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The Belt and Road Initiative: geo-economics and Indo-Paciﬁc security

competition
Article in International Affairs · January 2020

DOI: 10.1093/ia/iiz240
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geo-economics and Indo-Pacific
security competition
MINGJIANG LI *
Chinese leader Xi Jinping shared his vision of the Silk Road Economic Belt in
Kazakhstan in September 2013; a month later, he proposed the 21st-Century Mari-
time Silk Road in Indonesia. The two proposals culminated in the One Belt One
Road strategy, subsequently renamed the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI).1 The BRI
envisages five areas of cooperation among dozens of states in Eurasia, Africa and
Oceania: infrastructure and facilities connectivity, unimpeded trade, smooth finan-
cial flows, coordinated national policies, and increased people-to-people and
cultural exchanges.2 In reality, infrastructure projects appear to be the focus of the
BRI. Scholars have observed that the BRI is an ambitious Chinese geo-economic
strategy that is destined to have a major impact on the existing world economic
governance system, either in a positive way3 or in a negative way.4
The impact of the BRI is expected to be more salient in the domain of geopol-
itics than in the domain of global development governance. Under the BRI
umbrella, Beijing has pledged to invest billions of dollars in the infrastructural
and industrial sectors across Eurasia and the Indo-Pacific. There is no doubt that
such a huge investment will inevitably generate significant geostrategic repercus-
sions in regions where geopolitical contestations between China and other major
powers, particularly the United States, are already on the rise. To counter the BRI,
Washington is determined to promote the ‘free and open Indo-Pacific’ (FOIP)
strategy.5 Because Beijing fears that this US-dominated strategy may constrain
China’s influence and thwart the BRI, it seldom uses the term ‘Indo-Pacific’ in its
own official policy statements. Apparently, these two cross-regional strategies are
in serious rivalry with each other. However, although some opinion pieces have
* This article is part of the January 2020 special issue of International Affairs on ‘Unpacking the strategic dynamics
of the Indo-Pacific’, guest-edited by Kai He and Mingjiang Li.
1
Astrid H. M. Nordin and Mikael Weissmann, ‘Will Trump make China great again? The Belt and Road Initia-
tive and international order’, International Affairs 94: 2, March 2018, pp. 231–50.
2
Chris Alden and Lu Jiang, ‘Brave new world: debt, industrialization and security in China–Africa relations’,
International Affairs 95: 3, May 2019, pp. 641–58.
3
Wu Xinbo, ‘China in search of a liberal partnership international order’, International Affairs 94: 5, Sept. 2018,
pp. 995–1018.
4
Shahar Hameiri and Lee Jones, ‘China challenges global governance? Chinese international development
finance and the AIIB’, International Affairs 94: 3, May 2018, pp. 573–93.
5
US Department of Defense, Indo-Pacific strategy report: preparedness, partnerships, and promoting a networked region, 1
June 2019, https://media.defense.gov/2019/Jul/01/2002152311/-1/-1/1/DEPARTMENT-OF-DEFENSE-INDO
-PACIFIC-STRATEGY-REPORT-2019.PDF. (Unless otherwise noted at point of citation, all URLs cited in
this article were accessible on 7 Oct. 2019.)
International Affairs 96: 1 (2020) 169–187; doi: 10.1093/ia/iiz240

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reserved. For permissions, please e-mail: journals.permissions@oup.com
INTA96_1_FullIssue.indb 169 16/12/2019 08:44

Mingjiang Li
been published,6 very few scholarly works have explored the relationship between
these two strategies.7
This article attempts to identify the potential impacts of the BRI on the
security ties between China and the other major players in the Indo-Pacific; it
also seeks to explore new analytical pathways through which geo-economics
generates geopolitical rivalries.8 Instead of the traditional approach of treating
geo-economic policy as a means to a pre-existing geopolitical end, the article
offers a new analytical angle for the study of geo-economics that unpacks the role
of economic activities and processes in generating geopolitical intentions and in
driving geopolitical competition.
The article is divided into four sections. The first presents a theoretical discus-
sion of the linkages between geo-economics and geopolitics, and a brief expla-
nation of the motivations behind Beijing’s decision to roll out the BRI strategy.
This section provides new research evidence to emphasize the role that economic
considerations played in the inception stage of the BRI, balancing the popular view
that the BRI was predominantly driven by pre-existing geopolitical ambitions.
The second section provides an explanation of how and why the BRI has become
part of China’s developmental core interests and discusses its implications for
China’s geostrategic policy at the macro level. This section also offers detailed
analysis of how the Chinese policy community has been addressing the security
challenges that the initiative may face, and seeks to explain how the initiative
itself is gradually transforming China’s geostrategy and national security policy.
The third section discusses how other major powers perceive and respond to the
BRI and the expansion of China’s strategic influence in the affected regions from
a geopolitical perspective. The article argues that it is very likely that the BRI
and the related proposed changes in China’s international security policy will lead
to further intensification of geopolitical rivalry between China and other major
powers in the Indo-Pacific region. The fourth section presents the main conclu-
sions arising from the analysis.
Geo-economics and China’s BRI strategy

In the early twentieth century, strategists such as Alfred Thayer Mahan and Halford
John MacKinder debated the relative importance of sea power and dominance over
land areas.9 Mahan was obsessed with a state’s power projection capabilities based
6
See e.g. Dian Septiari, ‘US Indo-Pacific concept best alternative to China’s BRI: Washington official’, Jakarta
Post, 30 April 2019; Wang Peng, ‘BRI not meant to counter US Indo-Pacific strategy’, Global Times, 25 Feb.
2019; Shino Watanabe, ‘China’s infrastructure development in the Indo-Pacific region: challenges and oppor-
tunities’, cogitASIA (Washington DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, CSIS Asia Program,
11 April 2019), https://www.cogitasia.com/chinas-infrastructure-development-in-the-indo-pacific-region-
challenges-opportunities/.
7
For one exception, see Jonathan Fulton, ‘The gulf between the Indo-Pacific and the Belt and Road Initiative’,
Rising Powers Quarterly 3: 2, 2018, pp. 175–93.
8
Masanori Hasegawa, ‘The geography and geopolitics of the renminbi: a regional key currency in Asia’, Inter-
national Affairs 94: 3, May 2018, pp. 535–52.
9
Alfred Thayer Mahan, The influence of sea power upon history, 1660–1783 (Cambridge : Cambridge University
Press, 2010); Halford John Mackinder, The geographical pivot of history (Amazon Digital Services LLC, 2017).
170
International Affairs 96: 1, 2020

The Belt and Road Initiative
on the domination of seaborne commerce, whereas MacKinder emphasized the
importance of controlling the Eurasian landmass. Chung argues that, historically,
geo-economic competition between superpowers has led to global catastrophic
events, such as the French Revolution and the two world wars.10 During the
Cold War era, most studies on geopolitics focused on the military and security
dimensions. In the post-Cold War era, many strategists turned their attention to
states’ geopolitical use of economic power.11 A prevalent view is that in ‘the grand
strategies of the twenty-first century geopolitics will be pursued chiefly through
economic means’.12 Blackwill and Harris even regard geo-economic competition
as war by other means.13
Many studies have highlighted China’s adroit use of economic power for
political and security purposes in recent years.14 In the words of Blackwill and
Harris, China is ‘the world’s leading practitioner of geo-economics’.15 Its recent
economic initiatives, such as the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) and
the BRI, have generated considerable academic interest in China’s geo-economic
strategy.16 The BRI represents perhaps the most ambitious geo-economic policy
that China has ever proposed. This new strategy seems to suggest that China is
keen to transform itself into a continental-cum-maritime power, fusing Mahan’s
and MacKinder’s geostrategic ideas. The key question is: how will the BRI affect
Beijing’s geopolitical strategy and the strategic landscape in the Indo-Pacific region
and across the Eurasian continent?
Geo-economics: how it works

