Methods For Applying Risk Analysis To Fire Scenarios (MARIAFIRES) - 2008

Methods for Applying Risk Analysis to Fire Scenarios
(MARIAFIRES) – 2008
NRC-RES/EPRI Fire PRA Workshop
Volume 1 – Overall Course and Module 1: PRA/HRA
Volume 2 – Module 2: Electrical Analysis
Volume 3 – Module 3: Fire Analysis
Based on the Joint NRC-RES/EPRI Training Workshops Conducted in 2008
September 28–October 2, 2008, and November 17–20, 2008, Bethesda, MD
2010 TECHNICAL REPORT
12550194
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12550194
Methods for Applying Risk Analysis
to Fire Scenarios (MARIAFIRES) –
2008
NRC-RES/EPRI Fire PRA Workshop, Volume 1 –
Overall Course and Module 1: PRA/HRA
Based on the Joint NRC-RES/EPRI Training
Workshops Conducted in 2008 September 28–
October 2, 2008, and November 17–20, 2008,
Bethesda, MD
1020621 NUREG/CP-0194
Final Report, December 2010
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission

Office of Nuclear Regulatory Research
Washington, DC 20555-0001
U.S. NRC-RES Project Manager
M. H. Salley
EPRI Project Manager

K. Canavan
This document does NOT meet the requirements of

10CFR50 Appendix B, 10CFR Part 21,
ANSI N45.2-1977 and/or the intent of ISO-9001 (1994)
ELECTRIC POWER RESEARCH INSTITUTE

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800.313.3774 ▪ 650.855.2121 ▪ askepri@epri.com ▪ www.epri.com
12550194
DISCLAIMER OF WARRANTIES AND LIMITATION OF LIABILITIES
THIS DOCUMENT WAS PREPARED BY THE ORGANIZATION(S) NAMED BELOW AS AN
ACCOUNT OF WORK SPONSORED OR COSPONSORED BY THE ELECTRIC POWER RESEARCH
INSTITUTE, INC. (EPRI). NEITHER EPRI, ANY MEMBER OF EPRI, ANY COSPONSOR, THE
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THE FOLLOWING ORGANIZATIONS PREPARED THIS REPORT:
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Electric Power Research Institute (EPRI)
NOTE
For further information about EPRI, call the EPRI Customer Assistance Center at 800.313.3774 or
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Electric Power Research Institute, EPRI, and TOGETHER…SHAPING THE FUTURE OF ELECTRICITY
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Copyright © 2010 Electric Power Research Institute, Inc. All rights reserved.
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ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
The following organizations prepared this report:

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC)
Office of Nuclear Regulatory Research (RES)
Principal Investigators
D. Stroup
F. Gonzales
3420 Hillview Avenue
Palo Alto, CA 94303
Principal Investigator
R. Kassawara
This report describes research sponsored by EPRI.
Course Training Instructors and Project Managers:
Sandia National Laboratories (SNL)
1515 Eubank SE
Albuquerque, NM 87185
U.S. NRC-RES Project Managers
J. S. Hyslop
K. Hill
S. Nowlen
M. Kazarians (Kazarians & Associates)
F. Wyant
J. LaChance
J.S. Hyslop
K. Hill
iii
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Science Applications International Corp. (SAIC)
1671 Dell Ave, Suite 100
Campbell, CA 95008
B. Najafi
F. Joglar-Biloch
D. Funk (EDAN Engineering)
R. Anoba (Anoba Consulting Services)
The efforts and contributions made by Carli Follett, David Yates, and Thomas DeBold, summer
interns from the University of Maryland’s Fire Protection Engineering Department, during
development of this NUREG/Conference Proceedings report are greatly appreciated. As part of
their summer internship, they were asked to analyze, evaluate, organize, and edit information in
the videos of this report and to develop its first draft under direct supervision of the authors.
They compiled all the video files and presentation materials used during the training sessions and
used their knowledge to create, organize, edit, and deliver a user-friendly report of the highest
quality possible.
Also acknowledged are the other Fire Research Branch members—Kendra Hill, Aixa Belen-
Ojeda, Jason Dreisbach, Jessica Kratchman, Gabriel Taylor, J. S. Hyslop, and Mark Henry
Salley—for their support and contributions during its development. Their input and
encouragement facilitated its timely completion and greatly benefited the final product.
In addition, our gratitude is extended to Nathan White and Thomas Kardaras of the Information
Technology and Infrastructure Branch for their quick responses in addressing all our computer
needs and issues during development of the report. We greatly appreciate the support of Linda
Stevenson (the agency publication specialist) and Guy Beltz (the agency printing specialist),
whose invaluable support and expertise were critical to ensuring the published report’s quality.
Also, several other 2009 Office of Nuclear Regulatory Research summer interns, specifically
Minh Dang, Daniel Breedlove, Ashley Carnes, and Anders Gilbertson, made valuable
contributions to this project, both technical and editorial, that contributed to its overall quality.
This publication is a corporate document that should be cited in the literature in the following
manner:
Methods for Applying Risk Analysis to Fire Scenarios (MARIAFIRES) – 2008: NRC-RES/EPRI
Fire PRA Workshop, Volume 1 – Overall Course and Module 1: PRA/HRA; Based on the Joint
NRC-RES/EPRI Training Workshops Conducted in 2008 September 28–October 2, 2008, and
November 17–20, 2008, Bethesda, MD. EPRI, Palo Alto, CA and U.S. Nuclear Regulatory
Commission, Office of Nuclear Regulatory Research (RES), Washington, DC: 2010. 1020621.
iv
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ABSTRACT
The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) approved the risk-informed and performance-
based alternative regulation 10 CFR 50.48(c) in July 2004, which allows licensees the option of
using fire protection requirements contained in the National Fire Protection Association (NFPA)
Standard 805, “Performance Based Standard for Fire Protection for Light-Water Reactor Electric
Generating Plants, 2001 Edition,” with certain exceptions. To support licensees’ use of that
option, NRC and the Electric Power Research Institute (EPRI) jointly issued NUREG/CR-6850
(EPRI 1011989) “Fire PRA Methodology for Nuclear Power Facilities,” in September 2005.
That report documents the state-of-the art methods, tools, and data for conducting a fire
probabilistic risk assessment (PRA) in a commercial nuclear power plant (NPP) application. The
report is intended to serve the needs of a fire risk analysis team by providing a general
framework for conducting the overall analysis as well as specific recommended practices to
address each key aspect of the analysis. Participants from the U.S. nuclear power industry
supported demonstration analyses and provided peer review of the program. Methodological
issues raised in past fire risk analyses, including the Individual Plant Examination of External
Events fire analyses, are addressed to the extent allowed by the current state of the art and the
overall project scope. Although the primary objective of the report is to consolidate existing
state-of-the-art methods, in many areas, the newly documented methods represent a significant
advance over previous methods.
NUREG/CR-6850 does not constitute regulatory requirements, and NRC participation in this
study neither constitutes nor implies regulatory approval of applications based on the analysis
contained in this document. The analyses/methods documented in this report represent the
combined efforts of individuals from RES and EPRI. Both organizations provided specialists in
the use of fire PRA to support this work. The results from this combined effort do not constitute
either a regulatory position or regulatory guidance.
In addition, NUREG/CR-6850 can be used for risk-informed, performance-based approaches and
insights to support fire protection regulatory decision making in general.
On June 14–16, 2005, NRC’s Office of Nuclear Regulatory Research (RES) and EPRI conducted
a joint public workshop for about 80 attendees at EPRI’s offices in Charlotte, North Carolina. A
second workshop was held the following year on May 24–26, 2006, in NRC’s Two White Flint
North Auditorium in Rockville, Maryland. About 130 people attended the second workshop.
Based on the positive public response to these two workshops, a more detailed training class was
developed by the authors of NUREG/CR-6850. Two detailed training workshops were conducted
in 2007: on July 23–27 and again on August 27–30, both at EPRI in Palo Alto, California. About
100 people attended each of these workshops.
In 2008, two more workshops were held on September 29–October 2, and again on November
17–20 in Bethesda, Maryland, near NRC headquarters. The two workshops attracted about 170
v
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participants including domestic representatives from NRC headquarters and all four regional
offices, U.S. Department of Energy, National Aeronautics and Space Administration, EPRI,
nuclear power plant licensees/utilities, nuclear steam supply system vendors, consulting
engineering firms, and universities. Also in attendance were international representatives from
Belgium, Canada, France, Japan, South Korea, Spain, and Sweden.
The material in this NUREG/CP was recorded at the workshops in 2008 and adapted by the RES
Fire Research Branch members for use as an alternative training method for those who were
unable to attend the training sessions. This report can also serve as a refresher for those who
attended one or more training sessions and would be useful preparatory material for those
planning to attend a session.
NRC Disclaimer: This document’s text and video content are intended solely for use as training
tools. No portions of their content are intended to represent NRC conclusions or regulatory
positions, and they should not be interpreted as such.
Keywords
Fire PRA
Fire scenarios
Risk analysis
vi
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LIST OF ACRONYMS
ACB Air-cooled Circuit Breaker

ACRS Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards
AEP Abnormal Event Procedure
AFW Auxiliary Feedwater
AGS Assistance General Supervisor
AOP Abnormal Operating Procedure
AOV Air Operated Valve
ATHEANA A Technique for Human Event Analysis
ATS Automatic Transfer Switch
ATWS Anticipated Transient Without Scram
BAT Boric Acid Tank
BNL Brookhaven National Laboratory
BWR Boiling-Water Reactor
CBDT Causal Based Decision Tree
CCDP Conditional Core Damage Probability
CF Cable (Configuration) Factors
CCPS Center for Chemical Process Safety
CCW Component Cooling Water
CDF Core Damage Frequency
CFD Computational Fluid Dynamics
CFR Code of Federal Regulations
CLERP Conditional Large Early Release Probability
CM Corrective Maintenance
CR Control Room
CRS Cable and Raceway (Database) System
CST Condensate Storage Tank
CVCS Chemical and Volume Control System
CWP Circulating Water Pump
DC Direct Current
EDG Emergency Diesel Generator
EDS Electrical Distribution System
EF Error Factor
EI Erroneous Status Indicator
EOP Emergency Operating Procedure
EPR Ethylene-Propylene Rubber
EPRI Electric Power Research Institute
FEDB Fire Events Database
FEP Fire Emergency Procedure
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FHA Fire Hazards Analysis
FIVE Fire-Induced Vulnerability Evaluation (EPRI TR 100370)
FMRC Factory Mutual Research Corporation
FPRAIG Fire PRA Implementation Guide (EPRI TR 105928)
FRSS Fire Risk Scoping Study (NUREG/CR-5088)
FSAR Final Safety Analysis Report
HEAF High Energy Arcing Fault
HEP Human Error Probability
HFE Human Failure Event
HPI High-Pressure Injection
HPCI High-Pressure Coolant Injection
HRA Human Reliability Analysis
HRR Heat Release Rate
HTGR High Temperature Gas-cooled Reactor
HVAC Heating, Ventilation, and Air Conditioning
ICDP Incremental Core Damage Probability
ILERP Incremental Large Early Release Probability
INPO Institute for Nuclear Power Operations
IPE Individual Plant Examination
IPEEE Individual Plant Examination of External Events
IS Ignition Source
ISLOCA Interfacing Systems Loss of Coolant Accident
KS Key Switch
LCO Limiting Condition of Operation
LERF Large Early Release Frequency
LFL Lower Flammability Limit
LOC Loss of Control
LOCA Loss-of-Coolant Accident
LPG Liquefied Petroleum Gas
LWGR Light-Water-cooled Graphite Reactors (Russian design)
MCB Main Control Board
MCC Motor Control Center
MCR Main Control Room
MG Motor-Generator
MFW Main Feedwater
MOV Motor-Operated Valve
MQH McCaffrey, Quintiere and Harkleroad’s Method
MS Main Steam
MSIV Main Steam Isolation Valve
NC No Consequence
NEI Nuclear Energy Institute
NEIL Nuclear Electric Insurance Limited
NFPA National Fire Protection Association
NPP Nuclear Power Plant
NPSH Net Positive Suction Head
NQ cable Non-Qualified (IEEE-383) cable
12550194 viii
NRC U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
P&ID Piping and Instrumentation Diagram
PE Polyethylene
PM Preventive Maintenance
PMMA Polymethyl Methacrylate
PORV Power-Operated Relief Valve
PRA Probabilistic Risk Assessment
PSF Performance Shaping Factor
PTS Pressurized Thermal Shock
PVC Polyvinyl Chloride
PWR Pressurized-Water Reactor
Q cable Qualified (IEEE-383) cable
RBMK Reactor Bolshoy Moshchnosty Kanalny (high-power channel reactor)
RCIC Reactor Core Isolation Cooling
RCP Reactor Coolant Pump
RCS Reactor Coolant System
RDAT Computer program for Bayesian analysis
RES Office of Nuclear Regulatory Research (at NRC)
RHR Residual Heat Removal
RI/PB Risk-Informed / Performance-Based
RPS Reactor Protection System
RWST Refueling Water Storage Tank
SCBA Self-Contained Breathing Apparatus
SDP Significance Determination Process
SGTR Steam Generator Tube Rupture
SI Safety Injection
SMA Seismic Margin Assessment
SNPP Simplified Nuclear Power Plant
SO Spurious Operation
SOV Solenoid Operated Valve
SRV Safety Relief Valve
SSD Safe Shutdown
SSEL Safe Shutdown Equipment List
SST Station Service Transformer
SUT Start-up Transformer
SW Service Water
SWGR Switchgear
T/G Turbine/Generator
THERP Technique for Human Error Rate Prediction
TGB Turbine-Generator Building
TSP Transfer Switch Panel
UAT Unit Auxiliary Transformer
VCT Volume Control Tank
VTT Valtion Teknillinen Tutkimuskeskus (Technical Research Centre of Finland)
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VVER The Soviet (and now, Russian Federation) designation for light-water
pressurized reactor
XLPE Cross-Linked Polyethylene
ZOI Zone of Influence
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CONTENTS OF VOLUME 1
ABSTRACT..………………………………………………………………………………………… iii
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS..…………………………………………………………………………vii
LIST OF ACRONYMS……..………………………………………………………………............ ix
OVERALL COURSE…..………………………………………………………..…………………… 1-1
1 COURSE OVERVIEW…..………………………………………………………………………… 1-1

1.1 INTRODUCTION ............................................................................................................ 1-1
1.1.1 Background ............................................................................................................ 1-1
1.1.2 How to Use These Volumes .................................................................................. 1-4
1.1.3 EPRI Perspective ................................................................................................... 1-4
1.1.4 References ............................................................................................................. 1-4
1.2 GENERAL PLANT INFORMATION ............................................................................... 1-7
1.2.1 Overall Plant Description ........................................................................................ 1-7
1.2.2 Systems Description ............................................................................................... 1-7
1.2.2.1 Primary Coolant System .................................................................................. 1-7
1.2.2.2 Chemical Volume Control and High Pressure Injection Systems .................... 1-7
1.2.2.3 Residual Heat Removal System ...................................................................... 1-9
1.2.2.4 Auxiliary Feedwater System ............................................................................ 1-9
1.2.2.5 Electrical System ........................................................................................... 1-10
1.2.2.6 Other Systems ............................................................................................... 1-11
1.3 MODULE 1: PRA/HRA .................................................................................................. 1-24
1.4 MODULE 2: Electrical Analysis ..................................................................................... 1-25
1.5 MODULE 3: Fire Analysis ............................................................................................. 1-25
1.6 FORMAT OVERVIEW ................................................................................................... 1-26
1.6.1 Video Series ......................................................................................................... 1-26
1.6.2 Exercises .............................................................................................................. 1-27
1.6.3 General Comments Regarding This Course ........................................................ 1-29
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2 INTRODUCTION SLIDES………………………………………………………..………………....2-1
SESSION 1: NRC Welcome… ...... ……………………………………………………………….2-1
SESSION 2: Fire Risk Requantification Project…....... …………………………………………2-5
SESSION 3a: Fire PRA Methodology and Course Structure………………..……..………...2-11
SESSION 3b: PRA/HRA Module Overview……..………………………………..…………… 2-20
SESSION 3c: Circuits/Electrical Module Overview………………………...………………... . 2-30
SESSION 3d: Fire Analysis Module Overview……………………………………………...... . 2-36
SESSION 3e: Sample Exercises/Sample Plant……………………………………………….. 2-44
SESSION 4: Fire HRA Guidelines Overview………..………………………………….… ...... 2-61
MODULE 1: PRA/HRA (SYSTEMS ANALYSIS)
PRA/HRA ................................................................................................................................... 3-1

INTRODUCTION ....................................................................................................................... 3-1
SESSION 1a: Fire PRA Component Selection ..................................................................... 3-3
SESSION 1b: Example Exercises ....................................................................................... 3-20
SESSION 2: Fire Induced Risk Model Development .......................................................... 3-52
SESSION 3: Qualitative/Quantitative Screening ................................................................ 3-63
SESSION 4: Screening Post-Fire HRA ............................................................................... 3-75
SESSION 5: Post-Fire HRA Detailed Analysis................................................................... 3-81
SESSION 6: Fire Risk Quantification ................................................................................. 3-89
SESSION 7: Uncertainty and Sensitivity Analysis.............................................................. 3-94
APPENDICES ........................................................................................................................... A-1

APPENDIX A: QUESTIONS ASKED IN MODULE 1 SESSIONS ........................................ A-1
APPENDIX B: SAMPLE EXERCISES SOLUTIONS (MODULE 1, TASK 2) ........................ B-1
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OVERALL COURSE
1 COURSE OVERVIEW
1.1 INTRODUCTION
1.1.1 Background
The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) and Electric Power Research Institute (EPRI),
under a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) on Cooperative Nuclear Safety Research, have
been developing state-of-the-art methods for the conduct of fire probabilistic risk assessments
(PRAs). In September 2005, this work produced the joint EPRI and NRC report, “EPRI/NRC-
RES Fire PRA Methodology for Nuclear Power Facilities,” EPRI 1011989 and NUREG/CR
6850.
The course/seminar described in the three volumes of this NUREG/CP-0194 has been created to
train interested parties in the application of that fire PRA methodology. The course/seminar is
presented in the following three parallel parts:
• Module 1: PRA/Human Reliability Assessment (HRA) – This module covers the technical
tasks for development of the system and operator response to a fire. Specifically, this
module covers EPRI 1011989, NUREG/CR-6850, Volume 2, Sections (Technical Tasks) 2,
4, 5, 7, 12, 14, 15, and 16.
• Module 2: Electrical Analysis – This module covers the technical tasks for analysis of
electrical failures as the result of a fire. Specifically, this module covers EPRI 1011989,
NUREG/CR-6850, Volume 2, Sections (Technical Tasks) 3, 9, and 10.
• Module 3: Fire Analysis – This module covers technical tasks involved in development of
fire scenarios from initiation to target (e.g., cable) impact. Specifically, this module covers
EPRI 1011989, NUREG/CR-6850, Volume 2, Sections (Technical Tasks) 1, 6, 8, 11, and 13.
Integral to the course is a set of hands-on exercises based on a fictitious Simplified Nuclear
Power Plant (SNPP). The same SNPP is used in all three modules. Clearly, the power plant
defined in this package is an extremely simplified one that in many cases does not meet
regulatory requirements or good engineering practices. Design features are focused on bringing
forward various aspects of the fire PRA methodology.
This Volume 1 includes a general description of the SNPP and the internal events (i.e., non-fire)
PRA needed as input for application of the fire PRA methodology. The instructions for specific
technical tasks are organized by modules (see above). A short description of all of the technical
tasks is provided below. For further details, refer to the individual fire PRA technical task
descriptions in EPRI 1011989, NUREG/CR-6850, Volume 2.
• Plant Boundary Definition and Partitioning (Task 1). The first step in applying the fire
PRA methodology is to define the physical boundary of the analysis and to divide the area within
that boundary into analysis compartments.
12550194 1- 1
• Fire PRA Component Selection (Task 2). The selection of components that are to be
credited for plant shutdown following a fire is a critical step in any fire PRA. Components
selected would generally include many but not necessarily all components credited in the 10
CFR 50 Appendix R post-fire safe shutdown (SSD) analysis. Additional components will likely
be selected, potentially including most but not all components credited in the plant’s internal
events PRA. Also, the proposed methodology would likely introduce components beyond either
the 10 CFR 50 Appendix R list or the internal events PRA model. Such components are often of
interest due to considerations of multiple spurious actuations that may threaten the credited
functions and components, as well as due to concerns about fire effects on instrumentation used
by the plant crew to respond to the event.
• Fire PRA Cable Selection (Task 3). This task provides instructions and technical
considerations associated with identifying cables supporting those components selected in Task 2
above. In previous fire PRA methods (such as EPRI FIVE and Fire PRA Implementation
Guide), this task was relegated to the SSD analysis and its associated databases. EPRI 1011989,
NUREG/CR-6850 offers a more structured set of rules for selection of cables.
• Qualitative Screening (Task 4). This task identifies fire analysis compartments that can be
shown, without quantitative analysis, to have little or no risk significance. Fire compartments
may be screened out if they contain no components or cables identified in Tasks 2 and 3 and if
they cannot lead to a plant trip because of either plant procedures, an automatic trip signal, or
technical specification requirements.
• Plant Fire-Induced Risk Model (Task 5). This task discusses steps for the development
of a logic model that reflects plant response following a fire. Specific instructions have been
provided for treatment of fire-specific procedures or preplans. These procedures may impact
availability of functions and components or include fire-specific operator actions (e.g., self-
induced station blackout).
• Fire Ignition Frequency (Task 6). This task describes the approach to develop frequency
estimates for fire compartments and scenarios. Significant changes from the EPRI FIVE method
have been made in this task. The changes generally relate to use of challenging events,
considerations associated with data quality, and increased use of a fully component-based
ignition frequency model (as opposed to the location/component-based model used, for example,
in FIVE).
• Quantitative Screening (Task 7). A fire PRA allows the screening of fire compartments and
scenarios based on their contribution to fire risk. This approach considers the cumulative risk
associated with the screened compartments (i.e., the ones not retained for detailed analysis) to
ensure that a true estimate of fire risk profile (as opposed to vulnerability) is obtained.
• Scoping Fire Modeling (Task 8). This step provides simple rules to define and screen fire
ignition sources (and therefore fire scenarios) in an unscreened fire compartment.
• Detailed Circuit Failure Analysis (Task 9). This task provides an approach and technical
considerations for identifying how the failure of specific cables will impact the components
included in the fire PRA SSD plant response model.
12550194 1- 2
• Circuit Failure Mode Likelihood Analysis (Task 10). This task considers the relative
likelihood of various circuit failure modes. This added level of resolution may be a desired
option for those fire scenarios that are significant contributors to the risk. The methodology
provided in EPRI 1011989, NUREG/CR-6850 benefits from the knowledge gained from the tests
performed in response to the circuit failure issue.
• Detailed Fire Modeling (Task 11). This task describes the method to examine the
consequences of a fire. This includes consideration of scenarios involving single compartments,
multiple fire compartments, and the main control room. Factors considered include initial fire
characteristics, fire growth in a fire compartment or across fire compartments, detection and
suppression, electrical raceway fire barrier systems, and damage from heat and smoke. Special
consideration is given to turbine generator (T/G) fires, hydrogen fires, high-energy arcing faults,
cable fires, and main control board (MCB) fires. Considerable improvements can be found in
the method for this task over the EPRI FIVE and Fire PRA Implementation Guide in nearly all
technical areas.
• Post-Fire Human Reliability Analysis (Task 12). This task considers operator actions
for manipulation of plant components. The analysis task procedure provides structured
instructions for identification and inclusion of these actions in the fire PRA. The procedure also
provides instructions for estimating screening human error probabilities (HEPs) before detailed
fire modeling results (e.g., fire growth and damage behaviors) have necessarily been developed
or detailed circuit analyses (e.g., can the circuit spuriously actuate as opposed to simply
assuming it can actuate) have been completed. In a fire PRA, the estimation of HEP values with
high confidence is critical to the effectiveness of screening. This report does not develop a
detailed fire HRA methodology. A number of HRA methods can be adopted for fire with
appropriate additional instructions that superimpose fire effects on any of the existing HRA
methods such as the Technique for Human Error Rate Prediction (THERP), Causal Based
Decision Tree (CBDT), A Technique for Human Event Analysis (ATHEANA), etc. This would
improve consistency across analyses (i.e., fire and internal events PRA).
• Seismic Fire Interactions (Task 13). This task is a qualitative approach to help identify
the risk from any potential interactions between an earthquake and a fire.
• Fire Risk Quantification (Task 14). The task summarizes what is to be done
for quantification of the fire risk results.
• Uncertainty and Sensitivity Analyses (Task 15). This task describes the approach to follow
for identifying and treating uncertainties throughout the fire PRA process. The treatment may
vary from quantitative estimation and propagation of uncertainties where possible
(e.g., in fire frequency and nonsuppression probability) to identification of sources without
quantitative estimation. The treatment may also include one-at-a-time variation of individual
parameter values or modeling approaches to determine the effect on the overall fire risk (i.e.,
sensitivity analysis).
• Fire PRA Documentation (Task 16). This task describes the approach to follow for
documenting the Fire PRA process and its results.
Figure 1 shows the relationship between the above 16 technical tasks from EPRI 1011989,
NUREG/CR-6850, Volume 2.
12550194 1- 3
1.1.2 How to Use These Volumes
These three volumes are intended to provide the background information necessary to perform
the exercise sets of the course/seminar and, ultimately, to participate in performing fire PRAs for
NPPs. Please note:
1. All course/seminar attendees were expected to review Section 1.2 of this Volume 1 and
become familiar with the power plant (i.e., the SNPP) defined in that section.
2. The instructors of each module provided questions or case study exercise sets and guided the
attendees to material relevant to each specific exercise set. Attendees were expected to
review that relevant material and use the information or examples provided to complete the
assigned exercise sets.
3. Attendees were directed not to make any additional assumptions in terms of equipment,
systems, or plant layout other than those presented in the exercise without consulting the
instructor.
1.1.3 EPRI Perspective

