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Local Politics and Fluctuating Engagement with China: Analysing the Belt and
Road Initiative in Maritime Southeast Asia
Article in The Chinese Journal of International Politics · June 2022

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The Chinese Journal of International Politics, 2022, 15, 163–182
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1093/cjip/poac006
Advance Access Publication Date: 22 March 2022
Article
Local Politics and Fluctuating

Engagement with China: Analysing the
Belt and Road Initiative in Maritime
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Southeast Asia
Zhaohui Wang† and Yuheng Fu‡,*
†
Associate Professor, School of International Relations and Centre for Southeast Asian Studies,
Xiamen University, Xiamen, Fujian, China
‡
Assistant Professor, School of International Studies and Academy of Overseas Chinese Studies,
Jinan University, Guangzhou, Guangdong, China
*Corresponding author. Email: fuyuheng@jnu.edu.cn
Abstract
The past few years have witnessed that the success (or failure) of the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI)
depends to a large extent upon engagement with and responses from recipient countries. The arti-
cle explores the impact of Southeast Asian countries’ domestic socio-political factors on their foreign
policymaking and BRI projects in Southeast Asia. Based on comparative political sociology, the article
develops a conceptual typology of foreign policymaking and an explanatory typology of socio-political
risks, both of which are further applied to studying the socio-political risks that BRI projects entail in
the four maritime Southeast Asian countries of Malaysia, Indonesia, the Philippines, and Singapore.
The empirical study suggests that the Philippines’ “populist” type of foreign policymaking creates the
highest level of risks—both political and societal—for BRI projects and that Singapore’s “procedural”
type produces the lowest. Malaysia’s “arbitrary” type and Indonesia’s “democratic” type, meanwhile,
generate medium-level political or societal risks. These findings have important policy implications for
Chinese-funded overseas projects.
Introduction
China’s economic rise has led to its progressively proactive participation in twenty-first cen-
tury global economic governance. This has been particularly evident since 2012, when Xi
Jinping succeeded Hu Jintao as China’s paramount leader. Beijing has steered away from
the foreign policy strategy of “keeping a low profile”, which, due to the shifting interna-
tional landscape, no longer suits China’s national interests.1 Instead, the Chinese leadership
adopts the strategy of “striving for achievement”, so signifying a more proactive approach
1 Xuetong Yan, “From Keeping a Low Profile to Striving for Achievement,” Chinese Journal of International
Politics, Vol. 7, No. 2 (2014), pp. 153–84.
© The Author(s) 2022. Published by Oxford University Press on behalf of Institute of International Relations,
Tsinghua University. All rights reserved. For permissions, please e-mail: journals.permissions@oup.com
164 The Chinese Journal of International Politics, 2022, Vol. 15, No. 2.
to global leadership.2 The Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), consisting of the land-based “Silk
Road Economic Belt” and “Twenty-First Century Maritime Silk Road”, is one of Xi’s most
prominent foreign policies.
Since Xi first proposed the Initiative in 2013, the Chinese government has emphasised on
various occasions the BRI’s fundamental aim of win–win cooperation through “extensive
consultation, joint contributions, and shared benefits”.3 In spite of the official rhetoric,
however, growing numbers of critiques in both academia and the media have denounced
certain BRI projects as “debt-trap diplomacy”, “neo-colonialism”, and “the China threat”
in recent years.4 These critiques stem from the practical problems of financial sustainability
and environmental repercussions as well as non-transparency and corruption in recipient

countries. Such issues arising in the course of implementation warrant a more prudent stance
towards China’s BRI rhetoric and practices.
Scholarly investigations of the BRI at the macro-, meso-, and micro-levels over the past
few years have more or less resonated with the Initiative’s practical development. In view of
the difficulty in providing a complete delineation of the BRI literature, the authors present a
selective review by dividing it into three camps. The first, the macro-level study of the BRI,
debates whether or not it is indeed China’s strategy and how it may change the geopolitical
and geoeconomic order at both the international and the regional levels.5 Such debates,
however, tend to be inconclusive, due mainly to scholars and observers examination of the
BRI through the realist, liberal, constructivist, and relational lenses, among others.6 Sec-
ond is the meso-level study of the BRI, whose analyses are from the perspective of China
and recipient countries’ domestic politics. Meso-level studies examine the impact of such
socio-political factors as China’s political mobilisation and state–society relations—as well
as the perceptions and strategies of recipient countries in regard to China—on the inter-
pretation, policymaking, and implementation of the BRI.7 These studies have cast doubt
2 Robert D. Blackwill and Kurt M. Campbell, “Xi Jinping on the Global Stage: Chinese For-
eign Policy Under a Powerful but Exposed Leader,” Council on Foreign Relations, February 2016,
https://cdn.cfr.org/sites/default/files/pdf/2016/02/CSR74_Blackwill_Campbell_Xi_Jinping.pdf.
3 The State Council of People’s Republic of China, “Vision and Actions on Jointly Build-
ing the Silk Road Economic Belt and the 21st-Century Maritime Silk Road,” 28 March 2015,
https://en.ndrc.gov.cn/newsrelease_8232/201503/t20150330_1193900.html; Xi Jinping, “Full Text
of President Xi’s Speech at Opening of Belt and Road Forum,” XinhuaNet, 14 May 2017,
http://www.xinhuanet.com//english/2017-05/14/c_136282982.htm.
4 See, for example, Dragan Pavlićević and Agatha Kratz, “Testing the China Threat Paradigm: China’s High-
speed Railway Diplomacy in Southeast Asia,” Pacific Review, Vol. 31, No. 2 (2018), pp. 151–68; Lee Jones
and Shahar Hameiri, “Debunking the Myth of ‘Debt-trap Diplomacy’: How Recipient Countries Shape China’s
Belt and Road Initiative,” Chatham House Research Paper, August 2020, https://www.chathamhouse.org/sites/
default/files/2020-08-25-debunking-myth-debt-trap-diplomacy-jones-hameiri.pdf; Huam Hon Tat et al., “Glob-
alization, Colonialism and the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI): A Review of Literature,” Journal of Social Sciences
Research, No. 2 (2018), pp. 98–103; Lucy Hornby, “Mahathir Mohamad Warns Against ‘New Colonialism’
During China Visit,” Financial Times, 20 August 2018, https://www.ft.com/content/7566599e-a443-11e8-8ecf-
a7ae1beff35b; Amitai Etzioni, “Is China a New Colonial Power? How Well do the Claims of Neocolonialism
Stand up?” The Diplomat, 9 November 2020, https://thediplomat.com/2020/11/is-china-a-new-colonial-power.
5 See, for example, Michael Clarke, “The Belt and Road Initiative: Exploring Beijing’s Motivations and Chal-
lenges for its New Silk Road,” Strategic Analysis, Vol. 42, No. 2 (2018), pp. 84–102; Simon Shen and Wilson
Chan, “A Comparative Study of the Belt and Road Initiative and the Marshall Plan,” Palgrave Communications,
Vol. 4, No. 1 (2018), pp. 1–11; Hideo Ohashi, “The Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) in the Context of China’s
Opening-up Policy,” Journal of Contemporary East Asia Studies, Vol. 7, No. 2 (2018), pp. 85–103; Xugang
Yu, “‘Belt & Road Initiative’ as a Continuation of China’s Reforms and Opening up and as a Consequence
of the Beijing Consensus,” in Xugang Yu et al., ed., China’s Belt and Road: The Initiative and its Financial
Focus (Singapore: World Scientific, 2018), pp. 5–54; William A. Callahan, “China’s ‘Asia Dream’: The Belt
Road Initiative and the New Regional Order,” Asian Journal of Comparative Politics, Vol. 1, No. 3 (2016),
pp. 226–43.
6 Zhaohui Wang, “Understanding the Belt and Road Initiative from the Relational Perspective,” Chinese
Journal of International Review, Vol. 3, No. 1 (2021), pp. 1–26; Zhaohui Wang and Hong Zhao, “Relational
Governance in Rhetoric and Reality: Explanations and Problems of China’s Belt and Road Initiative from the
Relational Perspective,” Globalizations, Vol. 18, No. 4 (2021), pp. 650–66.
7 See, for example, Baogang He, “The Domestic Politics of the Belt and Road Initiative and its Implications,”
Journal of Contemporary China, Vol. 28, No. 116 (2019), pp. 180–95; Min Ye, “Fragmentation and Mobi-
lization: Domestic Politics of the Belt and Road in China,” Journal of Contemporary China, Vol. 28, No. 119
The Chinese Journal of International Politics, 2022, Vol. 15, No. 2. 165
on not only the nature of the BRI as a coherent strategy but also China’s official claims
of success. More importantly, they have presented fertile comparative grounds whereon to
demonstrate the varying degrees of agency exercised by recipient countries as well as the
contrasting outcomes of BRI projects therein.8 The third, the micro-level study of the BRI,
largely focuses on the success or failure of one or a group of BRI projects within a single
country.9 Although there are certain overlaps between the meso-level and micro-level stud-
ies of the BRI, the latter are less theory-driven and more case-orientated than the former.
Micro-level studies are more conducive to exploring certain causal factors in the success or
failure of one or a group of BRI projects within a single country, rather than to identifying
how and to what extent causal mechanisms may be generalised.