To address this question, we will first need to sort out some of the theoretical
linkages between geo-economics and geopolitics—lamentably, an understudied
area in international politics. The mainstream literature on geo-economics suggests
a linear means–end causality between mega-economic policies and geostrategic
contentions. This one-directional causal relationship can be seen in the theoretical
approaches of leading scholars on the subject from the 1960s to the 1980s, many of
whom, such as Johan Galtung, Klaus Knorr, Margaret Doxey, Donald Losman and
Richard Porter, attempted to examine the use and efficacy of economic coercion
10
Jae Wan Chung, Global economic disparity: a dynamic force in geo-economic competition of superpowers (Lanham, MD:
Lexington, 2015).
11
Gyula Csurgai, ‘The increasing importance of geo-economics in power rivalries in the twenty-first century’,
Geopolitics 23: 1, 2018, pp. 38–46.
12
Agnes Bernek, ‘The “grand chessboard” of the 21st century: geopolitical strategies of the multi-polar world’,
National Security Review (Budapest), special issue, 2015, pp. 5–28, https://folyoiratok.uni-nke.hu/document/
nkeszolgaltato-uni-nke-hu/nemzetbiztonsagi-szemle-2015_-angol-kulonszam.original.pdf.
13
Robert D. Blackwill and Jennifer M. Harris, War by other means: geo-economics and statecraft (Cambridge, MA:
Belknap/Harvard University Press, 2016); Barry Eichengreen, ‘Versailles: the economic legacy’, International
Affairs 95: 1, Jan. 2019, pp. 7–18.
14
Philippe Le Corre, China’s rise as a geo-economic influencer: four European case studies (Washington DC: Carn-
egie Endowment for International Peace, Oct. 2018); Markus Brunnermeier, Rush Doshi and Harold James,
‘Beijing’s Bismarckian ghosts: how Great Powers compete economically’, Washington Quarterly 41: 3, Fall 2018,
pp. 161–76.
15
Blackwill and Harris, War by other means, p. 11.
16
Alice de Jonge, ‘Perspectives on the emerging role of the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank’, International
Affairs 93: 5, Sept. 2017, pp. 1061–84.
171

Mingjiang Li
to change the behaviour of target states.17 Later, David Baldwin contended that
economic statecraft amounts to more than coercion, arguing that an economic
tool is just one of the many techniques that a state may employ in pursuit of a
wide range of objectives, not limited to modification of a target state’s political
behaviour.18 In his classic book Economic statecraft, Baldwin stated that ‘economic
sanctions may have diplomatic, psychological, political, military, or other effects
even when their economic effect is nil’.19 Many subsequent studies on economic
statecraft, particularly the literature on sanctions, continued to focus on the effec-
tiveness of economic tools in changing other states’ behaviours.20 Looking beyond
sanctions, Albert O. Hirschman, in his book National power and the structure of foreign
trade, argued that an asymmetric economic relationship may incentivize various
sectors, regions and firms in the economically weaker state to play a bigger role in
shaping the definition of national interest in ways that would benefit the economi-
cally stronger state.21 Conversely, states can also use economic tools positively, as
well as to apply coercion and pressure. For instance, states may lower tariffs, and
provide aid, investment and market access, for political objectives.22
This conventional behavioural-change lens for studying economic statecraft has
significantly influenced scholars who later used the term ‘geo-economics’. Luttwak
defines geo-economics as ‘the geostrategic use of economic power’ by nation-
states.23 His concept of geo-economics has influenced many other analysts in the
field. Scholvin and Wigell, for instance, suggest that ‘geo-economics, as a foreign
policy strategy, refers to the application of economic means of power by states so
as to realize strategic objectives’.24 Blackwill and Harris regard geo-economics as
‘the use of economic instruments to promote and defend national interests and to
17
Johan Galtung, ‘On the effects of international economic sanctions: with examples from the case of Rhode-
sia’, World Politics 19: 3, April 1967, pp. 378–416; Klaus E. Knorr, ‘International economic leverage and its uses’,
in Klaus E. Knorr and Frank N. Trager, eds, Economic issues and national security (Lawrence: University Press of
Kansas, 1977), pp. 99–126; Margaret P. Doxey, ‘International sanctions: a framework for analysis with special
reference to the UN and southern Africa’, International Organization 26: 3, Summer 1972, pp. 527–51; Donald
L. Losman, International economic sanctions: the cases of Cuba, Israel and Rhodesia (Albuquerque: University of
New Mexico Press, 1979); Richard Porter, ‘Economic sanctions: the theory and the evidence from Rhodesia’,
Journal of Peace Science 3: 2, Fall 1978, pp. 93–110.
18
David A. Baldwin and Robert A. Pape, ‘Evaluating economic sanctions’, International Security 23: 2, Fall 1998,
p. 189. David A. Baldwin, ‘The sanctions debate and the logic of choice’, International Security 24: 3, Winter
1999–2000, pp. 80–107.
19
David A. Baldwin, Economic statecraft (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1985), p. 63.
20
Robert Pape, ‘Why economic sanctions do not work’, International Security 22: 2, Autumn 1997, pp. 90–136;
Kimberly A. Elliot, ‘The sanctions glass: half full or completely empty’, International Security 23: 1, Summer 1998,
pp. 50–65; Robert Pape, ‘Why economic sanctions still do not work’, International Security 23: 1, Summer 1998,
pp. 66–77; Baldwin and Pape, ‘Evaluating economic sanctions’, pp. 189–198; Baldwin, ‘The sanctions debate
and the logic of choice’, pp. 80–107; Thomas J. Biersteker, Sue E. Eckert and Marcos Tourinho, eds, Targeted
sanctions: the impacts and effectiveness of United Nations actions (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2016).
21
Albert O. Hirschman, National power and the structure of foreign trade (Berkeley: University of California Press,
1980); Yuen Foong Khong, ‘Power as prestige in world politics’, International Affairs 95: 1, Jan. 2019, pp.
119–42.
22
David Baldwin, ‘The power of positive sanctions’, World Politics 24: 1, Oct. 1971, pp. 19–38; Patricia Davis, The
art of economic persuasion: positive incentives and German economic diplomacy (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan
Press, 1999).
23
E. N. Luttwak, ‘From geopolitics to geo-economics: logic of conflict, grammar of commerce’, The National
Interest, no. 20, Summer 1990, pp. 17–24.
24
Sören Scholvin and Mikael Wigell, ‘Power politics by economic means: geo-economics as an analytical
approach and foreign policy practice’, Comparative Strategy 37: 1, 2018, pp. 73–84.
172

produce beneficial geopolitical results; and the effects of other nations’ economic
actions on a country’s geopolitical goals’.25
Most existing studies on economic statecraft and geo-economics share three
assumptions: (a) states have clearly defined geopolitical goals when employing
economic policy tools; (b) states have geopolitical objectives which either remain
constant or change owing to the effects of countervailing strategies of other major
players; and (c) the geopolitical game stemming from geo-economic activities will
always be zero-sum.
This article challenges these three conventional assumptions in relation to
geo-economics and geopolitics in the context of the BRI. First, the BRI, at least
during its inception stage, was mainly driven by economic considerations associ-
ated with domestic industrial overcapacity. Chinese decision-makers had some
vague strategic aims but these did not amount to concrete geopolitical and security
policy goals for the BRI. Second, the BRI construct and implementation process
have provided incentives for Chinese policy circles to come up with a new geostra-
tegic outlook and various new security policies and objectives.26 Third, Beijing
has claimed that the BRI is an inclusive economic initiative and has encouraged
other major powers to collaborate with China under the BRI umbrella. Some
recent signs—for instance, Japan’s stated interest in working with China through
the BRI—suggest that there is indeed policy space for other major powers to
take part in the initiative.27 Increasing international collaboration under the BRI
may reduce Beijing’s geopolitical anxiety over the safety of its resulting invest-
ment, which in turn could mitigate the geostrategic rivalry bred by the initiative.
This essentially suggests that in this case geo-economics per se may not give rise to
entirely zero-sum geopolitical competition.
Driving forces behind the BRI

A more accurate assessment of China’s geostrategic intentions in launching the
BRI, and its likely geopolitical impacts, requires a deeper understanding of the
motivations behind the relevant decision-making processes. Generally speaking,
its underlying rationales are both economic and strategic.28 After the initiative
was launched, the international community viewed it exclusively from a geopo-
litical perspective. This perspective may need to be balanced by views through
various economic lenses. According to Chinse sources, the BRI did not originate
in a top-down strategic plan. Rather, the whole idea came from the Ministry of
Foreign Affairs: specifically, the Department of European–Central Asian Affairs
and the Department of Asian Affairs, in consultation with bureaucrats at various
ministries in charge of economic affairs. In the first years of the new century,
25
Blackwill and Harris, War by other means, p. 9.
26
Xiaoyu Pu and Changli Wang, ‘Rethinking China’s rise: Chinese scholars debate strategic overstretch’, Inter-
national Affairs 94: 5, Sept. 2018, pp. 1019–36.
27
Shogo Suzuki and Corey Wallace, ‘Explaining Japan’s response to geopolitical vulnerability’, International
Affairs 94: 4, July 2018, pp. 711–34.
28
Nordin and Weissmann, ‘Will Trump make China great again?’.
173

