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Internet, Facebook, competing political narratives, and political control in

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Article  in  Media Asia · February 2021

DOI: 10.1080/01296612.2021.1881285

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https://doi.org/10.1080/01296612.2021.1881285

COMMENTARY
1
2 Internet, Facebook, competing 44
45
3
4 political narratives, and political 46
47
5 48
6
7
control in Cambodia 49
50
8 SOKPHEA YOUNG 51
9 52
10 53
11 54

LY
T
he Internet and social media are thought & Fenton, 2003; Nisbet et al., 2012; Yang, 2009).
12 55
to be democratising tools, especially in The Internet and social media have also been seen 56
13
14 contexts where democratic participation as enabling what used to be known as “politically 57
15 is limited due either to political apathy from the apathetic” youth to engage with politics in new 58

N
16 citizens or to authoritarian control. Social media, in ways (Dahlgren, 2007; Livingstone, 2009; Loader, 59
17 particular, allow people to access information not 2007), and a lot of effort has been made to present 60
18
O
available in mainstream media, connect with like- social media as an enabler of Arab Spring and 61
19 minded people, mobilise resources and communi- other political protests (Browning, 2013; Comunello 62
20 cate directly with politicians. This paper comple-
& Anzera, 2012; Eltantawy & Wiest, 2011; Herrera 63
F 
21 ments existing understanding by looking at how
& Mayo, 2012; Kyj, 2006; Maamari & Zein, 2014). 64
22 political contest and control play out in the
Social media has become the latest communi- 65
Cambodian social media landscape by focusing on
O

23 66
cation technology that raises questions about the
24 Facebook pages of Cambodia’s ruling party leader 67
nature of politics, political participation and dem-
25 and opposition party leader. 68
ocracy. This has raised optimism among research-
O

26 The Internet has gained centrality in politics 69

ers and observers across political regimes, hoping
27 and beyond in the past two decades (Sarikakis & 70
that political elites are to be held more accountable
28 Thussu, 2006; Wellman & Haythornthwaite, 2007). 71
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29 (see Bode, 2017; Bosch, 2013; Browning, 2013; 72

Early literature on the Internet and information
30 and communication technologies has often set a Chou & Fu, 2017; Dumitrica, 2016;; Mutsvairo & 73
31 positive tone on the prospect of the emerging Sirks, 2015; Placek, 2016; Vong & Hok, 2018), des- 74
32 “affordances” for new possibilities of civic and pol- pite reservations about the realisation of the demo- 75
33 itical engagement despite several cautions, and the cratic potential of social media, including harsh 76
34 idea that new technologies strengthen democracy political control; digital surveillance; digital inequal- 77
35 remains common (Storsul, 2014). In both the global ity; and, traditional usage (Calderaro, 2017; Castells 78
36 North and South, this new digital media has been & Sey, 2004; Pearce, 2014; Ward et al., 2003; 79
37 proven as a democratising tool and space (Downey Zuboff, 2019). There is, however, less 80
38 ............................................................................................................................................ 81
39 Sokphea Young obtained his PhD from the University of Melbourne, Australia, and is currently a Postdoctoral Research 82
Associate at the University College London, United Kingdom. His research interests are grassroots and transnational activism,
40 83
civil society, visual politics, visual media and development, citizenship, globalisation and development, and political
41 development in Southeast Asia. His research was published in Journal of International Relations and Development, Journal of 84
42 Civil Society, Asian Politics & Policies, Asian Journal of Social Science, Georgetown Journal of Asian Affairs, and Journal of Current 85
Southeast Asian Affairs; and as book chapters and other working papers. Email: sophiabelieve@gmail.com
43 86
© 2021 Asian Media Information and Communication Centre 1 v MEDIA ASIA
87 understanding of how social media and politics Socialist Community”. Led by Prince Norodom 132
88 interact in a stable authoritarian context Sihanouk, the country was well developed in vari- 133
89 (Pearce, 2014). ous sectors, such as sport, education, infrastructure, 134
90 Instead of looking at how citizens utilise social agriculture and industrialisation. These legacies 135
91 media, I focus on how two political elites bring have impressed the younger generation with the 136
92 their contest onto Facebook and attempt to offer “modernity” and development during his regime, 137
93 two competing narratives of Cambodia, aiming to leading to a comparison with the present. However, 138
94 legitimise their political and personal legitimacy for under his rule from 1953 to 1970, media outlets, 139
95 power. I attempt to examine how two key political though flourishing at that time, were controlled by 140
96 figures, Cambodia’s “strongman” Prime Minister his regime (Strangio, 2016). The Prince also pub- 141
97 Hun Sen and opposition leader Sam Rainsy, utilise lished a number of newspapers and magazines to 142
98 Facebook to engage with Cambodian people and propagate his national programs, fight oppositions 143
99 present their political narratives. In the following, I and build a royal image (Mehta, 1997). 144
100 will first describe the Cambodian context of polit- Immediately after seizing power through a 145