With their respective merits, these three camps of BRI studies have provided differ-
ent perspectives whereby to examine the Initiative. Macro-level studies may be likened to
a telescope in making observations on the BRI as a whole, whereas micro-level studies,
in carrying out detailed examinations of each BRI project, more resemble a microscope.
Somewhere in-between are meso-level studies, which more or less connect the micro- and
macro-levels. After a brief selective review of existing BRI studies, this article attaches par-
ticular importance to those at the meso-level, from the perspective of recipient countries.
They are of immense importance for two reasons. Theoretically, the meso-level is one of
the most promising approaches by virtue of combining meso-level and micro-level studies—
in other words BRI theories and cases. As, practically speaking, the success (or failure) of
BRI projects to a large extent depends upon engagement with and responses from recipient
countries, the meso-level approach also contributes to our understanding of why respective
states respond so differently from each other, in regard to both China’s BRI proposals and
their implementation of BRI projects.
Considering the importance of Southeast Asia to the BRI,10 the authors aim to explore
how Southeast Asian countries’ domestic socio-political factors influence their foreign pol-
icymaking and BRI projects in Southeast Asia. The article thus makes a contribution to
the meso-level approach to the BRI. Based on comparative political sociology, the article
attempts to develop a conceptual typology of foreign policymaking and an explanatory
typology of socio-political risks. It argues that each ideal type of foreign policymaking
carries varying socio-political risks for BRI projects. The personalised responsive type is
assumed to create the highest level of risks, while the institutionalised insulated type is
anticipated to produce the lowest. The personalised insulated type and the institutionalised
responsive type, meanwhile, are expected to entail medium-level risks. The authors then
apply these typologies to an empirical study of the socio-political risks of BRI projects in
(2019), pp. 696–711; Lee Jones and Jinghan Zeng, “Understanding China’s ‘Belt and Road Initiative’: Beyond
‘grand strategy’ to a state transformation analysis,” Third World Quarterly, Vol. 40, No. 8 (2019), pp. 1415–39;
Hong Liu and Guanie Lim, “The political Economy of a Rising China in Southeast Asia: Malaysia’s Response
to the Belt and Road Initiative,” Journal of Contemporary China, Vol. 28, No. 116 (2018), pp. 216–31; Wang
and Zhao, “Relational Governance in Rhetoric and Reality.”
8 Cheng-Chwee Kuik, “Asymmetry and Authority: Theorizing Southeast Asian Responses to China’s Belt and
Road Initiative,” Asian Perspective, Vol. 45, No. 2 (2021), pp. 255–76.
9 See, for example, Francis E. Hutchinson and Tham Siew Yean, “The BRI in Malaysia’s Port Sec-
tor: Drivers of Success and Failure,” ISEAS-Yusof Ishak Institute, Economics Working Paper No. 2020-10,
November 2020, https://www.iseas.edu.sg/wp-content/uploads/2020/11/ISEAS_EWP_2020-10_Hutchinson_
Tham.pdf; Yose Rizal Damuri et al., “Perceptions and Readiness of Indonesia towards the Belt and Road
Initiative,” Center for Strategic and International Studies, 23 May 2019, https://www.csis.or.id/publications/
perceptions-and-readiness-of-indonesia-towards-the-belt-and-road-initiative; Ganeshan Wignaraja et al., “Chi-
nese Investment and the BRI in Sri Lanka,” Chatham House, March 2020, https://www.chathamhouse.org/
sites/default/files/CHHJ8010-Sri-Lanka-RP-WEB-200319.pdf.
10 See, for example, Jean-Marc F. Blanchard, “China’s Maritime Silk Road Initiative (MSRI) and Southeast
Asia: A Chinese ‘Pond’ not ‘Lake’ in the Works,” Journal of Contemporary China, Vol. 27, No. 111 (2018), pp.
329–43; Michael Cox et al., “China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) and Southeast Asia,” LSE IDEAS and CIMB
ASEAN Research Institute, October 2018, https://www.lse.ac.uk/ideas/Assets/Documents/reports/LSE-IDEAS-
China-SEA-BRI.pdf; Prashanth Parameswaran, “Southeast Asia and China’s Belt and Road Initiative,” The
Diplomat, 15 May 2019, https://thediplomat.com/2019/05/southeast-asia-and-chinas-belt-and-road-initiative.
Southeast Asia. The four maritime Southeast Asian countries of Malaysia, Indonesia, the
Philippines, and Singapore are selected to fit the typology of foreign policymaking. The
empirical findings largely confirm the varying levels of socio-political risks of BRI projects
in maritime Southeast Asia, which have important policy implications for Chinese overseas
investment.
Assessing Meso-Level Studies of the BRI

As is mentioned in the “Introduction” section, a number of the BRI projects rolled out have
faced various issues in practice. Meso-level studies of the BRI, from the perspectives of China

and recipient countries’ domestic politics, examine the impact of such socio-political factors
as China’s political mobilisation and state–society relations—as well as recipient countries’
perceptions of and strategies relating to China—on the interpretation, policymaking, and
implementation of the BRI. These studies have hence gained considerable traction in recent
years. Since the key research question of this article is why respective states respond so dif-
ferently from each other, in regard to both China’s BRI proposals and their implementation
of BRI projects, this part focuses on the existing scholarship that analyses the BRI from
the perspective of recipient countries’ domestic politics. To emphasise the debate on the
primacy of structure versus agency in shaping foreign policymaking, the authors divide the
literature into two approaches—the agent-based analysis and the structural analysis.
On the one hand, the agent-based approach investigates the roles of the different domes-
tic actors that are involved, one way or another, in foreign policymaking. It pays particular
attention to the impact on China’s BRI cooperation with recipient countries of the cognitive
and psychological characteristics of individual decision-makers, business sectors’ stances on
economic collaboration under the framework of the BRI, and the general public’s percep-
tions of China. The special issue, Perception and Strategy of ASEAN’s States on China’s
Belt and Road Initiative, recently published by The Chinese Economy, is illustrative of this
point.11 Each of the special issue’s six articles provides an in-depth analysis of the diverg-
ing stances of the state, businesses, and people of six Southeast Asian countries—Malaysia,
Indonesia, the Philippines, Thailand, Myanmar, and Vietnam—on China and the BRI. It
is argued that state–society–business perspectives exert a crucial impact on “their develop-
ment strategy on China’s footprint in ASEAN by way of adopting balancing, bandwagoning,
cooperating, or hedging consideration”.12
The structural approach, on the other hand, stresses that structures, both domestic and
international, are crucial to the making of foreign policy. Structure is fundamental to foreign
policymaking by reason of permitting varying degrees of agency in the process. Practically
speaking, however, conceptualising, operationalising, and assessing the roles of structures
in foreign policy analysis is by far the more complex approach. As Carlsnaes suggests,
“structures—political, cultural, psychological, economic, national, regional, global, tech-
nological, ideational, cognitive, and normative, to name some of the most important—are
omnipresent in societies everywhere, existing in various degrees on all levels. Not all are
equally important to foreign policymaking, but many are vital and central to understand-
ing and explaining its manifestations”.13 Another special issue, Southeast Asian Responses
to China’s Belt and Road Initiative, recently published by Asian Perspective, is a pioneering
work of this approach.14 Cheng-Chwee Kuik, its editor, develops the “asymmetry and
11 Jenn-Jaw Soong, “Perception and Strategy of ASEAN’s States on China’s Belt and Road Initiative,” Chinese
Economy, Vol. 54, No. 1 (2021), pp. 1–8.
12 Ibid., p. 1.
13 Walter Carlsnaes, “Actors, Structures, and Foreign Policy Analysis,” in Steve Smith, Amelia Hadfield, Tim
Dunne, ed., Foreign Policy: Theories, Actors, Cases (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016), p. 114.
14 Cheng-Chwee Kuik, ed., “Southeast Asian Responses to China’s Belt and Road Initiative,” Asian Perspective,
Vol. 45, No. 2 (2021), https://muse.jhu.edu/issue/44263.
authority (AA) framework”—a two-level model with external and internal structures—
to explain Southeast Asian responses to China’s BRI.15 Asymmetry refers to power gap
among states in the international structure and authority to the ruling elites’ legitimacy
and capacity to govern in the domestic structure. Based on the AA framework, the special
issue consists of ten carefully crafted articles that respectively analyse ten Southeast Asia
countries’ engagements with China’s BRI.
Although by no means complete, the selective review of the existing scholarship on meso-
level studies of the BRI suggests that the two approaches are not without merit, especially
insofar as they emphasise how actors and structures in Southeast Asian countries influ-
ence respectively their responses to and engagements with China’s BRI. However, it is