Mingjiang Li
the Department of European–Central Asian Affairs started to explore the possi-
bility of integrating various regional economic development plans involving the
Shanghai Cooperation Organization member states. At the same time, officials
at the Department of Asian Affairs gradually came up with the idea of building
a China–ASEAN ‘community of common destiny’ and reviving maritime Silk
Road connectivity between China and south-east Asia. These ideas gained traction
with the top political leadership and served as the groundwork for the BRI.29
These ideas were embraced by China’s top leaders mainly because the country
was facing a crisis of industrial overcapacity. The Chinese economy had gradually
accumulated excess productive capacity in the early 2000s, and this condition was
exacerbated by Beijing’s massive stimulus during the 2008–2009 global financial
crisis. By the late 2000s this overcapacity, mainly concentrated in the steel, coal,
cement, electrolytic aluminium and flat glass sectors, was widely perceived as a
major danger to the Chinese economy.30 At the Central Economic Work Confer-
ence in December 2012, China’s new leader, Xi Jinping, pointed out that resolving
overcapacity had to be the focus of the party-state’s work. Over the following
months, in April, July and September 2013, he repeatedly highlighted the need to
adjust the industrial structure to ease the overcapacity crisis.
According to Chinese experts who attended internal meetings with govern-
ment departments, during the inception stage of the BRI economic concerns were
dominant. Many policy deliberation sessions focused on working out a solution
to the problem of industrial overcapacity. The Chinese policy community under-
stood that financing more infrastructure projects in other countries would be the
only way to ease the overcapacity problem as domestic consumption, particularly
in the infrastructure area, was not expected to grow significantly. Chinese policy
researchers noted that Beijing could not publicly emphasize that the BRI was
designed to help solve its domestic economic problems because doing so would
undermine its official propaganda, with its constant emphasis on win–win cooper-
ation and Beijing’s generosity in providing international public goods.31
In the broader context, Chinese economic and financial expansion across the
world was widely seen as an inevitable consequence of China’s economic devel-
opment over the past four decades.32 Some scholars have pointed out that the
BRI is simply a continuation of Chinese companies’ ‘going-out’ strategy and
Beijing’s western development policy.33 Also, the accumulation of an impressive
29
Zhao Kejin, ‘Yi dai yi lu’: cong yuanjing dao xingdong [‘The BRI’: from vision to action] (Beijing: Peking Univer-
sity Press, 2015), p. 2.
30
Yu Miaojie and Jin Yang, Channeng guosheng de xianzhuang, qianyinhouguo yu yingdui [The current state and causes
of overcapacity and policy responses], Working paper series no. C2017015 (Beijing: China Center for Economic
Research, 28 Dec. 2017), http://www.nsd.pku.edu.cn/attachments/a5e0f4019d704895b5533d80f1a82254.pdf.
31
Author’s interviews with researchers at Chinese Academy of International Trade and Economic Coopera-
tion (Ministry of Commerce), Development Research Centre (State Council) and International Cooperation
Centre (National Development and Reform Commission), Beijing and Shanghai, 9–13 June 2019.
32
Tim Summers, ‘China’s “new Silk Roads”: sub-national regions and networks of global political economy’,
Third World Quarterly 37: 9, 2016, pp. 1635–7.
33
Peter Ferdinand, ‘Westward ho—the China dream and “One Belt, One Road”: Chinese foreign policy under
Xi Jinping’, International Affairs 92: 4, July 2016, pp. 941–57; Christopher K. Johnson, President Xi Jinping’s ‘Belt
and Road’ initiative: a practical assessment of the Chinese roadmap for China’s global resurgence, CSIS Freeman Chair
in China Studies report (Washington DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 28 March 2016),
174

amount of capital, owing to high savings rates at home and the stockpiling of
foreign reserves, rising domestic labour costs and the elevation of environmental
standards for the manufacturing sector all accelerated the shift of a significant
share of China’s economic and financial resources abroad.34
It is particularly worth noting the links between the BRI and the ‘western
development’ strategy. In the late 1990s, the Chinese government addressed
the growing disparity among the country’s regions by adopting policies that
supported socio-economic development in the vast central and western provinces.
These policies encouraged the provinces in the borderland regions to strengthen
cross-border trade and investment by ‘opening up’ to neighbouring countries. As
a result, almost all provinces in the border regions took an active role in trans-
boundary socio-economic engagements and infrastructure connectivity. For
example, Yunnan’s and Guangxi’s economic ties with south-east Asian countries
and Xinjiang’s interactions with central Asian states proved to be very successful.
These cross-border economic engagements involved a wide range of activities,
very similar to those envisaged in the BRI’s blueprint. Thus one can argue that
these borderland provinces’ activities and efforts, almost entirely motivated by the
pursuit of local economic interests, contributed to the emergence of the BRI.35
To emphasize the economic dimension is not to deny any political–strategic
context for the BRI decision-making process.36 The broad context was Beijing’s
persistent interest from the early 2000s in using economic influence to enhance
political relations with many neighbouring countries. The BRI was partially a
counter-reaction to the Obama administration’s Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP)
scheme, which Beijing perceived as an American effort to contain China’s grow-
ing regional economic weight.37 The BRI was also conceived as a way of coping
with the worsening security environment in China’s neighbourhood between 2009
and 2012, owing to conflicts in the East and South China seas and Washington’s
strategic rebalance to Asia. Prominent Chinese scholars such as Wang Jisi took the
https://csis-prod.s3.amazonaws.com/s3fs-public/publication/160328_Johnson_PresidentXiJinping_Web.
pdf; Weidong Liu and Michael Dunford, ‘Inclusive globalization: unpacking China’s Belt and Road Initia-
tive’, Area Development and Policy 1: 3, 2016, pp. 323–40; James Char, ‘Aspiring to be a global power: China’s
growing activism in the global South’, in Jacqueline Braveboy-Wagner, ed., Diplomatic strategies of nations in the
global South: the search for leadership (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2016), pp. 59–92; Xue Gong, ‘The Belt &
Road Initiative and China’s influence in southeast Asia’, The Pacific Review 32: 4, 2019, pp. 635–65.
34
de Jonge, ‘Perspectives on the emerging role of the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank’.
35
Mingjiang Li, ‘China’s economic power in Asia: the Belt and Road Initiative and the local Guangxi govern-
ment’s role’, Asian Perspective 43: 2, Spring 2019, pp. 273–95; Mingjiang Li, ‘From look-West to act-West:
Xinjiang’s role in China–central Asian relations’, Journal of Contemporary China 25: 100, July 2016, pp. 515–28;
Anchi Hoh, ‘From Qatar to Xinjiang: security in China’s Belt and Road Initiative’, Middle East Policy 25: 4,
2018, pp. 65–76, https://doi.org/10.1111/mepo.12378; Li-jun Xu, Xiao-chao Fan, Wei-qing Wang, Lei Xu,
You-lian Duan and Rui-jing Shi, ‘Renewable and sustainable energy of Xinjiang and development strategy
of node areas in the “Silk Road Economic Belt”’, Renewable and Sustainable Energy Reviews, no. 79, 2017, pp.
274–85, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.rser.2017.05.031.
36
Michelle Penna, ‘China’s Marshall Plan: all Silk Roads leading to Beijing?’, World Politics Review, 9 Dec. 2014,
https://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/articles/14618/china-s-marshall-plan-all-silk-roads-lead-to-beijing;
Lia Xing and Wan Wanga, ‘The “Silk Road economic belt” and the “China dream” relationship: a strategy or
tactic’, Sociology Study 5: 3, 2015, pp. 169–75; Shannon Tiezzi, ‘The new Silk Road: China’s Marshall Plan?’,
The Diplomat, 6 Nov. 2014, https://thediplomat.com/2014/11/the-new-silk-road-chinas-marshall-plan/.
37
Frank Tang, ‘How does China’s “One Belt, One Road” match up against the TPP?’, South China Morning Post,
24 Jan. 2017.
175

