complaint (“I.S. No. 96-193”), which the NBI indorsed, Microsoft alleged that
respondents illegally copied and sold Microsoft software. [20]

In their joint counter-affidavit, respondents Yvonne Keh (“respondent Keh”) and Emily K. Chua
(“respondent Chua”) denied the charges against respondents. Respondents Keh and Chua alleged
that: (1) Microsoft’s real intention in filing the complaint under I.S. No. 96-193 was to pressure
Beltron to pay its alleged unpaid royalties, thus Microsoft should have filed a collection suit instead of
a criminal complaint; (2) TMTC bought the confiscated 59 boxes of MS-DOS CDs from a Microsoft
dealer in Singapore (R.R. Donnelly); (3) respondents are not the “source” of the Microsoft Windows
3.1 software pre-installed in the CPU bought by Sacriz and Samiano, but only of the MS-DOS
software; (4) Microsoft’s alleged proof of purchase (receipt) for the 12 CD-ROMs is inconclusive
because the receipt does not indicate its source; and (5) respondents Benito Keh, Jonathan K.
Chua, Alfonso Chua, Alberto Chua, Judy K. Chua Hwang, Sophia Ong, and Deanna Chua are
stockholders of Beltron and TMTC in name only and thus cannot be held criminally liable. [21]

The other respondents did not file counter-affidavits.

Meanwhile, respondents moved to quash Search Warrant Nos. 95-684 and 95-685. The RTC
partially granted their motion in its Order of 16 April 1996. Microsoft sought reconsideration but the
RTC denied Microsoft’s motion in its Order of 19 July 1996. Microsoft appealed to the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 54600. In its Decision of 29 November 2001, the Court of Appeals
granted Microsoft’s appeal and set aside the RTC Orders of 16 April 1996 and 19 July 1996. The
Court of Appeals’ Decision became final on 27 December 2001.

The DOJ Resolutions

In the Resolution of 26 October 1999, DOJ State Prosecutor Jocelyn A. Ong (“State Prosecutor
Ong”) recommended the dismissal of Microsoft’s complaint for lack of merit and insufficiency of
evidence. State Prosecutor Ong also recommended the dismissal of Lotus Corporation’s complaint
for lack of interest to prosecute and for insufficiency of evidence. Assistant Chief State Prosecutor
Lualhati R. Buenafe (“Assistant Chief State Prosecutor Buenafe”) approved State Prosecutor Ong’s
recommendations.[22] The 26 October 1999 Resolution reads in part:

[T]wo (2) issues have to be resolved in this case, namely:

a)         Whether or not Beltron Computer and/or its stockholders should be held liable for the
offenses charged.

b)       Whether or not prima facie case exist[s] against Taiwan Machinery Display and Trade Center,
Inc. (TMTC) for violation of the offense charged.

Complainant had alleged that from the time the license agreement was terminated, respondent/s
is/are no longer authorized to copy/distribute/sell Microsoft products.  However, respondent/s
averred that the case is civil in nature, not criminal, considering that the case stemmed only out of
the desire of complainant to collect from them the amount of US$135,121.32 and that the contract
entered into by the parties cannot be unilaterally terminated.

In the order of Honorable William Bayhon dated July 19, 1996 [denying reconsideration to the Order
partially quashing the search warrants], he observed the following:

“It is further argued by counsel for respondent that the act taken by private complainant is to spite
revenge against the respondent Beltron for the latter failed to pay the alleged monetary obligation in
the amount of US$135,121.32.  That respondent has some monetary obligation to complainant
which is not denied by the complainant.”

[“]It appears therefore that prior to the issuance of the subject search warrants, complainant had
some business transactions with the respondent [Beltron] along the same line of products. 
Complainant failed to reveal the true circumstances existing between the two of them as it now
appears, indeed the search warrant[s] xxx [are] being used as a leverage to secure collection of the
money obligation which the Court cannot allow.”

From said order, it can be gleaned that the [RTC] xxx, had admitted that the search warrants applied
for by complainant were merely used as a leverage for the collection of the alleged monetary
obligation of the respondent/s.

From said order, it can be surmise (sic) that the obligations between the parties is civil in nature not
criminal.