worth noting that the simultaneous presence of actors and structures in foreign policy-
making and implementation engenders an intimate relationship between these two factors.
To the best of the authors’ knowledge, no such immediately relevant studies of Southeast
Asia’s foreign policymaking on China’s BRI exist. The neoclassical realist model of foreign
policymaking—a cross-level framework integrating agent-based and structural analyses—
is among the potential choices, but it suffers from certain operationalisation problems.
According to Ripsman, Taliaferro, and Lobell, although neoclassical realists submit to
the neorealist assumption that the international structure of power distribution plays a
fundamental role in shaping state foreign policy, it does not sacrifice the classical realist
insights wherein state behaviour is also influenced by such domestic and ideational vari-
ables as leader image, strategic culture, domestic institutions, and state–society relations.16
Although the list of domestic political factors in the neoclassical realist model is quite com-
plete, two caveats herein are nevertheless worth noting. First, strategic cultures often appear
too general or controversial in theoretical definitions and are too difficult for empirical stud-
ies to operationalise and measure, thus pressuring researchers to dip into murky waters.
Second, as far as we are concerned, domestic institutions occupy a central position in domes-
tic variables. Political and social actors, differentially embedded in a range of domestic
institutions, hence play different roles in foreign policymaking. As we will later discuss in
more detail, the two dimensions of domestic institutions—foreign policymaking institution-
alisation and responsiveness—have significant impacts on how individual decision-makers
and social groups are involved in the policymaking and implementation of BRI projects.
Last but not least, the existing scholarship presents fertile comparative grounds on which
to demonstrate the varying degrees of agency exercised by recipient countries as well as the
strikingly different outcomes of BRI projects.17 However, such cross-country studies based
on controlled comparison are far from sufficient at present.18 For instance, Weng et al.
compare three railway projects in Indonesia, Ethiopia, and Kenya19 ; and Jones and Hameiri
compare China’s BRI projects in Malaysia and Sri Lanka.20 Although their studies examine
the management and operational challenges arising in the process of BRI implementation,
they do not take into consideration which compounding variables should be controlled
and how such variables are controlled in the comparative case studies. In this sense, their
15 Kuik, “Asymmetry and Authority.”

16 Norrin M. Ripsman, Jeffrey W. Taliaferro, and Steven E. Lobell, Neoclassical Realist Theory of International
Politics (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016).
17 Kuik, “Asymmetry and Authority.”
18 A few seminal comparative studies of BRI are: David M. Lampton, Selina Ho, and Cheng-Chwee Kuik,
Rivers of Iron: Railroads and Chinese Power in Southeast Asia (Oakland: University of California Press, 2020);
Guanie Lim, Chen Li, and Emirza Adi Syailendra, “Why is it so Hard to Push Chinese Railway Projects in
Southeast Asia? The Role of Domestic Politics in Malaysia and Indonesia,” World Development, Vol. 138 (2021),
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.worlddev.2020.105272.
19 Lingfei Weng et al., “Challenges Faced by Chinese Firms Implementing the ‘Belt and Road Initiative’:
Evidence from Three Railway Projects,” Research in Globalization, Vol. 3 (2021), https://www.sciencedirect.
com/science/article/pii/S2590051X21000393.
20 Jones and Hameiri, “Debunking the Myth of ‘Debt-trap Diplomacy’.”
research designs lack methodological rigor in regard to controlled comparison, which is

often considered the hallmark of scientific method.
Therefore, the authors strive to make a contribution to the existing scholarship by
emphasising the centrality of domestic institutions, developing typologies of foreign pol-
icymaking and socio-political risk, and verifying the typological analysis through more
rigorously controlled comparative case studies.
Typologies of Foreign Policymaking and Socio-political Risks

The aforementioned critical review of the neoclassical realist model would suggest attach-
ing significance to the centrality of domestic institutions in our theoretical analysis. It also
directs our focus on two independent variables—foreign policymaking institutionalisation
and responsiveness—in order to further operationalise domestic institutions. Of course, as
the empirical world is so complicated that we can make no claim to have captured the whole
truth. Yet to attain a certain degree of simplification and understanding, we must develop
certain concepts and mechanisms. Ideal type, used by Max Weber as “artificial accentuation
of certain elements of reality”,21 is one way of filling the gap. Based on Weber’s methodol-
ogy of ideal type, this section develops a conceptual typology of foreign policymaking and
also an explanatory typology of socio-political risks.
Conceptual Typology of Foreign Policymaking

According to Weber, “an ideal type is formed by the one-sided accentuation of one or more
points of view and by the synthesis of a great many diffuse, discrete, more or less present
and occasionally absent concrete individual phenomena, which are arranged according to
those one-sidedly emphasized viewpoints into a unified analytical construct”.22 Ideal types
are idea-constructs that help social scientists to grasp certain characteristics or properties
of given objects. Typology is formed from a set of ideal types. While an impassable gulf
exists between subjective concepts and objective reality, typologies are a useful tool for
interpreting and explaining the social reality.23 In this sense, there are basically two types of
typologies: conceptual typologies used for interpretation and explanatory typologies used
for explanation.
In this article, the authors draw on Dosch’s approach to develop a conceptual typology
of foreign policymaking, which considers two socio-political dimensions that are of critical
importance—whether foreign policymaking is personalised or institutionalised and whether
it is responsive or insulated.24 In the context of ideal-type concepts, personalisation refers to
the maximum degree of agency exercised by political leaderships, while institutionalisation
refers to the maximum degree of institutional (more specifically, bureaucratic) procedures
whereby policies are initiated, deliberated, and decided, and responsiveness refers to the
maximum level of social participation in policymaking and implementation, whereas insu-
lation refers to the overwhelming control of state over society and extreme limitations of
social influence.
21 John Rex, “Value-relevance, Scientific Laws, and Ideal Types: The Sociological Methodology of Max
Weber,” Canadian Journal of Sociology, Vol. 2, No. 2 (1977), p. 161.
22 Max Weber, The Methodology of the Social Sciences (Glencoe: 7Free Press, 1949), p. 90.
23 For neo-Kantian concern with the possibility of a scientific study of social reality, see Heinrich Rickert, The
Limits of Concept Formation in Natural Science: A Logical Introduction to the Historical Sciences (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1986).
24 Jörn Dosch, “Mahathirism and its Legacy in Malaysia’s Foreign Policy,” European Journal of East Asian
Studies, Vol. 13, No. 1 (2014), pp. 5–32.
Table 1 A Conceptual Typology of Foreign Policymaking
Foreign policymaking is either insulated from or

responsive to political oppositions and societal
influences
Insulated Responsive
Foreign policymaking is Personalised Arbitrary Populist
either a personalised or an Institutionalised Procedural Democratic
institutionalised process

Conceptual typologies “explicate the meaning of a concept by mapping out its dimen-
sions, which correspond to the rows and columns in the typology”.25 Accordingly, the
following matrix (Table 1) distinguishes the four ideal types of foreign policymaking.
– The “arbitrary” type is characterised by both personalised and insulated foreign pol-
icymaking: foreign policymaking is primarily a personal issue, or confined to a small
circle, and foreign policy decision-making is largely insulated from political opposition
and societal influence.
– The “populist” type summarises personalised and responsive foreign policymaking: the
top leader enjoys a special position in formulating foreign policy, and social actors can
exert influence within the pluralist system.
– The “procedural” type corresponds to institutionalised and insulated foreign policy-
making: foreign policymaking follows standard operating procedures, and the process
is to a large extent insulated from societal influences.
– The “democratic” type is consistent with institutionalised and responsive foreign policy-
making: foreign policymaking is based on institutional arrangements, and social actors
can exert influence within the pluralist system.
Explanatory Typology of Socio-political Risks

An explanatory typology is different from a conceptual typology, which may also be called
a descriptive typology. In explanatory typologies, “the cell types are the outcomes to be
explained and the rows and columns are the explanatory variables”.26 As “an explanatory
typology is based on an explicitly stated preexisting theory”,27 the authors attempt to figure
out the sources of socio-political risks for BRI projects through logical deduction, thereby
developing an explanatory typology in this part.
Before proceeding, however, one caveat worth noting is that risk measurement is ulti-
mately subjective. For example, people tend to overestimate the risks of events that are
beyond our control, or situations involving unfamiliar or obscure dangers, yet they ill-
advisedly accept old, familiar risks that appear to be under our control.28 Moreover,
although all human societies face risks, people at different localities or with different
lifestyles attach varying levels of importance to different types of risks.29 Therefore, we
do not attempt to study risks to China, recipient countries, or other actors, which may be
25 David Collier, Jody LaPorte, and Jason Seawright, “Putting Typologies to Work: Concept Formation,
Measurement, and Analytic Rigor,” Political Research Quarterly, Vol. 65, No. 1 (2012), p. 218.
26 Ibid.
27 Colin Elman, “Explanatory Typologies in Qualitative Studies of International Politics,” International
Organization, Vol. 59, No. 2 (2005), p. 298.
28 Jared M. Diamond, The World Until Yesterday: What Can We Learn from Traditional Societies? (London:
Penguin, 2013).
29 Ibid.
subject to varying measurement and risk acceptance. Instead, we are to assess the substan-
tive and potential dangers, emanating from political and societal domains, of interrupting
or undermining BRI projects.
On the one hand, it is assumed that personalised foreign policymaking engenders more
political risk for the BRI projects. There is no denying that personalised foreign poli-
cymaking is usually less time-consuming and more efficient, but more likely to suffer
discontinuities for two reasons. First, personalised foreign policies, or decisions made by
individual leaders, are usually less legitimate than those expedited through institutional
channels and more likely to be contested by the opposition.30 Despite inconclusive debates
over the sources of political legitimacy, there is growing recognition that procedure gener-

