Domingo v. Zamora, G.R. No.

142283, February 06, 2003

Facts:

Former President Joseph E. Estrada issued Executive Order No. 81 for brevity) entitled
"Transferring the Sports Programs and Activities of the Department of Education, Culture and
Sports to the Philippine Sports Commission and Defining the Role of DECS in School-Based
Sports.
Pursuant to EO 81, former DECS Secretary Andrew B. Gonzales issued Memorandum No.
01592 on January 10, 2000. Said memorandum temporarily reassigned, in the exigency of the
service, all remaining BPESS Staff to other divisions or bureaus of the DECS effective March
15, 2000. On January 21, 2000, Secretary Gonzales issued Memorandum No. 01594
reassigning the BPESS staff named in the Memorandum to various offices within the DECS
effective March 15, 2000. Petitioners were among the BPESS personnel affected by
Memorandum No. 01594. Dissatisfied with their reassignment, petitioners filed the instant
petition. In their Petition, petitioners argue that EO 81 is void and unconstitutional for being an
undue legislation by President Estrada. Petitioners maintain that the President's issuance of EO
81 violated the principle of separation of powers. Petitioners also challenge the DECS
Memoranda for violating their right to security of tenure. Petitioners seek to nullify EO 81 and
the
DECS Memoranda. Petitioners pray that this Court prohibit the PSC from performing functions
related to school sports development. Petitioners further pray that, upon filing of the petition, this
Court issue a temporary restraining order against respondents to desist from implementing EO
81.
However, during the pendency of the case, Republic Act No. 9155 otherwise known as the
"Governance of Basic Education Act of 2001," was enacted on August 11, 2001. RA 9155
expressly abolished the BPESS and transferred the functions, programs and activities of the
DECS relating to sports competition to the PSC.

Issue: Whether or not EO 81 and the

DECS Memoranda are valid.

Held: The petition is dismissed for being moot and academic.

As manifested by both petitioners and respondents,
the subsequent enactment of RA 9155 has rendered the issues in the present case moot and
academic. Since RA 9155 abolished the BPESS and transferred the DECS' functions relating to
sports competition to the PSC, petitioners now admit that "it is no longer plausible to raise any
eltra sires assumess y Moreover, since RA 9155 provides that BPESS personnel not transferred
to the PSC shall be retained by tex it, pretion ens now accept, their right to security of tenure.
Although the issue is already academic, its significance constrains the Court to point out that
Executive Order No. 292 ("EO 292" for brevity), otherwise known as the Administrative Code of
1987, expressly grants the President continuing authority to reorganize the Office of the
President.
To wit: "SEC. 31. Continuing Authority of the President to Reorganize his Office.-The President,
subject to the policy in the Executive Office and in order to achieve simplicity, economy and
efficiency, shall have continuing authority to reorganize the administrative structure of the Office
of the President.
For this purpose, he may take any of the following actions:
(1) Restructure the internal organization of the Office of the President Proper, including the
immediate Offices, the Presidential Special Assistants/Advisers System and the Common
Support System, by abolishing, consolidating or merging units thereof or transferring functions
from one unit to another;
(2) Transfer any function under the Office of the President to any other Department or Agency
as well as transfer functions to the Office of the President from other Departments and
Agencies; and
(3) Transfer any agency under the Office of the President to any other department or agency as
well as transfer agencies to the Office of the President from other Departments or Agencies."

Since EO 81 is based on the President's continuing authority under Section 31 (2) and (3) of EO
292,"
EO 81 is a valid exercise of the
President's delegated power to reorganize the Office of the President. The law grants the
President this power in recognition of the recurring need of every President to reorganize his
office "to achieve simplicity, economy and efficiency." The Office of the President is the nerve
center of the Executive Branch.
This is the rationale behind the President's continuing authority to reorganize the administrative
structure of the Office of the President.
Petitioners'
contention that the DECS is not
part of the Office of the President is immaterial.
Under EO 292, the DECS is indisputably a Department of the Executive Branch. Even if the
DECS is not part of the Office of the President, Section 31 (2) and (3) of EO 292 clearly
authorizes the President to transfer any function or agency of the DECS to the Office of the
President. Therefore, the President has the authority to transfer the “functions, programs and
activities DECS related to sports development to the PSC, making EO 81 a valid presidential
issuance.
This distinction is crucial as it affects the security of tenure of employees. The abolition of an
office in good faith necessarily results in the employee's cessation in office, but in such event
there is no dismissal or separation because the office itself ceases to exist.
On the other hand,
the transfer of functions or agencies does not result in the employee's cessation in office
because his office continues to exist although in another department, agency or office. In the
instant case, the BP ESS employees who were not transferred to PSC were at first temporarily,
then later permanently reassigned to other offices of the DECS, ensuring their continued
employment.At any rate, RA 9155 now
mandates that these employees "shall be retained by the Department."
WHEREFORE,
the instant petition is
DISMISSED. No pronouncement as to costs.