“Methods for Applying Risk Analysis to Fire Scenarios (MARIAFIRES)” is a collection of the
materials that are presented at the fire PRA course provided by EPRI and RES. The training and
resulting presentation material is detailed and represents in excess of 60 hours of classroom
instruction. The training focuses on the fire PRA methods documented in the joint EPRI/NRC
RES publication 1011989 and NUREG/CR-6850 along with clarifications, enhancements, and
additions provided via the frequently asked question (FAQ) process for NFPA 805.
The intent of the publication is to provide to the public the training material used at the fire PRA
training. This material is not intended to be a substitute for direct interaction that is provided in
the periodically offered fire PRA courses; rather, it is meant to augment that training and to serve
as a reference. Enthusiastic future students can use the material to become familiar with the
general principles of fire PRA prior to arrival at the course. Students who have already taken the
course can use the material for reference. The material consists of a series of reports that
document the presentations including some speakers’ notes and text. In addition, an edited
version of a recorded training session is also available via a separate product number. This video
version can be used in a similar manner to the documentation (e.g., for reference or in
preparation for the course) and includes the actual recorded and edited course.
In providing this material, it is hoped that those who plan to attend the course can arrived more
informed, those who have already attended can have a reference, and those who have been
unable to attend have a resource to gain a more complete understanding of the intent and goals of
EPRI 1011989 and NUREG/CR-6850.
1.1.4 Reference
EPRI 1011989, NUREG/CR-6850, “EPRI/NRC-RES Fire PRA Methodology for Nuclear Power
Facilities,” September 2005.
12550194 1- 4
Figure 1 - Relationship of Technical Tasks in NUREG/CR-6850, Volume 2
TASK 1: TASK 2:
Plant Boundary & Partitioning Fire PRA Component Selection
TASK 3:
Fire PRA Cable Selection
SUPPORT TASK A:
Plant Walk Downs TASK 4: TASK 5:
Qualitative Screening Fire-Induced Risk Model
TASK 6:
Fire Ignition Frequencies
SUPPORT TASK B:
Fire PRA Database TASK 12A:
TASK 7A:
Quantitative Screening - I Post-Fire HRA: Screening
TASK 8:
Scoping Fire Modeling
Module 1: PRA/HRA
TASK 7B:
Quantitative Screening - II
Module 2: Electrical Analysis
Module 3: Fire Analysis
12550194 1- 5
Figure 1 (continued)
Note: “B” is from Task 7B, prev. pg.
Detailed Fire Scenario Analysis
TASK 9:
Detailed Circuit Failure Analysis
TASK 11:
Detailed Fire Modeling
A. Single Compartment
B. Multi-Compartment
TASK 10: C. Main Control Room
Circuit Failure Mode & Likelihood
Analysis
TASK 13: TASK 14: TASK 12B:

Seismic-Fire Interactions Fire Risk Quantification Post fire HRA: detailed & recovery
TASK 15:
Uncertainty & Sensitivity Analyses
Module 1: PRA/HRA
Module 2: Electrical Analysis TASK 16:

Fire PRA Documentation
Module 3: Fire Analysis
12550194 1- 6
1.2 GENERAL PLANT INFORMATION
1.2.1 Overall Plant Description

The following notes generally describe the SNPP, including its layout:
1. The plant is a pressurized-water reactor (PWR) consisting of one primary coolant loop that
consists of one steam generator, one reactor coolant pump, and the pressurizer. A chemical
volume control system and multiple train injection system as well as a single train residual
heat removal system interface with the primary system.
2. The secondary side of the plant contains a main steam and feedwater loop associated with the
single steam generator and a multiple train auxiliary feedwater system to provide decay heat
removal.
3. The operating conditions and parameters of this plant are similar to that of a typical PWR.
For example, the primary side runs at about 2,200 psi pressure. The steam generator can
reject the decay heat after a reactor trip. There is a possibility of feed and bleed, etc.
4. It is assumed that the reactor is initially at 100-percent power.
5. The plant is laid out in accordance with Figures 2 through 10. The plant consists of a
Containment Building, Auxiliary Building, Turbine Building, Diesel Generator Building, and
the Yard. All other buildings and plant areas are shown, but no details are provided.
1.2.2 Systems Description

This section provides a more detailed description of the various systems within the plant
addressed in the case studies. Each system is described separately.
1.2.2.1 Primary Coolant System

The following notes and Figure 11 define the primary coolant system:
1. The primary coolant loop consists of the reactor vessel, one reactor coolant pump, and one
steam generator and the pressurizer, along with associated piping.
2. The pressurizer is equipped with a normally closed power-operated relief valve (PORV),
which is an air-operated valve (AOV-1) with its pilot solenoid operated valve (SOV-1).
There is also a normally open motor-operated block valve (MOV-13) upstream of the PORV.
3. The pressure transmitter (PT-1) on the pressurizer provides the pressure reading for the
primary coolant loop and is used to signal a switch from the chemical and volume control
system (CVCS) to the high-pressure injection (HPI) configuration.
4. A nitrogen bottle provides the necessary pressurized gas to operate the PORV in case of loss
of plant air.
12550194 1- 7
1.2.2.2 Chemical Volume Control and High-Pressure Injection Systems
The following notes and Figure 11 define the shared CVCS and HPI system:
1. The CVCS normally operates during power generation.
2. Valve type and position information include:
Status on Loss of Power Position During

Valve Type
(or Air as applicable) Normal Operation
AOV-2 Air-Operated Valve Fail Closed Open
AOV-3 Air-Operated Valve Fail Closed Open
MOV-1 Motor-Operated Fail As Is Closed

Valve
MOV-2 Motor-Operated Fail As Is Open

Valve

Valve
Valve
Valve
3. One of the two HPI pumps runs when the CVCS is operating.
4. One of the two HPI pumps is sufficient to provide all injection needs after a reactor trip and
all postulated accident conditions.
5. HPI and CVCS use the same set of pumps.
6. On a need for safety injection, the following lineup takes place automatically:
• AOV-2 and AOV-3 close.
• MOV-5 and MOV-6 open.
• MOV-2 closes.
Both HPI pumps receive start signal, the stand-by pump starts, and the operating pump continues
operating.
• MOV-1 and MOV-9 open.

7. The HPI is used for recirculating sump water after a loss-of-coolant accident (LOCA) using
the pathway involving MOV-3 and MOV-4. For recirculation, the operator manually opens
MOV-3 and MOV-4 and closes MOV-5 and MOV-6 upon proper indication of low refueling
water storage tank (RWST) level and sufficient sump level.
12550194 1- 8
8. RWST provides the necessary cooling water for the HPI pumps. It has enough capacity to
depressurize the primary loop for residual heat removal (RHR) cooling.
9. There are level indications of the RWST and containment sump levels that are used by the
operator to know when to switch from high-pressure injection to recirculation cooling mode.
10. The air compressor provides the motive power for operating the AOVs, but the detailed
connections to the various valves are not shown (nor needed for exercises).
1.2.2.3 Residual Heat Removal System

The following notes and Figure 11 define the RHR system:
1. The design pressure of the RHR system downstream of MOV-8 is low.
Status on Loss of Position During

Valve Type
Power Normal Operation

Valve

Valve
3. Operators have to align the system for low-pressure cooling after reactor vessel
depressurization from the control room by opening MOV-7 and MOV-8, turning the RHR
pump on, and establishing cooling in the RHR heat exchanger.
1.2.2.4 Auxiliary Feedwater System

The following notes and Figure 12 define the auxiliary feedwater (AFW) system:
1. One of three pumps of the AFW system can provide the necessary secondary side cooling for
reactor heat removal after a reactor trip.
2. Pump AFW-B is steam turbine driven.
Position During
Status on Loss
Valve Type Normal
of Power
Operation
Valve
Valve
Valve
12550194 1- 9
Valve
MOV-16 Motor- Operated Fail As Is Closed
Valve
Valve
Valve
MOV-19 Motor–Operated Fail As Is Closed
Valve
4. Upon a plant trip, main feedwater isolates and AFW automatically initiates by starting AFW-
A and AFW-C pumps, opening the steam valves MOV-14 and MOV-15 to operate the AFW-
B steam-driven pump, and opening valves MOV-10, MOV-11, and MOV-18.
5. The condensate storage tank (CST) has sufficient capacity to provide core cooling until cold
shutdown is achieved.
6. The test return paths through MOVs-16, 17, and 19 are low-flow lines and do not represent
significant diversions of AFW flow even if the valves are open.
7. There is a high motor temperature alarm on AFW pump A. Upon indication in the control
room, the operator is to stop the pump immediately and have the condition subsequently
checked by dispatching a local operator.
8. The atmospheric relief valve opens, as needed, automatically to remove decay heat if/should
the main condenser path be unavailable.
9. The connections to the main turbine and main feedwater are shown in terms of one main
steam isolation valve (MSIV) and a check valve. Portions of the plant beyond these
interfacing components will not be addressed in the course.
1.2.2.5 Electrical System

Figure 13 is a one-line diagram of the electrical distribution system (EDS). Safety-related buses
are identified by the use of alphabetic letters (e.g., SWGR-A, MCC-B1, etc.) while the nonsafety
buses use numbers as part of their designations (e.g., SWGR-1 and MCC-2).
The safety-related portions of the EDS include 4160-volt switchgear buses SWGR-A and
SWGR-B that are normally powered from the startup transformer SUT-1. In the event that
offsite power is lost, these switchgears receive power from emergency diesel generators EDG-A
and EDG-B. The 480-volt safety-related load centers (LC-A and LC-B) receive power from the
switchgear buses via station service transformers SST-A and SST-B. The motor control centers
(MCC-A1 and MCC-B1) are powered directly from the load centers. The MCCs provide motive
power to several safety-related motor-operated valves (MOVs) and to DC buses DC BUS-A and
DC BUS-B via battery chargers BC-A and BC-B. The two 125 VDC batteries, BAT-A and
BAT-B, supply power to the DC buses in the event that all AC power is lost. DC control power
for the 4160 safety-related switchgear is provided through distribution panels PNL-A and PNL-
12550194 1-10
B. The 120 VAC vital loads are powered from buses VITAL-A and VITAL-B that in turn
receive their power from the DC buses through inverters INV-A and INV-B.
The nonsafety portions of the EDS reflect a similar hierarchy of power flow; however, important
differences exist. For example, 4160-volt SWGR-1 and SWGR-2 are normally energized from
the unit auxiliary transformer (UAT-1) with backup power available from SUT-1. A cross-tie
breaker allows one nonsafety switchgear bus to provide power to the other. Nonsafety load
centers LC-1 and LC-2 are powered at 480 volts from the 4160-volt switchgear via SST-1 and
SST-2. These load centers provide power directly to the nonsafety MCCs. The nonvital DC bus
(DC BUS-1) can be powered from either MCC via an automatic transfer switch (ATS-1) and
battery charger BC-1 or directly from the 250-volt DC battery BAT-1.
1.2.2.6 Other Systems

The following systems and equipment are mentioned in the plant description but not explicitly
included in the fire PRA:
• Service Water (SW). Provides cooling to recirculating and residual heat removal heat
exchangers – assumed to be available at all times.
• Component Cooling Water (CCW). Provides cooling to letdown heat exchanger – assumed
to be available at all times.
• It is assumed that the control rods can successfully insert and shutdown the reactor under all
conditions.
• It is assumed that the ECCS and other AFW-related instrumentation and control circuits
(other than those specifically noted in the diagrams) exist and are perfect such that in all
cases they would sense the presence of a LOCA or otherwise a need to trip the plant and
provide safety injection and auxiliary feedwater by sending the proper signals to the affected
components (i.e., close valves and start pumps, insert control rods, etc.)
12550194 1-11
Figure 2 - SNPP General Layout
12550194 1-12
Figure 3 - SNPP Plant Layout Section AA
12550194 1-13
Figure 4 - SNPP Aux Building Layout at Elevation Minus 20 ft
12550194 1-14
Figure 5 - SNPP Aux Building Layout 0 ft
12550194 1-15
Figure 6 - SNPP Aux Building Layout +20 ft
12550194 1-16
Figure 7- SNPP Aux Building Layout +40 ft
12550194 1-17
Figure 8 - SNPP Aux Building Main Control Room
12550194 1-18
Figure 9 - SNPP Turbine building
12550194 1-19
Figure 10 - SNPP Main Control Room
12550194 1-20
Figure 11 - Primary Coolant System Including RHR, HPI, and CVC Systems
12550194 1-21
Figure 12 - Aux. Feedwater System
12550194 1-22
Figure 13 - Electrical Distribution System
SWYD OFF-SITEPOWER
G EDG-A EDG-B
UAT-1 SUT-1
SWGR-1 SWGR-2 SWGR-A SWGR-B
RCP-1 RCP-2 AFW-C HPI-A AFW-A RHR-B HPI-B
SST-1 SST-2 SST-A SST-B
LC-1 LC-2 LC-A LC-B
COMP-1 MCC-A1 MCC-B1
MCC-1 MCC-2
(RackedOut)
MOV-17
MOV-10
MOV-13
MOV-16
MOV-1
MOV-3
MOV-5
MOV-2
MOV-4
MOV-6
MOV-8
MOV-9
MOV-7
ATS-1
MOV-18
MOV-19
BC-A BC-B
BAT-A BAT-B
BC-1
DC BUS-A DC BUS-B
BAT-1
DC BUS-1 Volt
Reg
PNL-A PNL-B INV-B
MOV-11
INV-A
MOV-14
Non-Vital DC MOV-15
Loads
VITAL-A VITAL-B
SWGR-B
EDG-A
SWGR-A
SOV-3
SOV-2
LI-1 LI-3 SOV-1 TI-1 ANN-1 PT-1 LI-2 LI-4
12550194 1-23
1.3 MODULE 1: PRA/HRA
The following is a short description of the fire PRA technical tasks covered in this module. For
details regarding these tasks, refer to the individual task descriptions in Volume 2 of EPRI
1011989, NUREG/CR-6850.
• Fire PRA Component Selection (Task 2). The selection of components that are to be
credited for plant shutdown following a fire is a critical step in any fire PRA. Components
selected would generally include many, but not necessarily all components credited in the 10
CFR 50 Appendix R post-fire SSD analysis. Additional components will likely be selected,
potentially including any and all components credited in the plant’s internal events PRA. Also,
the proposed methodology would likely introduce components beyond either the 10 CFR 50
Appendix R list or the internal events PRA model. Such components are often of interest due to
considerations of multiple spurious actuations that may threaten the credited functions and
components as well as concerns about fire effects on instrumentation used by the plant crew to
respond to the event.
• Qualitative Screening (Task 4). This task identifies fire analysis compartments that can be
shown without quantitative analysis to have little or no risk significance. Fire compartments
may be screened out if they contain no components or cables identified in Tasks 2 and 3, and if
they cannot lead to a plant trip due to either plant procedures, an automatic trip signal, or
technical specification requirements.
• Plant Fire-Induced Risk Model (Task 5). This task discusses steps for the development
of a logic model that reflects plant response following a fire. Specific instructions have been
provided for treatment of fire-specific procedures or preplans. These procedures may impact
• Quantitative Screening (Task 7). A fire PRA allows the screening of fire compartments and
scenarios based on their contribution to fire risk. This approach considers the cumulative risk
associated with the screened compartments (i.e., the ones not retained for detailed analysis) to
ensure that a true estimate of fire risk profile (as opposed to vulnerability) is obtained.
• Post-Fire Human Reliability Analysis (Task 12). This task considers operator actions
for manipulation of plant components. The analysis task procedure provides structured
instructions for identification and inclusion of these actions in the fire PRA. The procedure also
provides instructions for estimating screening human error probabilities (HEPs) before detailed
fire modeling results have been developed (e.g., fire growth and damage behaviors or detailed
circuit analyses). In a fire PRA, estimation of HEP values with high confidence is critical to the
effectiveness of screening. This report does not develop a detailed fire HRA methodology. A
number of HRA methods can be adopted for fire with appropriate additional instructions that
superimpose fire effects on any of the existing HRA methods such as SHARP, ATHEANA, etc.
This would improve consistency across analyses (i.e., fire and internal events PRA). This task is
subdivided into Task 12a, “Screening Post-Fire HRA,” and Task 12b, “Post-Fire HRA Detailed
Analysis.”
12550194 1-24
• Fire Risk Quantification (Task 14). The task summarizes what is to be done for
quantification of the fire risk results.
• Uncertainty and Sensitivity Analyses (Task 15). This task describes the approach to follow
for identifying and treating uncertainties throughout the fire PRA process. The treatment may
vary from quantitative estimation and propagation of uncertainties where possible (e.g., in fire
frequency and nonsuppression probability) to identification of sources without quantitative
estimation. The treatment may also include one-at-a-time variation of individual parameter
values or modeling approaches to determine the effect on the overall fire risk (i.e., sensitivity
analysis).
• Fire PRA Documentation (Task 16). This task describes the approach to follow for
documenting the fire PRA process and its results.
1.4 MODULE 2: Electrical Analysis

1011989, NUREG/CR-6850.
• Fire PRA Cable Selection (Task 3). This task provides instructions and technical
considerations associated with identifying cables supporting those components selected in Task
2. In previous fire PRA methods (such as EPRI FIVE and Fire PRA Implementation Guide), this
task was relegated to the SSD analysis and its associated databases. This document offers a
more structured set of rules for selection of cables.
• Detailed Circuit Failure Analysis (Task 9). This task provides an approach and technical
considerations for identifying how the failure of specific cables will impact the components
included in the fire PRA SSD plant response model.
• Circuit Failure Mode Likelihood Analysis (Task 10). This task considers the relative
likelihood of various circuit failure modes. This added level of resolution may be a desired
option for those fire scenarios that are significant contributors to the risk. The methodology
provided in EPRI 1011989, NUREG/CR-6850 benefits from the knowledge gained from the tests
performed in response to the circuit failure issue.
1.5 MODULE 3: Fire Analysis

1011989, NUREG/CR-6850.
• Plant Boundary Definition and Partitioning (Task 1). The first step in a fire PRA is to
define the physical boundary of the analysis and to divide the area within that boundary
into analysis compartments.
12550194 1-25
• Fire Ignition Frequency (Task 6). This task describes the approach to develop frequency
estimates for fire compartments and scenarios. Significant changes from the EPRI FIVE method
have been made in this task. The changes generally relate to use of challenging events,
considerations associated with data quality, and increased use of a fully component-based
ignition frequency model (as opposed to the location/component-based model used, for example,
in FIVE).
• Scoping Fire Modeling (Task 8). Scoping fire modeling is the first task in the fire PRA
framework where fire modeling tolls are used to identify ignition sources that may impact the
fire risk of the plant. Screening some of the ignition sources, along with the applications of
severity factors to the unscreened ones, may reduce the compartment fire frequency previously
calculated in Task 6.
• Detailed Fire Modeling (Task 11). This task describes the method to examine the
consequences of a fire. This includes consideration of scenarios involving single compartments,
multiple fire compartments, and the main control room. Factors considered include initial fire
characteristics, fire growth in a fire compartment or across fire compartments, detection and
suppression, electrical raceway fire barrier systems, and damage from heat and smoke. Special
consideration is given to turbine generator (T/G) fires, hydrogen fires, high-energy arcing faults,
cable fires, and main control board (MCB) fires. There are considerable improvements in the
method for this task over the EPRI FIVE and Fire PRA Implementation Guide in nearly all
technical areas.
• Seismic Fire Interactions (Task 13). This task is a qualitative approach to help identify the
risk from any potential interactions between an earthquake and a fire.
1.6 FORMAT OVERVIEW
1.6.1 Video Series

This NUREG-CP centers on video recordings of the NRC/EPRI course/seminars. Thus, the
course material is presented primarily in video format on the enclosed DVDs. A noteworthy
ramification is the absence of written text independently relating the course material. It was
decided that the words and gestures of the six lecturers were a necessary component of the
course that were preserved on the video recordings as authentically as possible.
Each module is broken into a number of sessions, corresponding to the associated tasks. Some
tasks correspond to multiple sessions, as indicated in each of the video menus. In a conventional
DVD player, these sessions appear as scenes within the DVD menu, which also indicates the
associated content. Important to note is that these DVDs comprise videos of both
course/seminars (i.e., each session was presented on two different dates). Careful selection was
made to provide the best presentation of each session’s material.
Onscreen text indicates which lecture slide is currently being discussed. In addition, a full-
screen snapshot of each slide will appear to indicate what information is currently being
discussed, and a smaller-scale version of the slide will continuously be displayed onscreen while
the instructors are lecturing. These are the same slides that are present in this NUREG/CP as
well as within the associated session folders on the DVDs, accessible only by computer.
12550194 1-26
1.6.2 Exercises
The three modules of this course contain exercises that were distributed by the instructors for
completion as reinforcement of certain concepts introduced within the sessions. However, the
videos included with these three NUREG/CP volumes do not adequately describe the locations
and instructors’ intentions regarding the exercises. Because of that inadequacy, this section
provides further available information regarding the exercises.
The exercises are not included in the three “Module Overview” slide presentations in the “2
INTRODUCTION SLIDES” section of this “OVERALL COURSE” part of Volume 1 (i.e., they
are not provided in SESSION 3b: PRA/HRA Module Overview, SESSION 3c:
Circuits/Electrical Module Overview, and SESSION 3d: Fire Analysis Module Overview).
Instead, the exercises are presented in the detailed, separate, parallel sessions for each module.
Thus, the PRA/HRA exercises are presented in the “Module 1: PRA/HRA (Systems Analysis)”
part of Volume 1; the “Module 2: Electrical Analysis” exercises are presented in Volume 2; and
the “Module 3: Fire Analysis” exercises are presented in Volume 3. The exercises are organized
differently within each of the three volumes, and it should be noted that they do not cover all 16
of the EPRI 1011989, NUREG/CR-6850 tasks.
MODULE 1: PRA/HRA
Exercises for this module begin with Task 2, “Component Selection,” as presented in the
“MODULE 1: SESSION 1b: Example Exercises” section of this Volume 1. These exercises
have seven steps. Step 1 asks whether a fire PRA model should incorporate a series of initiating
events. Students are asked to fill in the last two columns, explaining whether or not (and why)
each initiating event should be included in a fire PRA. For example, students are asked whether
initiator %T1, a reactor trip, is a reasonable consequence of a fire in most NPPs. Step 2 asks the
same question, but this time about whether certain systems rather than events should reasonably
be included. Step 3, as introduced in the lecture, combines the first two steps and examines
further which fire initiators are relevant to the particular equipment selected in Step 2. Step 4
identifies possible failure paths for each of the components that remain after Step 3 and also
identifies the need for modeling each of the failure paths depending upon its relative significance
within the PRA context. Step 5 incorporates the human element of the PRA. At this point,
instrumentation issues as a consequence of fire are discussed. Students are asked to identify
specific failure mechanisms that could occur as a result of the faulty operation of each of the
pieces of instrumentation. Step 6 examines multiple failure modes that are possible due to
interactions between pieces of equipment. Only one interaction is identified in this simplified
plant. Finally, in Step 7, the fire PRA equipment list is assembled. Students are given all of the
components as well as the event identifiers and descriptions and are asked to identify the
operating and failed positions of each component, according to different modes. Appendix B
provides the solution to these Task 2 exercises.
Exercises for Task 5 (mentioned in Slide 15 of the “MODULE 1: SESSION 2: Fire Induced Risk
Model Development” section of this Volume 1 but not included in the video for that Session)
focus on development of the fire-induced risk model for those components deemed necessary
within the screening process of Task 2. There are two steps in the task. First, students are asked
to use enclosed event trees and fault trees to develop a cumulative distribution function
12550194 1-27
(CDF)/conditional core damage probability (CCDP) model that identifies where changes are
required from the existing model to facilitate event mapping. Second, students develop a large
early release frequency (LERF) or conditional large early release probability (CLERP) model,
asking essentially the same questions except about fire-initiating events. The same event and
fault trees are employed. These “Task 5” exercises and their supporting information occupy 53
pages and are not included in this NUREG/CP report. However, they are available on NRC’s
public Web site (www.nrc.gov): using the Web-based ADAMS search, enter ML083330431 in
the “Search” box, right click on the “Image File” icon, select “Open Link,” and see pages 68 thru
120. However, the solutions are not currently available in this NUREG/CP report nor on the
Web.
MODULE 2: ELECTRICAL ANALYSIS
The first five sessions of the electrical task develop a structured approach for identifying cables
important to the fire PRA, performing circuit analysis to refine failure modes associated with
fire-induced equipment, and assigning likelihoods of spurious operations. The approach then
determines the importance of cable failures to fire events by using electrical diagrams and logic
trees to show which outcomes are possible given unsuccessful operations of cables. An
overview of the exercises for this module is presented in the sixth session (Volume 2 of this
NUREG/CP, Session 6, “Electrical Exercises Overview”). The exercises draw from all of the
modules and employ drawings that the developers provided for completion of the analyses. One
solution is included as a video, and the rest have instructor solutions with the completed charts as
described below.
An exercise sheet for each of the 16 exercises is provided in Volume 2 in the “3 EXAMPLE
EXERCISES” section. Another copy of each exercise sheet, along with the drawings needed to
perform it, is provided in Volume 2, Appendix B, “Exercise Problems and Solutions,” in its
“Exercises with Reference Figures” subsection. Solutions are provided in Volume 2, Appendix
B, “Exercise Problems and Solutions,” in its “Instructors Exercise Solutions” subsection. The
exercises include analyses of various failure modes of AOVs and MOVs, failure of a reactor
coolant system pressure indicator, a spurious annunciator alarm, an HPI pump failure to start and
failure to run, an instrument air compressor failure to run, and a 480V load center fault.
It should be noted that incomplete and sometimes conflicting documentation of Exercise 14 was
available for inclusion in this NUREG/CP report that does not acceptably describe details of the
exercise nor provide its solution.
MODULE 3: FIRE ANALYSIS
Module 3 includes exercises that correspond to the associated sessions, providing reinforcement
of the material presented in the session. Instructions for each of the fire analysis exercises are
specific to the exercise and are included at the beginning of each exercise on the videos. Most
involve completing a chart with missing information, and the solutions are included within each
module and labeled as the instructor set.
12550194 1-28
In this NUREG/CP, the exercises are presented in Volume 3 in five “Example Problems” sub-
sessions, numbered 1b, 2b, 6b, 10b, and 11b. The solutions for all exercises are presented in
Volume 3, Appendix C, “Exercise Set Solutions.” The exercises include, respectively, selection
of the plant analysis boundary and its partitioning into fire compartments, mapping ignition
sources, preparation for walkdown, characterization of compartments with respect to features
important to fires such as fire detection and suppression features and ignition sources, and fire
modeling in the main control room.
1.6.3 General Comments Regarding This Course

