9. G.R. No.

221857, August 16, 2017

JESUS O. TYPOCO, JR., Petitioner, v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.

G.R. No. 222020

NOEL D. REYES, Petitioner, v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.

DECISION

PERALTA, J.:

Before this Court are consolidated petitions for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court assailing the
Decision1 dated October 15, 2015, and Resolution2 dated December 8, 2015 of the Sandiganbayan (SB) in SB-11-CRM-
0159 finding petitioners Jesus O. Typoco, Jr. (Typoco) and Noel D. Reyes (Reyes) guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the
offense of Falsification of Public Document defined and penalized under Article 171, paragraphs (5) and (6) of the
Revised Penal Code.

The factual antecedents are as follows:

Petitioners and their co-accused Aida B. Pandeagua (Pandeagua) and Angelina H. Cabrera (Cabrera) were charged with
Falsification of Public Documents defined and penalized under Article 171 of the Revised Penal Code. Petitioners were
found guilty as charged, but their co-accused Pandeagua and Cabrera were acquitted for insufficiency of evidence. Also,
the petitioners and the aforementioned accused, together with Arnulfo G. Salagoste (Salagoste), were charged with
Violation of Section 3(e) of Republic Act (R.A.) 3019, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, but all
the accused were acquitted of the charge.3

The instant petitions review the conviction of the petitioners of the crime of falsification, hence, the discussion will
merely focus on the charge of falsification. The accusatory portion of the Amended Information for falsification states:

That on or about 21 April 2005, or sometime prior or subsequent thereto, in Camarines Norte, Philippines and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, Jesus O. Typoco, Jr., Salary Grade 30; Noel D. Reyes,
Salary Grade 22; and Aida B. Pandeagua, Salary Grade 9, holding the position of Governor, OIC-General Service Office,
and Buyer II, respectively, all public officers, taking advantage of their public positions, acting together, conspiring and
confederating with one another and with one Angelina H. Cabrera, owner of Cabrera's Drugstore and Medical Supply,
did then and there falsify Purchase Order No. 0628 involving the purchase of various medicine by the Provincial
Government by changing its original date from April 21, 2005 to May 20, 2005 in order to conceal that an order has been
(sic) made with Cabrera's Drugstore and Medical Supply prior to the bidding conducted on May 18, 2005 to the damage
and prejudice of the Provincial Government.

CONTRARY TO LAW.4

When arraigned for the charge of falsification, petitioners and their co-accused Pandeagua and Cabrera pleaded not
guilty to the offense charged. At the pre-trial conference of the two cases which were consolidated, petitioners and their
co-accused admitted their respective official capacities as public officers at the time of the commission of the offense as
contained in the Pre-Trial Order:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

I. STATEMENT OF ADMITTED FACTS:

"The accused individually admitted their respective official capacities as public officers at the time of the alleged
commission of the offenses charged as follows:

 Jesus O. Typo co, Jr. - Governor;

  Noel D. Reyes - Officer-in-Charge, General Services Office;

 Aida B. Pandeagua - Buyer II, General Services Office; and

 Arnulfo G. Salagoste - Provincial Health Officer

all of the Provicial Government of Camarines Norte, while accused Angelina H. Cabrera was a private individual during
that same period of time.

x x x5

Thereafter, joint trial on the merits ensued. To prove its case, the prosecution presented the testimony of Nemia Y.
Noora (Noora), State Auditor III of the Commission on Audit (COA), assigned in Daet, Camarines Norte. She testified on
the results of the post-audit conducted by their office relative to the transactions of the provincial government of
Camarines Norte which included the purchase of medicines from Cabrera Drugstore and Medical Supplies (CDMS).6 The
testimony of Provincial Accountant Myrna de Velez Sendon was dispensed with in view of the stipulations between the
parties as to the authenticity of some documents and as to the lack of personal knowledge of witness on the execution
of the documents.7 On the other hand, the defense presented the respective judicial affidavits of petitioners and their
co-accused.8

The evidence disclosed the following facts:9

In 2005, the Office of the Provincial Governor of Camarines Norte adopted a "Medical Indigency Program" with a project
cost of P4,500,000.00. The program was aimed to provide the indigent families of the two hundred eighty-two (282)
barangays of the province with medicines and hospitalization services, particularly those beyond the poverty line. The
program was based on a Project Design10 prepared by the accused Salagoste and approved by petitioner Typoco.

In the implementation of the aforesaid program, accused Salagoste procured from CDMS various medicines and medical
supplies in the total amount of P1,649,735 for the use of the Camarines Norte Provincial Hospital (CNPH) under
Purchase Request (PR) No. 062811 and Purchase Order (PO) No. 0628,12 both dated April 21, 2005. PR No. 0628 was
prepared by accused Pandeagua and approved by petitioner Typoco. The subject PO No. 0628 was also prepared by
accused Pandeagua, issued by petitioner Reyes and approved by petitioner Typoco.

The said procurement was supported by Disbursement Voucher (DV) No. 101-05-04-239813 dated April 26, 2005, with
CDMS as claimant, for the payment of the various medicines to be utilized by CNPH patients in the amount of One
Million Six Hundred Forty-Nine Thousand Seven Hundred Thirty-Five Pesos (P1,649,735.00). In the said DV, accused
Salagoste certified that the expenses were necessarily lawful and incurred under his supervision, while petitioner Typoco
approved the payment.

On April 28, 2005, CDMS delivered the procured medicines under the subject PO No. 0628 as evidenced by Sales Invoice
No. 4325.14 The medicines were inspected on the same day by Property Inspector Raymund L. Quinones as revealed in
the Inspection and Acceptance Report (IAR)15 thereby consummating the subject procurement of medicines covered by
the subject PO.16

On May 18, 2005, a public bidding for the procurement of the same medicines covered by PO No. 0628 was conducted
by the Bids and Committee (BAC) of the Province of Camarines Norte. The bid of CDMS in the amount of P1,645,140.00
was declared as the Lowest Calculated and Responsive Bid pursuant to BAC Resolution No. 2005-0517 dated May 18,
2005.18

On May 19, 2005, petitioner Typoco issued the corresponding Notice of Award (Exhibit "L") to accused Cabrera, owner
of CDMS.19
On May 20, 2005, a Contract20 was executed by and between the Province of Camarines Norte and CDMS whereby the
latter as supplier shall provide the former the various medicines covered by PR No. 0628 for and in consideration of the
amount of P1,645,140.00. On the same day, the supplier issued Sales Invoice No. 4325 (Exhibit "M") as proof of the
delivery of the procured medicines in the total amount of P1,649,735.00.21

On May 24, 2005, the Provincial Government of Camarines Norte issued Check No. 014473022 to CDMS covering the
amount of P1,420,802.72 as payment for the procured medicines. The check, signed by petitioner Typoco and Provincial
Treasurer Lorna Coreses, was received by CDMS as evidenced by Official Receipt No. 152823 dated May 25, 2005.24

In October 2005, the foregoing disbursement for the payment of medicines was the subject of a post-audit that was
conducted by a team of COA Auditors with State Auditor III Noora as team leader. In the Audit Observation
Memorandum (AOM) No. 2006-00525 dated April 18, 2006 addressed to petitioner Typoco the following audit
observations were made:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

"x x x on the disbursement for payment of medicines for Medical Indigency Program amounting to P1,649,735.00
showed that:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

 There are alterations in the Purchase Order and Purchase Request

 The dates of Delivery Receipt and Acceptance in the Sales Invoice were tampered vis-a vis in the Inspection and
Acceptance Report of the agency.

 List of individual recipients of the drugs and medicines are not submitted to us.26

An annual financial audit on the Provincial Government of Camarines Norte was conducted by the COA. The results of
the audit were embodied in its Annual Audit Report27 which revealed that: "(1) there was no attached list of individual
recipients to the voucher, (2) the date of inspection was changed, and (3) Sales Invoice No. 4325 and PO were
undated/apparently changed."28

Moreover, in the testimony of Noora, she cited the following deficiencies that the audit team found in the procurement
of medicines, to wit:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

1. the respective dates of the Purchase Order, the Inspection and Acceptance Report, and the Sales Invoice were
tampered/altered as there were erasures therein;

2. the list of the individual recipients of the drugs and medicines were not submitted and unnumbered;

3. the Request and Issue Slip (RIS) that was requested by Dr. Arnulfo Salagoste and approved by former Governor Jesus
O. Typoco, Jr. was undated and unnumbered;

4. the Report Utilization29 that was certified by accused Dr. Arnulfo Salagoste and Engr. Noel O. Reyes and approved by
accused Governor Jesus O. Typoco, Jr. as to its accuracy and correctness was undated so that the audit team had no way
to determine when the delivered medicines were actually disposed; and

5. there was no request/invitation from the BAC for the COA to attend the bidding.30

Petitioner Typoco did not submit any reply/comment to the audit report despite his request for an extension of one (1)
month.

All the documentary exhibits formally offered by the prosecution consisting of Exhibits "A," "H," "J" to "K," "M" to "P,"
"X" to "AA," and "CC" to "FF"31 were admitted by the Sandiganbayan.
During the trial of the case, petitioner Typoco, denied any irregularity in the transaction. He insisted that the real date of
the subject PO No. 0628 is "05/20/05" and that a competitive public bidding was conducted prior to the award of the
contract. His chronology of events highlighted the dates (as altered) of the preparation and accomplishment of the
various documents.

On the part of petitioner Reyes, he admitted having noticed the alteration of the date in PO No. 0628, but insisted that
the alteration was an honest mistake on the part of co-accused Pandeagua who was also the one who encoded the
wrong entries in the PO. Thus, the alleged alteration was supposedly a correction intended to reflect the true date of the
preparation/accomplishment of the documents. Petitioner Reyes utilized the timeline indicated in the altered dates to
explain the circumstances surrounding the transaction.

Accused Pandeagua admitted having prepared PO No. 0628. She likewise admitted having changed the date appearing
therein from April 21, 2005 to 20 May 2005 upon the instructions of petitioner Reyes.32

All the documentary exhibits formally offered by the defense consisting of Exhibits "3" to "18"33 were admitted by the
Sandiganbayan.

On October 15, 2015, the Sandiganbayan rendered a Decision, the dispositive portion of which
states:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered as follows:

1. In SB-U-CRM-0159 - finding the accused JESUS O. TYPOCO, JR. and NOEL D. REYES GUILTY beyond reasonable
doubt of the offense of falsification of public document defined and penalized under paragraphs (5) and (6) of
Article 171 of the Revised Penal Code as charged in the Information and, with the application of the
Indeterminate Sentence Law and without any mitigating or aggravating circumstance, hereby sentencing each of
them to suffer the indeterminate penalty of TWO (2) YEARS, FOUR (4) MONTHS and ONE (1) DAY of prision
correccional, as minimum, to EIGHT (8) YEARS and ONE (1) DAY of prision mayor, as maximum, with accessories
thereof and to pay a fine of TWO HUNDRED THOUSAND PESOS (P200,000.00) with costs against the accused,
and ACQUITTING accused AIDA B. PANDEAGUA and ANGELINA H. CABRERA for insufficiency of evidence with
cost de oficio.

2. In SB-11-CRM-0160 - ACQUITTING the accused JESUS O. TYPOCO, JR., ARNULFO G. SALAGOSTE, NOEL D. REYES,

AIDA B. PANDEAGUA and ANGELINA H. CABRERA with cost de oficio.

SO ORDERED.34

The Sandiganbayan found no civil liability against the accused, considering that the procured medicines were delivered
by CDMS as evidenced by Sales Invoice No. 0628 dated April 28, 2005; the medicines were inspected by the Property
Inspector as per Inspection and Acceptance Report; and there being no evidence of under delivery or overpricing or
damage. Nonetheless, considering that the list of intended recipients were not submitted, the Sandiganbayan Decision
was without prejudice to whatever liability that may arise for failure to deliver the subject medicines to their intended
recipients.

Subsequently, Petitioner Reyes filed a petition for review on certiorari35 before this Court docketed as G.R. No. 222020.
Petitioner Typoco followed suit and its petition36 was docketed as G.R. No. 221857. In this Court's Resolution37 dated
February 10, 2016, We ordered the consolidation considering that both cases involve similar parties and assail the same
Decision and Resolution of the Sandiganbayan.

In G.R. No. 222020, petitioner Reyes anchored his petition on the following assigned errors:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
THE HONORABLE SANDIGANBAYAN, FIRST DIVISION, GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING THE PETITIONER GUILTY OF THE
CRIME OF FALSIFICATION OF PUBLIC DOCUMENTS AS IT IS NOT IN ACCORD WITH LAW AND PERTINENT
JURISPRUDENCE.

THE HONORABLE SANDIGANBAYAN, FIRST DIVISION, GRAVELY ERRED IN NOT CONSIDERING "TO THE DAMAGE AND
PREJUDICE OF THE PROVINCIAL GOVERNMENT" AS ALLEGED IN THE INFORMATION UNDER SB-11-CRM-0519,
NEGATING AN ESSENTIAL ELEMENT OF CRIMINAL INTENT TO FALSIFICATION OF PUBLIC DOCUMENT TO WHICH
PETITIONER WAS FOUND GUILTY AS IT IS NOT IN ACCORD WITH LAW AND PERTINENT JURISPRUDENCE.

THE HONORABLE SANDIGANBAYAN, FIRST DIVISION, ERRED IN FINDING THAT PETITIONER CONSPIRED WITH HIS CO-
ACCUSED TYPOCO, JR. THERE BEING NO CRIME COMMITTED TO CONSPIRE INTO WHICH IS NOT IN ACCORD WITH LAW
AND PERTINENT JURISPRUDENCE.38

In G.R. No. 221857, petitioner Typoco anchored his petition on the following assigned
errors:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

THE HONORABLE SANDIGANBAYAN, FIRST DIVISION, GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING THE PETITIONER GUILTY OF THE
CRIME OF FALSIFICATION OF PUBLIC DOCUMENTS BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT WHICH IS NOT IN ACCORD WITH
LAW AND/OR WITH THE APPLICABLE DECISIONS OF THE SUPREME COURT.

THE HONORABLE SANDIGANBAYAN, FIRST DIVISION, GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE PETITIONER CONSPIRED
WITH HIS CO-ACCUSED BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT WHICH IS NOT IN ACCORD WITH LAW AND/OR WITH THE
APPLICABLE DECISIONS OF THE SUPREME COURT.

THE HONORABLE SANDIGANBAYAN, FIRST DIVISION, GRAVELY ERRED IN THE NON-APPLICATION OF THE DOCTRINE
LAID DOWN IN ARIAS AND MAGSUCI CASE WHICH IS NOT IN ACCORD WITH THE APPLICABLE DECISIONS OF THE
SUPREME COURT.

THE HONORABLE SANDIGANBAYAN, FIRST DIVISION, GRAVELY ERRED IN NOT CONSIDERING "TO THE DAMAGE AND
PREJUDICE OF THE PROVINCIAL GOVERNMENT" AS ALLEGED IN THE INFORMATION UNDER SB-11-CRM-0519, IN THE
APPRECIATION OF THE CASE WHICH IS NOT IN ACCORD WITH THE LAW AND APPLICABLE PERTINENT DECISIONS OF THE
SUPREME COURT.39

Petitioner Reyes asserted in his petition that the correction was made on the subject PO without criminal intent. And
that, in as much as the information for the crime of falsification of public document which includes damage and
prejudice to the Provincial Government bolsters lack of intent to falsify, the absence of the same should have resulted to
the acquittal of the petitioner on reasonable doubt. Petitioner Reyes averred that the acquittal of accused Pandeagua
who was the one who actually made the act of alteration negates the finding that he was a co-conspirator and broke the
alleged chain of conspiracy. He further claimed that the only purpose of the alleged alteration on the date appearing on
the PO is no other than to reflect the truth. The error happened because the PO was merely copied from the PR and
through the "copy and paste" command from the computer, all the encoded entries in the PR were transferred to the
PO.

Petitioner Typoco stated in his petition that the circumstances and the evidence presented by the prosecution failed to
prove his guilt in the commission of the crime of falsification. He may have acted negligently when he affixed his
signature on the subject PO which document was forwarded to him with all the necessary signatures of his subordinates,
but no criminal intent, much more conspiracy, on his part, can be attributed to him when he signed the same. He
stressed that he relied in good faith on his subordinates and provincial officers. According to petitioner Typoco, the only
purpose of the alleged alteration on the date appearing on the PO is no other than to reflect the truth. And that, in as
much as the information for the crime of falsification of public document includes damage and prejudice to the
Provincial Government which bolsters lack of intent to falsify, absence of the same should have resulted to his acquittal.
In the Consolidated Comment40 on the petition, the Office of the Ombudsman countered that both petitions raise
questions of fact which are simply outside the ambit of a Rule 45 petition. It argued that damage and prejudice are not
elements of the crime of falsification under Article 171. Although alleged in the Information, lack of proof thereof is not
essential to constitute the crime. The chronological timeline of the preparation, approval and issuance of the
procurement documents simply point to a concurrence of sentiments and a perfect blending of conspiratorial acts to
achieve a common purpose.

In the separate Reply of petitioners Typoco41 and Reyes,42 they reiterate that there was no falsification to speak of since
the alteration appearing in the subject PO was made in order to reflect the truth as discussed in their respective
petitions.

We deny both petitions.

It is settled that the appellate jurisdiction of the Court over decisions and final orders of the Sandiganbayan is limited
only to questions of laws; as its factual findings, as a rule, are conclusive upon the Court.43

A question of fact exists when the doubt or difference arises as to the truth or falsehood of facts or when the query
invites calibration of the whole evidence considering mainly the credibility of witnesses, the existence and relevancy of
specific surrounding circumstances as well as their relation to each other and to the whole, and the probability of the
situation.44

Issues raised before the Court on whether the prosecution's evidence proved the guilt of the accused beyond
reasonable doubt, whether the presumption of innocence was properly accorded the accused, whether there was
sufficient evidence to support a charge of conspiracy, or whether the defense of good faith was correctly appreciated,
are all, in varying degrees, questions of fact. As a rule, the factual findings of the Sandiganbayan are conclusive on this
Court, subject to limited exceptions.45 We find none of these exceptions in the present case. 46

Petitioners were charged47 with the crime of falsification of public documents under Article 171 of the Revised Penal
Code. The elements of falsification by a public officer or employee or notary public as defined in Article 171 of the
Revised Penal Code are that: (1) the offender is a public officer or employee or notary public; (2) the offender takes
advantage of his official position; and (3) he or she falsifies a document by committing any of the acts mentioned in
Article 171 of the Revised Penal Code.48

The first element is indisputably present in this case. Petitioners were public officers being the Governor and Officer-
in-Charge of the General Services Office of the Province of Camarines Norte at the time of the commission of the
offense.

As to the second element, the offender takes advantage of his official position in falsifying a document when (1) he has
the duty to make or to prepare, or otherwise to intervene, in the preparation of the document; or (2) he has the
official custody of the document which he falsifies.49 In the case at bar, petitioners took advantage of their respective
official positions because they had the duty to make or prepare or otherwise intervene, in the preparation of the
subject PO. Accused Pandeagua prepared the subject PO and petitioner Reyes was the one who issued the same.
Upon order of petitioner Reyes, the date in the subject PO was changed by accused Pandeagua, and petitioner Typoco
approved the subject PO.

As to the third element, the Sandiganbayan found petitioners guilty of the offense of falsification of public document
defined and penalized under paragraphs (5) and (6), Article 171 of the Revised Penal Code, which pertinently
state:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Article 171. Falsification by public officer, employee or notary or ecclesiastic minister. - The penalty of prision mayor and
a fine not to exceed P5,000 pesos shall be imposed upon any public officer, employee, or notary who, taking advantage
of his official position, shall falsify a document by committing any of the following acts:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

xxxx

5. Altering true dates;

6. Making any alteration or intercalation in a genuine document which changes its meaning;

xxx

The act of "altering true dates" requires that: (a) the date mentioned in the document is essential; and (b) the
alteration of the date in a document must affect either the veracity of the document or the effects thereof.50

On the other hand, "making alteration or intercalation in a genuine document" requires a showing that: (a) there be an
alteration (change) or intercalation (insertion) on a document; (b) it was made on a genuine document; (c) the
alteration or intercalation has changed the meaning of the document; and (d) the change made the document speak
something false.51

In the case at bar, the original date of the PO is essential because it affects not only the veracity or effect thereof but
also determinative of the time when it was prepared and approved so that the change or alteration made the document
speak something false. We quote herein the ratiocination of the Sandiganbayan:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

In this regard, the Court takes note that accused Aida Pandeagua admitted that she was the public officer who prepared
Purchase Request (PR) No. 0628 and PO No. 0628 on April 21, 2005, and Disbursement Voucher (DV) No. 101-04-04-
2398 on April 26, 2005; that at the time she prepared said documents, she did not find anything irregular or mistake in
the respective dates that she had typewritten therein until her superior in the GSO, accused Noel Reyes, instructed her
to change the original date of the subject PO from "4/21/05" to "5/20/05" when it was returned to their office on May
23, 2005; and that at the time she prepared the subject PO on April 21, 2005, there was yet no bidding for the said
purchase of medicines.