Mingjiang Li
lead in advocating a ‘westward engagement’ strategy.38 These ideas gained traction
in policy circles and provided further impetus for the BRI. Also, the BRI must
be understood in the broader context of changes that took place in Chinese poli-
tics after the 18th Party Congress in 2012. Under Xi Jinping’s political leadership,
Chinese foreign policy has been modified to serve the goal of achieving ‘grand
national rejuvenation’ and upgrading China’s international status. All these chang-
ing dynamics in Chinese politics and foreign policy fed into the BRI.39
The analysis presented above indicates that the BRI concept stemmed from a
combination of genuine economic considerations and vague geopolitical ambitions.
The expansion of Chinese influence and the elevation of Beijing’s status in inter-
national society have often been identified as major political objectives for the
BRI.40 Aside from these, it is difficult to pinpoint what other specific geostrategic
goals China aspired to attain through the BRI at the time of its launching. This
may be why many analysts simply emphasize the ‘potential’ enormous geopolit-
ical benefits of the BRI for China.41 It is even argued that the geopolitical purpose
of the BRI is ‘more ... defensive than offensive by nature’.42 Others caution that
we should not overestimate the original geostrategic rationale behind the BRI.
Jones, Zeng and Hameiri, for instance, argue:
BRI is not a coherent geopolitical plan but an agglomeration of many competing interests
and schemes, designed above all to absorb China’s surplus industrial capacity and capital.
It will unfold not according to some grand strategic masterplan designed in Beijing but
the often competing and incoherent interests of Chinese provinces, state-owned/private
enterprises, policy and commercial banks, and recipient states. Existing analyses vastly
exaggerate Beijing’s capacity to coordinate these actors towards a singular strategic goal.43
Protecting the BRI: China explores new strategic and security policies
Given the scale of the initiative and Beijing’s resolve to push it through, the BRI
is likely to change China’s geostrategic orientation significantly. At the macro
level, the impact of the BRI on China’s international strategy can be understood
38
Wang Jisi, ‘Xijin, zhongguo diyuan zhanlue de zai pingheng’ [Marching west: China’s geostrategic rebal-
ancing], Huanqiu shibao [Global Times], 17 Oct. 2012, http://opinion.huanqiu.com/opinion_world/2012-
10/3193760.html.
39
Theresa Fallon, ‘The new Silk Road: Xi Jinping’s grand strategy for Eurasia’, American Foreign Policy Interests
37: 3, 2015, pp. 140–47; Tiezzi, ‘The new Silk Road’; William A. Callahan, ‘China’s “Asia dream”: the Belt
Road Initiative and the new regional order’, Asian Journal of Comparative Politics 1: 3, 2016, pp. 226–43; Marcin
Kaczmarski, ‘Non-western visions of regionalism: China’s new Silk Road and Russia’s Eurasian Economic
Union’, International Affairs 93: 6, Nov. 2017, pp. 1357–76.
40
Hoo Tiang Boon, China’s global identity: considering the responsibilities of great power (Washington DC: George-
town University Press, 2018), pp. 139–42.
41
Jean-Marc F. Blanchard and Colin Flint, ‘The geopolitics of China’s maritime Silk Road Initiative’, Geopolitics
22: 2, 2017, pp. 223–45.
42
Yong Wang, ‘Offensive for defensive: the Belt and Road Initiative and China’s new grand strategy’, Pacific
Review 29: 3, 2016, pp. 455–63.
43
Lee Jones, Jinghan Zeng and Shahar Hameiri, Evidence on China’s ‘Belt and Road’ Initiative, written evidence
presented to the UK parliament, Dec. 2017, http://data.parliament.uk/writtenevidence/committeeevidence.
svc/evidencedocument/foreign-affairs-committee/china-and-the-international-rulesbased-system/writ-
ten/75536.pdf; see also Hameiri and Jones, ‘China challenges global governance?’.
176

from the perspective of Beijing’s increasing commitment to protecting its devel-
opmental interest, which is regarded as part of China’s core national interests.44
Growing interest in safeguarding developmental interest
Emphasis on protecting China’s developmental interest has been evident in
various official policy statements since the early 2000s. Beijing made its first state-
ment on ‘core interests’ in its 2005 white paper China’s endeavours for arms control,
disarmament and non-proliferation.45 In September 2011, the white paper on China’s
peaceful development made an official reference to developmental interest as one
of these core interests;46 since then, Chinese leaders have frequently referred to
the concept.47 In April 2014, at the first meeting of the Central National Security
Commission, Xi Jinping proposed the idea of ‘whole national security’ (zongti
guojia anquan guan), emphasizing the importance of political security, cultural
security and economic security as well as the traditional idea of security that hinges
on military power.48 Five years later, Chinese foreign minister Wang Yi stated that
his government’s efforts in helping Huawei, a giant Chinese telecommunications
company which was facing a context of US hostility, illustrated China’s protec-
tion of its legitimate developmental rights.49 These statements suggest that Beijing
is becoming more and more interested in using its hard power to defend its devel-
opmental interests outside China.
In addition to its role in ensuring security in the traditional sense, the People’s
Liberation Army (PLA) has been highly active in advocating a major role for itself
in the protection of China’s developmental interest.50 In an article published in
2007, Major-General (retired) Peng Guangqian, a former senior military analyst
at the PLA Academy of Military Science, made a strong argument that China,
no longer particularly worried about its existential security, should be more
44
Li Li, ‘Fazhan liyi zai zhongguo guojia liyi zhong de diwei yu zuoyong fenxi’ [Analysing the status and role
of developmental interest in China’s national interests], Journal of Hefei University of Technology (Social Sciences)
20: 6, Dec. 2006, pp. 21–5; Jinghan Zeng, Yuefan Xiao and Shaun Breslin, ‘Securing China’s core interests:
the state of the debate in China’, International Affairs 91: 2, March 2015, pp. 245–66.
45
‘China publishes white paper on arms control’, 1 Sept. 2005; http://www.china.org.cn/english/2005/
Aug/140343.htm.
46
China’s peaceful development, white paper (Beijing: Information Office of the State Council, Sept. 2011), http://
english.gov.cn/archive/white_paper/2014/09/09/content_281474986284646.htm.
47
Hoo Tiang Boon, ‘Hardening the hard, softening the soft: assertiveness and China’s regional strategy’, Journal
of Strategic Studies 40: 5, 2017, pp. 647–8.
48
‘Xi Jinping: jianchi zongti guojia anquan guan zou zhongguo tese guojia anquan daolu’ [Xi Jinping: adhere
to the concept of whole national security and take national security path with Chinese characteristics], press
release, Xinhua, 15 April 2014, http://www.xinhuanet.com//politics/2014-04/15/c_1110253910.htm.
49
‘State councillor and foreign minister Wang Yi answers questions on China’s foreign affairs at press conference’,
press release, Xinhua, 8 March 2019, http://www.xinhuanet.com/politics/2019-03/08/c_1124211466.htm.
50
‘Dali tuijin wo jun wuqi zhuangbei xiandaihua jianshe wei weihu guojia zhuquan anquan he fazhan liyi zuochu
xin de gengda gongxian’ [Push forward PLA arms development to make more contributions for safeguarding
national sovereignty, security, and developmental interest], PLA Daily, 8 Dec. 2011; ‘Jinjin niuzhu hexin junshi
nengli jianshe bu fangsong wei weihu guojia zhuquan anquan he fazhan liyi tigong jianqiang baozheng’ [Work
harder to enhance core military capabilities and safeguard national sovereignty, security, and developmental inter-
est], PLA Daily, 23 April 2011; ‘Nuli jianshe yu woguo guoji diwei xiangchen, yu guojia anquan he fazhan liyi
xiangshiying de gonggu guofang he qiangda jundui’ [Strive to build solid national defence and a strong military
compatible with China’s international status, security, and developmental interest], PLA Daily, 14 Nov. 2012.
177