The material within the DVD includes solutions to many of the example sets as well as full-size
versions of the lecture slides that are printable in assorted formats. Specifically, the solutions to
the electrical exercise sets include instructor interpretations that are challenging to read and,
therefore, were edited for use in the videos.
Questions raised by participants at the conference were removed from the videos. Generally, the
available video footage had questions that were largely inaudible. For the convenience of the
user, selected questions and answers have been transcribed and included in the associated session
folder on the DVDs. In this NUREG/CP, each volume includes selected questions and responses
in its Appendix A, “Questions Asked in Module {1, 2, or 3} Sessions.”
To obtain the most complete set of materials for this course, instructors provided portions
(particularly of the exercises and their solutions) that they had prepared for use in these courses
over a period of time. Because this material is being continuously improved, minor
discrepancies resulted between sections (e.g., between the statement of certain exercises and
their solutions). However, these differences are not sufficiently numerous nor significant to
affect accomplishment of the overall objectives of the course for its users.
12550194 1-29
12550194
2 INTRODUCTION SLIDES
SESSION 1: NRC Welcome
12550194 2-1
Slide 1 Notes:
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
EPRI/NRC-RES FIRE PRA ___________________________________
METHODOLOGY
___________________________________
Welcome
___________________________________
Mark Henry Salley P.E.
Chief, Fire Research Branch ___________________________________
___________________________________
Joint RES/EPRI Fire PRA Workshop
September 29 – October 2 and November 17-20, 2008 ___________________________________
Bethesda, MD.
___________________________________
A Collaboration of U.S. NRC Office of Nuclear Regulatory Research (RES) & Electric Power Research Institute (EPRI)
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
Slide 2 Notes:
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
Welcome ___________________________________
• Unique Training Opportunity

___________________________________
___________________________________
– State-of-the-Art Fire PRA for NPP application
___________________________________
– Presented by Leading Experts
___________________________________
• Joint Research Project
___________________________________
– Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) between NRC Office of
Nuclear Regulatory Research (RES) and Electric Power Research ___________________________________
Institute (EPRI)
___________________________________
– Performing the Training since 2005
___________________________________
Fire PRA Workshop, 2008, Bethesda, MD A Collaboration of U.S. NRC Office of Nuclear Regulatory
Slide 2
Module I-
I-1: Fire Risk Requantification Project Research (RES) & Electric Power Research Institute (EPRI)
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
12550194 2-2
Slide 3 Notes:
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
Introduction ___________________________________
• Domestic Attendees: ___________________________________

– NRC Headquarters and all 4 Regional Offices ___________________________________
– U.S. Department of Energy (DOE)
___________________________________
– National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA)
___________________________________
– EPRI
– NPP Licensees/Utilities
___________________________________
– NSSS Vendors ___________________________________
– Consulting Engineering Firms
___________________________________
– Universities
___________________________________
Module I-
I-1: Fire Risk Requantification Project
Slide 3
Research (RES) & Electric Power Research Institute (EPRI)
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
Slide 4 Notes:
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
Introduction ___________________________________
• International Attendees ___________________________________
– Regulators and NPP Operators ___________________________________
• Belgium
___________________________________
• Canada
___________________________________
• France
• Japan
___________________________________
• South Korea ___________________________________
• Spain ___________________________________
• Sweden ___________________________________
Slide 4
Module I-
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
12550194 2-3
Slide 5 Notes:
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
Introduction ___________________________________
___________________________________
• Enjoy the Training Session
– Interact with your Peers
___________________________________
• Participate in the Sessions ___________________________________
– Ask Questions
___________________________________
• If you have any needs, please contact one of the members of
the NRC ___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
Module I-
Slide 5
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
12550194 2-4
SESSION 2: Fire Risk Requantification Project
12550194 2-5
Slide 1 Notes:
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
METHODOLOGY
Module I-1: Fire Risk Requantification ___________________________________
Project
___________________________________
___________________________________
J.S. Hyslop – NRC/RES
K. Canavan – EPRI ___________________________________
Joint RES/EPRI Fire PRA Workshop ___________________________________
September 29 – October 2 and November 17-20, 2008
Bethesda, MD
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
Slide 2 Notes:
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
General ___________________________________
• Based on MOU between NRC-RES and EPRI on fire risk

___________________________________
___________________________________
• Needed to provide more realistic methods for risk-informed,
performance-based fire protection activities ___________________________________
• Scope is full power, CDF and LERF ___________________________________
___________________________________
• Similar training conducted last year in Palo Alto, CA
___________________________________
• Course does not provide official NRC positions, but does
represent the expertise of authors of NUREG/CR-6850 ___________________________________
(EPRI 1011989)
___________________________________
Slide 2
Module I-
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
12550194 2-6
Slide 3 Notes:
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
Quality Product ___________________________________
___________________________________
• NRC and EPRI brought diverse group of specialists together
___________________________________
• Volunteer pilot plants support testing
___________________________________
• Peer review by other participating licensees ___________________________________
• Public review and comment ___________________________________
___________________________________
• Formal process to resolve technical disputes
___________________________________
___________________________________
A Collaboration of U.S. NRC Office of Nuclear Regulatory
Fire PRA Workshop, 2008, Bethesda, MD
Module I-
Slide 3
Research (RES) & Electric Power Research Institute (EPRI) ___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
Slide 4 Notes:
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
Advancement To State Of Art ___________________________________
___________________________________
• Improvements made in areas important to fire risk (resource
constraints considered) ___________________________________
• Means to advance ___________________________________
– Consolidate existing research
___________________________________
– Analyze more extensive data
– Modify existing methods ___________________________________
– Develop new approaches
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
Module I-
Slide 4
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
12550194 2-7
Slide 5 Notes:
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
Uses Of Methodology ___________________________________
___________________________________
• Support for new rule 10CFR50.48c implementation
– NFPA pilot plants using technology for fire PRA development/upgrade
___________________________________
• ANS fire risk standard development
– Typically defines state-of-art, although supports lesser capability ___________________________________
categories as well
• Reactor Oversight Process analyses ___________________________________
– Refined phase 3 analyses
– Development of phase 2 Fire Protection SDP (IMC 0609, Appendix F)
___________________________________
• Basis for review guidance that RES developed for NFPA 805
related changes ___________________________________
• Other expected uses
– Analyses under the current fire protection regulations (i.e. ___________________________________
exemptions/deviations or plant changes due to risk-informed technical
specifications) ___________________________________
Module I-
Slide 5 Research (RES) & Electric Power Research Institute (EPRI)
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
Slide 6 Notes:
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
Implementation Impacts ___________________________________
___________________________________
• Fire PRA Methodology Standard clarifies requirements
– Particular impact on spurious actuations ___________________________________
• FAQ process for NFPA pilots requires implementation ___________________________________
guidance
___________________________________
– Several FAQs related to fire ignition frequency and counting of
sources solved
___________________________________
• Newer FAQs have been identified that address many areas
of fire PRA ___________________________________
– Identified in next presentation
– At various stages of completion ___________________________________
___________________________________
Slide 6
Module I-
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
12550194 2-8
Slide 7 Notes:
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
Fire Model Validation and Verification (V&V) ___________________________________
___________________________________
• Fire modeling is an integral part of fire PRA
___________________________________
• Fire model verification and validation (V&V) is required for
NFPA 805 applications ___________________________________
• Most fire models are computational ___________________________________
• Some are based only on empirical correlations ___________________________________
– Address cases where computational fire models inadequate
– Fill important gaps in fire PRA ___________________________________
• PRA Methodology document not a reference for fire models ___________________________________
• EPRI/RES V&V of fire models EPRI 101999/NUREG-1824 ___________________________________
Module I-
Slide 7
___________________________________
___________________________________
Slide 8 Notes:
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
Related Activities ___________________________________
• EPRI 1011989/NUREG/CR-6850
___________________________________
– Publication Sept 2005
___________________________________
– First Workshop Jun 2005
– Second Workshop May 2006 ___________________________________
– First detailed course Jul, Aug 2007
• EPRI 1011999/NUREG-1824 May 2007 ___________________________________
• Current Fire PRA Course Sept, Nov 08
___________________________________
• Fire Modeling User’s Guide mid 2009
• Fire HRA Methodology Development Fall 2009 ___________________________________
• FAQ Support Ongoing
• Fire Modeling Training Ongoing ___________________________________
• Low Power/Shutdown Fire PRA Methods NRC ___________________________________
Slide 8
Module I-
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
12550194 2-9
Slide 9 Notes:
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
Project Team ___________________________________
• Covers all technical disciplines critical to Fire PRA

___________________________________
Technical Lead: B. Najafi, S. Nowlen
General PRA & plant systems analysis: A. Kolaczkowski, R. Anoba
___________________________________
Circuit Analysis and Appendix R: D. Funk, F. Wyant
Human Reliability Analysis: J. Forrester, W. Hannaman, A. ___________________________________
Kolaczkowski
Fire analysis: F. Joglar, M. Kazarians ___________________________________
Consultants: A. Mosleh, D. Bley
• Collectively, over 250 years of relevant experience ___________________________________
• Principal authors of documented Fire PRA methods in the US
for the past 2 decades ___________________________________
• Experience with use of previous methods; their strengths and
weaknesses ___________________________________
• The Methodology reflects the consensus of this team, EPRI and
RES ___________________________________
Module I-
Slide 9
___________________________________
___________________________________
12550194 2-10
SESSION 3a: Fire PRA Methodology and Course Structure
12550194 2-11
Slide 1 Notes:
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
METHODOLOGY
Introduction and Overview: the Fire PRA ___________________________________
Methodology and Course Structure
___________________________________
___________________________________
Bijan Najafi - Science Applications International Corp.
Steve Nowlen - Sandia National Laboratories ___________________________________
Joint RES/EPRI Fire PRA Training Workshop
September and November, 2008
Bethesda, MD
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
Slide 2 Notes:
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
Overview ___________________________________
___________________________________
I. An Overview of the EPRI/NRC-RES Fire PRA
Methodology ___________________________________
– Fire PRA Course:
• Structure/Content ___________________________________
• Objectives
• Logistics ___________________________________
II. Ongoing Activities Related to Fire PRA
___________________________________
– ANS/ASME Fire PRA Standard
– Fire HRA, joint EPRI & RES project ___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
Fire PRA Training, Sept. and Nov., 2008 A Collaboration of U.S. NRC Office of Nuclear Regulatory
Introduction and Overview Slide 2
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
12550194 2-12
Slide 3 Notes:
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
PART I
___________________________________
An Overview of the ___________________________________
EPRI/NRC-
EPRI/NRC-RES Fire PRA Methodology
___________________________________
&
___________________________________
The Fire PRA Course ___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
Slide 4 Notes:
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
BACKGROUND ___________________________________
• Prior to IPEEE; Mostly simple approximate method for order- ___________________________________

of-magnitude assessment of fire risk, e.g. NUREG/CR-2258, ___________________________________
Fire Risk Analysis for Nuclear Power Plants.
• EPRI FIVE (1992) ___________________________________
– A “vulnerability evaluation” methodology developed in response to
IPEEE program ___________________________________
• EPRI Fire PRA Implementation Guide (1995)
– Developed as a complement to FIVE for detailed evaluation of ___________________________________
unscreened fire areas/compartments
– More robust methods (compared to FIVE) for: ___________________________________
• Development and evaluation of fire risk model, including human actions
• Assessment of fire growth and damage, detection and suppression ___________________________________
• Control room and multi-compartment fire risk
___________________________________
Slide 4
Introduction and Overview Research (RES) & Electric Power Research Institute (EPRI)
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
12550194 2-13
Slide 5 Notes:
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
EPRI/NRC-RES FIRE PRA METHODOLOGY ___________________________________
• The methodology is presented in the form technical

___________________________________
task procedures within an overall process ___________________________________
• The process is intended as a guide and should fit ___________________________________
most cases ___________________________________
• User may adjust process based on plant-specific ___________________________________
information, efficiency, economy and desired
___________________________________
applications
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
Slide 6 Notes:
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
EPRI/NRC-RES FIRE PRA METHODOLOGY ___________________________________
• Procedures cover the following technical areas ___________________________________

– Plant analysis boundary and partitioning ___________________________________
– Fire PRA component selection and risk model
___________________________________
– Circuit/cable selection, routing and failure modes analysis
– Screening, qualitative and quantitative ___________________________________
– Fire ignition frequency
___________________________________
– Fire modeling; fire growth, damage and detection/suppression
– Post-fire human reliability analysis (HRA) ___________________________________
– Seismic-fire interactions, and
___________________________________
– Fire risk quantification, including uncertainties, and documentation
___________________________________
Slide 6
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
12550194 2-14
Slide 7 Notes:
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
PROCEDURE CONTENT ___________________________________
1. Purpose
___________________________________
2. Scope ___________________________________
3. Background information: General approach and
assumptions ___________________________________
4. Interfaces: Input/output to other tasks, plant and other ___________________________________
information needed, walk-downs
5. Procedure: Step-by-step instructions for conduct of the ___________________________________
technical task ___________________________________
6. References
Appendices: Technical bases, data, examples, special models ___________________________________
or instructions, tools or databases
___________________________________
Slide 7
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
Slide 8 Notes:
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
Course Structure ___________________________________
• Three parallel modules: ___________________________________

– Module 1: Systems/PRA ___________________________________
– Module 2: Electrical Analysis
– Module 3: Fire Analysis ___________________________________
• General structure for each module: ___________________________________
– PowerPoint presentations designed to convey key concepts and
the general “how to” of each task ___________________________________
– Example problems designed to illustrate key elements of the
procedures (more on this shortly) ___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
Slide 8
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
12550194 2-15
Slide 9
OVERVIEW OF FIRE PRA PROCESS AND

MODULE STRUCTURE
TASK 1: Plant Boundary & TASK 2: Fire PRA Component
Partitioning Selection
TASK 3: Fire PRA Cable

Selection
SUPPORT TASK A: Plant Walk

Downs TASK 4: Qualitative Screening TASK 5: Fire-Induced Risk
Model
TASK 6: Fire Ignition

Frequencies
SUPPORT TASK B: Fire PRA

Database TASK 7A: Quantitative TASK 12A: Post-Fire HRA:
Screening - I Screening
TASK 8: Scoping Fire Modeling
Fire Module
TASK 7B: Quantitative
Screening - II Systems Module
Electrical Module
B
Notes:
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
12550194 2-16
Slide 10
OVERVIEW OF FIRE PRA PROCESS AND

MODULE STRUCTURE (2)
B
TASK 9: Detailed Circuit Failure

Analysis TASK 11: Detailed Fire Modeling
TASK 10: Circuit Failure Mode &
Likelihood Analysis C. Main Control Room
TASK 13: Seismic-Fire TASK 14: Fire Risk Quantification TASK 12B: Post fire HRA:
Interactions Detailed & recovery
TASK 15: Uncertainty &

Sensitivity Analyses Fire Module
Systems Module
TASK 16: Fire PRA
Documentation Electrical Module
Introduction and Overview Slide 10 Research (RES) & Electric Power Research Institute (EPRI)
Notes:
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
12550194 2-17
Slide 11 Notes:
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
Training Objectives (1 of 3) ___________________________________
___________________________________
• Target audience:
– FPRA practitioners ___________________________________
– FPRA reviewers
___________________________________
• The “doer” versus the “reviewer”
– We are targeting both types of users, but the needs are really quite ___________________________________
similar
– The key elements for implementation are the same as the key
___________________________________
elements for review
– Understanding how and why the “doer” does what they do is one key
___________________________________
to understanding the analysis itself
___________________________________
___________________________________
Slide 11
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
Slide 12 Notes:
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
Training Objectives (2 of 3) ___________________________________
___________________________________
• Our intent:
– To deliver practical implementation training at a higher level of detail ___________________________________
than provided via the previous “roll-out” workshops
– To illustrate and demonstrate key aspects of the procedures ___________________________________
• We expect and want significant participant interaction ___________________________________
– Class size was limited specifically to allow for questions and
discussion ___________________________________
– We will take questions about the methodology
– We cannot answer questions about a specific application
___________________________________
– We will moderate discussions, and we will judge when the course ___________________________________
must move on
___________________________________
Slide 12
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
12550194 2-18
Slide 13 Notes:
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
Training Objective (3 of 3) ___________________________________
• This training is about NUREG/CR-6850, EPRI TR-1011989 ___________________________________

and the EPRI/RES teams’ intent for implementation of that ___________________________________
method
– It is not about regulatory compliance (talk to NRR about that) ___________________________________
– It is not about alternative methods, NFPA-805, or the ANS FPRA
standard and its “Capability Categories” ___________________________________
– We cannot cover areas that are outside the scope of the document
(e.g., detailed HRA)
___________________________________
• Your next step:
– You should not expect to come out of this training an “instant expert” ___________________________________
– We do expect that after the training you will possess the fundamental
knowledge needed to “hit the ground running” and to implement the ___________________________________
method or to review an application involving the method
– Ultimately, you learn by doing, so get out there and do it! ___________________________________
Slide 13
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
Slide 14 Notes:
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
What’s next: ___________________________________
___________________________________
• The rest of these introductory slides will provide a short
overview of each of the three modules ___________________________________
• Intent is to ensure that those of you in one module are aware ___________________________________
of what is being covered in the other two modules
___________________________________
• FPRA requires a team effort and integration is critical to
success ___________________________________
___________________________________
• That will close out the introductions, and then you will be
breaking up and going to your individual modules ___________________________________
___________________________________
Slide 14
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
12550194 2-19
SESSION 3b: PRA/HRA Module Overview
12550194 2-20
Slide 15 Notes:
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
Module 1: PRA/HRA ___________________________________
• This module will cover all aspects of the plant systems ___________________________________
accident response modeling, human reliability analysis, and
quantification tasks ___________________________________
• Specific tasks covered are: ___________________________________
– Task 2: Equipment Selection
– Task 4: Qualitative Screening ___________________________________
– Task 5: Fire-Induced Risk Model
– Task 7: Quantitative Screening ___________________________________
– Task 12: Human Reliability Analysis (HRA)*
– Task 15: Risk Quantification
___________________________________
– Task 16: Uncertainty Analysis
___________________________________
*Fire HRA is the subject of an ongoing RES-EPRI collaboration. Results are expected to supersede
guidance in current methodology document. More on this later in this presentation…
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
Slide 16 Notes:
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
Task 2: Equipment Selection (1 of 3) ___________________________________
___________________________________
• Objective: To decide what subset of the plant equipment will
be modeled in the FPRA ___________________________________
• FPRA equipment will draw from: ___________________________________
– Equipment from the internal events PRA
• We do assume that an internal events PRA is available! ___________________________________
– Equipment from the Post-Fire Safe Shutdown analysis
• e.g., the Appendix R analysis or the Nuclear Safety Analysis under
___________________________________
NFPA-805
– Other “new” equipment not in either of these analyses ___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
Slide 16
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
12550194 2-21
Slide 17 Notes:
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
• Many choices to be made in this task, many factors will
influence these decisions ___________________________________
– Fire-induced failures that might cause and initiating event
– Mitigating equipment and operator actions
___________________________________
– Fire-induced failures that adversely impact credited equipment ___________________________________
– Fire-induced failures that could lead to inappropriate or unsafe
operator actions ___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
Slide 17
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
Slide 18 Notes:
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
• Choices are important in part because “selecting” equipment
implies a burden to Identify and Trace cables ___________________________________
– Cable selection is covered in Module 2 (Electrical) but can represent
a significant commitment of time and effort to the FPRA ___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
Slide 18
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
12550194 2-22
Slide 19 Notes:
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
Task 4: Qualitative Screening (1 of 2) ___________________________________
___________________________________
• Objective: To identify fire compartments that can be
screened out as insignificant risk contributors without ___________________________________
quantitative analysis
___________________________________
• This is an Optional task
– You may choose to bypass this task which means that all fire ___________________________________
compartments will be treated quantitatively to some level of analysis
(level may vary) ___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
Slide 20 Notes:
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
Task 4: Qualitative Screening (2 of 2) ___________________________________
___________________________________
• Criteria are established that consider:
– Trip initiators ___________________________________
– Presence of selected equipment
– Presence of selected cables ___________________________________
• Note that any compartment that is “screened out” in this step ___________________________________
is reconsidered in the multi-compartment fire analysis as a
potential source of multi-compartment fires
___________________________________
– See Module 3, Task 11c ___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
Slide 20
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
12550194 2-23
Slide 21 Notes:
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
Task 5: Fire-Induced Risk Model (1 of 2) ___________________________________
___________________________________
• Objective: To construct the FPRA plant response model
– Functional relationships among selected equipment ___________________________________
– Equipment failure modes (including spurious actuation)
___________________________________
– Human Failure Events (HFEs)
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
Slide 21
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
Slide 22 Notes:
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
Task 5: Fire-Induced Risk Model (2 of 2) ___________________________________
___________________________________
• Covers both CDF and LERF
– Builds on/from the internal events model but more than just a “tweak” ___________________________________
– Adds fire unique equipment
___________________________________
– Adds fire-specific equipment failure modes (e.g., spurious actuations)
– Adds fire-specific operator actions ___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
12550194 2-24
Slide 23 Notes:
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
Task 7: Quantitative Screening (1 of 2) ___________________________________
___________________________________
• Objective: To identify compartments that can be shown to be
insignificant contributors to fire risk based on limited ___________________________________
quantitative considerations
___________________________________
• This task is Optional
– Analyst may choose to retain all compartments for more detailed ___________________________________
analysis
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
Slide 24 Notes:
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
Task 7: Quantitative Screening (2 of 2) ___________________________________
___________________________________
• Screening may be performed in stages of increasing
complexity ___________________________________
• Consideration is given to: ___________________________________
– Fire ignition frequency
– Screening of specific fire sources as non-threatening (no spread, no ___________________________________
damage)
– Impact of fire-induced equipment and cable failures
___________________________________
• conditional core damage probability (CCDP)
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
12550194 2-25
Slide 25 Notes:
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
Post-fire Human Reliability Analysis (1 of 5) ___________________________________
___________________________________
• Objective: To assess Human Error Probabilities (HEPs) for
the Human Failure Events (HFEs) included in the FPRA plant ___________________________________
response model
– For those already in the level 1 PRA, and ___________________________________
– Those to be added specific to post-fire condition considerations
___________________________________
• Fire HRA is being addressed under a separate RES-EPRI
collaboration ___________________________________
– Dealing with both screening and quantification
– Intent is that new guidance will supersede that currently in ___________________________________
NUREG/CR-6850 EPRI TR-1011989
– More on this later ___________________________________
• In the mean time, back to the current guidance … ___________________________________
Slide 25
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
Slide 26 Notes:
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
• Focus on the Screening HRA
– Rule-based (in the absence of detailed fire scenario information) ___________________________________
quantitative screening approach
• Fire conditions; environment and accessibility
• Fire-induced component/system faults, such as spurious actuations
___________________________________
• Location and timing to diagnose and perform the required actions
• Availability of the crew to perform the actions, not impacted by dual ___________________________________
responsibilities
– Instructions provided to develop screening HEPs based on these ___________________________________
conditions
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
12550194 2-26
Slide 27 Notes:
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
• Use of existing HRA methods in fire conditions

___________________________________
– Fire performance shaping factors (PSF) defined and described
1. Available staffing resources
___________________________________
2. Applicability and suitability of training/experience
3. Suitability of relevant procedures and administrative controls
___________________________________
4. Availability and clarity of instrumentation
5. Time available and time needed to complete the action, including impact of ___________________________________
concurrent and competing activities
6. Environment ___________________________________
7. Accessibility and operability of equipment
8. Special tools ___________________________________
9. Communication
10. Crew dynamics and characteristics
11. Special fitness needs
___________________________________
– Operator Manual Action (OMA) feasibility criteria and Post-Fire HRA
PSFs
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
Slide 28 Notes:
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
• Quantitative link between these PSFs & best-estimate HEPs
specifically for fire not developed but much can be handled ___________________________________
with existing methods and guidance.
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
Slide 28
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
12550194 2-27
Slide 29 Notes:
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
Post-Fire Human Reliability Analysis (5 of 5) ___________________________________
• Special Case: Main Control Room (MCR) abandonment