Question: What are the continuing authority given to the President to reorganize the
administrative structure?

Answer:
1) Restructure the internal organization of the Office of the President Proper, including
the immediate Offices, the Presidential Special Assistants/Advisers System and the
Common Support System, by abolishing, consolidating or merging units thereof or
transferring functions from one unit to another;

(2) Transfer any function under the Office of the President to any other Department or
Agency as well as transfer functions agencies to the Office of the President from
other Departments or Agencies;" and

(3) Transfer any agency under the Office of the President to any other department or
agency as well as transfer agencies to the Office of the President from other
Departments or Agencies.

METROPOLITAN TRAFFIC COMMAND WEST TRAFFIC DISTRICT

vs.
HON. ARSENIO M. GONONG

Rodolfo A. Malapira complained to the Court that when he was stopped for an alleged traffic
violation, his driver's license was confiscated by Traffic Enforcer Angel de los Reyes in Quezon City.
The Caloocan-Manila Drivers and Operators Association sent a letter to the Court asking who should
enforce the decision in the above-mentioned case, whether they could seek damages for
confiscation of their driver's licenses, and where they should file their complaints.

Another letter was received by the Court from Stephen L. Monsanto, complaining against the
confiscation of his driver's license by Traffic Enforcer A.D. Martinez for an alleged traffic violation in
Mandaluyong.

This was followed by a letter-complaint filed from Dan R. Calderon, a lawyer, also for confiscation of
his driver's license by Pat. R.J. Tano-an of the Makati Police Force.

Still another complaint was received by the Court, this time from Grandy N. Trieste, another lawyer,
who also protested the removal of his front license plate by E. Ramos of the Metropolitan Manila
Authority-Traffic Operations Center and the confiscation of his driver's license by Pat. A.V.
Emmanuel of the Metropolitan Police Command-Western Police District.
Required to submit a Comment on the complaint against him, Allan D. Martinez invoked Ordinance
No. 7, Series of 1988, of Mandaluyong, authorizing the confiscation of driver's licenses and the
removal of license plates of motor vehicles for traffic violations.

For his part, A.V. Emmanuel said he confiscated Trieste's driver's license pursuant to a
memorandum dated February 27, 1991, from the District Commander of the Western Traffic District
of the Philippine National Police, authorizing such sanction under certain conditions.

Director General Cesar P. Nazareno of the Philippine National Police assured the Court in his own
Comment that his office had never authorized the removal of the license plates of illegally parked
vehicles and that he had in fact directed full compliance with the above-mentioned decision in a
memorandum, copy of which he attached, entitled Removal of Motor Vehicle License Plates.

Pat. R.J. Tano-an, on the other hand, argued that the Gonong decision prohibited only the removal
of license plates and not the confiscation of driver's licenses.

The Metropolitan Manila Authority issued Ordinance No. 11, Series of 1991, authorizing itself "to
detach the license plate/tow and impound attended/ unattended/ abandoned motor vehicles illegally
parked or obstructing the flow of traffic in Metro Manila."