Mingjiang Li
concerned about western threats to its national development. He listed half a
dozen major threats that had the potential to prevent China from exercising its
right to development: growing external support for various secessionist forces
seeking to damage China’s unity; limited access to global resources; actions and
events that upset the normal economic and financial order in China; policies that
undermine China’s exploitation of maritime resources; control of choke-points
in sea lanes; and activities that destabilize the socio-political order in China. In
view of these potential threats, he advocated greater effort on the part of the PLA
to protect China’s developmental interest in addition to its established role of
safeguarding national security in the traditional sense.51
Obviously, the BRI has become one of the most important elements in
China’s pursuit of its developmental interest, which constitutes an overarching
policy rubric under which Chinese leaders are keen to formulate effective geopo-
litical strategy and security policies for the purpose of safeguarding BRI invest-
ments and projects. Naturally, the Chinese policy community has been seriously
concerned about the security challenges facing BRI implementation, and has
identified the main threats as geopolitical contestations, territorial and maritime
disputes, regional states’ domestic political uncertainties, terrorism, piracy and
transboundary organized crime.52 BRI-related security challenges associated
with finance,53 culture,54 the borderlands,55 Chinese nationals overseas56 and even
climate change57 have also been examined. Many policy proposals have been made
to deal with these challenges.
Socio-political responses
One proposal is to establish a good security warning system. The Shanghai Institute
of International Studies, for instance, used artificial intelligence technologies to
establish a security warning and analysis system for the BRI.58 Terrorism features
51
Peng Guangqian, ‘Cong zhuozhong weihu shengcun liyi dao zhuozhong weihu fazhan liyi’ [A shift from
safeguarding existential interest to protecting developmental interest], Zhongguo guofang bao [China National
Defence Newspaper], 18 Jan. 2007.
52
Du Qinghao, ‘Yidai yilu zhanlue mianlin de anquan fengxian he duice jianyi’ [Security risks for the BRI and
policy suggestions], Shishi qiushi [Seeking Truth from Facts], no. 6, 2016, pp. 29–33; Liu Haiquan, ‘Yidai yilu
zhanlue de anquan tiaozhan yu zhongguo de xuanze’ [Security changes for the BRI and China’s choices],
Taipingyang xuebao [Pacific Journal] 23: 2, Feb. 2015, pp. 72–9; Zhang Jie, ‘Yidai yilu jianshe zhong de zhoubian
anquan wenti’ [Security problems for the BRI in the neighbouring regions], Shijie zhishi [World Affairs], no.
9, 2017, pp. 20–23.
53
Wan Zhe, ‘Yidai yilu yu jinrong anquan’ [The BRI and financial security], China Finance, no. 15, 2017, pp. 50–52.
54
Su Juan, ‘Yidai yilu yu zhongguo wenhua anquan’ [The BRI and China’s cultural security], Dongnanya yanjiu
[South-east Asian Studies], no. 3, 2017, pp. 106–22.
55
Li Genglun, ‘Yidai yilu zhanlue yu woguo bianjiang anquan’ [The BRI and China’s borderland security],
Journal of Hubei University for Nationalities 4: 34, 2016, pp. 32–6, 91; Yang Li and Ma Binfeng, ‘Yidai yilu zhanlue
yu xibei bianjiang wenhua anquan mianlin de tiaozhan he yingdui’ [The BRI and challenges to northwest
borderland cultural security and responses], Social Sciences in Ningxia 6: 206, Nov. 2017, pp. 141–6.
56
Lu Wengang and Wei Tian, ‘Yidai yilu yanxian guojia haiwai zhongguo gongmin anquan fengxian pinggu yu
zhili yanjiu’ [Assessment and governance of the security risks of Chinese nationals in BRI countries], Guangxi
shehui kexue [Social Sciences in Guangxi] 9: 267, 2017, pp. 65–9.
57
Wang Zhifang, ‘Zhongguo jianshe yidai yilu mianlin de qihou anquan fengxian’ [The climate risks for China’s
BRI], Guoji zhengzhi yanjiu [International Political Studies], no. 4, 2015, pp. 56–72.
58
Zhou Yiqi and Feng Shuai, ‘Anquan fengxian fenxi de fangfa chuangxin yu shijian’ [Methodological innova-
178

prominently in Chinese experts’ assessment of risks for the BRI. According
to one study, of the countries that may participate in it 40 are peaceful, 15 are
risky, eleven are in a state of unrest and five (Afghanistan, India, Iraq, Pakistan
and Syria) are alarmingly highly risky.59 Some scholars suggest that Beijing can
protect its BRI interests by enhancing cooperation on law enforcement with
other countries.60 China could also significantly strengthen cooperation with BRI
countries themselves to counter cyberterrorism.61 Others argue that China will
need to focus on winning the minds and hearts of people in the host countries
to better protect its investments in energy pipelines.62 This last proposal makes
sense, as the poor corporate social responsibility performance of many Chinese
enterprises investing in foreign countries has aroused negative responses from the
societies in the host countries. Apparently, this ‘soft power’ approach has been
accepted by Beijing: Xi Jinping announced at the 2019 BRI summit that China
would pay more attention to the quality and sustainability of BRI projects.
Playing a bigger role in shaping security in BRI regions

Another suggestion made by many Chinese policy analysts is that China could
better protect the BRI by playing a more active role in regional security issues.
They believe that China should aim to provide public security goods in various
regions. They also stress that China will need to enhance security coopera-
tion with other major countries and regional organizations in disaster relief
and maritime search-and-rescue operations.63 China could also consider setting
up regional security funds to help finance regional security cooperation in the
non-traditional security sectors.64 Even in the traditional security realm, there
have been suggestions that China should play a more direct role in a number of
regions. Liu, for instance, suggests that China should take a more proactive role
in shaping security in the Middle East by applying the ‘New Security Concept’
in the region.65 He argues that China should use the non-intervention principle
tion and practice in security risk analysis], Guoji zhanwang [Global Review] 9: 5, 2017, Sept.–Oct. 2017, pp.
147–66.
59
Zhao Minyan et al., ‘Yidai yilu yanxian guojia anquan xingshi pinggu ji duice’ [Security assessment in BRI
countries and policy responses], Journal of China Academy of Sciences 31: 6, 2016, pp. 689–96.
60
Xiong Anbang, ‘Yidai yilu fazhan zhanlue xia de zhifa anquan guoji hezuo jizhi yanjiu’ [International law
enforcement cooperation mechanism under the BRI], Journal of Hubei University of Police 11: 170, Nov. 2015, pp.
101–106; Lu Jing, ‘Zhongguo yu yidai yilu yanxian guojia zhifa anquan hezuo xin xing jiazhi fanshi goujian’
[Mechanisms of law enforcement cooperation between China and BRI countries], Journal of Shandong Police
College 2: 152, 2017, pp. 147–53.
61
Wang Xiaofeng, ‘Wangluo kongbu zhuyi yu yidai yilu wangluo anquan hezuo’ [Cyberterrorism and cyber-
security cooperation under the BRI], Guoji zhanwang [Global Review], no. 4, 2016, pp. 116–32.
62
Xie Minghua and Yang Mingzhu, ‘Yidai yilu youqi tongdao jianshe de diyuan zhengzhi he anquan fengxian’
[Geopolitical and security risks for oil and gas pipelines under BRI], Tansuo [Exploration], no. 2, 2016, pp.
63–9; and Li Chenyang and James Char, ‘China–Myanmar relations since Naypyidaw’s political transition: how
Beijing can balance short-term interests and long-term values’, RSIS Working Paper, no. 288, 16 March 2015.
63
Zhao Minghao, ‘Yidai yilu jianshe de anquan baozhang wenti chuyi’ [Analysing the security measures for the
BRI], Guoji luntan [International Forum] 18: 2, March 2016, pp. 1–6.
64
Liu, ‘Yidai yilu zhanlue de anquan tiaozhan yu zhongguo de xuanze’, pp. 72–9; Xia Zijun, ‘Yidai yilu tuijin
zhong shishi guojia anquan zhanlue tanxi’ [Analysing national security strategy in the promotion of the BRI],
Journal of Jiangnan Social University 18: 2, June 2016, pp. 8–21.
65
The Chinese ‘New Security Concept’ emphasizes mutual trust, mutual benefits, equality and collaboration;
179