___________________________________
– Additional considerations as part of PSF evaluation, e.g., ___________________________________
• The decision and timing of control room evacuation
• The number, complexity and multiple-location local manual actions ___________________________________
• Adequacy of human-machine interface at the remote shutdown and/or
local panels ___________________________________
• Guidance is method-neutral
– Specific HRA method is analyst choice
___________________________________
– General considerations are outlined and applicable regardless of ___________________________________
method chosen
– Specifics of treatment are method-dependent ___________________________________
• e.g., how you handle/quantify a performance shaping factor (PSF)
___________________________________
Slide 29
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
Slide 30 Notes:
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
Task 14: Fire Risk Quantification ___________________________________
___________________________________
• Objective: To quantify fire-induced CDF and LERF
___________________________________
• Covered in limited detail
___________________________________
• Relatively straight-forward roll-up for fire scenarios
considering ___________________________________
– Ignition frequency
– Scenario-specific equipment and cable damage
___________________________________
– Equipment failure modes and likelihoods ___________________________________
– Credit for fire mitigation (detection and suppression)
– Fire-specific HEPs ___________________________________
– Quantification of the FPRA plant response model
___________________________________
Slide 30
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
12550194 2-28
Slide 31 Notes:
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
Task 15: Uncertainty and Sensitivity ___________________________________
___________________________________
• Objective: Provide a process for identifying and quantifying
uncertainties in the FPRA and for identifying sensitivity ___________________________________
analysis cases
___________________________________
• Covered in limited detail
___________________________________
• Guidance is based on potential strategies that might be
taken, but choices are largely left to the analyst ___________________________________
– e.g., what uncertainties will be characterized as distributions and ___________________________________
propagated through the model?
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
12550194 2-29
SESSION 3c: Circuits/Electrical Module Overview
12550194 2-30
Slide 32 Notes:
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
Module 2: Circuits/Electrical ___________________________________
___________________________________
• This module covers those parts of the method specifically
related to the identification and tracing of cables, and the ___________________________________
analysis of electrical circuit failure modes and likelihood
___________________________________
• Tasks covered are:
– Task 3: Cable Selection (and Routing) ___________________________________
– Task 9: Detailed Circuit Analysis
___________________________________
– Task 10: Failure Mode Likelihood Analysis
– Support Task B: FPRA Database ___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
Slide 33 Notes:
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
Task 3: Cable Selection (1 of 2) ___________________________________
___________________________________
• Objectives:
– To identify/select cables whose fire-induced failure could adversely ___________________________________
effect the operation of selected equipment
– To locate selected cables ___________________________________
• Cables may include Power, Control/Indication, and ___________________________________
Instrumentation
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
12550194 2-31
Slide 34 Notes:
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
Task 3: Cable Selection (2 of 2) ___________________________________
___________________________________
• Selected cables need to be routed/located
___________________________________
• Cable routing can be a major commitment of FPRA
resources ___________________________________
– Depends a lot on status of existing plant cable information
• Scope, quality, vintage, method of documentation ___________________________________
– Tracing cables is a time consuming activity
___________________________________
– Intent is to allow for “work smart” approaches
• Iteration to identify and route more cables as needed to support FPRA ___________________________________
• Allowances are made for making “conservative” ___________________________________
assumptions about a cable’s routing if unknown
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
Slide 35 Notes:
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
Support Task B: FPRA Database (1 of 2) ___________________________________
___________________________________
• Objective: Develop a database to support query needs of the
FPRA ___________________________________
• FPRA will ask: “if a fire damages everything within some ___________________________________
spatial region, what equipment and cables are lost?”
– The regions is defined by the fire scenarios (covered in Module 3) ___________________________________
– The region may be as large as a combination of two or more fire areas
or as small as a single raceway ___________________________________
• Because cables tend to be the primary driver, the FPRA

___________________________________
Database is covered in the electrical module ___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
12550194 2-32
Slide 36 Notes:
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
Support Task B: FPRA Database (2 of 2) ___________________________________
___________________________________
• The electrical module will describe the needs served by the
database: ___________________________________
– Database functionality needs
– How to assess capability of exiting systems
___________________________________
– How to implement a structured process to obtain required capability ___________________________________
– Some discussion of the potential role of new software and data
management tools ___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
Slide 37 Notes:
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
Task 9: Detailed Circuit Failure Analysis (1 of 2) ___________________________________
___________________________________
• Objectives:
– To identify circuit responses (failure modes) to fire-induced cable ___________________________________
failures
– To screen out cables that do not impact the ability of a component to ___________________________________
complete its credited function
___________________________________
• This is not about failure mode likelihoods (that is task 10)
___________________________________
• This is about defining the effects that cable failure can (or
cannot have) on selected equipment ___________________________________
– e.g., what cables can, or cannot, cause spurious actuations?
___________________________________
___________________________________
Slide 37
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
12550194 2-33
Slide 38 Notes:
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
Task 9: Detailed Circuit Failure Analysis (2 of 2) ___________________________________
___________________________________
• Fundamentally a deterministic analysis of cable failure
modes and effects ___________________________________
• Module will cover: ___________________________________
– Those failure modes that are, and are not, considered plausible for
various cable/circuit configurations and applications ___________________________________
– Underlying assumptions of the analysis
– Role of existing analyses (e.g., Appendix R SSD analysis)
___________________________________
– Steps of the analysis
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
Slide 39 Notes:
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
Task 10: Circuit Failure Modes Likelihood (1 of 2) ___________________________________
___________________________________
• Objective: To establish first order estimates of the
conditional probability, given failure of a specific cable, that ___________________________________
the circuit will respond in a specific way
___________________________________
• This one is about the likelihood that certain equipment failure
modes will be observed given fire-induced cable failure ___________________________________
– Will the equipment spuriously actuate, or
– Will it be a loss of function failure?
___________________________________
– What is the relative likelihood of each failure mode of interest? ___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
Slide 39
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
12550194 2-34
Slide 40 Notes:
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
Task 10: Circuit Failure Mode Likelihood (2 of 2) ___________________________________
___________________________________
• This is a probabilistic analysis
___________________________________
• Based largely on existing data including
– The EPRI/NEI cable tests including the NRC/RES collaboration ___________________________________
– The EPRI expert panel
___________________________________
• Module will include
___________________________________
– Existing knowledge base
– Underlying assumptions ___________________________________
– Key factors in the analysis
– Analysis approach and methods ___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
12550194 2-35
SESSION 3d: Fire Analysis Module Overview
12550194 2-36
Slide 41 Notes:
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
Module 3: Fire Analysis ___________________________________
___________________________________
• This module covers those parts of the method specifically
related to the identification and analysis of fires, fire damage, ___________________________________
and fire protection systems and features
___________________________________
• Tasks covered are:
– Task 1: Plant Partitioning ___________________________________
– Task 6: Fire Ignition Frequency
___________________________________
– Task 8: Scoping Fire Modeling
– Task 11: Detailed Fire Scenario Analysis ___________________________________
– Task 13: Seismic/Fire Interactions (briefly)
– Support Task A: Plant Walkdowns ___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
Slide 42 Notes:
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
Task 1: Plant Partitioning (1 of 3) ___________________________________
___________________________________
• Objectives:
– To define the global analysis boundary of the FPRA ___________________________________
– To divide the areas within the global analysis boundary into fire
compartments ___________________________________
• The fire compartments become the “basic unit” of analysis ___________________________________
– Generally we screen based on fire compartments
– Risk results are often rolled up to a fire compartment level
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
Slide 42
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
12550194 2-37
Slide 43 Notes:
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
• The global analysis boundary is intended to be a liberal
definition of the region potential interest ___________________________________
– It will likely encompass areas of essentially no risk, but that is OK,
screening steps will identify these ___________________________________
• The fire compartments are a matter of analysis convenience ___________________________________
– Fire compartments may equal fire areas if you so choose
– You can also subdivide fire areas into multiple compartments
___________________________________
– The sum of the fire compartments must equal the global analysis
boundary
___________________________________
• No omissions, no overlap between compartments
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
Slide 44 Notes:
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
• Ultimately, the FPRA is expected to provide some resolution
to each defined fire compartment and to all locations within ___________________________________
the global analysis boundary
___________________________________
• Module will cover:
– Guidance and criteria for defining the global analysis boundary\ ___________________________________
– Guidance and criteria for defining fire compartments
___________________________________
• Ultimately, there is not a lot of new guidance in this task ___________________________________
– A lot like what was done in the IPEEE days
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
12550194 2-38
Slide 45 Notes:
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
Task 6: Fire Ignition Frequency (1 of 3) ___________________________________
___________________________________
• Objective: To define fire frequencies suitable to the analysis
of fire scenarios at various stages of the FPRA ___________________________________
• Fire frequencies will be needed at various levels of ___________________________________
resolution:
– An entire fire area ___________________________________
– A fire compartment
___________________________________
– A group of fire ignition sources (e.g., a bank of electrical cabinets)
– A single ignition source (e.g., one electrical panel) ___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
Slide 46 Notes:
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
• Task begins with generic industry-average statistics on fire
– EPRI fire event database ___________________________________
– Events filtered for applicability and sorted into ignition source bins
– Plant-wide fire frequency is provided for each bin ___________________________________
• The real “trick” is to convert the generic values into values ___________________________________
specific to your plant and to a given fire scenario
___________________________________
– Approach is based on ignition source counting and apportionment of
the plant-wide frequency based on local population
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
12550194 2-39
Slide 47 Notes:
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
• Quite a bit is new relative to fire frequency:
– The fire event data have been re-analyzed entirely to suit the new ___________________________________
method
• That means older IPEEE-vintage frequencies are obsolete ___________________________________
– There has been a switch towards component-based fire frequencies ___________________________________
and away from generic room-based fire frequencies
– Some areas have received special treatment ___________________________________
• e.g., main control room
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
Slide 48 Notes:
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
Task 8: Scoping Fire Modeling (1 of 2) ___________________________________
___________________________________
• Objective: To identify (and screen out) fire ignition sources
that are non-threatening and need not be considered in ___________________________________
detailed fire modeling
___________________________________
• Non-threatening means they cannot:
– Spread fire to other combustibles, or ___________________________________
– Damage any FPRA equipment item or cable
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
Slide 48
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
12550194 2-40
Slide 49 Notes:
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
Task 8: Scoping Fire Modeling (2 of 2) ___________________________________
___________________________________
• Scoping fire modeling introduces a number of key concepts
associated with the treatment of fire sources and damage ___________________________________
targets
– The Fire Severity Profile approach ___________________________________
– Damage criteria for cables and equipment ___________________________________
– Assumptions associated with specific fire sources
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
Slide 49
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
Slide 50 Notes:
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
Task 11: Detailed Fire Modeling (1 of 3) ___________________________________
___________________________________
• Objective: To identify and analyze specific fire scenarios
___________________________________
• Divided into three sub-tasks:
– 12a: General fire compartments (as individual risk contributors) ___________________________________
– 12b: Main Control Room analysis
– 12c: Multi-Compartment fire scenarios ___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
12550194 2-41
Slide 51 Notes:
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
• Task 11 involves many key elements
– Selection of specific fire scenarios ___________________________________
• Combinations of fire sources and damage targets
___________________________________
– Analysis of fire growth/spread
• Application of fire models ___________________________________
– Analysis of fire damage
___________________________________
• Time to failure
– Analysis of fire detection and suppression ___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
Slide 52 Notes:
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
• Task 11 comes with a wide range of supporting appendices
including: ___________________________________
– Specific fire sources such as high energy arc faults, turbine generator
fires, and hydrogen fires ___________________________________
– Treatment of fire severity and severity factors
– Treatment of manual fire suppression ___________________________________
– Treatment for main control board fires
___________________________________
• Module will cover key appendices ___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
12550194 2-42
Slide 53 Notes:
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
Task 13: Seismic/Fire Interactions ___________________________________
___________________________________
• Objective: A qualitative assessment of potential fire/seismic
interactions ___________________________________
• Module will cover this task briefly ___________________________________
– No significant changes from IPEEE guidance (e.g., the Fire PRA
Implementation Guide) ___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
12550194 2-43
SESSION 3e: Sample Exercises / Sample Plant
12550194 2-44
Slide 54 Notes:
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
Sample Problems / Sample Plant ___________________________________
___________________________________
• All modules will involve hands-on exercises
– Intent: To illustrate key aspects of the methodology through a ___________________________________
cohesive set of sample problems
___________________________________
• All exercises are built around a common sample plant – the
SNPP ___________________________________
• The exercises are designed such that taking all modules ___________________________________
together presents a fairly complete picture of the FPRA
methodology ___________________________________
– Not every task is covered by the SNPP sample problems
– Not every aspect of covered tasks are illustrated ___________________________________
___________________________________
Slide 54
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
Slide 55 Notes:
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
The SNPP: Intent and Approach ___________________________________
___________________________________
• The SNPP is not intended to reflect either regulatory
compliance or good engineering practice ___________________________________
– It is purely an imaginary construct intended to highlight key aspects
of the methodology – nothing more! ___________________________________
• The SNPP has been kept as simple as possible while still ___________________________________
serving the needs of the training modules
___________________________________
• Aspects of the plant are assumed for purposes of the
training exercises, e.g.: ___________________________________
– BOP equipment not covered in detail
– Some systems are assumed to remain available ___________________________________
– Details will be provided in each module
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
12550194 2-45
Slide 56 Notes:
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
The SNPP: Plant Characteristics ___________________________________
___________________________________
• PWR with one primary coolant loop
– One steam generator, one RCP, one pressurizer ___________________________________
– Shared chemical volume control system
– Multiple train injection system ___________________________________
– Residual heat removal system
___________________________________
• Secondary side includes:
___________________________________
– Main steam and feedwater loop for the single steam generator
– Multiple train aux. feedwater to provide decay heat removal ___________________________________
• Additional specifications in Chapter 2 of handouts ___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
12550194 2-46
Slide 57
The SNPP: Primary Systems P&ID
Notes:
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
12550194 2-47
Slide 58
The SNPP: Secondary Systems P&ID
Notes:
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
12550194 2-48
Slide 59
The SNPP: Electrical One-Line Diagram

SWYD OFF-SITEPOWER
G EDG-A EDG-B
UAT-1 SUT-1

LC-1 LC-2 LC-A LC-B
COMP-1 MCC-B1
MCC-A1
MCC-1 MCC-2
(RackedOut)
MOV-17
MOV-10
MOV-13
MOV-16
MOV-1
MOV-3
MOV-5
MOV-2
MOV-4
MOV-6
MOV-8
MOV-9
MOV-7
ATS-1
MOV-18
MOV-19
BC-A BC-B
BAT-A BAT-B
BC-1
DC BUS-A DC BUS-B
BAT-1
DC BUS-1 Volt
Reg
INV-B
PNL-A PNL-B
MOV-11
INV-A
MOV-14
Non-Vital DC MOV-15
Loads
VITAL-A VITAL-B
SWGR-B
EDG-A
SWGR-A
SOV-3
SOV-2
Notes:
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
12550194 2-49
Slide 60
The SNPP: General Plant Layout - Plan
Notes:
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
12550194 2-50
Slide 61
The SNPP: Plant Layout – Elevation

Containment and Auxiliary Building
Notes:
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
12550194 2-51
Slide 62
The SNPP: Aux. Bld. – RHR Pump Room
Notes:
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
12550194 2-52
Slide 63
The SNPP: Aux. Bld. – Charging Pump Rm.
Notes:
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
12550194 2-53
Slide 64
The SNPP: Aux. Bld. – Switchgear Rooms
Notes:
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
12550194 2-54
Slide 65
The SNPP: Aux. Bld. – Cable Spreading Rm.
Notes:
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
12550194 2-55
Slide 66
The SNPP: Aux. Bld. – Main Control Room
Notes:
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
12550194 2-56
Slide 67
The SNPP: Main Control Board Layout
Notes:
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
12550194 2-57
Slide 68
The SNPP: Turbine Building
Notes:
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
12550194 2-58
Slide 69 Notes:
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
PART II
___________________________________
EPRI and RES Fire Research Activities
Relevant to Fire PRA
___________________________________
Topics: ___________________________________
• The ANS/ASME FPRA Standard ___________________________________
• The RES-
RES-EPRI Collaboration on Fire HRA
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
Slide 70 Notes:
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
The ASME/ANS Fire PRA Standard (briefly..)
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
12550194 2-59
Slide 71 Notes:
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
The Fire PRA Standard ___________________________________
• The ANS Fire PRA Standard has been published

___________________________________
• The technical content has been adopted in whole into Part III of the ___________________________________
ASME/ANS PRA standard
– Pending as a proposed revision to RA-S-2002 (RA-S-200X)
___________________________________
• NRC issued Draft for Comment R.G.1.200, Rev. 2, June 2008
• Be aware that some areas of the standard have evolved beyond the ___________________________________
guidance of NUREG/CR-6850 – EPRI TR 1011989
• Particular areas to note: ___________________________________
– Quantitative screening criteria
– Treatment of concurrent spurious actuations ___________________________________
– Instrument cable tracing (to verify diversity/availability)
___________________________________
___________________________________
Slide 71
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
12550194 2-60
SESSION 4: Fire HRA Guidelines Overview
12550194 2-61
Slide 1 Notes:
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
Joint EPRI / NRC
Fire Human Reliability Analysis ___________________________________
Guidelines Overview ___________________________________

___________________________________
Susan Cooper, USNRC ___________________________________
___________________________________
EPRI-NRC Fire PRA Training,
September and November, 2008 ___________________________________
1 ___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
Slide 2 Notes:
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
Presentation Outline ___________________________________
___________________________________
• Project Overview ___________________________________
– Team ___________________________________
– Tasks
___________________________________
• Technical Overview ___________________________________
– Objectives & scope
___________________________________
___________________________________
• Status
___________________________________
A Collaboration of U.S. NRC Office of Nuclear Regulatory Research
Research (RES) & Electric Power Research Institute (EPRI) 2 ___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
12550194 2-62
Slide 3 Notes:
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
Problem Statement ___________________________________
• NUREG/CR-6850 addresses screening, with ___________________________________

conservative data, but not detailed fire HRA ___________________________________
___________________________________
• 6850 Fire HRA approach applied at Nine Mile ___________________________________
Point (but not released)
___________________________________
___________________________________
• Over 40% of the USA plants are transitioning
to NFPA-805, 3-year time window to complete ___________________________________
transition ___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
12550194 2-63
Slide 4
Fire HRA Team

EPRI NRC
Frank Rahn (Bob Kassawara) Susan Cooper (Kendra Hill)
EPRI Project Manager NRC-RES Project Manager
EPRI RES
J. Julius & B. Najafi John Forester (Lead)
Jan Grobbelaar & K. Kohlhepp Susan Cooper
G. William Hannaman Stacey Hendrickson
Independent Review Team **

NRC Reps
Utility HRA Reps

Research (RES) & Electric Power Research Institute (EPRI) 4
Notes:
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
12550194 2-64
Slide 5 Notes:
___________________________________
___________________________________
Project Overview ___________________________________
1) Data collection ___________________________________
• Fire events (reviewed historical event data).
___________________________________
• Considered a range of plant responses (fire response strategies).
• Some plant interviews (with more during the testing phase). ___________________________________
2) Method Development
• Started with a review of the EPRI Fire HRA Guideline.
___________________________________
• Updated NUREG/CR-6850 screening for long time windows. ___________________________________
• Adding a Fire HRA Scoping (flowchart) method.
• Detailed Fire HRA based on EPRI approach or ATHEANA. ___________________________________
3) Testing ___________________________________
4) Documentation
• Joint NUREG/CR & EPRI report, similar to NUREG/CR-6850
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
Slide 6 Notes:
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
Fire HRA Guidelines: ___________________________________
Objectives and Scope
___________________________________
• Identify/analyze existing post-initiator HFEs ___________________________________
• Identify/analyze post-initiator fire response (App R) HFEs
– Includes Main Control Room abandonment. ___________________________________
• Identify/analyze post-initiator undesired spurious HFEs
___________________________________
• Implement post-initiator fire HEPs in fire PRA model(s)
– First quantification/screening and/or detailed fire PRA model. ___________________________________
– Including dependency analysis.
• Out of Scope ___________________________________
– Pre-initiators (per NUREG/CR-6850).
– Fire brigade response.
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
12550194 2-65
Slide 7 Notes:
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
Fire HRA Approach ___________________________________
___________________________________
• Examine HRA process, see how the process and tasks
would change in a post-fire environment or post-fire ___________________________________
accident response scenarios
• Done for each of the 3 categories of post-fire actions ___________________________________
– Existing post-initiator HFEs
– Post-initiator fire response (App R) HFEs ___________________________________
• Includes Main Control Room abandonment.
– Undesired response to spurious HFEs ___________________________________
• Progressive fire HRA tasks reflect fire PRA development
– Rough, quantitative screening per NUREG/CR-6850. ___________________________________
– Scoping fire HRA approach for scoping fire models.
– Detailed fire HRA using EPRI or NRC methods (joint project). ___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
Slide 8 Notes:
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
Existing Post-IE HFEs in ___________________________________
Base PRA
___________________________________
• Identification
– Base PRA HFEs modeled in fault & event trees. ___________________________________
– Those portions use to develop the plant response to fire-induced
initiating events. ___________________________________
• Definition - HFE modeling modified based on fire impacts:
– Cues and indications may be inaccurate.
___________________________________
– Time available may be reduced. ___________________________________
– Response time may increase.
– Workload may be high. ___________________________________
– Crew credited for recovery may not be available anymore.
– Stress may be higher. ___________________________________
– Accessibility may be impeded due to smoke, heat.
– Communication may be impacted. ___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
12550194 2-66
Slide 9 Notes:
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
Fire Response ___________________________________
Operator Actions
___________________________________
• Required in response to a fire, as directed by the fire
procedure/s e.g. ___________________________________
– Mitigate or prevent fire damage to equipment
– Recover existing internal events operator actions ___________________________________
– Mitigate undesired operator actions in response to spurious
indications or actuations ___________________________________
– Abandon main control room and perform safe shutdown outside
the main control room ___________________________________
• Identification process can be
– Iterative as required in fire PRA ___________________________________
– Comprehensive based on fire procedure/s
• Similar definition considerations, but procedures, training, ___________________________________
and cues can be significantly different that for existing.
• Example HFEs on next slide ___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
Slide 10 Notes:
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
Fire Response Action ___________________________________
Examples
___________________________________
• Identify protected instrumentation channels
(to mitigate spurious indications) ___________________________________
• Defeat solid state protection system (to prevent spurious
safety injection)
___________________________________
• Control auxiliary feedwater locally by throttling valves ___________________________________
manually and starting / stopping pumps
• Place back-up indication panels in service ___________________________________
• Obtain steam generator level locally ___________________________________
• De-energize all ADS valves
• Close HPCI steam supply valve locally ___________________________________
• Align 4 kV bus by locally operating breakers ___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
12550194 2-67
Slide 11 Notes:
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
Undesired Response to
___________________________________
Spurious Operations
___________________________________
• A definition of an undesired operator action is a well ___________________________________
intentioned operator action that unintentionally aggravates
the scenario ___________________________________
– Operators are trained to (1) believe their instrumentation and (2) to
follow their procedures
___________________________________
___________________________________
• To be identified within the context of the accident
progression ___________________________________
– Emergency operating procedures
– Annunciator response procedures
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
Slide 12 Notes:
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
Fire HRA Guideline
___________________________________
Summary
1. Standard HRA process used for Fire HRA modeling: ___________________________________
- Based on other processes (e.g., NUREG-1792, EPRI Fire HRA
Guidelines, SHARP1, ATHEANA) ___________________________________
2. Fire HRA steps:
– Identification & definition of human failure events (HFEs): ___________________________________
• Substantial guidance provided, including feasibility test
• Feasibility Evaluation (Go / No-Go) example criteria ___________________________________
– Sufficient time available to complete action
– Sufficient manpower ___________________________________
– Procedures & cues exist
– NUREG/CR-6850 screening: ___________________________________
• Refinement/relaxation for areas identified in NUREG/CR-
6850 implementation
– Qualitative HRA analysis activities described: ___________________________________
• Certain activities required for all analyses; others only for
specific detailed HRA methods ___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
12550194 2-68
Slide 13 Notes:
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
Fire HRA Guideline ___________________________________
Summary (cont.) ___________________________________
2. Fire HRA steps: (continued) ___________________________________
– Scoping Fire HRA method added (new):
• Developed to address the majority of HFEs, thereby ___________________________________
conserving HRA resources
• Guidance being developed to aid reproducibility & ability to ___________________________________
review
• Can be used for defined scenario contexts that are ___________________________________
generalized & constrained with respect to PSFs, etc.
• Current format: decision trees
___________________________________
– Used existing methods for detailed Fire HRA, with
performance shaping factors modified for Fire PRA: ___________________________________
• EPRI Cause-Based Decision Tree & HCR/ORE; plus THERP
• ATHEANA ___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
Slide 14 Notes:
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
Qualitative Analysis ___________________________________
includes….
___________________________________
• Performance shaping factors that may ___________________________________
impact specific fire scenarios, such as:
___________________________________
– Timing (primarily increased response times)
– Instrumentation (i.e., cues for action & potential ___________________________________
unavailability or spurious actuation) ___________________________________
– Stress
___________________________________
– Procedure quality
– Workload ___________________________________
– Complexity ___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
12550194 2-69
Slide 15 Notes:
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
Quantification Methods ___________________________________
___________________________________
• Fire HRA quantification method can vary, commensurate
with the Fire PRA task where it is modeled, such as: ___________________________________
– NUREG/CR-6850 HRA screening for first quantification
• Revised NUREG/CR-6850 to reduce conservatism for long term ___________________________________
actions in sets 1 and 2 (for actions after the fire is out).
– Scoping Fire HRA method added as fire PRA iteratively quantified to ___________________________________
refine the quantification of areas
– Detailed Fire HRA for more detailed scenarios
___________________________________
• Using existing methods with performance shaping factors
modified for Fire PRA
___________________________________
– ATHEANA
– EPRI Cause-Based Decision Tree & Human Cognitive Reliability /
___________________________________
Operator Reliability Experiments
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
12550194 2-70
Slide 16
Scoping HRA Analysis for New & Existing
HFEs in the MCR (part one)
New & Existing
HFEs in MCR
In MCR Ac tions HFE

Demonstrated (transfer from MCR
feasibility Abandonment
Flowc hart)
All nec essary &

suffic ient c ues & Time of Transfer to
Yes <= 60 mins MCR Ac tions
c ontrols for req'd c ue for
ac tions are not ac tion? (part 2)
impac ted by fire.
> 60 mins
Cue is after
No
the fire effec ts New HFE: HEP = 1 E- 3
have ended Existing HFE: existing
Need to c onsider
HEP
spurious indic ators
>= 100%
What is
the time
margin?
Consider both EOC and What type of
EOO. Complete both error is
Unknown
Spurious Indic ator generated by 50 - 99%
Flowc harts the spurious 0 - 49%
indic ator?
New HFE: HEP = 5 E- 3
Existing HFE: inc rease
HEP = 1.0 HEP by fac tor of 5
EOC EOO
Transfer to Spurious Transfer to Spurious

Indic ator Flowc hart Indic ator Flowc hart
for EOC for EOO

Notes:
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
12550194 2-71
Slide 17
Scoping HRA Analysis for New & Existing