Moreover, complainant had time and again harped that respondent/s is/are not authorized to
sell/copy/distribute Microsoft products at the time of the execution of the search warrants.  Still, this
office has no power to pass upon said issue for one has then to interpret the provisions of the
contract entered into by the parties, which question, should be raised in a proper civil proceeding.

Accordingly, absen[t] a resolution from the proper court of (sic) whether or not the contract is still
binding between the parties at the time of the execution of the search warrants, this office cannot
pass upon the issue of whether respondent/s is or are liable for the offense charged.

As to the second issue, we find for the respondent/s.  TMTC had provided sufficient evidence such
as pro-forma invoice from R.R. Donnelley; Debt Advice of the Bank of Commerce; Official Receipts
from the Bureau of Customs; and Import Entry Declaration of the Bureau of Customs to prove that
indeed the Microsoft software in their possession were bought from Singapore.

Thus, respondent/s in this case has/have no intent to defraud the public, as provided under Article
189 of the Revised Penal Code, for they bought said Microsoft MS-DOS 6.0 from an alleged
licensee of Microsoft in Singapore, with all the necessary papers.  In their opinion, what they have
are genuine Microsoft software, therefore no unfair competition exist.

Moreover, violation of P.D. 49 does not exist, for respondent/s was/were not the manufacturers of
the Microsoft software seized and were selling their products as genuine Microsoft software,
considering that they bought it from a Microsoft licensee.

Complainant, on the other hand, considering that it has the burden of proving that the respondent/s
is/are liable for the offense charged, has not presented any evidence that the items seized namely
the 59 boxes of MS-DOS 6.0 software are counterfeit.
The certification issued on December 12, 1995 by Christopher Austin, Corporate Attorney of the
complainant, does not disclose this fact.  For the term used by Mr. Austin was that the items seized
were unauthorized.

The question now, is whether the products were unauthorized because TMTC has no license to sell
Microsoft products, or is it unauthorized because R.R. Donnelley has no authority to sell said
products here in the Philippines.

Still, to determine the culpability of the respondents, complainant should present evidence that what
is in the possession of the respondent/s is/are counterfeit Microsoft products.

This it failed to do.[23]

Microsoft sought reconsideration and prayed for an ocular inspection of the articles seized from
respondents. However, in the Resolution of 3 December 1999, Assistant Chief State Prosecutor
Buenafe, upon State Prosecutor Ong’s recommendation, denied Microsoft’s motion. [24]

Microsoft appealed to the Office of the DOJ Secretary. In the Resolution of 3 August 2000, DOJ
Undersecretary Regis V. Puno dismissed Microsoft’s appeal. [25] Microsoft sought reconsideration but
its motion was denied in the Resolution of 22 December 2000. [26]

Hence, this petition. Microsoft contends that:

I.      THE DOJ ERRED IN RULING THAT THE LIABILITY OF RESPONDENTS WAS ONLY CIVIL
IN NATURE BY VIRTUE OF THE LICENSE AGREEMENT.

II.     THE DOJ MISAPPRECIATED THE FACT THAT RESPONDENTS WERE ENGAGED IN THE
ILLEGAL IMPORTATION, SALE AND DISTRIBUTION OF COUNTERFEIT SOFTWARE AS
EVIDENCED BY THE ITEMS PURCHASED DURING THE TEST-BUY AND THE ITEMS SEIZED
FROM RESPONDENTS’ PREMISES.

III.    THE DOJ MISAPPRECIATED THE LAW ON COPYRIGHT INFRINGEMENT AND UNFAIR
COMPETITION.

IV.    ONLY TWO OUT OF THE NINE RESPONDENTS BOTHERED TO FILE COUNTER-
AFFIDAVITS; HENCE, THE CHARGES AGAINST SEVEN [RESPONDENTS] REMAIN
UNCONTROVERTED.[27]

In its Comment, filed by the Solicitor General, the DOJ maintains that it did not commit grave abuse
of discretion in dismissing Microsoft’s complaint. [28]