It particularly cited Section 2 thereof vesting in the Council the responsibility among others
of:
1. Formulation of policies on the delivery of basic services requiring coordination or
consolidation for the Authority; and
2. Promulgation of resolutions and other issuances of metropolitan wide application,
approval of a code of basic services requiring coordination, and exercise of its rule-making
powers.
The Authority argued that there was no conflict between the decision and the ordinance
because the latter was meant to supplement and not supplant the latter. It stressed that
the decision itself said that the confiscation of license plates was invalid in... the absence
of a valid law or ordinance, which was why Ordinance No. 11 was enacted. The Authority
also pointed out that the ordinance could not be attacked collaterally but only in a direct
action challenging its validity.
For his part, the Solicitor General expressed the view that the ordinance was null and void
because it represented an invalid exercise of a delegated legislative power. The flaw in the
measure was that it violated existing law, specifically PD 1605, which does not permit, and
so impliedly prohibits, the removal of license plates and the confiscation of driver's
licenses for traffic violations in Metropolitan Manila. He made no mention, however, of the
alleged impropriety of examining the said ordinance in the... absence of a formal challenge
to its validity.
The Office of the Solicitor General submitted a motion for the early resolution of the
questioned sanctions, to remove once and for all the uncertainty of their validity. A similar
motion was filed by the Metropolitan Manila Authority, which reiterated its contention that
the incidents in question should be dismissed because there was no actual case or
controversy before the Court.
The Metropolitan Manila Authority is correct in invoking the doctrine that the validity of a
law or act can be challenged only in a direct action and not collaterally. That is indeed the
settled principle. However, that rule is not inflexible and may be relaxed by the Court
under exceptional circumstances, such as those in the present controversy.
The Solicitor General notes that the practices complained of have created a great deal of
confusion among motorists about the state of the law on the questioned sanctions. More
importantly, he maintains that these sanctions are illegal, being violative of law and the
Gonong decision, and should therefore be stopped. We also note the disturbing report that
one policeman who confiscated a driver's license dismissed the Gonong decision as
"wrong" and said the police would not stop their "habit" unless they received orders "from
the top." Regrettably, not one of the complainants has filed a formal challenge to the
ordinances, including Monsanto and Trieste, who are lawyers and could have been more
assertive of their rights.
1. Whether or not LOI 43 is valid.
2. Whether or not private respondent’s license can be confiscated.

HELD:
1. Yes. The petitioners insists that LOI 43 remains in force despite the issuance of PD 1605. It contends that there is
no inconsistency between the two measures because the former deals with illegally parked vehicles anywhere in the
Philippines whereas the latter deals with the regulation of the flow of traffic in the Metro Manila area only.

Private respondent argues that LOI 43 has been repealed by PD 1605, which specifies all the sanctions available
against the various traffic violations, including illegal parking. He stresses that removal and confiscation of the license
plates of illegally parked vehicles is not one of them, the penalties being limited in the decree to imposition of fine and
suspension or revocation of driver's licenses or certificates of public convenience, etc. He claims that removal and
confiscation of the license plate without notice and hearing violates due process because such license plate is a form of
property protected by the Bill of Rights against unlawful deprivation.

The Court holds that LOI 43 is valid but may be applied only against motor vehicles that have stalled in the public
streets due to some involuntary cause and not those that have been intentionally parked in violation of the traffic
laws. A careful reading of the above decree will show that removal and confiscation of the license plate of any illegally
parked vehicle is not among the specified penalties. Moreover, although the Metropolitan Manila Commission is
authorized by the decree to "otherwise discipline" and "impose higher penalties" on traffic violators, whatever
sanctions it may impose must be "in such amounts and under such penalties as are herein prescribed."

It would appear that what the LOI punishes is not a traffic violation but a traffic obstruction, which is an altogether
different offense. A violation imports an intentional breach or disregard of a rule, as where a driver leaves his vehicle
in a no-parking area against a known and usually visible prohibition. Contrary to the common impression, LOI 43
does not punish illegal parking per se but parking of stalled vehicles, i.e., those that involuntarily stop on the road due
to some unexpected trouble such as engine defect, lack of gasoline, punctured tires, or other similar cause. The vehicle
is deemed illegally parked because it obstructs the flow of traffic, but only because it has stalled. The obstruction is
not deliberate. In fact, even the petitioner recognizes that "there is a world of difference between a stalled vehicle and
an illegally parked and unattended one" and suggests a different treatment for either. "The first means one which
stopped unnecessarily or broke down while the second means one which stopped to accomplish something, including
temporary rest.

2. No. It is not covered by LOI 43 thus subject to a different penalty. As it has not been shown that the private
respondent's motor vehicle had stalled because of an engine defect or some other accidental cause and, no less
importantly, that it had stalled on the road for a second or subsequent time, confiscation of the license plate cannot be
justified under LOI 43. And neither can that sanction be sustained under PD 1605, which clearly provides that "in
case of traffic violations, (even) the driver's license shall not be confiscated," let alone the license plate of the motor
vehicle. If at all, the private respondent may be held liable for illegal parking only and subjected to any of the specific
penalties mentioned in Section 3 of the decree.