HFEs in the MCR (part two)
MCR Transfer to MCR

Do the Smoke or other
abandonment Abandonment or
>= 100% procedures Yes hazardous effect Yes SCBA Yes Yes
conditions (e.g., HEP = 1.0 Alternative
match the (e.g., toxic gas) required?
high level of Shutdown
scenarios? in MCR?
smoke)?
No
No
No No
MCR Actions (part New HFE: HEP = 0.01
2) HEP = 1.0 Existing HFE: increase
New HFE: HEP = 1 E-3 HEP by factor of 10 New HFE: HEP = 0.05
Existing HFE: existing HEP Existing HFE: increase
HEP by factor of 20
Transfer to MCR
Do the Smoke or other MCR abandonment
What is Abandonment or
50-99% procedures Yes hazardous effect Yes SCBA Yes conditions (e.g., Yes
the time HEP = 1.0 Alternative
match the (e.g., toxic gas) required? high level of
margin? Shutdown Flowchart
scenarios? in MCR? smoke)?
No
No No
No
New HFE: HEP = 0.05
HEP = 1.0 Existing HFE: increase
New HFE: HEP = 0.01 New HFE: HEP = 0.1
HEP by factor of 20
Existing HFE: increase HEP by factor of Existing HFE: increase
10 HEP by factor of 50
Do the Smoke or other

25-49%
procedures Yes hazardous effect Yes HEP = 1.0
match the (e.g., toxic gas)
scenarios? in MCR?
No No
0-24%
HEP = 1.0
New HFE: HEP = 0.05
Existing HFE: increase
HEP by factor of 50

Notes:
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
12550194 2-72
Slide 18 Notes:
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
Joint NRC / EPRI ___________________________________
Fire HRA Schedule
___________________________________
– Started March 5, 2007 ___________________________________
– Meetings held June, July, Sept & Nov’07 ___________________________________
– First integrated draft May 2008 ___________________________________
– 1st peer review in June 2008
___________________________________
– Testing at 2 plants (in progress)
– 2nd peer review planned ___________________________________
– Public comment period planned for 2008/2009 ___________________________________
– Publication scheduled for Summer 2009 ___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
Slide 19 Notes:
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
Fire HRA Peer Review
___________________________________
& Testing
Peer Review Phase-1: NRC and industry team with 8 reviewers ___________________________________
• In general, was the right approach taken and implemented?
– Is the technical approach sound and reasonable? ___________________________________
– Are the selected HRA models appropriate for the application?
– Are the assumptions presented in this methodology reasonable? ___________________________________
– Does the guidance meet its stated objectives?
Testing
___________________________________
• Plant 1: Conducted in August, tested the flowcharts ___________________________________
• Plant 2: Scheduled for September
Peer Review Phase-2: ___________________________________
• Phase-2 to be conducted after testing
– Were the issues identified during the phase one review and testing
___________________________________
addressed?
– After addressing any issues does the method still meet the Phase-1 ___________________________________
criteria?
___________________________________
___________________________________
12550194 2-73
Slide 20 Notes:
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
Fire HRA Guideline
___________________________________
Summary
1. Standard HRA process used for Fire HRA modeling ___________________________________
2. Developing Fire HRA methodology & guidelines:
___________________________________
– Relaxation added to NUREG/CR-6850 screening
– Scoping Fire HRA method added (new) ___________________________________
– Used existing methods for detailed HRA, with
performance shaping factors modified for Fire PRA
___________________________________
• ATHEANA ___________________________________
• EPRI Cause-Based Decision Tree & HCR/ORE
3. Test methods & guidelines: ___________________________________
– Screening HEPs as well as HEPs supporting detailed
fire scenarios
___________________________________
4. Coordinated between the NRC and Industry via the ___________________________________
EPRI HRA Users Group
___________________________________
___________________________________
12550194 2-74
MODULE 1:
PRA/HRA (SYSTEMS ANALYSIS)
INTRODUCTION
With the adoption of NFPA 805 as an acceptable alternative to existing standards for fire
protection in NPPs, a systematic approach to performance-based analysis was developed for the
quantification of risks associated with fire. An integrated approach to conducting a fire PRA was
necessary to combine accident response modeling in response to a fire (including manual
actions) and the frequency and progression of fire with fire protection features and systems.
PRA is also highly iterative to enable successive refining of results as needed. The seven
sessions related to the PRA/HRA (Systems Analysis) module in this part of the NUREG/CP
report provide an introduction to many important elements in this risk quantification.
As discussed in the preceding “OVERALL COURSE” part of this report, the PRA/HRA Module
includes Technical Tasks 2, 4, 5, 7, 12, 14, 15, and 16 from NUREG/CR-6850. All of these
tasks (except Task 16, “Fire PRA Documentation”) are discussed in the MODULE 1 SESSIONS
summarized below and presented in detail in the remainder of this part of the NUREG/CP report.
SESSION 1a discusses Task 2, “Fire PRA Component Selection,” in which the scope of the
particular PRA is defined. A procedure is developed for choosing particular plant components to
be modeled, generating a list that forms the basis of subsequent systems, electrical, and fire
tasks. This task defines the scope of the selected components including equipment that could
mitigate core damage, equipment that could cause initiating events, and equipment that could
cause spurious actuations.
SESSION 1b presents the exercises for all seven of the Task 2 steps as discussed in Section
1.6.2, “Example Exercises,” in the first part of this Volume 1, “OVERALL COURSE,” in its
Section 1, “COURSE OVERVIEW.” Appendix B of this Volume 1 presents the instructor’s
solution for these exercises.
SESSION 2 discusses Task 5, “Fire Induced Risk Model Development.” This task discusses
development of a logic model that reflects plant response following a fire. Specific instructions
are provided for treatment of fire-specific procedures or preplans. These procedures may impact
SESSION 3 discusses Task 4, “Qualitative Screening,” and Task 7, “Quantitative Screening.”

Task 4 identifies fire analysis compartments that can be shown to have little or no risk
significance without relying on a quantitative risk analysis of those compartments. Fire
compartments may be screened out if they contain no components or cables identified in Task 2
12550194 3-1
and Task 3 1 , and if they cannot lead to a plant trip because of plant procedures, an automatic trip
signal, or technical specification requirements. Qualitative screening decreases the work
required in later parts of the PRA. Task 7, “Quantitative Screening,” discusses an approximate
evaluation of quantitative risk associated with each compartment to determine which
compartments screen out (i.e., for which detailed analyses will not be performed). However,
approximate (conservatively bounding) residual risks for “screened out” compartments are
retained in the final detailed quantification (i.e., Task 14) to ensure that fire risk is not
underestimated.
SESSION 4 discusses Task 12a, “Screening Post-Fire HRA,” in which human interactions with
the plant components vulnerable to fire risk are considered. The task provides structured
instructions for identification and inclusion of these actions in the fire PRA. It also provides
instructions for estimating screening human error probabilities (HEPs) before detailed fire
modeling results (e.g., fire growth and damage behaviors) or detailed circuit analyses (e.g., can
the circuit spuriously actuate as opposed to simply assuming it can) have been developed. It
does not develop a detailed fire HRA methodology. A number of HRA methods can be adopted
for fire with appropriate additional instructions that superimpose fire effects on any of the
existing HRA methods such as THERP, CBDT, ATHEANA, etc. This would improve
consistency across analyses (i.e., fire and internal events PRA).
SESSION 5 discusses Task 12b, “Post-Fire HRA Detailed Analysis,” in which nonscreened
HRA-related contributions to the fire risk from plant ignition sources are quantified. For
example, it discusses performance shaping factors that should be considered such as staff
resources available at the time of the fire, applicability and suitability of their training and
experience, suitability of relevant procedural and administrative controls, availability and clarity
of instrumentation, time available vs. time needed to complete actions, the environment in which
the actions are to be performed, and the accessibility and operability of needed equipment.
SESSION 6 discusses Task 14, “Fire Risk Quantification,” in which risks are determined for non
“screened out” compartments, and inputs from all other Tasks are compiled (e.g., the residual
risk from screened-out compartments from Task 7, etc.).
SESSION 7 discusses Task 15, “Uncertainty and Sensitivity Analysis,” where treatment may
vary from identification of sources of uncertainty to quantitative estimation and propagation of
uncertainties. The treatment may also include one-at-a-time variation of individual parameter
values to determine the effect on the overall fire risk (sensitivity analysis).
1
Task 3 from NUREG/CR-6850 is “Fire PRA Cable Selection,” in which electric cables are identified that support
components selected in Task 2. Task 3 is discussed in detail in Volume 2 (“Module 2: Electrical Analysis”) of this
NUREG/CP report.
12550194 3-2
SESSION 1a: Fire PRA Component Selection
12550194 3-3
Notes:
Slide 1 ___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
METHODOLOGY
___________________________________
Task 2 - Fire PRA Component Selection ___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
September and November 2008
___________________________________
Bethesda, MD
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
Slide 2 Notes:
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
Component Selection
Purpose ___________________________________
___________________________________
• Purpose: describe the procedure for selecting plant
components to be modeled in a Fire PRA ___________________________________
• Fire PRA Component List
___________________________________
– Key source of information for developing Fire PRA
Model (Task 5) ___________________________________
• Used to identify cables that must be located (Task 3)
• Process is iterative to ensure appropriate agreement ___________________________________
among fire PRA Component List, Fire PRA Model, and
cable identification
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
Fire PRA Workshop, Bethesda MD, 2008 A Collaboration of U.S. NRC Office of Nuclear Regulatory
Task 2: Component Selection
Slide 2
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
12550194 3-4
Slide 3 Notes:
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
Task 2: Fire PRA Component Selection ___________________________________
Scope
___________________________________
Fire PRA Component List should include following major categories of equipment:
• Equipment whose fire-induced failure (including spurious actuation) causes an
___________________________________
initiating event
– Model initiating events, not the specific equipment
___________________________________
– Need to identify worst-case initiator for each compartment
• Equipment needed to perform mitigating safety functions and to support
___________________________________
operator actions
• Equipment whose fire-induced failure or spurious actuation may adversely
___________________________________
impact credited mitigating safety functions
• Equipment whose fire-induced failure or spurious actuation may cause
___________________________________
inappropriate or unsafe operator actions
• Recommended to include passive systems in list even though they are not
___________________________________
susceptible to fire
___________________________________
Fire PRA Workshop, Bethesda MD, 2008 Slide 3

___________________________________
Task 2: Component Selection Research (RES) & Electric Power Research Institute (EPRI)
___________________________________
___________________________________
Slide 4 Notes:
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
Component Selection ___________________________________

Approach ___________________________________
• Step 1: Identify Internal Events PRA sequences to include in fire PRA Model
(necessary for identifying important equipment)
___________________________________
• Step 2: Review Internal Events PRA model against the Fire Safe Shutdown ___________________________________
(SSD) Analysis and reconcile differences in the two analyses
• Step 3: Identify fire-induced initiating events based on equipment affected

___________________________________
• Step 4: Identify equipment subject to fire-induced spurious operation that ___________________________________
may challenge the safe shutdown capability
___________________________________
• Step 5: Identify additional mitigating, instrumentation, and diagnostic
equipment important to human response
___________________________________
• Step 6: Include “potentially high consequence” related equipment
___________________________________
• Step 7: Assemble the Fire PRA Component List
Fire PRA Workshop, Bethesda MD, 2008 Slide 4 A Collaboration of U.S. NRC Office of Nuclear Regulatory
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
12550194 3-5
Slide 5 Notes:
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
General Observations
___________________________________
• Two major sources of existing information are used to generate the Fire PRA
Component List:
___________________________________
• Internal Events PRA model
• Fire Safe Shutdown Analysis (Appendix R assessment)
• Just “tweaking” your Internal Events PRA is probably NOT sufficient – requires
___________________________________
additional effort
–
–
Consideration of fire-induced spurious operation of equipment
Potential for undesirable operator actions due to spurious alarms/indications
___________________________________
– Additional operator actions for responding to fire (e.g., opening breakers to prevent spurious
operation) ___________________________________
• Just crediting Appendix R components may NOT be conservative
– True that all other components in Internal Events PRA will be assumed to fail, but:
• May be missing components with adverse risk implications (e.g., event initiators or
___________________________________
complicate SSD response)
• May miss effects of non-modeled components on credited (modeled) systems/components
and on operator performance
___________________________________
• Still need to consider non-credited components as sources of fires
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
12550194 3-6
Slide 6
Task 2: Fire PRA Component Selection

Overview of Scope
In Appendix R
In Internal Events PRA
CDF/LERF vs.
New* analysis resources
tradeoff
* - multiple spurious
- new sequences
In Fire PRA
perhaps not all
of Appendix R
New*
not all
internal event
sequences
Notes:
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
12550194 3-7
Slide 7 Notes:
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
Key Assumptions ___________________________________
The following key assumptions underlie this procedure: ___________________________________

• A good quality Internal Events PRA and App. R Safe Shutdown Analysis ___________________________________
are available
• Analysts have considerable collective knowledge and understanding of

___________________________________
plant systems, operator performance, the Internal Events PRA, and App.
R SSD analysis ___________________________________
• Steps 4 thru 6 are applied to determine an appropriate number of ___________________________________
spurious actuations to consider
– Configurations, timing, length of sustained spurious actuation, cable
___________________________________
material, etc. among reasons to limit what will be modeled
___________________________________
– Note that HS duration is a current FAQ topic…
___________________________________
Slide 7
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
Slide 8 Notes:
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
From: Lessons Learned and Insights
In-process FAQs … ___________________________________
• FAQ 08-0051 ___________________________________

– Issue:
• The guidance does not provide a method for estimating the
___________________________________
duration of a hot short once formed
• This could be a significant factor for certain types of plant ___________________________________
equipment that will return to a “fail safe” position if the hot short is
removed ___________________________________
– General approach to resolution:
• Analyze the cable fire test data to determine if an adequate basis ___________________________________
exists to establish hot short duration distributions
– Status: ___________________________________
• Initial data analysis has been completed and results are under
team review
• Staff and industry review pending
___________________________________
• Final revisions, as needed, pending - remove
___________________________________
Slide 8
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
12550194 3-8
Slide 9 Notes:
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________

Inputs/Outputs
___________________________________
Task inputs and outputs: ___________________________________
• Inputs from other tasks: equipment considerations for
operator actions from Task 12 (Post-Fire HRA) ___________________________________
• Could use inputs from other tasks to show equipment does ___________________________________
not have to be modeled (e.g., Task 9 – Detailed Circuit
Analysis or Task 11 - Fire Modeling to show an equipment ___________________________________
item cannot spuriously fail or be affected by possible fires)
___________________________________
• Outputs to Task 3 (Cable Selection) and Task 5 (Risk
Model) ___________________________________
• Choices made in this task set the overall analysis scope ___________________________________
___________________________________
Slide 9
___________________________________
___________________________________
Slide 10 Notes:
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________

Steps In Procedure/Details
___________________________________
Step 1: Identify sequences to include and exclude from Fire ___________________________________

PRA ___________________________________
• Some sequences can generally be excluded
– Sequences requiring passive/mechanical failures that can not be initiated by
fires (e.g., pipe-break LOCAs, SGTR, vessel rupture) ___________________________________
– Sequences that can be caused by a fire but are low frequency (e.g., ATWS)
– It may be decided to not model certain systems (i.e., assume failed for Fire ___________________________________
PRA) thereby excluding some sequences (e.g., main feedwater as a mitigating
system not important)
• Possible additional sequences (recommend use of expert panel to
___________________________________
address plant specific considerations)
– Sequences associated with spurious operation (e.g., vessel/SG overfills, ___________________________________
PORV opening, letdown or other pressure/level control anomalies)
– MCR abandonment scenarios and other sequences arising from Fire ___________________________________
Emergency Procedures (FEPs) and/or use of local manual actions
___________________________________
Slide 10
___________________________________
___________________________________
12550194 3-9
Slide 11 Notes:
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________

___________________________________
Step 2: Compare Internal Events PRA model to App. R SSD list
___________________________________
• Identify and reconcile:
– differences in functions, success criteria, and sequences (e.g., App. R- ___________________________________
no feed/bleed; PRA-feed/bleed)
___________________________________
– front-line and support system differences (e.g., App. R-need HVAC;
PRA-do not need HVAC)
___________________________________
– system and equipment differences due to end state and mission
considerations (e.g., App. R-cold shutdown; PRA-hot shutdown) ___________________________________
– other miscellaneous equipment differences.
___________________________________
• Include review of manual actions (e.g., actions needed for safe shutdown)
in conjunction with Task 12
___________________________________

___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
Slide 12 Notes:
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________

___________________________________
Step 3: Identify fire-induced initiating events. Consider:
___________________________________
• Equipment whose failure (including spurious actuation) will cause
automatic plant trip ___________________________________
• Equipment whose failure (including spurious actuation) will likely result in
manual plant trip, per procedures ___________________________________
• Equipment whose failure (including spurious actuation) will invoke Tech.
Spec. LCO necessitating a forced shutdown while fire may still be present ___________________________________
(prior EPRI guidance recommended consideration of <8-hr LCO)
___________________________________
• Compartments with none of the above need not have initiator though can
conservatively assume simple plant trip ___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
Slide 12
___________________________________
___________________________________
12550194 3-10
Slide 13 Notes:
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________

___________________________________
• Since not all equipment/cable locations in the plant (e.g., all BOP) may ___________________________________
be identified, judgment involved in ‘likely’ cable paths
– Need a basis for any case where routing is not verified

___________________________________
– Routing by exclusion (e.g., from a fire area, compartment, ___________________________________

raceway…) is a common and acceptable approach
___________________________________
• Identify worst-case initiator based on possible initiators and other
mitigating equipment likely to be affected ___________________________________
• Should consider spurious event(s) contributing to initiators ___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
Slide 13
___________________________________
___________________________________
12550194 3-11
Slide 14

Instrument
Air
Compartment Compartment Compartment
Compressor
XX YY ZZ
Cables judged
Compartment Compartment to be here
AA BB
Compartment Compartment MCCs

CC DD
Fires cause loss of

instrument air Fires assumed to cause loss of Fires assumed to cause loss
instrument air of MCC(s) & subsequent
effects (including loss of
instrument air)
Slide 14
Notes:
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
12550194 3-12
Slide 15 Notes:
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
Steps In Procedure/Details ___________________________________
___________________________________
Step 4: Identify equipment whose spurious actuation may
challenge ability to avoid core damage/large early release ___________________________________
• Consider multiple spurious events within each system ___________________________________
considering success criteria
• Involves review of system P&IDs and other drawings ___________________________________
• Focus on equipment or failure modes not already on the ___________________________________
component list (e.g., flow diversion paths)
___________________________________
• Any new equipment/failure modes should be added to
component list for subsequent cable-tracing and circuit ___________________________________
analysis
___________________________________
Slide 15
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
12550194 3-13
Slide 16

Flow Diversion Path Examples
from main to diversion takes 2 spurious

flowpath path hot shorts to
open diversion
Div A MOV Div B MOV path
Included in model
takes 1 spurious
to diversion hot short &
from main path
flowpath failure of check
Div A MOV valve to open
CheckValve diversion path
Screened from model

if not potential high
consequence event
Slide 16
Notes:
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
12550194 3-14
Slide 17

Example of a New Failure Mode of a Component
App. R ensures MSIVs
will close / remain closed
Containment so as to isolate vessel1
Main Steam Line

Reactor
Vessel
Inboard MSIV Outboard MSIV
Fire PRA concerned with

MSIVs closing / remaining
closed AND will not
spuriously close when want
valves to remain open so as to
use condenser as heat sink1
1
different cables and corresponding
circuits and analyses may need to
be accounted for
Slide 17
Notes:
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
12550194 3-15
Slide 18 Notes:
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
Step 5: Identify additional instrumentation/diagnostic equipment important ___________________________________

to operator response (level of redundancy matters!)
___________________________________
• Identify human actions of interest in conjunction with Task 12
• Identify instrumentation and diagnostic equipment associated with ___________________________________
credited and potentially harmful human actions considering spurious
indications related to each action ___________________________________
– Is there insufficient redundancy to credit desired actions in
EOPs/FEPs/ARPs in spite of failed/spurious indications? ___________________________________
– Can a spurious indication(s) cause an undesired action because action is
dependent on an indication that could be ‘false’? ___________________________________
– If yes – put indication on component list for cable/circuit review
• Watch for new/expanded guidance to be developed by the RES/EPRI ___________________________________
fire HRA collaboration…
___________________________________
Slide 18
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
Slide 19 Notes:
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________

___________________________________
Guidance on identification of harmful spurious operating
instrumentation and diagnostic equipment: ___________________________________
• Assume instrumentation is its normal configuration
___________________________________
• Focus on instrumentation with little redundancy
– Note that fire PRA standard has language on this subject (i.e., ___________________________________
verification of instrument redundancy in fire context)
• When verification of a spurious indication is required (and reliably ___________________________________
performed), it may be eliminated from consideration
• When multiple and diverse indications must spuriously occur, those ___________________________________
failures can be eliminated if the HRA shows that such failures would
not likely cause a harmful operator action
• Include spurious operation of electrical equipment that would cause a
___________________________________
faulty indication and harmful action
• Include inter-system effects
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
12550194 3-16
Slide 20 Notes:
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
Step 6: Include “potentially high consequence” related equipment
___________________________________
• High consequence events are one or more related failures at least
partially caused by fire that:
___________________________________
– by themselves cause core damage and large early release, or
– single component failures that cause loss of entire safety function and lead ___________________________________
directly to core damage
• Example of first case: spurious opening of two valves in high- ___________________________________
pressure/low pressure RCS interface, leading to ISLOCA
• Example of second case: spurious opening of single valve that drains ___________________________________
safety injection water source
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
Slide 21 Notes:
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________

___________________________________
Step 7: Assemble Fire PRA component list. Should include ___________________________________
following information:
___________________________________
• Equipment ID and description (may be indicator or alarm)
• System designation ___________________________________
• Equipment type and location (at least compartment ID) ___________________________________
• PRA event ID and description
___________________________________
• Normal and desired position/status
• Failed electrical/air position
___________________________________
• References, comments, and notes ___________________________________

___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
12550194 3-17
Slide 22 Notes:
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
Sample Problem Exercise for Task 2, Step 1
___________________________________
• Distribute blank handout for Task 2, Step 1 ___________________________________
___________________________________
• Distribute completed handout for Task 2, Step 1
___________________________________
• Question and Answer Session ___________________________________

___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
Slide 22
___________________________________
___________________________________
Slide 23 Notes:
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
Sample Problem Exercise for Task 2, Steps 2 ___________________________________
and 3 ___________________________________
___________________________________
• Distribute completed handout for Task 2, Step 2 Question
and Answer Session ___________________________________
___________________________________
• Discuss Step 3
___________________________________
___________________________________
• Question and Answer Session
___________________________________

___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
12550194 3-18
Slide 24 Notes:
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
Sample Problem Exercise for Task 2, Steps 4 ___________________________________
through 6 ___________________________________
• Distribute blank handout for Task 2, Steps 4 through 6 ___________________________________
___________________________________
• Distribute completed handout for Task 2, Steps 4 through 6
___________________________________
___________________________________
• Question and Answer Session
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________

___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
Slide 25 Notes:
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
Sample Problem Exercise for Task 2, Step 7
___________________________________
___________________________________
• Distribute completed handout for Task 2, Step 7
___________________________________

___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
Slide 25
___________________________________
___________________________________
12550194 3-19
SESSION 1b: Example Exercises
12550194 3-20
Step 1: Identify Internal Events PRA Sequences to be Included (and
those to be excluded) in the Fire PRA Model
INITIATING EVENTS IN THE PRA MODEL
Initiator Average Description Accident Address

Comments
Frequency Sequence in Fire
(per yr) or Event PRA
Tree Model?
Model (Y or N)
%T1 7.23E-01 Reactor Trip Transient

Event
Tree
%T2 9.33E-02 Loss of Transient

Condenser Event
Vacuum Tree
%T3 4.13E-01 Turbine trip Transient

Event
Tree
%T4 3.73E-02 Loss of Main Transient

Feedwater Event
Tree
%T5P 4.25E-02 Loss of Offsite Transient

Power (Plant- Event
Centered) Tree
%T5C 1.02E-02 Loss of Off-Site Transient

Power (Grid- Event
Related) Tree
%T5D 6.26E-03 Loss of Off-Site Transient

Power (Weather- Event
Induced) Tree
%T6 7.35E-03 Steamline/Feed Main

line Break Steamline
Upstream of Break
Main Steam Event
Isolation valves Tree
or Downstream
of Feedwater
Isolation Valves
(Includes Stuck-
Open Secondary
relief valves)
%T7 5.44E-03 Steamline Break Main

Downstream of Steamline
12550194 3-21

Comments
Tree Model?
Model (Y or N)
Main Steam Break
isolation valves Event
(Includes Stuck-
Open Secondary
relief valves)
%T8 2.94E-04 Loss of 4160 V Transient

Bus 1 Event
Tree

Bus A Event
Tree

Bus B Event
Tree

Bus 2 Event
Tree
%T12 3.00E-03 Loss of 125 VDC Transient

Bus A Event
Tree
%T13 3.00E-03 Loss of 125 VDC Transient

Bus B Event
Tree
%T15 Fault Tree Loss of CCW Transient

Model System Event
%T15-INIT Tree
%T16 Fault Tree Loss of Service Transient

Model Water System Event
%T16-INIT Tree
%T17 Fault Tree Loss of Transient

Model Instrument Air Event
%T17- Tree
INIT
%T21 3.41E-02 Closure of MSIV Transient

(1 SG Loop) Event
Tree
%T22 1.24E-02 Closure of both Transient

MSIVs Event
12550194 3-22

Comments
Tree Model?
Model (Y or N)
Tree
%T23 1.78E-01 Partial Load Transient

Rejection Event
Tree
%T24 5.79E-02 Spurious Steam Transient

Gen. Isolation Event
Signal Tree
%T25 7.23E-02 Reactor Trip With Transient

PORV Event
Opening/Demand Tree
%T26 Fault Tree Loss of Power Transient

Model from120 VAC Event
%T26- Buses A & B Tree
INIT
%S 6.8E-03 Small LOCA Small

(pipe breaks and LOCA
RCP seal LOCA) Event
Tree
%M 9.60E-06 Medium LOCA Medium

(pipe breaks) LOCA
Event
Tree
%A 7.77E-05 Large LOCA Large

(pipe breaks) LOCA
Event
Tree
%R 7.93E-03 Steam Generator SGTR

Tube Rupture Event
Tree
%I2 2.000E-07 Interfacing ISLRHR

Systems LOCA Sequence
at RCS/RHR (single
Interface (2 event
MOVs in series) model)
%I3 Fault Tree Interfacing ISLCCW