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101 ical communication as a repressive controlling coup in 1970, Lon Nol imposed martial law, effect- 146
102 regime. I will then show how political contestation ively censoring all media outlets. The later years of 147
103 and control have transformed with Facebook before the Lon Nol regime between 1970 and 1975 saw 148
104 illustrating the two political leaders’ usage of tight controlling of the media as well as persecution 149

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105 Facebook. I will conclude with a remark on the and violence against journalists and political critics 150
106 prospect of political control of and censorship (Mehta, 1997). State-owned media were used to 151
107 through social media,
O especially Facebook, criticised and condemned Lon Nol’s predecessor, 152
108 in Cambodia. Prince Sihanouk, and to legitimise the regime as a 153
109 democratic one, with the support of the United 154
F 
110 Censoring Cambodia: media in States. The Khmer Rouge regime between 1975 155
111 Cambodian political history and 1979 was a notorious failure in social experi- 156
112 Media was central to Cambodia’s political develop- mentation. It is a utopian project to transform 157
O

113 ment after independence in the mid-20th century. Cambodia into an ultra-socialist society, and the 158
114 During the French protectorate, French and regime attempted to get rid of what it perceived to 159
O

115 Vietnamese language newspapers dominated be elements of capitalism and Western imperialism. 160
116 Cambodian press. The first Khmer language news- The middle class and educated were particularly 161
117 paper Nagaravatta, or “the Land of Pagodas”, only targeted, and journalists were among them, result- 162
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118 started in 1936 and from the start was a political ing in many being executed or fleeing the country 163
119 tool for Cambodian nationalists (see Chandler, (Clarke, 2000). The Khmer Rouge monopolised the 164
120 2000; Clarke, 2000). While some describe these access to information, providing to the population 165
121 publications as political tools (see Clarke, 2000; only revolutionary imaginations and propaganda 166
122 Mehta, 1997), they play a part in promoting nation- materials through the state-owned radio station, 167
123 alism and contributing the construction of news pamphlets and magazines (Tyner et al., 2015). 168
124 Cambodia as an “imagined” national community The pro-Soviet regime People’s Republic of 169
125 (see Edwards, 2008; Ngoun, 2011). Towards the Kampuchea (PRK), which toppled the Khmer 170
126 end of the colonial rule, several other publications Rouge and ran the country in the 1980s, main- 171
127 began circulation and took on the French colonial tained tight control over the media. Forbidding pri- 172
128 master in the attempt to gain independence. vate media outlets, the PRK ran a state news 173
129 Before rampant civil wars and the contestation agency, a radio station, a TV station and a bunch 174
130 over power in the 1970s, Cambodia was once of print publications (Clarke, 2000; Mehta, 1997). 175
131 known as a regime of Reastr Niyum, or “People’s When a peace agreement was reached in Paris in 176