Mingjiang Li
creatively to contribute to solving the Middle East problem, to strengthen the
security capacity of regional states and to ‘increase China’s military presence in
the region to an appropriate level’.66 Another ambitious proposal is that China
dramatically increase its cooperation with BRI countries in space and satellite
navigation. China could use its advantages in civil–military satellite technologies
both to advance the implementation of BRI projects and to enhance the PLA’s
ability to defend national interests.67
The BRI has fuelled Chinese interest in revamping the regional security order
in the Asia–Pacific. For most of the 1990s, Beijing to a large extent respected the
status quo in the region, given its focus on domestic economic development, its
limited power and its need to maintain stable relations with America and with
neighbouring states. Since the late 1990s, however, Beijing has begun to gradu-
ally adjust the regional security order in its favour through various political and
economic means.68 In the 2010s, for example, this took the form of assertive
behaviour by Beijing in the East China Sea and the South China Sea. In 2014 at
the Conference on Interaction and Confidence Building Measures in Asia (CICA),
in a move clearly designed to weaken the US role in Asian security, President Xi
Jinping proposed a new regional security vision centred on ‘Asia for Asians’.69
It is argued that China could leverage the increased cooperation and trust
generated by the BRI to phase out the US-centred bilateral security system and
eventually build an east Asian security community. One proposal specifically
advocates two steps to this end: first, the establishment of an East Asian Security
and Cooperation Conference; second, the setting up of an East Asian Security and
Cooperation Organization, which would serve as the most comprehensive and
authoritative institution for regional security and cooperation.70
On a more philosophical level, Professor Liu Jiangyong of Tsinghua Univer-
sity has proposed a ‘sea–land peace and cooperation approach’ (hai lu he he lun)
to address the geopolitical tensions that the BRI may generate and the security
challenges that could undermine it. He argues that all states, whether coastal or
land-locked, should downplay geopolitics to focus on win–win cooperation,
with the aim of enhancing connectivity and creating a networked community of
common interests and common security.71
see ‘China’s position paper on the New Security Concept’, https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/ce/ceun/eng/xw/
t27742.htm.
66
Liu Zhongmin, ‘Zai zhongdong tuijin yidai yilu jianshe de zhengzhi he anquan fengxian ji yingdui’ [Political
and security risks for the BRI in the Middle East and policy responses], Guoji guancha [Global Review], no.
2, 2018, pp. 36–49.
67
He Qisong, ‘Tianji silu zhu tui yidai yilu zhanlue shishi’ [Space-based Silk Road to facilitate the BRI], Guoji
anquan yanjiu [International Security Study], no. 3, 2016, pp. 73–89.
68
David Shambaugh, ‘China engages Asia: reshaping the regional order’, International Security 29: 3, 2004, pp.
64–99.
69
‘Xi defines new Asian security vision at CICA’, Global Times, 22 May 2014, http://www.globaltimes.cn/
content/861573.shtml.
70
Zhai Xin and Liu Chengchen, ‘Yidai yilu jianshe zhong de Dongya anquan he hezuo jizhu chonggou’ [Recon-
figuration of east Asian security and cooperation mechanism in the context of the BRI], Dongbeiya luntan
[Northeast Asian Forum] 3: 131, 2017, pp. 29–37.
71
Liu Jiangyong, ‘Hailu he he lun: yidai yilu kechixu anquan de diyuan zhenzhixue’ [Sea–land integration
theory: geopolitics and sustained security for the BRI], Guoji anquan yanjiu [International Security Study] 5,
2015, pp. 3–21.
180

The role of the Chinese military
Researchers at the Chinese National Defence University (NDU) and the Academy
of Military Science have undertaken research projects on the protection of China’s
developmental interest in relation to the BRI and submitted policy proposals to
top PLA leaders.72 Recognizing that China lacks the military power to provide
comprehensive support to every project implemented under the BRI,73 PLA
researchers have focused on modifying the Chinese military’s role to better protect
China’s interests in this context. One suggestion is that Beijing do more to estab-
lish various private security forces with tacit PLA support or involvement,74
despite the fact that China has already encountered various diplomatic and polit-
ical challenges in encouraging its private security firms to play a larger role in
protecting its interests in foreign countries.75
Chinese military analysts have argued that the BRI necessitates the country’s
military ‘going out’. They believe that the military should play a bigger role in
protecting the BRI through enhanced military/defence diplomacy. This would
involve the Chinese military building stronger and more substantive ties with
other countries’ defence forces through military training, defence technologies,
military aid, arms sales and port calls. They advocate a proactive role for the PLA
in military operations outside conflict situations. Examples include commercial
shipping protection, international disaster relief, joint exercises and joint counter-
terrorism activities. Areas as far off as the Gulf of Guinea have been identified for
such activities for the PLA Navy.76 In addition, Chinese military deployments
are advocated at strategic channels, major ports, energy bases and mineral mines
where China has significant stakes.77 NDU Professor Li Daguang surmises that
ultimately China will need to build a joint force capable of conducting long-
distance combat operations to effectively support the BRI.78 Some of these policy
proposals have been gradually implemented. In Africa, for instance, China has
taken ‘a systematic, pan-African approach to security on the continent’79 and
72
Author’s interview with NDU researcher, Beijing, July 2018.
73
Author’s interviews with over 20 Chinese think-tank analysts, Beijing, Xiamen and Shanghai, Dec. 2018.
74
Dong Xuebing et al., ‘Zhongshi fengxian fangkong he anquan baozhang wei yidai yilu jianshe huhang’ [Pay
more attention to risk control and security measures to protect the BRI], Ziguangge [Ziguangge Journal], no.
5, 2017, pp. 40–42; Ji Mingkui, ‘Yidai yilu guihua xuyao zhongshi haiwai anquan baozhang’ [BRI plans need
overseas security protection], Zhongguo touzi [China Investment], no. 6, 2015, pp. 51–6. Other Chinese schol-
ars have made similar suggestions: see Dai Desheng and Wang Yong, ‘Meiguo guanyu siying junshi anbao
gongsi de falv guizhi ji qi dui zhongguo shishi yidai yilu zhanlue de qishi’ [US legal regulations of private
military security companies and the implications for China’s BRI], Jianghai xuekan [Jianghai Journal], no. 5,
2017, pp. 202–208.
75
Andrea Ghiselli, ‘Market opportunities and political responsibilities: the difficult development of Chinese private
security companies abroad’, Armed Forces and Society, publ. online 5 Nov. 2018, doi: 10.1177/0095327X18806517.
76
Liu Lei and He Jian, ‘Yidai yilu changyi xia de Zhong Fei haishang anquan hezuo’ [Sino-African maritime
cooperation under the BRI], Guoji anquan yanjiu [International Security Study], no. 1, 2017, pp. 98–117.
77
Li Daguang, ‘Yidai liu zhanlue gouxiang xia de junshi waijiao’ [Military diplomacy under the BRI], Zhongguo
jun zhuan min [Military–Civil Transition in China], no. 11, 2015, pp. 73–7.
78
Li, ‘Yidai liu zhanlue gouxiang xia de junshi waijiao’; Liu Lin, ‘Yidai yilu yanxian zhanlue zhidian yu junshi
waijiao jianshe’ [Pivots and military diplomacy under the BRI], Shijie zhishi [World Affairs], no. 15, 2017, pp.
62–4.
79
Michael Kovrig, ‘China expands its peace and security footprint in Africa’, Commentary (Brussels: Interna-
tional Crisis Group, 24 Oct. 2018).
181

Mingjiang Li
a ‘comprehensive approach, blending trade and investment deals and cultural
exchanges with arms sales, medical assistance, troops training, anti-piracy drills
and other programs’.80
Chinese security experts seem to be particularly interested in finding some
‘pivot’ states or locations where China could explore much more substantive
security cooperation to protect the BRI.81 In the words of an analyst at the
Academy of Military Science, China needs ‘pivots’ simply because it ‘currently
does not have the capability to build a system that would provide global coverage
for the protection of its overseas interests’.82 Such a pivot could be a state, or
it might be an overseas base close to a major port that can provide significant
support to the BRI. The Chinese decision to build a naval base (which Beijing
calls a ‘supply centre’) in Djibouti has been primarily motivated by geo-economic
interest, but geopolitical considerations have also been important.83 This newly
established naval base in Djibouti may be a good example of the ‘pivot’ strategy.
Pakistan has also been identified as a potential ‘pivot’ state. According to Chinese
policy analysts, Pakistan could fulfil this role in four ways: (a) by keeping China’s
western regions safe from terrorism; (b) by facilitating China’s participation in
Indian Ocean affairs; (c) by constraining India; and (d) by using the Gwadar port
to improve the security of maritime transport.84
The above analysis clearly suggests that the BRI has expanded China’s security
interest in Asia and beyond quite significantly. It has also prompted the Chinese
policy community to research and identify substantial modifications to the coun-
try’s international security policy. Driven by the BRI, a few new policies can be
expected in the coming decade: stronger military-to-military relations between
China and many BRI countries; a more active PLA role in various regional non-
traditional security activities; a stronger PLA presence in the Indo-Pacific region;
additional Chinese military bases or logistics centres in the Indian Ocean region;
and slightly more interventionist Chinese foreign policies in the BRI regions.
However, it should be noted that Beijing is also likely to take a cautious, gradual
approach to making these changes to its security policy, owing to several factors:
its limited capabilities; political and security sensitivities in other countries of the
region; the continuing constraints of China’s non-intervention principle; and
Beijing’s concerns about the major powers’ geostrategic responses.85
Certainly, the BRI is not going to prompt a complete overhaul of China’s
international security policy. For instance, it is unlikely that Beijing will emulate
US security policy any time soon in respect of its strong global military presence,
formal security commitments in many parts of the world, and occasional forceful
interventions when its domestic interests are at stake. But this does not mean that
80
Lina Benabdallah, ‘China–Africa military ties have deepened’, Washington Post, 6 July 2018.
81
Author’s interviews with Chinese analysts, Beijing, Xiamen and Shanghai, Dec. 2018.
82
Liu Lin, ‘Yidai yilu yanxian zhanlue zhidian yu junshi waijiao jianshe’.
83
Mordechai Chaziza, China’s military base in Djibouti, Mideast Security and Policy Studies, no. 153 (Ramat Gan:
Begin–Sadat Center for Strategic Studies, Aug. 2018).
84
Liu Haiquan, ‘Yidai yilu zhanlue de anquan tiaozhan yu zhongguo de xuanze’; Liu Zhongmin, ‘Zai zhong-
dong tuijin yidai yilu jianshe de zhengzhi he anquan fengxian ji yingdui’.
85
Author’s interviews with Chinese policy analysts, Beijing, Xiamen and Shanghai, Dec. 2018.
182