Model Systems LOCA Sequence
I3QINIT at RCS/CCW
interface
(Reactor Coolant
12550194 3-23

Comments
Tree Model?
Model (Y or N)
Pump Cooler
rupture)
%VR 2.70E-07 Reactor Vessel Single

Rupture Event in
Master
Fault Tree
12550194 3-24
ACCIDENT SEQUENCE OR EVENT TREE MODELS IN THE PRA
Accident Description Additional Details Address in Comments
Sequence or Fire PRA
Event Tree Model?
Model (Y or N)
TRA Transient Includes transient-
induced LOCAs such
as stuck-open PORV
and RCP seal LOCA
SLOCA Small LOCA Pipe breaks & RCP
seal LOCA
MLOCA Medium LOCA Pipe breaks
LLOCA Large LOCA Pipe breaks
ATWS Anticipated Reactor Protection
Transients System fails safe on
Without Scram loss of power. Trip
circuits are highly
redundant and
confirmed to be
physically separated.
SGTR Steam Generator
Tube Rupture
MSLB Main Steamline Includes spurious
Break opening of secondary
relief valves.
ISLCCW Interfacing Rupture of Reactor
Systems LOCA at Coolant Pump Cooler
RCS/CCW
interface
ISLRHR Interfacing Fire-induced opening
Systems LOCA at of RHR suction valves
RCS/RHR
Interface
New?
New?
12550194 3-25
Step 2: Review of the Internal Events PRA Against the Fire Safe
Shutdown Analysis
TABLE 1: SYSTEMS IN PRA MODEL
System Description Additional Details Address Comments

in Fire
PRA
Model?
(Y or N)
RCS Reactor PORV for pressure relief and feed

Coolant & bleed. Stuck-open PORV
System causes small LOCA.
CVCS Chemical and Normal charging and letdown

Volume Control functions are not modeled.
System However, components required to
isolate charging and letdown are
modeled for HPI mode.
HPI High Pressure The charging pumps in the CVCS

Injection also function as safety injection
System pumps.
RHR Residual Heat Shutdown cooling is not modeled

Removal
System
AFW Auxiliary Only Trains A and B are modeled

Feedwater
System
MFW Main Feed Would take considerable effort to

Water get cables involved and their
locations
MS Main Steam Stuck-open secondary relief

System valves could cause equivalent of
mainsteam line break.
12550194 3-26

in Fire
PRA
Model?
(Y or N)
CS Containment Required for recirculation during

Spray LOCA
CF Containment Required for recirculation during

Fan Coolers LOCA
CI Containment Modeled in LERF

Isolation
ESFAS Emergency
Safeguards
Actuation
System
CCW Component
Cooling Water
System
SW Service Water
System
AC AC Power (all To extent power is needed to

voltage levels) support equipment in the PRA.
DG Emergency
Diesel
Generators
DC DC Power To extent power is needed to

support equipment in the PRA.
IA Instrument Air Required for PORV and other

valves. Backup nitrogen is
provided for PORV and is what is
credited.
12550194 3-27

in Fire
PRA
Model?
(Y or N)
HVAC- HVAC in HPI HVAC is required during 24-hr

HPI Pump Room PRA mission
12550194 3-28
TABLE 2: SYSTEMS IN APPENDIX R

in Fire
PRA
Model?
(Y or N)
RCS Reactor Coolant PORV to prevent

System spurious opening and
consequential small
LOCA.
CVCS Chemical Volume Normal charging and

and Control letdown functions are
System credited.
RHR Residual heat Shutdown cooling is

Removal System credited
AFW Auxiliary Trains A&C are credited

Feedwater
System
MS Main Steam Secondary relief valves

System and MSIVs are included
to prevent spurious
opening causing
uncontrolled secondary
depressurization.
CCW Component
Cooling Water
System
SW Service Water
System
AC AC Power (all But certain buses not

voltage levels) credited (especially non-
safety) if loads not
12550194 3-29

in Fire
PRA
Model?
(Y or N)
otherwise required for
safe shutdown
DG Emergency
Diesel
Generators
DC DC Power But certain buses not

credited (especially non-
safety) if loads not
otherwise required for
safe shutdown
RCS RCS pressure, Required for safe

Instruments temperature, shutdown monitoring.
nuclear
instrumentation,
etc
IA Instrument Air Required for PORV and

other valves. Backup
nitrogen is provided for
PORV.
Secondary Steam Generator Required for safe

Instruments level, Streamline shutdown monitoring.
pressure, etc.
HVAC-HPI HVAC in HPI HVAC is required during

Pump Room 72-hr Appendix R
mission
HVAC-AFW HVAC in AFW HVAC is required during

Pump Room 72-hr Appendix R
12550194 3-30

in Fire
PRA
Model?
(Y or N)
mission
12550194 3-31
TABLE 3: LIST OF BASIC EVENTS IN MODEL
Basic Event Description
%I2 Interfacing Systems LOCA at RCS/RHR Interface (2 MOVs in series)
%I3 Interfacing Systems LOCA at RCS/CCW interface (Reactor Coolant Pump Cooler rupture)
%T15 LOSS OF COMPONENT COOLING WATER (CCW)
%T23 PARTIAL LOAD REJECTION
%T25 REACTOR TRIP WITH PORV OPENING
%T3 TURBINE TRIP
%T4 LOSS OF MAIN FEEDWATER
%T1 REACTOR TRIP
AFWA-FTR AFWA fails to run
AFWA-FTS AFWA fails to start
AFWB-FTR AFWB fails to run
AFWB-FTS AFWB fails to start
AOV-1_FTC PORV AOV-1 fails to CLOSE
AOV-1_FTO PORV AOV-1 fails to open
AOV-3_FTC AOV-3 FAILS TO CLOSE
EPS-120VBUSAF 120V BUS A FAULT
EPS-120VBUSAINVF FAILURE OF 120V BUS A INVERTER
EPS-125VDCBUSAF FAULT ON 125V DC BUS A
EPS-125VDCBUSBF FAULT ON 125V DC BUS B
EPS-125VDCPNLAF FAULT ON 125V DC PANEL A
EPS-125VDCPNLBF FAULT ON 125V DC PANEL B
EPS-480VLCAF 480V LOAD CENTER A FAULT
EPS-480VLCAXTF 480V LOAD CENTER A TRANSFORMER FAILS
EPS-480VLCBF 480V LOAD CENTER B FAULT
12550194 3-32
EPS-480VLCBXTF 480V LOAD CENTER B TRANSFORMER FAILS
EPS-480VMCCA1F 480V MCC A1 FAULT
EPS-480VMCCB1F 480V MCC B1 FAULT
EPS-4VBUSAF 4KV BUS A FAULT
EPS-4VBUSBF 4KV BUS B FAULT
EPS-BATA FAILURE OF BATTERY A
EPS-BATB FAILURE OF BATTERY B
EPS-BCAF FAILURE OF BATTERY CHARGER A
EPS-BCBF FAILURE OF BATTERY CHARGER B
EPS-DGAF FAILURE OF DIESEL GENERATOR A
EPS-DGBF FAILURE OF DIESEL GENERATOR B
HPIA_FTR HPIA fails to run
HPIA_FTS HPIA fails to start
HPIB_FTR HPIB fails to run
HPIB_FTS HPIB fails to start
MFWFAIL MAIN FEEDWATER SYSTEM FAILURE AFTER REACTOR TRIP
MOV-10_FTO MOV-10 fails to open
MOV-14_FTO MOV-14 FAILS TO OPEN
MOV-2_FTC MOV-2 fails to close
12550194 3-33
OPER-1 Operator fails to switch over to recirculation
OPER-4 Operator fails to establish feed an bleed cooling
OPER-7 OPERATOR FAILS TO TRIP REACTOR COOLANT PUMP
RCPSEAL RCP SEAL LOCA GIVEN LOSS OF CCW AND SUCCESSFUL RCP TRIP
SUTF FAILURE OF START-UP TRANSFORMER (SUT)
UATF FAILURE OF UNIT AUXILIARY TRANSFORMER (UAT)
12550194 3-34
Continuation of Step2 and Including Steps 4 thru 6:
TABLE 4: DISPOSTION OF COMPONENTS IN PRA AND APPENDIX R (USE TABLES 1-3 AND
FIGURES 1-3)
In PRA In Add to Fire PRA Comments

Equipment Power Model? Appendix Equipment
Equipment ID
Description Supply (Y or N) R? (Y or List? (Y or N)
N)
High pressure Y
4.16kV
HPI-A safety injection
Bus A
pump A
High pressure Y
4.16kV
HPI-B safety injection
Bus B
pump B
4.16kV Y
RHR-B RHR pump
Bus B
Instrument air 480 V Y

COMP-1
compressor LC 1
Motor driven 4.16kV Y

AFW-A
AFW pump A Bus A
Steam driven N
AFW-B N/A
AFW Pump B
4.16 kV Y
AFW-C AFW Pump C
Bus 2
Y (only to
Pressure
AOV-1 120VAC ensure
operated relief
(SOV-1) Bus A remains
valve
closed)
125 Y (for
AOV-2 Letdown
VDC normal
(SOV-2) isolation valve
Bus B letdown)
Charging pump 125 Y (for

AOV-3
injection valve VDC normal
12550194 3-35
FIGURES 1-3)

Equipment ID
N)
Bus B charging)
(SOV-3)
480V N
MOV-1 HPI valve
MCC A1
Y (for
VCT isolation 480V normal
MOV-2
valve MCC B1 suction to
charging)
Cont. sump 480V N

MOV-3
recirc valve MCC A1
Cont. sump 480V N

MOV-4
recirc valve MCC B1
RWST isolation 480V N

MOV-5
valve MCC A1
RWST isolation 480V N

MOV-6
valve MCC B1
Y (for
RHR inboard 480V
MOV-7 shutdown
suction valve MCC A1
cooling)
Y (for
RHR outboard 480V
MOV-8 shutdown
suction valve MCC B1
cooling)
480V N
MOV-9 HPI valve
MCC B1
AFW discharge 480V Y

MOV-10
valve MCC A1
MOV-11 AFW discharge 125 N
12550194 3-36
FIGURES 1-3)

Equipment ID
N)
valve VDC
Bus B
PORV block 480V Y

MOV-13
valve MCC A1
AFW turbine 125 N

MOV-14 steam line VDC
isolation valve Bus B
AFW steam 125 N

MOV-15 inlet throttle VDC
valve Bus B
AFW test line 480V N

MOV-16
isolation valve MCC A1
AFW test line 480V N

MOV-17
isolation valve MCC B1
AFW C Pump 480 V Y

MOV-18
Discharge MCC-2
AFW test line 480 V N

MOV-19
isolation valve MCC-2
Y (for
admin
CST isolation
V-12 N/A purposes
valve
to ensure
open)
120VAC Y
LI-1 RWST level
Bus A
LI-2 RWST level 120VAC Y
12550194 3-37
FIGURES 1-3)

Equipment ID
N)
Bus B
Cont. sump 120VAC Y

LI-3
level Bus A
Cont. sump 120VAC Y

LI-4
level Bus B
Letdown heat N
120VAC
TI-1 exchanger
Bus A
outlet temp
120VAC N
PT-1 RCS pressure
Bus B
AFW motor 120VAC N

A-1
high temp Bus A
Train A 4160 V SUT-1 Y

SWGR-A
Bus EDG-A
Train B 4160 V SUT-1 Y

SWGR-B
Bus EDG-B
Non-Safety UAT-1 N
SWGR-1
4160 V Bus SUT-1
Non-Safety UAT-1 Y
SWGR-2
4160 V Bus SUT-1
Startup Y
SUT-1 OSP
Transformer
Train A Y
EDG-A PNL-A
Emergency
12550194 3-38
FIGURES 1-3)

Equipment ID
N)
Diesel
Generator
Train B Y
Emergency
EDG-B PNL-B
Diesel
Generator
Non-Safety 480 N
LC-1 SST-1
V Load Center
Non-Safety 480 Y
LC-2 SST-2
V Load Center
Train A 480 V Y
LC-A SST-A
Load Center
Train B 480 V N
LC-B SST-B
Load Center
Non-Safety N
SWGR-
SST-1 Station Service
1
Transformer
Non-Safety Y
SWGR-
SST-2 Station Service
2
Transformer
Train A Station Y
SWGR-
SST-A Service
A
Transformer
Train B Station N
SWGR-
SST-B Service
B
Transformer
12550194 3-39
FIGURES 1-3)

Equipment ID
N)
Non-Safety 480 N
MCC-1 V Motor Control LC-1
Center
Non-Safety 480 Y
MCC-2 V Motor Control LC-2
Center
Train A 480 V Y
MCC-A1 Motor Control LC-A
Center
Train B 480 V N
MCC-B1 Motor Control LC-B
Center
Non-Safety N
MCC-1
BC-1 Swing Battery
MCC-2
Charger
Train A Battery N
BC-A MCC-A1
Charger
Train B Battery N
BC-B MCC-B1
Charger
Non-Safety N
BAT-1 N/A
Battery
BAT-A Train A Battery N/A Y
BAT-B Train B Battery N/A Y
Non-Safety 125 BC-1 N

DC BUS-1
VDC Bus BAT-1
12550194 3-40
FIGURES 1-3)

Equipment ID
N)
Train A 125 BC-A Y

DC BUS-A
VDC Bus BAT-A
Train B 125 BC-B Y

DC BUS-B
VDC Bus BAT-B
DC Y
INV-A Train A Inverter
BUS-A
DC Y
INV-B Train B Inverter
BUS-B
Train A 120 Y
VITAL-A INV-A
VAC Vital Bus
Train B 120 Y
VITAL-B INV-B
VAC Vital Bus
Train A 125 DC Y
PNL-A
VDC Panel BUS-A
Train B 125 DC Y
PNL-B
VDC Panel BUS-B
12550194 3-41
Step 3: Identify Fire-Induced Initiating Events Based on Equipment
Affected
Will need to examine each fire compartment / analysis unit and determine based on the
equipment and cables located there, which of the initiators (from Step 1 of Task 2) can be
caused by a fire in that compartment / analysis unit. If any new initiators are identified, include in
the Fire PRA. The Fire PRA will then include fires mapped to initiating events in the model.
Each compartment / analysis unit should have a disposition with regard to the initiating event(s)
that occur as a result of a fire in each location (even if “none”). Hold discussion with instructor.
12550194 3-42
Step 4: Identify Equipment with Potential Spurious Actuations that May Challenge the Mitigating
Capability to be Credited
Considered Description PRA System or Function Comments/Disposition

spurious equipment Possibly Affected
operations
MOV-16 AFW test line isolation valve
MOV-3 Cont. sump recirc. valve
MOV-4 Cont. sump recirc. valve
AOV-2 Letdown isolation valve
RHR RHR pump
12550194 3-43
Step 5: Identify Additional Mitigating, Instrumentation, and Diagnostic Equipment Important to
Human Response
Instrumentation Description Potentially Affected Comments/Disposition

required to Human Failure Event
perform human in PRA model
actions
LI-1 RWST level
LI-2 RWST level
LI-3 Cont. sump level
Letdown heat exchanger
TI-1
outlet temp
PT-1 RCS pressure
A-1 AFW motor high temp
Step 6: Include Potentially High Consequence Related Equipment
Equipment or combinations of Description of high consequence Comments/Disposition

equipment that can cause high event
consequence event
12550194 3-44
Step 7: Assemble Fire PRA Equipment List
Table 1: Fire PRA Equipment List Information (For Instructors)

Normal Desired Failed
Equipment PRA Event PRA Event Failed Air
Equipment ID Equipment Description Location Power Supply Position/ Position/ Electrical
Type Identifier Description Position
Status Status Position
HPIA fails to
HPIA_FTS
start
1 High pressure safety Aux Bldg.
HPI-A Pump SWGR-A
injection pump A El. 0 Ft
HPIB fails to
HPIB_FTS
start
High pressure safety Aux Bldg.
HPI-B Pump SWGR-B
injection pump B El. 0 Ft
Motor driven AFW Turbine Bldg. AFWA fails to

AFW-A Pump SWGR-A AFWA-FTS
pump A El. 0 Ft start
Motor driven AFW Turbine Bldg. Turbine Bldg. AFWA fails to
AFW-A Pump AFWA-FTR
pump A El. 0 Ft El. 0 Ft run
Steam driven AFW Turbine Bldg. AFWB fails to
AFW-B Pump N/A AFWB-FTS
pump B El. 0 Ft start
AFW-B Pump N/A AFWB-FTR
pump B El. 0 Ft run
Motor driven AFW Turbine Bldg. AFWC fails to
AFW-C Pump SWGR-2 AFWC-FTS
pump C El. 0 Ft start
AFW-C Pump SWGR-2 AFWC-FTR
pump C El. 0 Ft run
RCP 1 fails to
RCP Reactor coolant pump Pump Containment SWGR-1 RCP1-FTT
trip
Instrument air
Instrument air Turbine Bldg.
COMP-1 Compressor LC-1 IA-COMP1_FTS compressor fails
compressor El. 0 Ft
to start
3-45
12550194
Instrument air
COMP-1 Compressor LC-1 IA-COMP1_FTR compressor fails
compressor El. 0 Ft
to run
PORV AOV-1
AOV-1_TO
2
transfers open
AOV-1 Power operated relief
AOV Containment VITAL-A
(SOV-1) valve
PORV AOV-1
AOV-1_FTO
fails to open
3
AOV-2 Letdown isolation Aux Bldg. AOV-2 fails to
AOV DC BUS-B AOV-2_FTC
(SOV-2) valve El. 0 Ft close
4
AOV-3 Charging pump Aux Bldg. AOV-3 FAILS
AOV DC BUS-B AOV-3_FTC
(SOV-3) injection valve El. 0 Ft TO CLOSE
Aux Bldg. MOV-1 FAILS
MOV-1 HPI discharge valve MOV MCC-A1 MOV-1_FTO
El. 0 Ft TO OPEN
5 Aux Bldg. MOV-2 fails to
MOV-2 VCT isolation valve MOV MCC-B1 MOV-2_FTC
El. 0 Ft close
MOV-3 fails to
MOV-3_FTO
open
6 Cont. sump recirc Aux Bldg.
MOV-3 MOV MCC-A1 MOV-3
valve El. -20 Ft
MOV-3_TO TRANSFERS
OPEN
MOV-4 fails to
MOV-4_FTO
open
Cont. sump recirc Aux Bldg.
MOV-4 MOV MCC-B1 MOV-4
valve El. -20 Ft
MOV-4_TO TRANSFERS
OPEN
Aux Bldg. MOV-5 fails to
MOV-5 RWST isolation valve MOV MCC-A1 MOV-5_FTO
El. 0 Ft open
Aux Bldg. MOV-6 fails to
MOV-6 RWST isolation valve MOV MCC-B1 MOV-6_FTO
El. 0 Ft open
MOV-7
7 RHR inboard suction
MOV-7 MOV Containment MCC-A1 MOV-7_TO TRANSFERS
valve
OPEN
MOV-8
RHR outboard suction Aux Bldg.
MOV-8 MOV MCC-B1 MOV-8_TO TRANSFERS
valve El. -20 Ft
OPEN
3-46
12550194
MOV-9 HPI discharge valve MOV MCC-B1 MOV-9_FTO
El. 0 Ft TO OPEN
AFW pump A Turbine Bldg. MOV-10 fails to
MOV-10 MOV MCC-A1 MOV-10_FTO
discharge valve El. 0 Ft open
AFW pump B Turbine Bldg. MOV-11 fails to
MOV-11 MOV DC BUS-B MOV-11_FTO
discharge valve El. 0 F open
MOV-13 fails to
MOV-13 PORV block valve MOV Containment MCC-A1 MOV-13_FTC
close
AFW pump B turbine
Turbine Bldg. MOV-14 FAILS
MOV-14 steam line isolation MOV DC BUS-B MOV-14_FTO
El. 0 Ft TO OPEN
valve
AFW pump B steam Turbine Bldg. MOV-15 FAILS
MOV-15 MOV DC BUS-B MOV-15_FTO
inlet throttle valve El. 0 Ft TO OPEN
AFW pump C Turbine Bldg. MOV-18 fails to
MOV-18 MOV MCC-2 MOV-18_FTO
RWST Level
LI-1_FL indication fails
8 low
LI-1 RWST level Instrument Yard VITAL-A
RWST Level
LI-1_FH indication fails
high
RWST Level
LI-2_FL indication fails
low
LI-2 RWST level Instrument Yard VITAL-B
RWST Level
LI-2_FH indication fails
high
Cont sump Level
LI-3 Cont. sump level Instrument Containment VITAL-A LI-3_FH indication fails
high
Cont sump Level
LI-4 Cont. sump level Instrument Containment VITAL-B LI-4_FH indication fails
high
Letdown
9 Letdown heat Aux Bldg. temperature
TI-1 Instrument VITAL-A TI-1_FL
exchanger outlet temp El. 0 Ft indication fails
low
RCS pressure
10
PT-1 RCS pressure Instrument Containment VITAL-B PI-1_FH indication fails
high
3-47
12550194
AFW motor high
temperature
AFW motor high SWG Access
A-1 Annunciator VITAL-A ANN-1_FH annunciator
temperature Room
spuriously
indicates high
PNL-A
SUT-1 4KV BUS A
EPS-4VBUSAF-
DC BUS-A FAULT
1
11 Train A 4160 V Switchgear
SWGR-A Switchgear
switchgear Room A
PNL-A
EDG-A 4KV BUS A
EPS-4VBUSAF-
DC BUS-A FAULT
2
PNL-B
SUT-1 4KV BUS A
EPS-4VBUSBF-
DC BUS-B FAULT
Train B 4160 V Switchgear 1
SWGR-B Switchgear
switchgear Room B PNL-B
EDG-B 4KV BUS A
EPS-4VBUSBF-
DC BUS-B FAULT
2
Non-safety 4160 V Turbine Bldg. UAT-1 4KV BUS 1
SWGR-1 Switchgear EPS-4VBUS1F
switchgear El. 0ft SUT-1 FAULT
SWGR-2 Switchgear EPS-4VBUS2F
FAILURE OF
START-UP
SUT-1 Startup transformer Transformer Yard OSP SUTF
TRANSFORME
R (SUT)
FAILURE OF
Train A emergency Diesel
EDG-A DG Bldg. DC BUS-A EPS-DGAF DIESEL
diesel generator Generator
GENERATOR A
FAILURE OF
Train B emergency Diesel
EDG-B DG Bldg. DC BUS-B EPS-DGBF DIESEL
diesel generator Generator
GENERATOR B
480V LOAD
Non-safety 480 V load Turbine Bldg.
LC-1 Load Center SST-1 EPS-480VLC1F CENTER 1
center El. 0 ft
FAULT
480V LOAD
LC-2 Load Center SST-2 EPS-480VLC2F CENTER 2
center El. 0 ft
FAULT
3-48
12550194
480V LOAD
Train A 480 V load Switchgear SST-A
LC-A Load Center EPS-480VLCAF CENTER A
center Room A PNL-A
FAULT
480V LOAD
Train B 480 V load Switchgear SST-B
LC-B Load Center EPS-480VLCBF CENTER B
center Room B PNL-B
FAULT
480V LOAD
Non-safety station Turbine Bldg. EPS- CENTER 1
SST-1 Transformer SWGR-1
service transformer El. 0 F 480VLC1XTF TRANSFORME
R FAILS
480V LOAD
SST-2 Transformer SWGR-2
R FAILS
480V LOAD
Train A station service Switchgear EPS- CENTER A
SST-A Transformer SWGR-A
transformer Room A 480VLCAXTF TRANSFORME
R FAILS
480V LOAD
Train B station service Switchgear EPS- CENTER B
SST-B Transformer SWGR-B
transformer Room B 480VLCBXTF TRANSFORME
R FAILS
Non-safety 480 V Motor Control Turbine Bldg. EPS- 480V MCC 1
MCC-1 LC-1
motor control center Center El. 0 Ft 480VMCC1F FAULT
MCC-2 LC-2
Train A 480 V motor Motor Control SWG Access EPS- 480V MCC A1
MCC-A1 LC-A
control center Center Room 480VMCCA1F FAULT
Train B 480 V motor Motor Control SWG Access EPS- 480V MCC B1
MCC-B1 LC-B
control center Center Room 480VMCCB1F FAULT
AUTOMATIC
Automatic transfer SWG Access MCC-1 TRANSFER
ATS-1 ATS EPS-ATS1F
switch Room MCC-2 SWITCH ATS-1
FAILS
FAILURE OF
Non-safety swing Battery Turbine Bldg.
BC-1 ATS-1 EPS-BC1F BATTERY
battery charger Charger El. 0 Ft
CHARGER 1
FAILURE OF
Train A battery Battery Switchgear
BC-A MCC-A1 EPS-BCAF BATTERY
charger Charger Room A
CHARGER A
3-49
12550194
FAILURE OF
Train B battery Battery Switchgear
BC-B MCC-B1 EPS-BCBF BATTERY
charger Charger Room B
CHARGER B
FAILURE OF
Turbine Bldg.
BAT-1 Non-safety battery Battery N/A EPS-SB STATION
El. 0 Ft
BATTERY
Battery FAILURE OF
BAT-A Train A battery Battery N/A EPS-BATA
Room A BATTERY A
Battery FAILURE OF
BAT-B Train B battery Battery N/A EPS-BATB
Room B BATTERY B
FAULT ON
EPS-
Non-safety 125 VDC Turbine Bldg. BC-1 125V NON-
DC BUS-1 DC Bus 125VNSDCBUS
bus El. 0 Ft BAT-1 SAFETY DC
F
BUS
Switchgear BC-A EPS- FAULT ON
DC BUS-A Train A 125 VDC bus DC Bus
Room A BAT-A 125VDCBUSAF 125V DC BUS A
Switchgear BC-B EPS- FAULT ON
DC BUS-B Train B 125 VDC bus DC Bus
Room B BAT-B 125VDCBUSBF 125V DC BUS B
FAULT ON
Train A 125 VDC Switchgear EPS-
PNL-A Panel board DC BUS-A 125V DC
panel Room A 125VDCPNLAF
PANEL A
FAULT ON
Train B 125 VDC Switchgear EPS-
PNL-B Panel board DC BUS-B 125V DC
panel Room B 125VDCPNLBF
PANEL A
FAILURE OF
Switchgear EPS-
INV-A Train A inverter Inverter DC BUS-A 120V BUS A
Room A 120VBUSAINVF
INVERTER
FAILURE OF
Switchgear EPS-
INV-B Train B inverter Inverter DC BUS-B 120V BUS B
Room B 120VBUSAINVF
INVERTER
Train A 120 VAC vital SWG Access EPS- 120V BUS A
VITAL-A 120VAC Bus INV-A
bus Room 120VBUSAF FAULT
Train B 120 VAC vital SWG Access EPS- 120V BUS A
VITAL-B 120VAC Bus INV-B
bus Room 120VBUSBF FAULT
Notes:
3-50
12550194
Legend
Appendix R
Components/failures added
to PRA for Fire PRA Model
1
HPI pumps A & B are in Appendix R for normal charging function; not for HPI.
2
Closed to prevent LOCA /Open for feed and bleed. Appendix R has valve only to ensure remains closed.
3
AOV-2 in Appendix R only for normal letdown function.
4
AOV-3 in Appendix R only for normal charging function.
5
MOV-2 in Appendix R only for normal suction to charging.
6
MOV-3 and MOV-4 need to be closed for when using RWST water supply for HPI / Open for recirculation mode of injection. MOVs 5 & 6 are correspondingly open for RWST use and
closed for recirc.
7
Valve electrically blocked closed. Control power fuses are supposed to be removed. MOV-7 & 8 in Appendix R for both normal isolation and shutdown cooling functions.
8
If RWST level indication fails high the operator will fail to establish recirculation. If the RWST level fails low and containment sump level fails high, the operator will establish suction
to dry sump and fail the HPI the pumps due to insufficient suction. Need to resolve failure mode.
9
If letdown temperature indication fails low, the operator will fail to isolate the letdown line on loss of CCW. This will cause HPI pumps to cavitate due to high temperature in the
suction line.
10
If RCS pressure instrument fails high, the low pressure signal to initiate emergency safeguards actuation during a lire-induced LOCA will not be initiated
11
For SWGR-A or SWGR-B, only one basic event is used in the model. However, the circuit analysis impact to the switchgear is a function of the power supply
3-51
12550194
SESSION 2: Fire Induced Risk Model Development
12550194 3-52
Slide 1 Notes:
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
METHODOLOGY
___________________________________
Task 5 - Fire-Induced Risk Model ___________________________________
Development
___________________________________
___________________________________
Joint RES/EPRI Fire PRA Course ___________________________________
Bethesda, MD
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
Slide 2 Notes:
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
Fire PRA Risk Model
Scope
___________________________________
___________________________________
• Task 5: Fire-Induced Risk Model Development
___________________________________
– Constructing the PRA model
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
Slide 2
Task 5 - Fire-
Fire-Induced Risk Model Development Research (RES) & Electric Power Research Institute (EPRI)
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
12550194 3-53
Slide 3 Notes:
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
Fire PRA Risk Model ___________________________________
General Comment/Observation
___________________________________
• Task 5 does not represent any changes from past ___________________________________
practice, but what is modeled is largely based on Task 2
with HRA input from Task 12 ___________________________________
___________________________________
• Bottom line – just “tweaking” your Internal Events PRA is
probably NOT sufficient ___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
Task 5 - Fire-
Fire-Induced Risk Model Development
___________________________________
___________________________________
Slide 4 Notes:
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
Task 5: Fire Risk Model Development ___________________________________
General Objectives
___________________________________
Purpose: Configure the Internal Events PRA to provide fire
___________________________________
risk metrics of interest (primarily CDF and LERF).
• Based on standard state-of-the-art PRA practices ___________________________________
• Intended to be applicable for any PRA methodology or ___________________________________
software
___________________________________
• Allows user to quantify CDF and LERF, or conditional
metrics CCDP and CLERP ___________________________________
• Conceptually, nothing “new” here – need to “build the PRA
model” reflecting fire induced initiators, equipment and
___________________________________
failure modes, and human actions of interest ___________________________________
___________________________________
Task 5 - Fire-
___________________________________
___________________________________
12550194 3-54
Slide 5 Notes:
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
Inputs/Outputs
___________________________________
Task inputs and outputs: ___________________________________
• Inputs from other tasks: [Note: inclusion of spatial
information requires cable locations from Task 3]
___________________________________
– Sequence considerations, initiating event considerations, and ___________________________________
components from Task 2 (Fire PRA Component Selection),
– Unscreened fire compartments from Task 4 (Qualitative Screening), ___________________________________
– HRA events from Task 12 (Post-Fire HRA) ___________________________________
• Output to Task 7 (Quantitative Screening) which will further
modify the model development ___________________________________
• Can always iterate back to refine aspects of the model ___________________________________
___________________________________
Task 5 - Fire-
___________________________________
___________________________________
Slide 6 Notes:
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
Steps in Procedure
___________________________________
Two major steps: ___________________________________
___________________________________
• Step 1: Develop CDF/CCDP model
___________________________________
• Step 2: Develop LERF/CLERP model ___________________________________