2 v S. YOUNG
177 1991 to resolve “the Cambodia problem,” an inter- 1998, 2003 and 2013 elections, the CPP comfort- 222
178 nationally supported democratisation process was ably dominated the parliamentary seats. In 2013, 223
179 begun to “reconstruct” Cambodia and reintegrate the newly consolidated opposition party 224
180 the country into the new world order of democracy Cambodian National Rescue Party (CNRP) sur- 225
181 and capitalism. The Cambodian press was set to prised most observers by significantly reducing the 226
182 benefit from this process with the mushrooming of CPP’s seats in the parliament. Led by its exiled 227
183 the media and aid industry. By 1998, the number leader Sam Rainsy, the CNRP managed to win 55 228
184 of registered newspapers, magazines, radio chan- seats compared to CPP’s 68 seats even with accusa- 229
185 nels, TV channels and cable TV provider increased tions of vote-rigging by the ruling CPP. As such, 230
186 rapidly (Peou, 2009). The democratic promise was, CNRP organised a mass demonstration to call for 231
187 however, not straightforward. Throughout the re-election, but they failed. In 2014, CNRP compro- 232
188 1990s and 2000s, persecution and violence against mised and join the parliament with CPP; however, 233
189 journalists were commonplace given the lack of law the leaders of both parties were still criticising each 234
190 enforcement, corruption and political instability other until 2017 when CNRP’s leader, Khem Sokha, 235

LY
191 (Loo, 2006; Lor, 2002). The Law on the Press were accused of plotting colour revolution (a revo- 236
192 Regime, passed in 1995, was often used to restrict lution that is similar to Arab Spring) in an attempt 237
193 and prosecute the freedom of speech. Broadcast of toppling the legitimate government. While Sam 238
194 media generally practised self-censorship or were Rainsy was convicted of defamation and other alle- 239

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195 affiliated with the ruling party, especially after gations, Khem Sokha has been accused of treason. 240
196 1998, focusing mainly on administrative activities Provided that, in 2017, Cambodia’s supreme court 241
197 of state officials and
O entertainment content dissolved CNRP and banned all its members of par- 242
198 (Peou, 2009). liament from political activities for five years before 243
199 To date, the Cambodian media landscape the 2018 elections. 244
F 
200 remains restricted by its political environment Access to information through the Internet 245
201 (Peou et al., 2013). Persecution and violence against and social media has been an essential factor 246
202 critical media and figures remain, and self-censor- behind the increased support for the CNRP. There 247
O

203 ship becomes a norm (LICADHO, 2008, 2009). It are now 11 television channels and dozens of radio 248
204 is, in this context, the Internet and social media channels, but they are mostly controlled by or 249
O

205 offer a space for information and political engage- affiliated with the ruling party (Reporters without 250
206 ment. However, in recent years, the hype of the Borders, 2020). They often propagate the CPP’s 251
207 digital media as a democratising tool has cooled political agendas, the way the previous ruling 252
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208 down as persecution, and harassment of critics regimes practised. They also focused on “peace” 253
209 were carried over by the ruling regime onto the achievement “modern” developments, especially 254
210 new media scene (see CCHR., 2012). The question infrastructure projects, under the CPP’s and Hun 255
211 remains, whether tried and tested methods of polit- Sen’s rule. During the 2013 election campaign, elec- 256
212 ical control over traditional media will be effective tion monitors and watchdogs found that the ruling 257
213 over social media. party controlled the media outlets, leaving few 258
214 hours available for the opposition parties 259
215 Changing political and media scene (COMFREL (The Committee for Free & Fair 260
216 A multi-party governance system returned to Elections in Cambodia), 2013). The opposition 261
217 Cambodia in 1993 but has since regressed as the often had to rely on English language newspapers 262
218 Cambodian People’s Party (CPP) and Hun Sen has and international broadcasters for a share of air 263
219 consolidated power in the past 35 years. In 1993, time and communicating its agenda to the people, 264
220 the CPP won only 51 seats in the parliament com- especially Voice of America (VOA), Radio Free 265
221 pared to 58 seats by its rival royalist party, but in Asia (RFA) and Radio France Internationale (RFI), 266