ates more stable and sustainable legitimacy than does performance.31 Second, in regard to
personalised policymaking, once power transition takes place the incumbent is more likely
to attack the predecessor’s policies in order to legitimise his or her own.32 This kind of
policy reversal is not uncommon, either in authoritarian or in democratic countries.
On the other hand, it is to be expected that responsive foreign policymaking generates
more societal risks for BRI projects. The more social actors are involved in the course of
policymaking and implementation, the more likely BRI projects are to encounter social
pushback. The main reason is that foreign policy, particularly foreign economic policy, cre-
ates both winners and losers in the domestic realm, which intensifies competition among
different social actors and has the reverse effect on policy implementation. Specifically, a
large amount of literature on the society-centred approach has shed light on how the pref-
erences and interests of domestic social groups can shape foreign policy under the pluralist
system. Since foreign policy is to a large extent a function of demands made by domes-
tic interest groups, it should reflect the preferences of those groups with more political
clout.33 However, the less politically powerful may not necessarily yield to unfavourable
decisions. They tend, under the democratic system, to put up various resistances that engen-
der obstacles and delays in the process of policy implementation. Therefore, the more
that responsiveness is involved in the process, the more likely foreign policymaking and
implementation are to suffer social pushback.
Combining the two dimensions, we can establish an explanatory typology of socio-
political risks (Table 2). The personalised responsive type is assumed to generate the highest
level of risks (both political and societal), while the institutionalised insulated type is antic-
ipated to produce the lowest. The personalised insulated type and the institutionalised
responsive type, meanwhile, are expected to carry the medium level of risks (either politi-
cal or societal). Of course, before we proceed to the empirical studies, one caveat is worth
noting. The typologies are only one theoretical attempt, based on comparative political
sociology, to analyse socio-political risks. This approach neither dismisses other ways of
theorising and operationalising domestic variables within recipient countries nor claims to
identify all the factors that influence BRI implementation. There are indeed a number of
ways to interpret and explain the social reality, but as the following empirical studies will
demonstrate, the conceptual and explanatory typologies developed in this section will be
quite useful.
30 Wen Zha, “Personalized Foreign Policy Decision-Making and Economic Dependence: A Comparative Study
of Thailand and the Philippines’ China Policies,” Contemporary Southeast Asia, Vol. 37, No. 2 (2015), p. 246.
31 People may refer to the special issue Jonas Tallberg and Michael Zürn, “The Legitimacy and Legitima-
tion of International Organizations,” The Review of International Organizations, Vol. 14, No. 4 (2019),
https://link.springer.com/journal/11558/volumes-and-issues/14-4.
32 Zha, “Personalized Foreign Policy Decision-making and Economic Dependence,” p. 246.
33 For example, see Peter Grourevitch, Politics in Hard Times: Comparative Responses to International Eco-
nomic Crises (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1986); Ronald Rogowski, Commerce and Coalitions: How Trade
Affects Domestic Political Alignments (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1989); Michael J. Hiscox, Interna-
tional Trade and Political Conflict: Commerce, Coalitions and Mobility (Princeton: Princeton University Press,
2002).
Table 2 An Explanatory Typology of Socio-political Risks
Foreign policymaking is insulated from or

influences
Foreign policymaking is a Personalised Medium-level High-level
personalised or an Institutionalised Low-level Medium-level

From Ideal Types to Empirical Cases
Based on the two typologies developed in the previous section, the authors confront the ideal
types with the concrete reality of the phenomenon that is being analysed. We select four mar-
itime Southeast Asian countries—Malaysia, Indonesia, the Philippines, and Singapore—to
fit the typologies. There are certain motivations behind this case selection. Controlled com-
parison is the most salient consideration. Methodologically speaking, the four countries
are well suited to the Most Similar Systems Design.34 Although there are some differences
among the four countries, their similarities are far more significant when compared with
other (mainland) Southeast Asian countries, let alone the countries of regions elsewhere.
Specifically, situated between the Indian and the Pacific Oceans, these four countries in the
Malay Archipelago have certain historical and geographical environments in common. The
geopolitical and geoeconomic settings shaping the four maritime Southeast Asian countries’
infrastructure development have grown relatively similar over the past decade. Particularly,
since Duterte took office as President of the Philippines, the leaderships of all the four
countries have downplayed high-politics issues, such as territorial disputes, and emphasised
economic cooperation with China. Accordingly, the four countries are important economic
and strategic partners along China’s Maritime Silk Road.
First, Indonesia, as the region’s largest and most populous country, considers itself first
among equals in the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and driver of regional
integration.35 Without Indonesia’s support and cooperation, therefore, China’s BRI would
lack a solid basis. When Xi Jinping addressed the Indonesian parliament in 2013, he hence
announced the forthcoming building of the twenty-first century Maritime Silk Road. Sec-
ond, Malaysia has been China’s largest trade partner among Southeast Asian countries since
2009, and the two countries elevated their strategic cooperative relationship to a com-
prehensive strategic one in 2013. If China’s BRI projects do not work well in Malaysia,
therefore, they are unlikely to succeed anywhere else. Third, the Philippines is also an impor-
tant case in BRI studies, its relations with China having endured dramatic fluctuations over
the past decade. Various domestic agendas pursued by different governments have played
a significant role in influencing the Philippines’ China policy and BRI implementation.36
A high percentage (78.6% in 2019) of Filipinos, moreover, have reservations about the
BRI and worry about their government possibly incurring unsustainable financial debts to
China.37 Therefore, BRI projects face most uncertainty in the Philippines, which merits
further study. Fourth, even though it has a small demand for investment and technology
34 It is almost impossible to have perfect controlled experiments and comparisons in history and social sciences.
However, a carefully constructed method of controlled comparison would lend more confidence.
35 Felix Heiduk, “Indonesia in ASEAN: Regional Leadership Between Ambition and Ambiguity,”
SWP Research Paper, April 2016, https://www.swp-berlin.org/fileadmin/contents/products/research_
papers/2016RP06_hdk.pdf.
36 Wen Zha, “Great Power Rivalry and the Agency of Secondary States: A Study Based on China’s Relations
with Southeast Asian Countries,” International Relations of the Asia-Pacific, Vol. 22, No. 1 (2022), pp. 131–61.
37 Siew Mun Tang et al., “The State of Southeast Asia: 2019 Survey Report,” ISEAS-Yusof Ishak Institute, 29
January 2019, https://www.iseas.edu.sg/wp-content/uploads/pdfs/TheStateofSEASurveyReport_2019.pdf.
and the building of domestic infrastructure per se, Singapore can enact the important role of
infrastructure investment “broker”, which is helpful to China’s development of transparent,
sustainable, and inclusive projects in other countries.38
Last but not least, although BRI connectivity entails much more than just physical infras-
tructure, we nevertheless attach particular importance to infrastructure building as a key
element of the Initiative. Infrastructure building in BRI countries is an inherently political
construct that requires deliberative planning processes that entail technical expertise and
public engagement.39 Such infrastructure building, however, culminates in BRI infrastruc-
ture projects that, in the course of implementation, often spark controversy and encounter
pushback. In this sense, the policymaking and implementation of BRI infrastructure projects

are appropriate for testing the aforementioned typological analyses of foreign policymaking
and socio-political risks.
In a nutshell, the four maritime Southeast Asia countries are suitable cases for controlled
comparison. Considering their importance for BRI, it is worth examining how the four
countries’ domestic socio-political factors influence their foreign policymaking and BRI
infrastructure projects in Southeast Asia. The authors will first assign the four countries
to the conceptual typology of foreign policymaking and then conduct four empirical case
studies to verify the explanatory typology of socio-political risks.
Assigning Cases to the Conceptual Typology

Before we fit the four maritime Southeast Asian countries in the conceptual typology, it is
first necessary to define clearly the time range, since the institutional arrangements of foreign
policymaking are not static but evolving. For instance, Indonesia has moved from highly
personalised foreign policymaking under Sukarno and Suharto to an approach that, since
the Reformasi of 1998, is embedded in much more liberal and institutionalised structures.
As far as we are concerned, therefore, the time frame of this research is from 2013, when
Xi proposed the BRI, to the time of writing.
First is Malaysia, which is consistent with the “arbitrary” type of foreign policymaking.
Malaysia’s foreign policymaking has traditionally been an elite-driven process, with the
prime minister at the centre, rather than determined by public opinion.40 Ott provides an
excellent account of Malaysia’s “arbitrary” type of foreign policymaking:
Since independence (1957) the formulation of Malaysian foreign policy has been the virtual
prerogative of a small, stable elite comprising four or five men. Largely impervious to
domestic political pressure, the values and perceptions of this group exercised an often
decisive impact upon policy. The result was a decision-making process characterized by
informal conversations and personal, as opposed to institutional, relationships.41
Second is Indonesia, which comes closest to the “democratic” type of foreign policy-
making among the four countries. As earlier mentioned, democratisation has led to the
shift from a statist to a pluralist model of decision-making.42 Socio-political groups have
38 Irene Chan, “Reversing China’s Belt-and-Road Initiative—Singapore’s Response to the BRI and its Quest
for Relevance,” East Asia: An International Quarterly, Vol. 36, No. 3 (2019), pp. 185–204; Sarah Chan,
“Singapore–China Connectivity and its Role in the Belt and Road Initiative,” China: An International Journal,
Vol. 17, No. 4 (2019), pp. 34–49.
39 Kevin DeGood, “Infrastructure Investment Decisions are Political, Not Technical,” Center for American
Progress, 14 April 2020, https://cf.americanprogress.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/04/InfrastructureInvestment-
brief1.pdf?_ga=2.208949010.1008566585.1636939805-900870360.1636939805.
40 Mercy A. Kuo, “Malaysia in China’s Belt and Road: Insights from Chow Bing Ngeow,” The Diplomat, 23
November 2020, https://thediplomat.com/2020/11/malaysia-in-chinas-belt-and-road.
41 Marvin C. Ott, “Foreign Policy Formulation in Malaysia,” Asian Survey, Vol. 12, No. 3 (1972), p. 225.
42 Jörn Dosch, “The Impact of Democratization on the Making of Foreign Policy in Indonesia, Thailand and
the Philippines,” Südostasien Aktuell: Journal of Current Southeast Asian Affairs, Vol. 25, No. 5 (2006), pp.
42–70.
played a progressively influential role in the conduct in the post-Suharto political system of
Indonesia’s foreign relations.43 Moreover, Indonesia’s institutionalisation proceeds, hand-
in-hand, with its democratisation. More than a decade of political reforms, including legal
and constitutional reforms, “have resulted in greater parliamentary oversight, the adop-
tion of a multi-party system and the emergence of civil-society organization”, which is also
conducive to the greater participation and influence of socio-political groups in Indone-
sia’s foreign policymaking.44 In other words, democratisation has had significant impacts
on the structure and actors in Indonesia’s foreign policymaking, thereby rendering it the
“democratic” type.
Third is the Philippines, which falls into the “populist” type of foreign policymak-