For their part, respondents allege in their Comment that Microsoft is guilty of forum-shopping
because its petition in CA-G.R. CV No. 54600 was filed ahead of, and has a “common interest” with,
this petition. On the merits, respondents reiterate their claims in their motion to quash Search
Warrant Nos. 95-684 and 95-685 that the articles seized from them were either owned by others,
purchased from legitimate sources, or not produced by Microsoft. Respondents also insist that the
Agreement entitled Beltron to “copy and replicate or reproduce” Microsoft products. On the
confiscated 2,831 CD-ROMs, respondents allege that a certain corporation [29] left the CD-ROMs with
them for safekeeping. Lastly, respondents claim that there is no proof that the CPU Sacriz and
Samiano bought from them contained pre-installed Microsoft software because the receipt for the
CPU does not indicate “[s]oftware hard disk.” [30]
In its Reply, Microsoft counters that it is not liable for forum-shopping because its petition in CA-G.R.
CV No. 54600 involved the Orders of the RTC partially quashing Search Warrant Nos. 95-684 and
95-685 while this petition concerns the DOJ Resolutions dismissing its complaint against
respondents for copyright infringement and unfair competition. On the merits, Microsoft maintains
that respondents should be indicted for copyright infringement and unfair competition. [31]

The Issues

The petition raises the following issues:

(1) Whether Microsoft engaged in forum-shopping; and

(2) Whether the DOJ acted with grave abuse of discretion in not finding probable cause to charge
respondents with copyright infringement and unfair competition.

The Ruling of the Court

The petition has merit.

Microsoft did not Engage in Forum-Shopping

Forum-shopping takes place when a litigant files multiple suits involving the same parties, either
simultaneously or successively, to secure a favorable judgment. [32] Thus, it exists where the
elements of litis pendentia are present, namely: (a) identity of parties, or at least such parties who
represent the same interests in both actions; (b) identity of rights asserted and relief prayed for, the
relief being founded on the same facts; and (c) the identity with respect to the two preceding
particulars in the two cases is such that any judgment that may be rendered in the pending case,
regardless of which party is successful, would amount to res judicata in the other case.[33] Forum-
shopping is an act of malpractice because it abuses court processes. [34] To check this pernicious
practice, Section 5, Rule 7 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure requires the principal party in an
initiatory pleading to submit a certification against forum-shopping. [35] Failure to comply with this
requirement is a cause for the dismissal of the case and, in case of willful forum-shopping, for the
imposition of administrative sanctions.

Here, Microsoft correctly contends that it is not liable for forum-shopping. What Microsoft appealed in
CA-G.R. CV No. 54600 were the RTC Orders partially quashing Search Warrant Nos. 95-684 and
95-685. In the present case, Microsoft is appealing from the DOJ Resolutions dismissing its
complaint against respondents for copyright infringement and unfair competition. Thus, although the
parties in CA-G.R. CV No. 54600 and this petition are identical, the rights asserted and the reliefs
prayed for are not such that the judgment in CA-G.R. CV No. 54600 does not amount to res
judicata in the present case.  This renders forum-shopping impossible here.

The DOJ Acted with Grave Abuse of Discretion

in not Finding Probable Cause to Charge Respondents with

Copyright Infringement and Unfair Competition

Generally, this Court is loath to interfere in the prosecutor’s discretion in determining probable
cause[36] — unless such discretion is shown to have been abused. [37] This case falls under the
exception.
Unlike the higher quantum of proof beyond reasonable doubt required to secure a conviction, it is the
lower standard of probable cause which is applied during the preliminary investigation to determine
whether the accused should be held for trial. This standard is met if the facts and circumstances
incite a reasonable belief that the act or omission complained of constitutes the offense charged. As
we explained in Pilapil v. Sandiganbayan:[38]

The term [probable cause] does not mean “actual and positive cause” nor does it import absolute
certainty. It is merely based on opinion and reasonable belief. Thus, a finding of probable cause
does not require an inquiry into whether there is sufficient evidence to procure a conviction. It is
enough that it is believed that the act or omission complained of constitutes the offense charged.
Precisely, there is a trial for the reception of evidence of the prosecution in support of the charge.