Beijing will not gradually revise some of its foreign and security policies. The new
security proposals presented above clearly suggest a strong desire in the Chinese
policy community to protect BRI investments and to ensure the safety of Chinese
nationals in various regions and countries, along with a sense that this is a matter
of urgency. These proposals, over time, may culminate in a new Chinese geopo-
litical strategy in the Indo-Pacific region and in the Eurasian continent. These
dynamics suggest that both economic activities per se and the need for policy
adaptation to protect economic interests help to generate geostrategic imperatives.
This is a quite different picture from that painted by the conventional wisdom that
economic tools are employed to serve well-defined pre-existing geopolitical goals.
The BRI’s geopolitical repercussions

Mainstream discourse in China emphasizes the mutual consultation, mutual
endeavours and mutual benefits associated with the BRI, and the benefits of long-
term economic development for many participating countries. Chinese leaders,
media and analysts alike have stated that the BRI represents a Chinese project to
provide public international goods and that it is a proposal to revive globalization.
Chinese official statements have downplayed and even dismissed adverse geopo-
litical implications arising from the BRI.
The views expressed by other major powers and many international opinion-
formers are starkly different. The BRI is said to be a means for Beijing to promote
its own development model and consequently undermine the good governance
and human rights of 65 per cent of the world’s population and one-third of global
economic output.86 Another criticism is that Chinese infrastructure investments
fail to serve the needs of the host countries, increase waste through resource
misallocation,87 and increase the host countries’ debt burdens.88
In addition to these socio-economic concerns, many experts believe that the
BRI is primarily a geostrategic move by Beijing to dramatically expand Chinese
regional dominance.89 The BRI has been described as ‘the most ambitious and
all-encompassing economic development program in human history’,90 and
86
Richard Fontaine and Daniel Kliman, ‘On China’s new Silk Road, democracy pays a toll’, Foreign Policy, 16
May 2018, https://foreignpolicy.com/2018/05/16/on-chinas-new-silk-road-democracy-pays-a-toll/.
87
‘One Belt, One Road—and many questions’, Financial Times, 14 May 2017, https://www.ft.com/content/
d5c54b8e-37d3-11e7-ac89-b01cc67cfeec.
88
James M. Dorsey, ‘Scoring an own goal: China’s Belt and Road funding terms spark criticism’, Japan Times, 28
March 2018, https://www.japantimes.co.jp/opinion/2018/03/28/commentary/world-commentary/scoring-
goal-chinas-belt-road-funding-terms-spark-criticism/#.WzyNLtUzbIU; ‘OBOR trouble: now, IMF chief
Christine Lagarde sends this big warning to China over BRI’, Financial Express, 12 April 2018, https://www.
financialexpress.com/world-news/obor-trouble-now-imf-chief-christine-lagarde-sends-this-big-warning-
to-china-over-bri/1130440/.
89
Maryanne Kelton, Michael Sullivan, Emily Bienvenue and Zac Rogers, ‘Australia, the utility of force and the
society-centric battlespace’, International Affairs 95: 4, July 2019, pp. 859–76; Doug Stokes, ‘Trump, American
hegemony and the future of the liberal international order’, International Affairs 94: 1, Jan. 2018, pp. 133–50;
Corey Wallace, ‘Leaving (north-east) Asia? Japan’s southern strategy’, International Affairs 94: 4, July 2018, pp.
883–904; Harsh V. Pant and Kartik Bommakanti, ‘India’s national security: challenges and dilemmas’, Inter-
national Affairs 95: 4, July 2019, pp. 835–58.
90
Gal Luft, Silk Road 2.0: US strategy toward China’s Belt and Road Initiative, Strategy Paper no. 11 (Washington
DC: Atlantic Council, Oct. 2017).
183

Mingjiang Li
‘the most ambitious global connectivity project ever launched by China or any
country’.91 David Arase argues that if the BRI is successful, it will result in ‘the
great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation’ and ‘the rebirth of a China-centred
Asia’.92 It has also been said that China is engaging in a ‘colonial race’ through
‘capital’ and ‘coercion’ to secure resources for the Chinese economy and to seek
naval base rights in Myanmar (Burma), Pakistan, Sri Lanka and the Seychelles in
the Indian Ocean region.93
India has openly opposed the BRI on grounds of sovereignty and territorial
integrity: the China–Pakistan Economic Corridor runs across Kashmir, through
territory claimed by India but occupied by Pakistan.94 Japan’s alternative quality
infrastructure plan has emerged as a strong rival to China’s BRI. The Japanese
government has pledged to invest US$200 billion in the infrastructure sectors of
many countries that are supposed to be participants in the BRI. Japan and India have
launched the Asia–Africa Growth Corridor to strengthen the economic connec-
tions between Africa, south Asia and south-east Asia. Japan has also become more
active in regional economic activities in eastern Europe in an effort to counter
China’s economic activism in that region. Tokyo is also interested in increasing
its military activities in the Indian Ocean,95 and is working together with New
Delhi on infrastructure projects in Africa, Iran, Sri Lanka and south-east Asia.96
Observers believe that the BRI is likely to significantly harm US geopolit-
ical interests. The BRI is poised to serve as a formidable challenge to the Pax
Americana, in particular the US strategic position in Asia.97 It is hypothesized
that the BRI could ‘change the global landscape, shifting the focus of strategy and
commerce to the Eurasian landmass from the waters surrounding it and reducing
the significance of U.S. naval supremacy’,98 and that ‘a Sinocentric Eurasian order
will marginalize US interest’.99 It is thus no surprise that Washington’s response to
the BRI has been markedly negative. Former secretary of state Rex Tillerson, for
91
Bipul Chatterjee and Saurabh Kumar, ‘Promises and pitfalls of the Belt and Road Initiative’, Asia Pacific Bulle-
tin, no. 388, 18 July 2017, pp. 1–2.
92
David Arase, ‘China’s two Silk Roads: implications for south-east Asia’ (amended version), ISEAS Perspective,
no. 2, 2015, pp. 1–11.
93
Paulo Vicente dos Santos Alves and Fabian Salum, ‘China’s colonial ambitions’, Knowledge
(Fontainebleau: INSEAD, 15 May 2017), https://knowledge.insead.edu/blog/insead-blog/chinas-
colonial-ambitions-6081?utm_source=INSEAD+Knowledge&utm_campaign=9243749cae-EMAIL_
CAMPAIGN_2017_05_18&utm_medium=email&utm_term=0_e079141ebb-9243749cae-249894885.
94
Rohan Mukherjee, ‘Japan’s strategic outreach to India and the prospects of a Japan–India alliance’, International
Affairs 94: 4, July 2018, pp. 835–60.
95
Keith Johnson, ‘Japan’s own Belt and Road’, Foreign Policy, 9 Feb. 2018, https://foreignpolicy.com/2018/02/09/
japan-takes-the-lead-in-countering-chinas-belt-and-road/.
96
Dipanjan Roy Chaudhury, ‘Pushing back against China’s One Belt One Road, India, Japan build strategic
“Great Wall”’, Economic Times, 16 May 2017, https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/economy/infra-
structure/pushing-back-against-chinas-one-belt-one-road-india-japan-build-strategic-great-wall/article-
show/58689033.cms.
97
Christopher Layne, ‘The US–Chinese power shift and the end of the Pax Americana’, International Affairs 94:
1, Jan. 2018, pp. 89–111; Joseph S. Nye, Jr, ‘The rise and fall of American hegemony from Wilson to Trump’,
International Affairs 95: 1, Jan. 2019, pp. 63–80.
98
Nadege Rolland, ‘China’s new Silk Road’, NBR Commentary, 12 Feb. 2015.
99
Joel Wuthnow, ‘Chinese perspectives on the Belt Road Initiative: strategic rationales, risks, and implications’,
Center for the Study of Chinese Military Affairs Institute for National Strategic Studies China Strategic Perspectives, no.
12, Oct. 2017.
184

