FSC.

DEL/184/08
26 November 2008

Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe ENGLISH only

Secretariat

Conference Services

Please find attached the presentation by Major General Paul Schafer, United States European
Command, on the U.S. European Command's Strategy for Active Security, delivered to the
565th Meeting of the Forum for Security Co-operation on 26 November 2008.
 USEUCOM
Strategy of Active Security
Maj Gen Paul Schafer, J5/8
26 Nov 2008
The overall classification of this briefing is
UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

EUCOM Region and Mission

47
47 Countries
Countries ++
33 Principalities
Principalities and
and the
the
Holy
Holy See
See

Defend
Defend the
the Homeland
Homeland Forward
Forward and
and Support
Support U.S.
U.S. and
and Partner
Partner Strategic
Strategic Interests
Interests by:
by:
• Maintaining ready forces for global operations (unilateral or in concert with coalition partners)
• Securing strategic access and enabling global freedom of action
• Enhancing transatlantic security through support of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization
(NATO)
• Promoting regional stability
• Countering terrorism
UNCLASSIFIED
2

1
 UNCLASSIFIED

EUCOM Organization
DCDR
SACEUR/CDR
SACEUR/CDR EUCOM EUCOM
One
One of
of Only
Only Two
Two Forward
Forward
Based
Based Geographic
Geographic
Combatant
Combatant Commands
Commands

TOTAL
TOTAL
Military
Military Strength
Strength Mons,
USAREUR
USAREUR 45,740
45,740 Belgium Stuttgart,
USAFE
USAFE 26,960
26,960
NAVEUR
NAVEUR 6,580
6,580 Germany
MARFOREUR
MARFOREUR 140
140
SOCEUR
SOCEUR 1,860
1,860
Reserve/NG
Reserve/NG (daily
(dailyavg)
avg)
avg) 3,800
3,800
TOTAL
TOTAL 85,080
85,080

USAFE USAREUR MARFOREUR SOCEUR NAVEUR

Ramstein,
Ramstein, Heidelberg, Stuttgart, Stuttgart, Naples,
Germany Germany Germany Germany Italy
UNCLASSIFIED
3

UNCLASSIFIED

Strategic Vision
Theater Objectives & Security Challenges
•• Dynamic
Dynamic and
and diverse
diverse region
region
Capable
Capable and
and Expeditionary
Expeditionary Transformed,
Transformed, Expeditionary,
Expeditionary,
NATO
NATO •• Wide spectrum
Wide spectrum ofof Trained
Trained and
and Ready
Ready Forces
Forces
challenges
challenges
•• Rising
Rising Russia
Russia
•• Extremists
Extremists in in Europe
Europe
Strengthened
Strengthened Partnerships
Partnerships –– Sanctuary,
Sanctuary, battleground,
battleground, Protection
Protection ofof Allies,
Allies, Partners,
Partners,
recruitment,
recruitment, logistics
logistics and
and U.S.
U.S. Interests
Interests is
is Assured
Assured
base
base
–– Al
Al Qaida
Qaida (AQ)-inspired
(AQ)-inspired
terrorist
terrorist groups
groups plotting
plotting
Improved
Improved Partner
Partner Nation
Nation operations
operations
Capabilities
Capabilities and
and Capacities
Capacities Strategic
•• Potential
Potential flashpoints
flashpoints in in Strategic Freedom
Freedom of
of Action
Action
Balkans,
Balkans, Caucasus,
Caucasus, Levant,
Levant,
and
and Turkey’s
Turkey’s Eastern
Eastern border
border
Russia
•• Illegal
Illegal immigration
immigration andand drug
drug
Russia as
as Responsible
Responsible
trafficking
trafficking Regional
Regional Crisis
Crisis Precluded
Precluded
Partner
Partner
•• Shifting
Shifting Demographics
Demographics

UNCLASSIFIED
4

2
 UNCLASSIFIED

Terrorism
EUCOM region continues to be key battleground in the War on Terror

ATTACKS
Nov 03 Istanbul, Turkey Synagogues, UK Banks
and Consulate
London Bombings
Feb 04 Moscow, Russia Subway bombing Köln IED plot
Mar 04 Madrid, Spain Commuter train bombings
Nov 04 Amsterdam, NL Theo Van Gogh murder
Jul 05 London, UK Subway/bus bombings
Jul 06 Köln, GE Failed IEDs on trains
Jun 07 London, UK Attempted VBIEDs vs.
IJU plot
London theater district,
Glasgow airport