Undoubtedly, this alteration or change in the original date of the subject PO constitutes falsification of official
document because it affected not only its veracity but it also changed the time when it was prepared and approved to
make the document speak something false, i.e., that said PO was approved on "5-20-05" by accused Jesus O. Typoco,
Jr. in favor of Cabrera Drugstore and Medical Supplies and after a public bidding was conducted on May 18, 2005, when
in truth and fact the PO in question was already approved on April 21, 2005 without any public bidding. Hence, the
crime of falsification of document by a public official under paragraphs 5 and 6 of Article 171 of the Revised Penal Code
has been sufficiently established to sustain a verdict of conviction.52

It was sufficiently shown from the evidence adduced that PO No. 0628 was actually prepared on April 21,2005 prior to
the conduct of public bidding, and that petitioner Reyes gave the directive to change the original date in the subject
PO only on May 23, 2005, after the conduct of public bidding. Hence, the changing of the date in the subject PO from
April 21, 200553 to May 20, 200554 was not a mere correction but an act of falsification to make it appear that a bidding
was conducted prior to ordering the medicines from CDMS. (THIS IS THE ANSWER)

Moreover, conspiracy among the petitioners exists despite the acquittal of accused Pandeagua and Cabrera. A
conspiracy exists when two or more persons come to an agreement concerning the commission of a felony and decide
to commit it. To determine conspiracy, there must be a common design to commit a felony. A conspiracy is in its
nature a joint offense. The crime depends upon the joint act or intent of two or more persons. Yet, it does not follow
that one person cannot be convicted of conspiracy. As long as the acquittal or death of a co-conspirator does not
remove the basis of a charge of conspiracy, one defendant may be found guilty of the offense.55

The Sandiganbayan correctly found that there was conspiracy between petitioners as shown in their respective
participations in the alteration of the date on the PO in question. It found that it was petitioner Reyes who instructed
accused Pandeagua to alter or change the date "4/20/05" in the PO with "5/20/05" to make it appear that it was on May
20, 2005 that the procurement covered by the PO was approved by petitioner Typoco after the conduct of a public
bidding on May 18, 2005. After the bidding, petitioner Typoco immediately issued the Notice of Award to CDMS, then a
Contract for the procurement of medicines was executed by and between the Province of Camarines Norte and CDMS.
The Sandiganbayan opined that the respective acts of petitioners - Reyes directing the alteration of the date on the PO
to make it appear that the PO was approved after the bidding was conducted on May 18, 2005, and Typoco in entering
into a contract with CDMS knowing fully well that the procurement of medicines had already been done before the
bidding - are indicative of a joint purpose, concerted action and concurrence of sentiments.

The Sandiganabayan, however, acquitted accused Pandeagua and Cabrera. It held that accused Pandeagua considering
that she made the alteration in obedience to the instruction of her superior (petitioner Reyes), had nothing to do with
the procurement in question except in the preparation of the procurement documents, her duties and responsibilities
being clerical in nature. In the judicial affidavit of accused Pandeagua, she stated - "I merely prepared or typed the said
documents according to the specific instructions of my superiors."56

Likewise, accused Cabrera, the owner of CDMS, was acquitted upon the testimony of accused Pandeagua that when
she made the alteration on May 23, 2005, accused Cabrera had already signed the unaltered PO on April 21, 2005.
Accused Cabrera had no knowledge or concurred in the act of alteration there being no showing that she had access
to or custody of the procurement documents. (ANSWER)

Conspiracy need not be shown by direct proof of an agreement of the parties to commit the crime, as it can be
inferred from the acts of the accused which clearly manifest a concurrence of wills, a common intent or design to
commit a crime.57 An accepted badge of conspiracy is when the accused by their acts aimed at the same object, one
performing one part of and another performing another so as to complete it with a view to the attainment of the same
object, and their acts although apparently independent were, in fact, concerted and cooperative, indicating closeness of
personal association, concerted action and concurrence of sentiments.58

As correctly argued by the Office of the Ombudsman through the Office of the Special Prosecutor, the chronological
timeline of the preparation, approval and issuance of the procurement documents simply point to a concurrence of
sentiments and a perfect blending of conspiratorial act to achieve a common purpose. Hence, the unity of criminal
design and execution was very patent.

In addition, petitioners argue that damage to the government should have been proven considering that this was
alleged in the Information. We do not agree. In falsification of public or official documents, it is not necessary that there
be present the idea of gain or the intent to injure a third person because in the falsification of a public document, what
is punished is the violation of the public faith and the destruction of the truth as therein solemnly proclaimed.59

The law is clear that wrongful intent on the part of the accused to injure a third person is not an essential element of the
crime of falsification of public document. It is jurisprudentially settled that in the falsification of public or official
documents, whether by public officers or private persons, it is not necessary that there be present the idea of gain or the
intent to injure a third person for the reason that, in contradistinction to private documents, the principal thing
punished is the violation of the public faith and the destruction of truth as therein solemnly proclaimed. In falsification
of public documents, therefore, the controlling consideration is the public character of a document; and the existence of
any prejudice caused to third persons or, at least, the intent to cause such damage becomes immaterial.60
Furthermore, both petitioners claim that the alteration was made only to reflect the truth. Obviously, such is a not the
case as revealed by the other documents/exhibits of the prosecution. The subject PO was not the only one falsified; the
Acceptance and Inspection Report and Sales Invoice were likewise tampered:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

a. The date of inspection as stated in the Inspection and Acceptance Report was changed from "4-28-05" to "5-23-
05". In the same document, the date of acceptance was also tampered and changed from "5-20-05" to "5-23-
05". As in fact, there appears a note on the face of the disbursement voucher which reads: "Note: Supporting
paper #15 inspection report inspected 5/20/05".

b. The date of the Sales Invoice was changed from "4-28-05" to "5-23-05". The original date is the same as the
original date of inspection. The new date appearing on the document is now "5-28-2005" which also means that
the supplies were delivered on "5-28-2005". This alteration makes the new inspection date "5-23-05"
questionable as it would be impossible to inspect the medicines on "5-23-05" if the delivery had been made on
"5-28-2005".

This Court's observation was properly discussed by the Office of the Ombudsman in its comment to the petitions,
thus:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

For his part, petitioner Reyes claims that he ordered the alteration of the date in the purchase order "to reflect the
truth." Aside from this bare allegation, however, Reyes has not presented any feasible explanation for all the other
alterations and irregularities attending the documents supporting the transaction. For one, he has not explained why the
disbursement voucher in the name of Cabrera Drugstores and Medical Supplies was also dated 26 April 2005, when the
bidding was allegedly conducted on 18 May 2005. For another, he has not explained why the dates in the inspection and
acceptance report and the sales invoice also had to be altered, if the original date indicated in the purchase order was a
mistake. On the contrary, the dates in all the documents submitted by the local government of Camarines Norte to the
COA clearly show that the order and delivery of machines transpired before the alleged conduct of bidding. It becomes
utterly obvious that the alteration made on the purchase order and the other documents was for the sole purpose of
making it appear that the order and delivery of medicines were done after the alleged bidding on 18 May 2005. The
truth, however, is that an order had been placed as early as 21 April 2005, without the requisite public bidding.61

Petitioner Typoco invokes the Arias doctrine which states that "all heads of offices have to rely to a reasonable extent on
their subordinates and on the good faith of those who prepare bids, purchase supplies, or enter into negotiations."62

The factual circumstances which led to the Court's ruling in Arias were such that there was nothing else in the
documents presented before the head of office therein that would have required the detailed examination of each
paper or document, viz.:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

We can, in retrospect, argue that Arias should have probed records, inspected documents, received procedures, and
questioned persons. It is doubtful if any auditor for a fairly-sized office could personally do all these things in all vouchers
presented for his signature. The Court would be asking for the impossible. All heads of offices have to rely to a
reasonable extent on their subordinates and on the good faith of those who prepare bids, purchase supplies, or enter
into negotiations. If a department secretary entertains important visitors, the auditor is not ordinarily expected to call
the restaurant about the amount of the bill, question each guest whether he was.present at the luncheon, inquire
whether the correct amount of food was served, and otherwise personally look into the reimbursement voucher's
accuracy, propriety, and sufficiency. There has to be some added reason why he should examine each voucher in such
detail. Any executive head of even small government agencies or commissions can attest to the volume of papers that
must be signed. x x x63 (Emphasis supplied)

Simply put, when a matter is irregular on the document's face, so much so that a detailed examination becomes
warranted, the Arias doctrine is unavailing.64 Petitioner Typoco, therefore cannot rely on the Arias doctrine because the
falsification of the documents in it was not apparent. As discussed above, aside from the alteration in the subject PO, the
other documents were also obviously tampered which could have not escaped his attention.
Petitioner Typoco's defense that he relied on his subordinates does not find support in the circumstances surrounding
his actions. As Governor and concurrent Chairman of the BAC, he was the approving authority in the transaction with
CDMS. As such, he was expected to exercise due diligence in the performance of his duties.

We need to stress that the COA Annual Audit Report on the Province of Camarines Norte for the Year ended December
31, 2005 (Exhibit "C") revealed that: (a) there was no attached list of individual recipients to the voucher; (b) the date of
inspection was changed; and (c) Sales Invoice No. 4325 and the subject PO were undated/apparently changed.65

Further, in the Audit Observation Memorandum (AOM) No. 2006-005 dated April 18, 2006 addressed to petitioner
Typoco, the following audit observations were made: (a) there are alterations in the Purchase Order and Purchase
Request; (b) the dates of Delivery Receipt and Acceptance in the Sales Invoice were tampered vis-a-vis in the Inspection
and Acceptance Report; and (c) the list of individual recipients of the drugs and medicines were not submitted.66

Thus, the irregularities are very apparent on the face of the documents. Had petitioner Typoco exercised the due
diligence expected of him, he would have easily noticed the irregularities on the documents. As held in Cesa v. Office of
the Ombudsman,67 when there are facts that point to an irregularity and the officer failed to take steps to rectify it, even
tolerating it, the Arias doctrine is inapplicable.68

To clarify, the Arias doctrine is not an absolute rule. It is not a magic cloak that can be used as a cover by a public officer
to conceal himself in the shadows of his subordinates and necessarily escape liability. Thus, this ruling cannot be applied
to exculpate petitioner Typoco in view of the peculiar circumstances in this case which should have prompted him, as
head of office, to exercise a higher degree of circumspection and, necessarily, go beyond what his subordinates had
prepared.69

In the case of LihayLihay v. People,70 We ruled that:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

In this relation, it must be clarified that the ruling in Arias v. Sandiganbayan (Arias) cannot be applied to exculpate
petitioners in view of the peculiar circumstances in this case which should have prompted them to exercise a higher
degree of circumspection, and consequently, go beyond what their subordinates had prepared. In particular, the
tampered dates on some of the RIVs, the incomplete certification by GSC SAO Mateo on the date of receipt of the CCIE
items, the missing details on the Reports of Public Property Purchased and the fact that sixteen checks all dated January
15, 1992 were payable to PNP SSS should have aroused a reasonable sense of suspicion or curiosity on their part if only
to determine that they were not approving a fraudulent transaction. x x x71

As held in the case of Bacasmas v. Sandiganbayan, et al.72 when there are reasons for the heads of offices to further
examine the documents in question, they cannot seek refuge by invoking the Arias doctrine:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

Petitioners cannot hide behind our declaration in Arias v. Sandiganbayan charge just because they did not personally
examine every single detail before they, as the final approving authorities, affixed their signatures to certain documents.
The Court explained in that case that conspiracy was not adequately proven, contrary to the case at bar in which
petitioners' unity of purpose and unity in the execution of an unlawful objective were sufficiently established. Also,
unlike in Arias, where there were no reasons for the heads of offices to further examine each voucher in detail,
petitioners herein, by virtue of the duty given to them by law as well as by rules and regulations, had the responsibility
to examine each voucher to ascertain whether it was proper to sign it in order to approve and disburse the cash
advance.

The case of Cruz v. Sandiganbayan73 carved out an exception to the Arias doctrine, stating

that:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Unlike in Arias, however, there exists in the present case an exceptional circumstance which should have prodded
petitioner, if he were out to protect the interest of the municipality he swore to serve, to be curious and go beyond
what his subordinates prepared or recommended. In fine, the added reason contemplated in Arias which would have
put petitioner on his guard and examine the check/s and vouchers with some degree of circumspection before signing
the same was obtaining in this case.

Lastly, in criminal cases, to justify a conviction, the culpability of the accused must be established by proof beyond
reasonable doubt. The burden of proof is on the prosecution, as the accused enjoys a constitutionally enshrined
disputable presumption of innocence. The court, in ascertaining the guilt of the accused, must, after having marshalled
the facts and circumstances, reach a moral certainty as to the accused's guilt. Moral certainty is that degree of proof
which produces conviction in an unprejudiced mind. Otherwise, where there is reasonable doubt, the accused must be
acquitted.74

In this case, the Court is convinced that the guilt of the petitioners was proven beyond reasonable doubt and that the
Sandiganbayan did not err in its findings and conclusion. The totality of the facts and circumstances demonstrates
that they committed the crime of falsification by a public officer under Article 171, paragraphs 5 and 6, of the Revised
Penal Code. The moral certainty required in criminal cases has been satisfied.

WHEREFORE, the Decision dated October 15, 2015 and Resolution dated December 8, 2015 of the Sandiganbayan in SB-
11-CRM-0159 are hereby AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

Perlas-Bernabe, Jardeleza,** and Reyes, Jr., JJ., concur.

Caguioa, J., on wellness leave.

Endnotes:

**
 Additional Member in lieu of Associate Justice Antonio T. Carpio, per Raffle dated August 16, 2017.

1
 Penned by Associate Justice Rodolfo A. Ponferrada, with Associate Justices Efren N. De la Cruz and Rafael R. Lagos,
concurring; rollo (G.R. No. 222020), pp. 26-55.

2
Id. at 63-70.

3
 The Sandiganbayan held that in spite of the evidence showing that there was violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. 3019
because the contract for the purchase of medicines was awarded without public bidding, the accused cannot be
convicted of the said offense considering that "the offense charged is the act of falsifying" and "the offense proved is act
of awarding the contract" without public bidding, thus the offense proved is not charged in the Information; id. at 53.

10. [ G.R. No. 234023, September 03, 2018 ]

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, VS. JENNIE MANLAO Y LAQUILA, ACCUSED-APPELLANT.

DECISION

PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:

Before the Court is an ordinary appeal[1] filed by accused-appellant Jennie Manlao y Laquila (Jennie) assailing the
Decision[2] dated May 11, 2017 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 06882, which affirmed the
Decision[3] dated June 19, 2014 of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 85 (RTC) in Crim. Case No. Q-11-
171127 convicting her of Qualified Theft, defined and penalized under Article 310, in relation to Article 309, of the
Revised Penal Code (RPC).

The Facts

An Information[4] was filed before the RTC, charging Jennie with the crime of Qualified Theft, the accusatory portion of
which reads:

That on or about the 1st day of July 2011, in Quezon City, Philippines, the said accused, being then employed as
housemaid of one CARMEL ACE QUIMPO-VILLARAZA with residential address located at No. 125 Baltimore Street, Vista
Real Subdivision, Brgy. Batasan Hills, this City, conspiring together, confederating with other persons whose true names,
identities and present whereabouts have not as yet been ascertained and mutually helping each [other] and as such had
free access to the property stolen, with grave abuse of confidence reposed upon her by her employer with intent to gain
and without the knowledge and consent of the owner thereof, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously
take, steal and carry away the following:

1. Rolex watch worth Php360,000.00

2. Omega watch worth Php120,000.00

3. Huer watch worth Php60,000.00

4. Philip Charriol watch worth Php72,000.00

5. Diamond engagement ring worth Php150,000.00

6. Wedding diamond earrings worth Php150,000.00

7. [Diamond] stud worth Php150,000.00

8. Diamond cross pendant (princess cut) worth Php50,000.00

9. Diamond cross pendant worth Php25,000.00

10. Diamond donut pendant worth Php15,000.00

11. [Heart-shaped crushed] diamond earrings and ring worth Php50,000.00

12. Princess cut diamond earring and ring, gold worth Php120,000.00

13. [Oval-shaped] diamond earring, [ring] and pendant set worth Php100,000.00

14. Diamond [Creola] earring and ring set worth Php25,000.00

15. Diamond [studded Creola] earring and pendant set worth Php25,000.00

16. [White] South Sea Pearl [earring] and pendant set worth Php40,000.00

17. South Sea Champagne Pearl earring and pendant set worth Php40,000.00

18. Baby South Sea Pearl earring and pendant worth Php30,000.00

19. White South Sea Pearl dangling earrings worth Php20,000.00

20. South Sea Pearl [choker] worth Php140,000.00

21. Pearl long necklace worth Php6,000.00

 22. Double strand pink pearl necklace worth [Php 6,000.00]

23. [Small] Pearl choker and bracelet worth Php3,000.00

24. Blue Sapphire with diamonds ring worth Php40,000.00

25. Blue Sapphire with diamonds and pendant worth Php15,000.00

26. Amethyst earring worth Php10,000.00

27. Blue Topaz earring and [pendant] set worth Php15,000.00

28. White gold [n]ecklace worth Php8,000.00

29. Gold [n]ecklace worth Php4,000.00

all in total [value] of Php1,849,000.00, Philippine Currency, belonging to said CARMEL ACE QUIMPO-VILLARAZA, to the
damage [and] prejudice of the said offended party in the amount aforementioned.

CONTRARY TO LAW.[5]

The prosecution alleged that in February 2011, Carmel Ace Quimpo-Villaraza (Carmel) and her husband, Alessandro
Lorenzo Villaraza (Alessandro), hired Jennie as their housemaid, who was tasked to iron their clothes and to clean the
house, including the second floor. Jennie was referred to Carmel by a certain Maribel, who was a housemaid of her son's
friend. Upon hiring, Carmel briefed Jennie about the house's security, gave her a list of phone numbers to call in case of
emergency, cautioned her about scammers calling houses, and explicitly instructed her not to entertain people who
would visit or call to say that something happened to her employers. Carmel also stressed that if something happens to
her, she would not call her housemaids. After two (2) months, Carmel hired another housemaid, Geralyn Noynay
(Geralyn), whose job was to cook, wash clothes, clean the exterior of the house, and do some gardening.[6]

At around 5:30 in the afternoon of July 1, 2011, Geralyn was cooking in the kitchen when she noticed Jennie talking to
someone over the house phone and crying. When asked, Jennie replied that their employers met an accident. Geralyn
saw Jennie going up and down the stairs and decided to follow her. Upstairs, Geralyn found the bathroom inside the
master's bedroom open, and saw Jennie in the act of opening the bathroom drawer using a knife, screwdriver, and
hairpins. When Geralyn asked why she destroyed the lock, Jennie responded that Carmel instructed her to open the
drawer to look for dollars and told Geralyn not to interfere. Thereafter, Jennie went downstairs to talk to someone over
the phone and later on, went up again to the master's bedroom to take Carmel's jewelry. Meanwhile, Geralyn
comforted their employers' eight (8)-year old son who began crying due to the commotion. As she comforted the child,
Geralyn noticed the pearls as among those which Jennie took from Carmel's drawer. Jennie then left the house with all
the pieces of jewelry with her.[7]

Meanwhile, at around 3:30 in the afternoon of even date, Carmel kept calling the house phone to check on her son but
the line was continuously busy. She also tried reaching her two (2) housemaids through their mobile phones, but to no
avail. After fetching Alessandro, they decided to call the latter's brother, Carlo, who lives in the same village, to ask if he
could send his maid to their house and inform the housemaids that they have been calling the house phone. Finally,
Geralyn answered the phone and, when asked why the line was busy, Geralyn explained that Jennie used it earlier and
left the line hanging. She then informed them that Jennie left the house at around six (6) o'clock in the evening after
taking Carmel's jewelry. Upon the couple's request, Carlo stayed in the latter's house and confirmed that he found the
bathroom door and drawer open, with the keyhole destroyed.[8]
Upon reaching their house, Carmel found her drawer inside the bathroom open with all of her jewelry, which she
accumulated for 20 years, missing. At around 11:30 in the evening of even date, Carmel received a call from the village
guards that Jennie was with them. Alessandro then picked up Jennie from the gate, and when they arrived a few
minutes later, Carmel opened the car's rear door and immediately asked Jennie if the latter took her jewelry, to which
the latter answered yes while crying. When asked for a reason, Jennie stated that somebody called to inform her that
Carmel figured in an accident, and asked her to look for dollars in Carmel's cabinet. Instead, she took the jewelry and
brought them to a fair-skinned woman in Caloocan. At this juncture, Carmel reminded Jennie again about the house
rules on callers, but Jennie kept crying. Thus, the couple decided to bring Jennie to the nearby police station and filed
the complaint.[9] The following day, police officers went to the house of Maribel's employers, but they were told that she
left on the day of the incident.[10]

For her part, Jennie pleaded not guilty to the crime charged,[11] and presented her own narration of the events. She
averred that at three (3) o'clock in the afternoon of that fateful day, a certain Beth Garcia (Beth) called the house phone,
asked her if she was Jennie, and apprised her that her employers met an accident. Beth briefed her that "Carmel" would
talk over the phone slowly because she has a wound in her mouth. Then, a woman who purported herself to be Carmel
instructed Jennie to open the bedroom door and look for dollars, prompting Jennie to go to the kitchen to get a knife.
Unable to find dollars, Jennie talked to "Carmel" over the phone again and the latter instructed her to get the jewelry
instead, and thereafter, to go to Cubao and ride a bus going to Monumento, where a woman will meet her at 7-Eleven.
Upon arrival, a woman approached Jennie, introduced herself as "Carmel's" companion, then took the bag containing
the jewelry. After which, Jennie went home. When she arrived at the subdivision gate, the security guards asked her to
proceed to the second gate where Alessandro was waiting for her.[12]

The RTC Ruling

In a Decision[13] dated June 19, 2014, the RTC found Jennie guilty beyond reasonable doubt of Qualified Theft, and
accordingly, sentenced her to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua  and ordered her to restitute to Carmel the
amount of P1,189,000.00, representing the value of the jewelry and watches stolen.[14]

The RTC held that all the elements of Qualified Theft are present, having found that Jennie is a domestic servant who
admittedly took Carmel's jewelry and watches without the latter's consent, but without using violence or intimidation
against persons nor force upon things. As regards intent to gain, the RTC held that it is presumed from Jennie's overt
acts such as: (a) calmly opening the drawer which is contrary to a person's behavior under stressful
situations; (b) intentionally leaving the phone hanging; and (c) deliberately deviating from Carmel's instructions
regarding scammers. Anent the value of the missing items, the Court noted that while the Information stated that the
aggregate value of the jewelry is P1,849,000.00, such amount was merely Carmel's estimates, and thus, cannot be taken
on its face value. Nonetheless, since the stolen items consist of various luxury watches and jewelry, including diamonds
and pearls, the RTC pegged their aggregate value at, more or less, P1,189,000.00.[15]

Aggrieved, Jennie appealed[16] to the CA.