ing. Philippine’s political system features longstanding democratic deficits owing to its
patronage-based parties.45 Under such weak democratic institutions, “the Philippine politi-
cal system is and has always been personality driven”.46 The Philippine leaderships possess
the capability to shape foreign policy according to their own will as “key decision-makers
involved in important international cooperation are often the president’s friends and rela-
tives”.47 Moreover, it is important to emphasise that Philippine society continues to respect
the fundamental values of democracy.48 In the Philippines, “foreign policy decision- mak-
ing is generally difficult to insulate, thanks to media scrutiny, legislative oversight, judicial
review, and civil society lobbying”.49 More often than not, political leaders in Philippines
need to capitalise on support from disadvantaged social groups to expand their personal
appeal. In this sense, “populist” leaders in the Philippines enjoy a special position in formu-
lating foreign policy but claim legitimacy on the grounds that they respond to social needs
and voices.
Fourth is Singapore, which belongs to the “procedural” type of foreign policymaking.
Although the authoritarian regimes in the Philippines, Indonesia, and Malaysia have col-
lapsed, that in Singapore has been resilient and durable. Moreover, thanks to Singapore’s
strong state capacity, not just existing but also new institutional mechanisms have been
effectively established to engage with China.50 Foreign policy formulation in Singapore is
thus an institutionalised process with minimal (compared with the other three) domestic
input or pressure from political oppositions and social actors. Standard operating pro-
cedures that coordinate key transnational governance actors play an important role in
Singapore’s foreign policymaking.
In setting down the above-mentioned analyses, Table 3 summarises our fitting of the four
maritime Southeast Asian countries in the conceptual typology of foreign policymaking.
We then go on to examine BRI projects in the four countries to see if they conform to the
assumptions of the explanatory typology.
BRI Projects in Malaysia

As earlier mentioned, among the four countries, Malaysia’s relationship and economic
engagement with China are probably the most dramatic. This is particularly the case
43 Iis Gindarsah, “Democracy and Foreign Policy-making in Indonesia: A Case Study of the Iranian Nuclear
Issue, 2007–08,” Contemporary Southeast Asia: A Journal of International and Strategic Affairs, Vol. 34, No. 3
(2012), pp. 416–37.
44 Ibid, pp. 418–9.
45 Paul Hutchcroft and Joel Rocamora, “Patronage-Based Parties and the Democratic Deficit in the Philippines:
Origins, Evolution, and the Imperatives of Reform,” in Richard Robison, ed., Routledge Handbook of Southeast
Asian Politics (London: Routledge, 2012), pp. 97–119.
46 Evan S. Medeiros et al., Pacific Currents: The Responses of U.S. Allies and Security Partners in East Asia to
China’s Rise (Santa Monica: RAND Corporation, 2008), p. 99.
48 Hutchcroft and Rocamora, “Patronage-Based Parties and the Democratic Deficit in the Philippines,” p. 98.
49 Richard Javad Heydarian, “Tragedy of Small Power Politics: Duterte and the Shifting Sands of Philippine
Foreign Policy,” Asian Security, Vol. 13, No. 3 (2017), p. 221.
50 Hong Liu, Xin Fan, and Guanie Lim, “Singapore Engages the Belt and Road Initiative: Perceptions, Policies,
and Institutions,” Singapore Economic Review, Vol. 66, No. 1 (2021), pp. 219–41.
Table 3 Foreign Policymaking in Maritime Southeast Asia

responsive to political opposition and societal
influence
Foreign policymaking is Personalised Malaysia Philippines
either a personalised or an Institutionalised Singapore Indonesia

under the Xi–Najib administrations, when Beijing forged close ties with Kuala Lumpur
and Malaysia became a firm supporter of China’s BRI.51 However, a substantial shift in
Malaysia’s stance towards China’s BRI accompanied the unexpected government transition
after Malaysia’s 14th general election in May 2018. Upon taking office, Prime Minister
Mahathir Mohamed fulfilled his campaign promises to review all Beijing-linked “unequal
treaties”, cancel two China-backed pipeline projects, and suspend the East Coast Rail Link
(ECRL).52 Mahathir even announced, in August 2018, that foreigners would not be allowed
to buy residential units in the $100 billion Forest City project in Johor.53 Under such cir-
cumstances, certain observers went so far as to suggest that “Mahathir 2.0” was pushing
back China’s investment and influence.54
As the ECRL is the signature Malaysia–China BRI cooperation project, this part will
closely examine the political risks pertaining to Malaysia’s personalised foreign policymak-
ing in this regard. Najib Razak and Li Keqiang witnessed the ECRL signing ceremony
in November 2016, so signifying both governments’ strong endorsement of the project.
However, it is worth noting that the ECRL deal was decided through government-to-
government meetings and negotiations that were largely insulated from domestic influence
and opposition. According to an official from Malaysia’s Ministry of International Trade
and Industry:
The ECRL project was negotiated behind closed doors between the Chinese and the Najib
governments. There was no open tender, transparency, or competition, and it lacked a
rigorous feasibility study and cost-benefit analysis. After the project was announced, many
experts thought it was overpriced, and that it would place a huge burden on Malaysia. At
least in the short term, there would be limited economic benefits.55
The opacity of ECRL negotiations and decisions sparked Mahathir’s scathing criticism
of Najib’s heavy dependence on China. Other critics accused Najib of selling Malaysia
off to China to finance his hold on power, thus seriously jeopardising Malaysia’s national
sovereignty.56 Jomo Kwame Sundaram, a member of Malaysia’s Council of Elders, declared
that 1Malaysia Development Berhad (1MDB) and the ECRL were “tools” that Najib had
51 Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China, “Xi Jinping Meets with Prime Minister Najib
Razak of Malaysia,” 13 May 2017, https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/zxxx_662805/t1464012.shtml.
52 Stefania Palma, “Malaysia Cancels China-Backed Pipeline Projects,” Financial Times, 9 September 2018,
https://www.ft.com/content/06a71510-b24a-11e8-99ca-68cf89602132.
53 Reuters, “Mahathir Bans Foreigners from Buying Forest City Residential Units in Malaysia,” South China
Morning Post, 27 August 2018, https://www.scmp.com/news/asia/southeast-asia/article/2161465/mahathir-
bans-foreigners-buying-forest-city-residential.
54 Lucy Hornby, “Mahathir Mohamad Warns Against ‘New Colonialism’ During China Visit,” Financial
Times, 20 August 2018, https://www.ft.com/content/7566599e-a443-11e8-8ecf-a7ae1beff35b.
55 Interview on 24 October 2018.
56 Liz Lee, “Selling the Country to China? Debate Spills into Malaysia’s Election,” Reuters,
27 April 2018, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-malaysia-election-china/selling-the-country-to-china-debate-
spills-into-malaysias-election-idUSKBN1HY076.
created to serve his own interests, namely, to fund the general election.57 Public concern
about the Najib corruption scandal surrounding 1MDB became linked to China’s so-called
BRI “debt-trap diplomacy”. Mahathir, therefore, contested Najib’s personalised foreign
policymaking for its absence of procedural legitimacy. That Mahathir distinguished himself
from his predecessor after the power transition in May 2018 by reviewing the ECRL project
and fighting against Najib’s corruption—actions that posed substantial political risks to
Chinese investment in Malaysia—was hence no surprise.
On 12 April 2019, the Prime Minister’s Office of Malaysia confirmed the signing of a
supplementary agreement and announced that construction of the ECRL would resume at a
reduced cost (from RM65.5 billion to RM44 billion).58 That is not to say, however, that the