DISRUPTED PLOTS

Dec 04 Berlin, GE Iraqi PM assassination plot

Van Gogh Murder
Jun 06 Timisoara, RO VBIED/mass casualty plot
Madrid Bombings
Aug 06 London, UK Plot vs. US-bound aircraft
Sep 06 Odense, DE Plot vs. various U/I targets
Sep 06 Oslo, Norway Plot vs. US/Israeli interests Istanbul Bombings

Sep 07 Ulm, GE IJU plot vs. US targets

UNCLASSIFIED
5

UNCLASSIFIED

Violent Extremist Operations

• Europe is key battleground with global terrorist

movement sustained by “franchise” operations Madrid Bombings, March 2004

– Istanbul (2003), Madrid (2004), London (2005)

• Three Germany-based, Pakistan-trained
Islamic Jihad Union (IJU) operatives arrested
Sep
– Planned to use 730kg of H2O2 in Vehicle Born London Bombings, July 2005
Improvised Explosive Devices
– Possible targets: Frankfurt airport, Ramstein,
discotheque

Foiled Germany IJU Plot, September 2007

UNCLASSIFIED
6

3
 UNCLASSIFIED//FOUO

Violent Extremism Increasing in

Europe & Eurasia
Europe Terrorist Attacks &
• Significant increase in overall terrorist arrests and attacks Arrests
in Europe from ‘06 to ’07 1200
2006
1000 2007

– Most separatist related in France and Spain 800

8%
7%
600

• Increasing violent extremist attacks and related fatalities in

+4
+1
400

Eurasia 200

0
Attacks Arrests

– Vast majority in Russia Europe & Eurasia Islamic

Terrorist Attacks & Fatalities
• Increasing threat level seen from violent extremists in 35
2006
Europe 30 2007

25

– In 2007, less than 1% of failed & successful terrorist 20

15
attacks but almost 20% of arrests

%
40

80
10

+2

+1
5
– Increased arrests related to attack planning and 0

recruitment Attacks Killed

Europe Islamic Extremist

– Public statements by AQ senior leadership continue to 16
Arrests
tout Europe as desired attack venue 14
2006
2007
12

– Europeans see AQ mergers in Africa as increasing 10

threat to Europe due to increasing external ops focus

8%

5%
6

+1

+7
4

2
UNCLASSIFIED/FOUO 0
Attack Related Recruitment
7 Sources: NCTC WITS, EUROPOL TESAT 2007, 2008

UNCLASSIFIED

Energy Security
• AQ has stated desire to target West’s
economy

• Foreign fighters from Iraq have

experience in attacking energy sector

• Returning foreign fighters of concern

Crude oil tanker fire, Bosphorus
Straits (1994)

Al Qaida attack on French oil tanker, Limburg (2002)

UNCLASSIFIED
8

4
 UNCLASSIFIED

European Energy Infrastructure

UNCLASSIFIED//FOUO

UNCLASSIFIED//FOUO

LNG Terminals

Nab
ucc
o

• Network has
potential
vulnerabilities
oil
gas
UNCLASSIFIED
9

UNCLASSIFIED

Cyber Threats
• Cyber attacks against Georgia during Aug 08 conflict

• April 2007 cyber riot in Estonia

• Precipitated by Estonian govt. decision to move

WW-II statue

• Hackers conducted denial of service attacks for

several days

• Press reports of Chinese hackers trying to access

European govt. computers

• Hackers constantly attempt to attack Pentagon

computer systems
Soviet World War II Statue
in Estonia
• Undersea cable cuts off Egyptian coast significantly
reduce regional communications

UNCLASSIFIED
10 Source: Reuters, AP, BBC

5
 UNCLASSIFIED

Regional Instability
Caucasus
Chechnya
• Caucasus is a key transit route North Ossetia
for Caspian energy
Inguschetia
• BTC oil pipeline
Dagestan
• SCP gas pipeline
Abkhazia
• Area plagued by numerous
ethnic conflicts BTC/SCP
South Ossetia Pipelines

• Russian-Georgia conflict
stopped flow for several days

• May increase risk calculation

for future pipeline projects

• Re-ignition of Nagorno-
Karabakh conflict is potential
threat to pipelines Ethnic Nagorno-Karabakh
Conflicts

UNCLASSIFIED
11

UNCLASSIFIED

Regional Instability
The Balkans
• Kosovo: Declaration of Independence on 17
Feb 08
– Violent protests following declaration; border
posts and U.S. Embassy Belgrade damaged (17
Feb – 31 Mar)
• Bosnia: Real integration of ethnic entities
problematic - increase in ethnic rhetoric
• Only one high-level Persons Indicted For War
Crimes (PIFWC) still at-large