3 v MEDIA ASIA
267 who were in turn accused by the ruling CPP of Hun sen versus sam rainsy — facebook 312
268 interfering with Cambodia’s internal affairs and contest and completing 313
269 instigating political and social instability. political narratives 314
270 This restricted media space has countered by By early 2017, the number of active social media 315
271 social media to provide critical information to the users in Cambodia was estimated between 4.30 and 316
272 population by the opposition and government crit- 5.20 million, between 18.00% and 34.00% of the 317
273 ics. The number of Internet subscriptions in population (NapoleonCat, 2020), most of which 318
274 Cambodia rose from under 30,000 in 2009 to nearly were on Chinese and affordable smartphones, some 319
275 200,000 in 2010. By 2020, Internet penetration has of which cost just about US$25. Given the reach of 320
276 jumped to over 47.90% compared to 39.00% in Facebook and the potential of engaging people pol- 321
277 2015, mostly via smartphones, and Facebook had itically by feeding political information into people’s 322
278 become the second most important information 323
newsfeed and connecting with people directly,
279 source ! 67.10% (11.35 million) of the population 324
Cambodian politicians have in recent years focused
280 (about 16.7 million in 2020) – after TV and the 325
on utilising Facebook for political gain. In early

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281 radio channels (Internet World Statistics, 2020; 326
2016, Hun Sen ordered all government ministries
282 NapoleonCat, 2020). For example, just less than 327
and bodies to set up Facebook pages to better con-
283 two weeks before the national election in 2013, the 328
nect with the people. Ministerial Facebook working
284 opposition party CNRP leader Sam Rainsy returned 329

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groups have since been set up, senior governmental
285 to Cambodia after a political agreement was 330
officials had their own Facebook page created –
286 reached to give him a royal pardon for his politic- 331
though mostly in a public relations show-off man-
287
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ally motivated jail charge. By this time, the CNRP
ner, and many civil servants ordered to like, follow
332
288 had already been using Facebook to disseminate 333
and comment on ministerial Facebook pages and
289 information and gather support, and news of the 334
F 
Facebook pages of their bosses.
290 imminent return of its leader became widespread 335
The two political figures, Prime Minister Hun
291 on Facebook. Local broadcast TV and radio chan- 336
Sen and opposition leader Sam Rainsy, have been
292 nels either ignored the event or made light of it. 337
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among the most active in using Facebook as a

293 Many observers also add the increased number 338
means to engage with their political subjects.
294 of below-30-year-old voters a critical factor behind 339
Currently, Hun Sen’s official Facebook page has
O

295 the increased support for the CNRP in 2013. Two- 340
296 thirds of the population is 30 years old or younger about 13.22 million likes and Sam Rainsy’s Page 341
297 are now on social media, having 30.8% (18-24 years over 4.88 million likes. For Hun Sen, Facebook 342
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298 old) and 45.8% (25-34 years old) on Facebook popularity has even become personal. Having over- 343
299 (NapoleonCat, 2020). Furthermore, these adults taken Sam Rainsy in Facebook likes and becoming 344
300 were born after the Khmer Rouge regime, the end- the second most “engaging” leader on Facebook 345
301 ing of which was largely credited to the CPP. It is (McCaffrie, 2016), Hun Sen boasted himself as the 346
302 generally taken for granted that this youth gener- “father of Facebook” while earlier mocked Sam 347
303 ation has turned away from the ruling CPP, and Rainsy as the “Facebook Prime Minister” in 2013 348
304 the CNRP has taken advantage of the demographic when Hun Sen was not on Facebook. 349
305 change to mobilise young voters’ support through Hun Sen began using Facebook in 2014 by tak- 350
306 social media by providing them with alternative ing over a page called Samdech Hun Sen 351
307 information from traditional media and engaging Cambodian Prime Minister, which he claimed to 352
308 them with their political promises. The two leaders be once managed by a group of students who sup- 353
309 of the two parties compete each other to gain fol- ported him. In 2020, his Page was ranked the most 354
310 lowers (fans) on social media in the hope of gaining popular one in Cambodia with 13.22 million likes 355
311 offline electoral support. and fans (increased from 8.20 million in 2017), 356