The CA Ruling

In a Decision[18] dated May 11, 2017, the CA affirmed the RTC ruling.[19] It held that the prosecution had established all
the elements of the crime charged, highlighting that the element of intent to gain may be presumed from the proven
unlawful taking, as in this case. It also stated that the intent to gain is immediately discernable from Jennie's acts
– i.e.,  she did not show any sign of emotional distress upon learning that Carmel figured in an accident, she damaged
only the keyhole of the drawer where the stolen items were kept, and she left the phone hanging after the call – all of
which ensured the commission of the crime. The CA further noted that Jennie's low educational attainment is not a basis
to presume that she was not fully aware of the consequences of her actions. Moreover, the CA found no error in the
RTC's reduction of the value of the jewelry taken by ascertaining their value based on the pictures presented before it.[20]

Hence, this appeal.[21]

The Issue Before the Court

The issue for the Court's resolution is whether or not Jennie is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of Qualified Theft.

The Court's Ruling

The appeal is without merit.

Time and again, it has been held that an appeal in criminal cases opens the entire case for review, and it is the duty of
the reviewing tribunal to correct, cite, and appreciate errors in the appealed judgment whether they are assigned or
unassigned.[22] "The appeal confers the appellate court full jurisdiction over the case and renders such court competent
to examine records, revise the judgment appealed from, increase the penalty, and cite the proper provision of the penal
law."[23]

Guided by this consideration, the Court affirms Jennie's conviction with modification as to the penalty and award of
damages to private complainant, as will be explained hereunder.

Article 310 of the RPC states:

Article 310. Qualified theft.  – The crime of theft shall be punished by the penalties next higher by two degrees than
those respectively specified in the next preceding articles, if committed by a domestic servant, or with grave abuse of
confidence, or if the property stolen is motor vehicle, mail matter or large cattle or consists of coconuts taken from the
premises of the plantation or fish taken from a fishpond or fishery, or if property is taken on the occasion of fire,
earthquake, typhoon, volcanic eruption, or any other calamity, vehicular accident or civil disturbance.

The elements of Qualified Theft are as follows: (a) the taking of personal property; (b) the said property belongs to
another; (c) the said taking be done with intent to gain; (d) it be done without the owner's consent; (e) it be
accomplished without the use of violence or intimidation against persons, nor force upon things; and (f) it be done
under any of the circumstances enumerated in Article 310 of the RPC, i.e.,  committed by a domestic servant.[24]

Verily, the Court finds that these elements concur in this case as the prosecution, through its witnesses, was able to
establish that Jennie, while employed as Carmel's housemaid, admittedly took all of the latter's pieces of jewelry from
the bathroom drawer without her authority and consent.

In maintaining her innocence, Jennie insists that as a naive kasambahay  who hailed from a rural area and only had an
educational attainment until Grade 4, she was merely tricked in a modus operandi  when she complied with the verbal
instructions relayed over the phone by a person whom she thought to be Carmel. She further points out that her non-
flight manifests her lack of intent to gain; otherwise, she would not have returned to her employers' residence and face
prosecution for the enormous value of the items taken.[25]
The Court is not convinced.

Jurisprudence provides that intent to gain or animus lucrandi  is an internal act which can be established through the
overt acts of the offender[26] and is presumed from the proven unlawful taking.[27] Actual gain is irrelevant as the
important consideration is the intent to gain.[28] In this case, suffice it to say that Jennie's animus lucrandi  is presumed
from her admitted taking of the stolen items. Further, her aforesaid excuse that she was merely tricked cannot be given
credence for likewise being illogical, especially in view of Carmel's warning against scammers and explicit directive not to
entertain such phone calls.

Thus, the Court finds no reason to deviate from the factual findings of the trial court, as affirmed by the CA, as there is
no indication that it overlooked, misunderstood or misapplied the surrounding facts and circumstances of the case. In
fact, the trial court was in the best position to assess and determine the credibility of the witnesses presented by both
parties, and hence, due deference should be accorded to the same.[29] As such, Jennie's conviction for Qualified Theft
must be upheld.

Anent the proper penalty to be imposed on Jennie, it is well to stress that pending the final resolution of this case,
Republic Act No. (RA) 10951[30] was enacted into law. As may be gleaned from the law's title, it adjusted the value of the
property and the amount of damage on which various penalties are based, taking into consideration the present value of
money, as opposed to its archaic values when the RPC was enacted in 1932.[31] While it is conceded that Jennie
committed the crime way before the enactment of RA 10951, the newly-enacted law expressly provides for retroactive
effect if it is favorable to the accused,[32] as in this case.

Section 81 of RA 10951 adjusted the graduated values where the penalties for Theft are based. Pertinent portions of
which read:

Section 81. Article 309 of the same Act is hereby amended to read as follows:

"ART. 309. Penalties.  – Any person guilty of theft shall be punished by:

xxxx

2. The penalty of prision correccional  in its medium and maximum periods, if the value of the thing stolen is more than
Six hundred thousand pesos (P600,000) but does not exceed One million two hundred thousand pesos (P1,200,000).

x x x x"

Thus, applying the provisions of RA 10951, the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the increase of the aforesaid penalty by two
(2) degrees in instances of Qualified Theft under the RPC,[33] and considering further the absence of any mitigating or
aggravating circumstances and the fact that the aggregate value of the stolen items amounts to P1,189,000.00, the
Court finds it proper to sentence Jennie to suffer the penalty of imprisonment for an indeterminate period of seven (7)
years, four (4) months, and one (1) day of prision mayor, as minimum, to eleven (11) years, six (6) months, and twenty-
one (21) days of reclusion temporal,  as maximum.

Finally, the monetary awards due to Carmel shall earn legal interest at the rate of six percent (6%) per annum from the
date of finality of this Decision until full payment, pursuant to prevailing jurisprudence.[34]

WHEREFORE, the appeal is DENIED. The Decision dated May 11, 2017 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No.
06882 finding accused-appellant Jennie Manlao y Laquila GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Qualified
Theft, defined and penalized under Article 310, in relation to Article 309, of the Revised Penal Code is
hereby AFFIRMED with MODIFICATIONS, sentencing her to suffer the penalty of imprisonment for an indeterminate
period of seven (7) years, four (4) months, and one (1) day of prision mayor,  as minimum, to eleven (11) years, six (6)
months, and twenty-one (21) days of reclusion temporal,  as maximum, and ordering her to pay private complainant
Carmel Ace Quimpo-Villaraza the amount of P1,189,000.00 as actual damages, with legal interest at the rate of six
percent (6%) per annum from the date of finality of this Decision until full payment.

SO ORDERED.

11. G.R. No. L-28589 January 8, 1973

RAFAEL ZULUETA, ET AL., plaintiffs-appellees,

vs.
PAN AMERICAN WORLD AIRWAYS, INC., defendant-appellant.

Alfredo L. Benipayo for plaintiffs-appellee Rafael Zulueta and Carolina Zulueta.

Justo L. Albert for plaintiff-appellee Telly Albert Zulueta.

V.E. del Rosario and Associates and Salcedo, Del Rosario, Bito, Misa and Lozada for defendant-appellant.

RESOLUTION

CONCEPCION, C.J.:

Both parties in this case have moved for the reconsideration of the decision of this Court promulgated on February 29,
1972. Plaintiffs maintain that the decision appealed from should be affirmed in toto. The defendant, in turn, prays that
the decision of this Court be "set aside ... with or without a new trial, ... and that the complaint be dismissed, with costs;
or, in the alternative, that the amount of the award embodied therein be considerably reduced." .

Subsequently to the filing of its motion for reconsideration, the defendant filed a "petition to annul proceedings and/or
to order the dismissal of plaintiffs-appellees' complaint" upon the ground that "appellees' complaint actually seeks the
recovery of only P5,502.85 as actual damages, because, for the purpose of determining the jurisdiction of the lower
court, the unspecified sums representing items of alleged damages, may not be considered, under the settled doctrines
of this Honorable Court," and "the jurisdiction of courts of first instance when the complaint in the present case was
filed on Sept. 30, 1965" was limited to cases "in which the demand, exclusive of interest, or the value of the property in
controversy amounts to more than ten thousand pesos" and "the mere fact that the complaint also prays for unspecified
moral damages and attorney's fees, does not bring the action within the jurisdiction of the lower court."

We find no merit in this contention. To begin with, it is not true that "the unspecified sums representing items or other
alleged damages, may not be considered" — for the purpose of determining the jurisdiction of the court — "under the
settled doctrines of this Honorable Court." In fact, not a single case has been cited in support of this allegation.

Secondly, it has been held that a clam for moral damages is one not susceptible of pecuniary estimation.1 In fact, Article
2217 of the Civil Code of the Philippines explicitly provides that "(t)hough incapable of pecuniary computation, moral
damages may be recovered if they are the proximate result of the defendant's wrongful act or omission." Hence, "(n)o
proof pecuniary loss necessary" — pursuant to Article 2216 of the same Code — "in order that moral ... damages may be
adjudicated." And "(t)he assessment of such damages ... is left to the discretion of the court" - said article adds -
"according to the circumstances of each case." Appellees' complaint is, therefore, within the original jurisdiction of
courts of first instance, which includes "all civil actions in which the subject of the litigation is not capable of pecuniary
estimation."2
Thirdly, in its answer to plaintiffs' original and amended complainants, defendant had set up a counterclaim in the
aggregate sum of P12,000, which is, also, within the original jurisdiction of said courts, thereby curing the alleged defect
if any, in plaintiffs' complaint.3

We need not consider the jurisdictional controversy as to the amount the appellant sues to recover because the
counterclaim interposed establishes the jurisdiction of the District Court. Merchants' Heat & Light Co. v. James B. Clow &
Sons, 204 U.S. 286, 27 S. Ct. 285, 51 L. Ed. 488; O. J. Lewis Mercantile Co. v. Klepner, 176 F. 343 (C.C.A. 2), certiorari
denied 216 U.S. 620, 30 S Ct. 575, 54 L. Ed. 641. ... .4

... courts have said that "when the jurisdictional amount is in question, the tendering of a counterclaim in an amount
which in itself, or added to the amount claimed in the petition, makes up a sum equal to the amount necessary to the
jurisdiction of this court, jurisdiction is established, whatever may be the state of the plaintiff's complaint." American
Sheet & Tin Plate Co. v. Winzeler (D.C.) 227 F. 321, 324.5

Thus, in Ago v. Buslon,6 We held:

... . Then, too, petitioner's counterclaim for P37,000.00 was, also, within the exclusive original jurisdiction of the latter
courts, and there are ample precedents to the effect that "although the original claim involves less than the jurisdictional
amount, ... jurisdiction can be sustained if the counterclaim (of the compulsory type)" — such as the one set up by
petitioner herein, based upon the damages allegedly suffered by him in consequence of the filing of said complaint —
"exceeds the jurisdictional amount." (Moore Federal Practice, 2nd ed. [1948], Vol. 3, p. 41; Ginsburg vs. Pacific Mutual
Life Ins. Co. of California, 69 Fed. [2d] 97; Home Life Ins. Co. vs. Sipp., 11 Fed. [2d]474; American Sheet & Tin Plate Co. vs.
Winzeler [D.C.], 227 Fed. 321, 324; Brix vs. People's Mutual Life Ins. Co., 41 P. 2d. 537, 2 Cal. 2d. 446; Emery vs. Pacific
Employees Ins. Co., 67 P. 2d. 1046, 8 Cal. 2d. 663).

Needless to say, having not only failed to question the jurisdiction of the trial court — either in that court or in this
Court, before the rendition of the latter's decision, and even subsequently thereto, by filing the aforementioned motion
for reconsideration and seeking the reliefs therein prayed for — but, also, urged both courts to exercise jurisdiction over
the merits of the case, defendant is now estopped from impugning said jurisdiction.7

Before taking up the specific questions raised in defendant's motion for reconsideration, it should be noted that the
same is mainly predicated upon the premise that plaintiffs' version is inherently incredible, and that this Court should
accept the theory of the defense to the effect that petitioner was off-loaded because of a bomb-scare allegedly arising
from his delay in boarding the aircraft and subsequent refusal to open his bags for inspection. We need not repeat here
the reasons given in Our decision for rejecting defendant's contention and not disturbing the findings of fact of His
Honor, the Trial Judge, who had the decided advantage — denied to Us — of observing the behaviour of the witnesses in
the course of the trial and found those of the plaintiffs worthy of credence, not the evidence for the defense.

It may not be amiss however, to stress the fact that, in his written report, made in transit from Wake to Manila —
or immediately after the occurrence and before the legal implications or consequences thereof could have been the
object of mature deliberation, so that it could, in a way, be considered as part of the res gestae — Capt. Zentner stated
that Zulueta had been off-loaded "due to drinking" and "belligerent attitude," thereby belying the story of the defense
about said alleged bomb-scare, and confirming the view that said agent of the defendant had acted out of resentment
because his ego had been hurt by Mr. Zulueta's adamant refusal to be bullied by him. Indeed, had there been an iota of
truth in said story of the defense, Capt. Zentner would have caused every one of the passengers to be frisked or
searched and the luggage of all of them examined — as it is done now — before resuming the flight from Wake Island.
His failure to do so merely makes the artificious nature of defendant's version more manifest. Indeed, the fact that Mrs.
Zulueta and Miss Zulueta were on board the plane shows beyond doubt that Mr. Zulueta could not possibly have
intended to blow it up.

The defense tries to explain its failure to introduce any evidence to contradict the testimony of Mr. Zulueta as to why he
had gone to the beach and what he did there, alleging that, in the very nature of things, nobody else could have
witnessed it. Moreover, the defense insists, inter alia, that the testimony of Mr. Zulueta is inherently incredible because
he had no idea as to how many toilets the plane had; it could not have taken him an hour to relieve himself in the beach;
there were eight (8) commodes at the terminal toilet for men ; if he felt the need of relieving himself, he would have
seen to it that the soldiers did not beat him to the terminal toilets; he did not tell anybody about the reason for going to
the beach, until after the plane had taken off from Wake.

We find this pretense devoid of merit. Although Mr. Zulueta had to look for a secluded place in the beach to relieve
himself, beyond the view of others, defendant's airport manager, whom Mr. Zulueta informed about it, soon after the
departure of the plane, could have forthwith checked the veracity of Mr. Zulueta's statement by asking him to indicate
the specific place where he had been in the beach and then proceeding thereto for purposes of verification.

Then, again, the passenger of a plane seldom knows how many toilets it has. As a general rule, his knowledge is limited
to the toilets for the class — first class or tourist class — in which he is. Then, too, it takes several minutes for the
passengers of big aircrafts, like those flying from the U.S. to the Philippines, to deplane. Besides, the speed with which a
given passenger may do so depends, largely, upon the location of his seat in relation to the exit door. He cannot go over
the heads of those nearer than he thereto. Again, Mr. Zulueta may have stayed in the toilet terminal for some time,
expecting one of the commodes therein to be vacated soon enough, before deciding to go elsewhere to look for a place
suitable to his purpose. But he had to walk, first, from the plane to the terminal building and, then, after vainly waiting
therein for a while, cover a distance of about 400 yards therefrom to the beach, and seek there a place not visible by the
people in the plane and in the terminal, inasmuch as the terrain at Wake Island is flat. What is more, he must have had
to takeoff part, at least, of his clothing, because, without the facilities of a toilet, he had to wash himself and, then, dry
himself up before he could be properly attired and walk back the 400 yards that separated him from the terminal
building and/or the plane. Considering, in addition to the foregoing, the fact that he was not feeling well, at that time,
We are not prepared to hold that it could not have taken him around an hour to perform the acts narrated by him.

But, why — asks the defendant — did he not reveal the same before the plane took off? The record shows that, even
before Mr. Zulueta had reached the ramp leading to the plane, Capt. Zentner was already demonstrating at him in an
intemperate and arrogant tone and attitude ("What do you think you are?), thereby impelling Mr. Zulueta to answer
back in the same vein. As a consequence, there immediately ensued an altercation in the course of which each
apparently tried to show that he could not be cowed by the other. Then came the order of Capt. Zentner to off-load all
of the Zuluetas, including Mrs. Zulueta and the minor Miss Zulueta, as well as their luggage, their overcoats and other
effects handcarried by them; but, Mr. Zulueta requested that the ladies be allowed to continue the trip. Meanwhile, it
had taken time to locate his four (4) pieces of luggage. As a matter of fact, only three (3) of them were found, and the
fourth eventually remained in the plane. In short, the issue between Capt. Zentner and Mr. Zulueta had been limited to
determining whether the latter would allow himself to be browbeaten by the former. In the heat of the altercation,
nobody had inquired about the cause of Mr. Zulueta's delay in returning to the plane, apart from the fact that it was
rather embarrassing for him to explain, in the presence and within the hearing of the passengers and the crew, then
assembled around them, why he had gone to the beach and why it had taken him some time to answer there a call of
nature, instead of doing so in the terminal building.

Defendant's motion for reconsideration assails: (1) the amount of damages awarded as excessive; (2) the propriety of
accepting as credible plaintiffs' theory; (3) plaintiffs' right to recover either moral or exemplary damages; (4) plaintiffs'
right to recover attorney's fees; and (5) the non-enforcement of the compromise agreement between the defendant and
plaintiff's wife, Mrs. Zulueta. Upon the other hand, plaintiffs' motion for reconsideration contests the decision of this
Court reducing the amount of damages awarded by the trial court to approximately one-half thereof, upon the ground,
not only that, contrary to the findings of this Court, in said decision, plaintiff had not contributed to the aggravation of
his altercation or incident with Capt. Zentner by reacting to his provocation with extreme belligerency thereby allowing
himself to be dragged down to the level on which said agent of the defendant had placed himself, but, also, because the
purchasing power of our local currency is now much lower than when the trial court rendered its appealed decision,
over five (5) years ago, on July 5, 1967, which is an undeniable and undisputed fact. Precisely, for this reason,
defendant's characterization as exorbitant of the aggregate award of over P700,000 by way of damages, apart from
attorney's fees in the sum of P75,000, is untenable. Indeed, said award is now barely equivalent to around 100,000 U. S.
dollars.

It further support of its contention, defendant cites the damages awarded in previous cases to passengers of airlines,8 as
well as in several criminal cases, and some cases for libel and slander. None of these cases is, however, in point. Said
cases against airlines referred to passengers who were merely constrained to take a tourist class accommodation,
despite the fact that they had first class tickets, and that although, in one of such cases, there was proof that the airline
involved had acted as it did to give preference to a "white" passenger, this motive was not disclosed until the trial in
court. In the case at bar, plaintiff Rafael Zulueta was "off-loaded" at Wake Island, for having dared to retort to
defendant's agent in a tone and manner matching, if not befitting his intemperate language and arrogant attitude. As a
consequence, Capt. Zentner's attempt to humiliate Rafael Zulueta had boomeranged against him (Zentner), in the
presence of the other passengers and the crew. It was, also, in their presence that defendant's agent had referred to the
plaintiffs as "monkeys," a racial insult not made openly and publicly in the abovementioned previous cases against
airlines.

In other words, Mr. Zulueta was off-loaded, not to protect the safety of the aircraft and its passengers, but to retaliate
and  punish him for the embarrassment and loss of face thus suffered by defendant's agent. This vindictive motive is
made more manifest by the note delivered to Mr. Zulueta by defendant's airport manager at Wake Island, Mr. Sitton,
stating that the former's stay therein would be "for a minimum of one week," during which he would be charged $13.30
per day. This reference to a "minimum of one week" revealed the intention to keep him there stranded that long, for no
other plane, headed for Manila, was expected within said period of time, although Mr. Zulueta managed to board, days
later, a plane that brought him to Hawaii, whence he flew back to the Philippines, via Japan.