___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
Task 5 - Fire-
___________________________________
___________________________________
12550194 3-55
Slide 7 Notes:
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
Steps in Procedure/Details
___________________________________
Step 1 (2): Develop CDF/CCDP (LERF/CLERP) models ___________________________________
Step 1.1 (2.1): Select fire-induced initiators and sequences and
incorporate into the model
___________________________________
• Each fire-induced initiator is mapped to an internal events initiator that ___________________________________
mimics the effect on the plant of the fire initiator
___________________________________
• Internal events sequences form bulk of sequences for Fire PRA, but a
search for new sequences should be made (see Task 2). Some new ___________________________________
sequences may require new logic to be added to the PRA model
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
Slide 7
Task 5 - Fire-
___________________________________
___________________________________
Slide 8 Notes:
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
Step 1.1 (2.1) - continued ___________________________________
• Plants that use fire emergency procedures (FEPs) may ___________________________________
need special models to address unique fire-related actions
(e.g., pre-defined fire response actions and MCR ___________________________________
abandonment).
___________________________________
• Some human actions may induce new sequences not ___________________________________
covered in Internal Events PRA and can “fail” components
– Example: SISBO, or partial SISBO

___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
Task 5 - Fire-
___________________________________
___________________________________
12550194 3-56
Slide 9 Notes:
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
Loss of raw water

___________________________________
as initiator
___________________________________
___________________________________
Loss of raw Fire in
water compartment
(internal) A-1 ___________________________________
Initiator Initiator
___________________________________
Example of new logic with a fire-
induced loss of raw water initiating
event
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
Task 5 - Fire-
___________________________________
___________________________________
Slide 10 Notes:
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
Step 1.2 (2.2): Incorporate fire-induced equipment failures
___________________________________
• Fire PRA database documents list of potentially failed
equipment for each fire compartment
___________________________________
• Basic events for fire-induced spurious operations are

___________________________________
defined and added to the PRA model ___________________________________
• Inclusion of spatial information requires equipment and ___________________________________
cable locations
– May be an integral part of model logic, or handled with manipulation ___________________________________
of a cable location database, etc.
___________________________________
___________________________________
Slide 10
Task 5 - Fire-
___________________________________
___________________________________
12550194 3-57
Slide 11
Task 5: Fire Risk Model Development

Loss of high
Original logic pressure injection
Loss of Loss of
train A train B
etc.
…Suppose fire in
Pump A Pump A Valve fails compartment L1 or L2
fails to start fails to run to open could fail pump A
because pump A is in L1
and cable for pump A is
in L2 …
Loss of high
Possible temporary pressure injection
change to model to run
CCDPs for L1 and L2
Loss of Loss of
train A train B
etc.
Pump A Pump A Valve fails

fails to start fails to run to open
Set to
TRUE
Slide 11
Task 5 - Fire-
Notes:
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
12550194 3-58
Slide 12

Loss of high
pressure injection Permanent
change to model
Loss of Loss of
train A train B
etc.
Pump A Pump A Valve fails

fails to start fails to run to open
Pump A Pump A
fails to start fails to start
- hardware - fire
Fire in Fire in
compartment L1 compartment L2
fails pump A fails pump A
Initiator Initiator
Slide 12
Task 5 - Fire-
Notes:
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
12550194 3-59
Slide 13 Notes:
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
Steps in Procedure/Details ___________________________________
Step 1.3 (2.3): Incorporate fire-induced human failures

___________________________________
___________________________________
• New fire-specific HFEs may have to be added to the model ___________________________________
to address actions specified in FEPs [Note: all HFEs will be
set at screening values at first, using Task 12 guidance] ___________________________________
___________________________________
• Successful operator actions may temporarily disable (“fail”)
components
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
Task 5 - Fire-
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
12550194 3-60
Slide 14

Suppose a proceduralized manual action
carried out for fires in compartments AA & BB
defeats Pump A operation by de-energizing the
pump (opening its breaker drawer)…
Pump A fails
etc.
Pump A fails Pump A fails Operator action

to start to run defeats pump
operation
Relevant fires Operator opens

pump A
breaker as
directed
Fire in Fire in
compartment compartment
AA BB
Initiator Initiator
Task 5 - Fire-
Notes:
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
12550194 3-61
Slide 15 Notes:
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
Sample Problem Exercise for Task 5 ___________________________________
___________________________________
• Distribute blank handout for Task 5, Steps 1 and 2
___________________________________
• Distribute completed handout for Task 5, Steps 1 and 2 ___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
Task 5 - Fire-
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
12550194 3-62
SESSION 3: Qualitative/Quantitative Screening
12550194 3-63
Slide 1 Notes:
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
METHODOLOGY
___________________________________
Task 4 - Qualitative Screening ___________________________________
Task 7 - Quantitative Screening
___________________________________
___________________________________
Bethesda, MD
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
Slide 2 Notes:
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
Qualitative / Quantitative Screening
Scope ___________________________________
• Task 4: Qualitative Screening

___________________________________
– First chance to identify very low risk compartments ___________________________________
• Task 7: Quantitative Screening

___________________________________
– Running the Fire PRA model to iteratively screen / maintain ___________________________________
modeled sequences at different levels of detail
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
Slide 2
Task 4 & 7 – Qualitative/Quantitative Screening Research (RES) & Electric Power Research Institute (EPRI)
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
12550194 3-64
Slide 3 Notes:
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
Task 4: Qualitative Screening ___________________________________

Objectives and Scope
___________________________________
• The objective of Task 4 is to identify those fire ___________________________________
compartments that can be shown to have a negligible risk
contribution without quantitative analysis ___________________________________
– This is where you exclude the office building inside the protected ___________________________________
area
• Task 4 only considers fire compartments as individual ___________________________________
contributors
___________________________________
– Multi-compartment scenarios are covered in Task 11(b)
– Compartments that screen out qualitatively need to be re- ___________________________________
considered as potential Exposing Compartments in the multi-
compartment analysis (but not as the Exposed Compartment) ___________________________________

___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
Slide 4 Notes:
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
Required Input and Task Output
___________________________________
• To complete Task 4 you need the following input: ___________________________________
– List of fire compartments from Task 1
– List of Fire PRA equipment from Task 2 including location mapping ___________________________________
results
– List of Fire PRA cables from Task 3 including location mapping ___________________________________
results
___________________________________
• Task Output: A list of fire compartments that will be
screened out (no further analysis) based on qualitative ___________________________________
criteria
___________________________________
– Unscreened fire compartments are used in Task 6 and further
screened in Task 7 ___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
12550194 3-65
Slide 5 Notes:
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________

A Note….
___________________________________
• Qualitative Screening is OPTIONAL! ___________________________________
– You may choose to retain any number of potentially low-risk fire ___________________________________
compartments (from one to all) without formally conducting the
Qualitative Screening Assessment for the compartment
___________________________________
• However, to eliminate a compartment, you must exercise the
screening process for the compartment ___________________________________
– Example 1: Many areas will never pass qualitative screening, so ___________________________________
simply keep them
___________________________________
– Example 2: If you are dealing with an application with limited scope
(e.g. NFPA 805 Change Evaluation) a formalized Qualitative ___________________________________
Screening may be pointless

___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
Slide 6 Notes:
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________

Screening Criteria
___________________________________
• A Fire Compartment may be screened out** if:
– No Fire PRA equipment or cables are located in the compartment,
___________________________________
and
– No fire that remains confined to the compartment could lead to: ___________________________________
• An automatic plant trip, or
• A manual trip as specified by plant procedures, or ___________________________________
• A near-term manual shutdown due to violation of plant Technical
Specifications*
*In the case of tech spec shutdown, consideration of the time
___________________________________
window is appropriate
– No firm time window is specified in the procedure – rule of thumb: ___________________________________
consistent with the time window of the fire itself
– Analyst must choose and justify the maximum time window
considered ___________________________________
(**Note: screened compartments are re-considered as fire source
compartments in the multi-compartment analysis - Task 11c) ___________________________________
___________________________________
Slide 6
___________________________________
___________________________________
12550194 3-66
Slide 7 Notes:
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
Task 7: Quantitative Screening ___________________________________

General Objectives
___________________________________
Purpose: allow (i.e., optional) screening of fire compartments ___________________________________
and scenarios based on contribution to fire risk. Screening is
primarily compartment-based (Tasks 7A/B). Scenario-based ___________________________________
screening (Tasks 7C/D) is a further refinement (optional).
• Screening criteria not the same as acceptance criteria for ___________________________________
regulatory applications (e.g., R.G. 1.174)
___________________________________
• Screening does not mean “throw away” – screened
compartments/scenarios will be quantified (recognized to be ___________________________________
conservative) and carried through to Task 14 as a measure
of the residual fire risk ___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
Slide 7
___________________________________
___________________________________
Slide 8 Notes:
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________

Inputs/Outputs
___________________________________
• Inputs from other tasks for compartment-based screening
(7A/B):
___________________________________
– Fire ignition frequencies from Task 6,

___________________________________
– Task 5 (Fire-Induced Risk Model), ___________________________________
– Task 12 (Post-Fire HRA Screening), and ___________________________________
– Task 8 (Scoping Fire Modeling) (7B only) ___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
12550194 3-67
Slide 9 Notes:
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________

Inputs/Outputs (cont’d)
___________________________________
• Inputs from other tasks for scenario-based screening (7C/D) ___________________________________
include inputs listed above plus:
___________________________________
– Task 9 (Detailed Circuit Failure Analysis) and/or
___________________________________
– Task 11 (Detailed Fire Modeling) and/or
– Task 12 (Post-Fire HRA Detailed), and

___________________________________
– Task 10 (Circuit Failure Mode Likelihood Analysis) (7D only) ___________________________________

___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
Slide 9
___________________________________
___________________________________
Slide 10 Notes:
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________

Inputs/Outputs (cont’d)
___________________________________
• Outputs to other tasks: ___________________________________
– Unscreened fire compartments from Task 7A go to Task 8 (Scoping ___________________________________
Fire Modeling),
– Unscreened fire compartments from Task 7B go to Task 9 (Detailed

___________________________________
Circuit Failure Analysis) and/or Task 11 (Detailed Fire Modeling)
and/or Task 12 (detailed Post-Fire HRA), ___________________________________
– Unscreened fire scenarios from Task 7C/D go to Task 14 (Fire Risk ___________________________________
Quantification) for best-estimate risk calculation
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
Slide 10
___________________________________
___________________________________
12550194 3-68
Slide 11
Task 7: Quantitative Screening

Overview of the Process
Make more realistic via

circuit analysis
Perform any one,
Unscreened compartment two, or all three
Make more realistic via based on where
or scenario based on
calculated fire modeling you will get more
realistic results
CDF/CCDP/LERF/CLERP
for the least
resources
Make more realistic via
more detailed HRA
Screens?
If NO, iterate as
necessary
Task 4 & 7 – Qualitative/Quantitative Screening
Notes:
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
12550194 3-69
Slide 12 Notes:
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
Task 7: Quantitative Screening
Steps in Procedure ___________________________________
Three major steps in the procedure:

___________________________________
___________________________________
• Step 1: Quantify CDF/CCDP model
___________________________________
• Step 2: Quantify LERF/CLERP model ___________________________________
___________________________________
• Step 3: Quantitative screening
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
Slide 12
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
Slide 13 Notes:
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________

___________________________________
Step 1: Quantify CDF/CCDP models. ___________________________________
___________________________________
• Step 1.1: Quantify CCDP model
– Fire-induced initiators are set to TRUE (1.0) for each fire ___________________________________
compartment, CCDP calculated for each compartment
– This step can be bypassed, if desired, by using fire frequencies in ___________________________________
the model directly and calculating CDF
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________

___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
12550194 3-70
Slide 14 Notes:
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________

___________________________________
Step 1: Quantify CDF/CCDP models. ___________________________________
• Step 1.2: Quantify CDF ___________________________________
– Compartment fire-induced initiator frequencies combined with
compartment CCDPs from Step 1.1 to obtain compartment CDFs ___________________________________
• Step 1.3: Quantify ICDP (optional) ___________________________________

– ICDP includes unavailability of equipment removed from service
routinely
___________________________________
– Recommend this be done if will use PRA for configuration ___________________________________
management
___________________________________
___________________________________
Slide 14
___________________________________
___________________________________
Slide 15 Notes:
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________

___________________________________
Step 2: Develop LERF/CLERP models. ___________________________________
• Exactly analogous to Step 1 but now for LERF and CLERP ___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
12550194 3-71
Slide 16 Notes:
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________

Screening Criteria for Single Fire Compartment
___________________________________
Step 3: Quantitative screening, Table 7.2 from NUREG/CR-6850 ___________________________________
Quantification Type CDF and LERF ICDP and ILERP ___________________________________
Compartment Screening Compartment Screening
Criteria Criteria (Optional)
Fire Compartment CDF CDF < 1.0E-7/yr
___________________________________
Fire Compartment CDF
With Intact Trains/Systems
ICDP < 1.0E-7 ___________________________________
Unavailable
Fire Compartment LERF LERF < 1.0E-8/yr ___________________________________
Fire Compartment LERF ILERP < 1.0E-8
With Intact Trains/Systems
Unavailable
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
Slide 16
___________________________________
___________________________________
Slide 17 Notes:
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
Screening Criteria For All Screened Compartments
___________________________________
Step 3: Quantitative screening, Table 7.3 from NUREG/CR-6850
___________________________________
Quantification Type Screening Criteria
Sum of CDF for all screened-out fire compartments < 0.1 ∗ (internal event average CDF) ___________________________________
Sum of LERF for all screened-out fire compartments < 0.1 ∗ (internal event average LERF) ___________________________________
___________________________________
Sum of ICDP for all screened-out fire compartments < 1.0E-6
___________________________________
Sum of ILERP for all screened-out fire
compartments
< 1.0E-7 ___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
12550194 3-72
Slide 18 Notes:
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________

Bases for Values
___________________________________
Bases for quantitative screening criteria provided in App. D to ___________________________________
NUREG/CR-6850
___________________________________
• Premise is that most CDFs are ~1.0E-5/yr
___________________________________
• Increase in CDF less than 1.0E-6/yr is defined as very small
increase in R.G. 1.174 ___________________________________
• Sum of CDF from screened-out compartments therefore ___________________________________
limited to 10% of total CDF
___________________________________
• Individual compartment limit set at 1.0E-7/yr, or 1% of total
CDF ___________________________________

___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
Slide 19 Notes:
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________

Bases for Values (cont’d)
___________________________________
• Basis for LERF values same as for CDF, but factor of 10 ___________________________________
lower
___________________________________
• ICDP screening criterion of 1.0E-6 based on temporary ___________________________________
change risk criterion in EPRI PSA Applications Guide,
EPRI-TR-105396 ___________________________________
___________________________________
• Similar basis for ICLERP criterion of 1.0E-7
___________________________________
___________________________________

___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
12550194 3-73
Slide 20 Notes:
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________

A word of caution…
___________________________________
• Note that the quantitative screening criteria are a point of ___________________________________
ongoing discussion, e.g.:
– Should fire criteria be based on internal events totals
___________________________________
or based on fire totals? ___________________________________
• ASME/ANS standard provide guidance regarding ___________________________________

quantitative screening
___________________________________
– Anticipate that changes may be forthcoming
___________________________________
___________________________________

___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
12550194 3-74
SESSION 4: Screening Post-Fire HRA
12550194 3-75
Slide 1 Notes:
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
METHODOLOGY ___________________________________
Task 12a - Screening Post-Fire HRA ___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
2007
Palo Alto, CA
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
Slide 2 Notes:
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
HRA Screening
Scope ___________________________________
___________________________________
• Task 12a: Post-fire HRA (screening)
– Identifying applicable post-fire human failure events and

___________________________________
establishing screening values used during the running of the Fire
PRA model ___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
Fire PRA Workshop, 2007, Palo Alto, CA A Collaboration of U.S. NRC Office of Nuclear Regulatory
Slide 2
Task 12a - Screening Post-
Post-Fire HRA Research (RES) & Electric Power Research Institute (EPRI)
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
12550194 3-76
Slide 3 Notes:
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
Task 12a: Post-Fire HRA (Screening)
General Objectives ___________________________________
Purpose: identify reasonable and feasible human actions and

___________________________________
resulting HFEs to include in Fire PRA, and assign screening
HEPs to simplify the model and focus analysis resources ___________________________________
appropriately.
• Addresses screening values based on: ___________________________________
– Whether a prior analyzed Internal Events HFE vs. a new fire-related HFE
– Potential effects of fire scenario for which Internal Events HFE is applied ___________________________________
– Timing considerations for new fire-related HFEs
• Accounts for fire-scenario-induced changes in assumptions, ___________________________________
model structure, and performance shaping factors
• Addresses need to use procedures (e.g., FEPs) beyond those ___________________________________
modeled in the Internal Events PRA
• Does not address pre-initiator HFEs that are handled within the ___________________________________
data used in Tasks 6, 8, and 11
___________________________________
Slide 3
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
Slide 4 Notes:
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
Inputs/Outputs ___________________________________
• Inputs from other tasks:

___________________________________
– Mitigating equipment and diagnostic indications from Task 2 (Fire ___________________________________
PRA Component Selection),
– Human actions already in PRA (because of internal events ___________________________________
modeling) from Task 5 (Fire-Induced Risk Model),
___________________________________
– Information may be used for identifying equipment failures, spurious
operations and indications from Tasks 3 (Fire PRA Cable Selection),
9 (Detailed Circuit Failure Analysis), 10 (Circuit Failure Mode
___________________________________
Likelihood Analysis), 8 (Scoping Fire Modeling), and 11 (Detailed
Fire Modeling) as available, so as to determine proper screening ___________________________________
criteria to be used
___________________________________
___________________________________
Slide 4
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
12550194 3-77
Slide 5 Notes:
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
Inputs/Outputs (continued) ___________________________________
___________________________________
• Outputs to other tasks:
___________________________________
– May identify human actions implying other equipment and
indications to be added in Task 2 (Fire PRA Component Selection) ___________________________________
and thus modeling additions in Task 5 (Fire-Induced Risk Model)
___________________________________
– Provides screening HEPs for Task 7 (Quantitative Screening)
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
Slide 5
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
Slide 6 Notes:
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
Steps In Procedure ___________________________________
___________________________________
Two major steps:
___________________________________
• Step 1: Modify and add HFEs to the model
___________________________________
• Step 2: Assign quantitative screening HEPs ___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
Fire PRA Workshop, 2007, Palo Alto, CA
Post-Fire HRA
Slide 6
___________________________________
___________________________________
12550194 3-78
Slide 7 Notes:
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
Step 1: Modify and add HFEs to the model.
___________________________________
• Step 1.1: Review existing Internal Events HFEs and modify
as necessary ___________________________________
– Many existing HFEs will remain as is except for screening value
– Some existing HFEs may need to change such as due to the use of ___________________________________
different procedures, possible fire environmental effects, or different
scenario timing due to fire ___________________________________
• Step 1.2: Add new fire-unique HFEs ___________________________________
– Primarily from fire-specific procedures
___________________________________
– Actions taken in response to spurious (erroneous) indications
___________________________________
Slide 7
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
Slide 8 Notes:
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
The following are important elements of the identification
process: ___________________________________
• Expected steps taken in response to fires in specific ___________________________________
compartments
___________________________________
• Comparison of fire response actions to EOP actions
• Consider fire-specific training, if information is available and

___________________________________
relevant ___________________________________
• Role of each crew member during fire scenario ___________________________________
• Fire-specific informal rules that are part of crew knowledge ___________________________________
Slide 8
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
12550194 3-79
Slide 9 Notes:
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
Step 2: Assign quantitative screening HEPs (on a fire scenario
specific basis)
___________________________________
• Four sets of screening criteria :
– Set 1: multiply internal events HEP by 10 to account for effects of ___________________________________
potential fire brigade interaction and other minor increased
workload/distraction issues. Examine dependencies across scenario.
– Set 2 (spurious events could have impact but to only one critical
___________________________________
safety-related train/division): increase internal events HEP to 0.1, or
10 times original value, whichever is greater. Examine dependencies
___________________________________
across scenario.
– Set 3: applies generally to new HFEs but also to existing HFEs not ___________________________________
meeting Set 1 or 2. Use 1.0 if action has to be performed within one
hour of fire initiation. Use 0.1 otherwise. ___________________________________
– Set 4: applies to new HFEs associated with MCR abandonment. Use
screening value of 1.0. ___________________________________
Fire PRA Workshop, 2007, Palo Alto, CA
Post-Fire HRA
Slide 9 A Collaboration of U.S. NRC Office of Nuclear Regulatory
___________________________________
___________________________________
Slide 10 Notes:
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
Bases for Screening Values ___________________________________
___________________________________
Values have no direct empirical bases. Bases are:
• Experience with range of screening values used and ___________________________________
accepted in HRA
___________________________________
• Experience in quantifying HEPs for events in nuclear power
plant HRAs ___________________________________
• Experience applying range of HRA methods and values
associated with those methods ___________________________________
• Experience performing HRA for Fire PRAs, including pilots ___________________________________
• Peer comments
• Not so low so as to miss potential dependencies among ___________________________________
HFEs
___________________________________
Slide 10
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
12550194 3-80
SESSION 5: Post-Fire HRA Detailed Analysis
12550194 3-81
Slide 1 Notes:
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
METHODOLOGY
___________________________________
Task 12b – Post-Fire HRA Detailed ___________________________________
Analysis
___________________________________
___________________________________
Joint RES/EPRI Fire PRA Course
September and November 2008 ___________________________________
Bethesda, MD
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
Slide 2 Notes:
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
Post-Fire HRA Detailed Analysis
Scope ___________________________________
___________________________________
• Task 12b: Post-Fire Human Reliability Analysis (Detailed
Analysis) ___________________________________
– Obtaining more realistic human error probabilities (i.e., not