4 v S. YOUNG
357 overtaking popular pages such as Voice of America rule as well as personally and verbally attacking 402
358 (7.36 million), Radio Free Asia Khmer (6.86 mil- his opposition. 403
359 lion), Post Khmer (6.13 million), Khmerload (5.82 While living in exile to avoid a politically 404
360 million), Sabay News (5.45 million), Meas charged jail sentence, Sam Rainsy began using 405
361 Soksophea (4.95 million), and Sam Rainsy (4.88 Facebook as a means to communicate with his sup- 406
362 million) rising slowly from 4.10 million in 2017, porters before returning to Cambodia in July 2013 407
363 while there are 11.35 million Facebook users as in and escaped against in 2014. His Facebook page 408
364 October 2020 (Socialbakers, 2020). Sam Rainsy had 4.10 million likes and followers in 409
365 In 2014, Hun Sen instructed all his officials 2017 and has slowly increased to just 4.88 million 410
366 and party members to share and follow his posts in November 2020. He has long been active on his 411
367 and photographs on the Facebook page. The aim is Facebook page, posting, and comments, news sum- 412
368 to direct officials and government institutions to maries, pictures and video clips about social issues 413
369 monitor and respond to complaints that people focusing on social injustice and corruption. On 414
370 communicate to him. He also once announced that average, he has about 92,840 interactions with his 415

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371 Facebook page per week, of which per 1,000 fans 416
any disgruntled individuals could directly chat to
372 he has about 2.63 fans, and 1.61 fans engage with 417
his inbox if they had any complaints. On his
373 his video and photo posts, respectively. Like Hun 418
Facebook page, the Prime Minister posted com-
374 Sen, video and photo posts attract interaction of 419

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ments and pictures and lived broadcasts his official
375 his fans the most. To combine video and photo 420
activities, and sometimes personal ones, aiming to
376 post, 0.26% and 0.16% of total fan interact with 421
connect himself closer to the imaginations of the
377
O
Cambodian population along with the political nar-
video and photo posts per week, respectively. In 422
378 overall, only 1.89% of total fan interact with his 423
rative of developments and modernity – an
379 Facebook page per week (Socialbakers, 2020). 424
F 
approach used by the leaders of the previous
380 Compared to Hun Sen page, the level of interaction 425
regimes on TV. Per week, he posted videos
381 of fan with the Sam Rainsy’ Facebook page is lower 426
(80.00%), photos (12.00%) and text status (8.00%) to
382 than Hun San’s Facebook page. 427
O

draw admiring comments and well-wishing from

383 In stark contrast with Hun Sen’s posts, Sam 428
his supporters although sometimes also comments
384 Rainsy’s posts are generally about instances of 429
critical of lower-level officials or governance.
O