Neither may criminal cases, nor the cases for libel and slander cited in the defendant's motion for reconsideration, be
equated with the present case. Indeed, in ordinary criminal cases, the award for damages is, in actual practice, of purely
academic value, for the convicts generally belong to the poorest class of society. There is, moreover, a fundamental
difference between said cases and the one at bar. The Zuluetas had a contract of carriage with the defendant, as a
common carrier, pursuant to which the latter was bound, for a substantial monetary consideration paid by the former,
not merely to transport them to Manila, but, also, to do so with "extraordinary diligence" or "utmost diligence."9 The
responsibility of the common carrier, under said contract, as regards the passenger's safety, is of such a nature, affecting
as it does public interest, that it "cannot be dispensed with" or even "lessened by stipulation, by the posting of notices,
by statements on tickets, or otherwise." 10 In the present case, the defendant did not only fail to comply with its
obligation to transport Mr. Zulueta to Manila, but, also, acted in a manner calculated to humiliate him, to chastise him,
to make him suffer, to cause to him the greatest possible inconvenience, by leaving him in a desolate island, in the
expectation that he would be stranded there for a "minimum of one week" and, in addition thereto, charged therefor
$13.30 a day.

It is urged by the defendant that exemplary damages are not recoverable in quasi-delicts, pursuant to Article 2231 of our
Civil Code, except when the defendant has acted with "gross negligence," and that there is no specific finding that it had
so acted. It is obvious, however, that in off-loading plaintiff at Wake Island, under the circumstances heretofore
adverted to, defendant's agents had acted with malice aforethought and evident bad faith. If "gross negligence"
warrants the award of exemplary damages, with more reason is its imposition justified when the act performed is
deliberate, malicious and tainted with bad faith. Thus, in Lopez v. PANAM, 11 We held:

The rationale behind exemplary or corrective damages is, as the name implies, to provide an example or correction for
public good. Defendant having breached its contracts in bad faith, the court, as stated earlier, may award exemplary
damages in addition to moral damages (Articles 2229, 2232, New Civil Code.)

Similarly, in NWA v. Cuenca, 12 this Court declared that an award for exemplary damages was justified by the fact that
the airline's "agent had acted in a wanton, reckless and oppressive manner" in compelling Cuenca, upon arrival at
Okinawa, to transfer, over his objection, from the first class, where he was accommodated from Manila to Okinawa, to
the tourist class, in his trip to Japan, "under threat of otherwise leaving him in Okinawa," despite the fact that he had
paid in full the first class fare and was issued in Manila a first class ticket.

Defendant cites Rotea v. Halili, 13 in support of the proposition that a principal is not liable for exemplary damages owing
to acts of his agent unless the former has participated in said acts or ratified the same. Said case involved, however, the
subsidiary civil liability of an employer arising from criminal acts of his employee, and "exemplary damages ... may be
imposed when the crime was committed with one or more aggravating circumstances." 14 Accordingly, the Rotea case is
not in point, for the case at bar involves a breach of contract, as well as a quasi-delict.

Neither may the case of Palisoc v. Brillantes, 15 invoked by the defendant, be equated with the case at bar. The Palisoc
case dealt with the liability of school officials for damages arising from the death of a student (Palisoc) due to fist blows
given by another student (Daffon), in the course of a quarrel between them, while in a laboratory room of the Manila
Technical Institute. In an action for damages, the head thereof and the teacher in charge of said laboratory were held
jointly and severally liable with the student who caused said death, for failure of the school to provide "adequate
supervision over the activities of the students in the school premises," to protect them "from harm, whether at the
hands of fellow students or other parties." Such liability was predicated upon Article 2180 of our Civil Code, the
pertinent part of which reads:

ART. 2180. The obligation imposed by Article 2176 is demandable not only for one's own acts or omissions, but also for
those of persons for whom one is responsible.

xxx xxx xxx

Lastly, teachers or heads of establishments of arts and trades shall be liable for damages caused by their pupils and
students or apprentices, so long as they remain in their custody.

xxx xxx xxx

Obviously, the amount of damages warded in the Palisoc case is not and cannot serve as the measure of the damages
recoverable in the present case, the latter having been caused directly and intentionally by an employee or agent of the
defendant, whereas the student who killed the young Palisoc was in no wise an agent of the school. Moreover, upon her
arrival in the Philippines, Mrs. Zulueta reported her husband's predicament to defendant's local manager and asked him
to forthwith have him (Mr. Zulueta) brought to Manila, which defendant's aforementioned manager refused to do,
thereby impliedly ratifying the off-loading of Mr. Zulueta at Wake Island.

It is next urged that, under the contract of carriage with the defendant, Mr. Zulueta was bound to be present at the time
scheduled for the departure of defendant's plane and that he had, consequently, violated said contract when he did not
show up at such time. This argument might have had some weight had defendant's plane taken off before Mr. Zulueta
had shown up. But the fact is that he was ready, willing and able to board the plane about two hours before it actually
took off, and that he was deliberately and maliciously off-loaded on account of his altercation with Capt. Zentner. It
should, also, be noted that, although Mr. Zulueta was delayed some 20 to 30 minutes, the arrival or departure of planes
is often delayed for much longer periods of time. Followed to its logical conclusion, the argument adduced by the
defense suggests that airlines should be held liable for damages due to the inconvenience and anxiety, aside from actual
damages, suffered by many passengers either in their haste to arrive at the airport on scheduled time just to find that
their plane will not take off until later, or by reason of the late arrival of the aircraft at its destination.

PANAM impugns the award of attorney's fees upon the ground that no penalty should be imposed upon the right to
litigate; that, by law, it may be awarded only in exceptional cases; that the claim for attorney's fees has not been proven;
and that said defendant was justified in resisting plaintiff's claim "because it was patently exorbitant."

Nothing, however, can be farther from the truth. Indeed apart from plaintiff's claim for actual damages, the amount of
which is not contested, plaintiffs did not ask any specific sum by way of exemplary and moral damages, as well as
attorney's fees, and left the amount thereof to the "sound discretion" of the lower court. This, precisely, is the reason
why PANAM, now, alleges — without justification that the lower court had no jurisdiction over the subject matter of the
present case.

Moreover, Article 2208 of our Civil Code expressly authorizes the award of attorney's fees "when exemplary damages
are awarded," — as they are in this case —as well as "in any other case where the court deems it just and equitable that
attorney's fees ... be recovered," and We so deem it just and equitable in the present case, considering the "exceptional"
circumstances obtaining therein, particularly the bad faith with which defendant's agent had acted, the place where and
the conditions under which Rafael Zulueta was left at Wake Island, the absolute refusal of defendant's manager in
Manila to take any step whatsoever to alleviate Mr. Zulueta's predicament at Wake and have him brought to Manila —
which, under their contract of carriage, was defendant's obligation to discharge with "extra-ordinary" or "utmost"
diligence — and, the "racial" factor that had, likewise, tainted the decision of defendant's agent, Capt. Zentner, to off-
load him at Wake Island.

As regards the evidence necessary to justify the sum of P75,000 awarded as attorney's fees in this case, suffice it to say
that the quantity and quality of the services rendered by plaintiffs' counsel appearing on record, apart from the nature
of the case and the amount involved therein, as well as his prestige as one of the most distinguished members of the
legal profession in the Philippines, of which judicial cognizance may be taken, amply justify said award, which is a little
over 10% of the damages (P700,000) collectible by plaintiffs herein. Indeed, the attorney's fees in this case is
proportionally much less than that adjudged in Lopez v. PANAM 16 in which the judgment rendered for attorney's fees
(P50,000) was almost 20% of the damages (P275,000) recovered by the plaintiffs therein.

The defense assails the last part of the decision sought to be reconsidered, in which — relying upon Article 172 of our
Civil Code, which provides that "(t)he wife cannot bind the conjugal partnership without the husband's consent, except
in cases provided by law," and it is not claimed that this is one of such cases — We denied a motion, filed by Mrs.
Zulueta, for the dismissal of this case, insofar as she is concerned - she having settled all her differences with the
defendant, which appears to have paid her the sum of P50,000 therefor - "without prejudice to this sum being deducted
from the award made in said decision." Defendant now alleges that this is tantamount to holding that said
compromise agreement is both effective and ineffective.

This, of course, is not true. The  payment is effective, insofar as it is deductible from the award, and, because it is due (or
part of the amount due) from the defendant, with or without its compromise agreement with Mrs. Zulueta. What is
ineffective is the compromise agreement, insofar as the conjugal partnership is concerned. Mrs. Zulueta's motion was
for the dismissal of the case insofar as she was concerned, and the defense cited in support thereof Article 113 of said
Code, pursuant to which "(t)he husband must be joined in all suits by or against the wife except: ... (2) If they have in fact
been separated for at least one year." This provision, We held, however, refers to suits in which the wife is the principal
or real party in interest, not to the case at bar, "in which the husband is the main party in interest, both as the person
principally aggrieved and as administrator of the conjugal partnership ... he having acted in this capacity in entering into
the contract of carriage with PANAM and paid the amount due to the latter, under the contract, with funds of the
conjugal partnership," to which the amounts recoverable for breach of said contract, accordingly, belong. The damages
suffered by Mrs. Zulueta were mainly an in accident of the humiliation to which her husband had been subjected. The
Court ordered that said sum of P50,00 paid by PANAM to Mrs. Zulueta be deducted from the aggregate award in favor
of the plaintiffs herein for the simple reason that upon liquidation of the conjugal partnership, as provided by law, said
amount would have to be reckoned with, either as part of her share in the partnership, or as part of the support which
might have been or may be due to her as wife of Rafael Zulueta. It would surely be inane to sentence the defendant to
pay the P700,000 due to the plaintiffs and to direct Mrs. Zulueta to return said P50,000 to the defendant.

In this connection, it is noteworthy that, for obvious reasons of public policy, she is not allowed by law to waive her
share in the conjugal partnership, before the dissolution thereof. 17 She cannot even acquire any property by gratuitous
title, without the husband's consent, except from her ascendants, descendants, parents-in-law, and collateral relatives
within the fourth degree. 18
It is true that the law favors and encourages the settlement of litigations by compromise agreement between the
contending parties, but, it certainly does not favor a settlement with one of the spouses, both of whom are plaintiffs or
defendants in a common cause, such as the defense of the rights of the conjugal partnership, when the effect, even if
indirect, of the compromise is to jeopardize "the solidarity of the family" — which the
law 19 seeks to protect — by creating an additional cause for the misunderstanding that had arisen between such
spouses during the litigation, and thus rendering more difficult a reconciliation between them.

It is urged that there is no proof as to the purpose of the trip of the plaintiffs, that neither is there any evidence that the
money used to pay the plane tickets came from the conjugal funds and that the award to Mrs. Zulueta was for her
personal suffering or injuries. There was, however, no individual or specific award in favor of Mrs. Zulueta or any of the
plaintiffs. The award was made in their favor collectively. Again, in the absence of said proof, the presumption is that the
purpose of the trip was for the common benefit of the plaintiffs and that the money had come from the conjugal funds,
for, unless there is proof to the contrary, it is presumed "(t)hat things have happened according to the ordinary course
of nature and the ordinary habits of life." 20 In fact Manresa maintains 21 that they are deemed conjugal, when the source
of the money used therefor is not established, even if the purchase had been made by the wife. 22 And this is the rule
obtaining in the Philippines. Even property registered, under the Torrens system, in the name of one of the spouses, or
in that of the wife only, if acquired during the marriage, is presumed to belong to the conjugal partnership, unless there
is competent proof to the contrary. 23

PANAM maintains that the damages involved in the case at bar are not among those forming part of the conjugal
partnership pursuant to Article 153 of the Civil Code, reading:

ART. 153. The following are conjugal partnership property:

(1) That which is acquired by onerous title during the marriage at the expense of the common fund, whether the
acquisition be for the partnership, or for only one of the spouses;

(2) That which is obtained by the industry, or work, or as salary of the spouses, or of either of them;

(3) The fruits, rents or interests received or due during the marriage, coming from the common property or from the
exclusive property of each spouse.

Considering that the damages in question have arisen from, inter alia, a breach of plaintiffs' contract of carriage with the
defendant, for which plaintiffs paid their fare with funds presumably belonging to the conjugal partnership, We hold
that said damages fall under paragraph (1) of said Article 153, the right thereto having been "acquired by onerous title
during the marriage ... ." This conclusion is bolstered up by Article 148 of our Civil Code, according to which:

ART. 148. The following shall be the exclusive property of each spouse:

(1) That which is brought to the marriage as his or her own;

(2) That which each acquires, during the marriage, by lucrative title;

(3) That which is acquired by right of redemption or by exchange with other property belonging to only one of the
spouses;

(4) That which is purchased with exclusive money of the wife or of the husband.

The damages involved in the case at bar do not come under any of these provisions or of the other provisions forming
part of Chapter 3, Title VI, of Book I of the Civil Code, which chapter is entitled "Paraphernal Property." What is more, if
"(t)hat which is acquired by right of redemption or by exchange with other property belonging to only one of the
spouses," and "(t)hat which is purchased with exclusive money of the wife or of the husband," 24 belong exclusively to
such wife or husband, it follows necessarily that that which is acquired with money of the conjugal partnership belongs
thereto or forms part thereof. The rulings in Maramba v. Lozano 25 and Perez v. Lantin, 26 cited in defendant's motion for
reconsideration, are, in effect, adverse thereto. In both cases, it was merely held that the presumption under Article 160
of our Civil Code — to the effect that all property of the marriage belong to the conjugal partnership — does not apply
unless it is shown that it was acquired during marriage. In the present case, the contract of carriage was concededly
entered into, and the damages claimed by the plaintiffs were incurred, during marriage. Hence, the rights accruing from
said contract, including those resulting from breach thereof by the defendant, are presumed to belong to the conjugal
partnership of Mr. and Mrs. Zulueta. The fact that such breach of contract was coupled, also, with a quasi-delict
constitutes an aggravating circumstance and can not possibly have the effect of depriving the conjugal partnership of
such property rights.

Defendant insists that the use of conjugal funds to redeem property does not make the property redeemed conjugal if
the right of redemption pertained to the wife. In the absence, however, of  proof that such right of redemption pertains
to the wife — and there is no proof that the contract of carriage with PANAM or the money paid therefor belongs to
Mrs. Zulueta — the property involved, or the rights arising therefrom, must be presumed, therefore, to form part of the
conjugal partnership.

It is true that in Lilius v. Manila Railroad Co., 27 it was held that the "patrimonial and moral damages" awarded to a young
and beautiful woman by reason of a scar — in consequence of an injury resulting from an automobile accident — which
disfigured her face and fractured her left leg, as well as caused a permanent deformity, are her paraphernal property.
Defendant cites, also, in support of its contention the following passage from Colin y Capitant:

No esta resuelta expresamente en la legislacion española la cuestion de si las indemnizaciones debidas por

accidentes del trabaho tienen la consideracion de gananciales, o son bienes particulares de los conyuges.

Inclinan a la solucion de que estas indemnizaciones deben ser consideradas como gananciales, el hecho de que la
sociedad pierde la capacidad de trabajocon el accidente, que a ella le pertenece, puesto que de la sociedad son losfrutos
de ese trabajo; en cambio, la consideracion de que igual manera que losbienes que sustituyen a los que cada conyuge
lleva al matrimonio como propiostienen el caracter de propios, hace pensar que las indemnizaciones que vengana
suplir la capacidad de trabajo aportada por cada conyuge a la sociedad, debenser juridicamente reputadas como bienes
propios del conyuge que haya sufrido elaccidente. Asi se llega a la misma solucion aportada por la jurisprudencia
francesca. 28

This opinion is, however, undecisive, to say the least. It should be noted that Colin y Capitant were commenting on
the French Civil Code; that their comment referred to indemnities due in consequence of "accidentes del trabajo
"resulting in  physical injuries sustained by one of the spouses (which Mrs. Zulueta has not suffered); and that said
commentators admit that the question whether or not said damages are paraphernal property or belong to the conjugal
partnership is not settled under the Spanish law. 29 Besides, the French law and jurisprudence — to which the comments
of Planiol and Ripert, likewise, refer — are inapposite to the question under consideration, because they differ
basically from the Spanish law in the treatment of the property relations between husband and wife. Indeed, our Civil
Code, like the Spanish Civil Code, favors the system of conjugal partnership of gains. Accordingly, the former provides
that, "(i)n the absence of marriage settlements, or when the same are void, the system of relative community or
conjugal partnership of gains ... shall govern the property relations between" the spouses. 30 Hence, "(a)ll property of the
marriage is presumed to belong to the conjugal partnership, unless it be proved that it pertains exclusively to the
husband or to the wife." 31

No similar rules are found in the French Civil Code. What is more, under the provisions thereof, the conjugal partnership
exists only when so stipulated in the "capitulaciones matrimoniales" or by way of exception. In the language of Manresa
—

Prescindimos de los preceptos de los Condigos de Francia, Italia, Holanda, Portugal, Alemania y Suiza, porsue solo
excepcionalmente, o cuando asi se pacta en las capitulaciones, admiten el sistema de gananciales. 32

Again, Colin y Capitant, as well as the Lilius case, refer to damages recovered for physical injuries suffered by the wife. In
the case at bar, the party mainly injured, although not physically, is the husband.
Accordingly, the other Philippine cases 33 and those from Louisiana — whose civil law is based upon the French Civil Code
— cited by the defendant, which similarly refer to moral damages due to physical injuries suffered by the wife, are,
likewise, inapplicable to the case at bar.

We find, therefore, no plausible reason to disturb the views expressed in Our decision promulgated on February 29,
1972.

WHEREFORE, the motions for reconsideration above-referred to should be, as they are hereby denied.

2. G.R. No. 170180               November 23, 2007

ARSENIO VERGARA VALDEZ, Petitioner,

vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.

DECISION

TINGA, J.:

The sacred right against an arrest, search or seizure without valid warrant is not only ancient. It is also zealously
safeguarded. The Constitution guarantees the right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and
effects against unreasonable searches and seizures.1 Any evidence obtained in violation of said right shall be
inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding. Indeed, while the power to search and seize may at times be necessary
to the public welfare, still it must be exercised and the law implemented without contravening the constitutional rights
of the citizens, for the enforcement of no statute is of sufficient importance to justify indifference to the basic principles
of government.2

On appeal is the Decision3 of the Court of Appeals dated 28 July 2005, affirming the Judgment4 of the Regional Trial
Court (RTC), Branch 31, Agoo, La Union dated 31 March 2004 finding petitioner Arsenio Vergara Valdez guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of violating Section 11 of Republic Act No. 9165 (R.A. No. 9165)5 and sentencing him to suffer the
penalty of imprisonment ranging from eight (8) years and one (1) day of prision mayor medium as minimum to fifteen
(15) years of reclusion temporal medium as maximum and ordering him to pay a fine of ₱350,000.00.6

I.

On 26 June 2003, petitioner was charged with violation of Section 11, par. 2(2) of R.A. No. 9165 in an Information7 which
reads:

That on or about the 17th day of March 2003, in the Municipality of Aringay, Province of La Union, Philippines and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously have in his possession, control and custody dried marijuana leaves wrapped in a cellophane and newspaper
page, weighing more or less twenty-five (25) grams, without first securing the necessary permit, license or prescription
from the proper government agency.

CONTRARY TO LAW.8

On arraignment, petitioner pleaded not guilty. Thereafter, trial on the merits ensued with the prosecution presenting
the three (3) barangay  tanods of San Benito Norte, Aringay, La Union namely, Rogelio Bautista (Bautista), Nestor Aratas
(Aratas) and Eduardo Ordoño (Ordoño), who arrested petitioner.

