Rule 113

(A R R E S T )

A. Definition

a. Sanchez v. People, GR 204589, November 19, 2014

 Arrest
- The taking of a person into custody that he may be bound to answer for the
commission of an offense (Section 1, Rule 113 of the Rules of Court).

 Terry "stop-and-frisk"
- limited protective search of outer clothing for weapons and serves a two-fold
interest.
- A stop and frisk was defined as the act of a police officer to stop a citizen on the
street, interrogate him, and pat him for weapons or contraband. The police officer
should properly introduce himself and make initial inquiries, approach and restrain a
person who manifests unusual and suspicious conduct, in order to check the latter's
outer clothing for possibly concealed weapons.

 A search incidental to a lawful arrest

- the law requires that there first be a lawful arrest before a search can be made — the
process cannot be reversed.

 Note: Terry stop-and-frisk search is entirely different from and should not be confused
with the search incidental to a lawful arrest envisioned under Section 13, Rule 126 of
the Rules on Criminal Procedure.

b. Homar v. People, GR 182534, September 2, 2015

 Arrest is the taking of a person into custody in order that he or she may be bound to
answer for the commission of an offense.

c. Luz v. People, GR 197788, February 29, 2012

 Arrest is the taking of a person into custody in order that he or she may be bound
to answer for the commission of an offense.

B. Arrest; How Made

a. Homar v. People, supra

 How effected?
- It is effected by an actual restraint of the person to be arrested or by that person's
voluntary submission to the custody of the one making the arrest.
 - Neither the application of actual force, manual touching of the body, or physical
restraint, nor a formal declaration of arrest, is required. It is enough that there be an
intention on the part of one of the parties to arrest the other, and that there be an intent
on the part of the other to submit, under the belief and impression that submission is
necessary.

 Section 5, Rule 113 provides the only occasions when a person may be lawfully
arrested without a warrant.

To constitute a valid in flagrante delicto arrest, two requisites must concur:

1) the person to be arrested must execute an overt act indicating that he has just
committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit a crime; and
2) such overt act is done in the presence of or within the view of the arresting
officer

b. Sanchez v. People, supra

 How effected?
An arrest is made or effected by an actual restraint of the person to be arrested or by his
voluntary submission to the custody of the person making the arrest. (Section 2, Rule
113 of the Rules of Court).

Section 5, Rule 113. Arrest without warrant; when lawful. — A peace officer or
a private person may, without a warrant, arrest a person:
a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually
committing, or is attempting to commit an offense;
b) When an offense has just been committed and he has probable cause to
believe based on personal knowledge of facts or circumstances that the
person to be arrested has committed it; and
c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal
establishment or place where he is serving final judgment or is temporarily
confined while his case is pending, or has escaped while being transferred
from one confinement to another.

 2 Elements must concur in flagrante delicto arrest (Section 5a)

1. the person to be arrested must execute an overt act indicating that he has just
committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit a crime; and
2. such overt act is done in the presence or within the view of the arresting officer.

 2 Elements in hot pursuit arrest (Section 5b)

1. at the time of the arrest, an offense has in fact just been committed
2. the arresting officer has personal knowledge of facts indicating that the person to
be apprehended has committed it.

 Probable cause
- a reasonable ground of suspicion supported by circumstances sufficiently strong in
themselves to warrant a cautious man's belief that the person accused is guilty of the
offense with which he is charged.
c. Luz v. People, supra

 How effected?
- It is effected by an actual restraint of the person to be arrested or by that person's
voluntary submission to the custody of the one making the arrest. Neither the
application of actual force, manual touching of the body, or physical restraint, nor a
formal declaration of arrest, is required. It is enough that there be an intention on the
part of one of the parties to arrest the other, and that there be an intent on the part of
the other to submit, under the belief and impression that submission is necessary.

 Warrant of Arres not needed if penalized by a Fine only.

- Under the Rules of Court, a warrant of arrest need not be issued if the information or
charge was filed for an offense penalized by a fine only. It may be stated as a
corollary that neither can a warrantless arrest be made for such an offense.
- In this case, it appears that according to City Ordinance No. 98-012, the failure to
wear a crash helmet while riding a motorcycle is penalized by a fine only.

d. People v. Cunanan, GR 198024, March 16, 2015

 Appellant was lawfully arrested after he was caught in flagrante delicto selling an
illegal drug in a buy-bust operation; contrary to his contention, it was not
inconceivable that he would openly sell an illegal drug in public.

 The said transaction involved the illegal sale of dangerous drug was sufficiently shown
by the prosecution through its establishment of the following elements of the offense:
“(1) the identity of the buyer and the seller, object and consideration; and (2) the
delivery of the thing sold and the payment therefor.”

e. Sanchez v. Demetriou, 227 SCRA 627

 Letter-invitation to appear in camp for investigation, considered as Order of

Arrest In the case at bar, the invitation came from a high-ranking military official and
the investigation of Sanchez was to be made at a military camp. Although in the guise
of a request, it was obviously a command or an order of arrest that the petitioner could
hardly be expected to defy. In fact, apparently cowed by the “invitation,” he went
without protest (and in informal clothes and slippers only) with the officers who had
come to fetch him.
f. Babst v. National Intelligence Board, 264 SCRA 316

Invitation considered as Order of Arrest

 General Rule: This Court declared that an invitation to attend a hearing and answer
some questions, which the person invited may heed or refuse at his pleasure, is not
illegal or constitutionally objectionable.

 Exception: Where the invitation comes from a powerful group composed

predominantly of ranking military officers issued at a time when the country has just
emerged from martial rule and when the suspension of the privilege of the writ of
habeas corpus has not entirely been lifted, and the designated interrogation site is a
military camp, the same can easily be taken, not as a strictly voluntary invitation which
it purports to be, but as an authoritative command which one can only defy at his peril.

 Exception to the exception: When a high ranking military officer filed a case in his
personal capacity, not appearing as a member of any agency.

C. Duty of Arresting Officer

a. Soria v. Desierto, GR 153524-25, January 31, 2005

 Duty to deliver the accused to proper Judicial Authority

The Court ruled in Medina v. Orozco, Jr., that the arresting officer's duty under the law
was either to deliver him to the proper judicial authorities within 18 hours, or thereafter
release him.

 Tolled by weekdays, official holidays.

A Sunday and that declared as an official holiday; meaning no-office days, it will not be
an easy matter for a fiscal to look for his clerk and stenographer, draft the information
and search for the Judge to have him act thereon, and get the clerk of court to open the
courthouse, docket the case and have the order of commitment prepared.

b. Sayo v. Chief of Police of Manila, 80 Phil. 859

 Judicial Authority is vested only to a Judge and not City Fiscals

- The judicial authority mentioned in section 125 of RPC cannot be construed to
include the fiscal of the City of Manila or any other city, because they cannot issue a
warrant of arrest or of commitment or temporary confinement of a person
surrendered to legalize the detention of a person arrested without warrant. (Section
7, Rule 108).
- To consider the city fiscal as the judicial authority referred to in article 125 of RPC,
would be to authorize the detention of a person arrested without warrant for a period
longer than that permitted by law without any process issued by a court of
competent jurisdiction. The city fiscal, may not, after due investigation, find
sufficient ground for filing an information or prosecuting the person arrested and
 release him, after the latter had been illegally detained for days or weeks without
any process issued by a court or judge.

 Duty of Police Officer

- Section 17, Rule 109. A person making arrest for legal ground shall, without
unnecessary delay, and within the time prescribed in RPC, take the person arrested
to the proper court or judge for such action as they may deem proper to take.
- Section 11 of Rule 108. After the arrest by the defendant and his delivery to the
Court, he shall be informed of the complaint or information filed against him…..
- A peace officer has no power or authority to arrest a person without a warrant upon
complaint of the offended party or any other person, except in those cases expressly
authorized by law. What he or the complainant may do is to file a complaint with the
city fiscal of Manila, or directly with the justice of the peace courts.

c. People v. Sapal, 328 SCRA 417

 Full faith and credence to the testimony of officer

In convicting the accused, the trial court accorded full faith and credence to the
testimony of the officer who was presumed to have performed his duty in a regular
manner. However, there are circumstances that negate the presumption accorded to the
prosecution witness.

 Application in this case: There is sufficient evidence to show that the manner by
which the law enforcers effected the arrest of accused was highly irregular and suspect.
The records reveal that the documents relating to the arrest of accused and his wife
were prepared 3 days after the arrest. The length of time that it took the police
officers to prepare these documents, which otherwise involved routine paper work,
seriously casts doubt on their credibility.

D. Execution of Warrant

a. People v. Givera, GR 132159, January 18, 2001

 Rule: A warrant previously issued remains enforceable, despite being returned

unserved by the arresting officer, until it is executed, recalled or quashed.
The 10 period provided in Section 4, Rule 113 is only a directive to the officer
executing the warrant to make a return to the court.

 Objection is deemed waived for failure to move for the quashal of the information
before the trial court, entered a plea of not guilty and participated in the trial. Any
objection involving a warrant of arrest or procedure in the acquisition by the court of
jurisdiction over the person of an accused must be made before he enters his plea,
otherwise the objection is deemed waived.
E. Arrest Without Warrant; When Lawful

a. Homar v. People, supra

 To constitute a valid in flagrante delicto arrest, two requisites must concur:

1) The person to be arrested must execute an overt act indicating that he has just
committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit a crime; and
2) such overt act is done in the presence of or within the view of the arresting officer.

 Indispensability of intent to arrest in a warrantless search incident to a lawful

arrest.
- The prosecution has the burden to prove the legality of the warrantless arrest. For,
without a valid warrantless arrest, the warrantless search would be a violation of a
person’s constitutional right against unlawful search and seizure. As a
consequence, the object shall be inadmissible as evidence against him.
- The Court held that the shabu confiscated from the accused in that case was
inadmissible as evidence when the police officer who flagged him for traffic
violation had no intent to arrest him. Due to the lack of intent to arrest, the
subsequent search was unlawful.

b. People v. Breis, GR 205823, August 17, 2015

 General Rule: No arrest, search and seizure can be made without a valid warrant
issued by a competent judicial authority. No less than the Constitution guarantees this
right.

 Exception: Section 5, Rule 113

 Application in this case: The Court has ruled in several dangerous drug cases that
tipped information is sufficient probable cause to effect a warrantless search. In People
v. Mariacos, the police received at dawn information that a baggage of marijuna was
loaded on a passenger jeepney about to leave for the poblacion. There, the informant
described the bag containing the prohibited drugs. The Court held that the police had
probable cause to search the packages allegedly containing illegal drugs.

c. Comerciante v. People, GR 205926, July 22, 2015

 Section 2, Article III of the Constitution mandates that a search and seizure must be
carried out through or on the strength of a judicial warrant predicated upon the
existence of probable cause; in the absence of such warrant, such search and seizure
becomes, as a general rule, "unreasonable" within the meaning of said constitutional
provision.

 Section 3 (2), Article III of the Constitution

 An exclusionary rule which instructs that evidence obtained and confiscated on the
occasion of such unreasonable searches and seizures are deemed tainted and should be
excluded for being the proverbial fruit of a poisonous tree, to protect people from
unreasonable searches and seizures.

 Evidence obtained from unreasonable searches and seizures shall be inadmissible in

evidence for any purpose in any proceeding.

d. In Re: Salibo v. Warden, GR 197597, April 8, 2015

 Person arrested should be delivered to the nearest police station

In cases falling under Rule 113, Section 5(a) and (b), the person arrested without a
warrant shall be delivered to the nearest police station or jail and shall be proceeded
against in accordance with section 7 of Rule 112.

 Application in this case: Salibo voluntarily presented himself before the Datu Hofer
Police Station to clear his name and to prove that he is not the accused Butukan S.
Malang. When Salibo was in the presence of the police officers of Datu Hofer Police
Station, he was neither committing nor attempting to commit an offense. The police
officers had no personal knowledge of any offense that he might have committed.
Salibo was also not an escapee prisoner. The police officers, therefore, had no probable
cause to arrest Salibo without a warrant. They deprived him of his right to liberty
without due process of law, for which a petition for habeas corpus may be issued.

e. Pestilos v. Generoso, supra

 Requirement of Immediacy
The police officer's personal knowledge of facts or circumstances; and lastly, the
propriety of the determination of probable cause that the person sought to be arrested
committed the crime.

 Personal knowledge of a crime just committed

Does not require actual presence at the scene while a crime was being committed; it is
enough that evidence of the recent commission of the crime is patent and the police
officer has probable cause to believe based on personal knowledge of facts or
circumstances, that the person to be arrested has recently committed the crime.

 Application in this case: The police officers gathered and which they have personally
observed less than one hour from the time that they have arrived at the scene of the
crime until the time of the arrest of the petitioners; hence, it can be concluded that they
had personal knowledge of facts or circumstances justifying the petitioners' warrantless
arrests. These circumstances were well within the police officers' observation,
perception and evaluation at the time of the arrest. These circumstances qualify as the
 police officers' personal observation, which are within their personal knowledge,
prompting them to make the warrantless arrests.

f. People v. Nepomoceno, 750 SCRA 209

 Application in this case: Nepomuceno was arrested after committing a criminal

offense that resulted from a successful buy-bust operation. Having been apprehended in
flagrante delicto, the police officers were not only authorized but were even duty-
bound to arrest her even without a warrant.

 Appellant’s objection to the legality of her warrantless arrest and the admissibility in
evidence of the shabu she sold is not a valid ground to warrant a reversal of the rulings
of the RTC and the CA. Such an objection must be manifested prior to entering her
plea, otherwise, it is deemed waived.

g. Valdez v. People, 538 SCRA 611

 Section 5(a), Rule 113 Elements

(1) the person to be arrested must execute an overt act indicating that he has just
committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit a crime; and
(2) such overt act is done in the presence or within the view of the arresting officer.

 In People v. Shabaz: "flight alone is not a reliable indicator of guilt without other
circumstances because flight alone is inherently ambiguous."

 In People v. Tudtud: "the phrase ‘in his presence’ therein, connotes personal knowledge
on the part of the arresting officer. The right of the accused to be secure against any
unreasonable searches on and seizure of his own body and any deprivation of his liberty
being a most basic and fundamental one, the statute or rule that allows exception to the
requirement of a warrant of arrest is strictly construed. Its application cannot be
extended beyond the cases specifically provided by law."

h. People v. Doria, 301 SCRA 668

 “Personal knowledge of facts” not present in this case

The warrantless arrest was illegal because she was arrested solely on the basis of the
alleged identification made by Doria. Doria did not point to her as his associate in the
drug business, but as the person with whom he left the marked bills. This identification
does not necessarily mean that Gaddao conspired with Doria in pushing drugs. If there
is no showing that the person who effected the warrantless arrest had knowledge of
facts implicating the person arrested to the perpetration of the criminal offense, the
arrest is legally objectionable.

 Plain View Doctrine Requisite:

a. The law enforcement officer in search of the evidence has a prior justification for
an intrusion or is in a position from which he can view a particular area
b. The discovery of the evidence in plain view is inadvertent
 c. It is immediately apparent to the officer that the item he observes may be evidence
of a crime, contraband or otherwise subject to seizure

 An object is in plain view if the object itself is plainly exposed to sight. The difficulty
arises when the object is inside a closed container. Where the object seized was inside
a closed package, the object itself is not in plain view and therefore cannot be seized
without a warrant. If the package is such that an experienced observer could infer from
its appearance that it contains the prohibited article, then the article is deemed in plain
view. It must be immediately apparent to the police that the items that they observe may
be evidence of a crime, contraband or otherwise subject to seizure.

i. Posadas v. Ombudsman, 341 SCRA 388

 "Personal knowledge" of facts in arrests without a warrant (Section 5b, Rule 113)
- Personal knowledge must be based upon "probable cause" which means an
"actual belief or reasonable grounds of suspicion."

 Reasonable grounds of suspicion

- when, in the absence of actual belief of the arresting officers, the suspicion that
the person to be arrested is probably guilty of committing the offense is based
on actual facts, i.e., supported by circumstances sufficiently strong in
themselves to create the probable cause of guilt of the person to be arrested.
- A reasonable suspicion therefore must be founded on probable cause, coupled
with good faith on the part of the peace officers making the arrest.
- The determination of the existence of probable cause that the persons to be
arrested committed the crime was for the judge to make. The law authorizes a
police officer or even an ordinary citizen to arrest criminal offenders only if the
latter are committing or have just committed a crime. Otherwise, we cannot
leave to the police officers the determination of whom to apprehend if we are to
protect our civil liberties.

 In People v. Tonog, Jr., the accused voluntarily went upon invitation of the police
officer who later noticed the presence of blood stains on the pants of the accused. Upon
reaching the police station, the accused was asked to take off his pants for examination
at the crime laboratory. The question in that case involved the admissibility of the
maong pants taken from the accused.
 Tonog does not apply to this case. First, the accused in that case voluntarily went with
the police upon the latter's invitation. Second, the arresting officer found blood stains
on the pants of the accused, on the basis of which he concluded that the accused
probably committed the crime for which reason the latter was taken into custody. Third,
the arrest was made on the same day the crime was committed.

 Rule 113, sec.5(b)

the crime has "just been committed" and the arresting officer had "personal knowledge
of the facts indicating that the person to be arrested had committed it."

 “Personal knowledge of facts” not present in this case

 In contrast, the NBI agents in the case at bar tried to arrest Narag and Taparan four days
after the commission of the crime. They had no personal knowledge of any fact which
might indicate that the two students were probably guilty of the crime. What they had
were the supposed positive identification of two alleged eyewitnesses, which is
insufficient to justify the arrest without a warrant by the NBI.

j. People v. Villareal, 693 SCRA 549

 Rule 113, Section 5….

Personal Knowledge
Personal knowledge is not defined as knowledge of a person’s criminal record, but
personal knowledge as to the actual commission of the crime. The act of running away
from authority also does not automatically imply guilt on the accused. There are various
reasons to run away from authority, and commission of a crime is just one of the possible
reasons.

k. Ladlad v. Velasco, 523 SCRA 318

 Inquest proceedings and lawful arrest

Inquest proceedings are proper only when the accused has been lawfully arrested without
warrant.

 Section 5, Rule 113 provides the instances when such warrantless arrest may be effected.

 Where Arrest Not Properly Effected. — Should the Inquest Officer find that the arrest
was not made in accordance with the Rules, he shall:
- recommend the release of the person arrested or detained;
- note down the disposition on the referral document;
- prepare a brief memorandum indicating the reasons for the action taken; and
- forward the same, together with the record of the case, to the City or Provincial
Prosecutor for appropriate action.

 Probable cause is the "existence of such facts and circumstances as would excite the
belief in a reasonable mind, acting on the facts within the knowledge of the prosecutor,
that the person charged was guilty of the crime for which he was prosecuted."

 Remedy: file petition under Rule 65, where the prosecutor abused his discretion by
ignoring a clear insufficiency of evidence to support a finding of probable cause, thus
denying the accused his right to substantive and procedural due process.

l. People v. Ereno, 326 SCRA 157

 Objection should be done before plea

Any objection involving a warrant of arrest or the procedure in the acquisition by the court
of jurisdiction over the person of the accused must be made before he enters his plea,
otherwise, the objection is deemed waived.
  Failure to move for the quashal of the Information before arraignment = Estoppel An
accused may be estopped from assailing the illegality of his arrest if he fails to move for
the quashing of the information against him before his arraignment. And since the legality
of an arrest affects only the jurisdiction of the court over the person of the accused, any
defect in the arrest of the accused may be deemed cured when he voluntarily submitted to
the jurisdiction of the trial court as was done by the accused-appellant in the instant case.

F. Time of Making Arrest

a. Colorado v. Agapito, AM No. MTJ-06-1658, July 3, 2007

 Section 6, Rule 113

An arrest may be made on any day and at any time of the day or night.

 Warrant of arrest issued on a Friday, valid.

It is of no moment that the warrant of arrest was issued on a Friday, because it is clear
from the foregoing that an arrest may be made on any day regardless of what day the
warrant of arrest was issued. Nowhere in the Rules or in our jurisprudence can we find that
a warrant of arrest issued on a Friday is prohibited.

 Supreme Court Circular No. 95-96

Provides for a skeletal force on a Saturday from 8AM-1PM primarily to act on petitions
for bail and other urgent matters. And on Saturday afternoons, Sundays and non-working
holidays, any judge may act on bailable offenses.

G. Method of Arrest by Virtue of Warrant

a. Mallari v. CA, GR 110569, December 9, 1996

 Section 7, Rule 113

Allows a police officer to effect arrest without the warrant in his possession at the time of
the arrest. Thus, an arrest being lawful, the search and seizure made incidental thereto is
likewise valid, albeit conducted without a warrant.

 Unlicensed firearms may be seized without the necessity of obtaining a search

warrant: Where the unlicensed firearms were found when the police team apprehended
the accused for robbery and not for illegal possession of firearms and ammunition.
The illegality of the search is independent from the illegal possession of prohibited arms.
The illegality of the search did not make legal an illegal possession of firearms. When, in
pursuing an illegal action or in the commission of a criminal offense, the offending police
officers should happen to discover a criminal offense being committed by any person, they
are not precluded from performing their duties as police officers for the apprehension of
the guilty and the taking of the corpus delicti. (People v. Acol)
H. Method of Arrest by Officer Without Warrant

a. People v. Tan, GR 116200-02, June 21, 2001

 Section 2 (2), Rule 113

No violence or unnecessary force shall be used in making an arrest, and the person arrested
shall not be subject to any greater restraint than is necessary for his detention.

 The Rules of Court mandates that the police officer or any person conducting arrest must
identify himself as such and state his intention to arrest when there is no danger to himself
or it would not prejudice the arrest. Further, the rules of engagement does not require that
he should immediately draw or fire his weapon if the person asked or to be accosted does
not heed his call.

 Application in this case:

- Although the employment of high powered firearms, in this case were M-16 rifles,
does not necessarily connote unnecessary force, the police had no reason to fire their
weapons indiscriminately at a group of persons on board a moving boat.
- The mere fact that a pump boat is moving cannot justify their acts of firing upon the
vessel even if they may have presumed that the persons on board were fleeing from
the police. The pumpboat was found moving away from the shore because its
passengers were bound for the foreign vessel docked kilometers away from the shore.
- The victims in this case and all those on the pumpboat were not under any obligation
to surrender since they were not prisoners who had escaped from detention, nor were
they identified suspects. Not even the presumption of regularity in the performance of
duty can be resorted to by appellants, nor does it find application in this case because
they were no longer performing a duty when they immediately fired their weapons.

I. Right of Officer to Break Into Building or Enclosure

a. People v. Castiller, GR 87783, August 6, 1990

 Rule 113 Section 5(a) and (b) persons arrested without a warrant shall be forthwith
delivered to the nearest police station or jail, and he shall be proceeded against in
accordance with Rule 112, Section 7.

 General rule: searches and seizures must be supported by a valid warrant.

 Exception: a search incidental to a lawful arrest under Section 12, Rule 126. “a person
lawfully arrested may be searched for dangerous weapons or anything which may be used
as proof of the commission of an offense, without a search warrant."

 In such an instance, a contemporaneous search may be conducted upon the person of the
arrestee and the immediate vicinity where the arrest was made. The inclusion of the seized
items in the evidence for the prosecution cannot be challenged as they were seized in
conformity with the provision on lawful searches.
J. Other Cases

a. People v. De la Cruz, GR 205414, April 4, 2016

 Elements of Section 5, Article II of RA 9165. Illegal sale of regulated or prohibited

drugs
(1) the identities of the buyer and the seller, the object, and consideration; and
(2) the delivery of the thing sold and the payment therefor.

 Section 5, Rule 113

Enumerates the circumstances by which a warrantless arrest are considered reasonable.
Straightforward and unwavering testimonies were presented by the prosecution narrating,
in detail, how the police officers personally witnessed the sale by appellant of the
dangerous drug, being actual participants of the buy-bust operation.

 Buy-bust operation
A buy-bust operation is a form of entrapment, in which the violator is caught in flagrante
delicto and the police officers conducting the operation are not only authorized, but duty-
bound, to apprehend the violator and to search him for anything that may have been part of
or used in the commission of the crime.

b. Saraum v. People, GR 205472, January 25, 2016

 Elements of Section 12, Article II of R.A. No. 9165. Illegal possession of equipment,
instrument, apparatus and other paraphernalia for dangerous drugs
(1) possession or control by the accused of any equipment, apparatus or other
paraphernalia fit or intended for smoking, consuming, administering, injecting,
ingesting, or introducing any dangerous drug into the body; and
(2) such possession is not authorized by law.

 Arrest in flagrante delicto

In arrest in flagrante delicto, the accused is apprehended at the very moment he is
committing or attempting to commit or has just committed an offense in the presence of
the arresting officer.

 Two requisites to constitute in flagrante delicto:

(1) the person to be arrested must execute an overt act indicating that he has just
committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit a crime; and
(2) such overt act is done in the presence or within the view of the arresting officer.

 Chain of Custody
- the duly recorded authorized movements and custody of seized drugs or controlled
chemicals or plant sources of dangerous drugs or laboratory equipment of each stage,
from the time of seizure/confiscation to receipt in the forensic laboratory to
safekeeping to presentation in court for destruction. Such record of movements and
custody of seized item shall include the identity and signature of the person who held
temporary custody of the seized item, the date and time when such transfer of custody
 were made in the course of safekeeping and use in court as evidence, and the final
disposition.
- it requires the identification of the persons who handled the confiscated items for the
purpose of duly monitoring the authorized movements of the illegal drugs and/or drug
paraphernalia from the time they were seized from the accused until the time they are
presented in court.

 Method of authenticating evidence the chain of custody rule requires that the admission
of an exhibit be preceded by evidence sufficient to support a finding that the matter in
question is what the proponent claims it to be. It would include testimony about every link
in the chain, from the moment the item was picked up to the time it is offered into
evidence, in such a way that every person who touched the exhibit would describe how and
from whom it was received, where it was and what happened to it while in the witness'
possession, the condition in which it was received and the condition in which it was
delivered to the next link in the chain. These witnesses would then describe the precautions
taken to ensure that there had been no change in the condition of the item and no
opportunity for someone not in the chain to have possession of the same. (Mallillin v.
People)

c. People v. Lugnasin, 783 SCRA 557

 Estopped for failure to raise their allegations before arraignment

The active participation in the trial and posting their defenses without mentioning the
alleged illegality of the warrantless arrests. The accused is deemed to have waived their
right to question their arrest.

 Application in this case: In the present case, at the time of petitioner's arraignment, there
was no objection raised as to the irregularity of his arrest. Thereafter, he actively
participated in the proceedings before the trial court. In effect, he is deemed to have
waived any perceived defect in his arrest and effectively submitted himself to the
jurisdiction of the court trying his case. At any rate, the illegal arrest of an accused is not
sufficient cause for setting aside a valid judgment rendered upon a sufficient complaint
after a trial free from error. It will not even negate the validity of the conviction of the
accused.

d. Palo v. People, 783 SCRA 557

 Elements to secure a conviction for illegal possession of a dangerous drugs:

(1) the accused is in possession of an object, identified to be a prohibited or regulated drug;
(2) such possession is not authorized by law; and
(3) the accused freely and consciously possessed the drug.

 Essence of Chain of Custody: To make sure that the dangerous drug presented in court as
evidence against the accused is the same dangerous drug recovered from his or her
possession.

e. People v. De Leon, GR 186471, January 26, 2010

  Corpus delicti
- the body or substance of the crime, and establishes the fact that a crime has actually
been committed. It has two elements, namely:
1) proof of the occurrence of a certain
event; and
2) some person's criminal responsibility
for the act.

 RA 9165, exceptions.
Non-compliance with Sec. 21 does not render an accused's arrest illegal or the items
seized/confiscated from him inadmissible. What is essential is "the preservation of the
integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized items, as the same would be utilized in the
determination of the guilt or innocence of the accused."

f. People v. Laguio, GR 128587, March 16, 2007

 Warrantless search may be conducted as an incident to a valid warrantless arrest.

The law requires that there be first a lawful arrest before a search can be made; the process
cannot be reversed. However, if there are valid reasons to conduct lawful search and
seizure which thereafter shows that the accused is currently committing a crime, the
accused may be lawfully arrested in flagrante delicto without need for a warrant of arrest.

 Application in this case: The trial court resolved the case on the basis of its findings that
the arrest preceded the search, and finding no basis to rule in favor of a lawful arrest, it
ruled that the incidental search is likewise unlawful. Any and all pieces of evidence
acquired as a consequence thereof are inadmissible in evidence. Thus, the trial court
dismissed the case for lack of evidence.

 In People v. Aminnudin, the Court declared as inadmissible in evidence the marijuana

found in appellant's possession during a search without a warrant, because it had been
illegally seized.

g. Rolito Go v. CA, GR 101837, February 11, 1992

 In Umil v. Ramos, the Court sustained the legality of the warrantless arrests of petitioners
made from 1 to 14 days after the actual commission of the offenses, upon the ground that
such offenses constituted "continuing crimes." Those offenses were subversion,
membership in an outlawed organization like the New Peoples Army, etc.

 Crime not committed in his presence and no personal knowledge of facts.

Petitioner's "arrest" took place 6 days after the shooting of Maguan. The "arresting"
officers obviously were not present at the time the petitioner had allegedly shot Maguan.
Moreover, none of the "arresting" officers had any "personal knowledge" of facts
indicating that petitioner was the gunman who had shot Maguan. The information upon
which the police acted had been derived from statements made by alleged eyewitnesses to
the shooting — one stated that petitioner was the gunman; another was able to take down
the alleged gunman's car's plate number which turned out to be registered in petitioner's
wife's name. That information did not, however, constitute "personal knowledge."
Rule 114
(Bail)

A. DEFINITION

a. Enrile v. Sandiganbayan, GR 213847, August 18, 2015;

b. Enrile v. Sandiganbayan, GR 213847, July 12, 2016

 Bail is a matter right

- It is safeguarded by the constitution, its purpose is to ensure the personal
appearance of the accused during trial or whenever the court requires and at the
same time recognizing the guarantee of due process which is the presumption of
his innocence until proven guilty. The Supreme Court further explained that Bail
for the provisional liberty of the accused, regardless of the crime charged should
be allowed independently of the merits charged, provided his continued
incarceration is injurious to his health and endanger his life.
- It is expressly afforded by Section 13, Article III (Bill of Rights) of the
Constitution and Section 7, Rule 114 of the Rules of Court

 In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall be presumed innocent until the
contrary is proved.
The presumption of innocence is rooted in the guarantee of due process, and is safeguarded
by the constitutional right to be released on bail, and further binds the court to wait until
after trial to impose any punishment on the accused.

 General Rule: any person, before being convicted of any criminal offense, shall be
bailable. Exception: unless he is charged with a capital offense, or with an offense
punishable with reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, and the evidence of his guilt is
strong.

 Hence, from the moment he is placed under arrest, or is detained or restrained by the
officers of the law, he can claim the guarantee of his provisional liberty under the Bill of
Rights, and he retains his right to bail unless he is charged with a capital offense, or with
an offense punishable with reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, and the evidence of his
guilt is strong. Once it has been established that the evidence of guilt is strong, no right to
bail shall be recognized.

 All criminal cases within the competence of the MTCs are bailable as a matter of
right Rationale: these courts have no jurisdiction to try capital offenses, or offenses
punishable with reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment.

 Bail is a matter of right prior to conviction by RTC for any offense not punishable by
death, reclusion perpetua, or life imprisonment, or even prior to conviction for an offense
 punishable by death, reclusion perpetua, or life imprisonment when evidence of guilt is not
strong.

 Instances where the granting of bail is discretionary:

(1) upon conviction by the RTC of an offense not punishable by death, reclusion perpetua
or life imprisonment; or
(2) If the RTC has imposed a penalty of imprisonment exceeding six years, provided
none of the circumstances enumerated under paragraph 3 of Section 5, Rule 114 is
present, as follows:
- That he is a recidivist, quasi-recidivist, or habitual delinquent, or has committed
the crime aggravated by the circumstance of reiteration;
- That he has previously escaped from legal confinement, evaded sentence, or
violated the conditions of his bail without valid justification;
- That he committed the offense while under probation, parole, or conditional
pardon;
- That the circumstances of his case indicate the probability of flight if released on
bail; or
- That there is undue risk that he may commit another crime during the pendency of
the appeal.

c. Miranda v. Tuliao, 486 SCRA 377

Custody of Law
 General Rule: Custody of the law is required before the Court can act upon the
application for bail.
 Exception: Custody is not required for the adjudication of other relief sought by the
defendant where by mere application, thereof, constitutes a waiver of the defense of lack of
jurisdiction over the person accused.