385 social injustice, crimes, corruption, violence and 430

Videos and photos attract his fans the most, with
386 abuse by authorities, Vietnamese migration into 431
387 about 5.11 fan and 4.20 fan engagement per 1,000
Cambodia, territorial loss, and citizen protests. 432
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388 fans, respectively. This means at least between Unlike Hun Sen, who tried to construct a political 433
389 55,543 to 67,577 fans interact (views, shares and narrative of national prosperity based on a dark 434
390 comments) with videos, and photos he posted per past of the Khmer Rouge regime and for which he 435
391 week (Socialbakers, 2020). To combine these visual is a glorified leader, Sam Rainsy focuses on con- 436
392 posts, only 0.93% of the total fan (13.22 million) structing a political narrative of a poorly run and 437
393 engages with his video and photo posts per week, highly exploited country with self-serving leaders 438
394 and in overall, about 4.50% (600,000 fans) the total and officials where the national identity and exist- 439
395 fan engagement with the Page per week ence is at stake. 440
396 (Socialbakers, 2020). To compare the total fan, the As Hun Sen began to use Facebook in 2014, 441
397 level of engagement is relatively low. While Hun the competition over online popularity between the 442
398 Sen infrequently acts on comments asking for his two political figures ensued. While Sam Rainsy 443
399 help, in this sense allowing the people to communi- could once claim he had more support from 444
400 cate to him directly, his usage pattern is largely Cambodians based on his Facebook popularity, 445
401 about the glorification of himself and his party’s Hun Sen later managed to beat Sam Rainsy on the 446

5 v MEDIA ASIA
447 Figure 1. 492
448 Hun Sen’s distribution of fan population. 493
Source: www.socialbakers.com, as of 6 June 2017
449 494
450 495
451 496
452 497
453 498
454 499
455 500
456 501
457 502
458 503
459 504
460 505

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461 506
462 507
463 508
464 509

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465 510
466 511
467
O 512
468 513
469 514
F 
470 number of Facebook likes and followers and geographic distribution of fans/likes. 2017 data is 515
471 mocked Sam Rainsy as a “loser.” In return, Sam essential as it was when the two leaders were con- 516
472 Rainsy, likely rightly so, alleged that Hun Sen buy testing over the legitimate followers on Facebook. 517
O

473 likes from outside Cambodia and order the setup In 2017, of the total fan of Hun Sen’s Facebook 518
474 of a technical Facebook working group to create page, only 45.6% was from Cambodia. The rest come 519
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475 fake accounts to increase the number of likes on from the Philippines (12.80%), India (10.60%), 520
476 his Page. Indonesia (7.10%), Vietnam (6.10%) and others 521
477 Such allegation was, in turn, retaliated by Hun (17.80). Sam Rainsy’s Facebook page, however, 522
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478 Sen with a defamation charge (Niem & Turton, boasts a larger proportion of Cambodians within his 523
479 2016). Following the allegation, Hun Sen assigned a fan base (77.70%), approximately 3.15 million and 524
480 government and party official to oversee fake still fewer than that of Hun Sen’s (see Figures 1 and 525
481 accounts and mobilise more genuine follower 2 above). Notably, 6.60% of Sam Rainsy’s Facebook 526
482 accounts, and to file a defamation complaint fans come from Thailand, the largest destination for 527
483 against Sam Rainsy, who was in 2016 ordered by Cambodian labour migrants. As the total fan of Hun 528
484 the court to pay US$2,500 to the state and Sen’s Facebook page nearly doubled as of November 529
485 US$3,750 in compensation to Hun Sen (Touch, 2020, this has been proudly claimed how charismatic 530
486 2017). In addition, the fact that a large number of leader he has been. 531
487 his followers are from outside Cambodia is claimed 532
488 by Hun Sen to show that is well respected in the Conclusion — prospect for democracy 533
489 region and the world. Since I cannot access 2020 and control 534
490 data on fan distribution by country on www.social- The Internet and social media are thought to open 535
491 bakers.com, I use 2017 data to present the a new space for democratic engagement, given the 536

6 v S. YOUNG
537 Figure 2. 582
538 Sam Rainsy’s distribution of fan population. 583
Source: www.socialbakers.com, as of 6 June 2017
539 584
540 585
541 586
542 587
543 588
544 589
545 590
546 591
547 592
548 593
549 594
550 595

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551 596
552 597
553 598
554 599