Bautista testified that at around 8:00 to 8:30 p.m. of 17 March 2003, he was conducting the routine patrol along the
National Highway in Barangay San Benito Norte, Aringay, La Union together with Aratas and Ordoño when they noticed
petitioner, lugging a bag, alight from a mini-bus. The tanods  observed that petitioner, who appeared suspicious to them,
seemed to be looking for something. They thus approached him but the latter purportedly attempted to run away. They
chased him, put him under arrest and thereafter brought him to the house of Barangay Captain Orencio Mercado
(Mercado) where he, as averred by Bautista, was ordered by Mercado to open his bag. Petitioner’s bag allegedly
contained a pair of denim pants, eighteen pieces of eggplant and dried marijuana leaves wrapped in newspaper and
cellophane. It was then that petitioner was taken to the police station for further investigation.9

Aratas and Ordoño corroborated Bautista’s testimony on most material points. On cross-examination, however, Aratas
admitted that he himself brought out the contents of petitioner’s bag before petitioner was taken to the house of
Mercado.10 Nonetheless, he claimed that at Mercado’s house, it was petitioner himself who brought out the contents of
his bag upon orders from Mercado. For his part, Ordoño testified that it was he who was ordered by Mercado to open
petitioner’s bag and that it was then that they saw the purported contents thereof.11

The prosecution likewise presented Police Inspector Valeriano Laya II (Laya), the forensic chemist who conducted the
examination of the marijuana allegedly confiscated from petitioner. Laya maintained that the specimen submitted to
him for analysis, a sachet of the substance weighing 23.10 grams and contained in a plastic bag, tested positive of
marijuana. He disclosed on cross-examination, however, that he had knowledge neither of how the marijuana was taken
from petitioner nor of how the said substance reached the police officers. Moreover, he could not identify whose
marking was on the inside of the cellophane wrapping the marijuana leaves.12

The charges were denied by petitioner. As the defense’s sole witness, he testified that at around 8:30 p.m. on 17 March
2003, he arrived in Aringay from his place in Curro-oy, Santol, La Union. After alighting from the bus, petitioner claimed
that he went to the house of a friend to drink water and then proceeded to walk to his brother’s house. As he was
walking, prosecution witness Ordoño, a cousin of his brother’s wife, allegedly approached him and asked where he was
going. Petitioner replied that he was going to his brother’s house. Ordoño then purportedly requested to see the
contents of his bag and appellant acceded. It was at this point that Bautista and Aratas joined them. After inspecting all
the contents of his bag, petitioner testified that he was restrained by the tanod and taken to the house of Mercado. It
was Aratas who carried the bag until they reached their destination.13

Petitioner maintained that at Mercado’s house, his bag was opened by the tanod and Mercado himself. They took out
an item wrapped in newspaper, which later turned out to be marijuana leaves. Petitioner denied ownership thereof. He
claimed to have been threatened with imprisonment by his arrestors if he did not give the prohibited drugs to someone
from the east in order for them to apprehend such person. As petitioner declined, he was brought to the police station
and charged with the instant offense. Although petitioner divulged that it was he who opened and took out the contents
of his bag at his friend’s house, he averred that it was one of the tanod who did so at Mercado’s house and that it was
only there that they saw the marijuana for the first time.14

e. replied that he was going to his brother'en proceeded to walk to his brother'w

Finding that the prosecution had proven petitioner’s guilt beyond reasonable doubt, the RTC rendered judgment against
him and sentenced him to suffer indeterminate imprisonment ranging from eight (8) years and one (1) day of prision
mayor medium as minimum to fifteen (15) years of reclusion temporal medium as maximum and ordered him to pay a
fine of ₱350,000.00.15

Aggrieved, petitioner appealed the decision of the RTC to the Court of Appeals.1âwphi1 On 28 July 2005, the appellate
court affirmed the challenged decision. The Court of Appeals, finding no cogent reason to overturn the presumption of
regularity in favor of the barangay tanod in the absence of evidence of ill-motive on their part, agreed with the trial
court that there was probable cause to arrest petitioner. It observed further:

That the prosecution failed to establish the chain of custody of the seized marijuana is of no moment. Such circumstance
finds prominence only when the existence of the seized prohibited drugs is denied. In this case, accused-appellant
himself testified that the marijuana wrapped in a newspaper was taken from his bag. The corpus delicti of the crime, i.e.
[,] the existence of the marijuana and his possession thereof, was amply proven by accused-appellant Valdez’s own
testimony.16
In this appeal, petitioner prays for his acquittal and asserts that his guilt of the crime charged had not been proven
beyond reasonable doubt. He argues, albeit for the first time on appeal, that the warrantless arrest effected against him
by the barangay  tanod was unlawful and that the warrantless search of his bag that followed was likewise contrary to
law. Consequently, he maintains, the marijuana leaves purportedly seized from him are inadmissible in evidence for
being the fruit of a poisonous tree.

Well-settled is the rule that the findings of the trial court on the credibility of witnesses and their testimonies are
accorded great respect and weight, in the absence of any clear showing that some facts and circumstances of weight or
substance which could have affected the result of the case have been overlooked, misunderstood or misapplied.17

After meticulous examination of the records and evidence on hand, however, the Court finds and so holds that a
reversal of the decision a quo under review is in order.

II.

At the outset, we observe that nowhere in the records can we find any objection by petitioner to the irregularity of his
arrest before his arraignment. Considering this and his active participation in the trial of the case, jurisprudence dictates
that petitioner is deemed to have submitted to the jurisdiction of the trial court, thereby curing any defect in his arrest.
The legality of an arrest affects only the jurisdiction of the court over his person.18 Petitioner’s warrantless arrest
therefore cannot, in itself, be the basis of his acquittal.

However, to determine the admissibility of the seized drugs in evidence, it is indispensable to ascertain whether or not
the search which yielded the alleged contraband was lawful. The search, conducted as it was without a warrant, is
justified only if it were incidental to a lawful arrest.19 Evaluating the evidence on record in its totality, as earlier
intimated, the reasonable conclusion is that the arrest of petitioner without a warrant is not lawful as well.

Petitioner maintains, in a nutshell, that after he was approached by the tanod and asked to show the contents of his bag,
he was simply herded without explanation and taken to the house of the barangay captain. On their way there, it was
Aratas who carried his bag. He denies ownership over the contraband allegedly found in his bag and asserts that he saw
it for the first time at the barangay captain’s house.

Even casting aside petitioner’s version and basing the resolution of this case on the general thrust of the prosecution
evidence, the unlawfulness of petitioner’s arrest stands out just the same.

Section 5, Rule 113 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure provides the only occasions on which a person may be arrested
without a warrant, to wit:

Section 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful.—A peace officer or a private person may, without a warrant, arrest a
person:

(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit
an offense;

(b) When an offense has just been committed and he has probable cause to believe based on personal knowledge of
facts or circumstances that the person to be arrested has committed it; and

(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal establishment or place where he is
serving final judgment or temporarily confined while his case is pending, or has escaped while being transferred from
one confinement to another.

xxx

It is obvious that based on the testimonies of the arresting barangay tanod, not one of these circumstances was
obtaining at the time petitioner was arrested. By their own admission, petitioner was not committing an offense at the
time he alighted from the bus, nor did he appear to be then committing an offense.20 The tanod did not have probable
cause either to justify petitioner’s warrantless arrest.
For the exception in Section 5(a), Rule 113 to operate, this Court has ruled that two (2) elements must be present: (1)
the person to be arrested must execute an overt act indicating that he has just committed, is actually committing, or is
attempting to commit a crime; and (2) such overt act is done in the presence or within the view of the arresting
officer.21 Here, petitioner’s act of looking around after getting off the bus was but natural as he was finding his way to his
destination. That he purportedly attempted to run away as the tanod approached him is irrelevant and cannot by itself
be construed as adequate to charge the tanod with personal knowledge that petitioner had just engaged in, was actually
engaging in or was attempting to engage in criminal activity. More importantly, petitioner testified that he did not run
away but in fact spoke with the barangay tanod  when they approached him.

Even taking the prosecution’s version generally as the truth, in line with our assumption from the start, the conclusion
will not be any different. It is not unreasonable to expect that petitioner, walking the street at night, after being closely
observed and then later tailed by three unknown persons, would attempt to flee at their approach. Flight per se is not
synonymous with guilt and must not always be attributed to one’s consciousness of guilt.22 Of persuasion was the
Michigan Supreme Court when it ruled in People v. Shabaz23 that "[f]light alone is not a reliable indicator of guilt without
other circumstances because flight alone is inherently ambiguous." Alone, and under the circumstances of this case,
petitioner’s flight lends itself just as easily to an innocent explanation as it does to a nefarious one.

Moreover, as we pointed out in People v. Tudtud,24 "[t]he phrase ‘in his presence’ therein, connot[es] penal knowledge
on the part of the arresting officer. The right of the accused to be secure against any unreasonable searches on and
seizure of his own body and any deprivation of his liberty being a most basic and fundamental one, the statute or rule
that allows exception to the requirement of a warrant of arrest is strictly construed. Its application cannot be extended
beyond the cases specifically provided by law."25

Indeed, the supposed acts of petitioner, even assuming that they appeared dubious, cannot be viewed as sufficient to
incite suspicion of criminal activity enough to validate his warrantless arrest.26 If at all, the search most permissible for
the tanod to conduct under the prevailing backdrop of the case was a stop-and-frisk to allay any suspicion they have
been harboring based on petitioner’s behavior. However, a stop-and-frisk situation, following Terry v. Ohio,27 must
precede a warrantless arrest, be limited to the person’s outer clothing, and should be grounded upon a genuine reason,
in light of the police officer’s experience and surrounding conditions, to warrant the belief that the person detained has
weapons concealed about him.28

Accordingly, petitioner’s waiver of his right to question his arrest notwithstanding, the marijuana leaves allegedly taken
during the search cannot be admitted in evidence against him as they were seized during a warrantless search which
was not lawful.29 As we pronounced in People v. Bacla-an —

A waiver of an illegal warrantless arrest does not also mean a waiver of the inadmissibility of evidence seized during an
illegal warrantless arrest. The following searches and seizures are deemed permissible by jurisprudence: (1) search of
moving vehicles (2) seizure in plain view (3) customs searches (4) waiver or consent searches (5) stop and frisk situations
(Terry Search) and (6) search incidental to a lawful arrest. The last includes a valid warrantless search and seizure
pursuant to an equally valid warrantless arrest, for, while as a rule, an arrest is considered legitimate if effected with a
valid warrant of arrest, the Rules of Court recognize permissible warrantless arrests, to wit: (1) arrests in flagrante
delicto, (2) arrests effected in hot pursuit, and, (3) arrests of escaped prisoners.30

When petitioner was arrested without a warrant, he was neither caught in flagrante delicto committing a crime nor was
the arrest effected in hot pursuit. Verily, it cannot therefore be reasonably argued that the warrantless search
conducted on petitioner was incidental to a lawful arrest.

In its Comment, the Office of the Solicitor General posits that apart from the warrantless search being incidental to his
lawful arrest, petitioner had consented to the search. We are not convinced. As we explained in Caballes v. Court of
Appeals31 —

Doubtless, the constitutional immunity against unreasonable searches and seizures is a personal right which may be
waived. The consent must be voluntary in order to validate an otherwise illegal detention and search, i.e., the consent is
unequivocal, specific, and intelligently given, uncontaminated by any duress or coercion. Hence, consent to a search is
not to be lightly inferred, but must be shown by clear and convincing evidence. The question whether a consent to a
search was in fact voluntary is a question of fact to be determined from the totality of all the circumstances. Relevant to
this determination are the following characteristics of the person giving consent and the environment in which consent
is given: (1) the age of the defendant; (2) whether he was in a public or secluded location; (3) whether he objected to
the search or passively looked on; (4) the education and intelligence of the defendant; (5) the presence of coercive
police procedures; (6) the defendant's belief that no incriminating evidence will be found; (7) the nature of the police
questioning; (8) the environment in which the questioning took place; and (9) the possibly vulnerable subjective state of
the person consenting. It is the State which has the burden of proving, by clear and positive testimony, that the
necessary consent was obtained and that it was freely and voluntarily given.32

In the case at bar, following the theory of the prosecution— albeit based on conflicting testimonies on when petitioner’s
bag was actually opened, it is apparent that petitioner was already under the coercive control of the public officials who
had custody of him when the search of his bag was demanded. Moreover, the prosecution failed to prove any specific
statement as to how the consent was asked and how it was given, nor the specific words spoken by petitioner indicating
his alleged "consent." Even granting that petitioner admitted to opening his bag when Ordoño asked to see its contents,
his implied acquiescence, if at all, could not have been more than mere passive conformity given under coercive or
intimidating circumstances and hence, is considered no consent at all within the contemplation of the constitutional
guarantee.33 As a result, petitioner’s lack of objection to the search and seizure is not tantamount to a waiver of his
constitutional right or a voluntary submission to the warrantless search and seizure.34

III.

Notably, the inadmissibility in evidence of the seized marijuana leaves for being the fruit of an unlawful search is not the
lone cause that militates against the case of the prosecution. We likewise find that it has failed to convincingly establish
the identity of the marijuana leaves purportedly taken from petitioner’s bag.

In all prosecutions for violation of the Dangerous Drugs Act, the following elements must concur: (1) proof that the
transaction took place; and (2) presentation in court of the corpus delicti or the illicit drug as evidence.35 The existence of
dangerous drugs is a condition sine qua non for conviction for the illegal sale of dangerous drugs, it being the very
corpus delicti of the crime.36

In a line of cases, we have ruled as fatal to the prosecution’s case its failure to prove that the specimen submitted for
laboratory examination was the same one allegedly seized from the accused.37 There can be no crime of illegal
possession of a prohibited drug when nagging doubts persist on whether the item confiscated was the same specimen
examined and established to be the prohibited drug.38 As we discussed in People v. Orteza39 , where we deemed the
prosecution to have failed in establishing all the elements necessary for conviction of appellant for illegal sale of shabu –

First, there appears nothing in the record showing that police officers complied with the proper procedure in the
custody of seized drugs as specified in People v. Lim, i.e., any apprehending team having initial control of said drugs
and/or paraphernalia should, immediately after seizure or confiscation, have the same physically inventoried and
photographed in the presence of the accused, if there be any, and or his representative, who shall be required to sign
the copies of the inventory and be given a copy thereof. The failure of the agents to comply with the requirement raises
doubt whether what was submitted for laboratory examination and presented in court was actually recovered from
appellant. It negates the presumption that official duties have been regularly performed by the police officers.

In People v. Laxa, where the buy-bust team failed to mark the confiscated marijuana immediately after the
apprehension of the accused, the Court held that the deviation from the standard procedure in anti-narcotics operations
produced doubts as to the origins of the marijuana. Consequently, the Court concluded that the prosecution failed to
establish the identity of the corpus delicti.

The Court made a similar ruling in People v. Kimura, where the Narcom operatives failed to place markings on the seized
marijuana at the time the accused was arrested and to observe the procedure and take custody of the drug.
More recently, in Zarraga v. People, the Court held that the material inconsistencies with regard to when and where the
markings on the shabu were made and the lack of inventory on the seized drugs created reasonable doubt as to the
identity of the corpus delicti. The Court thus acquitted the accused due to the prosecution’s failure to indubitably show
the identity of the shabu.

In the case at bar, after the arrest of petitioner by the barangay tanod, the records only show that he was taken to the
house of the barangay captain and thereafter to the police station. The Joint Affidavit40 executed by the tanod merely
states that they confiscated the marijuana leaves which they brought to the police station together with petitioner.
Likewise, the Receipt41 issued by the Aringay Police Station merely acknowledged receipt of the suspected drugs
supposedly confiscated from petitioner.

Not only did the three tanod contradict each other on the matter of when petitioner’s bag was opened, they also gave
conflicting testimony on who actually opened the same. The prosecution, despite these material inconsistencies,
neglected to explain the discrepancies. Even more damning to its cause was the admission by Laya, the forensic chemist,
that he did not know how the specimen was taken from petitioner, how it reached the police authorities or whose
marking was on the cellophane wrapping of the marijuana. The non-presentation, without justifiable reason, of the
police officers who conducted the inquest proceedings and marked the seized drugs, if such was the case, is fatal to the
case. Plainly, the prosecution neglected to establish the crucial link in the chain of custody of the seized marijuana leaves
from the time they were first allegedly discovered until they were brought for examination by Laya.

The Court of Appeals found as irrelevant the failure of the prosecution to establish the chain of custody over the seized
marijuana as such "[f]inds prominence only when the existence of the seized prohibited drug is denied."42 We cannot
agree.

To buttress its ratiocination, the appellate court narrowed on petitioner’s testimony that the marijuana was taken from
his bag, without taking the statement in full context.43 Contrary to the Court of Appeals’ findings, although petitioner
testified that the marijuana was taken from his bag, he consistently denied ownership thereof.44 Furthermore, it defies
logic to require a denial of ownership of the seized drugs before the principle of chain of custody comes into play.

The onus of proving culpability in criminal indictment falls upon the State. In conjunction with this, law enforcers and
public officers alike have the corollary duty to preserve the chain of custody over the seized drugs. The chain of evidence
is constructed by proper exhibit handling, storage, labeling and recording, and must exist from the time the evidence is
found until the time it is offered in evidence. Each person who takes possession of the specimen is duty-bound to detail
how it was cared for, safeguarded and preserved while in his or her control to prevent alteration or replacement while in
custody. This guarantee of the integrity of the evidence to be used against an accused goes to the very heart of his
fundamental rights.

The presumption of regularity in the performance of official duty invoked by the prosecution and relied upon by the
courts a quo cannot by itself overcome the presumption of innocence nor constitute proof of guilt beyond reasonable
doubt.45 Among the constitutional rights enjoyed by an accused, the most primordial yet often disregarded is the
presumption of innocence. This elementary principle accords every accused the right to be presumed innocent until the
contrary is proven beyond reasonable doubt. Thus, the burden of proving the guilt of the accused rests upon the
prosecution.

Concededly, the evidence of the defense is weak and uncorroborated. Nevertheless, this "[c]annot be used to advance
the cause of the prosecution as its evidence must stand or fall on its own weight and cannot be allowed to draw strength
from the weakness of the defense."46 Moreover, where the circumstances are shown to yield two or more inferences,
one inconsistent with the presumption of innocence and the other compatible with the finding of guilt, the court must
acquit the accused for the reason that the evidence does not satisfy the test of moral certainty and is inadequate to
support a judgment of conviction.47

Drug addiction has been invariably denounced as "an especially vicious crime,"48 and "one of the most pernicious evils
that has ever crept into our society,"49 for those who become addicted to it "not only slide into the ranks of the living
dead, what is worse, they become a grave menace to the safety of law-abiding members of society,"50 whereas
"peddlers of drugs are actually agents of destruction."51 Indeed, the havoc created by the ruinous effects of prohibited
drugs on the moral fiber of society cannot be underscored enough. However, in the rightfully vigorous campaign of the
government to eradicate the hazards of drug use and drug trafficking, it cannot be permitted to run roughshod over an
accused’s right to be presumed innocent until proven to the contrary and neither can it shirk from its corollary obligation
to establish such guilt beyond reasonable doubt.

In this case, the totality of the evidence presented utterly fails to overcome the presumption of innocence which
petitioner enjoys. The failure of the prosecution to prove all the elements of the offense beyond reasonable doubt must
perforce result in petitioner’s exoneration from criminal liability.

IV.

A final word. We find it fitting to take this occasion to remind the courts to exercise the highest degree of diligence and
prudence in deliberating upon the guilt of accused persons brought before them, especially in light of the fundamental
rights at stake. Here, we note that the courts a quo neglected to give more serious consideration to certain material
issues in the determination of the merits of the case. We are not oblivious to the fact that in some instances, law
enforcers resort to the practice of planting evidence to extract information or even harass civilians. Accordingly, courts
are duty-bound to be "[e]xtra vigilant in trying drug cases lest an innocent person be made to suffer the unusually severe
penalties for drug offenses."52 In the same vein, let this serve as an admonition to police officers and public officials alike
to perform their mandated duties with commitment to the highest degree of diligence, righteousness and respect for
the law.

WHEREFORE, the assailed Decision is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Petitioner Arsenio Vergara Valdez is ACQUITTED on
reasonable doubt. The Director of the Bureau of Corrections is directed to cause the immediate release of petitioner,
unless the latter is being lawfully held for another cause; and to inform the Court of

the date of his release, or the reasons for his continued confinement, within ten (10) days from notice. No costs.

SO ORDERED.

3. [ G.R. No. 224495, February 19, 2020 ]

ROMEO TUMABINI, PETITIONER, VS. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, RESPONDENT.

DECISION

GESMUNDO, J.:

This is an appeal by certiorari seeking to reverse and set aside the January 28, 2016 Decision1 and the April 7, 2016
Resolution2 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR No. 02289. The CA affirmed the October 15, 2012 Joint
Judgment3 of the Regional Trial Court of Mandaue City, Branch 28 (RTC) in Crim. Case Nos. DU-10273-74 which found
Romeo Tumabini (petitioner) guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violations of Sections 11 and 12, Article II, of Republic
Act (R.A.) No. 9165.

The Antecedents

In two (2) Informations4 dated July 3, 2003, petitioner was charged with violations of Sections 11 and 12 of R.A. No.
9165, the accusatory portions of which read:

Criminal Case No. DU-10273

(Illegal Possession of Dangerous Drugs)

That on or about the 19th day of June, 2003 at 5:00 o'clock in the morning, more or less, at Sitio Tuburan, Brgy[.] Jubay,
Municipality of Lilo-an, Province of Cebu, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-
named accused, without authority of law, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have in his possession,
custody and control three (3) heat-sealed transparent plastic packet[s] of white crystalline substance weighing 0.07
gram, and one (1) heat-sealed transparent plastic packet containing [w]hite crystalline substance weighing 0.01 gram
which when subjected to laboratory examination gave positive results for the presence of Methylamphetamine
Hydrochloride, a dangerous drug.

CONTRARY TO LAW.5

Criminal Case No. DU-10274

(Illegal Possession of Drug Paraphernalia)

That on [or about] the 19th day of June, 2003, at about 5:00 in the morning [at] Sitio Tuburan, Barangay Jubay,
Municipality of Lilo-an, Province of Cebu, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable [C]ourt, the above-
named accused, without authority of law[,] did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have in his
possession, custody and control one (1) roll of tin foil, two (2) pcs. lighters intended to be used in heating, burning
and/or sniffing shabu.

CONTRARY TO LAW.6

On August 12, 2003, petitioner was released on bail pending trial.7 On October 29, 2003, petitioner was arraigned and
pleaded not guilty. After pretrial, trial on the merits ensued.

Evidence of the Prosecution

The prosecution presented SPO2 Reynaldo Alcala Matillano (SPO2 Matillano) and SPO1 Edwin Tesoro (SPO1 Tesoro) as
its witnesses. Their testimonies tended to establish the following:

Pursuant to a prior surveillance and test buy, a Search Warrant8 dated June 18, 2003, was issued by Judge Ireneo Lee
Gako of the Regional Trial Court of Cebu City, Branch 5 (RTC Cebu City) against petitioner and his wife, Ivy Tumabini (Ivy).