Voluntary Submission
 General Rule: One who seeks affirmative relief is deemed to have submitted to the
 Jurisdiction of the Court. Adjudication of a motion to quash a warrant of arrest requires
neither jurisdiction over the person of the accused, nor custody of law over the body of the
accused.

 Exception: Making a special appearance in court to question the jurisdiction of the court
over the person of the accused is not a voluntary appearance as when in a criminal case a
motion to quash is filed precisely on that ground. There is likewise no submission to the
jurisdiction of the court when the accused files a motion to quash the warrant of arrest
because it is the very legality of the court process forcing the submission of the person of
the accused that is the very issue in a motion to quash a warrant of arrest
d. Allado v. Diokno, 232 SCRA 192

 Probable Cause
"the existence of such facts and circumstances as would excite the belief, in a reasonable
mind, acting on the facts within the knowledge of the prosecutor, that the person charged
was guilty of the crime for which he was prosecuted."

 Standard for determining the existence of probable cause: a finding of probable cause
does not require an inquiry into whether there is sufficient evidence to procure a
conviction. It is enough that it is believed that the act or omission complained of
constitutes the offense charged. Precisely, there is a trial for the reception of evidence of
the prosecution in support of the charge. (Pilapil v. Sandiganbayan)

e. Roberts v. CA, 254 SCRA 307

 Determination of probable cause not lodged with the Court.

The Court’s duty in an appropriate case is confined to the issue of whether the executive or
judicial determination, as the case may be, of probable cause was done without or in
excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to want of jurisdiction.

f. Lacson v. Executive Scretary, 301 SCRA 298

 The amended Information has no specific allegation of facts that the shooting of the victim
by the said principal accused was intimately related to the discharge of their official duties
as police officers. Likewise, the amended information does not indicate that the said
accused arrested and investigated the victim and then killed the latter while in their
custody. The stringent requirement that the charge set forth with such particularity as will
reasonably indicate the exact offense which the accused is alleged to have committed in
relation to his office was not established.

g. Pico v. Combong, Jr., 215 SCRA 421

 It is well-settled that an application for bail from a person charged with a capital offense
(now an offense punishable by reclusion perpetua) must be set for hearing at which both
the prosecution and the defense must be given a reasonable opportunity to prove (in the
case of the prosecution) that evidence of guilt of the applicant is strong, or (in the case of
the defense) that such evidence of guilt was not strong.
 In the instant case, where the offense charged is murder and punishable by reclusion
perpetua or death, respondent Judge’s deliberate failure to set the application for bail for
hearing effectively deprived the People of its right to due process. Granting the application
for bail and fixing the amount thereof, absent any taking of evidence as to whether or not
the guilt of the accused was strong, constitutes arbitrary, capricious and whimsical action.
B. Conditions of Bail; Requirements

a. Pantillo III v. Canoy, AM No. RTJ-11-2262, February 9, 2011

 Sec. 17, Rule 114 allows that any person in custody who is not yet charged in court may
apply for bail with any court in the province, city or municipality where he is held.

 Procedural rules have their own wholesome rationale in the orderly administration of
justice. Justice has to be administered according to the Rules in order to obviate
arbitrariness, caprice, or whimsicality.

b. Crisostomo v. Sandiganbayan, 456 SCRA 45

Waiver of right in criminal cases

 While constitutional rights may be waived, such waiver must be clear and must be coupled
with an actual intention to relinquish the right.
 In criminal cases where the imposable penalty may be death, as in the present case, the
court is called upon to see to it that the accused is personally made aware of the
consequences of a waiver of the right to present evidence. In fact, it is not enough that the
accused is simply warned of the consequences of another failure to attend the succeeding
hearings. The court must first explain to the accused personally in clear terms the exact
nature and consequences of a waiver.
 Clearly, the waiver of the right to present evidence in a criminal case involving a grave
penalty is not assumed and taken lightly. The presence of the accused and his counsel is
indispensable so that the court could personally conduct a searching inquiry into the
waiver.

c. Lavides v. CA, 324 SCRA 321

 Bail should be granted before arraignment

In cases where it is authorized, bail should be granted before arraignment, otherwise the
accused may be precluded from filing a motion to quash. For if the information is quashed
and the case is dismissed, there would then be no need for the arraignment of the accused.

 Rule 114, 2(b)

One of the conditions of bail is that "the accused shall appear before the proper court
whenever so required by the court or these Rules,"

 Rule 116, 1(b)

The presence of the accused at the arraignment is required.
To condition the grant of bail to an accused on his arraignment would be to place him in a
position where he has to choose between (1) filing a motion to quash and thus delay his
release on bail because until his motion to quash can be resolved, his arraignment cannot
be held, and (2) foregoing the filing of a motion to quash so that he can be arraigned at
 once and thereafter be released on bail. These scenarios certainly undermine the accused's
constitutional right not to be put on trial except upon valid complaint or information
sufficient to charge him with a crime and his right to bail.

C. No Release or Transfer, Except on Court Order or Bail

a. Ambil v. Sandiganbayan, GR 175457 and 175482, July 6, 2011

 Section 3, Rule 114

“SEC. 3. No release or transfer except on court order or bail. — No person under detention
by legal process shall be released or transferred except upon order of the court or when he
is admitted to bail.”

 Without a court order, petitioners transferred Adalim and detained him in a place other
than the provincial jail. The latter was housed in much more comfortable quarters,
provided better nourishment, was free to move about the house and watch television.
Petitioners readily extended these benefits to Adalim on the mere representation of his
lawyers that the mayor's life would be put in danger inside the provincial jail. More
importantly, even if Adalim could have proven the presence of an imminent peril on his
person to petitioners, a court order was still indispensable for his transfer.

D. Bail, a Matter of Right; Exception

a. Enrile v. Sandiganbayan, supra

 General rule: any person, before being convicted of any criminal offense, shall be
bailable.

 Execption: he is charged with a capital offense, or with an offense punishable with

reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, and the evidence of his guilt is strong.

 Hence, from the moment he is placed under arrest, or is detained or restrained by the
officers of the law, he can claim the guarantee of his provisional liberty under the Bill of
Rights, and he retains his right to bail unless he is charged with a capital offense, or with
an offense punishable with reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, and the evidence of his
guilt is strong. Once it has been established that the evidence of guilt is strong, no right to
bail shall be recognized.

b. Tolentino v. Camano Jr., 322 SCRA 559

 Sec. 17(c) Rule 114

"Any person in custody who is not yet charged in court may apply for bail with any court in
the province, city or municipality where he is held."

 "Where the accused was charged for murder without the benefit of a preliminary
investigation and trial had already began over his objections, the accused remains entitled
 to be released on bail as a matter of right pending the preliminary investigation." (Go vs.
CA)

 Petition for Bail, not a waiver to preliminary investigation

The filing of the Petition for Bail does not constitute a waiver of accused’s right to
preliminary investigation."

c. Go v. CA, 206 SCRA 138

 Section 4, Rule 114. Bail, a matter of right; exception. — All persons in custody shall
be admitted to bail as a matter of right, with sufficient sureties, or released on recognize as
prescribed by law or this Rule (a) before or after conviction by the MeTC, MTC, MTCC,
or MCTC, and (b) before conviction by the RTC of an offense not punishable by death,
reclusion perpetua, or life imprisonment.

 Should the evidence already of record concerning petitioner's guilt be strong, the
Prosecutor may move in the trial court for cancellation of petitioner's bail. It would then be
up to the trial court, after a careful and objective assessment of the evidence on record, to
grant or deny the motion for cancellation of bail.

d. Government of US v. Puruganan, 389 SCRA 623

 Section 4 of Rule 114

Applies only when a person has been arrested and detained for violation of Philippine
criminal laws. It does not apply to extradition proceedings, because extradition courts do
not render judgments of conviction or acquittal.

 Constitutional right to bail

"flows from the presumption of innocence in favor of every accused who should not be
subjected to the loss of freedom as thereafter he would be entitled to acquittal, unless his
guilt be proved beyond reasonable doubt." It follows that the constitutional provision on
bail will not apply to a case like extradition, where the presumption of innocence is not at
issue.

 The provision in the Constitution stating that the "right to bail shall not be impaired even
when the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is suspended" does not detract from the
rule that the constitutional right to bail is available only in criminal proceedings. It must be
noted that the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus finds application
"only to persons judicially charged for rebellion or offenses inherent in or directly
connected with invasion." Hence, the second sentence in the constitutional provision on
bail merely emphasizes the right to bail in criminal proceedings for the aforementioned
offenses. It cannot be taken to mean that the right is available even in extradition
proceedings that are not criminal in nature.

 Application in this case: That the offenses for which Jimenez is sought to be extradited
are bailable in the United States is not an argument to grant him one in the present case. To
 stress, extradition proceedings are separate and distinct from the trial for the offenses for
which he is charged. He should apply for bail before the courts trying the criminal cases
against him, not before the extradition court.

e. Government of Hongkong v. Olalia, 521 SCRA 470

 The right of a prospective extraditee to apply for bail:

The Philippines should see to it that the right to liberty of every individual is not impaired.
It must be viewed in the light of the various treaty obligations of the Philippines
concerning respect for the promotion and protection of human rights. Under these treaties,
the presumption lies in favor of human liberty.

 The Supreme Court also noted that:

a. The exercise of the State’s power to deprive an individual of his liberty is not
necessarily limited to criminal proceedings. Respondents in administrative
proceedings, such as deportation and quarantine, have likewise been detained.
b. Philippine jurisprudence has not limited the exercise of the right to bail to criminal
proceedings only. The Supreme Court has admitted to bail persons who are not
involved in criminal proceedings. In fact, bail has been allowed in this jurisdiction to
persons in detention during the pendency of administrative proceedings such as
deportation proceedings, taking into cognizance the obligation of the Philippines
under international conventions to uphold human rights. Likewise, since the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights applies to deportation cases, there is no
reason why it cannot be invoked in extradition cases. After all, both are administrative
proceedings where the innocence or guilt of the person detained is not in issue

 Extradition" is defined by law as "the removal of an accused from the Philippines with the
object of placing him at the disposal of foreign authorities to enable the requesting state or
government to hold him in connection with any criminal investigation directed against him
or the execution of a penalty imposed on him under the penal or criminal law of the
requesting state or government."

 While extradition is not a criminal proceeding, it is characterized by the following:

a) it entails a deprivation of liberty on the part of the potential extraditee and
b) the means employed to attain the purpose of extradition is also "the machinery of
criminal law."

 Provisional arrest in case of urgency

Under the Philippine Extradition Law, the requesting state is allowed "in case of urgency"
to ask for the "provisional arrest of the accused, pending receipt of the request for
extradition;" and that release from provisional arrest "shall not prejudice re-arrest and
extradition of the accused if a request for extradition is received subsequently."

 A potential extraditee may be subjected to arrest, to a prolonged restraint of liberty, and

forced to transfer to the demanding state following the proceedings. "Temporary detention"
may be a necessary step in the process of extradition, but the length of time of the detention
should be reasonable.
  An extradition proceeding being sui generis:
The standard of proof required in granting or denying bail can neither be the proof beyond
reasonable doubt in criminal cases nor the standard of proof of preponderance of evidence
in civil cases. While administrative in character, the standard of substantial evidence used
in administrative cases cannot likewise apply given the object of extradition law which is to
prevent the prospective extraditee from fleeing our jurisdiction. A "clear and convincing
evidence" should be used in granting bail in extradition cases. This standard should be
lower than proof beyond reasonable doubt but higher than preponderance of evidence. The
potential extraditee must prove by "clear and convincing evidence" that he is not a flight
risk and will abide with all the orders and processes of the extradition court.

E. Bail, When Discretionary

a. Enrile v. Sandiganbayan, supra

 Section 2, Rule 114

One of the conditions of bail is for the accused to "appear before the proper court
whenever required by the court or these Rules." The practice of bail fixing supports this
purpose.

 Probability of the appearance of the accused or flight to avoid punishment

Thus, in Villasenor v. Abano, the Court has pronounced that "the principal factor
considered (in bail fixing), to the determination of which most factors are directed, is the
probability of the appearance of the accused, or of his flight to avoid punishment."

 Admission to bail always involves the risk that the accused will take flight. This is the
reason precisely why the probability or the improbability of flight is an important factor to
be taken into consideration in granting or denying bail, even in capital cases. The
exception to the fundamental right to bail should be applied in direct ratio to the extent of
the probability of evasion of prosecution.

b. Qui v. People, GR 196161, September 26, 2012

 Sec. 5 of Rule 114

The grant of bail is a matter of discretion upon conviction by the RTC of an offense not
punishable by death, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, as in this case.

 Bail pending appeal:

The Court held that pursuant to the "tough on bail pending appeal" policy, the presence of
bailnegating conditions mandates the denial or revocation of bail pending appeal such that
those circumstances are deemed to be as grave as conviction by the trial court for an
offense punishable by death, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment where bail is
prohibited. In the exercise of that discretion, the proper courts are to be guided by the
fundamental principle that the allowance of bail pending appeal should be exercised not
with laxity but with grave caution and only for strong reasons, considering that the accused
 has been in fact convicted by the trial court. After one is convicted by the trial court, the
presumption of innocence, and with it, the constitutional right to bail, ends.

c. Leviste v. CA and People, GR 189122, March 17, 2010

 Bail is either a matter of right or of discretion.

- A matter of right - when the offense charged is not punishable by death, reclusion
perpetua or life imprisonment.
- A matter of discretion - upon conviction by the RTC of an offense not punishable
death, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, bail becomes a matter of discretion

 General Rule: When bail is a matter of discretion, the determination of whether or not to
grant bail lies with the sound discretion of the court.

 Bail is discretionary:
1. Upon conviction by the RTC of an offense not punishable by death, reclusion perpetua
or life imprisonment, admission to bail is discretionary.
2. After conviction by the RTC wherein a penalty of imprisonment exceeding 6 but not
more than 20 years is imposed, and not one of the circumstances below is present and
proved, bail is a matter of discretion:
a) That he is a recidivist, quasi-recidivist, or habitual delinquent, or has committed
the
b) crime aggravated by the circumstance of reiteration;
c) That he has previously escaped from legal confinement, evaded sentence, or
violated the conditions of his bail without a valid justification;
d) That he committed the offense while under probation, parole, or conditional
pardon;
e) That the circumstances of his case indicate the probability of flight if released on
bail; or
f) That there is undue risk that he may commit another crime during the pendency
of the appeal.

 Any application for bail pending appeal should be viewed from the perspective of two
stages:
1) the determination of discretion stage, where the appellate court must determine
whether any of the circumstances in the third paragraph of Section 5, Rule
114 is present; this will establish whether or not the appellate court will exercise
sound discretion or stringent discretion in resolving the application for bail
pending appeal and
2) the exercise of discretion stage where, assuming the appellant’s case falls within
the first scenario allowing the exercise of sound discretion, the appellate court
may consider all relevant circumstances, other than those mentioned in the
third paragraph of Section 5, Rule 114, including the demands of equity and
justice; on the basis thereof, it may either allow or disallow bail.

A finding that none of the said circumstances is present will not

automatically result in the grant of bail. Such findings will simply authorize
the court to use the less stringent sound discretion approach.
 d. Obosa v. CA, 266 SCRA 281

 Bail, a matter of discretion

While the accused, after conviction, may upon application be bailed at the discretion of the
court, that discretion — particularly with respect to extending the bail — should be
exercised not with laxity, but with caution and only for strong reasons, with the end in
view of upholding the majesty of the law and the administration of justice.

 Certainty of innocence
The importance attached to conviction is due to the underlying principle that bail should be
granted only where it is uncertain whether the accused is guilty or innocent, and therefore,
where that uncertainty is removed by conviction it would be absurd to admit to bail.

After a person has been tried and convicted the presumption of innocence which may be
relied upon in prior applications is rebutted, and the burden is upon the accused to show
error in the conviction. From another point of view, it may be properly argued that the
probability of ultimate punishment is so enhanced by the conviction that the accused is
much more likely to attempt to escape if liberated on bail than before conviction.

d. Alva v. CA, 487 SCRA 146

 General Rule:
Section 5 of Rule 114 provides that the RTC is given the discretion to admit to bail an
accused even after the latter has been convicted to suffer the penalty of imprisonment for a
term of more than 6 years but less than 20 years.
However, the same also provides for the cancellation of bail bonds already granted or the
denial of a bail bond application upon the concurrence of two points:
1. If the judgment of the Regional Trial Court exceeds six (6) years but not more than
twenty (20) years; and
2. Upon a showing by the prosecution, with notice to the accused, of the presence of any
of the five circumstances:
a) That the accused is a recidivist, quasi-recidivist, or habitual delinquent, or has
committed the crime aggravated by the circumstances of reiteration;
b) That the accused is found to have previously escaped from legal confinement,
evaded sentence, or has violated the conditions of his bail without valid
justification;
c) That the accused committed the offense while on probation, parole, or under
conditional pardon;
d) That the circumstances of the accused or his case indicate the probability of flight
if released on bail; or
e) That there is undue risk that during the pendency of the appeal, the accused may
commit another crime.

 Right to bail available only to person who is in custody of the law

Basic is the principle that the right to bail can only be availed of by a person who is in
custody of the law or otherwise deprived of his liberty and it would be premature, x x x, to
file a petition for bail for someone whose freedom has yet to be curtailed.
  “The issue of the validity of petitioner’s bail bond on appeal having been laid to rest
by Section 5 of Rule 114 of the 1994 Rules of Court, as amended, petitioner’s alleged
failure to post a bail bond on appeal is, therefore, inconsequential as, under the
circumstances, he is disallowed by law to be admitted to bail on appeal. Thus, for all legal
intents and purposes, there can be no other conclusion than that at the time petitioner filed
his notice of appeal and during the pendency of his appeal – even until now – he remains at
large, placing himself beyond the pale, and protection of the law.”

 “[O]nce an accused escapes from prison or confinement or jumps bail or flees to a foreign
country, he losses his standing in court and unless he surrenders or submits to the
jurisdiction of the court he is deemed to have waived any right to seek relief from the court.

 Thus, the Court of Appeals committed no reversible error in dismissing petitioner’s appeal.
Within the meaning of the principles governing the prevailing criminal procedure,
petitioner impliedly withdrew his appeal by jumping bail and thereby made the judgment of
the RTC final and executory.”

 Custody of the law is literally custody over the body of the accused.
It includes, but is not limited to, detention." In the case at bar, petitioner, being a fugitive,
until and unless he submits himself to the custody of the law, in the manner of being under
the jurisdiction of the courts, he cannot be granted any relief by the CA.

g. Chua v. CA, 520 SCRA 729

 Remedy upon Omnibus Order for Cancellation of Bail:

Temporary Restraining Order and writ of preliminary injunction is not the proper remedy
to assail Omnibus Order cancelling his bail. Proper remedy is filing with CA a motion to
review of the said order in regular appeal proceedings.

 CA’s granting of writ of prelim injunction is deprived of factual or legal basis. To be

entitled to an injunctive writ, the applicant must show that (1) he has a clear existing
right to be protected; and (2) the acts against which the injunction is to be directed
are in violation of such right.

a. The first requisite is absent. Respondent has no right to be freed on bail pending his
appeal from the trial court’s judgment. His conviction carries a penalty of
imprisonment exceeding 6 years (to be exact, 12 years of prision mayor, as minimum, to
20 years of reclusion temporal, as maximum) which justifies the cancellation of his bail
pursuant to the third paragraph of Section 5 (b), (d) and (e) of Rule 114. Moreover, he
failed to appear despite notice during the promulgation of judgment on January 26,
1999. His inexcusable non-appearance not only violated the condition of his bail that
he "shall appear" before the court "whenever required" by the latter or the Rules,
but also showed the probability that he might flee or commit another crime while
released on bail.
 b. Rule 120, Sec 6. Promulgation of Judgment - xxx If the judgment is for conviction and
the failure of the accused to appear was without justifiable cause, he shall lose the
remedies available in these Rules against the judgment and the court shall order his
arrest. Within fifteen (15) days from promulgation of judgment, however, the accused
may surrender and file a motion for leave of court to avail of these remedies. He shall
state the reasons for his absence at the scheduled promulgation, and if he proves that his
absence was for a justifiable cause, he shall be allowed to avail of said remedies within
fifteen (15) days from notice.

 Since respondent has not shown any right to be protected, the second requisite for the
issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction is obviously absent. As such, the Court of
Appeals clearly acted with grave abuse of discretion in issuing its assailed resolution

h. People v. Fitzgerald, 505 SCRA 573

 Doctrine:
The right to bail emanates from of the right to be presumed innocent. It is accorded to
a person in the custody of the law who may, by reason of the presumption of innocence
he enjoys, be allowed provisional liberty upon filing of a security to guarantee his
appearance before any court, as required under specified conditions.

 Sec. 4 of Rule 114 provides that bail is a matter of right to an accused person in
custody for an offense not punishable by death, reclusion perpetua or life
imprisonment, but a matter of discretion on the part of the court, concerning one facing
an accusation for an offense punishable by death, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment
when the evidence of his guilt is strong.

 As for an accused already convicted and sentenced to imprisonment term exceeding

six years, bail may be denied or revoked based on prosecution evidence as to the
existence of any of the circumstances under Sec. 5 of Rule 114.

 In the case at bar, bail was not a matter of right but a mere privilege subject to the
discretion of the CA to be exercised in accordance with the stringent requirements of
Sec. 5, Rule 114. Sec. 5 directs the denial or revocation of bail upon evidence of the
existence of any of the circumstances enumerated therein such as those indicating
probability of flight if released on bail or undue risk that the accused may commit another
crime during the pendency of the appeal.

 Bail is not a sick pass for an ailing or aged detainee or prisoner needing medical care
outside the prison facility. A mere claim of illness is not a ground for bail.

F. Capital Offense

a. Trillanes v. Pimentel, 556 SCRA 471

  The Rules also state that no person charged with a capital offense, or an offense punishable
by reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, shall be admitted to bail when evidence of
guilt is strong, regardless of the stage of the criminal action.

 That Section 7 of Rule 114 of the Rules of Court, apply equally to rape and coup d’etat
cases, both being punishable by reclusion perpetua, is beyond cavil. Within the class of
offenses covered by the stated range of imposable penalties, there is clearly no
distinction as to the political complexion of or moral turpitude involved in the crime
charged.

b. Enrile v. Sandiganbayan, 767 SCRA 282

 Entitled to Bail as a Matter of Right based on Humanitarian Grounds:

This national commitment to uphold the fundamental human rights as well as value the
worth and dignity of every person has authorized the grant of bail not only to those charged
in criminal proceedings but also to extradite upon a clear and convincing showing:
1) that the detainee will not be a flight risk or a danger to the community; and
2) that there exist special, humanitarian and compelling circumstances

Note:
Bail for the provisional liberty of the accused, regardless of the crime charged,
should be allowed independently of the merits of the charge, provided his
continued incarceration is clearly shown to be injurious to his health or to
endanger his life. Indeed, denying him bail despite imperiling his health and life
would not serve the true objective of preventive incarceration during the trial.

G. Capital Offense or an Offense Punishable by Reclusion Perpetua or Life

Imprisonment, not Bailable

a. People v. Valdez, GR 216007-09, December 8, 2015

 General Rule:
Capital Offense or those punishable by reclusion perpetua, life imprisonment or death are
not bailable when evidence of guilt is strong.

 Doctrine:
In determining whether an offense is punishable by reclusion perpetua or life
imprisonment, what is taken to account is the prescribed penalty not the imposable
penalty. Notably, the word used is ["punishable,"] which practically bears the same
meaning as "imposable." It is only logical that the reference has a direct correlation with
the time frame "before conviction" since trial is yet to begin; hence, it can only be the
penalty imposable of the offense charged that can be considered for purposes of bail.
  The word used is "imposed," not imposable. Thus, the reference can only point to the
time when a judgment of conviction is impending. If and when "the penalty for the most
serious crime shall be imposed, the same to be applied in its maximum period," is thus
applied in the proper application of the penalty to be imposed on the accused. Certainly,
this cannot be considered for purposes of bail.

 Note:
The capital nature of the offense is determined by the penalty described by law and not the
penalty actually imposed on the accused.

b. Enrile v. Sandiganbayan, supra

 For purposes of admission to bail, the determination of whether or not evidence of guilt is
strong in criminal cases involving capital offenses, or offenses punishable with reclusion
perpetua or life imprisonment lies within the discretion of the trial court.

 Such discretion may be exercised only after the hearing called to ascertain the degree of
guilt of the accused for the purpose of whether or not he should be granted provisional
liberty.It is axiomatic, therefore, that bail cannot be allowed when its grant is a matter of
discretion on the part of the trial court unless there has been a hearing with notice to the
Prosecution.

 In resolving bail applications of the accused who is charged with a capital offense, or
an offense punishable by reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, the trial judge is
expected to comply with the guidelines outlined in Cortes v. Catral, to wit:
1. In all cases, whether bail is a matter of right or of discretion, notify the prosecutor of
the hearing of the application for bail or require him to submit his recommendation
(Section 18, Rule 114 of the Rules of Court, as amended);
2. Where bail is a matter of discretion, conduct a hearing of the application for bail
regardless of whether or not the prosecution refuses to present evidence to show that
the guilt of the accused is strong for the purpose of enabling the court to exercise its
sound discretion; (Section 7 and 8, supra)
3. Decide whether the guilt of the accused is strong based on the summary of evidence of
the prosecution;
4. If the guilt of the accused is not strong, discharge the accused upon the approval of the
bail bond (Section 19, supra) Otherwise petition should be denied.

H. Burden of Proof in Bail Application

a. Gacad v. Clapis, Jr., AM No. RTJ-10-2257, July 17, 2012

 Section 8 of Rule 114 provides that "at the hearing of an application for bail filed by
the person who is in custody for the commission of an offense punishable by death,
reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, the prosecution has the burden of showing that
evidence of guilt is strong…"

 This rule presupposes that:

 1) an application for bail was filed, and
2) the judge notified the prosecutor and conducted a bail hearing for the prosecution to
adduce evidence to prove the guilt of the accused.

 In the present case, the prosecution was not given an opportunity to present evidence to
prove that the guilt of the accused is strong. Judge Clapis' Order granting bail indicates
that he merely used as basis the affidavit of one prosecution witness that was
submitted earlier. Clearly, Judge Clapis failed to observe the proper procedure in
granting bail.

 Jurisprudence clearly instructs that "in cases where the grant of bail is discretionary, due
process requires that the Prosecution must be given the opportunity to present within
a reasonable period all the evidence it may desire to produce before the court should
resolve the Motion for Bail.

 The Court emphasized that bail cannot be allowed to a person charged with a capital
offense, or an offense punishable with reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, without a
hearing upon notice to the prosecution; otherwise, a violation of due process occurs.

I. Amount of Bail Guidelines

a. Tanog v. Balindong, GR 187464, November 25, 2015

 Section 9 of Rule 114. Amount of bail

In fixing the amount of bail in criminal cases, judges shall primarily consider the following
factors:
a) financial ability of the accused to give bail;
b) nature and circumstances of the offense;
c) penalty for the offense charged;
d) character and reputation of the accused;
e) age and health of the accused;
f) weight of the evidence against the accused;
g) probability of the accused appearing at the trial;
h) forfeiture of other bail;
i) the fact that the accused was a fugitive from justice when arrested; and (j) pendency
of other cases where the accused is on bail.

 The amount of bail should be reasonable at all times.

In implementing this mandate, regard should be taken of the prisoner's pecuniary
circumstances. We point out that what is reasonable bail to a man of wealth may be
unreasonable to a poor man charged with a like offense. Thus, the right to bail should not
be rendered nugatory by requiring a sum that is relatively excessive. The amount should be
high enough to assure the presence of the defendant when required, but no higher than is
reasonably calculated to fulfill this purpose.

 DOJ Bail Bond Guide, while persuasive and merits attention, is not binding on the courts.
In fixing the amount of bail, the judge is given the discretion to set an amount which he or
she perceives as appropriate under given circumstances in relation to the factors
enumerated under Section 9 of Rule 114.
  As quoted above, Judge Balindong enumerated the reasons (i.e., accused's incarceration for
more than 4 years; his reputation as a former councillor; his financial ability; and the weak
evidence against him) why he set the amount of bail at P30,000.00. Contrary to the
petitioner's claim, we also hold that Judge Balindong did not act with grave abuse of
discretion when he set the amount of Sidic's bailatP30,000.00.

J. Property Bond, How Posted

a. Re: Report on the Judicial Audit Conducted in the RTC Branch 4, Dolores, Eastern Samar, AM
No. 06-6-340-RTC, October 17, 2007

 Section 11, Rule 114 of the Rules of Court states that failure of the accused to cause the
annotation of the lien on the property's certificate of title within 10 days after the approval
of the property bond shall be sufficient cause for the cancellation of the bond and re-arrest
and detention of the accused.

 Although the duty to ensure compliance with the requisites of bail bond application rests
mainly with the Clerk of Court or his duly authorized personnel and the task of the Judge
is only to approve the same, said task has an accompanying responsibility on the part
of the approving Judge to review or determine its validity. Understandably, he should
be employing the minimum standard the rules require the clerks of court to observe.
Considering the seriousness of the purpose in the posting of bail bond, approval
thereof should pass through strict scrutiny and with utmost caution on the part of
both the Clerk of Court (or his duly authorized personnel) and the approving Judge.

K. Deposit of Cash as Bail

a. Pantillo III v. Canoy, supra

 Release of the accused without a need of Court Order:

Just submit:
1. Proper certificate of deposit
2. Written undertaking showing compliance with therequirement of Sec. 2, Rule 114 of
the Rules of Court.

 The money deposited shall be considered as bail and applied to the payment of fine and
costs while the excess, if any, shall be returned to the accused or to whoever made the
deposit.

 In the case at bar, Melgazo or any person acting on his behalf did not deposit the amount
of bail recommended by Prosecutor Gonzaga with the nearest collector of internal
revenue or provincial, city or municipal treasurer. In clear departure from Sec. 14 of
Rule 114, Judge Canoy instead verbally ordered Clerk IV Suriaga of the Surigao City RTC
Office of the Clerk of Court, accept the cash deposit as bail, to earmark an official receipt
for the cash deposit, and to date it the following day.
b. Lachica v. Tormis, AM No. MTJ-05-1609, September 20, 2005

 Persons to whom the cash bond may be deposited:

1. Nearest collector of Internal Revenue, or
2. Provincial, city or municipal treasurer, or the clerk of court where the case is pending

 Note:
A judge is not one of those authorized to receive the deposit of cash as bail, nor should
such cash be kept in the office of the judge.

L. Recognizance

a. OCA v. Floro, Jr., AM No. RTJ-99-7-273-RTC, RTJ-06-1988, March 31, 2006

 P.D. No. 968, Section 7 as amended, provides:

SEC. 7. Period for Submission of Investigation Report. - The probation officer shall
submit to the court the investigation report on a defendant not later than sixty
days from receipt of the order of said court to conduct the investigation. The court
shall resolve the petition for probation not later than five days after receipt of said
report.

Pending submission of the investigation report and the resolution of the petition, the
defendant may be allowed on temporary liberty under his bail filed in the criminal
case; Provided, That, in case where no bail was filed or that the defendant is incapable
of filing one, the court may allow the release of the defendant on recognizance to the
custody of a responsible member of the community who shall guarantee his
appearance whenever required by the court.

 Recognizance
It refers to an obligation of record, entered into before some court or officer authorized to
take it with the condition to do some particular act, the most usual condition in criminal
cases being the appearance of the accused for trial.

 The release of an accused on recognizance entails more than a cursory interview of the
custodian and the applicant.

 Under the Probation Law, and as we explained in Poso v. Judge Mijares, it is incumbent
upon the Judge hearing the application to ascertain first that the applicant is not a
“disqualified offender” as “putting the discharge of the accused on hold would have
allowed the judge more time to pass upon the request for provisional liberty.”

 Temporary Liberty
Temporary liberty of an applicant for probation is effective no longer than the period for
awaiting the submission of the investigation report and the resolution of the petition, which
the law mandates as no more than 60 days to finish the case study and report and a
maximum of 15 days from receipt of the report for the trial judge to resolve the application
for probation.
b. Adalim-White v. Bugtas, AM No. RTJ-02-1738, November 17, 2005

 On reduced bail or on his own recognizance:

Section 16, Rule 114 of the Rules of Court – A person in custody for a period equal to or
more than the minimum of the principal penalty prescribed for the offense charged,
without application of the indeterminate sentence law or any of modifying circumstance
shall be released on reduced bail or on his own recognizance, at the discernment of the
court.