PD 49 and Article 189(1)

Section 5[39] of PD 49 (“Section 5”) enumerates the rights vested exclusively on the copyright owner.
Contrary to the DOJ’s ruling, the gravamen of copyright infringement is not merely the unauthorized
“manufacturing” of intellectual works but rather the unauthorized performance of any of the acts
covered by Section 5. Hence, any person who performs any of the acts under Section 5 without
obtaining the copyright owner’s prior consent renders himself civilly [40] and criminally[41] liable for
copyright infringement. We held in Columbia Pictures, Inc. v. Court of Appeals:[42]

Infringement of a copyright is a trespass on a private domain owned and occupied by the owner of
the copyright, and, therefore, protected by law, and infringement of copyright, or piracy, which is a
synonymous term in this connection, consists in the doing by any person, without the consent of the
owner of the copyright, of anything the sole right to do which is conferred by statute on the owner of
the copyright. (Emphasis supplied)

Significantly, under Section 5(A), a copyright owner is vested with the exclusive right to “copy,
distribute, multiply, [and] sell” his intellectual works.

On the other hand, the elements of unfair competition under Article 189(1) [43] of the Revised Penal
Code are:

(a)   That the offender gives his goods the general appearance of the goods of another manufacturer
or dealer;

(b)   That the general appearance is shown in the (1) goods themselves, or in the (2) wrapping  of
their packages, or in the (3) device or words therein, or in (4) any other feature of their appearance[;]

(c)   That the offender offers to sell or sells those goods or gives other persons a chance or
opportunity to do the same with a like purpose[; and]

(d)   That there is actual intent to deceive the public or defraud a competitor.[44]

The element of intent to deceive may be inferred from the similarity of the goods or their
appearance.[45]

On the Sufficiency of Evidence to

Support a Finding of Probable Cause

Against Respondents

In its pleadings filed with the DOJ, Microsoft invoked three clusters of evidence to support its
complaint against respondents, namely: (1) the 12 CD-ROMs containing Microsoft software Sacriz
and Samiano bought from respondents; (2) the CPU with pre-installed Microsoft software Sacriz and
Samiano also purchased from respondents; and (3) the 2,831 CD-ROMs containing Microsoft
software seized from respondents.[46] The DOJ, on the one hand, refused to pass upon the relevance
of these pieces of evidence because: (1) the “obligations between the parties is civil and not
criminal” considering that Microsoft merely sought the issuance of Search Warrant Nos. 95-684 and
95-685 to pressure Beltron to pay its obligation under the Agreement, and (2) the validity of
Microsoft’s termination of the Agreement must first be resolved by the “proper court.” On the other
hand, the DOJ ruled that Microsoft failed to present evidence proving that what were obtained from
respondents were counterfeit Microsoft products.

This is grave abuse of discretion. [47]

First. Being the copyright and trademark owner of Microsoft software, Microsoft acted well within its
rights in filing the complaint under I.S. No. 96-193 based on the incriminating evidence obtained from
respondents.  Hence, it was highly irregular for the DOJ to hold, based on the RTC Order of 19 July
1996, that Microsoft sought the issuance of Search Warrant Nos. 95-684 and 95-685, and by
inference, the filing of the complaint under I.S. No. 96-193, merely to pressure Beltron to pay its
overdue royalties to Microsoft.  Significantly, in its Decision in CA-G.R. CV No. 54600 dated 29
November 2001, the Court of Appeals set aside the RTC Order of 19 July 1996. Respondents no
longer contested that ruling which became final on 27 December 2001.

Second. There is no basis for the DOJ to rule that Microsoft must await a prior “resolution from the
proper court of (sic) whether or not the [Agreement] is still binding between the parties.” Beltron has
not filed any suit to question Microsoft’s termination of the Agreement. Microsoft can neither be
expected nor compelled to wait until Beltron decides to sue before Microsoft can seek remedies for
violation of its intellectual property rights.