162
162 PIFWCs
PIFWCs
161
161 In
In Custody
Custody // Dead
Dead
11 At
At Large
Large
•• RATKO
RATKO MLADIC:
MLADIC: Genocide
Genocide
(Siege
(Siege of
of Sarajevo,
Sarajevo, Srebrenica)
Srebrenica)

UNCLASSIFIED
12

6
 UNCLASSIFIED

Regional Instability
Turkey’s Eastern Border

• Kurdish Worker's Party (PKK), a.k.a. KGK

• Armed wing: People’s Defense Forces (HPG)
• Terrorist wing: Kurdistan Freedom Hawks
(TAK)
• Estimated 3,000-5,000 PKK combatants in
northern Iraq PKK Fighter

• Turkish cross-border operations against PKK

safe havens
• U.S. supports Turkey in its struggle against
terrorism

UNCLASSIFIED
13 Source: BBC, CNN

UNCLASSIFIED

Regional Instability
The Levant
• Syria:
– Continues to play de-stabilizing role
in Lebanon
• Palestinian Authority Territory:
– Fatah vs. Hamas
– IDF vs. Hamas, Fatah
• Lebanon:
– LAF vs. Fatah al Islam
– Government vs. Hizballah
– IDF vs. Hizballah
• 2006 Israel/Hizballah conflict:
– Renewed conflict possible
– Regional implications
UNCLASSIFIED
14

7
 UNCLASSIFIED

EUCOM Strategy of Active Security

• Derived from National level guidance
• Supports two over-arching Strategic Objectives:
• Defend the Homeland
• Create and Maintain an Environment that Supports the
Strategic Interest of the U.S. and our Allies and Partners
• USEUCOM is uniquely positioned to actively engage our
strategic partners in Europe, Eurasia, and the Levant
• Forward presence and strategic location
• New and enduring partnerships allow us to proactively foster
opportunities and rapidly respond to challenges

BUILDING PARTNERSHIP CAPACITY

UNCLASSIFIED
15

UNCLASSIFIED

A Strategy of Active Security

• Expresses the Commander’s intent and guidance for the AOR
• Provides guidance and a framework for everything we do
• Security Cooperation Activities
• Exercises and Training
• Contingency Planning and Crisis Response
• Resourcing and In-Theater Force Posture and Installations
• Realities of our environment demand a new focus
• Security Cooperation, Training and Exercise, and Contingency and
Theater Posture Plans will no longer operate as separate “stovepipes”
• Focus is on integrated, proactive efforts in the theater to achieve EUCOM
Objectives
• Re-think our processes for long-term security cooperation
• Proper resourcing of Peacetime Engagement versus Contingency
Response
• Collaborating with Allies and partners to achieve common goals

UNCLASSIFIED
16

8
 UNCLASSIFIED
The Strategy and Theater Campaign Plan

NSS, NDS, NMS, UCP, GEF, JSCP 88 Theater

Theater Objectives
Objectives
•• Transformed,
Transformed, Expeditionary,
Expeditionary,
Trained
Trained and
and Ready
Ready Forces
Forces
Strategy of Active Security •• Capable
Capable and
and Expeditionary
Expeditionary
Functional NATO
NATO
Plans •• Strengthened
Strengthened Partnerships
Partnerships
In Execution Theater Campaign Plan with
with Europe
Europe
• Global War on Terror •• Improved
Improved Partner
Partner Nation
Nation
• Combating Weapons of Mass Europe Eurasia Capabilities
Capabilities and
and Capacities
Capacities
Destruction Regional Campaign Plans
• Theater Posture Plan •• Protection
Protection of
of Allies,
Allies,
Partners,
Partners, and
and U.S.
U.S. Interests
Interests
is
is Assured
Assured
EUCOM Service •• Strategic
Strategic Freedom
Freedom of
of Action
Action
Component Security
Contingency Cooperation Plans •• Russia
Russia as
as aa Responsible
Responsible
Plans Partner
Partner
Enduring Engagement by USAREUR,
Deviations from our USAFE, CNE, MARFOREUR, and SOCEUR •• Regional
Regional Crisis
Crisis Precluded
Precluded
Theater Campaign Plan
• CRISIS RESPONSE Country Level
Security
• EMERGENCIES Bilateral Engagement by EUCOM through our
Engagement Plans Offices of Defense Cooperation at the US
Embassies and Consulates
UNCLASSIFIED
17

UNCLASSIFIED
Increasing Partner Nation Capacity & Capability
(Implementing A Strategy of Active Security)