M. Bail, when not required; Reduced Bail or Recognizance

a. Adalim-White v. Bugtas, supra

 Can be released without bail but in recognizance of another:

1) Section 24, Rule 114 of the Rules of Court is plain and clear in prohibiting the
grant of bail after conviction by final judgment and after the convict has started to
serve sentence

EXCEPTION:
When the convict has applied for probation before he commences to serve sentence,
provided the penalty and the offense are within the purview of the Probation Law.

2) Section 16, Rule 114 of the Rules of Court: A person who has been in custody for
a period equal to or more than the possible maximum imprisonment prescribed for
the offense charged, without prejudice to the continuation of the trial or the
proceedings on appeal;

There is no basis for Bugtos in allowing Bagaporo to be released on recognizance.

Aside from the fact that there is no evidence to prove that Bagaporos' application for
parole was approved by the Board of Pardons and Parole, there is neither any
showing that he was extended good conduct allowances by the Director of Prisons,
nor was he granted pardon by the President.

Moreover, Bugtas should know that the provisions of Sections 5 and 16, Rule 114
of the Rules of Court apply only to an accused undergoing preventive imprisonment
during trial or on appeal. They do not apply to a person convicted by final
judgment and already serving sentence.

N. Bail, where Filed

a. Pantillo v. Canoy III, supra

 In the case at bar, Melgazo did not file any application or petition for the grant of bail with
the Surigao City RTC, Branch 29. Despite the absence of any written application,
respondent judge verbally granted bail to Melgazo. This is a clear deviation from the
procedure laid down in Sec. 17 of Rule 114.
  In addition to a written application for bail, Rule 114 of the Rules prescribes other
requirements for the release of the accused:

 SEC.14. Deposit of cash as bail. The accused or any person acting in his behalf may
deposit in cash with the nearest collector of internal revenue or provincial, city, or
municipal treasurer the amount of bail fixed by the court, or recommended by the
prosecutor who investigated or filed the case. Upon submission of a proper certificate of
deposit and a written undertaking showing compliance with the requirements of section 2
of this Rule, the accused shall be discharged from custody. The money deposited shall be
considered as bail and applied to the payment of fine and costs while the excess, if any,
shall be returned to the accused or to whoever made the deposit.

 SEC. 2. Conditions of the bail; requirements. All kinds of bail are subject to the
following conditions:
(a) The undertaking shall be effective upon approval, and unless cancelled, shall remain in
form at all stages of the case until promulgation of the judgment of the Regional Trial
Court, irrespective of whether the case was originally filed in or appealed to it;
(b) The accused shall appear before the proper court whenever required by the court
or these Rules;
(c) The failure of the accused to appear at the trial without justification and despite
due notice shall be deemed a waiver of his right to be present thereat. In such case,
the trial may proceed in absentia; and
(d) The bondsman shall surrender the accused to the court for execution of the final
execution
The original papers shall state the full name and address of the accused, the
amount of the undertaking and the conditions required by this section.
Photographs (passport size) taken within the last six (6) months showing the face,
left and right profiles of the accused must be attached to the bail.

b. Re: Anonymous Letter-Complaint Against Marilou Runes-Tamang, AM No. MTJ-

041558, April 7, 2010

 Judge Tamang contends that the accused voluntarily surrendered at San Juan
therefore could apply for bail in San Juan. She was correct in approving the application
for bail of the accused who voluntarily surrendered detained in San Juan, Pateros and
Taguig, because Sec. 17(a) granted her authority to approve applications for bail of
the accused detained within her territorial jurisdiction, in the event of the
unavailability of any RTC judge in the area. (there was still no RTC judge stationed
in San Juan and Pateros) However, she did not substantiate her approved bail
application of the accused in Pasig City. She offered no proof to justify her approval of
the questioned bond.

 Sec 17 (a), Rule 114

governs the approval of bail bonds for criminal cases pending OUTSIDE the judge’s
territorial jurisdiction
Bail, where filed. — (a) Bail in the amount fixed may be filed with the court where the
case is pending, or in the absence or unavailability of the judge thereof, with any
regional trial judge, metropolitan trial judge, municipal trial judge, or municipal
circuit trial judge in the province, city, or municipality. If the accused is arrested in a
 province, city, or municipality other than where the case is pending, bail may also be
filed with any regional trial court of said place, or if no judge thereof is available, with
any metropolitan trial judge, municipal trial judge, or municipal circuit trial judge
therein.

 Under this provision, the bail bond may be filed either:

- With the court where the case is pending, or
- With any RTC of the place of arrest, or
- (If no judge is available) with any MeTC or MTC of the place of arrest.

O. Notice of Application to Prosecutor

a. Torrevillas v. Navidad, AM No. RTJ-06-1976 and AM No. RTJ-061977, April 29, 2009

 Sec. 18. Notice of application to prosecutor. – In the application for bail under section 8 of
this Rule, the court must give reasonable notice of the hearing to the prosecutor or require
him to submit his recommendation.

 While it is well-settled that the courts cannot interfere with the discretion of the public
prosecutor to determine the specificity and adequacy of the offense charged, the judge may
dismiss a complaint if he finds it to be insufficient in form or substance or without any
ground; otherwise, he may proceed with the case if in his view it is sufficient and proper in
form.

 Under the present Rules, a hearing is mandatory in granting bail whether it is a matter
of right or discretion. It must be stressed that the grant or the denial of bail, in cases
where bail is a matter of discretion, hinges on the issue of whether or not the evidence
of guilt of the accused is strong, and the determination of whether or not the evidence is
strong is a matter of judicial discretion which remains with the judge.

 In order for the latter to properly exercise his discretion, he must first conduct a
hearing to determine whether the evidence of guilt is strong. In fact, even in cases
where there is no petition for bail, a hearing should still be held. It has been held that
such error cannot be characterized as mere deficiency in prudence, discretion and
judgment but a patent disregard of well-known rules and, therefore, constitutive of gross
ignorance of the law.

P. Release on Bail

a. Re: Report on the Judicial Audit Conducted in the RTC, Branch 4, Dolores, Eastern
Samar, supra

 Once the accused is admitted to bail, he is entitled to immediate release from custody. An
officer who fails or refuses to release him from detention notwithstanding the approval by
the proper court of his bail bond may be held liable under Art. 126 of the Revised Penal
Code for delaying release.
  Where bail is filed in court other than where the case is pending, the judge who
accepted the bail shall forward it together with the order of release and other
supporting papers, to the court where the case is pending.

Q. Increase or Reduction of Bail

a. Conquilla v. Bernardo, AM No. MTJ-09-1737, February 9, 2011

 When the amount of bail is increased, the accused may be committed to custody if he
does not give bail in the increased amount within a reasonable period. An accused
released without bail upon filing of the Complaint or Information may, at any
subsequent stage of the proceedings and whenever a strong showing of guilt appears to
the court, be required to give bail in the amount fixed, or in lieu thereof, committed to
custody.

 The guidelines for in Rule 114, Section 9 of the Rules of Court in fixing the amount of
bail are also applicable in reducing or increasing the bail previously fixed.

R. Forfeiture of Bail

a. Re: Josefina D. Farrales, AM Nos. 06-3-196-RTC and AM No. 06-7416-RTC, December

24, 2008.

 The rule governing forfeitures of bail bonds is found in Section 21, Rule 114 of the
Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure, which provides:

Sec. 21. Forfeiture of bail. - When the presence of the accused is required by the
court or these Rules, his bondsmen shall be notified to produce him before the
court on a given date and time. If the accused fails to appear in person as required,
his bail shall be declared forfeited and the bondsmen given 30 days within which to
produce the principal and to show cause why no judgment should be rendered
against them for the amount of their bail. Within the said period, the bondmen
must:
a. produce the body of the principal or give the reason for his non-production;
and
b. explain why the accused did not appear before the court when first required to
do so.

 Failing in these two requisites, a judgment shall be rendered against the bondsmen,
jointly and severally, for the amount of the bail. The Court shall not reduce or otherwise
mitigate the liability of the bondsmen, unless the accused has been surrendered or is
acquitted.

 Significantly, OCA Circular No. 100-2006 (Re: Guidelines on the Reduction of

Bond Liability) provides:
 1. REDUCTION OF BOND LIABILITY - Following an Order of Forfeiture, the Court
may reduce or otherwise mitigate the liability of the bondsmen, PROVIDED, the
accused has been surrendered or is acquitted. Only in these two instances may Judges
reduce or mitigate the liability of the bondsmen. (RULE 114, SEC. 21)

 Note: The 30-day period granted to the bondsmen to comply with the two requisites for
the lifting of the order of forfeiture cannot be shortened by the court but may be
extended for good cause shown.

b. Mendoza v. Alarma, GR 151970, May 7, 2008

 An order of forfeiture is interlocutory and merely requires appellant “to show cause
cause why judgement should not be rendered against it for the amount of bond.” Such
order is different from a judgement on the bond which is issued if the accused was not
produced within the 30day period. The judgement on the bond is the one that ultimately
determines the liability of the surety, and when it becomes final, execution may issue at
once.

S. Cancellation of Bail

a. Bongcac v. Sandiganbayan, GR 156687-88, May 21, 2009

 SEC. 22. Cancellation of bail. - Upon application of the bondsmen, with due notice to
the prosecutor, the bail may be cancelled upon surrender of the accused or proof of his
death.

 The bail shall be deemed automatically cancelled upon acquittal of the accused,
dismissal of the case, or execution of the judgment of conviction.

 In all instances, the cancellation shall be without prejudice to any liability on the
bail. From this provision, it is clear that the cancellation of bail is automatic upon
execution of the judgment of conviction.

 Principle of immutability of final judgment:

Upon finality of the judgment, the Court loses its jurisdiction to amend, modify or alter
the same. Except for correction of clerical errors or the making of nunc pro tunc entries
which cause no prejudice to any party, or where the judgment is void, the judgment can
neither be amended nor altered after it has become final and executory.

b. People v. Cawaling, GR 157147, April 17, 2009

 The posted property bond cannot be cancelled, much less withdrawn and replaced
with a cash bond by movant Cruz, unless Wilfredo is surrendered to the Court, or
adequate proof of his death is presented.
  Under Section of Rule 114, Cruz, as a bondsman, guarantees the appearance of the
accused before any court as required under specified conditions.

 SEC. 22. Cancellation of bail.— Upon application of the bondsmen with due notice to
the prosecutor, the bail may be cancelled upon surrender of the accused or proof of
his death.

 The bail shall be deemed automatically cancelled upon acquittal of the accused,
dismissal of the case, or execution of the judgment of conviction. In all instances, the
cancellation shall be without prejudice to any liability on the bail.

 In the case at bar, Wilfredo, a convicted fellow, was already beyond the reach of the
law so the property bond cannot be released.

T. Arrest of Accused Out on Bail

a. Silverio v. CA, GR 94284, April 8, 1991

 A person facing criminal charges may be restrained by the Court from leaving the
country or, if abroad, compelled to return. In the same manner, an accused released on
bail may be re-arrested without the necessity of a warrant if he attempts to depart from
the Philippines without prior permission of the Court where the case is pending.

 Silverio is facing a criminal charge. He has posted bail but has violated the conditions
thereof by failing to appear before the Court when required. Warrants for his arrest have
been issued. Those orders and processes would be rendered nugatory if an accused were
to be allowed to leave or to remain, at his pleasure, outside the territorial confines of the
country.

 Re right to travel:
Article III, Section 6 of the 1987 Constitution should by no means be construed as
delimiting the inherent power of the Courts to use all means necessary to carry their
orders into effect in criminal cases pending before them. When by law jurisdiction is
conferred on a Court or judicial officer, all auxillary writs, process and other means
necessary to carry it into effect may be employed by such Court or officer (Rule 135,
Section 6, Rules of Court).

U. No Bail After Final Judgment; Exception

a. Adalim-White v. Bugtas, supra

 Section 24, Rule 114 of the Rules of Court is plain and clear in prohibiting the grant of
bail after conviction by final judgment and after the convict has started to serve
sentence.
  Rule 114 of the Rules of Court reads: Sec. 24. No bail after final judgment;
exception. — No bail shall be allowed after a judgment of conviction has become final.
If before such finality, the accused applies for probation, he may be allowed temporary
liberty under his bail. When no bail was filed or the accused is incapable of filing one,
the court may allow his release on recognizance to the custody of a responsible member
of the community. In no case shall bail be allowed after the accused has commenced to
serve sentence.

 The only exception is when the convict has applied for probation before he
commences to serve sentence, provided the penalty and the offense are within the
purview of the Probation Law.

 Provisions of Sections 5 and 16, Rule 114 of the Rules of Court do not apply to a
person convicted by final judgment and already serving sentence.

b. Vicente v. Majaducon, AM No. RTJ-02-1968, June 23, 2005

 General Rule:
No bail shall be allowed after the judgement has become final, as what is left is for him
to serve the sentence.

 Exception:
When he has applied for probation before commencing to serve sentence, the penalty
and the offense being within the purview of the Probation Law. The application for
probation must be filed within the period perfecting an appeal. Such filing operated as a
waiver of the right of appeal.

 Exception to the Exception:

The accused shall not be allowed to be released on bail after he has commenced to
serve his sentence.

V. Court Supervision of Detainees

a. Mupas v. Español, AM No. RTJ-04-1850, July 14, 2004

 Respondent-judge's order to transfer the accused from the municipal jail to the
provincial jail cannot be justified under Section 25 of Rule 114 of the Revised Rules
of Criminal Procedure.

 Court supervision of detainees. — The court shall exercise supervision over all
persons in custody for the purpose of eliminating unnecessary detention. The
executive judges of the Regional Trial Courts shall conduct monthly personal
inspections of provincial, city and municipal jails and the prisoners within their
respective jurisdictions. They shall ascertain the number of detainees, inquire on their
proper accommodation and health and examine the condition of the jail facilities. They
 shall order the segregation of sexes and of minors from adults, ensure the observance of
the right of detainees to confer privately with counsel, and strive to eliminate conditions
inimical to detainees.

 The OCA expounds that as Executive Judge, respondent exercises supervision over all
persons in custody for the purpose of eliminating unnecessary detention but the rule
does not give her the authority to arrogate upon herself a power vested upon a
presiding judge of the court where the case is pending.

W. Bail not a Bar to Objections on Illegal Arrest, Lack of or Irregular

a. Leviste v. Alameda, GR 182677, August 3, 2010

 An application for admission to bail shall not bar the accused from challenging:
1. The validity of his arrest
2. The legality of the warrant issued therefore; or
3. The regularity or questioning the absence of preliminary investigation of the
charge against him.

 Provided that the accused raises them before entering his plea.

 The court shall observe the matter as early as practicable, but not later than the start of
the trial of the case.

 By applying for bail, petitioner did not waive his right to challenge the regularity of
the reinvestigation of the charge against him, the validity of the admission of the
Amended Information, and the legality of his arrest under the Amended Information, as
he vigorously raised them prior to his arraignment.

 Court cannot reasonably infer a valid waiver on the part of petitioner to preclude him
from obtaining a definite resolution of the objections he so timely invoked. Other than
its allegation of active participation, the OSG offered no clear and convincing proof that
petitioner's participation in the trial was unconditional with the intent to voluntarily and
unequivocally abandon his petition.

Rule 115
(Rights of Accused)

A. Rights of Accused at the Trial

1. Jacob v. Sandiganbayan, GR 162206, November 17, 2010

 Right to have a speedy, impartial and public trial.

The right of the accused to a speedy trial and to a speedy disposition of the case against him
was designed to prevent the oppression of the citizen by holding criminal prosecution
suspended over him for an indefinite time, and to prevent delays in the administration of
justice by mandating the courts to proceed with reasonable dispatch in the trial of criminal
cases. Such right to a speedy trial and a speedy disposition of a case is violated only when the
proceeding is attended by vexatious, capricious and oppressive delays.

 Speedy disposition
The inquiry as to whether or not an accused has been denied such right is not susceptible by
precise qualification. The concept of a speedy disposition is a relative term and must
necessarily be a flexible concept.

 4 Factors in determining whether the accused has been deprived of his right to a speedy
disposition of the case and to a speedy trial
a) length of delay;
b) the reason for the delay;
c) the defendant’s assertion of his right; and
d) prejudice to the defendant.

 Prejudice should be assessed in the light of the interest of the defendant that the speedy
trial was designed to protect, namely:
- to prevent oppressive pre-trial incarceration;
- to minimize anxiety and concerns of the accused to trial; and
- to limit the possibility that his defense will be impaired.

 Of these, the most serious is the last, because the inability of a defendant adequately to
prepare his case skews the fairness of the entire system. There is also prejudice if the
defense witnesses are unable to recall accurately the events of the distant past.

2. Crisostomo v. Sandiganbayan, GR 152398, April 14, 2005

WAIVER OF HIS RIGHT TO PRESENT EVIDENCE

 Crisostomo’s non-appearance during the 22 June 1995 trial was merely a waiver of his right
to be present for trial on such date only and not for the succeeding trial dates.

 Section 1(c) of Rule 115 clearly states that:

xxx The absence of the accused without any justifiable cause at the trial on a particular date of
which he had notice shall be considered a waiver of his right to be present during that trial.
When an accused under custody had been notified of the date of the trial and escapes, he shall
be deemed to have waived his right to be present on said date and on all subsequent trial dates
until custody is regained.
  While constitutional rights may be waived, such waiver must be clear and must be coupled
with an actual intention to relinquish the right.

 In criminal cases where the imposable penalty may be death, as in the present case, the court
is called upon to see to it that the accused is personally made aware of the consequences
of a waiver of the right to present evidence. In fact, it is not enough that the accused is
simply warned of the consequences of another failure to attend the succeeding hearings. The
court must first explain to the accused personally in clear terms the exact nature and
consequences of a waiver.

 The presence of the accused and his counsel is indispensable so that the court could
personally conduct a searching inquiry into the waiver.

3. People v. Abatayo, GR 139456, July 7, 2004

 Right to Confront and Cross-examine the witness against him at trial.

 Under Rule 115, Section 1(f) of the Rules of Court, he has the right to confront and
crossexamine the witnesses against him at the trial, a fundamental right which is part of
due process.

 (f) To confront and cross-examine the witnesses against him at the trial. Either party may
utilize as part of its evidence the testimony of a witness who is deceased, out of or can not
with due diligence be found in the Philippines, unavailable or otherwise unable to testify,
given in another case or proceeding, judicial or administrative, involving the same parties and
subject matter, the adverse party having the opportunity to cross-examine him.

 However, the right of confrontation and cross-examination is a personal one. It is not an

absolute right which a party can claim at all times.

 Right may be waived:

When a party has had the opportunity to cross-examine a witness but failed to avail himself of
it, he necessarily forfeits the right to cross-examine and the testimony given on direct
examination will be allowed to remain in the record.

 In this case, he waived such right when he failed to invoke the same after his initial
crossexamination of Juanito.

4. People v. Larrañaga, GR 138874-75, February 3, 2004

(a) right to be assisted by counsel at every stage of the proceedings;

There is no denial of the right to counsel where a counsel de oficio was appointed during the
absence of the accused's counsel de parte, pursuant to the court's desire to finish the case as early as
practicable under the continuous trial system. An examination of the provisions of the Constitution
and of Rule 115 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure concerning the right to counsel shows
that the "preference in the choice of counsel" pertains more aptly and specifically to a person under
investigation rather than an accused in a criminal prosecution. And even if we are to extend the
"application of the concept of "preference in the choice of counsel" to an accused in a criminal
prosecution, such preferential discretion is not absolute as would enable him to choose a particular
counsel to the exclusion of others equally capable.

Constitutional guaranty of right to representation by counsel does not mean that accused may avoid
trial by neglecting or refusing to secure assistance of counsel and by refusing to participate in his
trial.
(b) right to confront and cross-examine the prosecution witnesses;

Where several accused are being tried jointly for the same offense, the order in which counsel for
the several defendants shall cross-examine the state's witnesses may be regulated by the court and
one of them may even be denied the right to cross-examine separately where he had arranged with
the others that counsel of one of them should cross-examine for all.

In People vs. Gorospe, the court ruled that "while cross-examination is a right available to the
adverse party, it is not absolute in the sense that a cross-examiner could determine for himself the
length and scope of his cross-examination of a witness. The court has always the discretion to limit
the cross-examination and to consider it terminated if it would serve the ends of justice."

(c) right to produce evidence on their behalf; and

Due process of law is not denied by the exclusion of irrelevant, immaterial, or incompetent
evidence, or testimony of an incompetent witness. It is not error to refuse evidence which although
admissible for certain purposes, is not admissible for the purpose which counsel states as the
ground for offering it.

Due process is satisfied when the parties are afforded a fair and reasonable opportunity to explain
their respective sides of the controversy. In the present case, there is no showing of violation of
due process which justifies the reversal or setting aside of the trial court's findings.

(d) right to an impartial trial.

A trial judge is not a wallflower during trial. It is proper for him to caution and admonish witnesses
when necessary and he may rebuke a witness for levity or for other improper conduct. This is
because he is called upon to ascertain the truth of the controversy before him.

5. Pielago v. People, GR 202020, March 13, 2013

  Right to be Informed of the Nature and the Cause of the Accusation against him.
It is well-settled that in all criminal prosecutions, the accused is entitled to be informed of the
nature and cause of the accusation against him. In this respect, the designation in the
Information of the specific statute violated is imperative to avoid surprise on the accused and
to afford him the opportunity to prepare his defense accordingly.

 The factual allegations contained in the Information determine the crime charged against the
accused and not the designation of the offense as given by the prosecutor which is merely an
opinion not binding to the courts.

 What controls is not the title of the information or the designation of the offense but the
actual facts recited in the information. In other words, it is the recital of facts of the
commission of the offense, not the nomenclature of the offense, that determines the crime
being charged in the information.

 The Court reiterated that the character of the crime is not determined by the caption or
preamble of the information nor from the specification of the provision of law alleged to
have been violated, but by the recital of the ultimate facts and circumstances in the
complaint or information.

6. Andrada v. People, 452 SCRA 685

Rights of Accused at the Trial

 In this case, there was no violation of petitioner’s right to due process.

 In criminal cases, the negligence or incompetence of counsel to be deemed gross must have
prejudiced the constitutional right of an accused to be heard.
 The long-standing rule is that a client is bound by the mistakes of his lawyer. Mistakes of
attorneys as to the competency of a witness, the sufficiency, relevancy or irrelevancy of
certain evidence, the proper defense or the burden of proof, failure to introduce evidence, to
summon witnesses, and to argue the case, unless they prejudice the client and prevent him
from properly presenting his case, do not constitute gross incompetence or negligence.

7. Olivarez v. Court of Appeals, 465 SCRA 465

Rights of Accused at the Trial

 While it is necessary to allege the essential elements of the crime in the information, the
failure to do so is not an irremediable vice. When the complaint or the resolution by the public
prosecutor which contain the missing averments is attached to the information and form part
of the records, the defect in the latter is effectively cured, and the accused cannot successfully
invoke the defense that his right to be informed is violated.
 The information merely states that petitioner was being charged for the crime of “violation of
R.A. 7610” without citing the specific sections alleged to have been violated by petitioner.
This omission is not sufficient to invalidate the information. The character of the crime is not
determined by the caption or preamble of the information nor from the specification of the
 provision of law alleged to have been violated, they may be conclusions of law, but by the
recital of the ultimate facts and circumstances in the complaint or information.
 The sufficiency of an information is not negated by an incomplete or defective designation of
the crime in the caption or other parts of the information but by the narration of facts and
circumstances which adequately depicts a crime and sufficiently apprises the accused of the
nature and cause of the accusation against him.

8. Libuit v. People, 469 SCRA 439

 Right to Counsel.
The duty of the court to appoint a counsel de officio for the accused who has no counsel of
choice and desires to employ the services of one is mandatory only at the time of arraignment.
No such duty exists where the accused has proceeded to arraignment and then trial with a
counsel of his own choice

 Note:
While the right to be represented by Counsel is immutable, the right to counsel de parte, is
however, not.

 Represented by counsel de parte at the arraignment and trial, the trial court could not be
deemed duty-bound to appoint a counsel de oficio for the continuation of his
crossexamination. Indeed, after his initial cross- examination, the trial court granted the
petitioner's motion to postpone, giving him sufficient time to engage the services of another
counsel.

 Right to Counsel during Arraignment.

The court has the affirmative duty to inform the accused of his right to counsel and to provide
him with one in case he cannot afford it. The court must act on its own volition, unless the
right is waived by the accused.

 Right to Counsel during the Trail.

It is the accused wo must assert his right to counsel. The court wll not act unlesss the accused
invokes hif rights.

9. Magtolis v. Salud, 469 SCRA 439

 Right to Privacy
Text messages have been classified as “ephemeral electronic communication” under Section
1(k),
Rule 2 of the Rules on Electronic Evidence, and “shall be proven by the testimony of a person
who was a party to the same or has personal knowledge thereof.”

 The text messages were properly admitted by the Committee since the same are now covered
by Section 1(k), Rule 2 of the Rules on Electronic Evidence, which provides:
 “Ephemeral electronic communication” refers to telephone conversations, text messages …
and other electronic forms of communication the evidence of which is not recorded or
retained.”
10. Herrera v. Alba, 460 SCRA 197

 In 2002 there was already no question as to the acceptability of DNA test results as admissible
object evidence in Philippine courts. This was the decisive ruling in the case of People vs
Vallejo (2002).

 The Vallejo Guidelines:

1. how the samples were collected;
2. how they were handled;
3. the possibility of contamination of the samples;
4. the procedure followed in analyzing the samples;
5. whether the proper standards and procedures were followed in conducting the tests; and
6. the qualification of the analyst who conducted the tests.

 Doctrine:
DNA samples obtained from an accused in a criminal case will not violate the rights
against self-incrimination. The privilege applies to evidences that is “communicative” in
essence taken under duress.

11. Yulo v. People, 452 SCRA 705

Right to Speedy Trial.

 The concept of speedy disposition is a relative term and must necessarily be a flexible
concept. A mere mathematical reckoning of the time involved is not sufficient. In applying the
Constitutional guarantee, particular regard must be taken of the facts and circumstances of
each case.

 The right to a speedy disposition of a case, like the right to speedy trial, is deemed violated
only:

a) when the proceedings are attended by vexatious, capricious, and oppressive delays, or
b) when unjustified postponements of the trial are asked for and secured, or
c) when without cause or justifiable motive a long period of time is allowed to elapse
without the party having his case tried.

 To determine whether the right has been violated, the following factors may be
considered: a) length of delay
a) reasons for such delay
b) assertion or failure to assert such right by the accused
c) prejudice caused by the delay

12. Petition for Radio and Television Coverage of the Multiple Murder Cases Against
Maguindanao Governor Ampatuan
  Is the right of an accused to a fair trial compatible with the right to free press granted by
the Constitution?

 The right of an accused to a fair trial is not incompatible to a free press. There must be
allegation and proof of the impaired capacity of a judge to render a bias-free decision. Mere
fear of possible undue influence is not tantamount to actual prejudice resulting in the
deprivation of the right to a fair trial. Prejudicial publicity insofar as it undermines the right to
a fair trial must pass the "totality of circumstances" test. Pervasive publicity is not per se
prejudicial to the right of an accused to a fair trial.

 A public trial is not synonymous with publicized trial; it only implies that the court doors
must be open to those who wish to come, sit in the available seats, conduct themselves with
decorum and observe the trial process. In the constitutional sense, a courtroom should have
enough facilities for a reasonable number of the public to observe the proceedings, not too
small as to render the openness negligible and not too large as to distract the trial participants
from their proper functions, who shall then be totally free to report what they have observed
during the proceedings. (Estrada Case) Technology tends to provide the only solution to break
the inherent limitations of the courtroom, i.e., the impossibility of holding a judicial
proceeding in a courtroom that will accommodate all the interested parties, whether private
complainants or accused, to satisfy the imperative of a transparent, open and public trial.

 Technology per se has always been neutral. It is the use and regulation thereof that need fine-
tuning. Law and technology can work to the advantage and furtherance of the various rights
herein involved, within the contours of defined guidelines.

Rule 116
(Arraignment and Plea)

A. Arraignment and Plea; How Made

1. Bandoy v. Jacinto, AM No. RTJ-14-2399, November 19, 2014

  Where should an arraignment be made?
Under Section 1(a) Rule 116 of the Revised Rules of Court, arraignment of an accused required to
be made in open court. Arraignment inside a judge’s chamber is not proper.

Section 1. Arraignment and plea, how made. – (a) The accused must be arraigned before the
court where the complaint or information was filed or assigned for trial. The arraignment shall
be made in open court by the judge or clerk by furnishing the accused with a copy of the
complaint or information, reading the same in the language or dialect known to him, and
asking him whether he pleads guilty or not guilty. The prosecution may call at the trial
witnesses other than those named in the complaint or information.

 Are the requirements set in Rule 116 required?

Yes, the procedural steps set in Rule 116 are not empty rituals that a judge can take nonchalantly.
Each step constitutes an integral part of that crucial stage in criminal litigation where the issues are
joined and without which the proceedings cannot advance further.

2. Ramiscal v. Sandiganbayan, GR 172476-99, September 15, 2010

 What is an arraignment?
An arraignment is that stage where, in the mode and manner required by the Rules, an accused, for
the first time, is granted the opportunity to know the precise charge that confronts him. The accused
is formally informed of the charges against him, to which he enters a plea of guilty or not guilty.

 Will the filing of a motion for reconsideration of the resolution finding probable cause bar the
arraignment of an accused?
No, the filing of a motion for reconsideration of the resolution finding probable cause cannot bar
the filing of the corresponding information and the arraignment of the accused.

 When should arraignment be done?

- The court must proceed with the arraignment of an accused within 30 days from the filing of
the information or from the date the accused has appeared before the court in which the charge
is pending, whichever is later. (Section 7 of Republic Act No. 8493, aka the Speedy Trial Act
of 1998)
- The 30-day period shall be counted from the time the court acquires jurisdiction over the
person of the accused, which is when the accused appears before the court. (Section 1(g), Rule
116 of the Rules of Court and the last clause of Section 7 of RA 8493)

3. Pielago v. People, supra

 Can an accused be arraigned for and convicted of an offense that is different from the one
designated by the prosecutor in the Information filed with the Court?
- In all criminal prosecutions, the accused is entitled to be informed of the nature and cause of
the accusation against him. In this respect, the designation in the Information of the specific
statute violated is imperative to avoid surprise on the accused and to afford him the
opportunity to prepare his defense accordingly. However, the right of the accused to be
properly informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him is not violated if the
 actual offense or crime can be determined from the factual allegations contained in the
Information. The designation of the offense as given by the prosecutor is merely an opinion
not binding to the courts.
- What controls is not the title of the information or the designation of the offense but the actual
facts recited in the information. In other words, it is the recital of facts of the commission of
the offense, not the nomenclature of the offense, that determines the crime being charged in
the information. The character of the crime is not determined by the caption or preamble of
the information nor from the specification of the provision of law alleged to have been
violated, but by the recital of the ultimate facts and circumstances in the complaint or
information.

4. Kummer v. People, GR 174461, September 11, 2013

 Why is arraignment important?

- Arraignment is indispensable in bringing the accused to court and in notifying him of the
nature and cause of the accusations against him. The importance of arraignment is based on
the constitutional right of the accused to be informed. Procedural due process requires that the
accused be arraigned so that he may be informed of the reason for his indictment, the specific
charges he is bound to face, and the corresponding penalty that could be possibly meted
against him. It is at this stage that the accused, for the first time, is given the opportunity to
know the precise charge that confronts him. It is only imperative that he is thus made fully
aware of the possible loss of freedom, even of his life, depending on the nature of the imputed
crime.
 Is arraignment needed in an amended information or complaint?
- The need for arraignment is imperative in an amended information or complaint where the
amendment is substantial (not merely formal), that, by their very nature:
o do not charge an offense different from that charged in the original
complaint or information;
o do not alter the theory of the prosecution; o do not cause any surprise and
affect the line of defense; and o do not adversely affect the substantial
rights of the accused
o An amendment in the date of the commission of the offense is not substantial.
 Is a second plea needed if an amendment is done after the plea and during trial?
- No, an amendment done after the plea and during trial, in accordance with the rules, does not
call for a second plea since the amendment is only as to form. The purpose of an arraignment,
that is, to inform the accused of the nature and cause of the accusation against him, has already
been attained when the accused was arraigned the first time. The subsequent amendment
could not have conceivably come as a surprise to the accused simply because the amendment
did not charge a new offense nor alter the theory of the prosecution

5. People v. Moro Sabilul, 93 SCRA 567

 What happens when an accused pleads guilty?