On June 19, 2003, the team led by Police Senior Inspector (PSI) Ricardo Flores, SPO2 Matillano, SPO1 Tesoro, and PO3
Jesus Manulat implemented the search warrant. SPO2 Matillano was designated as the searcher; while SPO1 Tesoro was
the recorder. According to SPO2 Matillano, they were accompanied by Barangay Councilor Silvestre Pepito (Councilor
Pepito) and Barangay Tanod Antonio Ayuda, Jr. (Tanod Ayuda). Upon arriving at petitioner's residence, the team called
out petitioner but nobody answered. SPO2 Matillano forced open the door of the house but found another locked door
leading to the second level where petitioner and his children were staying. Petitioner eventually opened the door and
was given a copy of the search warrant. The team informed petitioner that they would search the house in the presence
of the barangay councilor and tanod.9

After searching the house, SPO2 Matillano found three (3) heat-sealed packs and one (1) heat-sealed plastic sachet
containing white crystalline substance. The team further found one (1) tin foil, two (2) lighters, a camera, seven (7)
watches, a cellphone, five (5) P100.00 bills, two (2) handguns, and three (3) live ammunitions. The three (3) packs
weighing 0.07 gram were marked with "RT," the initials of petitioner; while the one (1) sachet weighing 0.01 gram was
marked with "IT," the initials of Ivy. SPO1 Tesoro prepared an inventory of the items seized. The seized items were
subsequently brought to the PNP Crime Laboratory for examination. Chemistry Report No. D-1010-2003,10 dated June
19, 2003, indicated that the specimens yielded a positive result for Methylamphetamine Hydrochloride or shabu.11

Evidence of the Defense

The defense presented petitioner as its witness. Petitioner denied the allegations against him. He averred that on the
morning of June 19, 2003, he was home together with his family when he heard the sound of people running outside
and someone looking for their house. Then, police officers suddenly barged in through their kitchen door. Petitioner
asserted that he went to the living room and found armed persons in civilian clothing. He was ordered to sit down and
sign a piece of paper at gunpoint, and the police proceeded to search their house while he and his family remained on
the first level. SPO2 Matillano came back with shabu, and accused petitioner as its owner.12

The RTC Ruling

In its October 15, 2012 Joint Judgment, the RTC found petitioner guilty of illegal possession of dangerous drugs and
sentenced him to suffer imprisonment of twelve (12) years and one (1) day to twenty (20) years, and to pay a fine of
Three Hundred Thousand Pesos (P300,000.00). It also found petitioner guilty of illegal possession of drug paraphernalia
and sentenced him to suffer imprisonment of six (6) months and one (1) day to four (4) years and to pay a fine of Ten
Thousand Pesos (P10,000.00). The RTC held that the search of petitioner's house was validly conducted through a search
warrant; and that it was sufficiently proven by the prosecution that petitioner had possession, custody and control of
the three (3) packets, one (1) sachet of shabu, and several drug paraphernalia.13

Aggrieved, petitioner appealed to the CA.

The CA Ruling

In its January 28, 2016 Decision, the CA affirmed with modification the RTC ruling. It agreed with the RTC that all the
elements of the crime of illegal possession of dangerous drugs were duly established because the packets of shabu were
recovered from petitioner's house when the search warrant was enforced. The CA also stated that the prosecution
substantially complied with the law and the integrity of the items seized was preserved because SPO1 Tesoro
immediately marked the seized items, prepared an inventory, and the petitioner and witnesses signed the said
inventory. It underscored that there was minor inconsistency as to who accompanied the police officers during the
implementation of the search warrant. The CA further ruled that petitioner failed to prove any ill motive on the part of
the police officers.

However, the CA acquitted petitioner of the crime of illegal possession of drug paraphernalia because the items
presented in court were ordinary household items and it was not proven by evidence that said items were actually used
in connection with the confiscated drugs.14

Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration but it was denied by the CA in its April 7, 2016 Resolution.15

Hence, this petition raising the following issues:

I.

WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN AFFIRMING CONVICTION OF SECTION 11, ARTICLE 2 OF
[R.A. NO.] 9165 DESPITE THE BLATANT VIOLATION OF BOTH THE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO PRIVACY AND RIGHT
AGAINST UNREASONABLE SEARCH AND SEIZURE OF THE PETITIONER, BECAUSE OF THE UNDUE AND UNNECESSARY
[FORCIBLE OPENING] OF HIS HOUSE EMPLOYED BY THE POLICE OFFICERS, DURING [THE UNREASONABLE HOUR
ABOUT 5 O'CLOCK IN THE MORNING]; ANY EVIDENCE OBTAINED IS THUS INADMISSIBLE.

II.

WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN RULING THAT THERE [WAS] SUBSTANTIAL
COMPLIANCE WITH THE CHAIN OF CUSTODY MANDATED UNDER SECTION 12 OF R.A. [NO.] 9165, DESPITE THE
EXISTENCE OF FLAGRANT LAPSES THEREOF, THEREBY CASTING SERIOUS DOUBT AS TO THE INTEGRITY AND
PRESERVATION OF THE ALLEGED ILLEGAL DRUGS SEIZED.16

Petitioner argues that the search conducted in his house was unreasonable because it was implemented at 5:00 a.m.
while the residents were still asleep; that the prosecution failed to prove compliance with the chain of custody rule; that
the required witnesses under R.A. No. 9165 were not present during the inventory; that no photographs of the seized
items were taken; that it was not disclosed as to who delivered the items to the crime laboratory; and that there was no
evidence on how the seized items were stored, preserved, labeled, and recorded.
In its Comment,17 the People of the Philippines (respondent), through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), counters
that the prosecution sufficiently proved all the elements of the crime of illegal possession of dangerous drugs; that it was
reasonable for the police to forcibly enter petitioner's house because they were not allowed entry even though they
called out petitioner's name; and that it was not shown that the seized drugs were contaminated in any manner.

The Court's Ruling

The petition is impressed with merit.

A search warrant may be

served at dawn

One of the arguments of petitioner is that it was unreasonable for the police officers to enforce the search warrant at
dawn because it violates his right against unreasonable searches and seizures.

The argument fails.

Section 9, Rule 126 of the Rules of Court states:

Section 9. Time of making search. – The warrant must direct that it be served in the day time, unless the affidavit asserts
that the property is on the person or in the place ordered to be searched, in which case a direction may be inserted that
it be served at any time of the day or night.

In People v. Court of Appeals,18 the Court explained that a search warrant, as an exception, may be enforced at any
reasonable hour of the day or night, to wit:

The general rule is that search warrants must be served during the daytime. However, the rule allows an exception,
namely, a search at any reasonable hour of the day or night, when the application asserts that the property is on the
person or place ordered to be searched. In the instant case, the judge issuing the warrant relied on the positive
assertion of the applicant and his witnesses that the firearms and ammunition were kept at private respondent's
residence. Evidently, the court issuing the warrant was satisfied that the affidavits of the applicants clearly satisfied the
requirements of Section 8, Rule 126 of the Rules of Court. The rule on issuance of a search warrant allows for the
exercise of judicial discretion in fixing the time within which the warrant may be served, subject to the statutory
requirement fixing the maximum time for the execution of a warrant. We have examined the application for search
warrant, and the deposition of the witnesses supporting said application, and find that both satisfactorily comply with
the requirements of Section 8, Rule 126. The inescapable conclusion is that the judge who issued the questioned
warrant did not abuse his discretion in allowing a search "at any reasonable hour of the day or night." Absent such abuse
of discretion, a search conducted at night where so allowed, is not improper.19 (emphasis supplied; citations omitted).

In this case, the search warrant stated that the search shall be made at "ANY TIME OF THE DAY OR NIGHT."20 Notably,
the RTC Cebu City issued the search warrant based on the deposition of PO3 Arturo C. Enriquez and PO3 Jesus
Manulat,21 which stated that they allegedly bought shabu from petitioner at about 9:00 in the evening. Thus, the RTC
Cebu City had basis to state that the search warrant may also be implemented at dawn or early morning.

Further, petitioner failed to prove that the entry of police officers in his house was unreasonable. Section 7, Rule 126 of
the Rules of Court states:

Section 7. Right to break door or window to effect search. – The Officer, if refused admittance to the place of directed
search after giving notice of his purpose and authority, may break open any outer or inner door or window of a house or
any part of a house or anything therein to execute the warrant or liberate himself or any person lawfully aiding him
when unlawfully detained therein.

As testified by SPO2 Matillano, when they went to the house of petitioner, they knocked on the door and called out
petitioner's name but nobody answered.22 Thus, they bumped the door open on the ground floor to be able to enter
petitioner's house. However, the second floor, where petitioner and his children were staying, also had a locked door. At
that moment, they tried to convince petitioner to open the door, to which he obliged. Verily, the police officers followed
Sec. 7, Rule 126 when they forcibly opened the door of the first floor because they were refused admittance despite
giving notice to petitioner.

Chain of Custody Rule

Section 21 of R.A. No. 9165 applies whether the drugs were seized either in a buy-bust operation or pursuant to a search
warrant. Chain of custody means the duly recorded authorized movements and custody of seized drugs or controlled
chemicals or plant sources of dangerous drugs or laboratory equipment of each stage, from the time of
seizure/confiscation to receipt in the forensic laboratory to safekeeping to presentation in court for destruction. Such
record of movements and custody of the seized item shall include the identity and signature of the person who held
temporary custody of the seized item, the date and time when such transfer of custody were made in the course of
safekeeping and use in court as evidence, and the final disposition.23 To ensure the establishment of the chain of
custody, Sec. 21(1) of R.A. No. 9165 specifies that:

(1) The apprehending team having initial custody and control of the drugs shall, immediately after seizure and
confiscation, physically inventory and photograph the same in the presence of the accused or the person/s from whom
such items were confiscated and/or seized, or his/her representative or counsel, a representative from the media and
the Department of Justice (DOJ), and any elected public official who shall be required to sign the copies of the inventory
and be given a copy thereof.

Sec. 21 of R.A. No. 9165 requires the apprehending team, after seizure and confiscation, to immediately conduct a
physical inventory and photograph the same in the presence of (1) the accused or the persons from whom such items
were confiscated and/or seized, or his/her representative or counsel; (2) a representative from the media and (3) the
DOJ; and (4) any elected public official who shall be required to sign the copies of the inventory and be given a copy
thereof.

A plain reading of the law shows that it applies as long as there has been a seizure and confiscation of drugs. There is
nothing in the statutory provision which states that it is only applicable when there is a warrantless seizure in a buy-bust
operation. Thus, it should be applied in every situation when an apprehending team seizes and confiscates drugs from
an accused, whether through a buy-bust operation or through a search warrant.

A cardinal rule in statutory construction is that when the law is clear and free from any doubt or ambiguity, there is no
room for construction or interpretation. There is only room for application. As the statute is clear, plain, and free from
ambiguity, it must be given its literal meaning and applied without attempted interpretation. This is what is known as
the plain-meaning rule or verba legis. It is expressed in the maxim, index animi sermo, or "speech is the index of
intention." Furthermore, there is the maxim verba legis non est recedendum, or "from the words of a statute there
should be no departure."24

Based on verba legis, Sec. 21 of R.A. No. 9165, as amended, operates as long as there is seizure and confiscation of
drugs. It does not distinguish between warrantless seizure of the drugs in a buy-bust operation and in the
implementation of a search warrant. Accordingly, in every situation where there is a seizure and confiscation of drugs,
the presence of the accused, or his/her representative or counsel, a representative from the media and the DOJ, and any
elected public official, is required during the physical inventory and taking of photographs of the seized drugs, because
they shall be required to sign the copies of the inventory and be given a copy thereof.

The Court is aware that Section 8, Rule 126 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure provides that only two (2)
witnesses are required to be present during the implementation of a search warrant:

Section 8. Search of house, room, or premise to be made in presence of two witnesses. – No search of a house, room, or
any other premise shall be made except in the presence of the lawful occupant thereof or any member of his family or in
the absence of the latter, two witnesses of sufficient age and discretion residing in the same locality.
Nevertheless, Sec. 8 of Rule 126 is a general provision with respect to the implementation of search warrants in all kinds
of cases, such as for illegal firearms, infringing goods, or incriminating documents. On the other hand, Sec. 21 of R.A. No.
9165, as amended, and as implemented by its Implementing Rules and Regulations (IRR), is a special provision that
applies specifically to the seizure and confiscation of dangerous drugs.1a₩phi1 In case of conflict between a general law
and a special law, the latter must prevail regardless of the dates of their enactment. Thus, it has been held that — [t]he
fact that one law is special and the other general creates a presumption that the special act is to be considered as
remaining an exception of the general act, one as a general law of the land and the other as the law of the particular
case.25

Further, Sec. 8, Rule 126 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure is not even a substantive law; rather, it is a mere
remedial provision. In determining whether a rule prescribed by the Supreme Court, for the practice and procedure of
the lower courts, abridges, enlarges, or modifies any substantive right, the test is whether the rule really regulates
procedure, that is, the judicial process for enforcing rights and duties recognized by substantive law and for justly
administering remedy and redress for a disregard or infraction of them. If the rule takes away a vested right, it is not
procedural. If the rule creates a right such as the right to appeal, it may be classified as a substantive matter; but if it
operates as a means of implementing an existing right then the rule deals merely with procedure.26

Here, Congress enacted Sec. 21 of R.A. No. 9165 to ensure the identity and integrity of the seized drugs and to prevent
tampering thereof. As stated in People v. Acub,27 in all prosecutions for violations of R.A. No. 9165, the corpus delicti is
the dangerous drug itself. Its existence is essential to a judgment of conviction. Hence, the identity of the dangerous
drug must be clearly established. Narcotic substances are not readily identifiable. To determine their composition and
nature, they must undergo scientific testing and analysis. Narcotic substances are also highly susceptible to alteration,
tampering, or contamination. It is imperative, therefore, that the drugs allegedly seized from the accused are the very
same objects tested in the laboratory and offered in court as evidence. The chain of custody, as a method of
authentication, ensures that unnecessary doubts involving the identity of seized drugs are removed.28

Verily, in the special cases of seizure of drugs, the statutory provision of Sec. 21 of R.A. No. 9165 should apply and must
take precedence in contrast to the general remedial provision of Sec. 8, Rule 126 of the Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure.

On the other hand, Sec. 21(a) of the IRR of R.A. No. 9165 supplements Sec. 21(1) of the said law, viz.:

(a) The apprehending officer/team having initial custody and control of the drugs shall, immediately after seizure and
confiscation, physically inventory and photograph the same in the presence of the accused or the person/s from whom
such items were confiscated and/or seized, or his/her representative or counsel, a representative from the media and
the Department of Justice (DOJ), and any elected public official who shall be required to sign the copies of the inventory
and be given a copy thereof: Provided, that the physical inventory and photograph shall be conducted at the place
where the search warrant is served; or at the nearest police station or at the nearest office of the apprehending
officer/team, whichever is practicable, in case of warrantless seizures; Provided, further, that noncompliance with these
requirements under justifiable grounds, as long as the integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized items are
properly preserved by the apprehending officer/team, shall not render void and invalid such seizures of and custody
over said items.

From the foregoing, the only recognizable difference between seizure and confiscation of drugs pursuant to a search
warrant and a buybust operation is the venue of the physical inventory and taking of photographs of the said
drugs. In People v. Lazaro,29 the Court explained that the venue of physical inventory is not limited to the place of
apprehension. The venues of the physical inventory and photography of the seized items differ and depend on whether
the seizure was made by virtue of a search warrant or through a warrantless seizure such as a buy-bust operation.

When the drugs are seized pursuant to a search warrant, then the physical inventory and taking of photographs shall be
conducted at the place where the said search warrant was served. In contrast, when the drugs are seized pursuant to a
buy-bust operation or a warrantless seizure, then these can be conducted at the nearest police station or at the nearest
office of the apprehending team. Other than that, there is no other difference between seizure and confiscation of drugs
with a search warrant and without it (such as a buy-bust operation). Consistent with Sec. 21 of R.A. No. 9165, its IRR
does not suspend the application of the chain of custody rule simply because the drugs were seized pursuant to a search
warrant. Thus, the witnesses under the law are required to be present. Again, the only difference is with respect to the
venue of the inventory and taking of photographs.

Notably, Sec. 21 of R.A. No. 9165 was recently amended by R.A. No. 10640, which became effective on July 15, 2014. In
the amendment, the apprehending team is now required to conduct a physical inventory of the seized items and to
photograph the same (1) in the presence of the accused or the persons from whom such items were confiscated and/or
seized, or his/her representative or counsel, (2) with an elected public official and (3) a representative of the National
Prosecution Service or the media who shall be required to sign the copies of the inventory and be given a copy
thereof.30 In this case, as the alleged crime was committed on June 19, 2003, the provisions of Sec. 21 of R.A. No. 9165,
prior to its amendment, and its IRR shall apply.

Further, Sec. 21 and its IRR provide for a saving clause in case of noncompliance with the chain of custody rule. This
saving clause applies only (1) where the prosecution recognized the procedural lapses, and thereafter explained the
cited justifiable grounds, and (2) when the prosecution established that the integrity and evidentiary value of the
evidence seized had been preserved. The prosecution, thus, loses the benefit of invoking the presumption of regularity
and bears the burden of proving – with moral certainty – that the illegal drug presented in court is the same drug that
was confiscated from the accused during his arrest.31 Again, this saving clause does not distinguish between cases with
a search warrant and a buy-bust operation. Whether drugs were seized in a buy-bust operation or in the implementation
of the search warrant, the prosecution can invoke the saving clause provided that there is justifiable reason for
noncompliance with the procedural lapses and the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized drugs are established.

Jurisprudence   has    consistently

applied Sec. 21 of R.A. No.   9165
in the implementation of a search
warrant

A review of the jurisprudence shows that even when the drugs are seized and confiscated pursuant to a search wanant,
the Court still applies Sec. 21 of R.A. No. 9165 to determine whether the corpus delicti was properly established.

In People v. Gayoso,32 the police officers therein secured a search warrant to search the house of the accused. Upon
implementing the search warrant, they saw a tin foil containing several sachets of suspected shabu. However, the
apprehending team never conducted a physical inventory of the seized items at the place where the warrant was served
in the presence of a representative of the DOJ, nor did it photograph the same in the presence of accused after their
initial custody and control of the said drug, and after immediately seizing and confiscating the same, violating Sec. 21 of
R.A. No. 9165. The saving clause under the IRR was not applied because the prosecution did not offer any explanation
for noncompliance and the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized items were not preserved. Thus, the accused
therein was acquitted. Verily, even if the drugs are seized pursuant to a search warrant, the Court dutifully applies Sec.
21 of R.A. No. 9165 to determine compliance with the chain of custody rule.

In Cunanan v. People,33 a search warrant was secured by the police operatives in searching the bedroom and vehicle of
the accused therein. They found several sachets of suspected shabu. However, the apprehending team did not comply
with the provisions of Sec. 21 of R.A. No. 9165 because there was no representative of the DOJ present during the
physical inventory and taking of photographs of the seized items. Further, there were several unexplained discrepancies
in the marking and the numbering of the confiscated items, which resulted in failure to comply with the chain of custody
rule. As a result, the Court acquitted the accused. Again, Sec. 21 of R.A. No. 9165 was observed in the confiscation of the
seized drugs in the implementation of the search warrant.

Similarly, in Dizon v. People,34 the Court acquitted the accused therein of the drug charges because of the police
operatives' failure to comply with Sec. 21 of R.A. No. 9165 in the implementation of a search warrant. In said case, the
police officers implemented a warrant in the house of the accused. Several sachets of suspected shabu were confiscated
but the inventory and taking of photographs were only conducted in the presence of the accused and two (2) barangay
kagawads. The Court ruled that there was noncompliance with Sec. 21 because there were no media and DOJ
representatives present during the inventory. Likewise, the saving clause did not apply because they failed to provide
justifiable reason for their failure to secure the attendance of these witnesses. The Court underscored that lapses in the
procedure under Sec. 21 of R.A. No. 9165, when left unacknowledged and unexplained by the State, militate against a
finding of guilt beyond reasonable doubt against the accused as the integrity and evidentiary value of the corpus
delicti have been compromised.

On the other hand, in Derilo v. People,35 a search warrant was also implemented in the residence of the accused
therein. However, the police operatives failed to follow the chain of custody rule under Sec. 21 of R.A. No. 9165. They
failed to immediately and consistently mark the seized items and there was doubt as to who actually handled the said
drugs when these were confiscated. Due to the noncompliance with the chain of custody rule under Sec. 21 of R.A. No.
9165, the accused was acquitted.

In the same manner, in People v. Dumaplin,36 the police officers secured a search warrant against the accused therein.
They first conducted a buy-bust operation and then implemented the search warrant in the accused's residence. The
Court ruled that the police officers utterly failed to comply with the chain of custody rule under Sec. 21 of R.A. No. 9165.
It was underscored that the prosecution failed to explain how the purported seized drugs were transferred from one
person to another until these were presented in court. The handling of the seized drugs was also unexplained. For failure
to comply with Sec. 21, the accused was acquitted.