• Coalition Support to OIF and OEF

• International Security and Assistance Force (ISAF)
• Georgia Sustainment, Stability Operations Program
• State Partnership Program (SPP)
• Partnership for Peace (PfP) Potential for near-term
increases to support for
• Membership Action Plans (MAP) Georgia and
neighboring countries
• Partner SOF Development
• NATO Special Ops Force Coordination Center
• Maritime Domain Awareness and Security
• Operation ACTIVE ENDEAVOR
• Maritime Cooperation in the Black and Caspian Seas
• Joint Task Force-East
• Joint and Combined Exercises
• George C. Marshall Center
UNCLASSIFIED
18

9
 UNCLASSIFIED

Exporting Security From Europe

Coalition Partners in OEF/OIF
Armenia Albania Denmark Lithuania Austria Hungary
(ARM) (ALB) (LTU) Norway
(DNK)* (AUT) (HUN) (NOR)
Bosnia and Azerbaijan Estonia Macedonia Belgium Iceland Portugal
Herzegovina (AZE) (EST) (MKD) (BEL) (ISL) (PRT)
(BIH)
Bulgaria Georgia Poland
Croatia Ireland Slovak Rep
(BGR) (GEO) (POL)
(HRV) (IRL) (SVK)
Czech Republic Great Britain Romania
El Salvador Finland Italy Slovenia
(CZE) (GBR)
(SLV) (ROU) (FIN) (ITA) (SVN)

Ukraine France Latvia Spain

Japan (UKR) (FRA) (LVA) (ESP)
(JPN)
Germany Luxembourg Sweden
(DEU) (LUX) (SWE)
Kazakhstan
(KAZ) Greece Netherlands Turkey
(GRC) (NLD) (TUR)
Korea, Rep. of
(KOR) Australia Iceland
(AUS) (ISL)
Mongolia Canada New Zealand
(MNG) (CAN) (NZL)

Jordan Singapore
(JOR) (SGP)

OIF/NTM-I (2/6) OIF/NTM-I AND OEF/ISAF (13/14) OEF/ISAF (21/25)

OIF ISAF/OEF
COALITION COALITION
PARTNERS PARTNERS
FROM
EUCOM AOR:
Building Partner Capacity brings Forces to the Fight FROM
EUCOM AOR:
75% 87%
75% 87%
UNCLASSIFIED
19

UNCLASSIFIED

Transforming EUCOM
• EUCOM Basing
• Re-positioning Land Forces
• Changing Priorities and Perspectives
• Strategy of Active Security vs. War Plans
• Fostering Security to less stable regions
• Global Force Posture
• Whole of Government and Multinational
Approach

UNCLASSIFIED
20

10
 UNCLASSIFIED

Cold War EUCOM (1990)

EUCOM 1990 Footprint

Major Operating Base (MOB)
Personnel: 315,000
Installations: 1421
• Heavy, massed forces
• European Center of Gravity
• Robust infrastructure
• Extensive family support
structure

UNCLASSIFIED
21

UNCLASSIFIED

Transformed EUCOM Footprint

EUCOM 2008 Footprint

Personnel: ~ 86,000
Installations: 438
Main Operating Base • Expeditionary presence
Forward Operating Site • Agile and sustainable

Cooperative Security • Enables regional approach

Location • Strategic effects at Strategic
distances

UNCLASSIFIED
22

11
 UNCLASSIFIED

Requires a Whole of Government and

Multinational Approach
• Integration of EUCOM activities with the rest of USG is a
Commander’s priority
• EUCOM shares interests with other agencies:
• Partner Engagement objectives are similar throughout USG and
international agencies and departments
• EUCOM SAS executed in cooperation with established
organizations such as NATO, OSCE, EU, and others
• Continue to improve interagency participation from strategy
development and planning to execution and assessment
• Establishment of Commander’s Interagency Engagement Group
(CIEG)
• Coordination with Embassy Country Teams
• Encourage cross-talk and coordination at conferences and
clearinghouses
• Strategy of Active Security Working Group- SASWG
UNCLASSIFIED
23

UNCLASSIFIED
Strategic Vision
Theater Objectives
Capable
Capable and
and Expeditionary
Expeditionary Transformed, Expeditionary,
NATO
NATO Trained and Ready Forces

Europe
Europe as
as aa Global
Global Partner
Partner
Improved
Improved Partner
Partner Nation
Nation
Capabilities
Capabilities and
and Capacities
Capacities
• Forward
Defense
Protection
Protection of
of Allies,
Allies, of Homeland
Partners,
Partners, and
and U.S.
U.S. Interests
Interests • Protect the
is Assured
is Assured Strategic
Strategic Freedom
Freedom of
of Action
Action
Interests of the
US, our Allies,
and Partners

Russia
Russia as
as Responsible
Responsible Regional
Regional Crisis
Crisis Precluded
Precluded
Partner
Partner

UNCLASSIFIED
24

12
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