- Having in mind the danger of the entry of improvident pleas of "guilty" in criminal cases, the
prudent and advisable course, especially in cases wherein grave crimes are charged, is to take
additional evidence as to the guilt of the accused and the circumstances attendant upon
the commission of the crime.
 - The better practice would indicate that, when practicable, such additional evidence should be
sufficient to sustain a judgment of conviction independently of the plea of guilty, or at
least to leave no room for reasonable doubt in the mind of either the trial or the appellate court
as to the possibility of a misunderstanding on the part of the accused as to the precise nature of
the charges to which he pleaded guilty.

 What happens if an accused pleads guilty but a reasonable doubt arises as to whether the
accused did in fact enter the plea of 'guilty' with full knowledge of meaning and consequences
of the acts?
- In the event that no evidence is taken, the Supreme Court, if called upon to review the
proceedings had in the court below, may reverse and sent back for a new trial, if, on the
whole record, a reasonable doubt arises as to whether the accused did in fact enter the plea of
'guilty' with full knowledge of meaning and consequences of the acts.

 What happens if an accused entered a conditional plea of guilty, i.e., he admits his guilt
provided that a certain penalty be imposed upon him?
- An accused may not enter a conditional plea of guilty in the sense that he admits his guilt
provided that a certain penalty be imposed upon him. In such circumstance, the court is
constrained to hold that the accused must be considered as having entered a plea of not
guilty.

6. People v. Magat, 332 SCRA 517

 Can an accused plead guilty to an offense but for a lesser penalty?

- No, by pleading guilty to an offense charged, an accused should be sentenced to the penalty to
which he pleaded. The only instance where a plea bargaining is allowed under the Rules is
when an accused pleads guilty to a lesser offense. Thus, Section 2, Rule 116 of Revised Rules
of Court provides:
○ Sec. 2. Plea of guilty to a lesser offense. — The accused, with the consent of the
offended party and the fiscal, may be allowed by the trial court to plead guilty to a lesser
offense, regardless of whether or not it is necessarily included in the crime charged, or is
cognizable by a court of lesser jurisdiction than the trial court. No amendment of the
complaint or information is necessary.
A conviction under this plea shall be equivalent to a conviction of the offense charged for
purposes of double jeopardy.
- The reduction of the penalty is only a consequence of the plea of guilt to a lesser penalty.

 Can an accused enter a conditional plea of guilty?

- No, it is the essence of a plea of guilty that the accused admits absolutely and unconditionally
his guilt and responsibility for the offense imputed to him. Hence, an accused may not foist a
conditional plea of guilty on the court by admitting his guilt provided that a certain penalty
will be meted unto him.

 What happens when an accused enters a conditional plea of guilty?

- The trial court should vacate such plea and enter a plea of not guilty for a conditional plea of
guilty, or one subject to the proviso that a certain penalty be imposed upon him, is equivalent
to a plea of not guilty and would, therefore, require a full-blown trial before judgment may be
rendered.
  Is a judgment rendered based on a void plea bargaining valid?
- No, judgment rendered by a trial court which based on a void plea bargaining is also void ab
initio and cannot be considered to have attained finality for the simple reason that a void
judgment has no legality from its inception. Thus, since the judgment of conviction rendered
against an accused is void, double jeopardy will not lie.

 Can the right to question the procedural errors in an arraignment be waived?

- Yes, an accused who failed to question the procedural errors in an arraignment is deemed to
have abandoned his right to question the same and waived the errors in procedure.

 Can the procedural errors in an arraignment be rectified?

- Yes, whatever procedural infirmity in the arraignment of an accused may be rectified when he
is re-arraigned and has entered a new plea.

7. People v. Pangilinan, 518 SCRA 358

 When do courts acquire jurisdiction over the person of the accused?

- Jurisdiction over the person of the accused is acquired upon his arrest or voluntary appearance.
The arrest of a person, not his arraignment, conferred on the trial court jurisdiction over his
person.

 What is the purpose of arraignment?

- Arraignment is the formal mode and manner of implementing the constitutional right of an
accused to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him. Its purpose is,
thus, to apprise the accused of the possible loss of freedom, even of his life, depending on the
nature of the crime imputed to him, or at the very least to inform him of why the prosecuting
arm of the State is mobilized against him.

 Were the rights and interests of an accused prejudiced by the fact that he was arraigned only
after the case was submitted for decision?
- No, the belated arraignment of an accused does not prejudice him. This procedural defect can
be cured when there is a clear indication that he is fully aware of the charges against him
(through active participation in the trial without raising any objection that he had yet to be
arraigned), and upon his subsequent arraignment.
- While the arraignment of an accused was conducted after the cases had been submitted for
decision, the error is non-prejudicial and has been fully cured. Since the rights and interests of
an accused were not prejudiced by this lapse in procedure, it only follows that his
constitutional right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him was
not violated.

8. People v. Espinosa, 409 SCRA 256

 Can an accused be arraigned conditionally by the Sandiganbayan pending the Ombudsman’s

reinvestigation of the case?
- No, the practice by the Sandiganbayan of "conditionally" arraigning an accused pending the
Ombudsman’s reinvestigation of the case is not mentioned or provided for in the regular rules
of procedure. The Revised Internal Rules of the Sandiganbayan, promulgated by the Supreme
Court, do not mention any "conditional arraignment." Neither do the regular Rules of Court.
 - Section 9 of PD 1606, as amended by RA 7975, provides:
Sec. 9. Rules of Procedure. - The Rules of Court promulgated by the Supreme Court
shall apply to all cases and proceedings filed with the Sandiganbayan. The
Sandiganbayan shall have no power to promulgate its own rules of procedure, except to
adopt internal rules governing the allotment of cases among the divisions, the rotation of
justices among them, and other matters relating to the internal operations of the court
which shall be enforced until repealed or modified by the Supreme Court.

 Why is arraignment important?

- Arraignment is an indispensable requirement of due process. It consists of the judge’s or the
clerk of court’s reading of the criminal complaint or information to the defendant. At this
stage, the accused is granted, for the first time, the opportunity to be officially informed of the
nature and the cause of the accusation. Thus, arraignment cannot be regarded lightly or
brushed aside peremptorily.

 What happens when a reinvestigation or review is being conducted at either the Department
of Justice or the Office of the President?
- Under Section 11(c) of Rule 116 of the Rules of Court, the arraignment shall be suspended for
a period not exceeding 60 days when a reinvestigation or review is being conducted at either
the Department of Justice or the Office of the President. However, the court does not lose
control of the proceedings by reason of such review. Once it has assumed jurisdiction, it is not
handcuffed by any resolution of the reviewing prosecuting authority. Neither is it deprived of
its jurisdiction by such resolution.
- Whether the accused had been arraigned or not and whether it was due to a reinvestigation by
the fiscal or a review by the Secretary of Justice whereby a motion to dismiss was submitted to
the Court, the Court in the exercise of its discretion may grant the motion or deny it and
require that the trial on the merits proceed for the proper determination of the case. The rule
therefore in this jurisdiction is that once a complaint or information is filed in Court any
disposition of the case as to its dismissal or the conviction or acquittal of the accused rests in
the sound discretion of the Court.
- Although the fiscal retains the direction and control of the prosecution of criminal cases even
while the case is already in Court he cannot impose his opinion on the trial court. The Court is
the best and sole judge on what to do with the case before it. The determination of the case is
within its exclusive jurisdiction and competence. A motion to dismiss the case filed by the
fiscal should be addressed to the Court which has the option to grant or deny the same. It does
not matter if this is done before or after the arraignment of the accused or that the motion was
filed after a reinvestigation or upon instructions of the Secretary of Justice who reviewed the
records of the investigation.

(CRESPO CASE)

B. Plea of Guilty to a Lesser Offense

1. Bug-atan v. People, GR 175195, September 15, 2010

 When may a plea bargain be allowed?

- Section 2, Rule 116 of the Rules of Court, which authorizes plea bargain for a lesser offense in
a criminal case, is explicit on how and when a plea bargain may be allowed.
- The rule pertinently provides:
 Sec. 2. Plea of guilty to lesser offense. - At arraignment, the accused, with the consent of
the offended party and the prosecutor, may be allowed by the trial court to plead guilty to
a lesser offense which is necessarily included in the offense charged. After arraignment
but before trial, the accused may still be allowed to plead guilty to said lesser offense
after withdrawing his plea of not guilty. No amendment of the complaint or information
is necessary.
- A plea bargain may be validly acted upon despite the fact that all the proceedings, i.e.
arraignment, plea bargaining and conviction, occurred on a single day.

 Can an accused change his plea to “guilty”, on a plea bargain, after entering a previous plea
of “not guilty”?
- There is nothing in the law (Section 2, Rule 116) which expressly or impliedly prohibits the
trial court from allowing an accused to change his plea, on a plea bargain, immediately after a
previous plea of not guilty. In approving the plea bargaining agreement, the trial court
undoubtedly took into consideration the timeliness of the plea bargaining and its compliance
with the requirements of the law.

2. Heirs of Gevero v. Guihing Agricultural and Development Corp., GR 122619, August 18,
2006

 May an accused in a criminal case be allowed to plead guilty to a lesser offense even if it is not
included in the crime charged?
- Yes. An accused in a criminal case may be allowed to plead guilty to a lesser offense,
regardless of whether it is included or not in the crime charged. Section 2, Rule 116:
SEC. 2. Plea of guilty to a lesser offense. - The accused, with the consent of the offended
party and the fiscal, may be allowed by the trial court to plead guilty to a lesser offense,
regardless of whether or not it is necessarily included in the crime charged, or is
cognizable by a court of lesser jurisdiction than the trial court. No amendment of the
complaint of information is necessary.

 When an accused is allowed to plead guilty to a lesser offense, what is the effect on his civil
liability?
- When a provision of law is silent or ambiguous, judges ought to invoke a solution responsive
to the vehement urge of conscience. In instances where a literal application of a provision of
law would lead to injustice or to a result so directly in opposition which the dictates of logic
and everyday common sense as to be unconscionable, the Civil Code admonishes judges to
take principles of right and justice at heart. In case of doubt, the intent is to promote right
and justice. Fiat justicia ruat coelum.

3. Daan v. Sandigan, 550 SCRA 233

 What is plea bargaining?

- Plea bargaining in criminal cases is a process whereby the accused and the prosecution work
out a mutually satisfactory disposition of the case subject to court approval. It usually
involves the defendant's pleading guilty to a lesser offense or to only one or some of the counts
of a multi-count indictment in return for a lighter sentence than that for the graver charge.
- Plea bargaining is authorized under Section 2, Rule 116.
  When can plea bargaining be made?
- during the pre-trial stage of the proceedings (Sec. 1, Rule 118); or
- during the trial proper and even after the prosecution has finished presenting its evidence and
rested its case. It is immaterial that plea bargaining was not made during the pre-trial stage or
that it was made only after the prosecution already presented several witnesses.

 What are the requisites of plea bargaining?

- It should be with the consent of the offended party and the prosecutor;
- The plea of guilt should be to a lesser offense which is necessarily included in the offense
charged.

 Can an accused enter a plea of guilty for a lighter offense than that actually charged?
- Generally, a plea of guilty for a lighter offense than that actually charged is not supposed to be
allowed as a matter of bargaining or compromise for the convenience of the accused.
However, since the Rules of Court used the word “may” in the second sentence of Section 2,
Rule 116, it denotes an exercise of discretion upon the trial court on whether to allow the
accused to make a plea of guilty for a lighter offense than that actually charged.

 The acceptance of an offer to plead guilty to a lesser offense is not demandable by the
accused as a matter of right but is a matter that is addressed entirely to the sound discretion
of the trial court. Jurisprudence dictates that such a plea shall be allowed only when the
prosecution does not have sufficient evidence to establish the guilt of the crime charged.
After the prosecution had already rested, the only basis on which the fiscal and the court could
rightfully act in allowing the appellant to change his former plea of “not guilty” to “guilty” to the
lesser crime could be nothing more nothing less than the evidence already in the record. The
reason for this being that Section 4 of Rule 118 (now Section 2, Rule 116) under which a plea for a
lesser offense is allowed was not and could not have been intended as a procedure for compromise,
much less bargaining.

4. People v. Villarama, 210 SCRA 246

 Can plea bargaining be made after pre-trial?

- Yes. Ordinarily, plea-bargaining is made during the pre-trial stage of the criminal
proceedings. However, the law still permits the accused sufficient opportunity to change his
plea thereafter.

 Can an accused demand the acceptance of an offer to plead guilty to a lesser offense
- No. The acceptance of an offer to plead guilty to a lesser offense under Section 2, Rule 116
of the Rules of Court is not demandable by the accused as a matter of right but is a matter that
is addressed entirely to the sound discretion of the trial court.

 What happens after an accused pleads guilty to a lesser offense after the prosecution had
already rested its case
- When the accused moved to plead guilty to a lesser offense after the prosecution had already
rested its case, jurisprudence provides the rules allow such a plea only when the prosecution
does not have sufficient evidence to establish guilt of the crime charged. The trial court need
not wait for a guideline from the Office of the Prosecutor before it could act on the accused's
 motion to change plea. As soon as the fiscal has submitted his comment whether for or
against the said motion, it behooves the trial court to assiduously study the prosecution's
evidence as well as all the circumstances upon which the accused made his change of plea to
the end that the interests of justice and of the public will be served.

 Is the consent of the offended party an absolute requirement before the trial court could
allow the accused to change his plea of guilty to a lesser offense
- Yes. The provision of Section 2, Rule 116 is clear. The consent of both the Fiscal and the
offended party is a condition precedent to a valid plea of guilty to a lesser offense. The reason
for this is obvious. The Fiscal has full control of the prosecution of criminal actions.
Consequently, it is his duty to always prosecute the proper offense, not any lesser or graver
one, when the evidence in his hands can only sustain the former.

C. Plea of Guilty to Capital Offense; Reception of Evidence

1. People v. Baharan, GR 188314, January 10, 2011

 What is the duty of the judge when an accused pleads guilty to a capital offense?
- Judges are duty bound to be extra solicitous in seeing to it that when an accused pleads
guilty, he understands fully the meaning of his plea and the import of an inevitable
conviction. Thus, trial court judges are required to observe the following procedure under
Section 3, Rule 116 of the Rules of Court:
SEC. 3. Plea of guilty to capital offense; reception of evidence. — When the accused
pleads guilty to a capital offense, the court shall conduct a searching inquiry into the
voluntariness and full comprehension of the consequences of his plea and shall require
the prosecution to prove his guilt and the precise degree of culpability. The accused may
also present evidence in his behalf.
- The stringent procedure governing the reception of a plea of guilt, especially in a case
involving the death penalty, is imposed upon the trial judge in order to leave no room for
doubt on the possibility that the accused might have misunderstood the nature of the charge
and the consequences of the plea.

 How does the requirement to conduct a searching inquiry deemed satisfied?

- The conduct of a searching inquiry remains the duty of judges, as they are mandated by the
rules to satisfy themselves that the accused had not been under coercion or duress;
mistaken impressions; or a misunderstanding of the significance, effects, and
consequences of their guilty plea. This requirement is stringent and mandatory. The
requirement to conduct a searching inquiry should not be deemed satisfied in cases in which it
was the defense counsel who explained the consequences of a "guilty" plea to the accused.

2. People v. Gambao, et al., GR 172707, October 1, 2013

 What are the duties of the trial court when an accused pleads guilty to a capital offense?
- In order for the courts to proceed with more care where the possible punishment is in its
severest form, namely death, for the reason that the execution of such a sentence is
irreversible, and to avoid improvident pleas of guilt on the part of an accused where grave
crimes are involved since he might be admitting his guilt before the court and thus forfeiting
 his life and liberty without having fully understood the meaning, significance and consequence
of his plea, the trial court have the following duties when the accused pleads guilty to a capital
offense:
1) to conduct a searching inquiry into the voluntariness and full comprehension of the
consequences of the plea of guilt;
2) to require the prosecution to still prove the guilt of the accused and the precise degree of
his culpability; and
3) to inquire whether or not the accused wishes to present evidence in his behalf and allow
him to do so if he desires.

 Why is it important to take further evidence when an accused pleads guilty to a capital
offense?
- The requirement of taking further evidence would aid the Supreme Court on appellate review
in determining the propriety or impropriety of the plea.
 What are the guidelines that must be observed by a trial judge when conducting a
“searching inquiry” to determine whether the plea of guilt was based on a free and informed
judgement?
- The inquiry must focus on the voluntariness of the plea and the full comprehension of the
consequences of the plea.
- The following guidelines should be observed:
1. Ascertain from the accused himself.
a) how he was brought into the custody of the law
b) whether he had the assistance of a competent counsel during the custodial and
preliminary investigations; and
c) under what conditions he was detained and interrogated during the investigations. This
is intended to rule out the possibility that the accused has been coerced or placed under
a state of duress either by actual threats of physical harm coming from malevolent
quarters or simply because of the judge’s intimidating robes.
2. Ask the defense counsel a series of questions as to whether he had conferred with, and
completely explained to, the accused the meaning and consequences of a plea of guilty
3. Elicit information about the personality profile of the accused, such as his age,
socioeconomic status, and educational background, which may serve as a trustworthy index
of his capacity to give a free and informed plea of guilty
4. Inform the accused the exact length of imprisonment or nature of the penalty under the law
and the certainty that he will serve such sentence.

3. People v. Durango, 329 SCRA 758

 How is “searching inquiry” conducted?

- A searching inquiry conducted after the accused pleads guilty to a capital offense must focus
on: (1) the voluntariness of the plea and (2) a complete comprehension of the legal effects
of the plea so that the plea of guilt can be truly said as being based on a free and
informed judgment. The trial court should also be convinced that the accused has not been
coerced or placed under a state of duress either by actual threats or physical harm coming from
malevolent or avenging quarters, and this it can do either by eliciting from the accused himself
the manner in which he has been brought into the custody of the law and whether he had the
assistance of competent counsel during the custodial and preliminary investigations or by
ascertaining from him the conditions of his detention and interrogation during the
investigation. Likewise, a series of questions directed at defense counsel on whether or not
 counsel has conferred with the accused and has completely explained to him the meaning of a
plea of guilt are well-taken steps along those lines.

 What is the effect if the trial court has inadequately discharged the duty of conducting the
prescribed "searching inquiry?"
- A plea of guilt to a capital offense can be held null and void if the trial court has inadequately
discharged the duty of conducting the prescribed "searching inquiry." No valid judgment can
be rendered upon an invalid arraignment.

4. People v. Ceredon, 542 SCRA 550

 What rules should the court observe when an accused desires to plead guilty to a capital
offense?
- The rule is where the accused desires to plead guilty to a capital offense, the court is enjoined
to observe the following:
1. It must conduct a searching inquiry into the voluntariness and full comprehension of the
consequences of his plea;
2. The court must require the prosecution to present evidence to prove the guilt of the
accused and the precise degree of his culpability; and
3. The court must ask the accused if he desires to present evidence in his behalf and allow
him to do so if he desires.

 How may a trial judge go about the matter of a proper "searching inquiry?"
- There is no definite and concrete rule on how a trial judge may go about the matter of a proper
"searching inquiry" as required by the aforecited rule. It is incumbent upon a trial judge to
ascertain and be fully convinced that the plea of guilty was voluntarily made and its
consequences fully comprehended by the accused.

 May convictions based on pleas of guilt to capital offenses be set aside because of the
improvidence of the plea?
- Convictions based on pleas of guilt to capital offenses may be set aside because of the
improvidence of the plea, but only when such plea is the sole basis of the judgment. When
the trial court relied on sufficient and credible evidence to convict the accused beyond
reasonable doubt, the same must be sustained for the simple reason that the conviction is
predicated not on the guilty plea of the accused but on the convincing evidence proving his
commission of the offenses charged.

D. Plea of Guilty to Non-Capital Offense; Reception of Evidence, Discretionary

1. People v. Flores, GR 137491, November 23, 2000

 How do we determine if an offense charged is capital or not?

 As to whether the offense charged is capital or not, the only determinant factor is the
information itself.

 In terms of the reception of evidence from the parties, what is the difference between the
Rules applicable to the plea of guilty to a capital offense and a plea of guilty to a non-capital
offense?
 - When the accused pleads guilty to a capital offense, the present Rules of Court makes it
mandatory for the court to take additional evidence as to the guilt of the accused and the
circumstances attendant upon the commission of the crime after the entry of plea of guilty. In
non-capital offenses, the reception of evidence is discretionary with the court.

E. Withdrawal of Improvident Plea of Guilty

1. People v. Solamillo, GR 123161, June 18, 2003

 How can an accused withdraw his guilty plea?

- Section 5, Rule 116 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, as amended, provides that "at
any time before the judgment of conviction becomes final, the court may permit an
improvident plea of guilty to be withdrawn and be substituted by a plea of not guilty." There
should be a categorical declaration from the accused that he is withdrawing his plea of
guilty and substituting it with a plea of not guilty. Manifestation of such withdrawal during
the testimony of the accused is not a positive and categorical declaration that he is
withdrawing his plea of guilty. Without any unequivocal act on the part of the accused, the
trial court could not assume that he is withdrawing his original plea.

 Will an improvident plea of guilty and its subsequent withdrawal automatically exculpate the
accused from criminal liability?
- No, an improvident plea of guilty and its subsequent withdrawal by the accused do not operate
to automatically exculpate him from criminal liability. Convictions based on an
improvident plea of guilty are set aside only if such plea is the sole basis of the judgment.
If the trial court relied on sufficient and credible evidence to convict the accused, the
conviction must be sustained because then it is predicated not merely on the guilty plea of the
accused but on evidence proving his commission of the offense charged

F. Duty of Court to Inform Accused of his Right to Counsel

1. Gamas v. Oco, AM No. MTJ-99-1231, March 17, 2004

 What are the duties of the court when a defendant appears at the arraignment without an
attorney?
- When a defendant appears at the arraignment without an attorney, the court has four important
duties to comply with:
1) It must inform the defendant that it is his right to have an attorney before being arraigned;
2) After giving him such information the court must ask him if he desires the aid of attorney;
3) If he desires and is unable to employ attorney, the court must assign an attorney de oficio
to defend him; and
4) If the accused desires to procure an attorney of his own the court must grant him a
reasonable time therefor.

 Can the court arraign an accused without the benefit of counsel?

- Generally, no. The only instance when the court can arraign an accused without the benefit of
counsel is if the accused waives such right and the court, finding the accused capable, allows
him to represent himself in person. However, to be a valid waiver, the accused must make the
waiver voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently. In determining whether the accused can
 make a valid waiver, the court must take into account all the relevant circumstances, including
the educational attainment of the accused.

G. Appointment of Counsel de Oficio

1. PAO v. Sandiganbayan, GR 154297-300, February 15, 2008

 Can the Sandiganbayan appoint PAO Lawyers as counsel de officio to defend an accused
who is not indigent?
- Yes. To protect the constitutional right of an accused to be heard by themselves and counsel,
the Sandiganbayan may exercise its prerogative under Sec. 7, Rule 116 of the Revised Rules
of Criminal Procedure to appoint PAO lawyer/s to act as counsels de oficio for the said
accused. The PAO Lawyer/s appointed is required to perform his/their duty as member/s of
the Bar and officer/s of the court to assist the court in the efficient administration of justice.

H. Time for Counsel de Oficio to Prepare for Arraignment

1. People v. Gonzaga, GR L-48373, January 30, 1984

 How much time should be given to an attorney de officio if he is employed or assigned by the
court to defend an accused?
- Under Sec. 5, Rule 116 of the Rules of Court, whenever an attorney de officio is employed or
assigned by the court to defend an accused either at the arraignment or at the trial he should
be given a reasonable time to consult with the accused and prepare his defense before
proceeding further in the case which should not be less than two (2) hours in case of
arraignment and two (2) days in case of trial.

I. Bill of Particulars

1. Enrile v. People, GR 213455, August 11, 2015

 What is a Bill of Particulars?

- In general, a bill of particulars is the further specification of the charges or claims in an action,
which an accused may avail of by motion before arraignment, to enable him to properly plead
and prepare for trial. In criminal cases, a bill of particulars details items or specific conduct
not recited in the Information but nonetheless pertain to or are included in the crime charged.
Its purpose is to enable an accused: to know the theory of the government’s case; to prepare
his defense and to avoid surprise at the trial; to plead his acquittal or conviction in bar of
another prosecution for the same offense; and to compel the prosecution to observe certain
limitations in offering evidence.

 What must be included in a Bill of Particulars? (Section 9 of Rule 116)

Section 9. Bill of particulars. - The accused may, before arraignment, move for a bill of
particulars to enable him properly to plead and prepare for trial. The motion shall specify
the alleged defects of the complaint or information and the details desired.
 - The rule requires the information to describe the offense with sufficient particularity to apprise
the accused of the crime charged with and to enable the court to pronounce judgment. The
particularity must be such that persons of ordinary intelligence may immediately know
what the Information means
- The general function of a bill of particulars, whether in civil or criminal proceedings, is to
guard against surprises during trial. It is not the function of the bill to furnish the accused with
the evidence of the prosecution. Thus, the prosecutor shall not be required to include in
the bill of particulars matters of evidence relating to how the people intend to prove the
elements of the offense charged or how the people intend to prove any item of factual
information included in the bill of particulars.

 What is the remedy of the accused when allegations in an Information are vague or
indefinite?
- When allegations in an Information are vague or indefinite, the remedy of the accused is not a
motion to quash, but a motion for a bill of particulars. A bill of particulars does not presuppose
an invalid information for it merely fills in the details of an otherwise valid information to
enable an accused to make an intelligent plea and prepare for his defense.

 What is the difference between a Motion to Quash and a Motion for Bill of Particulars?
- A bill of particulars presupposes a valid Information (one that presents all the elements of the
crime charged, albeit under vague terms) while a motion to quash is a jurisdictional defect on
account that the facts charged in the Information does not constitute an offense
- If the information does not charge an offense, then a motion to quash is in order. But if the
information charges an offense and the averments are so vague that the accused cannot prepare
to plead or prepare for trial, then a motion for a bill of particulars is the proper remedy. The
specifications that a bill of particulars may supply are only formal amendments to the
complaint or Information.

 What is the purpose of a bill of particulars?

- The purpose of a bill of particulars is to supply vague facts or allegations in the complaint or
information to enable the accused to properly plead and prepare for trial. It has also been
stated that it is the function or purpose of a bill of particulars to define, clarify, particularize,
and limit or circumscribe the issues in the case, to expedite the trial, and assist the court. A
general function or purpose of a bill of particulars is to prevent injustice or do justice in the
case when that cannot be accomplished without the aid of such a bill. Notably, the failure of
the accused to move for the specification of the details desired deprives him of the right to
object to evidence that could be introduced and admitted under an Information of more or less
general terms but which sufficiently charges the accused with a definite crime.

 How are doubts on the granting of bill of particulars resolved?

- Doubts should be resolved in favor of granting the bill to give full meaning to the accused’s
Constitutionally guaranteed rights. Thus, if the Information is lacking, a court should take a
liberal attitude towards its granting and order the government to file a bill of particulars
elaborating on the charges.

2. Virata v. Sandiganbayan, 221 SCRA 52

 What should a complaint contain?

- A complaint must contain the ultimate facts constituting the plaintiff's cause of action.
 What are the elements of a cause of action?
- A cause of action has the following elements, to wit:
1) a right in favor of the plaintiff by whatever means and under whatever law it arises or is
created;
2) an obligation on the part of the named defendant to respect or not to violate such right;
and
3) an act or omission on the part of such defendant violative of the right of the plaintiff or
constituting a breach of the obligation of the defendant to the plaintiff for which the latter
may maintain an action for recovery of damages.

 What is the effect if, while the complaint contains all of the above-mentioned elements, but
the allegations therein are vague?
- As long as the complaint contains the above-listed three elements, a cause of action exists even
though the allegations therein are vague, and dismissal of the action is not the proper remedy
when the pleading is ambiguous because the defendant may ask for more particulars.

 What is the remedy if the allegations in the Complaint are vague?

- Section 1, Rule 12 of the Rules of Court, provides, inter alia, that a party may move for more
definite statement or for a bill of particulars of any matter which is not averred with sufficient
definiteness or particularity to enable him properly to prepare his responsive pleading or to
prepare for trial. Such motion shall point out the defects complained of and the details desired.
Under this Rule, the remedy available to a party who seeks clarification of any issue or matter
vaguely or obscurely pleaded by the other party, is to file a motion, either for a more definite
statement or for a bill of particulars. An order directing the submission of such statement or
bill, further, is proper where it enables the party movant intelligently to prepare a responsive
pleading, or adequately to prepare for trial.

 What is a bill of particulars?

- A bill of particulars is a complementary procedural document consisting of an amplification or
more particularized outline of a pleading, and being in the nature of a more specific allegation
of the facts recited in the pleading. It is the office of the bill of particulars to inform the
opposite party and the court of the precise nature and character of the cause of action or
defense which the pleader has attempted to set forth and thereby to guide his adversary in his
preparations for trial, and reasonably to protect him against surprise at the trial. It gives
information of the specific proposition for which the pleader contends, in respect to any
material and issuable fact in the case, and it becomes a part of the pleading which it
supplements. It has been held that a bill of particulars must inform the opposite party of the
nature of the pleader's cause of action or defense, and it must furnish the required items of the
claim with reasonable fullness and precision. Generally, it will be held sufficient if it fairly
and substantially gives the opposite party the information to which he is entitled, as required
by the terms of the application and of the order therefor. It should be definite and specific and
not contain general allegations and conclusions. It should be reasonably certain and as
specific as the circumstances will allow.

J. Production or Inspection of Material Evidence in Possession of Prosecution

1. Lejano v. People, GR 176389 and 176864, December 14, 2010

 What is covered by the accused’s right of access to evidence?
The accused’s right of access to evidence requires the correlative duty of the prosecution to
produce and permit the inspection of the evidence, and not to suppress or alter it.

K. Suspension of Arraignment

1. ABS-CBN Corp. v. Gozon, GR 195956, March 11, 2015

 When can an arraignment be suspended?

Rule 116, Section 11 (c) of the Rules of Criminal Procedure allows the suspension of the accused’s
arraignment in certain circumstances only:

SEC. 11. Suspension of arraignment.–Upon motion by the proper party, the arraignment shall
be suspended in the following cases:
a) The accused appears to be suffering from an unsound mental condition which
effectively renders him unable to fully understand the charge against him and to plead
intelligently thereto. In such case, the court shall order his mental examination and, if
necessary, his confinement for such purpose;
b) There exists a prejudicial question; and
c) A petition for review of the resolution of the prosecutor is pending at either the
Department of Justice, or the Office of the President; provided, that the period of
suspension shall not exceed sixty (60) days counted from the filing of the petition with
the reviewing office.

 When arraignment was deferred due to the pendency of a petition for review under
Section 11(c) of Rule 116, what will happen after the expiration of the period of 60 days?
While the pendency of a petition for review is a ground for suspension of the arraignment, the
provision limits the deferment of the arraignment to a period of 60 days reckoned from the filing of
the petition with the reviewing office. It follows, therefore, that after the expiration of said period,
the trial court is bound to arraign the accused or to deny the motion to defer arraignment.
The suspension of the arraignment should always be within the limits allowed by law.

2. Aguinaldo v. Ventus, GR 176033, March 11, 2015

 Is the provision of Section 11 (c), Rule 116 of the Rules of Court limiting the suspension for
arraignment to only sixty (60) days merely directory?
- No, the provision of Section 11 (c), Rule 116 of the Rules of Court limiting the suspension for
arraignment to only sixty (60) days is not merely directory. While the pendency of a petition
for review is a ground for suspension of the arraignment, the afore-cited provision limits the
deferment of the arraignment to a period of 60 days reckoned from the filing of the petition
with the reviewing office. It follows, therefore, that after the expiration of said period, the
trial court is bound to arraign the accused or to deny the motion to defer arraignment.

 How are the provisions on reglementary periods construed?