Furthermore, some of the counterfeit CD-ROMs bought from respondents were “installer” CD-ROMs
containing Microsoft software only or both Microsoft and non-Microsoft software. These articles are
counterfeit per se because Microsoft does not (and could not have authorized anyone to) produce
such CD-ROMs. The copying of the genuine Microsoft software to produce these fake CD-ROMs
and their distribution are illegal even if the copier or distributor is a Microsoft licensee. As far as
these installer CD-ROMs are concerned, the Agreement (and the alleged question on the validity of
its termination) is immaterial to the determination of respondents’ liability for copyright infringement
and unfair competition.

Lastly, Section 10(b)[48] of the Agreement provides that Microsoft’s “rights and remedies” under the
contract are “not xxx exclusive and are in addition to any other rights and remedies provided by law
or [the] Agreement.” Thus, even if the Agreement still subsists, Microsoft is not precluded from
seeking remedies under PD 49 and Article 189(1) of the Revised Penal Code to vindicate its rights.

Third. The Court finds that the 12 CD-ROMs (“installer” and “non-installer”) and the CPU with pre-
installed Microsoft software Sacriz and Samiano bought from respondents and the 2,831 Microsoft
CD-ROMs seized from respondents suffice to support a finding of probable cause to indict
respondents for copyright infringement under Section 5(A) in relation to Section 29 of PD 49 for
unauthorized copying and selling of protected intellectual works. The installer CD-ROMs with
Microsoft software, to repeat, are counterfeit per se.  On the other hand, the illegality of the “non-
installer” CD-ROMs purchased from respondents and of the Microsoft software pre-installed in the
CPU is shown by the absence of the standard features accompanying authentic Microsoft products,
namely, the Microsoft end-user license agreements, user’s manuals, registration cards or certificates
of authenticity.

On the 2,831 Microsoft CD-ROMs [49] seized from respondents, respondent Beltron, the only
respondent who was party to the Agreement, could not have reproduced them under the Agreement
as the Solicitor General[50] and respondents contend. Beltron’s rights [51] under the Agreement were
limited to:

(1) the “reproduc[tion] and install[ation of] no more than one copy of [Microsoft] software on each
Customer System hard disk or Read Only Memory (“ROM”)”; and

(2) the “distribut[ion] xxx and licens[ing of] copies of the [Microsoft] Product [as reproduced above]
and/or acquired from Authorized Replicator or Authorized Distributor) in object code form to
end users.”

The Agreement defines an authorized replicator as “a third party approved by [Microsoft] which may
reproduce and manufacture [Microsoft] Product[s] for [Beltron] xxx.” [52] An authorized distributor, on
the other hand, is a “third party approved by [Microsoft] from which [Beltron] may purchase
MED[53] Product.”[54] Being a mere reproducer/installer of one Microsoft software copy on each
customer’s hard disk or ROM, Beltron could only have acquired the hundreds of Microsoft CD-ROMs
found in respondents’ possession from Microsoft distributors or replicators.

However, respondents makes no such claim. What respondents contend is that these CD-ROMs
were left to them for safekeeping. But neither is this claim tenable for lack of substantiation.   Indeed,
respondents Keh and Chua, the only respondents who filed counter-affidavits, did not make this
claim in the DOJ. These circumstances give rise to the reasonable inference that respondents mass-
produced the CD-ROMs in question without securing Microsoft’s prior authorization.

The counterfeit “non-installer” CD-ROMs Sacriz and Samiano bought from respondents also suffice
to support a finding of probable cause to indict respondents for unfair competition under Article
189(1) of the Revised Penal Code for passing off Microsoft products. From the pictures of the CD-
ROMs’ packaging,[55] one cannot distinguish them from the packaging of CD-ROMs containing
genuine Microsoft software. Such replication, coupled with the similarity of content of these fake CD-
ROMs and the CD-ROMs with genuine Microsoft software, implies intent to deceive.

Respondents’ contention that the 12 CD-ROMs Sacriz and Samiano purchased cannot be traced to
them because the receipt for these articles does not indicate its source is unavailing. The receipt in
question should be taken together with Microsoft’s claim that Sacriz and Samiano bought the CD-
ROMs from respondents.[56] Together, these considerations point to respondents as the vendor of
the counterfeit CD-ROMs. Respondents do not give any reason why the Court should not give
credence to Microsoft’s claim. For the same reason, the fact that the receipt for the CPU does not
indicate “[s]oftware hard disk” does not mean that the CPU had no pre-installed Microsoft software. 
Respondents Keh and Chua admit in their counter-affidavit that respondents are the “source” of the
pre-installed MS-DOS software. 