ECRL was henceforward free from political risks. Government-to-government negotiations
once more played an important role in the ECRL’s resumption, but remained behind closed
doors, providing scant justification for the new deal. Both winners and losers resulted from
ECRL’s resumption and reroute, which created the potential for more controversy in the
future. For example, after Prime Minister Muhyiddin Yassin took office on 29 February
2019, the ECRL hit the spotlight once more, with the news that the new Transport Min-
istry was conducting a comprehensive review of the previous government’s revisions to the
project, thus making it a debatable issue once more.59 In this sense, therefore, political risks
have persistently complicated BRI implementation in Malaysia. Process tracing of the ECRL
project hence reveals that Malaysia’s “arbitrary” type of foreign policymaking has led to
discontinuities of BRI policy and engendered political risks to BRI infrastructure projects in
Malaysia, particularly after changes of government.
BRI Projects in Indonesia

In 2014, early in his presidency, Joko Widodo (Jokowi) put forward the Global Maritime
Fulcrum (GMF) concept, which highlighted his vision of transforming Indonesia into a
global maritime hub. Jokowi thus made enhancing inter-island connectivity, as well as build-
ing and upgrading infrastructure in the archipelago, the priority of his administration.60
Under such circumstances, Jokowi and Xi Jinping acknowledged a convergence of interests
in maritime cooperation and reached a consensus on promoting synergy between the BRI
and the GMF. This, however, by no means guaranteed success for BRI projects in Indonesia
due to the public’s strong antipathy towards China, which engendered considerable societal
risks.
Similar to the case of Malaysia and the ECRL, this part will provide an in-depth
study of Indonesia’s Jakarta–Bandung High-Speed Railway (JBHSR), the flagship project
of Indonesia–China BRI cooperation. When finished, the Railway, at an estimated cost of
approximately $6 billion, is expected to reduce the travelling time between the two cities
from the 3 hours it takes by car to around 40 minutes.61 Designated one of Jokowi’s national
strategic projects under Presidential Regulation No. 3/2016 and given priority by virtue of
accelerating the issuance of permits, progress on the JBHSR project has nevertheless been
57 Gah Chie Kow, “Jomo: 1MDB, ECRL were used to Fund Elections,” Malaysiakini, 2 May 2019,
https://www.malaysiakini.com/news/474566.
58 The Prime Minister’s Office of Malaysia, “An Improved Deal on the East Coast Rail Link (ECRL)
Project,” 12 April 2019, https://www.pmo.gov.my/wp-content/uploads/2019/04/PRESS-RELEASE-ECRL-12-
APRIL-2019.pdf.
59 Wah Foon Ho, “Changes to ECRL Imminent after Transport Ministry’s Scrutiny,” The Star, 19 July
2020, https://www.thestar.com.my/news/focus/2020/07/19/analysis-changes-to-ecrl-imminent-after-transport-
ministrys-scrutiny.
60 Siwage Dharma Negara and Leo Suryadinata, “China’s Maritime Silk Road Initiative and Indonesia,” in
Jean-Marc F. Blanchard, ed., China’s Maritime Silk Road Initiative and Southeast Asia: Dilemmas, Doubts, and
Determination (Singapore: Palgrave Macmillan, 2019), pp. 65–94.
61 Damuri et al., “Perceptions and Readiness of Indonesia towards the Belt and Road Initiative.”
much slower than expected. This is first and foremost due to land acquisition and envi-
ronmental problems.62 Although not uncommon in other Southeast Asian countries, the
land issue was far more serious in such relatively democratic countries as Indonesia, where
indigenous peoples either refused to sell their land or demanded exorbitant prices.63 The
situation was exacerbated by the project’s detrimental impact on the environment. JBHSR
construction flooded roads, damaged houses and farmland, and caused landslides. This is in
part due to poor environmental assessment and protection procedures, which have triggered
recurring protests along the proposed rail route since 2016.
The JBHSR project is, moreover, being expedited on a business-to-business basis, with
minimum government involvement. It hence relies on cooperation between capable, cred-

itable local business partners and Chinese investors. While China dealt with funding,
procurement, and operation, Indonesia was in charge of land acquisition, local negotia-
tions, and initial land-marking.64 This division of labour was aimed at making the project
more inclusive and collaborative, but it also promoted the greater participation in infras-
tructure development of local socio-economic groups. Specifically, there was a widespread
belief among a number of socio-economic groups, particularly Indonesian SMEs and locals,
that the railway line’s benefits would disproportionately favour Indonesian elites—that the
high-speed train would primarily benefit the Indonesian elite, which could both participate
in its construction and later afford the pricey commute it provided.65 Some even attributed
Indonesia’s high unemployment rates to the growing influx of projects and workers from
China, although this was not necessarily the case in reality. But as they saw it, Indone-
sians on the whole were no less likely to enjoy the benefits of China’s growing economy
and investments in 2019 than they were 5 years ago.66 Such perceptions of and resistance
to the JBHSR project intensified the challenges of the aforementioned land acquisition and
environmental problems.
Last but not least, the above visible issues were deeply rooted in the sustained prevalence
in Indonesian civil society of anti-Chinese sentiments.67 Owing to certain historical memo-
ries,68 there has long been a deep undercurrent of antipathy towards Chinese Indonesians.
In part fuelled by social media, it is largely such sentiment that has evoked public aver-
sion to new Chinese projects and workers. For instance, in 2015 and 2016, “fake news”
stories claiming that millions of Chinese workers were inundating the country prompted
broadly negative responses to Chinese projects. In 2017, The Jakarta Post ran several
stories about a Chinese-Indonesian joint venture investment in an industrial park in Cen-
tral Sulawesi, which involved large numbers of workers from China.69 “In the past, this
62 Siwage Dharma Negara and Leo Suryadinata, “Jakarta-Bandung High Speed Rail Project: Lit-
tle Progress, Many Challenges,” ISEAS Perspective 2018/2, 4 January 2018, https://www.iseas.edu.sg/
images/pdf/ISEAS_Perspective_2018_2@50.pdf.
63 Murray Hiebert, “China’s Belt and Road Finds Southeast Asia a Tough Slog,” ISEAS Perspective 2020/95,
31 August 2020, https://www.iseas.edu.sg/wp-content/uploads/2020/08/ISEAS_Perspective_2020_95.pdf.
64 Alvin Camba, “Derailing Development: China’s Railway Projects and Financing Coali-
tions in Indonesia, Malaysia, and the Philippines,” GCI Working Paper, 8 January 2020,
https://www.bu.edu/gdp/files/2020/02/WP8-Camba-Derailing-Development.pdf.
65 Meiki W. Paendong, “The Jakarta-Bandung Rail Project: 5 Years on and Still Going Nowhere,” The Diplo-
mat, 3 December 2020, https://thediplomat.com/2020/12/the-jakarta-bandung-rail-project-5-years-on-and-still-
going-nowhere.
66 Laura Silver, Kat Devlin, and Christine Huang, “China’s Economic Growth Mostly Welcomed
in Emerging Markets, but Neighbors Wary of Its Influence,” Pew Research Center, 5 Decem-
ber 2019, https://www.pewresearch.org/global/wp-content/uploads/sites/2/2019/12/PG_2019.12.05_Balance-of-
Power_FINAL.pdf.
67 Charlotte Setijadi, “Anti-Chinese Sentiment and the ‘Return’ of the Pribumi Discourse,” in Greg Fealy and
Ronit Ricci, ed., Contentious Belonging: The Place of Minorities in Indonesia (Singapore: ISEAS–Yusof Ishak
Institute, 2019), pp. 194–213.
68 Two incidents of discrimination and violence against Chinese Indonesians were the killings after the 30
September Movement of 1965 and the assaults during the May 1998 riots.
69 Murray Hiebert, Under Beijing’s Shadow: Southeast Asia’s China Challenge (Jakarta: Center for Strategic
& International Studies, 2020), p. 430.
narrative allowed for a series of discriminatory policies against the Chinese Indonesian
community. … This sentiment is still strong nowadays and would seem to render the ‘new’
Chinese presence precarious.”70 Therefore, China’s growing presence in Indonesia, includ-
ing projects and workers, has ignited criticism and even protest, among many segments of
Indonesian society.
Under these circumstances, in the 2019 Indonesian general election, Prabowo Subianto
followed Mahathir Mohamed’s suit in accusing Jokowi of being too soft on China in allow-
ing millions of Chinese to work on Chinese-funded projects. Prabowo likewise declared
that if he became president he would review all of Beijing’s projects in the country.71 These
tactics, however, were less successful for Prabowo than for Mahathir, because to minimise

political risks the Jokowi administration had selected the project in a more transparent
manner and institutionalised the decision-making process. Process tracing of the JBHSR
project, therefore, suggests that under such a “democratic” type of foreign policymaking,
it is mainly societal rather than political risks that have caused such a substantial delay
in Indonesia’s BRI infrastructure building. As this social antipathy towards China is not
expected to change any time soon, it is likely to persist in complicating BRI implementation
in Indonesia.
BRI Projects in the Philippines