- While rules of procedure are liberally construed, the provisions on reglementary periods
are strictly applied, indispensable as they are to the prevention of needless delays, and are
 necessary to the orderly and speedy discharge of judicial business. After all, rules of
procedure do not exist for the convenience of the litigants, and they are not to be trifled with
lightly or overlooked by the mere expedience of invoking "substantial justice." Relaxation or
suspension of procedural rules, or the exemption of a case from their operation, is warranted
only by compelling reasons or when the purpose of justice requires it.

L. Other Cases

1. Adasa v. Abalos, GR 168617, February 19, 2007

 Can the DOJ give due course to an appeal or petition for review despite its having been filed
after the accused had already been arraigned?
No. Section 7 and Section 12 of DOJ Circular No. 70 provide:

SECTION 7. Action on the petition. – The Secretary of Justice may dismiss the petition
outright if he finds the same to be patently without merit or manifestly intended for delay, or
when the issues raised therein are too unsubstantial to require consideration. If an
information has been filed in court pursuant to the appealed resolution, the petition
shall not be given due course if the accused had already been arraigned. Any
arraignment made after the filing of the petition shall not bar the Secretary of Justice from
exercising his power of review.

SECTION 12. Disposition of the Appeal. – The Secretary may reverse, affirm or modify the
appealed resolution. He may, motu proprio or upon motion, dismiss the petition for
review on any of the following grounds:
a) That the petition was filed beyond the period prescribed in Section 3 hereof; (b) That
the procedure or any of the requirements herein provided has not been complied with;
b) That there is no showing of any reversible error;
c) That the appealed resolution is interlocutory in nature, except when it suspends the
proceedings based on the alleged existence of a prejudicial question; (e) That the
accused had already been arraigned when the appeal was taken;
d) That the offense has already prescribed; and
e) That other legal or factual grounds exist to warrant a dismissal.

Thus, when an accused has already been arraigned, the DOJ must not give the appeal or
petition for review due course and must dismiss the same

 What is the effect of arraignment to an accused’s right to a reinvestigation of the case? When
an accused pleads to the charge, he is deemed to have waived the right to preliminary investigation
and the right to question any irregularity that surrounds it. This precept is also applicable in cases
of reinvestigation as well as in cases of review of such reinvestigation.
 When an accused unconditionally pleaded to the charge, he effectively waived the
reinvestigation of the case by the prosecutor as well as the right to appeal the result thereof to
the DOJ Secretary. Thus, with the arraignment of the petitioner, the DOJ Secretary can no longer
entertain the appeal or petition for review because petitioner had already waived or abandoned the
same.

2. People v. Documento, GR 188706, March 17, 2010

  Should a case be remanded automatically to the trial court if the guilty plea of the accused is
deemed improvidently made and thus rendered inefficacious?
When the trial court fails to comply with the guidelines set forth by the Supreme Court in the
conduct of the prescribed "searching inquiry" into the matter of whether or not the plea of guilt of
the accused is improvidently made, the guilty plea of the accused is deemed improvidently made
and thus rendered inefficacious.

 This does not mean, however, that the case should be remanded to the trial court. This
course of action is appropriate only when the appellant's guilty plea was the sole basis for his
conviction.

 Convictions based on an improvident plea of guilt are set aside only if such plea is the sole basis of
the judgment. If the trial court relied on sufficient and credible evidence in finding the accused
guilty, the judgment must be sustained, because then it is predicated not merely on the guilty plea
of the accused but also on evidence proving his commission of the offense charged

Rule 117
(Motion to Quash)

A. Time to Move to Quash

1. Tolentino v. Paqueo, GR 150606, June 7, 2007

 When should an accused move for the quashal of a complaint or information?

- Section 2, Rule 117 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure on the Motion to Quash
provides:
 SECTION 1. Time to move to quash.—At any time before entering his plea, the accused
may move to quash the complaint or information.

B. Form and Contents

1. People v. Andrade, GR 187000, November 24, 2014

 May the filing of a motion to quash be allowed after arraignment?

- Section 9, Rule 117 of the Rules of Court provides:
Sec. 9. Failure to Move to Quash or to Allege Any Ground Therefor. - The failure of the
accused to assert any ground of a motion to quash before he pleads to the complaint or
information, either because he did not file a motion to quash or failed to allege the same in
said motion, shall be deemed a waiver of any objections except those based on the grounds
provided for in paragraphs (a),(b), (g), and (i) of Section 3 of this Rule.
If the ground asserted by the accused is one of the exceptions provided under the
aboveprovision, the timeliness of the filing is inconsequential.

 May the court consider any ground other than those stated in the motion to quash?
- Section 2, Rule 117 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure plainly states that in a
motion to quash, the court shall not consider any ground other than those stated in the
motion, except lack of jurisdiction over the offense charged.

 If the motion to quash is based on the ground that the facts charged do not constitute an
offense, what should the court do?
- Section 4, Rule 117 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure clearly states that if the
ground based upon is that "the facts charged do not constitute an offense," the prosecution
shall be given by the court an opportunity to correct the defect by amendment. If the
defect in the information is curable by amendment, the motion to quash shall be
denied and the prosecution shall be ordered to file an amended information.
Generally, the fact that the allegations in the information do not constitute an offense, or
that the information does not conform substantially to the prescribed form, are defects
curable by amendment. When there is any doubt about the sufficiency of the complaint or
information, the court should direct its amendment or that a new information be filed, and
save the necessity of appealing the case on technical grounds when the complaint might
easily be amended. However, the motion shall be granted if the prosecution fails to
make the amendment, or the complaint or information still suffers from the same
defect despite the amendment.

2. Tolentino v. Paqueo, supra

 What is the required form for a motion to quash?

- Section 2, Rule 117 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure on the Motion to Quash
provides:
SEC. 2. Form and contents.— The motion to quash shall be in writing, signed by the
accused or his counsel and shall distinctly specify its factual and legal grounds. The
court shall consider no grounds other than those stated in the motion, except lack of
jurisdiction over the offense charged.
C. Grounds

1. Quisay v. People, supra

 Are complaints or informations filed before the courts without the prior written authority or
approval of the authorized officers subject to quashal?
- As a general rule, complaints or informations filed before the courts without the prior
written authority or approval of the foregoing authorized officers renders the same
defective and, therefore, subject to quashal pursuant to Section 3 (d), Rule 117 of the same
Rules, to wit: SECTION 3. Grounds. - The accused may move to quash the complaint or
information on any of the following grounds:
xxxx
(d) That the officer who filed the information had no authority to do so; x
xxx

 When can the ground that the complaint or information was filed without the prior written
authority or approval of the authorized officers be raised?
- The filing of an Information by an officer without the requisite authority to file the same
constitutes a jurisdictional infirmity which cannot be cured by silence, waiver,
acquiescence, or even by express consent. Hence, such ground may be raised at any
stage of the proceedings.

2. Enrile v. People, supra

 What is the difference between a Motion to Quash and a Motion for Bill of Particulars?
- A bill of particulars presupposes a valid Information (one that presents all the elements of
the crime charged, albeit under vague terms) while a motion to quash is a jurisdictional
defect on account that the facts charged in the Information does not constitute an offense.
- If the information does not charge an offense, then a motion to quash is in order. But if the
information charges an offense and the averments are so vague that the accused cannot
prepare to plead or prepare for trial, then a motion for a bill of particulars is the proper
remedy. The specifications that a bill of particulars may supply are only formal
amendments to the complaint or Information.

3. In Re Salibo v. Warden, supra

 Will the writ of habeas corpus be allowed if a person is restrained under a lawful process or
order of the court?
- The rule is, that if a person alleged to be restrained of his liberty is in the custody of an
officer under process issued by a court or judge, and that the court or judge had jurisdiction
to issue the process or make the order, or if such person is charged before any court, the
writ of habeas corpus will not be allowed. In such cases, instead of availing themselves
of the extraordinary remedy of a petition for habeas corpus, persons restrained under a
 lawful process or order of the court must pursue the orderly course of trial and exhaust the
usual remedies. This ordinary remedy is to file a motion to quash the information or the
warrant of arrest.
 What are the grounds for the motion to quash a complaint or information?
- At any time before a plea is entered, the accused may file a motion to quash complaint or
information based on any of the grounds enumerated in Rule 117, Section 3 of the Rules of
Court:
SEC. 3. Grounds.—The accused may move to quash the complaint or information on any of
the following grounds:
a) That the facts charged do not constitute an offense;
b) That the court trying the case has no jurisdiction over the offense charged; (c) That the
court trying the case has no jurisdiction over the person of the accused;
c) That the officer who filed the information had no authority to do so;
d) That it does not conform substantially to the prescribed form;
e) That more than one offense is charged except when a single punishment for various
offenses is prescribed by law;
f) That the criminal action or liability has been extinguished;
g) That it contains averments which, if true, would constitute a legal excuse or justification;
and
h) That the accused has been previously convicted or acquitted of the offense charged, or the
case against him was dismissed or otherwise terminated without his express consent.
 If a person is arrested because of mistaken identity, should the accused file a Motion to Quash
Information and/or Warrant of Arrest?
- The proper remedy is not a Motion to Quash Information and/or Warrant of Arrest as none
of the grounds for filing a Motion to Quash Information apply. Even if a Motion to Quash
is filed, the defect alleged could not have been cured by mere amendment of the
Information and/or Warrant of Arrest. Changing the name of the accused appearing in the
Information and/or Warrant of Arrest will not cure the lack of preliminary investigation in
this case. A motion for reinvestigation will also not cure the defect of lack of preliminary
investigation.

4. Estrada v. Office of the Ombudsman, supra

 Can the absence of preliminary investigation be a ground to quash the complaint or

Information?
- No, the absence of the preliminary investigation is not a ground to quash the complaint or
Information. Section 3, Rule 117 of the Rules of Court enumerates the grounds in
quashing an Information, as follows:
Section 3. Grounds. – The accused may move to quash the complaint or information on
any of the following grounds:
a) That the facts charged do not constitute an offense;
b) That the court trying the case has no jurisdiction over the offense charged;
c) That the court trying the case has no jurisdiction over the person of the accused;
d) That the officer who filed the information had no authority to do so;
e) That it does not conform substantially to the prescribed form;
f) That more than one offense is charged except when a single punishment for various
offenses is prescribed by law;
g) That the criminal action or liability has been extinguished;
 h) That it contains averments which, if true, would constitute a legal excuse or
justification; and
i) That the accused has been previously convicted or acquitted of the offense charged,
or the case against him was dismissed or otherwise terminated without his express
consent.
Nowhere in Section 3 is the "lack of preliminary investigation" mentioned as a ground for a motion to
quash

5. Lazarte v. Sandiganbayan, 581 SCRA 431

 What is the fundamental test in reflecting on the viability of a motion to quash on the ground
that the facts charged do not constitute an offense?
- The fundamental test in reflecting on the viability of a motion to quash on the ground that
the facts charged do not constitute an offense is whether or not the facts asseverated, if
hypothetically admitted, would establish the essential elements of the crime defined in
law. Matters aliunde will not be considered.

6. Uy v. CA, 276 SCRA 367

 Can an accused be estopped from raising the issue of jurisdiction?

- No. The Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure, under Rule 117, Sec. 3, provides that the
accused may move to quash the complaint or information on any of the following grounds:
. . . (b) that the court trying the case has no jurisdiction over the offense charged or over
the person of the accused . Moreover, under Sec. 8 of the same Rule it is provided that the
failure of the accused to assert any ground of a motion to quash before he pleads to
the complaint or information, either because he did not file a motion to quash or failed to
allege the same in said motion, shall be deemed a waiver of the grounds of a motion to
quash, except the grounds of . . . lack of jurisdiction over the offense charged . . . as
provided for in paragraph . . . (b) . . . of Section 3 of this Rule.
- Clearly, from the above-quoted law, even if a party fails to file a motion to quash, he may
still question the jurisdiction of the court later on. Moreover, these objections may be
raised or considered motu propio by the court at any stage of the proceedings or on appeal.
 Is there an exception to this rule?
- An exception to the general rule that the lack of jurisdiction of a court may be raised at any
stage of the proceedings, even on appeal, is the presence of laches. Laches is failure or
neglect for an unreasonable and unexplained length of time, to do that which, by exercising
due diligence, could or should have been done earlier; it is the negligence or omission to
assert a right within a reasonable time, warranting a presumption that the party entitled to
assert has abandoned it or declined to assert it. (Tijam v. Sibonghanoy)

7. Eugenio v. People, 549 SCRA 433

 When should an accused raise the issue on any irregularity attending his arrest?
- Any irregularity attending the arrest of an accused, depriving the trial court of jurisdiction
over her person, should be raised in a motion to quash at any time before entering her
plea.
 What is the effect of the failure to timely raise the issue on any irregularity attending the
arrest of the accused?
 - The failure of an accused to timely raise an objection regarding any irregularity attending
his arrest amounts to a waiver of such irregularity, and will result in his concomitant
submission to the trial court’s jurisdiction over his person.

8. People v. Rondero, 320 SCRA 383

 Can an accused move for the quashal of information for lack of jurisdiction over his person
after he enters a plea of guilty or not guilty during the arraignment?
- No, any irregularity attending the arrest of an accused is deemed waived when, instead of
quashing the information for lack of jurisdiction over his person, the accused voluntarily
submits himself to the court by entering a plea of guilty or not guilty during the
arraignment and participating in the proceedings.

9. Romualdez v. Sandiganbayan, 385 SCRA 436

 What is the difference between a “motion to quash” and a “motion to dismiss?”

- There is no substantial distinction between a "motion to quash" and a "motion to dismiss."
Both pray for an identical relief, which is the dismissal of the case. Such motions are
employed to raise preliminary objections, so as to avoid the necessity of proceeding to trial.
A motion to quash is generally used in criminal proceedings to annul a defective
indictment. A motion to dismiss, the nomenclature ordinarily used in civil
proceedings, is aimed at summarily defeating a complaint. Thus, our Rules of Court
use the term "motion to quash" in criminal, and "motion to dismiss" in civil, proceedings.
 What is the effect of filing a second motion to quash?
- A party is not permitted to raise issues, whether similar or different, by installment. The
Rules abhor repetitive motions. Otherwise, there would be no end to preliminary
objections, and trial would never commence. A second motion to quash delays the
administration of justice and unduly burdens the courts. Moreover, Rule 117 provides
that grounds not raised in the first motion to quash are generally deemed waived.
 Will the failure to conduct a valid preliminary investigation warrant the quashal of an
information?
- No. In Raro v. Sandiganbayan, the Supreme Court held that the failure to conduct a valid
preliminary investigation would not warrant the quashal of an information. If the
information has already been filed, the proper procedure is for the Sandiganbayan to hold
the trial in abeyance while the preliminary investigation is being conducted or completed.
 When does the prescription of offenses penalized by special laws begin to run?
- In the nature of things, acts made criminal by special laws are frequently not immoral or
obviously criminal in themselves; for this reason, the applicable statute requires that if the
violation of the special law is not known at the time, the prescription begins to run only
from the discovery thereof, i.e., discovery of the unlawful nature of the constitutive act or
acts.
- Act No. 3326, as amended, governs the prescription of offenses penalized by special laws.
Its pertinent provision reads:
Sec. 2. Prescription shall begin to run from the day of the commission of the violation of
the law, and if the same not be known at the time, from the discovery thereof and the
institution of judicial proceedings for its investigation and punishment.
 The prescription shall be interrupted when proceedings are instituted against the guilty
person, and shall begin to run again if the proceedings are dismissed for reasons not
constituting jeopardy.
Consistent with the provision quoted above, the Supreme Court has previously reckoned
the prescriptive period of cases involving RA 3019 committed prior to the February 1986
EDSA Revolution from the discovery of the violation. Prior to said date, no person would
have dared to question the legality or propriety of alleged anomalous transactions. Hence,
the counting of the prescriptive period would commence from the date of discovery of the
offense.

10. Sasot v. People, 462 SCRA 138

 Are an alleged defect in the complaint filed before the fiscal and the complainant’s capacity to
sue valid grounds to move for the quashal of an information?
- No. The defect in the complaint filed before the fiscal and the complainant’s capacity to
sue are not grounds for a motion to quash. Section 3, Rule 117 of the 1985 Rules of
Criminal Procedure enumerates the grounds for quashing an information, to wit:
a) That the facts charged do not constitute an offense;
b) That the court trying the case has no jurisdiction over the offense charged or the
person of the accused;
c) That the officer who filed the information had no authority to do so;
d) That it does not conform substantially to the prescribed form;
e) That more than one offense is charged except in those cases in which existing laws
prescribe a single punishment for various offenses;
f) That the criminal action or liability has been extinguished;
g) That it contains averments which, if true, would constitute a legal excuse or
justification; and

h) That the accused has been previously convicted or in jeopardy of being convicted, or
acquitted of the offense charged.

 If the accused failed to object before trial to the duplicitous information, he may be validly
convicted of both or either of the offenses charged and proved pursuant to Section 3, Rule 120 and
Section 8, Rule 117:

 RULE 120
Section 3. Judgment for two or more offenses. — When two or more offenses are charged in a
single complaint or information but the accused fails to object to it before trial, the court may
convict him of as many offenses as are charged and proved, and impose on him the penalty for
each offense, setting out separately the findings of fact and law in each offense.

 RULE 117
 Section 8. Provisional dismissal. — A case shall not be provisionally dismissed except with the
express consent of the accused and with notice to the offended party.

 The provisional dismissal of offenses punishable by imprisonment not exceeding six (6) years or a
fine of any amount, or both, shall become permanent one (1) year after issuance of the order
without the case having been revived. With respect to offenses punishable by imprisonment of
more than six (6) years, their provisional dismissal shall become permanent two (2) years after
issuance of the order without the case having been revived

12. People v. Desuyo, 381 SCRA 235

 The failure of the accused to move for the specification of the date when the alleged
crime was committed or for the quashal of the Information on the ground that it does
not conform substantially to the prescribed form deprives him of the right to object to
evidence which could lawfully be introduced and admitted under an information of
more or less general terms but which sufficiently charges the accused with a definite
crime.

 It is indeed too late in the day for the accused to raise this issue because objections to
matters of form or substance in the information cannot be made for the first time on
appeal.

13. Monteverde v. People, 387 SCRA 196

 An information "must charge only one offense, except when the law prescribes a single
punishment for various offenses." When more than one offense is charged, the accused may move
to quash the information.

 Failure to move to quash the indictments, the accused is deemed to have waived the right to be
tried for only one crime.

14. Loney v. People, 482 SCRA 194

 Duplicity of charges simply means a single complaint or information charges more than one
offense. A complaint or information must charge but one offense, except only in those cases in
which existing laws prescribe a single punishment for various offenses. There is duplicity (or
multiplicity) of charges when a single Information charges more than one offense.

15. Cabico v. Dimaculangan-Querijero, 522 SCRA 300

 Criminal liability is totally extinguished:

 1. By the death of the convict, as to the personal penalties; and as to pecuniary penalties,
liability therefor is extinguished only when the death of the offender occurs before final
judgment;
2. By service of the sentence;
3. By amnesty, which completely extinguishes the penalty and all its effects;
4. By absolute pardon;
5. By prescription of the crime;
6. By prescription of the penalty;
7. By the marriage of the offended woman, as provided in Article 344 of this Code.
 Criminal liability is extinguished partially:
1. By conditional pardon;
2. By commutation of the sentence; and
3. For good conduct allowances which the culprit may earn while he is serving his sentence.

16. Poblete v. Sandiganbayan, 426 SCRA 346

 The test on whether the rights of an accused are prejudiced by the amendment of a complaint or
information is whether a defense under the complaint or information, as it originally stood, would
no longer be available after the amendment is made, and when any evidence the accused might
have would be inapplicable to the complaint or information. ςrνll
 The mere re-arrangement of the words and phrases in the second Amended Information which are
also alleged in the first Amended Information does not change the basic theory of the prosecution,
thus creating no material change or modification in the defenses of the accused.

17. Valencia v. Sandiganbayan, 433 SCRA 88

 As significant as the right of an accused to a speedy trial is the right of the State to prosecute people
who violate its penal laws. The right to a speedy trial is deemed violated only when the proceeding
is attended by vexatious, capricious and oppressive delays.

18. Tan v. COMELEC, 237 SCRA 353

 The COMELEC's mandate includes its authority to exercise direct and immediate supervision and
control over national and local officials or employees, including members of any national or local
law enforcement agency and instrumentality of the government, required by law to perform duties
relative to the conduct of elections. In order to help ensure that such duly deputized officials and
employees of government carry out their respective assigned tasks, the law has also provided than
upon the COMELEC's recommendation, the corresponding proper authority (the Secretary of the
Department of Justice in the case at bar) shall take appropriate action, either to suspend or remove
from office the officer or employee who may, after due process, be found guilty of violation of
election laws or failure to comply with instructions, orders, decision or rulings of the
COMELEC.

D. Amendment of Complaint or Information

1. People v. Sandiganbayan (Fourth), supra

  General rule on motion to quash:
Where insufficient, an accused in a criminal case can file a motion to have the Information against
him quashed and/or dismissed before he enters his plea.

 A motion to quash an Information on the ground that the facts charged do not constitute an offense
should be resolved on the basis of the allegations in the Information whose truth and veracity are
hypothetically admitted. The question that must be answered is whether such allegations are
sufficient to establish the elements of the crime charged without considering matters aliunde. In
proceeding to resolve this issue, courts must look into three matters:
1) what must be alleged in a valid Information;
2) what the elements of the crime charged are; and
3) whether these elements are sufficiently stated in the Information

2. People v. Bayabos, GR 171222 and 174786, February 18, 2015

 Section 4, Rule 117 of the Rules of Court provides that if a motion to quash is based on the ground
that the facts charged do not constitute an offense, the court shall give the prosecution a chance to
correct the defect by amendment, the provision also states that if the prosecution fails to make the
amendment, the motion shall be granted.

3. People v. Andrade, supra

 Section 2, Rule 117 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure plainly states that in a motion to
quash, the court shall not consider any ground other than those stated in the motion, except lack of
jurisdiction over the offense charged.

 If the defect in the information is curable by amendment, the motion to quash shall be denied and
the prosecution shall be ordered to file an amended information. Generally, the fact that the
allegations in the information do not constitute an offense, or that the information does not conform
substantially to the prescribed form, are defects curable by amendment. Corollary to this rule, the
court should give the prosecution an opportunity to amend the information.

E. Effect of Sustaining the Motion to Quash

1. Gonzales v. Salvador, GR 168340, December 5, 2006

 Once the court issues an order granting the motion to quash, the information and such order
becomes final & executory, however there is nothing more to amend.
  Sec. 5 of Rule 117, where the motion to quash is sustained on grounds other than those stated in
Sec. 6 of the same Rule, the trial court has the discretion to order the filing of another information
within a specified period of which is extendible to such further time as the court may allow for
good cause. The order to file another information if determined to be warranted by the
circumstances of the case, must be contained in the same order granting the motion to quash. If the
order sustaining the motion to quash does not order the filing of another information and said order
becomes final and executory, then the court may no longer direct the filing of another information.

F. Order Sustaining the Motion to Quash Not a Bar to Another Prosecution; Exception

1. People v. Bayabos, supra

Section 4, Rule 117 of the Rules of Court, provides that if a motion to quash is based on the ground
that the facts charged do not constitute an offense, the court shall give the prosecution a chance to
correct the defect by amendment. However, the provision also states that if the prosecution fails to
make the amendment, the motion shall be granted.

G. Former Conviction or Acquittal; Double Jeopardy

1. People v. Jugueta, supra

 Double jeopardy only attaches if the following requisites are present:

(1) a first jeopardy has attached before the second;
(2) the first jeopardy has been validly terminated;
(3) a second jeopardy is for the same offense as in the first.

 In turn, a first jeopardy attaches only (a) after a valid indictment; (b) before a competent court;
(c) after arraignment; (d) when a valid plea has been entered; and (e) when the accused has been
acquitted or convicted, or the case dismissed or otherwise terminated without his express
consent.

2. Chiok v. People, supra

 For double jeopardy to attach, the following elements must concur: (1) a valid information
sufficient in form and substance to sustain a conviction of the crime charged; (2) a court of
competent jurisdiction; (3) the accused has been arraigned and had pleaded; and (4) the accused
was convicted or acquitted or the case was dismissed without his express consent.

 In order to give life to the rule on double jeopardy, our rules on criminal proceedings require
that a judgment of acquittal, whether ordered by the trial or the appellate court, is final,
unappealable, and immediately executory upon its promulgation. This is referred to as the
"finality-of-acquittal" rule.

3. Morillo v. People, supra

  An appeal by the prosecution from the order of dismissal (of the criminal case) by the trial court
shall not constitute double jeopardy if
1) the dismissal is made upon motion, or with the express consent of the defendant;
2) the dismissal is not an acquittal or based upon consideration of the evidence or of the merits
of the case; and
3) the question to be passed upon by the appellate court is purely legal so that should the
dismissal he found incorrect, the case would have to be remanded to the court of origin for
further proceedings, to determine the guilt or innocence of the defendant.

H. Provisional Dismissal

1. Bonsubre, Jr. v. Yerro, GR 205952, February 11, 2015

 The provisional dismissal of a criminal case, which is a dismissal without prejudice to the
reinstatement thereof, is governed by Section 8, Rule 117 of the Rules of Court which reads:
 SEC. 8. Provisional dismissal. – A case shall not be provisionally dismissed except with the
express consent of the accused and with notice to the offended party. The provisional dismissal
of offenses punishable by imprisonment not exceeding six (6) years or a fine of any amount, or
both, shall become permanent one (1) year after issuance of the order without the case having
been revived. With respect to offenses punishable by imprisonment of more than six (6) years,
their provisional dismissal shall become permanent two (2) years after issuance of the order
without the case having been revived.
 A case is provisionally dismissed if the following requisites concur:
a. The prosecution with the express conformity of the accused, or the accused, moves for a
provisional dismissal (sin perjuicio) of his case; or both the prosecution and the accused
move for its provisional dismissal;
b. The offended party is notified of the motion for a provisional dismissal of the case;
c. The court issues an Order granting the motion and dismissing the case provisionally; and
d. The public prosecutor is served with a copy of the Order of provisional dismissal of the case.

2. Co v. New Prosperity Plastic Products, GR 183994, June 30, 2014

 Essential requisites of the first paragraph of Sec 18, Rule 117 of the ROC, which are conditions
sine qua non to the application of the time-bar in the second paragraph thereof are:

1) The prosecution with the express conformity of the accused or the accused moves for a
provisional (sin perjuicio) dismissal of the case or both the prosecution and the accused
move for a provisional dismissal of the case
2) The offended party is notified of the motion for a provisional dismissal of the case;
3) The court issues an order granting the motion and dismissing the case provisionally 4) The
public prosecutor is served with a copy of the order of provisional dismissal of the case.

3. Los Baños v. Pedro, GR 173588, April 22, 2009

  In Motion to Quash, the Information itself has deficiency while in Provisional Dismissal, the
Information has no deficiencies. It does not follow that a motion to quash results in a provisional
dismissal to which Section 8, Rule 117 applies.
 Section 8. Provisional dismissal. — A case shall not be provisionally dismissed except with the
express consent of the accused and with notice to the offended party.
 The provisional dismissal of offenses punishable by imprisonment not exceeding six (6) years or
a fine of any amount, or both, shall become permanent one (1) year after issuance of the order
without the case having been revived. With respect to offenses punishable by imprisonment of
more than six (6) years, their provisional dismissal shall become permanent two (2) years after
issuance of the order without the case having been revived.
 If the problem relates to an intrinsic or extrinsic deficiency of the complaint or information, as
shown on its face, the remedy is a motion to quash under the terms of Section 3, Rule 117. All
other reasons for seeking the dismissal of the complaint or information, before arraignment and
under the circumstances outlined in Section 8, fall under provisional dismissal.

4. People v. Lacson, 400 SCRA 267

 Express consent to a provisional dismissal is given either viva voce or in writing. It is a positive,
direct, unequivocal consent requiring no inference or implication to supply its meaning. Where
the accused writes on the motion of a prosecutor for a provisional dismissal of the case No
objection or With my conformity, the writing amounts to express consent of the accused to a
provisional dismissal of the case. The mere inaction or silence of the accused to a motion for a
provisional dismissal of the case or his failure to object to a provisional dismissal does not
amount to express consent.

 A motion of the accused for a provisional dismissal of a case is an express consent to such
provisional dismissal. If a criminal case is provisionally dismissed with the express consent of the
accused, the case may be revived only within the periods provided in the new rule. On the other
hand, if a criminal case is provisionally dismissed without the express consent of the accused or
over his objection, the new rule would not apply. The case may be revived or refiled even beyond
the prescribed periods subject to the right of the accused to oppose the same on the ground of
double jeopardy or that such revival or refiling is barred by the statute of limitations.

 The case may be revived by the State within the time-bar either by the refiling of the Information
or by the filing of a new Information for the same offense or an offense necessarily included
therein. There would be no need of a new preliminary investigation.

5. Torres v. Aguinaldo, 461 SCRA 599

 A motion to withdraw information differs from a motion to dismiss. While both put an end to an
action filed in court, their legal effect varies. The order granting the withdrawal of the
information attains finality after 15 days from receipt thereof, without prejudice to the refiling of
the information upon reinvestigation.
 On the other hand, the order granting a motion to dismiss becomes final 15 days after receipt
thereof, with prejudice to the re-filing of the same case once such order achieves finality.
I. Failure to Move to Quash or Allege Any Ground Therefor

1. People v. Andrade, supra

 If the defect in the information is curable by amendment, the motion to quash shall be denied and
the prosecution shall be ordered to file an amended information. Generally, the fact that the
allegations in the information do not constitute an offense, or that the information does not
conform substantially to the prescribed form, are defects curable by amendment. Corollary to this
rule, the court should give the prosecution an opportunity to amend the information.

2. People v. Asilan, supra

 Information which lacks essential allegations may still sustain a conviction when the accused
fails to object to its sufficiency during the trial, and the deficiency was cured by competent
evidence presented therein.

Rule 118
(Pre-Trial)

A. Pre-Trial; Mandatory in Criminal Cases

1. Zaldivar v. People, GR 197056, March 2, 2016

 The pertinent provision governing pre-trial in criminal cases states:

SEC. 1. Pre-trial; mandatory in criminal cases. - In all criminal cases cognizable by the
Sandiganbayan, [RTC], Metropolitan Trial Court, Municipal Trial Court in Cities, Municipal
Trial Court and Municipal Circuit Trial Court, the court shall, after arraignment and within thirty
(30) days from the date the court acquires jurisdiction over the person of the accused, unless a
 shorter period is provided for in special laws or circulars of the Supreme Court, order a pre-trial
conference to consider the following:
a) plea bargaining;
b) stipulation of facts;
c) marking for identification of evidence of the parties;
d) waiver of objections to admissibility of evidence;
e) modification of the order of trial if the accused admits the charge but interposes a lawful
defense; and
f) such matters as will promote a fair and expeditious trial of the criminal and civil aspects of
the case.

 Pre-trial is a procedural device intended to clarify and limit the basic issues between the parties
and to take the trial of cases out of the realm of surprise and maneuvering. Its chief objective is to
simplify, abbreviate and expedite or dispense with the trial.

2. Daan v. Sandiganbayan, GR 163972-77, March 28, 2008

 Plea bargaining in criminal cases is a process whereby the accused and the prosecution work out
a mutually satisfactory disposition of the case subject to court approval. It usually involves the
defendant's pleading guilty to a lesser offense or to only one or some of the counts of a multi-
count indictment in return for a lighter sentence than that for the graver charge.
 Ordinarily, plea bargaining is made during the pre-trial stage of the proceedings. Sections 1 and
2, Rule 118 of the Rules of Court, require plea bargaining to be considered by the trial court at the
pre-trial conference. But it may also be made during the trial proper and even after the
prosecution has finished presenting its evidence and rested its case.

B. Pre-Trial Agreement

1. Daan v. Sandiganbayan, supra

 Plea bargaining in criminal cases is a process whereby the accused and the prosecution work
out a mutually satisfactory disposition of the case subject to court approval. It usually involves
the defendant's pleading guilty to a lesser offense or to only one or some of the counts of a
multi-count indictment in return for a lighter sentence than that for the graver charge.

 Ordinarily, plea bargaining is made during the pre-trial stage of the proceedings. Sections 1 and
2, Rule 118 of the Rules of Court, require plea bargaining to be considered by the trial court at
the pre-trial conference. But it may also be made during the trial proper and even after the
prosecution has finished presenting its evidence and rested its case.