WHEREFORE, we GRANT the petition. We SET ASIDE the Resolutions dated 26 October 1999, 3
December 1999, 3 August 2000, and 22 December 2000 of the Department of Justice.

SO ORDERED.
12. Microsoft v. Maxicorp G.R. No. 140946 Sept. 13, 2004 fave

FACTS OF THE CASE

This case involves the issuance of search warrant to the respondent MAXICORP Incfor alleged

violation of Section 29 of Intellectual Property and Article 189 of the RPC(unfair
competition).Armed with the search warrants, NBI agents conducted a search of Maxicorp’spremises
and seized property fitting the description stated in the search warrants.Maxicorp filed a motion to
quash the search warrants alleging that there was noprobable cause for their issuance and that the
warrants are in the form of "generalwarrants." Where the RTC denied the motion and at the same
time denied theirmotion for reconsideration.

According to RTC they’ve found a probable cause to issue such warrant afterexamining the NBI

agent and the computer technician who visited Maxicorp.Maxicorp filed a petition for certiorari with
the Court of Appeals seeking to set asidethe RTC’s order. The Court of Appeals reversed the RTC’s
order denying Maxicorp’smotion to quash the search warrants. Petitioners moved
for reconsideration. The Court of Appeals denied petitioners’ motion on 29 November
1999. The Court of Appeals held that NBI Agent Samiano failed to present during thepreliminary exa
mination conclusive evidence that Maxicorp produced or sold thecounterfeit products. The Court of
Appeals pointed out that the sales receipt NBIAgent Samiano presented as evidence that he bought
the products from Maxicorpwas in the name of a certain "Joel Diaz."Hence, this petition.

13. Twentieth Century Fox v. CA G.R. Nos. 76649-51 Aug. 19, 1988

Petitioner 20th Century Fox Film Corporation sought the assistance of the NBI in conducting
searches and seizures in connection with the NBI’s anti-film piracy campaign. Petitioner alleged that
certain videotape outlets all over Metro Manila are engaged in the unauthorized sale and renting out
of copyrighted films in violation of PD No. 49 (the old Intellectual Property Law).

The NBI conducted surveillance and investigation of the outlets pinpointed by the petitioner and
subsequently filed three (3) applications for search warrants against the video outlets owned by the
private respondents.  The lower court issued the desired search warrants. The NBI, accompanied by
the petitioner's agents, raided the video outlets and seized the items described in the three warrants.

Private respondents later filed a motion to lift the search warrants and release the seized properties,
which was granted by the lower court. Petitioner’s motion for reconsideration was denied by the
lower court. The CA affirmed the trial court.

II.    THE ISSUE

Did the judge properly lift the search warrants he issued earlier?
III.   THE RULING

[The Court DISMISSED the petition and AFFIRMED the questioned decision and resolution of the
CA.]

YES, the judge properly lifted the search warrants he issued earlier.

The lower court lifted the three (3) questioned search warrants in the absence of probable cause that
the private respondents violated P.D. 49. NBI agents who acted as witnesses during the application
for search warrant did not have personal knowledge of the subject matter of their testimony, which
was the alleged commission of the offense of piracy by the private respondents. Only the petitioner’s
counsel who was also a witness during the application stated that he had personal knowledge that
the confiscated tapes owned by the private respondents were pirated tapes taken from master tapes
belonging to the petitioner. The lower court lifted the warrants, declaring that the testimony of
petitioner’s counsel did not have much credence because the master tapes of the allegedly pirated
tapes were not shown to the court during the application.

The presentation of the master tapes of the copyrighted films, from which the pirated films were
allegedly copied, was necessary for the validity of search warrants against those who have in their
possession the pirated films. The petitioner's argument to the effect that the presentation of the
master tapes at the time of application may not be necessary as these would be merely evidentiary
in nature and not determinative of whether or not a probable cause exists to justify the issuance of
the search warrants is not meritorious. The court cannot presume that duplicate or copied tapes
were necessarily reproduced from master tapes that it owns.