Owing to the South China Sea dispute with China, the Philippines under the Aquino III
Administration was not keen to participate in the BRI. However, after assuming office on
30 June 2016, President Duterte substantially altered Philippine foreign policy by “separat-
ing” from the USA and moving closer to China.72 Similar to Jakarta, to improve domestic
infrastructure and promote the Philippines’ economic development, Manila tried to com-
bine Xi’s BRI with Duterte’s Build, Build, Build infrastructure programme. With the benefit
of hindsight, Duterte was a populist leader who espoused less institutionalised and more
personalistic foreign policy decision-making. Descriptions of Duterte as “the Donald Trump
of the Philippines” have in recent years become a cliché in international media.73 Heydarian
provided a revealing insight into Duterte:
In many ways, Duterte is best described as a strongman populist, who combines author-
itarian style of governance, limited respect for democratic checks and balances, with
“caudillo” style populism, skilfully appealing to both right-wing yearning for rule of law
and left-wing demand for social justice.74
In spite of the president’s great efforts to assure the Filipinos that “China, after all, is
really a good neighbour” and that “China will be ‘fair’ in eventually resolving its disputes
with his country in the South China Sea”,75 the public did not share their president’s positive
impression of China.76 In fact, Philippine society was still quite sceptical of China and much
more favourable to the USA. For instance, the Second Quarter 2019 Social Weather Survey
70 Angela Tritto, “Contentious Embeddedness: Chinese State Capital and the Belt and Road Initiative in
Indonesia,” Made in China Journal, Vol. 5, No. 1 (2020), p. 183.
71 Karishma Vaswani, “Indonesia Election: China’s Complicated Role in the Country’s Future,” BBC, 12 April
2019 https://www.bbc.com/news/business-47905090.
72 Heydarian, “Tragedy of Small Power Politics,” pp. 220–36.
73 Sebastian Strangio, In the Dragon’s Shadow: Southeast Asia in the Chinese Century (New Haven and
London: Yale University Press, 2020), p. 250.
74 Heydarian, “Tragedy of Small Power Politics,” p. 230.
75 Kyodo, “Duterte Confident China will be ‘Fair’ When Resolving Maritime Disputes,” South China Morning
Post, 17 July 2018, https://www.scmp.com/news/asia/southeast-asia/article/2155709/duterte-confident-china-
will-be-fair-when-resolving.
76 Yen Nee Lee, “Four Years on, Philippine President Duterte is Still Struggling to Show the Benefits of Being
Pro-China,” CNBC, 7 September 2020, https://www.cnbc.com/2020/09/08/philippine-president-duterte-fails-to-
produce-results-from-pro-china-stance.html.
found that 51% of adult Filipinos had little trust, 21% was undecided, and 27% had much
trust in China, as compared with the 81% that had much trust, 11% that was undecided,
and 8% that had little trust in the USA.77 And the Third Quarter 2019 Social Weather
Survey found that 78% of adult Filipinos thought the Philippines’ relationship with the
USA more important than its relationship with China, while 12% thought the country’s
relationship with China more important than that with the USA.78
As with the case of Indonesia, the suspicious-of-China (if not anti-China) social sen-
timents in the Philippines have remained a stubborn obstacle to Duterte’s China policy.
Moreover, the country’s indigenous peoples’ insistence on recognition of their rights to self-
determination, to their ancestral lands, territories, and resources, and to free, prior, and

informed consent presents a formidable challenge to several BRI projects.79 For instance,
the Kaliwa Dam Project, the BRI centrepiece in the Philippines, is a $12.2 billion Chi-
nese government-funded PHP project funded through Official Development Assistance
from China. The project has faced periodical steep opposition from indigenous residents,
nongovernmental organisations (NGOs), and even local government officials over recent
years.80 Another instance is the Chico River Pump Irrigation Project, a 4.37 billion PHP
project that the China Export-Import Bank funded with a soft loan and the China CAMC
Engineering Company implemented, faced similar domestic criticisms and resistance. In
fact, the World Bank had previously planned to fund the project but eventually abandoned
it due to massive protests from indigenous communities. Accordingly, “Chico Once More”
is the current slogan among local communities, one which reflects the resolve to sustain
their legacy of resistance and struggle.81 Therefore, similar to the case of Indonesia, BRI
implementation in the Philippines has encountered substantial societal risks.
More importantly, such social challenges have driven political opposition aimed at
undermining Duterte’s embrace of China’s BRI and aggravated divisions within the Philip-
pine government over Duterte’s foreign policy.82 Although political challenges to reverse the
course of BRI projects have not yet materialised, political risks nonetheless loom, as there
are limits to how far the Philippine–China relationship will proceed. As Strangio points
out, “the political structures that gave Duterte the power to wrench foreign policy in the
direction of China would give his successors the power to reverse course”.83 Considering
the fact that the Philippines’ personalised foreign policy decision-making has given rise to
the dramatic changes—from Arroyo to Aquino84 and further to Duterte—in the Philip-
pines’ China policy, BRI projects would be very likely to suffer policy discontinuity should
a power transition occur after the 2022 Philippine presidential election. Therefore, despite
his pro-China stance, Duterte’s “populist” type of foreign policymaking has exposed BRI
projects to substantial socio-political risks.
77 Social Weather Stations, “Second Quarter 2019 Social Weather Survey,” 19 July 2019,
https://www.sws.org.ph/downloads/media_release/pr20190719%20-%20SWR2019-II%20Trust%20in%20
countries%20and%20Intentions%20of%20foreign%20governments%20(special%20report).pdf.
78 Social Weather Stations, “Third Quarter 2019 Social Weather Survey,” 7 December 2019,
https://www.sws.org.ph/downloads/media_release/pr20191207%20-%20SWR2019-III%20PH%20Relation
ship%20with%20China%20and%20the%20US%20(Special%20Report).pdf.
79 Angus Lam, “Domestic Politics in Southeast Asia and Local Backlash Against the Belt and Road Initiative,”
Foreign Policy Research Institute, 15 October 2020, https://www.fpri.org/article/2020/10/domestic-politics-in-
southeast-asia-and-local-backlash-against-the-belt-and-road-initiative.
80 David Green, “The Philippines’ China Dam Controversy,” The Diplomat, 27 March 2019,
https://thediplomat.com/2019/03/the-philippines-china-dam-controversy.
81 Jiten Yumnam, “Chico Once More: Legacy of Resistance in Cordillera Highlands,” Centre for Research and
Advocacy Manipur, 9 August 2018, https://cramanipur.wordpress.com/2018/10/23/chico-once-more-legacy-of-
resistance-in-cordillera-highlands.
82 Sebastian Strangio, “Controversial China Projects Reveal Philippine Rifts,” The Diplomat, 11 September
2020, https://thediplomat.com/2020/09/controversial-china-projects-reveal-philippine-rifts.
83 Strangio, In the Dragon’s Shadow, p. 271.
84 Zha, “Personalized Foreign Policy Decision-making and Economic Dependence,” pp. 242–68.
Singapore–China BRI Cooperation

As earlier mentioned, while Singapore has little demand for China’s assistance in domes-
tic infrastructure development, it has nonetheless consistently endorsed and proactively
engaged with China’s BRI cooperation. As Lawrence Wong, Singapore’s Minister for
National Development, remarked at the first Belt and Road Forum for International
Cooperation in May 2007:
We don’t have any specific projects as of now that may be part of this Belt and Road (initia-
tive) in terms of infrastructure, but it doesn’t mean that we are completely irrelevant. We
shouldn’t be complacent and should continue to work hard to make Singapore relevant.85

Singapore is, of course, relevant to the BRI in playing the important role of intermedi-
ary between China and recipient countries. On 8 April 2018, Singapore and China signed
in Beijing a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) to promote greater collaboration in
infrastructure projects in the third-party markets along the Belt and Road.86 In fact, even
before the MOU was signed, the Singaporean government and companies had been “work-
ing together with their Chinese counterparts to invest in other countries along the Belt and
Road for several years”.87 Singapore has thus played, and will continue to play, a highly
relevant role in China’s BRI.
The reason for the stabilised and sustained economic cooperation between Singapore
and China lies partly in the “procedural” characteristic of Singapore’s foreign policymak-
ing, which is institutionalised and insulated. On the one hand, institutionalisation means
that foreign policymaking follows standard operating procedures. Thanks to its strong
state capacity and institutionalised policy formulation, in engaging with China, Singapore
has promoted effective policies and coordinated mutually reinforcing institutional mech-
anisms.88 The establishment of Infrastructure Asia in October 2018 marked the creation
of one of the most important new institutions in regard to the BRI. Set up by Enterprise
Singapore and the Monetary Authority of Singapore, Infrastructure Asia serves as a key
institutionalised platform, which includes both public sector agencies and private sector
firms, whereon to support infrastructure financing and development in the region. The Asia
Infrastructure Forum—its annual flagship event that brings together international develop-
ers, financial institutions, and multilateral development banks—provides the industry with
the opportunity to exchange ideas, broker deals, and share best practices.89
On the other hand, insulation means that the foreign policymaking process is to a large
extent insulated from political opposition and societal influence. Chan describes the silence
from opposition political parties in regard to the BRI: “None of the political opposition
parties has publicly opposed the Singapore state’s proactive response to the BRI. Nor have
they issued official statements of their views and position on the country’s involvement in
the BRI”.90 Singapore’s foreign policy formulation proceeds with minimal domestic input
and nil pressure from political oppositions or social actors. In these circumstances, and
in sharp contrast to the three other cases, China has never been a contentious issue in
85 Chong Koh Ping, “China’s Belt and Road Project Could Bring Opportunities and Challenges to S’pore:
Minister Lawrence Wong,” The Strait Times, 16 May 2017, https://www.straitstimes.com/asia/east-asia/chinas-
belt-and-road-project-could-pose-challenges-to-spore-minister-lawrence-wong.
86 Anna Maria Romero, “Singapore and China Sign MOU for Partnership on Belt and Road Initiative,” The
Independent, 10 April 2018, https://theindependent.sg/singapore-and-china-sign-mou-for-partnership-on-belt-
and-road-initiative.
87 Divya Ryan, “Singapore: The Belt and Road’s Gateway to India,” The Diplomat, 27 September 2018,
https://thediplomat.com/2018/09/singapore-the-belt-and-roads-gateway-to-india.
88 Liu, Fan, and Lim, “Singapore Engages the Belt and Road Initiative.”
89 Infrastructure Asia, “Making Infrastructure Happen,” February 2020, https://www.infrastructureasia.org/-
/media/InfraAsia/About-us/InfraAsia-brochure.pdf?la=en&hash=9A0B7578BAF84D787FE1A3A4C4D564C5
610EB087.
90 Chan, “Reversing China’s Belt-and-Road Initiative,” p. 197.
Table 4 Socio-political Risks on BRI Projects in Maritime Southeast Asia