C. Non-Appearance at Pre-Trial Conference

1. Garayblas v. Ong, GR 174507-30, August 3, 2011

 Section 3, Rule 118 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure provides as follows:
  Sec. 3. Non-appearance at Pre-Trial Conference. - If the counsel for the accused or the
prosecutor does not appear at the pre-trial conference and does not offer an acceptable
excuse for his lack of cooperation, the court may impose proper sanctions or penalties.
 The court may sanction or penalize counsel for the accused if the following concur: (1)
counsel does not appear at the pre-trial conference AND (2) counsel does not offer an
acceptable excuse. During pre-trial, attorneys must make a full disclosure of their positions
as to what the real issues of the trial would be. They should not be allowed to embarrass or
inconvenience the court or injure the opposing litigant by their careless preparation for a
case; or by their failure to raise relevant issues at the outset of a trial

D. Pre-Trial Order

1. People v. Guzman, GR 169246, January 26, 2007

 Section 4, Rule 118 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure mandates that the matters
agreed upon in the pre-trial conference and as stated in the pre-trial order shall bind the
parties, to wit: SEC. 4. Pre-trial order. – After the pre-trial conference, the court shall issue
an order reciting the actions taken, the facts stipulated, and evidence marked. Such order
shall bind the parties, limit the trial to matters not disposed of, and control the course of the
action during the trial, unless modified by the court to prevent manifest injustice.
 This is not to say, however, that such provision is absolute. It can be relaxed in the greater
interest of justice.

Rule 119
(Trial)

A. Time to Prepare for Trial

1. Mari v. Gonzales, GR 187728, September 12, 2011

 The right of the accused to a speedy trial and to a speedy disposition of the case
against him was designed to prevent the oppression of the citizen by holding
criminal prosecution suspended over him for an indefinite time, and to prevent
 delays in the administration of justice by mandating the courts to proceed with
reasonable dispatch in the trial of criminal cases. Such right to a speedy trial and a
speedy disposition of a case is violated only when the proceeding is attended by
vexatious, capricious and oppressive delays. The inquiry as to whether or not an
accused has been denied such right is not susceptible by precise qualification. The
concept of a speedy disposition is a relative term and must necessarily be a flexible
concept.

 While justice is administered with dispatch, the essential ingredient is orderly,

expeditious and not mere speed. It cannot be definitely said how long is too long in
a system where justice is supposed to be swift, but deliberate. It is consistent with
delays and depends upon circumstances. It secures rights to the accused, but it does
not preclude the rights of public justice. Also, it must be borne in mind that the
rights given to the accused by the Constitution and the Rules of Court are shields,
not weapons; hence, courts are to give meaning to that intent.

B. Continuous Trial Until Terminated; Postponements

1. Tan v. People, GR 173637, April 21, 2009

 Section 2 of Rule 119 (Continuous trial until terminated; postponements) provides

that once a trial commences, it shall continue from day to day as far as practicable
until terminated. It may be postponed for a reasonable period of time for good
cause.

 The court shall, after consultation with the prosecutor and defense counsel, set the
case for continuous trial on a weekly or other short-term trial calendar at the
earliest possible time so as to ensure speedy trial. In no case shall the entire trial
period exceed one hundred eighty (180) days from the first day of trial, except as
otherwise authorized by the Supreme Court.

 The time limitations provided under this section and the preceding section shall not
apply where special laws or circulars of the Supreme Court provide for a shorter
period of trial.

2. Spouses Uy v. Adriano, GR 159098, October 27, 2006

 While it is true that lack of jurisdiction may be assailed at any stage of the
proceedings, such defense must be seasonably raised at the earliest possible
opportunity. Otherwise, active participation in the trial would estop a party from
later challenging such want of jurisdiction. In the same vein, one’s failure to timely
question the delay in the trial of a case would be an implied acceptance of such
delay and a waiver of the right to question the same. Except when otherwise
expressly so provided, the speedy trial right, like any other right conferred by the
 Constitution or statute, may be waived when not positively asserted. A party’s
silence may amount to laches. The right to a speedy trial is a privilege of the
accused. If he does not claim it, he should not complain. R.A. No. 8493 (Speedy
Trial Act of 1998) is a means of enforcing Section 14(2), Article III of the
Constitution. The spirit of the law is that the accused must go on record in the
attitude of demanding a trial or resisting delay. If he does not do this, he must be
held, in law, to have waived the privilege.

RA 8493, supra

C. Exclusions

1. Mari v. Gonzales, supra

 Sec. 3(a) item no. 5 of the Rule 119 Rules of Court provides that any period of
delay from other proceedings concerning the accused such as a delay resulting
from orders of inhibition, or proceedings relating to change of venue of cases or
transfer from other courts shall be excluded in computing the time within which
the trial must commence.

 In the said provision, it clearly states that the time involved in the proceedings in a
petition for transfer of venue can only be excluded from said time limit if it was
the accused who instituted the same.

D. Extended Time Limit

1. Olbes v. Buemio, GR 173319, December 4, 2009

 The principle of speedy trial is a relative term and necessarily involves a

degree of flexibility. Thus, in spite of the prescribed time limits, jurisprudence
continues to adopt the view that the concept of speedy trial is a relative term and
must necessarily be a flexible concept and that while justice is administered
with dispatch, the essential ingredient is orderly, expeditious, and not mere
speed. It cannot be definitely said how long is too long in a system where justice is
supposed to be swift, but deliberate. It is consistent with the delays and
depends upon circumstances. It secures rights to the accused, but it does not
preclude the rights of public justice hence, a balancing test of applying societal
interests and the rights of the accused necessarily compels the court to approach
speedy trial cases on an ad hoc basis.

 In determining whether the accused has been deprived of his right to a speedy
disposition of the case and to a speedy trial, four factors must be
considered: (a) length of delay; (b) the reason for the delay; (c) the defendant’s
assertion of his right; and (d) prejudice to the defendant.
 Moreover the limit set by the Speedy Trial Act of 1998 do not preclude justifiable
postponement and delays when so warranted by the situation.
E. Sanctions

1. Caballes v. CA, GR 163108, February 23, 2005

 In cases where the right of the accused to a speedy trial is violated by the
prosecution, the remedy lies in the procedure provided for under Republic Act No.
8493, as implemented by Rule 119 of the 2000 Rules of Criminal Procedure.
Section 8 of the said Rule provides: SEC. 8. Sanctions. - In any case in which
private counsel for the accused, the public attorney, or the prosecutor:
a. Knowingly allows the case to be set for trial without disclosing that a
necessary witness would be unavailable for trial;
b. Files a motion solely for delay which he knows is totally frivolous and
without merit;
c. Makes a statement for the purpose of obtaining continuance which he knows
to be false and which is material to the granting of a continuance; or
d. Willfully fails to proceed to trial without justification consistent with the
provisions hereof, the court may punish such counsel, attorney, or
prosecutor, as follows:
1. By imposing on a counsel privately retained in connection with the
defense of an accused, a fine not exceeding twenty thousand pesos
(P20,000.00);
2. By imposing on any appointed counsel de oficio, public attorney, or
prosecutor a fine not exceeding five thousand pesos (P5,000.00); and
3. By denying any defense counsel or prosecutor the right to practice
before the court trying the case for a period not exceeding thirty (30)
days. The punishment provided for by this section shall be without
prejudice to any appropriate criminal action or other sanction
authorized under these Rules.

 If the trial court acted with grave abuse of its discretion amounting to excess of
lack of jurisdiction in granting the prosecution's motion for the resetting of the
trial over the petitioner's objections, the more appropriate remedy would have
been to file a petition for certiorari and/or a petition for mandamus to compel the
trial court to comply with the timeline provided for by the said Rule for trial and
termination of the case.

F. Remedy Where Accused is not Brought to Trial Within the Time Limit

1. Spouses Uy v. Adriano, supra

 SECTION 9. Remedy Where Accused is not Brought to Trial Within the Time
Limit. — If the accused is not brought to trial within the time limit required by
Section 1(g), Rule 116 and Section 1, as extended by Section 6 of this rule, the
information may be dismissed on motion of the accused on the ground of denial of
his right to speedy trial. The accused shall have the burden of proving the motion
but the prosecution shall have the burden of going forward with the evidence to
establish the exclusion of time under section 3 of this rule.
  The dismissal shall be subject to the rules on double jeopardy.
 Failure of the accused to move for dismissal prior to trial shall constitute a waiver
of the right to dismiss under this section. (sec. 14, cir. 38-98)
 Under Section 9, Rule 119 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, the
accused have the burden to prove the factual basis of the motion to quash the
Information on the ground of denial of their right to a speedy trial. They must
demonstrate that the delay in the proceedings is vexatious, capricious, and
oppressive; or is caused by unjustified postponements that were asked for and
secured; or that without cause or justifiable motive, a long period of time is
allowed to elapse without the case being tried. On the other hand, the prosecution
is required to present evidence establishing that the delay was reasonably attributed
to the ordinary processes of justice, and that petitioners suffered no serious
prejudice beyond that which ensued after an inevitable and ordinary delay.

G. Speedy Trial

H. Order of Trial

1. People v. Marcial, GR 152864-85, September 27, 2006

 If the accused pleads not guilty to the crime charged, he/she shall state whether
he/she interposes a negative or affirmative defense. A negative defense shall
require the prosecution to prove the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt
while an affirmative defense may modify the order of trial and require the accused
to prove such defense by clear and convincing evidence.

 If the accused has pleaded not guilty to the crime charged, he may state whether he
interposes a negative or affirmative defense. A negative defense shall require the
prosecution to prove the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt, while an
affirmative defense may modify the order of trial and require the accused to prove
such defense by clear and convincing evidence.

AM No. 15-06-10-SC (Adopting the Guidelines for Continuous

Trial of Criminal Cases in Pilot Courts)

AM No. 00-4-07-SC (Rule on Examination of Child Witness)

I. Application for Examination of Witness for Accused Before Trial

1. Jaylo v. Sandiganbayan, GR 111502-04, November 22, 2001

 Section 6, Rule 120, of the Rules of Court provides that an accused who failed to
appear at the promulgation of the judgment of conviction shall lose the remedies
available against the said judgment.
 Except when the conviction is for a light offense, in which case the judgment may
be pronounced in the presence of the counsel for the accused or the latter’s
representative, the accused is required to be present at the scheduled date of
 promulgation of judgment. Notice of the schedule of promulgation shall be made to
the accused personally or through the bondsman or warden and counsel.
 The promulgation of judgment shall proceed even in the absence of the accused
despite notice. The promulgation in absentia shall be made by recording the
judgment in the criminal docket and serving a copy thereof to the accused at their
last known address or through counsel. The court shall also order the arrest of the
accused if the judgment is for conviction and the failure to appear was without
justifiable cause.
 If the judgment is for conviction and the failure to appear was without justifiable
cause, the accused shall lose the remedies available in the Rules of Court against
the judgment. Thus, it is incumbent upon the accused to appear on the scheduled
date of promulgation, because it determines the availability of their possible
remedies against the judgment of conviction. When the accused fail to present
themselves at the promulgation of the judgment of conviction, they lose the
remedies of filing a motion for a new trial or reconsideration (Rule 121) and an
appeal from the judgment of conviction (Rule 122).

J. Examination of Defense Witness; How Made

1. Jaylo v. Sandiganbayan, supra

 Section 6, Rule 120, of the Rules of Court provides that an accused who failed to
appear at the promulgation of the judgment of conviction shall lose the remedies
available against the said judgment.
 Except when the conviction is for a light offense, in which case the judgment may
be pronounced in the presence of the counsel for the accused or the latter’s
representative, the accused is required to be present at the scheduled date of
promulgation of judgment. Notice of the schedule of promulgation shall be made to
the accused personally or through the bondsman or warden and counsel.
 The promulgation of judgment shall proceed even in the absence of the accused
despite notice. The promulgation in absentia shall be made by recording the
judgment in the criminal docket and serving a copy thereof to the accused at their
last known address or through counsel. The court shall also order the arrest of the
accused if the judgment is for conviction and the failure to appear was without
justifiable cause.
 If the judgment is for conviction and the failure to appear was without justifiable
cause, the accused shall lose the remedies available in the Rules of Court against
the judgment. Thus, it is incumbent upon the accused to appear on the scheduled
date of promulgation, because it determines the availability of their possible
remedies against the judgment of conviction. When the accused fail to present
themselves at the promulgation of the judgment of conviction, they lose the
remedies of filing a motion for a new trial or reconsideration (Rule 121) and an
appeal from the judgment of conviction (Rule 122)

K. Bail to Secure Appearance of Material Witness

1. Seludo v. Fineza, AM No. RTJ-03-1813, November 21, 2003

  The Code of Judicial Ethics mandates that a judge must be free of a whiff of
impropriety not only with respect to his performance of official duties, but also to
his behavior outside his sala and as a private individual. The Code dictates that a
judge must behave with propriety at all times.

L. Examination of Witness for the Prosecution

1. Go v. People, GR 185527, July 18, 2012

 Testimonial examination should be made before the court, or at least before the
judge, where the case is pending as required by the clear mandate of Section 15,
Rule 119 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure. The pertinent provision reads
thus:

 SEC. 15. Examination of witness for the prosecution. – When it satisfactorily

appears that a witness for the prosecution is too sick or infirm to appear at the trial
as directed by the court, or has to leave the Philippines with no definite date of
returning, he may forthwith be conditionally examined before the court where the
case is pending. Such examination, in the presence of the accused, or in his absence
after reasonable notice to attend the examination has been served on him shall be
conducted in the same manner as an examination at the trial. Failure or refusal of
the accused to attend the examination after notice shall be considered a waiver. The
statement taken may be admitted in behalf of or against the accused.

 Certainly, to take the deposition of the prosecution witness elsewhere and not
before the very same court where the case is pending would not only deprive a
detained accused of his right to attend the proceedings but also deprive the trial
judge of the opportunity to observe the prosecution witness' deportment and
properly assess his credibility, which is especially intolerable when the witness'
testimony is crucial to the prosecution's case against the accused.

2. Vda. De Manguerra v. Risos, GR 152643, August 28, 2008

 Section 15 of Rule 119 provides:

Section 15. Examination of witness for the prosecution. — When it satisfactorily
appears that a witness for the prosecution is too sick or infirm to appear at the trial
as directed by the court, or has to leave the Philippines with no definite date of
returning, he may forthwith be conditionally examined before the court where the
case is pending. Such examination, in the presence of the accused, or in his
absence after reasonable notice to attend the examination has been served on him,
shall be conducted in the same manner as an examination at the trial. Failure or
refusal of the accused to attend the examination after notice shall be considered a
waiver. The statement taken may be admitted in behalf of or against the accused.
  Rule 119 categorically states that the conditional examination of a prosecution
witness shall be made before the court, or at least before the judge, where the case
is pending. Therefore, the court may not introduce exceptions or conditions.
Neither may it engraft into the law (or the Rules) qualifications not contemplated.
When the words are clear and categorical, there is no room for interpretation.
There is only room for application.

M. Discharge of Accused to be State Witness

1. Jimenez, Jr. v. People, GR 209195 and 209215, September 17, 2014

 To the prosecution belongs the control of its case and the Supreme Court (SC)
cannot dictate on its choice in the discharge of a state witness, save only when the
legal requirements have not been complied with.

 The prosecution’s right to prosecute gives it “a wide range of discretion — the

discretion of whether, what and whom to charge, the exercise of which depends on
a smorgasbord of factors which are best appreciated by prosecutors.” Under
Section 17, Rule 119 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, the court is
given the power to discharge a state witness only after it has already acquired
jurisdiction over the crime and the accused.

2. Monge v. People, GR 170308, March 7, 2008

 The discharge of an accused so he may turn state witness is left to the exercise of
the trial court’s sound discretion limited only by the requirements set forth in
Section 17, Rule 119 of the Rules of Court.

 Thus, whether the accused offered to be discharged appears to be the least guilty
and whether there is objectively an absolute necessity for his testimony are
questions that lie within the domain of the trial court, it being competent to resolve
issues of fact. The discretionary judgment of the trial court with respect this highly
factual issue is not to be interfered with by the appellate courts except in case of
grave abuse of discretion. No such grave abuse is present in this case.

3. Ampatuan, Jr. v. De Lima, 695 SCRA 159

 The two modes by which a participant in the commission of a crime may become
a state witness are, namely: (a) by discharge from the criminal case pursuant to
Section 17 of Rule 119 of the Rules of Court; and (b) by the approval of his
application for admission into the Witness Protection Program of the Department
of Justice (DOJ) in accordance with Republic Act No. 6981 (The Witness
Protection, Security and Benefit Act)
  Under Section 17, Rule 119 of the Rules of Court, the discharge by the trial court
of one or more of several accused with their consent so that they can be witnesses
for the State is made upon motion by the Prosecution before resting its case. The
trial court shall require the Prosecution to present evidence and the sworn
statements of the proposed witnesses at a hearing in support of the discharge.

 The trial court must ascertain if the following conditions fixed by Section 17 of
Rule 119 are complied with, namely:
a) there is absolute necessity for the testimony of the accused whose discharge is
requested;
b) there is no other direct evidence available for the proper prosecution of the
offense committed, except the testimony of said accused;
c) the testimony of said accused can be substantially corroborated in its material
points;
d) said accused does not appear to be most guilty; and
e) said accused has not at any time been convicted of any offense involving
moral turpitude.

4. Valerio v. CA, 535 SCRA 453

 At any rate, the discharge of an accused may be ordered “at any time before they
(defendants) have entered upon their defense,” that is, at any stage of the
proceedings, from the filing of the information to the time the defense starts to
offer anyevidence.

 In the case at bar, considering the opposition of herein petitioners to the motion
for the discharge of Abelardo B. Licaros, particularly the contention that he
(herein private respondent) is the most guilty and that his testimony is not
absolutely necessary, the trial court should have held in abeyance or deferred its
resolution on the motion until after the prosecution has presented all its other
evidence. Thereafter, it can fully determine whether the requisites prescribed in
Section 9 [Now Section 17], Rule 119 of the New Rules of Court, are fully
complied with.

5. Flores v. Sandiganbayan, 124 SCRA 109

 It is apparent from this rule that the discharge of an accused from the information
so that he may be utilized as a state witness is the exclusive responsibility of the
trial court provided that it sees to it that the requisites prescribed by the rules exist,
particularly the requisite that there is absolute necessity for the testimony of the
defendant whose discharge is requested.

 Under this requisite, the fiscal must show that there is absolute necessity for the
testimony of the defendant whose discharge he seeks, in order to be a witness for
the prosecution. This requirement is aimed to curtail miscarriage of justice, before
too common, through the abuse of the power to ask for the discharge of one or
more defendants.
  Absolute necessity of the testimony of the defendant, whose discharge is requested
must now be shown if the discharge is to be allowed, and the power to determine
the necessity is lodged upon the court. (People vs. Ibañez, 92 Phil. 933). The
expedient should be availed of, only when there is absolute necessity for the
testimony of the accused whose discharge is requested, as when he alone has
knowledge of the crime, and not when his testimony would simply corroborate or
otherwise strengthen the evidence in the hands of the prosecution (People vs.
Borja, 106 Phil. 1111)

N. Discharge of Accused Operates as Acquittal

1. Monge v. People, supra

 The discharge of an accused so he may turn state witness is left to the exercise of
the trial court’s sound discretion limited only by the requirements set forth in
Section 17, Rule 119 of the Rules of Court.

 Thus, whether the accused offered to be discharged appears to be the least guilty
and whether there is objectively an absolute necessity for his testimony are
questions that lie within the domain of the trial court, it being competent to resolve
issues of fact. The discretionary judgment of the trial court with respect this highly
factual issue is not to be interfered with by the appellate courts except in case of
grave abuse of discretion. No such grave abuse is present in this case.

O. When Mistake has been Made in Charging the Proper Offense

1. Pacoy v. Cajigal, GR 157472, September 28, 2007

 The change of the offense charged from Homicide to Murder is merely a formal
amendment and not a substantial amendment or a substitution as defined in
Teehankee.

 There was no change in the recital of facts constituting the offense charged or in
the determination of the jurisdiction of the court; The averments in the amended
Information for Murder are exactly the same as those already alleged in the
original Information for Homicide, as there was not at all any change in the act
imputed to petitioner, i.e., the killing of 2Lt. Escueta without any qualifying
circumstance. Thus, we find that the amendment made in the caption and
preamble from “Homicide” to “Murder” as purely formal.

P. Exclusion of the Public

1. Perez v. Estrada, AM No. 01-4-03-SC, June 29, 2001

  The propriety of granting or denying the instant petition involve the weighing out
of the constitutional guarantees of freedom of the press and the right to public
information, on the one hand, and the fundamental rights of the accused, on the
other hand, along with the constitutional power of a court to control its
proceedings in ensuring a fair and impartial trial. When these rights race against
one another, jurisprudence tells us that the right of the accused must be preferred
to win. Re: Petition for the coverage of the case

Q. Consolidation of Trials of Related Offenses

1. People v. Sandiganbayan, GR 149495, August 21, 2003

 Jurisprudence has laid down the requisites for the consolidation of cases. As held
in Caños v. Peralta, joint trial is permissible “x x x where the [actions] arise from
the same act, event or transaction, involve the same or like issues, and depend
largely or substantially on the same evidence, provided that the court has
jurisdiction over the cases to be consolidated and that a joint trial will not give one
party an undue advantage or prejudice the substantial rights of any of the parties, x
x x.” People vs. Sandiganbayan, 409 SCRA 419, G.R. No. 149495 August 21,
2003

 Other cases were consolidated, as they had sought the same reliefs or involved the
same parties and basically the same issues. Another purpose was to avoid the
possibility of conflicting decisions. These reasons are in line with the object of
consolidation, which is to “avoid multiplicity of suits, guard against oppression or
abuse, prevent delay, clear congested dockets, simplify the work of the trial court
and save unnecessary costs and expense.”

R. Demurrer to Evidence

1. Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo v. Sandiganbayan, GR 220598, July 19, 2016

 Section 23, Rule 119 of the Rules of Court expressly provides that “the order
denying the motion for leave of court to file demurrer to evidence or the demurrer
itself shall not be reviewable by appeal or by certiorari before judgment.”—

 The special civil action for certiorari is generally not proper to assail such an
interlocutory order issued by the trial court because of the availability of another
remedy in the ordinary course of law. Moreover, Section 23, Rule 119 of the
Rules of Court expressly provides that “the order denying the motion for leave of
court to file demurrer to evidence or the demurrer itself shall not be reviewable by
appeal or by certiorari before judgment.” It is not an insuperable obstacle to this
action, however, that the denial of the demurrers to evidence of the petitioners was
an interlocutory order that did not terminate the proceedings, and the proper
recourse of the demurring accused was to go to trial, and that in case of their
conviction they may then appeal the conviction, and assign the denial as among
the errors to be reviewed. Indeed, it is doctrinal that the situations in which the
writ of certiorari may issue should not be limited, because to do so — x x x would
 be to destroy its comprehensiveness and usefulness. So wide is the discretion of
the court that authority is not wanting to show that certiorari is more discretionary
than either prohibition or mandamus. In the exercise of our superintending control
over other courts, we are to be guided by all the circumstances of each particular
case ‘as the ends of justice may require.’ So it is that the writ will be granted
where necessary to prevent a substantial wrong or to do substantial justice.

2. People v. Sandiganbayan, GR 197953, August 5, 2015

 A demurrer to evidence is an objection by one of the parties in an action to the

effect that the evidence which his adversary produced is insufficient in point of
law to make out a case or sustain the issue. The party filing the demurrer
challenges the sufficiency of the prosecution’s evidence. The Court’s task is to
ascertain if there is competent or sufficient evidence to establish a prima facie
case to sustain the indictment or support a verdict of guilt. In criminal cases, the
grant of a demurrer amounts to an acquittal, and the dismissal order may not be
appealed as this would place the accused in double jeopardy. Although the
dismissal order is not subject to appeal, it may be reviewed through certiorari
under Rule 65. For the writ to issue, the trial court must be shown to have acted
with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction such as
where the prosecution was denied the opportunity to present its case or where the
trial was a sham thus rendering the assailed judgment void.

S. Reopening

1. Re: Complaint against Ofelia Pinto, AM No. RTJ-11-2289, October 2, 2012

 A motion to reopen a criminal case is not the proper procedural recourse when
there is already a final judgment of conviction. This rule is consistent with the
doctrine of finality of judgment which Judge Pinto failed to apply. “The doctrine
of finality of judgment, which is grounded on fundamental considerations of
public policy and sound practice, dictates that at the risk of occasional error, the
judgments of the courts must become final and executory at some definite date
set by law.” In this case, the final decision of the CA should have been given
effect.

2. Cabarles v. Maceda, GR 161330, February 20, 2007

 A motion to reopen a case to receive further proofs was not in the old rules but it
was nonetheless a recognized procedural recourse, deriving validity and
acceptance from long, established usage. This lack of a specific provision
covering motions to reopen was remedied by the Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure which took effect on December 1, 2000. The April 1, 2003 Order was
issued under the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure. Section 24, Rule 119 and
existing jurisprudence stress the following requirements for reopening a case:
a) the reopening must be before the finality of a judgment of conviction;
b) the order is issued by the judge on his own initiative or upon motion;
c) the order is issued only after a hearing is conducted;
d) the order intends to prevent a miscarriage of justice; and
 e) the presentation of additional and/or further evidence should be terminated
within thirty days from the issuance of the order.

 The court, for good reasons, in the furtherance of justice, may allow new evidence
upon their original case, and its ruling will not be disturbed in the appellate court
where no abuse of discretion appears, and the only controlling guideline governing
a motion to reopen is the paramount interest of justice; While a judge is allowed to
reopen a case before judgment is rendered, a hearing must first be had, and where
the judge does so without notice and hearing and without giving the prosecution
and the accused an opportunity to manifest their position on the matter, the same
constitutes grave abuse of discretion and goes against the due process clause of the
Constitution

 Participation by the defense counsel in cross-examining the witness for the

prosecution and in the proceedings after the case was reopened by the judge
without prior hearing does not amount to a waiver of the accused’s objection to
the order reopening the case—to be effective, a waiver must be certain and
unequivocal.

 Although the matter of reopening a case for reception of further evidence is

largely a matter of discretion on the part of the trial court judge, this judicial action
must not, however, be done whimsically, capriciously and/or unreasonably; The
presence of prosecution witnesses in court is the responsibility of the public
prosecutor and it is incumbent upon him to take the initiative of ensuring the
attendance of his witnesses at the trial.

RULE 120
(Judgment)

A. Judgment; Definition and Form

1. Tan v. Ramirez, GR 158929, August 3, 2010

 A decision, judgment or final order determining the merits of the case

shall state, clearly and distinctly, the facts and the law on which it is
based.
B. Contents of the Judgment

1. Bacolod v. People, GR 206236, July 15, 2013

 It is not amiss to stress that both the RTC and the CA disregarded their
express mandate under Section 2, Rule 120 of the Rules of Court to have
the judgment, if it was of conviction, state:
(1) “the legal qualification of the offense constituted by the acts
committed by the accused and the aggravating or mitigating
circumstances which attended its commission;
(2) the participation of the accused in the offense, whether as
principal, accomplice, or accessory after the fact;
(3) the penalty imposed upon the accused; and
(4) the civil liability or damages caused by his wrongful act or
omission to be recovered from the accused by the offended party, if there
is any, unless the enforcement of the civil liability by a separate civil
action has been reserved or waived.”

 Their disregard compels us to act as we now do lest the Court be

unreasonably seen as tolerant of their omission. That the Spouses Cogtas
did not themselves seek the correction of the omission by an appeal is no
hindrance to this action because the Court, as the final reviewing tribunal,
has not only the authority but also the duty to correct at any time a matter
of law and justice.

2. Garces v. Hernandez, GR 180761, August 9, 2010

 A trial court, in case of acquittal of an accused, is to state whether the

prosecution absolutely failed to prove his guilt or merely failed to prove
his guilt beyond reasonable doubt and in either case, it shall determine if
the act or omission from which the civil liability might arise did not exist.

3. Zafra v. People, GR 176317, July 23, 2014

 We also pointedly remind all trial and appellate courts to avoid omitting
reliefs that the parties are properly entitled to by law or in equity under the
established facts.

 Their judgments will not be worthy of the name unless they thereby fully
determine the rights and obligations of the litigants. It cannot be
otherwise, for only by a full determination of such rights and obligations
would they be true to the judicial office of administering justice and
equity for all.
  Courts should then be alert and cautious in their rendition of judgments of
conviction in criminal cases. They should prescribe the legal penalties,
which is what the Constitution and the law require and expect them to do.
Their prescription of the wrong penalties will be invalid and ineffectual for
being done without jurisdiction or in manifest grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack of jurisdiction. They should also determine and set the
civil liability ex delicto of the accused, in order to do justice to the
complaining victims who are always entitled to them. The Rules of Court
mandates them to do so unless the enforcement of the civil liability by
separate actions has been reserved or waived.

Administrative Circular 83-15 (Protocols and Procedures in the

Promulgation, Publication and Posting on the Websites of
Decisions, Final Resolutions and Final Orders Using Fictitious
Names)

C. Judgment for Two or More Offenses

1. People v. Lindo, GR 189818, August 9, 2010

 Section 3, Rule 120 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure states, “When two
or more offenses are charged in a single complaint or information but the accused
fails to object to it before trial, the court may convict the appellant of as many as are
charged and proved, and impose on him the penalty for each offense, setting out
separately the findings of fact and law in each offense.” As accused-appellant failed
to file a motion to quash the Information he can be convicted of two counts of rape.

D. Judgment in Case of Variance in Allegation and Proof

1. Ricalde v. People, GR 211002, January 21, 2015

 SEC. 4. Judgment in case of variance between allegation and proof.—When there

is variance between the offense charged in the complaint or information and that
proved, and the offense as charged is included in or necessarily includes the offense
proved, the accused shall be convicted of the offense proved which is included in
the offense charged, or of the offense charged which is included in the offense
proved.

 SEC. 5. When an offense includes or is included in another.—An offense charged

necessarily includes the offense proved when some of the essential elements or
ingredients of the former, as alleged in the complaint or information, constitute the
latter. And an offense charged is necessarily included in the offense proved, when
the essential ingredients of the former continue or form part of those constituting the
latter.

2. People v. Pareja, GR 202122, January 15, 2014

  Even though the crime charged against Pareja was for rape through carnal
knowledge, he can be convicted of the crime of acts of lasciviousness without
violating any of his constitutional rights because said crime is included in the crime
of rape.

E. When an Offense Includes of is Included in Another

1. Asistio v. People, GR 200465, April 20, 2015

 Since the Informations filed against petitioner were for separate, and distinct
offenses as discussed above—the first against' Article 172 (2) of the Revised Penal
Code and the second against Section 46 of the Cooperative Code (RA 6938)—one
cannot be pleaded as a bar to the other under the rule on double jeopardy.

 Besides, it is basic in criminal procedure that an accused may be charged with as

many crimes as defined in our penal laws even if these arose from one incident.
Thus, where a single act is directed against one person but said act constitutes a
violation of two or more entirely distinct and unrelated provisions of law, or by a
special law and the Revised Penal Code, as in this case, the prosecution against one
is not an obstacle to the prosecution of the other

F. Promulgation of Judgment

1. Salvador v. Chua, GR 212865, July 15, 2015

 The accused who fails to appear at the promulgation of the judgment of conviction
loses the remedies available under the Rules of Court against the judgment,
specifically: (a) the filing of a motion for new trial or for reconsideration (Rule
121), and (b) an appeal from the judgment of conviction (Rule 122). However, the
Rules of Court permits him to regain his standing in court in order to avail himself
of these remedies within fifteen (15) days from the date of promulgation of the
judgment conditioned upon: (a) his surrender; and (b) his filing of a motion for
leave of court to avail himself of the remedies, stating therein the reason for his
absence.

2. Jaylo v. Sandiganbayan, GR 183152-54, January 21, 2015

 Except when the conviction is for a light offense, in which case the judgment may
be pronounced in the presence of the counsel for the accused or the latter’s
representative, the accused is required to be present at the scheduled date of
promulgation of judgment; The promulgation in absentia shall be made by recording
the judgment in the criminal docket and serving a copy thereof to the accused at
their last known address or through counsel.
 3. Pascua v. CA, 348 SCRA 197

 Promulgation of judgment is an official proclamation or announcement of the

decision of the court (Jacinto, Sr., Commentaries and Jurisprudence on the Revised
Rules of Court [Criminal Procedure], 1994 ed., p. 521). In a criminal case,
promulgation of the decision cannot take place until after the clerk receives it and
enters it into the criminal docket.