The essence of a copyright infringement is the similarity or at least substantial similarity of the
purported pirated works to the copyrighted work. Hence, the applicant must present to the court the
copyrighted films to compare them with the purchased evidence of the video tapes allegedly pirated
to determine whether the latter is an unauthorized reproduction of the former. This linkage of the
copyrighted films to the pirated films must be established to satisfy the requirements of probable
cause. Mere allegations as to the existence of the copyrighted films cannot serve as basis for the
issuance of a search warrant.

14. Bayanihan Music v. BMG Records G.R. No. 166337 March 7, 2005

DOCTRINE: The composer/author’s copyright over his musical composition is protected by the mere
fact alone that he is the creator thereof.

FACTS: Private Respondent Jose Mari Chan (“Chan”) entered into contracts with Petitioner
Bayanihan Music (“Bayanihan”) whereunder Chan assigned all his rights, interests and participation
to Bayanihan over his musical compositions entitled “Can We Just Stop and Talk a While” and
“Afraid for Love to Fade” on 1973 and 1976, respectively.

On the strength of the abovementioned contracts, Bayanihan applied for and was granted by the
National Library a Certificate of Copyright Registration for each of the two musical compositions.

Thereafter, without the knowledge and consent of Bayanihan, Chan authorized his co-respondent
BMG Records (Pilipinas) (“BMG”) to record and distribute the aforementioned musical compositions
in a then recently released album of singer Lea Salonga.

In separate letters, Bayanihan alleged that Chan and BMG committed violation of its existing
copyrights over the subject musical compositions. Demands were made on both to settle the matter.
However, no settlement was reached.

Hence, Bayanihan filed a complaint before the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City (“RTC QC”) a
Complaint for copyright infringement, particularly citing Section 216 of Republic Act No. 8293,
otherwise known as the Intellectual Property Code of the Philippines, with a prayer for the issuance
of Temporary Restraining Order (“TRO”) and/or writ of preliminary injunction.

BMG’s Answer:

1. That the acts of recording and publication sought to be enjoined had already been
consummated, thereby rendering moot Bayanihan’s prayer for TRO and/or preliminary
injunction; and
2. That there is no clear showing that Bayanihan would be greatly damaged by the refusal of
the prayed for TRO and/or preliminary injunction.

Chan’s Answer:

1. That it was never his intention to divest himself of all his rights and interest over the subject
musical compositions when he signed the contracts with Bayanihan;
2. That the contracts he entered into with Bayanihan are mere music publication agreements
giving Bayanihan, as assignee, the power to administer his copyright over his two songs and
to act as the exclusive publisher thereof;
3. That he was not cognizant of the application made by and the subsequent grant of
copyrights to Bayanihan; and
4. That Bayanihan was remiss in its obligations under the contracts because it failed to
effectively advertise his musical compositions for almost twenty (20) years.

RTC QC Ruling: Bayanihan’s prayer for TRO/Writ of Preliminary Injunction are denied.

The Motion for Reconsideration by Bayanihan was also subsequently denied. Hence, an appeal
through a Petition for Certiorari was filed before the Court of Appeals (“CA”).

CA Ruling: RTC decision was affirmed.

Hence this instant petition from Bayanihan before the Supreme Court (“SC”).

ISSUES:

1. Whether or not Bayanihan was entitled to a Writ of Preliminary Injunction.

 2. Whether or not Chan and BMG violated Bayanihan’s copyrights over the subject musical
compositions.

RULING:

1. NO, Bayanihan is not entitled to a Writ of Preliminary Injuntion.

The SC emphasised that a court should, as much as possible, avoid issuing the writ which would
effectively dispose of the main case without trial and enumerated the requisites for its issuance, to
wit:

1. There must be a right in esse or the existence of a right to be protected; and

2. The act against which the injunction is to be directed is a violation of such right.

Such a writ should only be granted if a party is clearly entitled thereto. Bayanihan, to be entitled to
the writ, is required to show that he has the ostensible right to the final relief prayed for in its
complaint. Here, the RTC QC did not find ample justifications for the issuance of the writ prayed for
by petitioner. Hence, the SC ruled that Bayanihan was not entitled to the writ.