Verily, jurisprudence has consistently held that in the seizure and confiscation of seized drugs in the implementation of a
search warrant, the Court religiously applies Sec. 21 of R.A. No. 9165, as amended, including the mandatory presence of
the required witnesses during the physical inventory and taking of photographs of the seized drugs, and the
preservation of the integrity and evidentiary value of the same in applying the saving clause under the IRR. Notably,
these cases never stated that Sec. 8, Rule 126 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure on the implementation of
search warrants prevails over Sec. 21 of R.A. No. 9165. As a result, Sec. 21 must always be complied with regardless of
whether the seizure and confiscation of the seized drugs are a result of a buy-bust operation or during the
implementation of a search warrant.

Rationale for Sec. 21 of

R.A. No. 9165

In the prosecution of illegal possession of dangerous drugs, the dangerous drug itself constitutes the very corpus
delicti of the offense and, in sustaining a conviction therefor, the identity and integrity of the corpus delicti must
definitely be shown to have been preserved. This requirement necessarily arises from the illegal drug's unique
characteristic that renders it indistinct, not readily identifiable, and easily open to tampering, alteration or
substitution either by accident or otherwise. Thus, to remove any doubt or uncertainty on the identity and integrity of
the seized drug, evidence must definitely show that the illegal drug presented in court is the same illegal drug actually
recovered from the accused; otherwise, the prosecution for illegal possession of dangerous drugs under R.A. No. 9165
fails.37

A unique characteristic of narcotic substances is that they are not readily identifiable as in fact they have to be subjected
to scientific analysis to determine their composition and nature. Congress deemed it wise to incorporate the
jurisprudential safeguards in the present law in an unequivocal language to prevent any tampering, alteration or
substitution, by accident or otherwise. The Court, in upholding the right of the accused to be presumed innocent, can do
no less than apply the present law which prescribes a more stringent standard in handling evidence than that applied to
criminal cases involving objects which are readily identifiable.38 R.A. No. 9165 had placed upon the law enforcers the
duty to establish the chain of custody of the seized drugs to ensure the integrity of the corpus delicti. [Through] proper
exhibit handling, storage, labeling and recording, the identity of the seized drugs is insulated from doubt from their
confiscation up to their presentation in court.39
Sec. 21 of R.A. No. 9165 was originally envisioned by the legislature to serve as a protection for the accused from
malicious imputations of guilt by abusive police officers. The illegal drugs being the corpus delicti, it is essential for the
prosecution to prove and show to the court beyond reasonable doubt that the illegal drugs presented to [it] as evidence
of the crime are indeed the illegal drugs seized from the accused.40 By its very nature, Sec. 21 demands strict
compliance. Compliance cannot give way to a facsimile; otherwise, the purpose of guarding against tampering,
substitution, and planting of evidence is defeated. Proof that strict compliance is imperative is how jurisprudence
disapproves of the approximation of compliance.41

Even the saving clause under the IRR of Sec. 21, "as an exception to the rule of strict compliance, is not a talisman that
the prosecution may invoke at will. Instead, it may only be appreciated in the prosecution's favor if the latter shows a
valid reason for not observing the procedure laid out in Section 21."42

The ultimate purpose of Sec. 21 of R.A. No. 9165 is to prevent the tampering, alteration, and substitution of the seized
drugs, which are not readily identifiable, and to serve as a protection against abusive police officers. The evil sought to
be prevented by Sec. 21 of R.A. No. 9165 exists both in the implementation of a search warrant and in the conduct of a
buy-bust operation. In both cases, the law requires that the identity and integrity of the confiscated items be maintained
so as to prevent the malicious practice of police officers in tampering, altering, and substituting the said items. Thus, the
chain of custody rule under Sec. 21 of R.A. No. 9165, including the mandatory witnesses during the physical inventory
and taking of photographs of the seized drugs, must be applied when there is a confiscation of purported drugs in the
implementation of a search warrant.

Again, under the IRR of R.A. No. 9165, the only difference between a search warrant and a warrantless search with
regard a buy-bust operation is the venue of the conduct of the physical inventory and taking of photographs. The venue
of physical inventory is not limited to the place of apprehension. The venues of the physical inventory and photography
of the seized items differ and depend on whether the seizure was made by virtue of a search warrant or through a
warrantless seizure such as a buy-bust operation.43

However, other than the venue of the conduct of the physical inventory and taking of photographs, the law, its IRR, and
jurisprudence consistently require that Sec. 21 of R.A. No. 9165 be applied uniformly, whether the confiscation of the
drugs was pursuant to an implementation of a search warrant or through a warrantless search in a buy-bust operation,
to give life to the purpose of the law.

Even the DOJ and the Philippine National Police (PNP) recognize that Sec. 21 of R.A. No. 9165 must be applied in both
confiscation of seized drugs in the implementation of a search warrant or a buy-bust operation. The 2011 PNP Criminal
Investigation Manual states:

5.2.3. INVESTIGATION OF CASES INVOLVING PLANNED [OPERATIONS]

a. Buy-Bust Operation

1 All warrantless arrest, search, and seizures to be undertaken by PNP member/anti-drug units shall be in accordance
with Section 5, paragraphs (a) and (b), Rule 113, Section 13, Rule 126 of the Rules of Court, respectively and relevant
Supreme Court Decisions.

2 The Team Leader shall see to it that prior reports have been submitted which may include but not limited to the
following classified reports:

a) Summary of the Information of the Target/s

b) Special Reports

c) Surveilance Report

d) Contact Meeting Report

e) Development Report
3 The following shall be strictly observed by the Arresting Officers/Investigator-on-Case during the conduct of BuyBust
Operations:

a) Arrested person shall be informed of the nature of his arrest and be apprised of his constitutional rights (Miranda
Doctrine);

b) The dangerous drugs, CPECs, paraphernalia and equipment as the case may be, shall be immediately seized and taken
into custody of the apprehending team;

c) The seizing officer shall, as far as practicable, conduct the actual physical inventory, take photographs and properly
mark the items or articles seized or confiscated in the place of seizure and in the presence of the arrested person/or his
counsel or representative and representatives from the Department of Justice, MEDIA and any elected government
officials who shall be required to sign on the inventory and given each a copy thereof. (Observed the rule on chain of
custody and DOJ Department Circular No. 3 in compliance with Prescribed Procedures on the Seizure and Custody of
Dangerous Drugs.)

NOTE: DOJ Department Circular No. 3 para 2 and 3 stated that:

Paragraph 2. All anti-drug operations require physical inventory and photography of seized and confiscated drugs. – The
mandatory nature of the requirements under Section 21 (1), Article II of RA 9165 and its IRR does not distinguish
between warrantless seizures and those made by virtue of a warrant. The difference merely lies in the venues of the
physical inventory and photography of the seized items. Thus:

1 In seizures covered by search warrants, the physical inventory and photography must be conducted in the place where
the search warrant was served;

2 In case of warrantless seizures such as a buy-bust operation, the physical inventory and photography shall be
conducted at the nearest police station or office of the apprehending officer/team, whichever is practicable; however,
nothing prevents the apprehending officer/team from immediately conducting the physical inventory and photography
of the items at the place where they were seized.

Paragraph 3. In case of non-observance of the prescribed procedure, the apprehending law enforcement officers must
present an explanation to justify the same, and must prove that the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized items
are not tainted. – While lapses in the handling of confiscated evidence in anti-drug operations may be countenanced,
these lapses must be duly recognized and explained in terms of their justifiable grounds. The integrity and evidentiary
value of the evidence seized must also be shown to have been preserved.44

xxxx

k) Search and Seizure by Virtue of Warrant

The following rules and procedures shall govern the responsibility of anti-drug units in the application and
implementation of a Search Warrant (SW).

(a) the accused or the person/s from whom such items were confiscated and/or seized, or his/her representative or
counsel;

(b) a representative from the media;

(c) a representative from the Department of Justice (must be Prosecutor); and

(d) any elected public official who shall sign, and shall be given copies of the inventory.45 (emphases and underscoring
supplied)
Based on the foregoing, the law, its IRR, jurisprudence, and even the law enforcement agencies equally apply Sec. 21 of
R.A. No. 9165 in seizures of dangerous drugs both in pursuant to a search warrant and in a warrantless search like a buy-
bust operation.

Improper inventory; no photographs

of the seized drugs; no justifiable
reason provided

The Court finds that the police officers in this case committed several violations of Sec. 21 of R.A. No. 9165. First, the
required witnesses under Sec. 21 of R.A. No. 9165 were not present. Manifestly, when the police officers conducted the
inventory of the items seized from the house of petitioner, no media and DOJ representatives were present. Only
petitioner, the barangay councilor and tanod were present during the inventory. Under the law, the presence of the
accused, a representative from the media and the DOJ, and any elected public official is mandatory because the law
requires them to sign the copies of the inventory and to be given a copy thereof.

Second, the seized items were not photographed by the police officers. The records are bereft of any photographs of the
said items. Sec. 21 of R.A. No. 9165 is very clear that the apprehending officers should immediately photograph the
seized items in the presence of the required witnesses.

Third, neither can the prosecution apply the saving clause under Sec. 21 of R.A. No. 9165. To reiterate, the saving clause
applies only (1) where the prosecution recognized the procedural lapses, and thereafter explained the cited justifiable
grounds, and (2) when the prosecution established that the integrity and evidentiary value of the evidence seized had
been preserved.46

In this case, the prosecution failed to give any justifiable ground for the noncompliance with Sec. 21 of R.A. No. 9165.
SPO1 Tesoro testified that:

Defense Counsel

[Atty. Serbise]

Q   : You are charging the accused based on [R.A. No.] 9165, the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act. My question now
is when you made the inventory in this case, did you photograph the accused?

[SPO1 Tesoro]

A   : No.

Q   : When you made the inventory, was there media, DOJ personnel, the lawyer of the accused or his representative?

A   : No.

Q   : Are you trying to impress upon us that you did not follow faithfully the procedures in [R.A. No.] 9165?

A   : That's our practice.47 (emphasis supplied)

It must be emphasized that the duty imposed by the law regarding the inventory of the seized items and taking of
photographs of the same is mandatory. It cannot simply be set aside by the traditional practice of the law enforcers.

Further, a surveillance operation was conducted prior to the enforcement of the search warrant for the alleged drugs; it
was not conducted at the spur of the moment. Thus, the police officers had sufficient opportunity to secure the
mandatory witnesses for the inventory and photography of the seized drugs. They, however, could not offer any valid
excuse for the noncompliance with Sec. 21 of R.A. No. 9165.

The integrity  and  evidentiary

value of the seized items were

not preserved

Aside from recognizing the procedural lapses and providing a justifiable ground for the noncompliance, it is also required
that the prosecution establish that the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized items were preserved in order to
substantially comply with Sec. 21 of R.A. No. 9165.48 In People v. Salvador,49 the Court explained how the integrity and
evidentiary value of the confiscated items are preserved, to wit:

The integrity and evidentiary value of seized items are properly preserved for as long as the chain of custody of the same
are duly established. x x x

There are links that must be established in the chain of custody in a buy-bust situation, namely: "first, the seizure and
marking, if practicable, of the illegal drug recovered from the accused by the apprehending officer; second, the turnover
of the illegal drug seized by the apprehending officer to the investigating officer; third, the turnover by the investigating
officer of the illegal drug to the forensic chemist for laboratory examination; and, fourth, the turnover and submission of
the marked illegal drug seized from the forensic chemist to the court.50

In this case, it is evident that the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized items were not preserved for the following
reasons:

First, the markings on the seized items are marred by dubious circumstances. Marking of the seized items is crucial in
proving the chain of custody because it serves to separate the marked evidence from the corpus of all other similarly
related evidence from the time they are seized until they are disposed of at the end of the proceedings, thus, preventing
switching, planting or contamination of evidence.51

According to SPO2 Matillano, they marked the three (3) packets with "RT," initials of petitioner. However, he could not
explain why the other sachet of shabu was marked "IT," which were the initials of Ivy, petitioner's wife, even though she
was not present at that time, to wit:

[Pros. Carisma:]

Q   : Who else was inside this closed room at the second level, if any, when [petitioner] opened the door?

[SPO2 Matillano]

A   : His children.

Q   : How many?

A   : One or two children. I could not ascertain the number.

Q   : What about the wife, was she around?

A   : No, sir.

x x x x52

Q   : On Exh. C, there is a marking of capital letters IT, whose markings are these?

A   : Ivy Tumabini.

Q   : Who is Ivy Tumabini?

A   : The wife of [petitioner].

Q   : I thought you said the wife was not around when you began implementing the search warrant. How is it that her
initials appear on Exh. C?

A   : I don't know because it was Tesoro who marked that.53 (emphasis supplied)

However, when SPO1 Tesoro testified, he never explained why he marked the one (1) sachet of shabu with "IT" even
though Ivy was not present at the time of the search of petitioner's house.

Second, aside from marking, the seized items should be placed in an envelope or an evidence bag unless the type and
quantity of these items require a different type of handling and/or container. The evidence bag or container shall
accordingly be signed by the handling officer and turned over to the next officer in the chain of custody.54 The purpose
of placing the seized item in an envelope or an evidence bag is to ensure that the item is secured from tampering,
especially when the seized item is susceptible to alteration or damage.55

Here, there was no evidence presented on how the seized items were secured upon confiscation. It is not even clear
who safeguarded the seized items from the time of confiscation up to its transfer to the investigating officer and until it
reached the laboratory for examination.

Further, the second link in the chain of custody is the transfer of the seized drugs by the apprehending officer to the
investigating officer. Usually, the police officer who seizes the suspected substance turns it over to a supervising officer,
who will then send it by courier to the police crime laboratory for testing. This is a necessary step in the chain of custody
because it is the investigating officer who shall conduct the proper investigation and prepare the necessary documents
for the developing criminal case. Certainly, the investigating officer must have possession of the illegal drugs to properly
prepare the required documents.56 Noticeably, the investigating officer who handled the seized items was not
identified. Thus, there exists a missing link in the chain.

Third, from the investigating officer, the illegal drug is delivered to the forensic chemist.1a₩phi1 Once the seized drugs
arrive at the forensic laboratory, it will be the laboratory technician who will test and verify the nature of the
substance.57

In this case, the forensic chemist was Insp. David Alexander Tan Patriana (Insp. Patriana). However, he did not testify in
court. Instead, there was merely a stipulation that SPO1 Tesoro delivered the request for laboratory examination with
the specimen to the PNP Crime Laboratory.58 Notably, it was not established as to who received the seized items from
SPO1 Tesoro at the laboratory. In addition, it was also not stated whom Insp. Patriana received the seized items from or
how the seized drugs were stored until presented before the RTC.

In People v. Gutierrez,59 there were also inadequate stipulations as to the testimony of the forensic chemist. No
explanation was given regarding the custody of the seized drug from the time it was turned over to the investigator up
to its turnover for laboratory examination. The records of the said case did not show what happened to the allegedly
seized shabu between the turnover by the investigator to the chemist and before its presentation in court. Thus, since
there was no showing that precautions were taken to ensure that there was no change in the condition of the drugs and
no opportunity for someone not in the chain to have possession thereof, the accused therein was likewise acquitted.

Due to the prosecution's failure to prove that the integrity and evidentiary value of the corpus delicti were preserved,
petitioner cannot be convicted of the crime of illegal possession of dangerous drugs.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The January 28, 2016 Decision and the April 7, 2016 Resolution of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 02289 are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Romeo Tumabini is ACQUITTED of violation of
Section 11, Article II of Republic Act No. 9165, for failure of the prosecution to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt.

The Director of the Bureau of Corrections is ORDERED to implement this Decision and to inform this Court of the date of
the actual release from confinement of Romeo Tumabini within five (5) days from receipt hereof.

SO ORDERED.

4. G.R. No. 225210, August 07, 2019

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, v. LARRY SULTAN Y ALMADA, ACCUSED-APPELLANT.

DECISION
LEONEN, J.:

Unless an unbroken chain of custody over items allegedly seized during drug operations is established, the constitutional
right to be presumed innocent prevails. Ultimately, doubt in the corpus delicti—the drugs and drug paraphernalia that
were the alleged objects of a drug offense—impels the acquittal of an accused.

For this Court's resolution is an appeal challenging the Decision1 of the Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals
affirmed in toto the Decision2 of the Regional Trial Court, finding accused-appellant Larry Sultan y Almad. (Sultan) guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of violating Article II, Sections and 11 of Republic Act No. 9165, otherwise known as the
Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002.

Two (2) separate Informations were filed against Sultan for violating the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002.
The charge for violation of Section 5, for the illegal sale of dangerous drugs, read:

Criminal Case Nos. 12-37189

That on or about the 6th day of December, 2012, in the City of Bacolod, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the herein accused, not being authorized by law to sell, trade, dispense, deliver, give away to another,
distribute, dispatch in transit or transport any dangerous drugs, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously
sell, deliver or give away One (1) small heat-sealed transparent plastic sachet containing methamphetamine
hydrochloride, also known as Shabu, a dangerous drug, with a weight of 0.080 gram of white crystalline substance, with
marking "LAS-A" to the CAID-SOTG, BCPO, Bacolod City poseur-buyer PO2 Tony D. Hechanova in a buy-bust operation in
exchange on One (1) piece One Thousand peso bill bearing Serial No. QJ921640 with SYR marking, in violation of
aforementioned law.3

Meanwhile, the charge for violation of Section 11, for the illegal possession of dangerous drugs, read:

Criminal Case Nos. 12-37188

That on or about the 6th day of December, 2012, in the City of Bacolod, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the herein accused, not being authorized by law to possess any dangerous drugs, did then and there
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have in his possession and under his custody and control, THREE (3) big heat-sealed
plastic sachets with the following weights and markings:

1) "LASB-1" 2.982  

2) "LAS B-2" 3.256  

3) "LAS B-3" 2.572  

TOTAL WEIGHT 8.810

containing white crystalline substance with a total weight of 8.810 grams, containing Methamphetamine Hydrochloride,
a dangerous drug, without the corresponding license or prescription therefore (sic), in violation of aforementioned law.4

When arraigned on December 18, 2012, Sultan pleaded not guilty to the crimes charged. Trial then followed.5

The prosecution presented three (3) witnesses: (1) Police Superintendent Santiago Y. Rapiz (Superintendent Rapiz); (2)
Police Officer 2 Tony D. Hechanova (PO2 Hechanova); and (3) Police Chief Inspector Paul Jerome S. Puentespina (Chief
Inspector Puentespina). For the defense, Sultan and Marian M. Batungara (Batungara) took the witness stand.6
According to the prosecution, at around 2:00 p.m. on December 6, 2012, Superintendent Rapiz was informed that a
certain Larry Sultan was engaging in the illegal trade of shabu. Accordingly, he assembled a buy-bust team, designating
PO2 Hechanova as the poseur-buyer. PO2 Hechanova received a marked P1,000.00 bill for the transaction.7

Later that day, PO2 Hechanova and the confidential asset rode a jeep to the Sea Breeze Hotel on San Juan Street,
Bacolod City.8

Upon arrival, they approached Sultan, who was standing at the hotel's main door. The confidential asset inquired if
Sultan has P1,000.00 worth of shabu. Confirming that he had it, Sultan handed PO2 Hechanova an elongated sachet
containing white crystalline substance in exchange for the marked money. As soon as the transaction occurred, the asset
placed a missed call to the team, which then rushed to the scene. Meanwhile, PO2 Hechanova introduced himself as a
police officer and arrested Sultan.9

Upon frisking Sultan, PO2 Hechanova recovered three (3) plastic sachets of suspected shabu in his left pocket. He then
informed Sultan of the nature and cause of his arrest and apprised him of his constitutional rights.10

Sultan was then brought to the barangay hall of Barangay 12, Bacolod City where PO2 Hechanova marked the plastic
sachets. The inventory and photographing of the seized items were made in the presence of Punong Barangay
Demapanag and Kagawad Gomez.11

Subsequently, PO2 Hechanova requested a laboratory examination of the seized sachets' contents at the Philippine
National Police Crime Laboratory Office Six, Camp Montelibano, Bacolod City.12 PO2 Edwin Albarico (PO2 Albarico)
received the specimen,13 after which he gave it to Chief Inspector Puentespina who examined the seized items, which
tested positive for shabu.14

Testifying in his defense, Sultan denied possessing and selling shabu. He claimed that at around 2:00 p.m. on December
6, 2012, he was booking a room with Batungara at the Sea Breeze Hotel when he received a call from a friend, Erwin
Elibaldo (Elibaldo). When Elibaldo allegedly expressed his desire to pay his debt, Sultan arranged for their meeting in the
hotel. A few minutes later, Elibaldo arrived with two (2) strangers, whom Sultan later came to know as police officers.
They approached Sultan, took his sling bag, and arrested him.15

Then, the officers brought him to Superintendent Rapiz's office at a certain JMP Building.16 Superintendent Rapiz
allegedly talked about bargaining, but it did not make sense to Sultan. Afterwards, he was brought to a barangay hall,
where the police officers opened his sling bag and marked its contents, which, according to Sultan, did not include
shabu.17

Batungara corroborated Sultan's testimony.18

In its November 27, 2013 Decision,19 the Regional Trial Court found Sultan guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violating
Section 5, for the illegal sale of dangerous drugs, and Section 11, for the illegal possession of dangerous drugs, under
Article II of the Comprehensive Dangerous Drug Act.20

The Regional Trial Court ruled that the prosecution established all the elements of the crimes and satisfactorily proved
the identity of the dangerous drugs. It found PO2 Hechanova's "candid and straightforward testimony"21 deserving of full
faith and credit, finding no ill motive on his part.22 The dispositive portion of the Decision read:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered, as follows:

(a) In Criminal Case No. 12-37189, finding Accused-Defendant LARRY SULTAN y ALMADA GUILTY, beyond reasonable
doubt, of Section 5, Article II, Comprehensive Dangerous Drug Act of 2002. He is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty
of life imprisonment and to pay a fine of Five Hundred Thousand Pesos (P500,000.00);

(b) In Criminal Case No. 12-37188, finding Accused-Defendant LARRY SULTAN y ALMADA GUILTY, beyond reasonable
doubt, of Section 11, Article II, Comprehensive Dangerous Drug Act of 2002. He is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty
of twenty (20) years and one (1) day and to pay a fine of Four Hundred Thousand Pesos (P400,000.00).