instance, accused Beijing of practising ‘opaque contracts, predatory loan practices
and corrupt deals that mire nations in debt and undercut their sovereignty, denying
them their long-term, self-sustaining growth’.100 The 2017 US National Security
Strategy implied that the BRI was a Chinese attempt to ‘displace the United States
in the Indo-Pacific region, expand the reaches of its state-driven economic model,
and reorder the region in its favor’.101 Vice-President Mike Pence stated in a speech
at the Hudson Institute in October 2018 that a port built by Chinese companies
‘may soon become a forward military base for China’s growing blue-water navy’
and that Washington would strengthen partnerships across the region from India
to Samoa to ‘advance our vision of a free and open Indo-Pacific’.102 The US
Department of Defense’s Indo-Pacific strategy report emphasized the United States’
serious concern about ‘China’s potential to convert unsustainable debt burdens of
recipient countries or sub-national groups into strategic and military access’.103
Washington has reportedly begun to roll out its own financial arrangements
in cooperation with allies and partners to counter China’s BRI financing.104
Recently, the US Chamber of Commerce’s US–India Business Council and US–
Japan Business Council launched the Indo-Pacific Infrastructure Trilateral Forum
to encourage private-sector enterprises in India, Japan and the United States to
invest in regional infrastructure and connectivity.105 American leaders and senior
officials frequently remark that the new Better Utilization of Investment Leading
to Development (BUILD) Act, passed in 2018, can serve as a tool to counter China’s
BRI in the Indo-Pacific region.106 Very likely, the BRI will continue to be an issue
of strategic contestation between the United States and China amid Washington’s
growing concerns over a rising China’s ability to challenge US global leadership.107
It was perhaps inevitable that other major powers would evaluate the BRI from
a geopolitical perspective, as clearly demonstrated by the statements and actions
of the United States and others noted above. These major players are seriously
concerned about the geopolitical benefits that Beijing may gain from the BRI. It
is only logical to believe that these powers will mount a much stronger strategic
100
Quoted in Dorsey, ‘Scoring an own goal’.
101
National Security Strategy of the United States of America (Dec. 2017), p. 25; https://www.whitehouse.gov/
wp-content/uploads/2017/12/NSS-Final-12-18-2017-0905.pdf.
102
‘Remarks by Vice President Pence on the administration’s policy toward China’, Hudson Institute, Wash-
ington DC, 4 Oct. 2018, https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-statements/remarks-vice-president-pence-
administrations-policy-toward-china/.
103
US Department of Defense, Indo-Pacific strategy report.
104
Joel Wuthnow, ‘From friend to foe-ish: Washington’s negative turn on the Belt and Road Initiative’, Asan
Forum, 21 May 2018, http://www.theasanforum.org/from-friend-to-foe-ish-washingtons-negative-turn-on-
the-belt-and-road-initiative/.
105
‘Indo–Pacific infrastructure forum launched to tap private sector in India, United States and Japan’, Economic
Times, 15 May 2018, https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/economy/infrastructure/indo-pacific-infra-
structure-forum-launched-to-tap-private-sector-in-india-us-japan/articleshow/64171805.cms.
106
For an explanation of the BUILD Act, see Daniel F. Runde and Romina Bandura, The BUILD Act has passed:
what’s next? (Washington DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 12 Oct. 2018), https://www.
csis.org/analysis/build-act-has-passed-whats-next. See also then Acting Secretary of Defense Patrick M.
Shanahan’s speech at the Shangri-La Dialogue in Singapore, 1 June 2019, https://dod.defense.gov/News/
Transcripts/Transcript-View/Article/1871584/acting-secretary-shanahans-remarks-at-the-iiss-shangri-la-dia-
logue-2019/.
107
Naná de Graaff and Bastiaan van Apeldoorn, ‘US–China relations and the liberal world order: contending
elites, colliding visions?’, International Affairs 94: 1, Jan. 2018, pp. 113–31.
185

Mingjiang Li
push-back if China adopts many of the strategic and security policies currently
proposed by its policy community.
However, geopolitical rivalry could be mitigated if the BRI were to include
other major powers and become a truly multilateral policy platform. It is possible
to be cautiously optimistic about such a development, for three reasons. First,
Chinese leaders have always stated that the BRI is an inclusive economic initiative,
and accordingly continue to encourage major powers and other countries to take
part in this massive programme. Second, China realizes that it lacks the resources
to carry out this large-scale infrastructure-investment-cum-connectivity initiative
on its own. Third, we have seen positive signs of growing collaboration between
China and other major powers within the BRI framework. China and Japan, for
instance, have tentatively agreed to cooperate in infrastructure investments in
developing countries.108 Inside China, there is growing interest in exploring more
explicit rules and higher standards for China-funded infrastructure and industrial
projects in the BRI host countries.109 Better rules and standards for the BRI will
facilitate the participation of other major powers in the initiative.110 More multi-
lateral collaboration under the BRI umbrella may help mitigate the geopolitical
competition between China and other major players, as has already occurred in
the case of the AIIB.
Conclusion
All the signs indicate that the Chinese leader Xi Jinping views the BRI as a major
part of his foreign policy legacy in the decades ahead. The BRI is thus destined to
remain a key priority in China’s foreign policy and international strategy. There
is no doubt that it will have a major impact on international politics and interna-
tional security. Joining the ongoing debate on the subject, this article has sought
to explore the strategic consequences of the BRI in the Indo-Pacific region. A
few conclusions can be drawn from the analysis. First, many analysts believe that
Beijing has a very ambitious geostrategic agenda behind the BRI. Such a concern
can be grounded on a traditional theoretical understanding of geo-economics.
However, we should note that, prior to the inception of the BRI, China had only
vaguely conceived geopolitical objectives. On balance, economic factors played a
more important role than geopolitical ambitions in the policy deliberation on and
subsequent adoption of the initiative. The bulk of Beijing’s expanding geopo-
litical interests in the Indo-Pacific region and the Eurasian continent emerged after
the launch of the BRI.
Second, China’s desire to protect its economic interests in the BRI regions and
countries in the larger context of preserving its developmental interest is gradu-
ally transforming Chinese international strategy and significantly modifying its
108
‘Japan pledges to back BRI project, promote economic cooperation with China’, Business Standard, 26 Oct.
2018, https://www.business-standard.com/article/international/japan-pledges-to-back-bri-project-promote-
economic-cooperation-with-china-118102601194_1.html.
109
Author’s interviews with government-affiliated think-tank researchers, Beijing, Aug. 2018.
110
This was a core message that the Chinese government wanted to convey at the BRI summit in 2019.
186

security policy. These changes are likely to become manifest in an increasingly
large role for the Chinese military in protecting China’s developmental interest,
a stronger Chinese military presence beyond Asia, a more active Chinese role
in security issues in the BRI regions, growing Chinese military activities in the
domain of non-traditional security outside China, and enhanced military-to-
military partnerships between China and many other countries.
Third, a more visible Chinese security presence and more assertive security
strategy in the Indo-Pacific are likely to draw forth counter-measures from other
major powers, heightening security competition between these actors in the
region. The geopolitical concerns that the United States and other countries have
already expressed in response to the BRI attest to the high possibility of such a
scenario. Growing Chinese security activism in the Indo-Pacific region, driven by
the BRI, is unlikely to be overlooked by other major powers, partly because of the
significant strategic trust deficit between China and these powers. It is unfortunate
that the rivalry between the BRI and the FOIP is contributing to the prospect of
the United States and China being drawn into a ‘Thucydides trap’.111 As briefly
noted above, the only way to reduce the geopolitical rivalry between China and
other major powers is to transform the BRI from a China-dominated initiative
into a multilateral platform and encourage greater participation by other major
players in regional and cross-regional economic cooperation, as Beijing did with
the AIIB.
Fourth, this study has some theoretical implications for the field of economic
statecraft and geo-economics. While the received wisdom suggests that states
often uses economic means for political ends in their relations with other states,
this study reveals that geo-economic schemes many also prompt the initiating
state to develop new geostrategic interests and objectives. These new interests and
objectives then transform that state’s international security strategy, which in turn
may create completely new dynamics in its security ties with other countries. This
article suggests that it would be useful to pay more attention to this new analytical
angle in studies on the geo-economics–security nexus.
111
Graham Allison, Destined for war: can America and China escape Thucydides’s trap? (New York: Houghton Mifflin
Harcourt, 2017).
187
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The Belt and Road Initiative: geo-economics and Indo-Paciﬁc security

Article in International Affairs · January 2020

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International Affairs 96: 1 (2020) 169–187; doi: 10.1093/ia/iiz240

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Geo-economics and China’s BRI strategy

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Geo-economics: how it works

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Driving forces behind the BRI

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Playing a bigger role in shaping security in BRI regions

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The role of the Chinese military

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The BRI’s geopolitical repercussions

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