2. NO, Chan and BMG did not violate Bayanihan’s copyrights over the subject musical
compositions.

Unquestionably, Chan, being undeniably the composer and author of the lyrics of the subject
musical compositions, is protected by the mere fact alone that he is the creator thereof, conformably
with the Intellectual Property Code, Section 172.2

In addition, the two contracts entered into by Bayanihan and Chan, transferring the latter’s rights
over the songs to the former, expressly provided for the condition that in the event that Bayanihan
fails to use the compositions for a period of two (2) years from the date of the contract, the copyright
assigned to Bayanihan should revert back to the author, Chan. 

Since it appeared that the two (2) contracts expired on October 1, 1975 and March 11, 1978,
respectively, there being neither an allegation, much less proof, that Bayanihan ever made use of
the compositions within the two-year period agreed upon by the parties, the above mentioned
provision applied and the copyright assigned to Bayanihan hereby reverted back to the author,
Chan.

Finally, evidence also showed that Chan revoked and terminated the contracts on July 30, 199,
Bayanihan only wrote the letter to Chan and BMG on December 7, 1999, and the Complaint was
only filed on August 8, 2000. Clearly, Bayanihan no longer had any right over the two musical
compositions.

Thus, Chan and BMG’s act of reproducing and distributing the songs did not, in any way, constitute
copyright infringement as alleged by Bayanihan.

Petition was thus thereby DENIED.

15. Manly Sportswear v. Dadodette G.R. Nos. 165306 Sept. 20, 2005

FACTS:
On March 14, 2003, Special Investigator Eliezer P. Salcedo of the National Bureau of Investigation
(NBI) applied for a search warrant before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City, based on
the information that Dadodette Enterprises and/or Hermes Sports Center were in possession of
goods, the copyright of which belonged to Manly Sportswear Mfg., Inc. (MANLY).

After finding reasonable grounds that a violation under RA 8293, a search warrant was issued.

Respondents thereafter moved to quash and annul the search warrant contending that the same is
invalid since the requisites for its issuance have not been complied with. They insisted that the
sporting goods manufactured by and/or registered in the name of MANLY are ordinary and common
hence, not among the classes of work protected under Section 172 of RA 8293.

The trial court granted the motion to quash and the search warrant null and void based on its finding
that the copyrighted products of MANLY do not appear to be original creations and were being
manufactured and distributed by different companies locally and abroad under various brands, and
therefore unqualified for protection under Section 172 of RA 8293. The lower court also denied
Petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration.

Thereafter, Petitioner filed a petition for certiorari before the Court of Appeals which was denied for
lack of merit. The appellate court likewise denied its Motion for Reconsideration. Hence, this present
petition.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the copyrighted products of MANLY are original creations subject to the protection of
RA 8293?

RULING:

The Court held NO.

The Court discussed that the copyright certificates issued in favor of MANLY constitute merely

prima facie evidence of validity and ownership. However, no presumption of validity is
created where other evidence exist that may cast doubt on the copyright validity. Hence,
where there is sufficient proof that the copyrighted products are not original creations but
are readily available in the market under various brands, as in this case, validity and
originality will not be presumed xxx. (underscoring, italics and emphasis supplied)

Besides, no copyright accrues in favor of MANLY despite issuance of the certificates of registration
and deposit pursuant to Section 2, Rule 7 of the Copyrights Safeguards and Regulations which
states:

Sec. 2 Effects of Registration and Deposit of Work. The registration and deposit of the work is purely
for recording the date of registration and deposit of the work and shall not be conclusive as to
copyright ownership or the term of the copyrights or the rights of the copyright owner, including
neighboring rights.

At most, the certificates of registration and deposit issued by the National Library and the Supreme
Court Library serve merely as a notice of recording and registration of the work but do not confer any
right or title upon the registered copyright owner or automatically put his work under the protective
mantle of the copyright law. It is not a conclusive proof of copyright ownership. As it is, non-
registration and deposit of the work within the prescribed period only makes the copyright owner
liable to pay a fine.