N
555 600
556 601
557
O 602
558 limited role of mainstream media in promoting justify the opposition leader’s imagination in social 603
559 meaningful political engagement in contexts of lit- media as his party managed to win in 484 out of 604
F 
560 tle democratic practice (Placek, 2016). It allows 1,632 communes, a twelve-fold increase from 2012. 605
561 people to access information not accessible in the The opposition CNRP managed to get 44.00% of 606
562 mainstream media, share information and mobilise the popular votes, compared that 51.00% by the 607
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563 resources to organise. In the context Cambodia, ruling CPP. Despite claiming higher popularity on 608
564 where the ruling party and self-censorship tightly Facebook, Hun Sen saw his party’s support signifi- 609
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565 control mainstream media is the norm, Facebook cantly reduced in both the national election in 610
566 provides a space for the opposition leader to com- 2013 and commune election in 2017. 611
567 pete directly with the ruling party leader in engag- Notwithstanding these results, Hun Sen remains 612
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568 ing with Cambodians and in constructing and defiant on Facebook arguing that the number of 613
569 demonstrating a competing political narrative of ballots voted in favour of his party increased from 614
570 Cambodia, hoping to rally support and bring about 3.2 million in 2013 to 3.5 million in 2017, hoping 615
571 a historic political change in the country’s to convince his online fans of his legitimacy as the 616
572 recent history. charismatic leader. The fact is for Hun Sen, the 617
573 The two major parties or leaders have envi- number of Facebook fans, which are imagined 618
574 sioned social media as a critical space for their pol- space and power social media, appears to necessar- 619
575 itical project. They have imagined, as to what ily reflect actual political support despite countless 620
576 Anderson (2006) suggests in print media: the larger ongoing intimidation and suppression on the 621
577 space they expanded (through the expansion of opposition party. Meanwhile, social media platform 622
578 their community members) the higher probability like Facebook is a critical means for Sam Rainsy 623
579 of political actualisation. That social media space is and his party to connect with his supporters as he 624
580 imagined to have implication for political reality. has been, again, living in exile and losing the offline 625
581 The results of the commune election 2017 help battleground to cultivate support. 626

7 v MEDIA ASIA
627 The question remains why Hun Sen and the This virtual space is, however, problematic 672
628 ruling government have not controlled social media since online activities are subject to digital and 673
629 as tightly as traditional media. Observers tend to cyber surveillance, mostly committed by the rulers, 674
630 agree Cambodia is a blend of “outright freedom in collaboration with the pro-ruler corporations, 675
631 and outright suppression” (Strangio, 2014, p. 207) who have power and capacity to enforce relevant 676
632 when it comes to freedom of expression. Allowing cyber regulations at the ruling party’ advantages. 677
633 a manageable opposition legitimises Cambodia as a Crackdown on online activisms and activities are 678
634 democracy, and allowing a limited space for the observed in contemporary Cambodia’s online activ- 679
635 opposition voice can also help the ruling regime to ities even though it is claimed to have more space 680
636 keep surveillance on the opposition’s agenda. It is a rather than offline (on street protests). Anyone sub- 681
637 regime type which employs both carrots and sticks scribed to this virtual space is submitting to the 682
638 policies; they co-opt some challengers and surveillance system of the ruling party whose cor- 683
639 repress others. porate alliances own and manage all internet ser- 684
640 As the opposition has increasingly been gaining vice providers and telephone networks. 685

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641 686
voice as in 2013 election, the ruling party has
642 Funding 687
begun to restrict critical voice on social media. A Q1
643 This work was supported by European 688
cybercrime draft law has been discussed, in which
644 Research Council. 689

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comments that are deemed to instigate insecurity
645 690
and instability or even “harm” national image are
646 691
punishable with a jail sentence. Political persecu-
647
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tion has become frequent in the last few years. In
References 692
648 Anderson, B. (2006). Imagined communities: 693
2015, an opposition senator was arrested and Reflections on the origin and spread of
649 694
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imprisoned for sharing a controversial video clip in nationalism. Verso Books. Q3695
Q2
650
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651 696
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652 traditional media. In G. W. Richardson (Ed.), 697
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653 Social media and politics: A new way to 698
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654 699
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