Gonong decision will show that the measures under consideration do not pass the first criterion because
they do not conform to existing law. The pertinent law is PD 1605. PD 1605 does not allow either the
removal of license plates or the confiscation of driver's licenses for traffic violations committed in
Metropolitan Manila. There is nothing in the following provisions of the decree authorizing the
Metropolitan Manila Commission to impose such sanctions. In fact, the provisions prohibit the
imposition of such sanctions in Metropolitan Manila. The Commission was allowed to "impose fines and
otherwise discipline" traffic violators only "in such amounts and under such penalties as are herein
prescribed," that is, by the decree itself. Nowhere is the removal of license plates directly imposed by the
decree or at least allowed by it to be imposed by the Commission. Notably, Section 5 thereof expressly
provides that "in case of traffic violations, the driver's license shall not be confiscated." These restrictions
are applicable to the Metropolitan Manila Authority and all other local political subdivisions comprising
Metropolitan Manila, including the Municipality of Mandaluyong. `The requirement that the municipal
enactment must not violate existing law explains itself. Local political subdivisions are able to legislate
only by virtue of a valid delegation of legislative power from the national legislature. They are mere agents
vested with what is called the power ofsubordinate legislation. As delegates of the Congress, the local
government unit cannot contravene but must obey at all times the will of their principal.

Question: What are the requisites of a valid delegation of legislative power to promulgate
administrative measures?

Answer: 1. The completeness of the statute making the delegation; and 2. The presence of
a sufficient standard.

Under the first requirement, the statute must leave the legislature to complete all its terms
and provisions such that all delegates will have to do when the statute reaches it is to
implement it.
As the second requirement, the enforcement may be effected only in accordance with a
sufficient standard, the dunctionof which is to map out the boundaries of the delegate’s
authoruty and thus “prevent the delegation from running riot”.

THE UNITED STATES,

vs.
ADRIANO PANLILIO,
Facts: On or about the 22nd day of February, 1913, all of the carabaos belonging to the above-
named accused having been exposed to the dangerous and contagious disease known as
rinderpest, were, in accordance with an order of duly-authorized agent of the Director of Agriculture,
duly quarantined in a corral in the barrio of Masamat, municipality of Mexico, Province of Pampanga,
P. I.; that, on said place, the said accused, Adriano Panlilio, illegally and voluntarily and without
being authorized so to do, and while the quarantine against said carabaos was still in force,
permitted and ordered said carabaos to be taken from the corral in which they were then
quarantined and conducted from one place to another; that by virtue of said orders of the accused,
his servants and agents took the said carabaos from the said corral and drove them from one place
to another for the purpose of working them."

The defendant demurred to the information on the ground that the acts complained of did not
constitute a crime. The demurrer was overruled and the defendant duly excepted and pleaded not
guilty, however, the accused was convicted of violation of Act 1760 relating to the quarantining of
animals suffering from dangerous communicable or contagious diseases and sentencing him to pay
a fine of P40 with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency and to pay the costs of trial. The
accused contends that the facts alleged in the information and proved on the trial do not constitute a
violation of Act No. 1760.

From the evidence introduced by the prosecution on the trial of the cause it appears that the
defendant was notified in writing by a duly authorized agent of the Director of agriculture, that all of
his carabaos in the barrio of Masamat, municipality of Mexico, Pampanga Province, had been
exposed to the disease commonly known as rinderpest, and that said carabaos were accordingly
declared under quarantine, and were ordered kept in a corral designated by an agent of the Bureau
of Agriculture and were to remain there until released by further order of the Director of Agriculture.

ISSUE:

Whether accused can be penalized for violation of the order of the Bureau of Agriculture?

Held: NO. Nowhere in the law is the violation of the orders of the Bureau of Agriculture prohibited or
made unlawful, nor is there provided any punishment for a violation of such orders. Section 8 of Act
No. 1760 provides that any person violating any of the provisions of the Act shall, upon conviction,
be punished. However, the only sections of the Act which prohibit acts and pronounce them as
unlawful are Sections 3, 4 and 5. This case does not fall within any of them. A violation of the orders
of the Bureau of Agriculture, as authorized by paragraph, is not a violation of the provision of the Act.
The orders of the Bureau of Agriculture, while they may possibly be said to have the force of law, are
statutes and particularly not penal statutes, and a violation of such orders is not a penal offense
unless the statute itself somewhere makes a violation thereof unlawful and penalizes it. Nowhere in
Act No. 1760 is a violation of the orders of the Bureau of Agriculture made a penal offense, nor is
such violation punished in any way therein. However, the accused did violate Art. 581, par 2 of the
Penal Code which punishes any person who violates regulations or ordinances with reference to
epidemic disease among animals.

Question: Are the orders, rules and regulations of an administrative officers or body issued pursuant
to a statute have the force of law?

Answer: It has none of the aspects of a penal provision or the form or substance of such provision. It
does not prohibit any act. It does not compel an act nor does it really punish or impose a criminal
penalty. The other sections of the law under which punishments may be inflicted are so phrased as
to make the prohibited act unlawful, and section 8 provides the punishment for any act declared
unlawful by the law.