4. People v. Taruc, 576 SCRA 682

 It is indisputable that accused-appellant herein, by escaping from jail, was not

present at the promulgation by the RTC of its Decision dated 29 June 2005 in
Criminal Case No. 8010, finding him guilty of the crime of murder. Accused-
appellant failed to surrender and file the required motion within 15 days from the
promulgation of the RTC Decision. This alone already deprived him of any remedy
against said judgment of conviction available under the Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure, including the right to appeal the same.

 The foregoing notwithstanding, the escape of the accused-appellant did not preclude
the Court of Appeals from exercising its review jurisdiction, considering that what
was involved was capital punishment. Automatic review being mandatory, it is not
only a power of the court but a duty to review all death penalty cases. In this case,
considering that the penalty imposed by the trial court was death, the Court of
Appeals rightly took cognizance of the case. Upon review by the appellate court,
however, it modified the penalty from death to reclusion perpetua.

5. Icdang v. Sandiganbayan, 664 SCRA 253

 There is nothing in the rules that requires the presence of counsel for the
promulgation of the judgment of conviction to be valid. While notice must be served
on both accused and his counsel, the latter’s absence during the promulgation of
judgment would not affect the validity of the promulgation. Indeed, no substantial
right of the accused on the merits was prejudiced by such absence of his counsel
when the sentence was pronounced.

G. Modification of Judgment

1. Villareal v. People, GR 151258, December 1, 2014

 When an accused has been convicted or acquitted, or the case against him dismissed
or otherwise terminated without his express consent by a court of competent
jurisdiction, upon a valid complaint or information or other formal charge sufficient
in form and substance to sustain a conviction and after the accused had pleaded to
the charge, the conviction or acquittal of the accused or the dismissal of the case
shall be a bar to another prosecution for the offense charged, or for any attempt to
commit the same or frustration thereof, or for any offense which necessarily
 includes or is necessarily included in the offense charged in the former complaint or
information.

 The rule on double jeopardy thus prohibits the state from appealing the judgment in
order to reverse the acquittal or to increase the penalty imposed either through a
regular appeal under Rule 41 of the Rules of Court or through an appeal by
certiorari on pure questions of law under Rule 45 of the same Rules.

H. Entry of Judgment
I. Existing Provision Governing Suspension of Sentence
Rule 121
(New Trial or Reconsideration)

A. New Trial or Reconsideration

1. Tadeja v. People, GR 145336, February 20, 2013

 Fundamental considerations of public policy and sound practice necessitate that, at

the risk of occasional errors, the judgment or orders of courts should attain finality
at some definite time fixed by law. Otherwise, there would be no end to litigation.

 This is the reason why we have consistently denied petitioners’ motions for
reconsideration of this Court’s Decision and subsequent pleas for the reopening of
the case. Section 1 of Rule 121 of the Rules of Court provides that a new trial may
only be granted by the court on motion of the accused, or motu proprio with the
consent of the accused “(a)t any time before a judgment of conviction becomes
final.”

 In this case, petitioners’ judgment of conviction already became final and

executory on 26 July 2007―the date on which the Decision of this Court denying
the petition and affirming the ruling of the CA was recorded in the Book of
Entries of Judgments. Thus, pleas for the remand of this case to the trial court for
the conduct of a new trial may no longer be entertained.

2. Custodio v. Sandiganbayan, GR 96027-28, March 8, 2005

 In line with the objective of the Rules of Court to set guidelines in the dispensation
of justice, but without shackling the hands that dispense it, the remedy of new trial
has been described as “a new invention to temper the severity of a judgment or
prevent the failure of justice.” Thus, the Rules allow the courts to grant a new trial
when there are errors of law or irregularities prejudicial to the substantial rights of
the accused committed during the trial, or when there exists newly discovered
evidence. In the proceedings for new trial, the errors of law or irregularities are
expunged from the record or new evidence is introduced. Thereafter, the original
judgment is vacated and a new one is rendered.

B. Grounds for a New Trial

1.
Payumo v. Sandiganbayan, GR 151911 and 154537, July 24, 2011

 A motion for new trial based on newly-discovered evidence may be granted only if
the following requisites are met:
(a) that the evidence was discovered after trial;
 (b) that said evidence could not have been discovered and produced at the trial
even with the exercise of reasonable diligence;
(c) that it is material, not merely cumulative, corroborative or impeaching; and (d)
that the evidence is of such weight that, if admitted, would probably change the
judgment. It is essential that the offering party exercised reasonable diligence in
seeking to locate the evidence before or during trial but nonetheless failed to
secure it.
2.
Dinglasan, Jr. v. CA, GR 145420, September 19, 2006

 The requisites for newly discovered evidence under Section 2, Rule 121 of the
Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure are:
a) the evidence was discovered after the trial;
b) such evidence could not have been discovered and produced at the trial with
reasonable diligence; and
c) that it is material, not merely cumulative, corroborative or impeaching, and is of
such weight that, if admitted, will probably change the judgment.

 These standards, also known as the “Berry Rule,” trace their origin to the 1851 case
of Berry State of Georgia—where the Supreme Court of Georgia held: Applications
for new trial on account of newly discovered evidence, are not favored by the Courts.
x x x Upon the following points there seems to be a pretty general concurrence of
authority, viz.; that it is incumbent on a party who asks for a new trial, on the ground
of newly discovered evidence, to satisfy the Court,
1st. That the evidence has come to his knowledge since the trial.
2d. That it was not owing to the want of due diligence that it did not come
sooner.
3d. That it is so material that it would produce a different verdict, if the new
trial were granted.
4th. That it is not cumulative only—viz.; speaking to facts, in relation to which there
was evidence on the trial.
5th. That the affidavit of the witness himself should be produced, or its absence
accounted for. And 6th, a new trial will not be granted, if the only object of the
testimony is to impeach the character or credit of a witness.

C. Form of Motion and Notice to the Prosecutor

1. Flores v. People, GR 181354, February 27, 2013

 As correctly stated by the Office of the Special Prosecutor (OSP), Sec. 2 of Rule 37
and Sec. 4 of Rule 121 should be read in conjunction with Sec. 5 of Rule 15 of the
Rules of Court. Basic is the rule that every motion must be set for hearing by the
movant except for those motions which the court may act upon without prejudice to
the rights of the adverse party. The notice of hearing must be addressed to all parties
and must specify the time and date of the hearing, with proof of service. This Court
has indeed held, time and again, that under Sections 4 and 5 of Rule 15 of the Rules
of Court, the requirement is mandatory. Failure to comply with the requirement
renders the motion defective. “As a rule, a motion without a notice of hearing is
considered pro forma and does not affect the reglementary period for the appeal or
the filing of the requisite pleading.”
 D. Effects of Granting a New Trial or Reconsideration

1. People v. Licayan, GR 203961, July 29, 2015

 SEC. 6. Effects of granting a new trial or reconsideration – The effects of granting a new trial or
reconsideration are the following:

xxxx
 (b) when a new trial is granted on the ground of newly-discovered evidence, the evidence already
adduced shall stand and the newly discovered and such other evidence as the court may, in the
interest of justice, allow to be introduced shall be taken and considered together with the evidence
already in the record.

 In general, the “new” evidence adduced in the second trial consists in (1) allegations that the
identification of Licayan and Lara by Co and Manaysay was unreliable; (2) testimonies and
affidavits of the recently apprehended Mabansag and Delos Reyes, both of whom allege that
Licayan and Lara were not involved in the crime; and (3) testimonies purporting to establish that
Lara was at work in Antipolo during the kidnapping incident.

 While the second trial was meant to give Licayan and Lara the opportunity to present
newlydiscovered evidence that were not available during the first trial, the focus of their defense
was to show that the identification made by the victims was unreliable.
Rule 122
(Appeal)

A. Who May Appeal

1. Burgos, Jr. v. Sps. Naval, GR 219468, June 8, 2016

 Jurisprudence dictates that it is the OSG which possesses the requisite authority to
represent the People in an appeal on the criminal aspect of a case. The OSG is “the
law office of the Government whose specific powers and functions include that of
representing the Republic and/or the [P]eople before any court in any action which
affects the welfare of the people as the ends of justice may require.” Section 35(1),
Chapter 12, Title III, Book IV of the 1987 Administrative Code provides that:
Section 35. Powers and Functions.—The Office of the Solicitor General shall
represent the Government of the Philippines, its agencies and instrumentalities and
its officials and agents in any litigation, proceeding, investigation or matter
requiring the services of lawyer. x x x. It shall have the following specific powers
and functions: (1) Represent the Government in the Supreme Court and the Court of
Appeals in all criminal proceedings; represent the Government and its officers in the
Supreme Court, the Court of Appeals, and all other courts or tribunals in all civil
actions and special proceedings in which the Government or any officer thereof in
his official capacity is a party.

2. People v. Sandiganbayan, GR 164577, July 5, 2010

 Procedurally, the petitioner resorted to a wrong remedy. Section 1 of Rule 122

allows “any party” to appeal from a judgment or final order, unless the right of the
accused against double jeopardy will be violated.

 It is axiomatic that an appeal in criminal cases throws the whole case wide open for
review by an appellate court. As a consequence, an appeal by the prosecution from a
judgment of acquittal necessarily places the accused in double jeopardy. The rule
barring an appeal from a judgment of acquittal is, however, not absolute. The
following are the recognized exceptions thereto: (i) when the prosecution is denied
due process of law; and (ii) when the trial court commits grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in dismissing a criminal case by granting
the accused’ demurrer to evidence. Such issues are brought to the attention of a
reviewing court through the special civil action of certiorari under Rule 65 on the
ground of grave abuse of discretion, amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. In
assailing the resolution of the Sandiganbayan, the petitioner resorted to this petition
for review on certiorari under Rule 45, purportedly raising pure questions of law.
This is erroneous for which reason this petition is dismissible outright.

3. People v. Hernandez, GR 154218 and 154372, August 28, 2006

 Appeal by the prosecution from the order of dismissal of the criminal case by the
trial court may be allowed only on errors of jurisdiction when there was denial of
 due process resulting in loss or lack of jurisdiction; A decision acquitting the
accused, an acquittal rendered in grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction does not really “acquit” and therefore does not terminate the
case as there can be no double jeopardy based on a void indictment.

B. Where to Appeal

1. Macapagal v. People, GR 193217, February 26, 2014

 Even if we treat this petition as one for certiorari under Rule 65, it is still dismissible
for violation of the hierarchy of courts.14 Although the Supreme Court has
concurrent jurisdiction with the RTC and the CA to issue writs of certiorari, this
should not be taken as granting parties the absolute and unrestrained freedom of
choice of the court to which an application will be directed. Direct resort to this
Court is allowed only if there are special, important and compelling reasons clearly
and specifically spelled out in the petition, which are not present in this case.

C. How Appeal Taken

1. Sanico v. People, GR 198753, March 25, 2015

 The failure to file the memorandum on appeal is a ground for the RTC to dismiss the
appeal only in civil cases. The same rule does not apply in criminal cases, because
Section 9(c), supra, imposes on the RTC the duty to decide the appeal "on the basis
of the entire record of the case and of such memoranda or briefs as may have been
filed" upon the submission of the appellate memoranda or briefs, or upon the
expiration of the period to file the same

2. Macapagal v. People, supra

 SEC. 3. How appeal taken. – (a) The appeal to the Regional Trial Court or to the
Court of Appeals in cases decided by the Regional Trial Court in the exercise of its
original jurisdiction, shall be taken by filing a notice of appeal filed with the court
which rendered the judgment or final order appealed from and by serving a copy
thereof upon the adverse party.

 SEC. 6. When appeal to be taken. – An appeal must be taken within fifteen days
from promulgation of the judgment or from notice of the final order appealed from x
x x.

 Consequently, the disallowance of the notice of appeal signifies the disallowance of

the appeal itself.10 A petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court is a
mode of appeal of a lower court’s decision or final order direct to the Supreme
Court. However, the questioned Order denying her notice of appeal is not a decision
or final order from which an appeal may be taken.11 The Rules of Court specifically
provides that no appeal shall be taken from an order disallowing or dismissing an
appeal. Rather, the aggrieved party can elevate the matter through a special civil
 action under Rule 65. Thus, in availing of the wrong mode of appeal in this petition
under Rule 45 instead of the appropriate remedy of Rule 65, the petition merits an
outright dismissal

3. People v. Mateo, GR 147648-87, July 7, 2004

 Constitutional provision is not preclusive in character, and it does not necessarily

prevent the Court, in the exercise of its rule-making power, from adding an
intermediate appeal or review in favor of the accused.

D. When Appeal to be Taken

1. Macapagal v. People, supra

2. Ramirez v. People, GR 197832, October 2, 2013

 The right to appeal is not a natural right and is not part of due process. It is merely a
statutory privilege, and may be exercised only in accordance with the law.―Section 6,
Rule 122 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure provides for the period when an
appeal from a judgment or final order in a criminal case should be taken, viz.: Sec. 6.
When appeal to be taken.—An appeal must be taken within fifteen (15) days from
promulgation of the judgment or from notice of the final order appealed from. This period
for perfecting an appeal shall be suspended from the time a motion for new trial or
reconsideration is filed until notice of the order overruling the motions has been served
upon the accused or his counsel at which time the balance of the period begins to run.

 In exceptional cases, the Court has in fact relaxed the period for perfecting an appeal on
grounds of substantial justice or when there are other special and meritorious
circumstances and issues.

3. Rodriguez v. People, GR 192799, October 24, 2012

 Fresh Period Rule; While Neypes vs. CA involved the period to appeal in civil cases, the
Court’s pronouncement of a “fresh period” to appeal should equally apply to the period
for appeal in criminal cases under Section 6 of Rule 122 of the Revised Rules of
Criminal Procedure.―The pivotal question is whether the “fresh period rule” is
applicable to appeals from conviction in criminal cases governed by Sec. 6 of Rule 122
which pertinently provides: Sec. 6. When appeal to be taken.―An appeal must be taken
within fifteen (15) days from promulgation of the judgment or from notice of the final
order appealed from. This period for perfecting an appeal shall be suspended from the
time a motion for new trial or reconsideration is filed until notice of the order overruling
the motion has been served upon the accused or his counsel at which time the balance of
the period begins to run. Court’s pronouncement of a “fresh period” to appeal should
equally apply to the period for appeal in criminal cases under Section 6 of Rule 122 of
the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure.

 It is now settled that the fresh period rule is applicable in criminal cases, like the instant
case, where the accused files from a judgment of conviction a motion for new trial or
 reconsideration which is denied by the trial court. The accused will have a fresh 15-day
period counted from receipt of such denial within which to file his or her notice of appeal.

4. People v. Rocha, GR 173797, August 31, 2007

 It should be kept in mind that accused-appellants could not avail themselves of parole if
their appeal is dismissed, unless they also apply for executive clemency and ask for the
commutation of their reclusion perpetua sentences. Republic Act No. 4108, as amended,
otherwise known as the Indeterminate Sentence Law, does not apply to persons convicted
of offenses punishable with death penalty or life imprisonment. In several cases,23 we
have considered the penalty of reclusion perpetua as synonymous to life imprisonment
for purposes of the Indeterminate Sentence Law, and ruled that said law does not apply to
persons convicted of offenses punishable with the said penalty.

E. Transmission of Papers to Appellate Court Upon Appeal

 Within 5 days from the filing of the notice of appeal, the clerk of court with whom the
notice of appeal was filed must transmit to the clerk of court of the appellate court the
complete record of the case, together with said notice. The original and three copies of
the transcript of stenographic notes, together with the records, shall also be transmitted to
the clerk of the appellate court without undue delay. The other copy of the transcript shall
remain in the lower court.

 Parole is extended only to those convicted of divisible penalties. Reclusion perpetua is an

indivisible penalty, with no minimum or maximum period. Under section 5 of the
Indeterminate Sentence Law, it is after "any prisoner shall have served the minimum
penalty imposed on him," that the Board of Indeterminate Sentence may consider
whether such prisoner may be granted parole. There being no "minimum penalty"
imposable on those convicted to reclusion perpetua, it follows that even prior to the
enactment of Rep. Act No. 9346, persons sentenced by final judgment to reclusion
perpetua could not have availed of parole under the Indeterminate Sentence Law.

1. Sanico v. People, supra

 Although the right to appeal is statutory, it must be respected and observed because it is
an essential component of due process.—It behooves the Court to remind all lower courts
and their judges to be alert in safeguarding the right of the parties to appeal. Although the
right to appeal is statutory, it must be respected and observed because it is an essential
component of due process. What happened herein was the uncharacteristic oversight of
the RTC in the application of the proper governing rules. There should have been no
difficulty to discern the applicable rules, given the clear distinction between the civil and
the criminal procedures. The alertness could have avoided the oversight, and prevented
the waste of time by the petitioner who had to come all the way to this Court to safeguard
his right to appeal.
 F. Appeal to the Regional Trial Courts

a) Within 5 days from perfection of the appeal, the clerk of court shall transmit the
original record to the appropriate Regional Trial Court.
b) Upon receipt of the complete record of the case, transcripts and exhibits, the clerk of
court of the Regional Trial Court shall notify the parties of such fact.
c) Within 15 days from receipt of said notice, the parties may submit memoranda or
briefs, or may be required by the Regional Trial Court to do so. After the submission
of such memoranda or briefs, or upon the expiration of the period to file the same, the
Regional Trial Court shall decide the case on the basis of the entire record of the case
and of such memoranda or briefs as may have been filed.

This is the procedure to be followed if the RTC is acting as an appellate court reviewing
the decision, final order, or resolution of the MTC.

1. Sanico v. People, supra

 The failure to file the memorandum on appeal is a ground for the RTC to dismiss
the appeal only in civil cases. The same rule does not apply in criminal cases,
because Section
 9(c)imposes on the RTC the duty to decide the appeal “on the basis of the entire
record of the case and of such memoranda or briefs as may have been filed” upon
the submission of the appellate memoranda or briefs, or upon the expiration of
the period to file the same. Hence, the dismissal of the petitioner’s appeal cannot
be properly premised on the failure to file the memorandum on appeal.

G. Transmission of Records in Case of Death Penalty

 In all cases where the death penalty is imposed by the trial court, the records shall
be forwarded to the Court of Appeals for automatic review and judgment within
twenty days but not earlier than fifteen days from the promulgation of the
judgment or notice of denial of a motion for new trial or reconsideration. The
transcript shall also be forwarded within ten days after the filing thereof by the
stenographic reporter.

1. People v. Rocha, supra

 The Constitution does not require a mandatory review by the Supreme Court of
cases where the penalty imposed is reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment—the
constitutional provision quoted in Mateo merely gives the Court jurisdiction over
such cases.—Neither does the Constitution require a mandatory review by this
Court of cases where the penalty imposed is reclusion perpetua or life
imprisonment. The constitutional provision quoted in Mateo merely gives this
Court jurisdiction over such cases: Up until now, the Supreme Court has assumed
the direct appellate review over all criminal cases in which the penalty imposed is
death, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment (or lower but involving offenses
committed on the same occasion or arising out of the same occurrence that gave
rise to the more serious offense for which the penalty of death, reclusion
 perpetua, or life imprisonment is imposed). The practice finds justification in the
1987 Constitution—Article VIII, Section 5. The Supreme Court shall have the
following powers: “(2) Review, revise, reverse, modify, or affirm on appeal or
certiorari, as the law or the Rules of Court may provide, final judgments and
orders of lower courts in: “x x x x x x x x x “(d) All criminal cases in which the
penalty imposed is reclusion perpetua or higher.”

2. People v. Mateo, supra

 Rules require a mandatory review by the Supreme Court of cases where the
penalty imposed is reclusion perpetua, life imprisonment, or death, nowhere,
however, has it proscribed an intermediate review. If only to ensure utmost
circumspection before the penalty of death, reclusion perpetuaor life
imprisonment is imposed, the Court now deems it wise and compelling to provide
in these cases a review by the Court of Appeals before the case is elevated to the
Supreme Court.

 Where life and liberty are at stake, all possible avenues to determine his guilt or
innocence must be accorded an accused, and no care in the evaluation of the facts
can ever be overdone. A prior determination by the Court of Appeals on,
particularly, the factual issues, would minimize the possibility of an error of
judgment. If the Court of Appeals should affirm the penalty of death, reclusion
perpetua or life imprisonment, it could then render judgment imposing the
corresponding penalty as the circumstances so warrant, refrain from entering
judgment and elevate the entire records of the case to the Supreme Court for its
final disposition.

H. Effect of Appeal by Any of Several Accused

 General rule:
a) An appeal taken by one or more of several accused shall not affect those who did
not appeal.
b) b.The appeal of the offended part from the civil aspect shall not affect the
criminal aspect of the judgment or order appealed from
c) Upon perfection of the appeal, the execution of the judgment or final order
appealed from shall be stayed as to the appealing party

 An appeal taken by one or more of several accused shall not affect those who did
not appeal, except, insofar as the judgment of the appellate court is favorable and
applicable to the latter.

1. Benabaye v. People, GR 203466, February 25, 2015

 While it is true that only Benabaye was able to successfully perfect her appeal,
the rule is that an appeal in a criminal proceeding throws the whole case open for
review of all its aspects, including those not raised by the parties.
 2. People v. Valdez, GR 175602, February 13, 2013

 An appeal taken by one or more of several accused shall not affect those who did
not appeal, except insofar as the judgment of the appellate court is favorable and
applicable to the latter. In this connection, the Supreme Court has pronounced in
Lim vs. CA that the benefits of this provision extended to all the accused,
regardless of whether they appealed or not.

3. People v. Brillantes, GR 190610, April 25, 2012

 An appeal taken by one or more of several accused shall not affect those who did
not appeal, except insofar as the judgment of the appellate court is favorable and
applicable to the latter. The Rules on Criminal Procedure on the matter states:
RULE 122—Appeal Section 11. Effect of appeal by any of several accused.—
(a) An appeal taken by one or more of several accused shall not affect those who
did not appeal, except insofar as the judgment of the appellate court is favorable
and applicable to the latter.

 Under Sec. 11, Rule 122 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure as
abovequoted, a favorable judgment, as in this case, shall benefit the co-accused
who did not appeal or those who appealed from their judgments of conviction but
for one reason or another, the conviction became final and executory, Benabaye’s
discharge for the crime of estafa is likewise applicable to Tupag.

I. Withdrawal of Appeal

i. May be made at any time before judgment on the appeal is rendered

ii. Lower court judgment becomes final
iii. Case remanded for execution of judgment
iv. Once notice of appeal is filed, cannot be validly withdrawn to give way for a Motion for
Recon or a Motion for New Trial, since the filing of the notice perfected the appeal, and
the trial court loses its power to modify or set aside the judgment. The only valid
withdrawal of an appeal is where the accused decides to serve his sentence.

Period to withdraw an appeal

1. An appellant may withdraw his appeal before the record has been forwarded by the clerk of
court to the proper appellate court as provided by Sec. 8, Rule 122, in which case the
judgment shall become final (Sec. 12, Rule 122).
2. The court may also, in its discretion, allow the appellant to withdraw his appeal, provided a
motion to that effect is filed before the rendition of the judgment in the case on appeal (Sec.
12, Rule 122).
 1. Moll v. Buban, GR 136974, August 27, 2002

 The rule requiring a party to specify the court where the appeal is being taken is
merely directory; An error in designating the appellate court is not fatal to the
appeal. The Court has held that the rule requiring a party to specify the court
where the appeal is being taken is merely directory. An error in designating the
appellate court is not fatal to the appeal.

 The right to appeal is a right not litigated by the appeal.

 The correction in designating the proper appellate court should be made within the
15-day period to appeal. Once made within the said period, the designation of the
correct appellate court may be allowed even if the records of the case are
forwarded to the Court of Appeals.

J. Appointment of Counsel de Officio for Accused on Appeal

 It shall be the duty of the clerk of the trial court to ascertain from the appellant, if
confined in prison, whether he desires the RTC, CA or the SC to appoint a counsel
de oficio to defend him and to transmit with the record on a form to be prepared
by the clerk of court of the appellate court, a certificate of compliance with this
duty and of the response of the appellant to his inquiry.

 Trial court clerk is duty bound to ascertain from the accused if he wants a counsel
de officio for an accused (then court will appoint):

 On appeal, and Accused is confined in prison

o What’re the other instances where mandatory to give a counsel de officio?

o Upon arraignment, but that’s by the court.
o Read with Rule 124, Sec 2. (appointment by the CA) o Also allowed by the
SC but not found in the rules

1. People v. Rio, GR 90294, September 24, 1991

 Accused-appellant seems unaware that the Court can appoint a counsel de oficio
to prosecute his appeal pursuant to Section 13 of Rule 122 of the Rules of Court.

 It is not enough for the Court to apprise an accused of his right to have an
attorney, it is not enough to ask him whether he desires the aid of an attorney but it
is essential that the court, should assign one de oficio for him if he so desires and
he is poor or grant him a reasonable time to procure an attorney of his own.

 Right to a counsel de oficio does not cease upon the conviction of an accused by a
trial court.
 Court admonishes members of the Bar to be more conscious of their duties as
advocates of their clients’ causes whether acting de parte or de oficio for public
interest requires that an attorney exert his best efforts and ability in the prosecution
or defense of his client’s cause.

 Fact that he merely volunteered his services or the circumstances that he was a
counsel de oficio neither diminishes nor alters the degree of professional
responsibility owed to his client.
 Rule 124
(Procedure in the Court of Appeals)

A. Dismissal of Appeal for Abandonment or Failure to Prosecute

Appellant fails to file his brief within the prescribed time.

The CA may, upon motion of the appellee or motu proprio and with notice to the appellant in either case,
dismiss the appeal if the appellant fails to file his brief with the time prescribed, except where the
appellant is represented by a counsel de oficio.

If failure to file brief on time is the ground, appellant must be given notice to give him opportunity to
reason out why his appeal should not be dismissed

However, dismissal is proper despite lack of notice:

1. If appellant has filed a MFR or motion to set aside the order dismissing the appeal, in
which he stated the reason why he failed to file his brief on time and the appellate
court denied the motion after considering reason
2. If the appeal was dismissed without notice but the appellant took no steps to have the
appeal reinstated. Such action amounts to abandonment

Appellant escapes, jumps bail, or flees.

The CA may also, upon motion of the appellee or motu proprio, dismiss the appeal if the appellant
escapes from prison/confinement, jumps bail or flees to a foreign country during the pendency of the
appeal [Sec. 8, Rule 124]

Likewise, when accused flees after the case has been submitted for decision, he is deemed to have waived
his right to appeal

However, the appeal will not be dismissed despite escape:

1. In one exceptional case, the appellant took advantage of a mass jailbreak but was recaptured two
hours after, the SC ruled that these circumstances were not sufficient to justify dismissal of the
appeal which, upon the conclusion arrived at by the Court on the merits, would entail a clear
miscarriage of justice

2. In case of automatic review

1. Celestial v. People, GR 214865, August 19, 2015

 Section 8, Rule 124 of the Rules of Court pertinently provides:

 SEC. 8. Dismissal of appeal for abandonment or failure to prosecute.—The Court of
Appeals may, upon motion of the appellee or motu proprio and with notice to the appellant in
either case, dismiss the appeal if the appellant fails to file his brief within the time prescribed
by this Rule, except where the appellant is represented by a counsel de officio.
 - In the case at bar, it cannot be disputed that Atty. Paredes represented the petitioner in
the proceedings before the CA. And based on the registry return receipt, counsel
received a copy of the April 28, 2014 Resolution on May 12, 2014. Thus, the CA
complied with the procedural requirement under Section 8, Rule 124 and no violation
of petitioner’s right to notice of the dismissal can be attributed to the appellate court.

- Furthermore, the oft-cited doctrine is that the negligence of counsel binds his client.
This is based on the rule that any act performed by a counsel within the scope of his
general or implied authority is regarded as an act of his client. While, truly, there are
situations where the Court can relax procedural rules, such exceptions do not obtain in
the extant case.

- Under the factual backdrop of this case, We find the failure to file the appeal brief
inexcusable. First, the handling lawyer, Atty. Paredes was undoubtedly at fault. Even
with the benefit of 2 thirty-day extensions, counsel, nevertheless, still failed to comply
with the CA’s directive. Second, petitioner herself was likewise negligent since, as she
admitted, Atty. Paredes informed her that the deadline for the second extension. It is
then baffling why the petitioner took no action to ensure compliance with the CA
Notice to file her appellant’s brief from the time she followed up the case to the date
of the deadline, and even thereafter until the Resolution was promulgated. Absolutely
nothing appeared to have been done in the interim, not even in terms of noting that no
appeal brief had been filed. Thus, the petitioner simply took too long to rectify its
mistake; by the time that she acted, it was simply too late. From these circumstances,
the CA cannot in any way be said to have erred in dismissing the appeal.

2. Villena v. People, GR 184091, January 31, 2011

 While it is true that an appeal is perfected upon the mere filing of a notice of appeal and that
the trial court thereupon loses jurisdiction over the case, this principle presupposes that the
party filing the notice of appeal could validly avail of the remedy of appeal and had not lost
standing in court.

 The accused who failed to appear at the promulgation of the judgment of conviction shall
lose the remedies available under the Rules of Court against the judgment.

a. the filing of a motion for new trial or reconsideration (Rule 121), and
b. an appeal from the judgment of conviction (Rule 122).

 However, the Rules allow the accused to regain his standing in court in order to avail of
these remedies by:

a. his surrender, and

b. his filing of a motion for leave of court to avail of these remedies, stating therein the
reasons for his absence, within 15 days from the date of promulgation of judgment.

 The right to appeal is neither a natural right nor a part of due process. It is merely a statutory
privilege, and may be exercised only in the manner and in accordance with the provisions of
the law. The party who seeks to avail of the same must comply with the requirements of the
Rules. Failing to do so, the right to appeal is lost.
 3. Dimarucot v. People, GR 183975, September 20, 2010

 The Court of Appeals motu proprio and with notice to the appellant if the latter fails to file
his brief within the prescribed time.—Section 8, paragraph 1, Rule 124 of the Revised
Rules of Criminal Procedure provides:

 SEC. 8. Dismissal of appeal for abandonment or failure to prosecute.—The Court of

Appeals may, upon motion of the appellee or motu proprio and with notice to the appellant
in either case, dismiss the appeal if the appellant fails to file his brief within the time
prescribed by this Rule, except where the appellant is represented by a counsel de oficio. x x
x x It is clear under the foregoing provision that a criminal case may be dismissed by the CA
motu proprio and with notice to the appellant if the latter fails to file his brief within the
prescribed time.

 Even if it does not appear that the appellate court gave the appellant notice before dismissing
the appeal, if the appellant has filed a motion for reconsideration of, or to set aside, the order
dismissing the appeal, in which he stated the reasons why he failed to file his brief on time
and the appellate court denied the motion after considering said reasons, the dismissal is
proper; Likewise, where the appeal was dismissed without prior notice, but the appellant
took no steps either by himself or through counsel to have the appeal reinstated, such an
attitude of indifference and inaction amounts to his abandonment and renunciation of the
right granted to him by law to prosecute his appeal.

B. Scope of Judgment

The CA may:
1. Reverse/affirm/modify the judgment;
2. Increase/reduce the penalty imposed by the Trial Court;
3. Remand the case to the RTC for new trial or retrial;
4. Dismiss the case

When the accused appeals from the sentence of the TC, he waives the constitutional
safeguard against double jeopardy and throws the whole case open to the review of the appellate
court, which is then called upon to render such judgment as law and justice dictate, WON
favorable to the accused and WON made the subject of assignment of errors. [Ko Bu Lin v. CA
(1982)]

1. People v. Mirandilla, Jr., GR 186417, July 27, 2011

 “SEC. 11. Scope of Judgment.—The Court of Appeals may reverse, affirm, or

modify the judgment and increase or reduce the penalty imposed by the trial court, remand
the case to the Regional Trial Court for new trial or retrial, or dismiss the case.”

 The reason behind this rule is that when an accused appeals from the sentence of the trial
court, he waives the constitutional safeguard against double jeopardy and throws the whole
case open to the review of the appellate court, which is then called upon to render such
 judgment as law and justice dictate, whether favorable or unfavorable to the appellant. To
reiterate, the six informations charged Mirandilla with kidnapping and serious illegal
detention with rape, four counts of rape, and one count of rape through sexual assault.

 The accusatory portion of the information in Criminal Case alleged that Mirandilla
kidnapped AAA and seriously and illegally detained her for more than three days during
which time he had carnal knowledge of her, against her will.