(c) The dangerous drug subject matter of these cases (Exhibits "C" to "F") are hereby confiscated in favor of the
government pursuant to Section 20, R.A. No. 9165 and ordered to be turned-over to the Philippine Drug Enforcement
Agency (PDEA), Regional Office Six (6) for destruction;

(d) The Jail Warden of the Bureau of Jail Management and Penology, Male Dormitory, Barangay Taculing, Bacolod City is
hereby ORDERED to IMMEDIATELY TRANSFER Accused-Defendant LARRY SULTAN y ALMADA to the National Bilibid
Prison, Muntinlupa City, Metro Manila, for the service of his sentence pursuant to OCA Circular No. 40-2013; and,

(e) No pronouncement as to cost.

SO ORDERED.23 (Emphasis in the original)

In its October 20, 2015 Decision,24 the Court of Appeals affirmed Sultan's conviction in toto. It dismissed as trivial the
prosecution's failure to identify who had custody of the seized evidence at all times.25 Maintaining that what is
important is the preservation of the seized items' integrity, the Court of Appeals held that "the testimony about a
perfect chain is not always the standard as it is almost always impossible to obtain an unbroken chain."26 The dispositive
portion of its Decision read:

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the appeal is DENIED. The 27 November 2013 Decision of the Regional Trial Court
of Bacolod City, Branch 52 finding Larry Sultan y Almada guilty beyond reasonable doubt for violating Sections 5 and 11,
Article II of R.A. No. 9165, in Criminal Case Nos. 12-37188 and 12-37189 is AFFIRMED in toto.

SO ORDERED.27 (Emphasis in the original)

Thus, Sultan filed his Notice of Appeal.28 Giving due course to his appeal per its April 22, 2016 Resolution,29 the Court of
Appeals elevated30 the case records to this Court.

In its August 10, 2016 Resolution,31 this Court noted the case records and informed the parties that they may file their
supplemental briefs.

On November 13, 2018, accused-appellant filed his Supplemental Brief.32 For its part, the Office of the Solicitor General,
on behalf of plaintiff-appellee People of the Philippines, manifested that it would no longer file a supplemental brief.33

In his Brief,34 accused-appellant asserts that the Court of Appeals erred in affirming his conviction despite the
prosecution's failure to prove an unbroken chain of custody. He assails the police officer's unjustified marking of the
seized items at the barangay hall instead of at the place of confiscation.35 He argues that the non-presentation of PO2
Albarico, the police officer who allegedly received the specimen for examination, casts doubt on the identity and
integrity of the seized items.36

On the other hand, the Office of the Solicitor General maintains in its Brief37 that the prosecution duly established all the
elements of the crimes of illegal sale and illegal possession of dangerous drugs. It further avers that the chain of custody
was properly established.38

For this Court's resolution is the lone issue of whether or not accused-appellant Larry Sultan y Almada is guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of violating Article II, Sections 5 and 11 of the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act.
This Court grants the appeal and acquits accused-appellant.

Settled are the elements required to sustain convictions for violations of Section 5, for the illegal sale of dangerous
drugs, and Section 11, for the illegal possession of dangerous drugs, of the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act. These
are enumerated in People v. Que:39

In actions involving the illegal sale of dangerous drugs, the following elements must first be established: (1) proof that
the transaction or sale took place and (2) the presentation in court of the corpus delicti or the illicit drug as evidence.

On the other hand, in prosecutions for illegal possession of a dangerous drug, it must be shown that (1) the accused was
in possession of an item or an object identified to be a prohibited or regulated drug, (2) such possession is not
authorized by law, and (3) the accused was freely and consciously aware of being in possession of the drug. Similarly, in
this case, the evidence of the corpus delicti must be established beyond reasonable doubt.40

In both cases, the corpus delicti is the illicit drug seized from the accused.41 In People v. Sagana:42

"[I]t is of paramount importance that the existence of the drug, the corpus delicti of the crime, be established beyond
doubt." Its identity and integrity must be proven to have been safeguarded. Aside from proving the elements of the
charges, "the fact that the substance illegally possessed and sold [was] the same substance offered in court as exhibit
must likewise be established with the same degree of certitude as that needed to sustain a guilty verdict." The chain of
custody carries out this purpose "as it ensures that unnecessary doubts concerning the identity of the evidence are
removed."43

Section 21 of the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act, as amended by Republic Act No. 10640, outlines the
requirements for the custody and disposition of confiscated, seized, and/or surrendered drugs and/or drug
paraphernalia:

SECTION 21. Custody and Disposition of Confiscated, Seized, and/or Surrendered Dangerous Drugs, Plant Sources of
Dangerous Drugs, Controlled Precursors and Essential Chemicals, Instruments/Paraphernalia and/or Laboratory
Equipment. — The PDEA shall take charge and have custody of all dangerous drugs, plant sources of dangerous drugs,
controlled precursors and essential chemicals, as well as instruments/paraphernalia and/or laboratory equipment so
confiscated, seized and/or surrendered, for proper disposition in the following manner:

(1) The apprehending team having initial custody and control of the dangerous drugs, controlled precursors and
essential chemicals, instruments/paraphernalia and/or laboratory equipment shall, immediately after seizure
and confiscation, conduct a physical inventory of the seized items and photograph the same in the presence of
the accused or the persons from whom such items were confiscated and/or seized, or his/her representative or
counsel, with an elected public official and a representative of the National Prosecution Service or the media
who shall be required to sign the copies of the inventory and be given a copy thereof: Provided, That the
physical inventory and photograph shall be conducted at the place where the search warrant is served; or at the
nearest police station or at the nearest office of the apprehending officer/team, whichever is practicable, in case
of warrantless seizures: Provided, finally, That noncompliance of these requirements under justifiable grounds,
as long as the integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized items are properly preserved by the
apprehending officer/team, shall not render void and invalid such seizures and custody over said items[;]

(2) Within twenty-four (24) hours upon confiscation/seizure of dangerous drugs, plant sources of dangerous drugs,
controlled precursors and essential chemicals, as well as instruments/paraphernalia and/or laboratory
equipment, the same shall be submitted to the PDEA Forensic Laboratory for a qualitative and quantitative
 examination;

(3) A certification of the forensic laboratory examination results, which shall be done by the forensic laboratory
examiner, shall be issued immediately upon the receipt of the subject item/s: Provided, That when the volume
of dangerous drugs, plant sources of dangerous drugs, and controlled precursors and essential chemicals does
not allow the completion of testing within the time frame, a partial laboratory examination report shall be
provisionally issued stating therein the quantities of dangerous drugs still to be examined by the forensic
laboratory: Provided, however, That a final certification shall be issued immediately upon completion of the said
examination and certification] (Emphasis supplied)

Noncompliance with Section 21 engenders doubt on the integrity of the corpus delicti. When the corpus delicti is cast in
doubt, an accused's guilt is also cast in doubt—warranting acquittal.44

Que explained how Republic Act No. 10640, in amending Republic Act No. 9165, relaxed what Section 21(1) required:

It was relaxed with respect to the persons required to be present during the physical inventory and photographing of
the seized items. Originally under Republic Act No. 9165, the use of the conjunctive "and" indicated that Section 21
required the presence of all of the following, in addition to "the accused or the person/s from whom such items were
confiscated and/or seized, or his/her representative or counsel":

First, a representative from the media;

Second, a representative from the Department of Justice; and

Third, any elected public official.

As amended by Republic Act No. 10640, Section 21 (1) uses the disjunctive "or," i.e., "with an elected public official and a
representative of the National Prosecution Service or the media." Thus, a representative from the media and a
representative from the National Prosecution Service are now alternatives to each other.45 (Emphasis in the original,
citations omitted)

Because the buy-bust operation occurred in 2012, prior to Section 21's amendment, the original text of the law applies.
Yet, operating under either version still leads this Court to the same ruling in this case: the prosecution failed to show
the police officers' strict compliance with Section 21. Two (2) barangay officials witnessed the marking, inventorying, and
photographing of the seized items. Beyond that, no representatives from both the media and the Department of Justice
were present.

The required witnesses must not only be present during the inventorying and photographing, but as early as the seizure
of items.46People v. Mendoza47 underscores the danger that follows when these required third-party witnesses are
absent in securing the custody of the seized items:

Without the insulating presence of the representative from the media or the Department of Justice, or any elected
public official during the seizure and marking of the sachets of shabu, the evils of switching, "planting" or contamination
of the evidence that had tainted the buy-busts conducted under the regime of RA No. 6425 (Dangerous Drugs Act of
1972) again reared their ugly heads as to negate the integrity and credibility of the seizure and confiscation of the
sachets of shabu that were evidence herein of the corpus delicti, and thus adversely affected the trustworthiness of the
incrimination of the accused. Indeed, the insulating presence of such witnesses would have preserved an unbroken
chain of custody.48

Moreover, Section 21 mandates the conduct of inventory and taking of photographs "immediately after seizure and
confiscation," which means that these must be done at the place of the arrest. Que explained:
What is critical in drug cases is not the bare conduct of inventory, marking, and photographing. Instead, it is the
certainty that the items allegedly taken from the accused retain their integrity, even as they make their way from the
accused to an officer effecting the seizure, to an investigating officer, to a forensic chemist, and ultimately, to courts
where they are introduced as evidence. . . .

Section 21 (1)'s requirements are designed to make the first and second links foolproof. Conducting the inventory and
photographing immediately after seizure, exactly where the seizure was done, or at a location as practicably close to
it, minimizes, if not eliminates, room for adulteration or the planting of evidence[.]49 (Emphasis supplied)

Under the Implementing Rules and Regulations of the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act, the physical inventory and
photographing of the seized items may be done "at the nearest police station or at the nearer. office of the
apprehending officer/team, whichever is practicable." Evidently, the barangay hall, as in this case, is not an alternative.

While deviations may be condoned under justifiable grounds, the prosecution must plead and prove that justifiable
ground.50 This Court has decried sweeping, unsubstantiated references to exceptions from Section 21's requirements
in Sagana:51

[T]he prosecution cannot simply rely on the saving clause provided for under the Implementing Rules and Regulations of
Republic Act No. 9165. While non-conformity with the strict directive of Section 21 is not essentially prejudicial to its
claim, the lapses committed by the police officers "must be recognized and explained in terms of their justifiable
grounds and the integrity and evidentiary value of the evidence seized must be shown to have been
preserved."52 (Emphasis in the original, citation omitted)

People v. Lim53 considered excusable situations:

It must be alleged and proved that the presence of the three witnesses to the physical inventory and photograph of the
illegal drug seized was not obtained due to reason/s such as:

(1) their attendance was impossible because the place of arrest was a remote area; (2) their safety during the inventory
and photograph of the seized drugs was threatened by an immediate retaliatory action of the accused or any person/s
acting for and in his/her behalf; (3) the elected official themselves were involved in the punishable acts sought to be
apprehended; (4) earnest efforts to secure the presence of a DOJ or media representative and an elected public official
within the period required under Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code prove futile through no fault of the arresting
officers, who face the threat of being charged with arbitrary detention; or (5) time constraints and urgency of the anti-
drug operations, which often rely on tips of confidential assets, prevented the law enforcers from obtaining the
presence of the required witnesses even before the offenders could escape.54 (Citation omitted)

Here, the prosecution has never bothered to prove, let alone plead, any situation akin to those contemplated in Lim to
excuse the police enforcers deviation from the law's simple requirements. This casts doubt on the integrity of the items
supposedly seized and, ultimately, on the commission of the crimes.

II

The chain of custody rule removes unnecessary doubts on the identity of the dangerous drugs presented in
court.55 Officers who come into possession of seized drugs must show how they handled and preserved the integrity of
the seized drugs while in their custody.56 In Mallillin v. People:57

As a method of authenticating evidence, the chain of custody rule requires that the admission of an exhibit be preceded
by evidence sufficient to support a finding that the matter in question is what the proponent claims it to be. It would
include testimony about every link in the chain, from the moment the item was picked up to the time it is offered into
evidence, in such a way that every person who touched the exhibit would describe how and from whom it was received,
where it was and what happened to it while in the witness' possession, the condition in which it was received and the
condition in which it was delivered to the next link in the chain. These witnesses would then describe the precautions
taken to ensure that there had been no change in the condition of the item and no opportunity for someone not in the
chain to have possession of the same.58 (Emphasis supplied, citation omitted)

People v. Nandi59 identified four (4) links which should be established in the chain of custody of the confiscated item:

[F]irst, the seizure and marking, if practicable, of the illegal drug recovered from the accused by the apprehending
officer; second, the turnover of the illegal drug seized by the apprehending officer to the investigating officer; third, the
turnover by the investigating officer of the illegal drug to the forensic chemist for laboratory examination; and fourth,
the turnover and submission of the marked illegal drug seized from the forensic chemist to the court.60

Here, the prosecution established that from the place of seizure to the barangay hall, PO2 Hechanova had sole custody
of the supposedly confiscated items. But this alone cannot be taken as a guarantee of the items' integrity. On the
contrary, an officer's act of personally and bodily keeping allegedly seized items, without any clear indication of
safeguards other than his or her mere possession, has been viewed as prejudicial to the integrity of the items.

In People v. Dela Cruz,61 this Court reprehended the act of a police officer who, having custody of the sachets seized from
a buy-bust operation, recklessly kept them in his pockets until they were supposedly turned over for examination:

The prosecution effectively admits that from the moment of the supposed buy-bust operation until the seized items'
turnover for examination, these items had been in the sole possession of a police officer. In fact, not only had they been
in his possession, they had been in such close proximity to him that they had been nowhere else but in his own pockets.

Keeping one of the seized items in his right pocket and the rest in his left pocket is a doubtful and suspicious way of
ensuring the integrity of the items. Contrary to the Court of Appeals' finding that PO1 Bobon took the necessary
precautions, we find his actions reckless, if not dubious.

Even without referring to the strict requirements of Section 21, common sense dictates that a single police officer's act
of bodily-keeping the item(s) which is at the crux of offenses penalized under the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act
of 2002, is fraught with dangers. One need not engage in a meticulous counter-checking with the requirements of
Section 21 to view with distrust the items coming out of PO1 Bobon's pockets. That the Regional Trial Court and the
Court of Appeals both failed to see through this and fell hook, line, and sinker — for PO1 Bobon's avowals is mind-
boggling.

Moreover, PO1 Bobon did so without even offering the slightest justification for dispensing with the requirements of
Section 21.

Section 21, paragraph 1, of the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002, includes a proviso to the effect that
"noncompliance of (sic) these requirements under justifiable grounds, as long as the integrity and the evidentiary value
of the seized items are properly preserved by the apprehending officer/team, shall not render void and invalid such
seizures and custody over said items." Plainly, the prosecution has not shown that — on September 14, 2004, when dela
Cruz was arrested and the sachets supposedly seized and marked — there were "justifiable grounds" for dispensing with
compliance with Section 21. All that the prosecution has done is insist on its self-serving assertion that the integrity of
the seized sachets has, despite all its lapses, nevertheless been preserved.62

In Dela Cruz, this Court did not approve of the incautious keeping of allegedly seized narcotics even as the prosecution
averred separating them in different pockets as a supposed measure to preserve integrity With greater reason should
this Court, in this case, reject PO2 Hechanova's claim. The bare assertion that PO2 Hechanova had possession of the
items, without so much as a simulation of safekeeping measures such as the segregation in Dela Cruz, is a blatant gap in
the chain of custody. The dearth of specific and detailed descriptions of how the allegedly seized items had been
preserved while in transit amounts to a broken, unreliable chain of custody. This is fatal to the prosecution's case.
Moreover, the prosecution failed to present as witness PO2 Albarico, the police officer who personally received the
specimen and the request for laboratory examination.

In Sagana, this Court acquitted the accused-appellant when it found that the prosecution did not proffer the testimonies
of persons who handled the seized items without ample explanation.63 This Court explained:

The prosecution has the "burden of establishing the identity of the seized items." Considering the sequence of the
people who have dealt with the confiscated articles, the prosecution failed to justify why three (3) other significant
persons were not presented as witnesses. These persons were the desk officer who supposedly recorded the incident in
the police blotter, the investigator who prepared the request for examination, and the police officer who received the
articles in the laboratory. "In effect, there is no reasonable guaranty as to the integrity of the exhibits inasmuch as it
failed to rule out the possibility of substitution of the exhibits, which cannot but inure to its own detriment."64 (Emphasis
supplied, citations omitted)

Here, Chief Inspector Puentespina recalled that PO2 Hechanova turned the seized items over to PO2 Albarico, who
placed them in his personal drawer for safekeeping.65 However, his testimony is mere hearsay and inadmissible in
evidence. The testimony on matters of which only PO2 Albarico has personal knowledge cannot be admitted or given
probative value.66

Without PO2 Albarico's testimony, this Court finds a fatal gap in the juncture involving PO2 Hechanova, the designated
poseur-buyer, and Chief Inspector Puentespina, the forensic chemical officer. This—together with the absence of the
required third-party witnesses, the police officers' lack of a sense of immediacy to mark, inventory, and photograph the
items at the place of the arrest, and the unsound manner of transporting whatever items were supposedly seized from
accused-appellant—reveals a seriously compromised chain of custody. These put in serious suspicion the identity of the
objects of the offenses attributed to accused-appellant, leaving reasonable doubt on his guilt. His constitutional right to
be presumed, innocent67 prevails:

From the constitutional law point of view, the prosecution's failure to establish with moral certainty all the elements of
the crime and to identify the accused as the perpetrator signify that it failed to overturn the constitutional presumption
of innocence that every accused enjoys in a criminal prosecution. When this happens, as in this case, the courts need not
even consider the case for the defense in deciding the case; a ruling for acquittal must forthwith issue.68 (Citations
omitted)

This Court is, thus, constrained to acquit accused-appellant.

Finally, this Court reiterates our pronouncement in People v. Holgado,69 where we espoused heightened scrutiny in
evaluating prosecution evidence in drug cases where what was allegedly seized involved a minuscule amount of
narcotics:

Trial courts should meticulously consider the factual intricacies of cases involving violations of Republic Act No. 9165. All
details that factor into an ostensibly uncomplicated and barefaced narrative must be scrupulously considered. Courts
must employ heightened scrutiny, consistent with the requirement of proof beyond reasonable doubt, in evaluating
cases involving miniscule amounts of drugs. These can be readily planted and tampered. Also, doubt normally follows in
cases where an accused has been discharged from other simultaneous offenses due to mishandling of evidence. Had the
Regional Trial Court and the Court of Appeals been so judicious in this case, a speedier resolution would have been
handed to Holgado and Misarez whose guilt beyond reasonable doubt was not established.

It is lamentable that while our dockets are clogged with prosecutions under Republic Act No. 9165 involving small-time
drug users and retailers, we are seriously short of prosecutions involving the proverbial "big fish." We are swamped with
cases involving small fry who have been arrested for miniscule amounts. While they are certainly a bane to our society,
small retailers are but low-lying fruits in an exceedingly vast network of drug cartels. Both law enforcers and prosecutors
should realize that the more effective and efficient strategy is to focus resources more on the source and true leadership
of these nefarious organizations. Otherwise, all these executive and judicial resources expended to attempt to convict an
accused for 0.05 gram of shabu under doubtful custodial arrangements will hardly make a dent in the overall picture. It
might in fact be distracting our law enforcers from their more challenging task: to uproot the causes of this drug
menace. We stand ready to assess cases involving greater amounts of drugs and the leadership of these cartels.70

WHEREFORE, the Court of Appeals' October 20, 2015 Decision in CA-G.R. CEB-CR HC No. 01776 is REVERSED and SET
ASIDE. Accused-appellant Larry Sultan y Aimada is ACQUITTED for the prosecution's failure to prove his guilt beyond
reasonable doubt. He is ordered immediately RELEASED from detention, unless he is confined for some other lawful
cause.

Let a copy of this Decision be furnished to the Director of the Bureau of Corrections for immediate implementation. The
Director of the Bureau of Corrections is directed to report the action he has taken to this Court within five (5) days from
receipt of this Decision. Copies shall also be furnished to the Director General of the Philippine National Police and the
Director General of the Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency for their information.

The Regional Trial Court is directed to turn over the seized sachets of mythamphetamine hydrochloride to the
Dangerous Drugs Board for destruction in accordance with law.

Let entry of final judgment be immediately issued.

SO ORDERED.