influences
Foreign policymaking is Personalised Medium level of political Relatively high level of
either a personalised risks for BRI projects in socio-political risks
or an institutionalised Malaysia for BRI projects in
process Philippines
Institutionalised Relatively low level of Medium level of societal

risks for Singapore– risks for BRI projects in
China BRI cooperation Indonesia
Singaporean general elections. Moreover, it is worth noting that insulation does not neces-
sarily denote exclusion. In fact, Singaporean political institutions “traverse parliamentary
and extra-parliamentary spheres to involve a range of individuals and groups in public
policy discussion or feedback”.91 Therefore, the Singaporean regime is ever more described
as “consultative authoritarianism”, wherein “new social and economic interests generated
by capitalist development are increasingly engaged through various creative mechanisms of
consultation”.92 In other words, while political representation is highly institutionalised,
the policymaking process is largely insulated in Singapore.
Accordingly, we have witnessed a relatively low level of risks in Singapore–China BRI
cooperation in recent years. Although we must admit that there is currently no BRI infras-
tructure building in Singapore, based on counterfactual reasoning, we nevertheless believe
that in this case the explanatory typology developed in this article still has internal valid-
ity. As mentioned above, the “procedural” characteristic of foreign policymaking has
ensured the essential prudence of Singapore’s China policy over the past few decades. In
fact, as the “procedural” type is not common, Singapore appears to be the most eligible
case among Southeast Asian countries. Let’s imagine that, if the Singaporean leadership
were to consider introducing a BRI infrastructure project to the sovereign island city-state,
it would go through institutionalised consultation to form a solid consensus within the
political system. Under such a scenario, the ruling authority of the Singaporean govern-
ment would ensure that the BRI project’s legitimacy and sustainability was significantly
greater than that in the other three countries. In fact, Singapore and China have established
three government-to-government collaboration projects, namely, the China–Singapore
Suzhou Industrial Park, the Sino-Singapore Tianjin Eco-City, and the China–Singapore
(Chongqing) Demonstrative Initiative on Strategic Connectivity. The sustainable develop-
ment of these projects to some extent demonstrates the benefit of Singapore’s “procedural”
decision-making in reducing the political and societal risks of potential BRI infrastructure
projects.
To summarise, the key findings of the four empirical cases are shown in Table 4, which
confirms the varying levels of socio-political risks of BRI projects in maritime Southeast
Asia.
91 Garry Rodan, “Consultative Authoritarianism and Regime Change Analysis: Implications of the Singapore
Case,” in Richard Robison, ed., Routledge Handbook of Southeast Asian Politics (London: Routledge, 2012),
p. 121.
92 Ibid.
Conclusion
By developing a conceptual typology of foreign policymaking and an explanatory typol-
ogy of socio-political risks, this article has studied how Southeast Asian countries’ domestic
socio-political factors influence their foreign policymaking and the BRI projects in South-
east Asia. Four maritime Southeast Asian countries–Malaysia, Indonesia, the Philippines,
and Singapore—have been selected to fit the typologies. The empirical study finds that the
Philippines’ “populist” type of foreign policymaking engenders the highest level of risks
(both political and societal) for BRI projects, while Singapore’s “procedural” type produces
the lowest. Malaysia’s “arbitrary” type and Indonesia’s “democratic” type, meanwhile,
generate the medium-level political or societal risks.

This article has underscored the salience of meso-level BRI studies from recipient coun-
tries’ perspectives, as the success (or failure) of the BRI projects to a large extent depends
upon engagement with and responses from the recipient countries. The examples of
Malaysia, Indonesia, and the Philippines show that understanding the complexities of
domestic politics and society within recipient countries is of crucial importance to Chinese-
funded overseas projects. Our study makes a contribution to the existing scholarship by
examining how socio-political risks influence the interpretation and implementation of BRI
projects from both the theoretical and the empirical perspectives.
Of course, this article makes no claim to be the final word on the socio-political risks
of BRI projects in Southeast Asia. It is hoped, however, that the typologies developed in
this article, as well as their assumptions and findings, will stimulate future research. First,
more cases, including but not limited to BRI projects in other Southeast Asian countries,
may be explored and placed in the typological matrixes for congruence testing and compar-
ative study. For example, much like the Philippines, Thailand’s foreign policymaking bears
strong similarity to the “populist” type, Thai leaders such as Thaksin Shinawatra having
exerted a disproportionate impact on foreign policy decision-making and capitalised on the
populist idea of “people-centric diplomacy”.93 There existed multiple veto actors—the State
Railway Workers’ Union, legal safeguards, environmental NGOs, and civil society—within
Thailand’s politics and society, which delayed the construction of the Bangkok–Nong Khai
High-Speed Railway.94 It would thus be worthwhile investigating whether BRI projects in
Thailand have encountered similar socio-political risks. Another example, similar to the
Malaysian case, is Cambodia, which is characterised by personalised and insulated foreign
policymaking, wherein the latter is primarily a personal issue, or confined to a small circle,
and decision-making is largely insulated from political opposition and societal influence.
The Cambodian leadership, moreover, has also been striving to forge close economic ties
with China. It would hence be worthwhile to examine the political risks of BRI projects in
Cambodia, particularly if a power transition should take place in the future.
Second, if we are to accommodate both maritime and mainland Southeast Asia in
the comparative analysis, we can further apply qualitative comparative analysis (QCA),
especially fuzzy-set QCA, to conduct systemic cross-case comparisons that reveal causal
complexity in medium-N comparative research.95 We can expand recipient country cases
into country-government cases and identify how different configurations of conditions or
variables combine to produce given outcomes from given cases. We can thus incorporate
not only foreign policymaking institutionalisation and responsiveness but also agent-based
conditions or variables into the causal recipes. We believe that by applying our typologies

94 Pavin Chachavalpongpun, ed., Routledge Handbook of Contemporary Thailand (London: Routledge,
2020).
95 Charles C. Ragin, Redesigning Social Inquiry Fuzzy Sets and Beyond (Chicago: University of Chicago
Press, 2008); Benoit Rihoux and Charles C. Ragin, ed., Configurational Comparative Methods: Qualitative
Comparative Analysis (QCA) and Related Techniques (Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications, 2009).
to mainland Southeast Asian countries and making use of the QCA method, compara-
tive case studies will contribute to the further exploration of the ways in which domestic
socio-political factors influence foreign policymaking and BRI projects in Southeast Asia.
Acknowledgements
The authors express their gratitude to Shaun Breslin, Qingguo Jia, Zhengxu Wang, Weihua
Wang, Wen Zha, Ruonan Liu, Jiajie He, and Yao Wen for their valuable suggestions for
the earlier drafts of this article. They are also grateful to the editors of The Chinese Journal
of International Politics and the two anonymous reviewers for their helpful comments. As

always, all responsibility for any errors lies with the authors.
Conflict of interest statement. None declared.
Funding
The research on this article is supported by the National Social Science Fund of China (grant
number: 21CGJ015).
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Article in The Chinese Journal of International Politics · June 2022

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Local Politics and Fluctuating

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Assessing Meso-Level Studies of the BRI

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15 Kuik, “Asymmetry and Authority.”

research designs lack methodological rigor in regard to controlled comparison, which is

Typologies of Foreign Policymaking and Socio-political Risks

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Conceptual Typology of Foreign Policymaking

Table 1 A Conceptual Typology of Foreign Policymaking

Foreign policymaking is either insulated from or

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Explanatory Typology of Socio-political Risks

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Table 2 An Explanatory Typology of Socio-political Risks

Foreign policymaking is insulated from or

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Assigning Cases to the Conceptual Typology

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BRI Projects in Malaysia

Table 3 Foreign Policymaking in Maritime Southeast Asia

Foreign policymaking is either insulated from or

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BRI Projects in Indonesia

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BRI Projects in the Philippines

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Singapore–China BRI Cooperation

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Table 4 Socio-political Risks on BRI Projects in Maritime Southeast Asia

Foreign policymaking is either insulated from or

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93 Zha, “Personalized Foreign Policy Decision-making and Economic Dependence,” p. 248.

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Conflict of interest statement. None declared.

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