 The Court agrees with the CA in finding Mirandilla guilty of the special complex crime of
kidnapping with rape, instead of simple kidnapping as the RTC ruled. It was the RTC, no
less, which found that Mirandilla kidnapped AAA, held her in detention for 39 days and
carnally abused her while holding a gun and/or a knife.

C. Quorum of the Court; Certification or Appeal of Cases to the Supreme Court

QUORUM IN THE CA [S E C . 11, BP 129]

(a) 3 CA Justices constitute a quorum for the sessions of a division.
(b) The unanimous vote of the 3 Justices of a division is necessary for the pronouncement of a
judgment or final resolution
(c) Decision is reached through a consultation before the writing of the opinion by a member of
the division.
(d) If there is lack of unanimity, the Presiding Justice shall direct the CA raffle committee to
designate 2 additional Justices to sit temporarily with them. They shall then form a special
division of 5 members.

The concurrence of a majority of that special division is necessary for the pronouncement
of a judgment or final resolution.

Designation of the additional Justices shall be made strictly by raffle and rotation among
all other CA Justices.

CERTIFICATION OR APPEAL OF CASES TO THE SC [R U L E 124, S E C . 13]

(1) If the CA finds that death penalty should be imposed:
(a) AUTOMATIC REVIEW – CA shall render judgment but refrain from making an entry
of judgment. It shall then certify the case and elevate its entire record to the SC for
review. The accused does not have to do anything.
(b) Note: Death penalty has been abolished.

(2) If the judgment also imposes a lesser penalty for offenses committed on the same occasion or
which arose from the same occurrence that gave rise to the more severe offense for which
death is imposed, and the accused appeals:

The appeal shall be automatically included in the case certified for review in the SC.
 (3) If the CA imposes reclusion perpetua, life imprisonment or a lesser penalty: (a) It shall render
and enter judgment imposing such penalty.
(b) Appeal here is not automatic. The accused has to file a notice of appeal with the CA

1. Dungo v. People, GR 209464, July 1, 2013

 Section 13(c), Rule 124 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, as amended
by A.M. No. 00-5-03, dated October 15, 2004, governs the procedure on the
appeal from the CA to the SC when the penalty imposed is either reclusion
perpetua or life imprisonment.

 An accused, upon whom the penalty of reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment

had been imposed by the Court of Appeals (CA), can simply file a notice of appeal
to allow him to pursue an appeal as a matter of right before the Supreme Court
(SC). An appeal in a criminal case opens the entire case for review on any
question including one not raised by the parties.

D. Motion for New Trial

1. Appellant may file MNT on the ground of newly discovered evidence material to his defense any
time:
a. After the appeal from the lower court has been perfected; but
b. Before the CA judgment convicting him becomes final;

2. The motion shall conform to Sec. 4, Rule 121 [Sec. 14, Rule 124];

3. If the CA grants a Motion for a New Trial, it may either:

a. Conduct the hearing and receive evidence;
b. Refer the trial to the court of origin [Sec. 15, Rule 124]

1. Baylosis, Sr. v. People, GR 152119, August 14, 2007

 Newly Discovered Evidence; Requisites for a Newly Discovered Evidence to be

Appreciated as a Ground for Granting a Motion for New Trial.—For a newly discovered
evidence to be appreciated as a ground for granting a motion for new trial, it must fairly
be shown that:

1. the evidence was discovered after trial;

2. such evidence could not have been discovered and produced at the trial even with the
exercise of reasonable diligence;
3. it is material, not merely cumulative, corroborative, or impeaching; and
4. the evidence is of such weight that it would probably change the judgment if
admitted.

 In granting a motion for new trial on the ground of newly discovered evidence, the
evidence presented must be in actual existence and unknown to the party even if a
judgment had been rendered before.
2. Dinglasan, Jr. v. CA, supra

 Newly Discovered Evidence; “Berry Rule”; Requisites.—The requisites for newly

discovered evidence under Section 2, Rule 121 of the Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure are:
a) the evidence was discovered after the trial;
b) such evidence could not have been discovered and produced at the trial with
reasonable diligence; and
c) that it is material, not merely cumulative, corroborative or impeaching, and is of such
weight that, if admitted, will probably change the judgment.
 The question of whether evidence is newly discovered has two aspects—a temporal one,
i.e., when was the evidence discovered, and a predictive one, i.e., when should or could it
have been discovered.
 It is contrary to human experience to have overlooked an evidence which was decisively
claimed to have such significance that might probably change the judgment.

E. Application of Certain Rules in Civil Procedure to Criminal Cases

Provisions of Rules 42, 44-46 and 48-56 relating to procedure in the CA and the SC in
original and appealed civil cases, shall be applied to criminal cases insofar as they are applicable
and not inconsistent with the provision of this Rule.

1. People v. Balinga, GR 159222, June 26, 2007

 The remedy of annulment of judgment cannot be resorted to when the Regional Trial
Court judgment being questioned was rendered in a criminal case.

Section 1, Rule 47 of the Rules of Court, limits the scope of the remedy of annulment of
judgment to the following:

Section 1. Coverage.—This Rule shall govern the annulment by the Court of Appeals of
judgments or final orders and resolutions in civil actions of Regional Trial Courts for
which the ordinary remedies of new trial, appeal, petition for relief or other appropriate
remedies are no longer available through no fault of the petitioner.

 The 2000 Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure itself does not permit such recourse, for it
excluded Rule 47 from the enumeration of the provisions of the 1997 Revised Rules of
Civil Procedure which have suppletory application to criminal cases. Section 18, Rule
124 thereof, provides: Sec. 18. Application of certain rules in civil procedure to criminal
cases.—The provisions of Rules 42, 44 to 46 and 48 to 56 relating to procedure in the
Court of Appeals and in the Supreme Court in original and appealed civil cases shall be
applied to criminal cases insofar as they are applicable and not inconsistent with the
provisions of this Rule
Rule 125
(Procedure in the Supreme Court)

Uniform procedure
General rule: The procedure in the SC in original and in appealed cases shall be the same as in
the CA.

Exception: The Constitution or law otherwise provides

In a criminal case, an appeal to the SC throws open the whole case for review and it becomes its
duty to correct such errors as may be found in the judgment appealed from, whether or not they
were assigned as errors

It may examine the judgment as to the qualification of the crime and the degree of the penalty
imposed

It may also assess and award civil indemnity

1. People v. Mateo, supra

 Fundamental Law requires a mandatory review by the Supreme Court of cases where the
penalty imposed is reclusion perpetua, life imprisonment, or death, nowhere, however, has it
proscribed an intermediate review. If only to ensure utmost circumspection before the penalty
of death, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment is imposed, the Court now deems it wise and
compelling to provide in these cases a review by the Court of Appeals before the case is
elevated to the Supreme Court. Where life and liberty are at stake, all possible avenues to
determine his guilt or innocence must be accorded an accused, and no care in the evaluation of
the facts can ever be overdone.

2. People v. Taruc, GR 185202, February 18, 2009

 Once an accused escapes from prison or confinement or jumps bail or flees to a foreign
country, he loses his standing in court and unless he surrenders or submits to the jurisdiction
of the court he is deemed to have waived any right to seek relief from the court.

 Although Rule 124, Section 8 particularly applies to the Court of Appeals, it has been
extended to the Supreme Court by Rule 125, Section 1 of the Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure.

 SECTION 1. Uniform procedure.—Unless otherwise provided by the Constitution or by

law, the procedure in the Supreme Court in original and in appealed cases shall be the same as
in the Court of Appeals.
  The escape of the accused-appellant did not preclude the Court of Appeals from exercising its
review jurisdiction, considering that what was involved was capital punishment—automatic
review being mandatory, it is not only a power of the court but a duty to review all death
penalty cases.

Rule 126
(Search and Seizure)
1.
Stonehill and Diokno, GR L-19550, June 19, 1967

 Only party affected may contest legality of seizure effected by search warrants. Officers
of certain corporations, from which documents, papers and things were seized by means
of search warrants, have no cause of action to assail the legality of the seizures because
said corporations have personalities distinct and separate from those of said officers.

 When illegally seized evidence is admissible. - Officers of certain corporations cannot

validly object to the use in evidence against them of the documents, papers and things
seized from the offices and premises of the corporations since the right to object to their
admission in evidence belongs exclusively to the corporations, to which the seized effects
belong, and may not be invoked by the corporate officers in proceedings against them in
their individual capacity.

 Requisites for issuing search warrants. - The Constitution provides that no warrant shall
issue but upon probable cause, to be determined by the judge, and that the warrant shall
particularly describe the things to be seized.

 General search warrants - issued upon applications stating that the natural and juridical
persons therein named had committed a violation of Central Bank laws, tariff and customs
laws, Tax Code and Revised Penal Code do not satisfy the constitutional requirements
because no specific offense had been alleged in said applications.

 General search warrants are outlawed because they place the sanctity of the domicile and
the privacy of communication and correspondence at the mercy of the whims, caprice or
passion of peace officers.
 Warrants not describing particularly the things to be seized. Things to be seized should be
particularly described and defeat its major objective of eliminating general warrants.

2.
Katz v. United States, 389 US 347 (1967)

 The Supreme Court's decision in Katz significantly expanded the scope of the Fourth
Amendment's protections, and represented an unprecedented shift in American search and
seizure jurisprudence. Many law enforcement practices that previously were not "within
the view" of the Fourth Amendment—such as wiretaps on public phone wires—are now
covered by it and cannot be done without first obtaining a search warrant.
 1. The Government's eavesdropping activities violated the privacy upon which
petitioner justifiably relied while using the telephone booth, and thus constituted a "search
and seizure" within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment.

a. The Fourth Amendment governs not only the seizure of tangible items, but
extends as well to the recording of oral statements. Silverman v. United States
b. Because the Fourth Amendment protects people, rather than places, its reach
cannot turn on the presence or absence of a physical intrusion into any given
enclosure. The "trespass" doctrine of Olmstead v. United States and Goldman v.
United States is no longer controlling
2. Although the surveillance in this case may have been so narrowly circumscribed
that it could constitutionally have been authorized in advance, it was not in fact conducted
pursuant to the warrant procedure which is a constitutional precondition of such
electronic surveillance.

3.
People v. Marti, GR 81561, January 18, 1991

 The constitutional protection against unreasonable searches and seizures refers to the
immunity of one’s person from interference by government; it cannot be extended to acts
committed by private individuals so as to bring it within the ambit of alleged unlawful
intrusion by the government. Thus is outlawed any unwarranted intrusion by government,
which is called upon to refrain from any invasion of his dwelling and to respect the
privacies of his life.

 Where the contraband articles are identified without a trespass on the part of the arresting
officer, there is not a search that is prohibited by the constitution.

 The Bill of Rights embodied in the Constitution is not meant to be invoked against acts of
private individuals, it is directed only against the government and its agencies tasked with
the enforcement of the law.

 Protection against the state. The Bill of Rights governs the relationship between the
individual and the state. Its concern is not the relation between individuals, between a
private individual and other individuals. What the Bill of Rights does is to declare some
forbidden zones in the private sphere inaccessible to any power holder.

A. Search Warrant, Defined

It is an order in writing; issued in the name of the People of the Philippines; signed by a
judge; and directed to a peace officer, commanding him to search for personal property described
in the warrant and bring it before the court.

A search warrant is not a criminal action nor does it represent a commencement of a

criminal prosecution even if it is entitled like a criminal action. It is not a proceeding against a
person but is solely for the discovery and to get possession of personal property.
 General rule: Search of property is unreasonable unless it has been authorized by a valid
search warrant.

Exceptions:
a. Search incidental to a lawful arrest;
b. Consented search;
c. Search of moving vehicle;
d. Checkpoints;
e. Plain view;
f. Stop and frisk;
g. Customs search;
h. Other exceptions, such as exigent circumstance
1.
Te v. Breva, GR 164974, August 5, 2015

 The requirement that the search warrant be issued in the name of the People of the
Philippines is imposed by Section 1, Rule 126 of the Rules of Court - A search warrant is
an order in writing issued in the name of the People of the Philippines, signed by a judge
and directed to a peace officer, commanding him to search for personal property
described therein and bring it before the court.

 Every search warrant is applied for and issued by and under the authority of the State,
regardless of who initiates its application or causes its issuance.
2.
Santos v. Pryce Gases, Inc., 539 SCRA 474

 Requisites for a search warrant’s validity, the absence of even one will cause it's
downright nullification:

1) it must be issued upon probable cause;

2) the probable cause must be determined by the judge himself and not by the applicant
or any other person;
3) in the determination of probable cause, the judge must examine, under oath or
affirmation, the complainant and such witnesses as the latter may produce; and
4) the warrant issued must particularly describe the place to be searched and persons or
things to be seized.
 Probable cause for a search warrant is defined as such facts and circumstances which
would lead a reasonably discrete and prudent man to believe that an offense has been
committed and that the objects sought in connection with the offense are in the place
sought to be searched.

B. Court Where Application for Search Warrant Shall be Filed

General rule: It may be filed in any court within whose territorial jurisdiction the crime was
committed.

Exception: For compelling reasons, which must be stated in the application, it may also be filed:
a. If the place of the commission of the crime is known, any court within the judicial region
where the crime was committed
b. Any court within the judicial region where the warrant shall be enforced
However, if the criminal action has already been filed, the application shall only be made in the
court where the criminal action is pending.

1. Pilipinas Shell Petroleum Corp. v. Romars International Gases Corp., GR 189669, February
16, 2015

 Since Section 2, Article III of the 1987 Constitution guarantees the right of persons to be
free from unreasonable searches and seizures, and search warrants constitute a limitation
on this right, then Section 2, Rule 126 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure should
be construed strictly against state authorities who would be enforcing the search warrants.
—Under paragraph (b) thereof, the application for search warrant in this case should have
stated compelling reasons why the same was being filed with the RTC-Naga instead of
the RTC-Iriga City, considering that it is the latter court that has territorial jurisdiction
over the place where the alleged crime was committed and also the place where the search
warrant was enforced.

 The SC distinctly stated in Abuan v. People that “the motion to quash the search warrant
which the accused may file shall be governed by the omnibus motion rule, provided,
however, that objections not available, existent or known during the proceedings for the
quashal of the warrant may be raised in the hearing of the motion to suppress.”

 The omnibus motion rule embodied in Section 8, Rule 15, in relation to Section 1, Rule
9, demands that all available objections be included in a party’s motion, otherwise, said
objections shall be deemed waived; and, the only grounds the court could take cognizance
of, even if not pleaded in said motion are:
a) lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter;
b) existence of another action pending between the same parties for the same cause; and
c) bar by prior judgment or by statute of limitations.

 The trial court could only take cognizance of an issue that was not raised in the motion to
quash if:
1) said issue was not available or existent when they filed the motion to quash the
search warrant; or
2) the issue was one involving jurisdiction over the subject matter.

2. Laud v. People, GR 199032, November 19, 2014

 Section 12, Chapter V of A.M. No. 03-8-02-SC states the requirements for the issuance
of search warrants in special criminal cases by the RTCs of Manila and Quezon City.
These special criminal cases pertain to those “involving heinous crimes, illegal gambling,
illegal possession of firearms and ammunitions, as well as violations of the
Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002, the Intellectual Property Code, the Anti-
Money Laundering Act of 2001, the Tariff and Customs Code and other relevant laws
that may hereafter be enacted by Congress, and included herein by the Supreme Court.”
Search warrant applications for such cases may be filed by “the NBI, the PNP and the
ACTAF,” and “personally endorsed by the heads of such agencies.” As in ordinary search
warrant applications, they “shall particularly described therein the places to be searched
 and/or the property or things to be seized as prescribed in the Rules of Court.” “The
Executive Judges [of these RTCs] and, whenever they are on official leave of absence or
are not physically present in the station, the Vice Executive Judges'' are authorized to act
on such applications and “shall issue the warrants, if justified, which may be served in
places outside the territorial jurisdiction of the said courts.”

3. Malaloan v. CA, 232 SCRA 249

 Search Warrants; Venue; Jurisdiction; It is erroneous to equate the application for and
the obtention of a search warrant with the institution and prosecution of a criminal
action in a trial court.

 Jurisdiction is conferred by substantive law, in this case Batas Pambansa Blg. 129,
not by a procedural law and much less by an administrative order or circular. The
jurisdiction conferred by said Act on regional trial courts and their judges is basically
regional in scope. Thus, Section 17 thereof provides that “(e)very Regional Trial
Judge shall be appointed to a region which shall be his permanent station,” and he
“may be assigned by the Supreme Court to any branch or city or municipality within
the same region as public interest may require, and such assignment shall not be
deemed an assignment to another station x x x” which, otherwise, would necessitate a
new appointment for the judge.

 Administrative Order No. 3 and Circulars Nos. 13 and 19, did not per se confer
jurisdiction on the covered regional trial court or its branches such that
nonobservance thereof would nullify their judicial acts.

 It is incorrect to say that only the court which has jurisdiction over the criminal case
can issue the search warrant.

 It does not mean that a court whose territorial jurisdiction does not embrace the place
to be searched cannot issue a search warrant therefore where the obtention of that
search warrant is necessitated and justified by compelling considerations of urgency,
subject, time and place.

 No law or rule imposes such a limitation on search warrants in the same manner that
no such restriction is provided for warrants of arrest.

 The exception violates the settled principle that even in case of concurrent
jurisdiction the first court which acquires jurisdiction over the case acquires it to the
exclusion of the other.

4. People v. Chiu, 424 SCRA 72

 The court must take into account and consider not only the “subject” but the time and
place of the enforcement of the search warrant as well; “Urgent” means pressing,
calling for immediate attention.
  Failure to raise before the trial court the issues of the validity of the search warrant
and of the propriety of its enforcement in a certain locality constitute waiver of the
protection under Section 2, Article II of the Constitution.

5. Sony Computer Entertainment v. Supergreen, 518 SCRA 750

 A Regional Trial Court has no jurisdiction to issue a warrant for a search outside its
territorial jurisdiction—the RTC of Manila has no authority to issue a search warrant
for offenses committed in Cavite; The instant case involves a transitory or continuing
offense of unfair competition under Section 168 of R.A. No. 8293.

Administrative Circular 13-85 (Guidelines and Procedure in the Issuance of Search Warrants)

SC Circular 19-87 (Amended Guidelines and Procedure on Applications for Search Warrants for
Illegal Possession of Firearms and other Serious Crimes Filed in Metro Manila Courts and other
Courts with Multiple Salas)

AM No. 99-10-09-SC (Resolution Clarifying Guidelines on the

Application for and Enforceability of Search Warrants)

C. Personal Property to be Seized

What may be seized:

a. Personal property subject of the offense;
b. Personal property stolen/embezzled and other proceeds/fruits of the offense;
c. Personal property used or intended to be used as the means of committing an offense

General rule: Things to be seized must be described particularly. General search warrants
are not allowed.

General Warrant - "a search or arrest warrant that is not particular as to the person to be arrested
or the property to be seized." It is one that allows the "seizure of one thing under a warrant
describing another" and gives the officer executing the warrant the discretion over which items to
take.

Exceptions: Where, by the nature of the goods to be seized, their description must be rather
general, it is not required that a technical description be given, for this would mean that no search
warrant could issue

The general description of the documents listed in the search warrant does not render it void if it
is severable, and those items not particularly described may be cut off without destroying the
whole

The rule does not require that the property to be seized should be owned by the person against
whom the search warrant is directed. It is sufficient that the person against whom the warrant is
directed has control of possession of the property sought to be seized

1. Laud v. People, supra

  In order to protect the people’s right against unreasonable searches and seizures,
Section 2, Article III of the 1987 Philippine Constitution provides that no search
warrant shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined personally by the
judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the
witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and
the persons or things to be seized.
 Section 4, Rule 126 of the Rules of Court states that a search warrant shall not be
issued except upon probable cause in connection with one (1) specific offense.

 Requisites for issuing search warrant.—A search warrant shall not issue except upon
probable cause in connection with one specific offense to be determined personally
by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the
witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and
the things to be seized which may be anywhere in the Philippines.

 In determining the existence of probable cause, the facts and circumstances must be
personally examined by the judge in their totality, together with a judicious
recognition of the variable complications and sensibilities attending a criminal case.

 Any designation or description known to the locality that points out the place to the
exclusion of all others, and on inquiry leads the officers unerringly to it, satisfies the
constitutional requirement.

2. Worldwide Web Corp. v. People, supra

 A trial judge’s finding of probable cause may be set aside and the search warrant
issued by him based on his finding may be quashed if the person against whom the
warrant is issued presents clear and convincing evidence that when the police officers
and witnesses testified, they committed a deliberate falsehood or reckless disregard
for the truth on matters that are essential or necessary to a showing of probable
cause.

 General warrant - is defined as “(a) search or arrest warrant that is not particular as
to the person to be arrested or the property to be seized.” It is one that allows the
 “seizure of one thing under a warrant describing another” and gives the officer
executing the warrant the discretion over which items to take.

 Any description of the place or thing to be searched that will enable the officer
making the search with reasonable certainty to locate such place or thing is
sufficient.

 Sections 3 and 4, Rule 126 of the Rules of Court:

SEC. 3. Personal property to be seized.—A search warrant may be issued for the
search and seizure of personal property:
a) Subject of the offense;
b) Stolen or embezzled and other proceeds, or fruits of the offense; or
c) Used or intended to be used as the means of committing an offense.
 SEC. 4. Requisites for issuing search warrant.—A search warrant shall not issue
except upon probable cause in connection with one specific offense to be determined
personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the
complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place
to be searched and the things to be seized which may be anywhere in the Philippines.

 A search warrant need not describe the items to be seized in precise and minute
detail. The warrant is valid when it enables the police officers to readily identify the
properties to be seized and leaves them with no discretion regarding the articles to be
seized.

 A search warrant fulfills the requirement of particularity in the description of the

things to be seized when the things described are limited to those that bear a direct
relation to the offense for which the warrant is being issued.

3. People v. Nuñez, 591 SCRA 394

 The matter of presentation of witnesses is neither for the accused nor even for the
trial court to decide; Prosecutor has the right to choose whom he would present as
witness.

 Witnesses’ testimonies need only corroborate one another on material details

surrounding the actual commission of the crime.

 An affirmative testimony coming from credible witnesses without motive to perjure

is far stronger than a negative testimony.

 Any objection to the legality of the search warrant and the admissibility of the
evidence obtained thereby was deemed waived when no objection was raised by
appellant during trial.

 A search warrant is not a sweeping authority empowering a raiding party to

undertake a fishing expedition to confiscate any and all kinds of evidence or articles
relating to a crime.

4. Tambasen v. People, 246 SCRA 184

 A search warrant for more than one offense—a “scatter-shot warrant”—violates

Section 3, Rule 126 of the Revised Rules of Court, and is totally null and void.

 The police acted beyond the parameters of their authority if they seized articles not
described in the search warrant.

 Purpose of the constitutional requirement that a search warrant should particularly

describe the things to be seized.

 The presumption juris tantum of regularity in the performance of official duty

cannot by itself prevail against the constitutionally protected rights of an individual,
 as zeal in the pursuit of criminals cannot ennoble the use of arbitrary methods that
the Constitution itself abhors.

D. Warrantless Search
SEARCH INCIDENTAL TO LAWFUL ARREST - Warrantless searches allowed as an
incident of lawful arrest.

A person lawfully arrested may be searched for

● dangerous weapons or
● anything which may have been used or
● constitute proof in the commission of an offense without a search warrant. (Rule 126, Sec. 13)

Consented warrantless search - Jurisprudence requires that in case of consented searches or

waiver of the constitutional guarantee against obtrusive searches, it must first appear that: ● the right
exists;
● the person involved had knowledge, either actual or constructive, of the existence of such right;
and
● the said person had an actual intention to relinquish the right.

When is consented search reasonable: Only if kept within the bounds of the actual consent.

A person’s consent may limit the extent/scope of a warrantless search in the same way that the
specifications of a warrant limit the search pursuant thereto.

Search of moving vehicle Rationale: Peace officers may lawfully conduct searches of moving
vehicles without need of a warrant as it is impracticable to secure a judicial warrant before searching
a vehicle since it can be quickly moved out of the locality or jurisdiction in which the warrant may be
sought. [People v. Tuazon (2007)]

However, these searches would be limited to visual inspection and the vehicles or their occupants
cannot be subjected to physical or body searches, except where there is probable cause to believe that
the occupant is a law offender or the contents of the vehicles are instruments or proceeds of some
criminal offense. The search and seizure without warrant of vessel and aircrafts for violation of
customs laws has been a traditional exception to the requirement of SW. [Roldan v. Hon. Arca
(1975)]

Nonetheless, in all cases falling under this category, there must be a showing of a PC of a violation of
the law. [Caroll v. US (1924)]

S E A R C H E S C ON D U C T E D I N C H E C K P O I N T S
They are valid as long as they are warranted by the exigencies of public order and conducted in a
way least intrusive to motorists. The vehicle is neither searched nor its occupants subjected to a
body search (i.e. inspection of the vehicle is limited to a visual search). Routine inspections are
not regarded as violative of an individual’s right against unreasonable search:
(a) Where the officer merely draws aside the curtain of a vacant vehicle which is parked on the
public fair grounds;
(b) Officer simply looks into a vehicle;
(c) Officer flashes a light therein without opening car’s doors;
(d) Occupants not subjected to a physical search;
(e) Inspection is limited to usual search or inspection; or
(f) Routine check is conducted in a fixed area

P L A IN V IE W D OC T R IN E

Requisites:
(1) A prior valid intrusion i.e., based on the valid warrantless arrest in which the police are
legally present in the pursuit of their official duties;
(2) Evidence was inadvertently discovered by the police who have a right to be where they
are; (3) Evidence must be immediately apparently illegal (i.e., drug paraphernalia);
(4) Plain view justified mere seizure of evidence without further search.

Limitations:
(1) It may not be used to launch unbridled searches and indiscriminate seizures.
(2) Does not extend to a general exploratory search made solely to find evidence of defendant’s
guilt.

The doctrine is usually applied where a police officer is not searching for evidence against the
accused, but nonetheless inadvertently comes across an incriminating object.

Even if an object is in plain view, before it can be seized without a SW, its incriminating nature
must first be apparent.

Where police officers are on the premises pursuant to a valid consent to a search, an item falling
into their plain view may properly be seized even if the item is not connected with their purpose
in entering.

Stop and Frisk - A limited protective search of outer clothing for weapons.
Where a police officer observes unusual conduct, which leads him reasonably to conclude in the
light of his experience that criminal activity may be afoot, and that a person with whom he is
dealing may be armed and presently dangerous, Where in the course of investigating this behavior
he identifies himself as a policeman and makes reasonable inquiry, and where nothing in the
initial stage of the encounter serves to dispel his reasonable fear for his own or others’ safety, he
is entitled for the protection of himself and others in the area to conduct a carefully limited search
of outer clothing of such persons in an attempt to discover weapons which might be used to
assault him. [Terry v. Ohio (1968)]

Under this theory, PC is not required to conduct a “stop and frisk” BUT, nevertheless, mere
suspicion/hunch will not validate a “stop and frisk.”

Test: Genuine reason - Reasonable belief based on genuine reason and in the light of the
officer’s experience and the surrounding circumstances, that a crime has either taken place or is
about to take place and the person to be stopped is armed and dangerous.

E. Requisites for Issuing Search Warrant

 If the judge is satisfied of the existence of facts upon which the application is based or that there
is probable cause to believe that they exist, he shall issue the warrant, which must be substantially
in the form prescribed the Rules

Thus, the search warrant must be in writing and contain:

1. Name of person against whom it is directed
2. Offense for which it was issued
3. The place to be searched, and
4. The description of the specific things to be seized
5. A directive to law enforcement officers to search and seize and for them to bring in court the
things seized
6. Signature of the judge issuing it

The absence of such requisites will cause the search warrant’s downright nullification

1. Laud v. People, supra

 In order to protect the people’s right against unreasonable searches and seizures,
Section 2, Article III of the 1987 Philippine Constitution provides that no search
warrant shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined personally by the
judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the
witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and
the persons or things to be seized.

 Section 4, Rule 126 of the Rules of Court states that a search warrant shall not be
issued except upon probable cause in connection with one (1) specific offense.

 Requisites for issuing search warrant.—A search warrant shall not issue except upon
probable cause in connection with one specific offense to be determined personally
by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the
witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and
the things to be seized which may be anywhere in the Philippines.

 In determining the existence of probable cause, the facts and circumstances must be
personally examined by the judge in their totality, together with a judicious
recognition of the variable complications and sensibilities attending a criminal case.
Any designation or description known to the locality that points out the place to the
exclusion of all others, and on inquiry leads the officers unerringly to it, satisfies the
constitutional requirement.

2. PLDT v. Alvarez, GR 179408, March 5, 2014

 The constitutional requirement for the issuance of a search warrant is reiterated

under Sections 4 and 5, Rule 126 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure.

 Requirements for the issuance of a search warrant:

1) the existence of probable cause;
 2) the probable cause must be determined personally by the judge;
3) the judge must examine, in writing and under oath or affirmation, the
complainant and the witnesses he or she may produce;
4) the applicant and the witnesses testify on the facts personally known to them;
and (5) the warrant specifically describes the place to be searched and the
things to be seized.

 A search warrant proceeding is a special criminal and judicial process akin to a writ
of discovery; Since it is at most incidental to the main criminal case, an order
granting or denying a motion to quash a search warrant may be questioned only via a
petition for certiorari under Rule 65.
 One of the constitutional requirements for the validity of a search warrant is that it
must be issued based on probable cause which, under the Rules, must be in
connection with one specific offense.
 If the offense for which the warrant is issued is subsequently decriminalized during
the pendency of the petition for certiorari, then the warrant may be quashed.
 Aside from the requirement of probable cause, the Constitution also requires that the
search warrant must particularly describe the place to be searched and the things to
be seized.

 One of the tests to determine the particularity in the description of objects to be

seized under a search warrant is when the things described are limited to those which
bear direct relation to the offense for which the warrant is being issued.

 Since the primary objective of applying for a search warrant is to obtain evidence to
be used in a subsequent prosecution for an offense for which the search warrant was
applied, a judge issuing a particular warrant must satisfy himself that the evidence
presented by the applicant establishes the facts and circumstances relating to this
specific offense for which the warrant is sought and issued

3. La Chemise Lacoste v. Fernandez, 129 SCRA 373

 A bare allegation that respondent’s trademark is different from that of petitioner’s is

a matter of defense. It is not sufficient ground for a motion to quash a search warrant.

 Probable cause - presupposes the introduction of competent proof that the party
against whom it is sought has performed particular acts, or committed specific
omissions, violating a given provision of our criminal laws.

 An allegation that an applicant for search warrant withhold certain information from
the court is not of itself a sufficient basis to quash the search warrant issued.

4. Hon Ne Chan v. Honda, 541 SCRA 249

  The validity of the issuance of a search warrant rests upon the following factors:
1) it must be issued upon probable cause;
2) the probable cause must be determined by the judge himself and not by the
applicant or any other person;
3) in the determination of probable cause, the judge must examine, under oath or
affirmation, the complainant and such witnesses as the latter may produce; and
4) the warrant issued must particularly describe the place to be searched and
persons or things to be seized.

 Search warrants are not issued on loose, vague or doubtful basis of fact, or on mere
suspicion or belief.

 “Probable cause,” as far as the issuance of a search warrant is concerned, has been
uniformly defined as such facts and circumstances which would lead a reasonable,
discreet and prudent man to believe that an offense has been committed, and that the
objects sought in connection with the offense are in the place sought to be searched.

5. Kho v. Macalintal, 306 SCRA 70

 Search Warrants; The question of whether or not a probable cause exists is one
which must be determined in light of the conditions obtaining in given situations.

 In the absence of any showing that a judge was recreant of his duties in connection
with the personal examination he so conducted on the affiants before him, there is no
basis for doubting the reliability and correctness of his findings and impressions.

 It is within the discretion of the examining Judge to determine what questions to ask
the witnesses so long as the questions asked are germane to the pivot of inquiry—the
existence or absence of a probable cause.

 Words and Phrases; The use of the phrase “and the like” does not necessarily make a
search warrant a general warrant.

 The law does not require that the things to be seized must be described in precise and
minute detail as to leave no room for doubt on the part of the searching authorities,
otherwise, it would be virtually impossible for the applicants to obtain a warrant as
they would not know exactly what kind of things they are looking for.