___________________________________
screening values)
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
Joint Fire PRA Course, Sept. & Nov. 2008 A Collaboration of U.S. NRC Office of Nuclear Regulatory
Slide 2
Task 12b – Post-
Post-Fire HRA Detailed Analysis Research (RES) & Electric Power Research Institute (EPRI)
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
12550194 3-82
Slide 3 Notes:
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
Task 12b: Post-Fire HRA Detailed Analysis
___________________________________
Purpose: assign best-estimate HEPs to allow more realistic
estimate of fire risk. ___________________________________
• Current procedures do not specify an HRA method to use
– There are too many methods analysts might use (THERP, ASEP, ___________________________________
CBDT…) and each is unique in what it treats and how to determine
HEPs ___________________________________
– Hence, procedure outlines what should be addressed but not how to
specifically incorporate into existing HRA methods because there are ___________________________________
too many of them
• Addresses fire-scenario-induced changes in assumptions, ___________________________________
model structure, and performance shaping factors
• Addresses need to use procedures (e.g., FEPs) beyond ___________________________________
those modeled in the Internal Events PRA
___________________________________
Slide 3
Task 12b – Post-
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
Slide 4 Notes:
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
Inputs/Outputs ___________________________________
___________________________________
Task inputs and outputs:
___________________________________
• Inputs from other tasks: feedback from Task 7 (Quantitative
Screening) identifying HFEs needing detailed analysis
___________________________________
___________________________________
• Outputs to other tasks: best-estimate HEPs for Task 14 (Fire
Risk Quantification) ___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
Slide 4
Task 12b – Post-
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
12550194 3-83
Slide 5 Notes:
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
ASME PRA Standard & Possible Team Addition ___________________________________
• Overall approach is not new

___________________________________
– Continue to follow the basic HRA approach addressed in ___________________________________
ASME/ANS PRA Standard (RA-S-200X) including both Part 3 (fire)
and cited requirements from Part 2 (internal events)
___________________________________
– Recommends individual with experience in human behavior during ___________________________________
fires (firefighter trainers, etc.) be involved in quantification IF useful
for safe shutdown considerations (e.g., for local actions) ___________________________________
– But need to recognize the difference between operator safe ___________________________________
shutdown actions generally in the MCR vs. fire-fighting actions in the
vicinity of the fire ___________________________________
___________________________________
Slide 5
Task 12b – Post-
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
Slide 6 Notes:
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
PSFs and Fire Effects to Consider ___________________________________
Guidance focuses on identification of fire-relevant

___________________________________
performance shaping factors (PSFs) and potential ___________________________________
interactions among the PSFs (fire conditions could make
PSFs different than those for internal events):
___________________________________
• Available staffing resources
– Fire situation may need more staffing than responding to an internal ___________________________________
event
– “Nominal” staffing for internal event could be less than adequate for ___________________________________
fire
___________________________________
• Applicability and suitability of training/experience
– Extent of familiarity/training may be less for fire than for internal
events for both in-MCR and local actions
___________________________________
more… ___________________________________
Slide 6
Task 12b – Post-
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
12550194 3-84
Slide 7 Notes:
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
• Suitability of relevant procedures and administrative

___________________________________
controls ___________________________________
– Fires may require multiple procedures be used at the same time
(e.g., EOPs and Fire Procedures) that may be more burdensome ___________________________________
and together take more time to implement
– There may be less detailed or no procedures available for some ___________________________________
actions (e.g., local action steps are not spelled out but require more
skill-of-the-craft or memory) ___________________________________
• Availability and clarity of instrumentation ___________________________________

– Possibility of spurious or failed indications more likely for fires than
for internal events
___________________________________
___________________________________
Slide 7
Task 12b – Post-
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
Slide 8 Notes:
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
• Time available and needed to complete action, including

___________________________________
impact of concurrent and competing activities ___________________________________
– Timing of scenario could be different from comparable internal events
scenario due to spurious events and introduction of new/different ___________________________________
procedures and actions
– Actions themselves may have different execution times (e.g., have to ___________________________________
disable before reposition, may require more sequencing of actions,
etc.)
___________________________________
• Environment in which action is to be performed
– Fires can introduce new considerations (smoke, heat, chemicals, ___________________________________
toxic gases…)
• Accessibility and operability of equipment ___________________________________
– Fires can eliminate or delay the ability to take actions due to
accessibility or damage considerations ___________________________________
Slide 8
Task 12b – Post-
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
12550194 3-85
Slide 9 Notes:
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
• Need for special tools and clothing
– Fires may increase these requirements (e.g., breathing gear, ___________________________________
protective clothing, ladders, keys…)
– Need to ensure access to these, and consider potential increase in ___________________________________
execution of similar actions than that estimated for internal events
• Communications ___________________________________
– Could be greater demand and potential need for different form (e.g.,
runners) ___________________________________
• Team/crew dynamics and crew characteristics
– Potential for different roles/responsibilities, less frequent or different ___________________________________
timing of plant status checks (could affect recoveries), etc.
• Special fitness needs ___________________________________
– Ensure no new fitness needs required (especially for local actions)
___________________________________
Slide 9
Task 12b – Post-
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
Slide 10 Notes:
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
MCR Abandonment ___________________________________
___________________________________
Should consider as part of the PSF evaluations:
___________________________________
• Procedural/training approach and explicitness/clarity of
criteria for abandoning MCR ___________________________________
– Could be confusion about need to evacuate MCR
– Impact of crew reluctance to abandon MCR
___________________________________
– Timeliness of decision and problems associated with delays in
abandoning MCR
___________________________________
– Inappropriate abandonment of MCR (e.g., premature or less viable ___________________________________
option)
___________________________________
___________________________________
Task 12b – Post-
Slide 10
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
12550194 3-86
Slide 11 Notes:
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
MCR Abandonment (cont’d) ___________________________________
___________________________________
• Effects of crew no longer having access to complete MCR
indications and the information they provide ___________________________________
• Number and complexity of actions to shift control and carry
out subsequent activities ___________________________________
• Number of different locations to be visited ___________________________________
• Extent to which multiple actions need to be coordinated or
sequentially performed ___________________________________
• Ability to communicate between different locations
___________________________________
• Need to wear breathing apparatus or special clothing
• Adequacy of human-machine interface at remote shutdown ___________________________________
and local panels
___________________________________
Task 12b – Post-
Slide 11
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
Slide 12 Notes:
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
Cases Where Little or No Credit Should be Allowed ___________________________________
• Tasks needing significant interaction/communication

___________________________________
between individuals wearing SCBAs unless can be justified ___________________________________
as not a problem
• Fire causes numerous spurious actuations (or stops) of ___________________________________
equipment including instruments ___________________________________
• Actions performed in fire areas or requiring travel through
fire areas ___________________________________
• Actions requiring use of damaged equipment ___________________________________
• Actions without procedural direction or training, lacking ___________________________________
necessary tools, or with inadequate time available
___________________________________
Slide 12
Task 12b – Post-
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
12550194 3-87
Slide 13 Notes:
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
Documentation ___________________________________
___________________________________
Product of this task is a calculation package, which should
contain (per the ASME/ANS PRA Std. Part 3): ___________________________________
• All human actions and HFEs considered, including ___________________________________
descriptions in context of fire scenarios
___________________________________
• Quantification approach and method/tools used
___________________________________
• HEP results and bases for HEP calculations, including
dependencies, PSFs, and uncertainty
___________________________________
___________________________________
• Important sensitivities
___________________________________
Task 12b – Post-
Slide 13
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
12550194 3-88
SESSION 6: Fire Risk Quantification
12550194 3-89
Slide 1 Notes:
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
METHODOLOGY ___________________________________
Task 14 – Fire Risk Quantification ___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
Bethesda, MD ___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
Slide 2 Notes:
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
Fire Risk Quantification
Scope ___________________________________
___________________________________
• Task 14: Fire Risk Quantification
– Obtaining best-estimate quantification of fire risk

___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
Slide 2
Task 14 – Fire Risk Quantification Research (RES) & Electric Power Research Institute (EPRI)
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
12550194 3-90
Slide 3 Notes:
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
Task 14: Fire Risk Quantification
___________________________________
Purpose: perform final (best-estimate) quantification of fire
risk ___________________________________
• Calculate CDF/LERF as the primary risk metrics
• Include uncertainty analysis / sensitivity results (see Task
___________________________________
15) ___________________________________
• Identify significant contributors to fire risk
___________________________________
• Carry along insights from Task 13 to documentation but this
is not an explicit part of “quantifying” the Fire PRA model ___________________________________
• Carry along residual risk from screened compartments and
scenarios (Task 7); both (final fire risk and residual risk) are ___________________________________
documented in Task 16 to provide total risk perspective
___________________________________
Slide 3
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
Slide 4 Notes:
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
Inputs/Outputs ___________________________________
Task inputs:
___________________________________
___________________________________
• Inputs from other tasks: ___________________________________
– Task 5 (Fire-Induced Risk Model) as modified/run thru Task 7
(Quantitative Screening), ___________________________________
– Task 10 (Circuit Failure Mode Likelihood Analysis),
– Task 11 (Detailed Fire Modeling), and ___________________________________
– Task 12 (Post-Fire HRA Detailed Analysis)
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
Slide 4
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
12550194 3-91
Slide 5 Notes:
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
Inputs/Outputs ___________________________________
• Output is the quantified fire risk results including the

___________________________________
uncertainty and sensitivity analyses directed by Task 15 ___________________________________
(Uncertainty and Sensitivity Analysis), all of which is
documented per Task 16 (Fire PRA Documentation) ___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
Slide 5
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
Slide 6 Notes:
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
Four major steps in the procedure*:

___________________________________
• Step 1: Quantify CDF ___________________________________
• Step 2: Quantify LERF ___________________________________
• Step 3: Perform uncertainty analyses including propagation ___________________________________
of uncertainty bounds as directed under step 4 of Task 15
• Step 4: Perform sensitivity analyses as directed under step ___________________________________
4 of Task 15
___________________________________
* In each case, significant contributors are also identified

___________________________________
___________________________________
Task 14 – Fire Risk Quantification
Slide 6
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
12550194 3-92
Slide 7 Notes:
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
Quantification Process ___________________________________
Characteristics of the quantification process:

___________________________________
___________________________________
• Procedure is “general”; i.e., not tied to a specific method
(event tree with boundary conditions, fault tree linking…) ___________________________________
• Can calculate CDF/LERF directly by explicitly including fire ___________________________________
scenario frequencies or first calculate CCDP/CLERP and
then combine with fire scenario frequencies ___________________________________
• Quantification is to be done in conformance with relevant ___________________________________
ASME PRA Standard (RA-S-200X) requirements and
supporting requirements ___________________________________
– Fire section (Part 3) references internal events section (Part 2) for
most aspect of risk quantification
___________________________________
Slide 7
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
12550194 3-93
SESSION 7: Uncertainty and Sensitivity Analysis
12550194 3-94
Slide 1 Notes:
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
METHODOLOGY ___________________________________
Task 14 – Fire Risk Quantification ___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
Bethesda, MD ___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
Slide 2 Notes:
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
Fire Risk Quantification
Scope ___________________________________
___________________________________
• Task 14: Fire Risk Quantification
– Obtaining best-estimate quantification of fire risk

___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
Slide 2
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
12550194 3-90
Slide 3 Notes:
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
Purpose: perform final (best-estimate) quantification of fire
risk ___________________________________
• Calculate CDF/LERF as the primary risk metrics
• Include uncertainty analysis / sensitivity results (see Task
___________________________________
15) ___________________________________
• Identify significant contributors to fire risk
___________________________________
• Carry along insights from Task 13 to documentation but this
is not an explicit part of “quantifying” the Fire PRA model ___________________________________
• Carry along residual risk from screened compartments and
scenarios (Task 7); both (final fire risk and residual risk) are ___________________________________
documented in Task 16 to provide total risk perspective
___________________________________
Slide 3
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
Slide 4 Notes:
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
Inputs/Outputs ___________________________________
Task inputs:
___________________________________
___________________________________
• Inputs from other tasks: ___________________________________
– Task 5 (Fire-Induced Risk Model) as modified/run thru Task 7
(Quantitative Screening), ___________________________________
– Task 10 (Circuit Failure Mode Likelihood Analysis),
– Task 11 (Detailed Fire Modeling), and ___________________________________
– Task 12 (Post-Fire HRA Detailed Analysis)
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
Slide 4
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
12550194 3-91
Slide 5 Notes:
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
Inputs/Outputs ___________________________________
• Output is the quantified fire risk results including the

___________________________________
uncertainty and sensitivity analyses directed by Task 15 ___________________________________
(Uncertainty and Sensitivity Analysis), all of which is
documented per Task 16 (Fire PRA Documentation) ___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
Slide 5
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
Slide 6 Notes:
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
Four major steps in the procedure*:

___________________________________
• Step 1: Quantify CDF ___________________________________
• Step 2: Quantify LERF ___________________________________
• Step 3: Perform uncertainty analyses including propagation ___________________________________
of uncertainty bounds as directed under step 4 of Task 15
• Step 4: Perform sensitivity analyses as directed under step ___________________________________
4 of Task 15
___________________________________
* In each case, significant contributors are also identified

___________________________________
___________________________________
Task 14 – Fire Risk Quantification
Slide 6
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
12550194 3-92
Slide 7 Notes:
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
Quantification Process ___________________________________
Characteristics of the quantification process:

___________________________________
___________________________________
• Procedure is “general”; i.e., not tied to a specific method
(event tree with boundary conditions, fault tree linking…) ___________________________________
• Can calculate CDF/LERF directly by explicitly including fire ___________________________________
scenario frequencies or first calculate CCDP/CLERP and
then combine with fire scenario frequencies ___________________________________
• Quantification is to be done in conformance with relevant ___________________________________
ASME PRA Standard (RA-S-200X) requirements and
supporting requirements ___________________________________
– Fire section (Part 3) references internal events section (Part 2) for
most aspect of risk quantification
___________________________________
Slide 7
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
12550194 3-93
Slide 1 Notes:
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
METHODOLOGY
___________________________________
Task 15 - Uncertainty and Sensitivity ___________________________________
Analysis
___________________________________
___________________________________
September and November, 2008
Bethesda, MD
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
Slide 2 Notes:
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
Task 15:Uncertainty and Sensitivity Analysis
Purpose ___________________________________
___________________________________
Purpose: Provide a process for identifying and treating
uncertainties in the Fire PRA, and identifying sensitivity ___________________________________
analysis cases
___________________________________
• Many of the inputs to the Fire PRA are uncertain
___________________________________
• Important to identify sources of uncertainty and assumptions
that have the strongest influence on the final results ___________________________________
• Fire risk can be quantified without explicit quantification of ___________________________________
uncertainties, but the risk results cannot be considered as
complete without it ___________________________________
• Sensitivity analysis is an important tool in uncertainty
assessment
___________________________________
Slide 2
Task 15 - Uncertainty and Sensitivity Analysis Research (RES) & Electric Power Research Institute (EPRI)
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
12550194 3-95
Slide 3 Notes:
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
Scope ___________________________________
___________________________________
Scope of Task 15 includes:
___________________________________
•Background information on uncertainty ___________________________________
•Classification of the types of uncertainty ___________________________________
•A general approach on treating ___________________________________

uncertainties in Fire PRA ___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
Task 15 - Uncertainty and Sensitivity Analysis
Slide 3
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
Slide 4 Notes:
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
Types of Uncertainty ___________________________________
• Distinction between aleatory and epistemic uncertainty:

___________________________________
– “Aleatory” - from the Latin alea (dice), of or relating to ___________________________________
random or stochastic phenomena. Also called
“random uncertainty or variability.” ___________________________________
• Reflected in the Fire PRA models as a set of
interacting random processes involving a fire- ___________________________________
induced transient, response of mitigating systems,
and corresponding human actions ___________________________________
– “Epistemic” - of, relating to, or involving knowledge;
cognitive. [From Greek episteme, knowledge]. Also ___________________________________
called “state-of-knowledge uncertainty.”
___________________________________
• Reflects uncertainty in the parameter values and
models (including completeness) used in the Fire ___________________________________
PRA – addressed in this Task
Slide 4
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
12550194 3-96
Slide 5 Notes:
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
Inputs and Outputs ___________________________________
• Inputs from other Tasks:

___________________________________
– Identification of sources of epistemic uncertainties from Tasks 1 through ___________________________________
13 worthy of uncertainty/sensitivity analysis (i.e., key uncertainties)
– Quantification results from Task 14 including risk drivers used to help ___________________________________
determine key uncertainties
___________________________________
– Proposed approach for addressing each of the identified uncertainties
including sensitivity analyses
___________________________________
• Outputs to other Tasks:
– Sensitivity analyses performed in Task 14
___________________________________
– Results of uncertainty and sensitivity analysis are reflected in ___________________________________
documentation of Fire PRA (Task 16)
___________________________________
Task 15 - Uncertainty and Sensitivity Analysis
Slide 5
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
Slide 6 Notes:
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
General Procedure ___________________________________
Addresses a process to be followed rather than a pre-defined

___________________________________
list of epistemic uncertainties and sensitivity analyses, since
these could be plant specific
___________________________________
•Step 1: Identify uncertainties associated with each task ___________________________________
•Step 2: Develop strategies for addressing uncertainties
___________________________________
•Step 3: Review uncertainties to decide which uncertainties
to address and how ___________________________________
•Step 4: Perform uncertainty and sensitivity analyses ___________________________________
•Step 5: Include results of uncertainty and sensitivity
___________________________________
analyses in Fire PRA documentation
___________________________________
Slide 6
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
12550194 3-97
Slide 7 Notes:
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
See Appendix U to NUREG/CR-6850 for background on
uncertainty analysis. See Appendix V for details for each ___________________________________
task.
Step 1: Identify epistemic uncertainties for each task ___________________________________
• Initial assessment of uncertainties to be treated is provided
in Appendix V to NUREG/CR-6850 (but consider plant ___________________________________
specific analysis for other uncertainties such as specific
assumptions) ___________________________________
• From a practical standpoint, characterize uncertainties as
___________________________________
modeling and data uncertainties
• Outcome is a list of issues, by task, leading to potentially ___________________________________
important uncertainties (both modeling and data uncertainty)
___________________________________
Slide 7
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
Slide 8 Notes:
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
Step 2: Develop strategies for addressing uncertainties
• Strategy can range from no action to explicit quantitative ___________________________________
modeling
• Each task analyst is expected to provide suggested
___________________________________
strategies ___________________________________
• Possible strategies include propagation of data
uncertainties, developing multiple models, addressing ___________________________________
uncertainties qualitatively, quality review process, and basis
for excluding some uncertainties ___________________________________
• Basis for strategy should be noted and may include ___________________________________
importance of uncertainty on overall results, effects on
future applications, resource and schedule constraints ___________________________________
Slide 8
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
12550194 3-98
Slide 9 Notes:
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
Step 3: Review uncertainties to decide which uncertainties to

___________________________________
address and how ___________________________________
• Review carried out by team of analysts familiar with issues, ___________________________________
perhaps meeting more than once
___________________________________
• Review has multiple objectives: ___________________________________
– Identify uncertainties that will not be addressed, and reasons why
– Identify uncertainties to be addressed, and strategies to be used
– Identify uncertainties to be grouped into single assessment
___________________________________
– Identify issues to be treated via sensitivity analysis
– Instructions to task analysts to perform the analyses
___________________________________
___________________________________
Slide 9
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
Slide 10 Notes:
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
Sensitivity Analysis ___________________________________
• Sensitivity analysis can provide a perspective that

___________________________________
cannot be obtained from a review of significant risk
contributors.
___________________________________
– Each task analyst can provide a list of parameters that had the
___________________________________
strongest influence in their part of the analysis
___________________________________
– Experiment with modified parameter to demonstrate impact on
the final risk results ___________________________________
– Modeling uncertainties can be demonstrated through sensitivity ___________________________________
analysis
___________________________________
– Sensitivities should be performed for individual uncertainties as
well as for appropriate logical groups of uncertainties ___________________________________
Slide 10
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
12550194 3-99
Slide 11 Notes:
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
Step 4: Perform uncertainty and sensitivity analyses
___________________________________
• Uncertainty analyses may involve:
– Quantitative sampling of parameter distributions
– Manipulation of models to perform sensitivity analyses ___________________________________
– Qualitative evaluation of uncertainty
___________________________________
• Following items should be made explicit:
– Uncertainties being addressed ___________________________________
– Strategy being followed
– Specific methods, references, computer programs, etc. being used ___________________________________
(to allow traceability)
– Results of analyses, including conclusions relative to overall results
of Fire PRA ___________________________________
– Potential impacts on anticipated applications of results
___________________________________
Slide 11
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
Slide 12 Notes:
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
Step 5: Include results in PRA documentation

___________________________________
___________________________________
• Adequate documentation of uncertainties and sensitivities is
as important as documentation of baseline results ___________________________________
___________________________________
• Adequate documentation leads to improved decision-making
___________________________________
• Documentation covered more fully under Task 16 ___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
Slide 12
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
12550194 3-100
Slide 13 Notes:
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
Expectations ___________________________________
___________________________________
• Minimum set of uncertainties expected to have a formal
treatment: ___________________________________
– Fire PRA model structure itself, representing the uncertainty with regard
to how fires could result in core damage and/or large early release ___________________________________
outcomes (Tasks 5/7)
– Uncertainty in each significant fire ignition frequency (Task 6) ___________________________________
– Uncertainty in each significant circuit failure mode probability (Task 10)
– Uncertainty in each significant target failure probability (Task 11) ___________________________________
– Heat release rate
– Suppression failure model and failure rate ___________________________________
– Position of the target set vs. ignition sources
– Uncertainty in each significant human error probability (Task 12)
___________________________________
– Uncertainty in each sequence core damage and large early release
frequency based on the above inputs as well as uncertainties for other
significant equipment failures/modes (Task 14)
___________________________________
Slide 13
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
Slide 14 Notes:
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
Expectations ___________________________________
___________________________________
• Other uncertainties may be relevant to address
___________________________________
• Sensitivity analyses should be performed where
important to show robustness in results (i.e., demonstrate
___________________________________
where results are / are not sensitive to reasonable ___________________________________
changes in the inputs)
___________________________________
• While not really a source of uncertainty, per se, technical
___________________________________
quality issues and recommended reviews are also
addressed ___________________________________
___________________________________
Slide 14
___________________________________
___________________________________
12550194 3-101
12550194
APPENDICES
APPENDIX A: QUESTIONS ASKED IN MODULE 1 SESSIONS
NRC Disclaimer: Appendix A is intended solely for use as part of a training tool. No portion
represents NRC Conclusions or Regulatory Positions, and should not be interpreted as such.
Session 1a: Fire PRA Component Selection

QUESTION
Given that spurious opening is a high-consequence event, would doubles and triples be
considered in the PRA?
RESPONSE
The relevant guidance addresses doubles, but provides no numerical upper limit for
consideration.
QUESTION
For consideration in the PRA, why aren’t small LOCAs considered?
RESPONSE
They are! We’re not concerned about pipe-break LOCAs, but we are concerned about any
other event, like a spurious opening of the PORV, that can result in the same thing, like a small-
break LOCA, or a medium-break LOCA, or a large-break LOCA.
QUESTION
Should we include the auxiliary feedwater pumps’ test-line isolation valves in the fire PRA
equipment list?
RESPONSE
No. The system description says that they are not a significant diversion of flow.
ASIDE: DUAL FAILURE MODES
Both failure modes of a particular component, like failure to open and spuriously opening, must
be considered in the model and potentially each of those failure modes will involve different
cables. The circuit analysts will need that information, so when identifying information for the
PRA equipment list, identify each failure mode.
QUESTION
Are most components required for the PRA included in the fire PRA?
12550194 A-1
RESPONSE
In most cases, this is correct, but additional information is needed. In addition, there may be
certain situations on which you make a decision that you don’t want to include in the fire PRA
model.
QUESTION
On the electrical drawings, it says that MOV-7 and -8 are racked out. Are these included
anyway because they are high consequence?
RESPONSE
Yes. The circuit analysts will consider the potential for a three-phase smart short, even if the
valve is racked out. Include it in the analysis, but you will ultimately determine that the
probability of this short is very low.
QUESTION
Could you clarify the meaning of the “normal position” column in table 1 in the fire PRA
equipment list?
RESPONSE
“Normal position” here refers to the position of the component prior to failure. For example,
HPI-A in the first line of the table initiates from standby, turning off in the event of an electrical
failure and on as the desired position.
Session 2: Fire-Induced Risk Model

Development
QUESTION
Slide 5: How do you define what LERF means in the context of a PRA?
RESPONSE
It’s the same definition that you use in the PRA right now. There’s no change in the definition of
these risk metrics. What will change is the things that give you core damage and LERF, like the
fire damage and impacts, the fire initiators in your model. The intent of 6850 was to make it
generic enough that it would work with any type of software package, rather than being
designed to focus on any one methodology or software package. The advantage of this
approach is that it is flexible, but the downside is that it might be too high-level or generic in
some cases. For this reason, we present here a guide on how to get there, but once you get it,
you try to incorporate these fire risk models into your plant. You’ll have to tailor it into your own
packages. Nothing new here, just new fire-induced initiators and failure modes. The human
actions will have to be reassessed; in particular, the post-initiator actions that must be taken
12550194 A-2
after a plant trip. You must account for the fact that there are higher stress conditions and more
confusion during a fire. In addition, there might be some new operator actions in the fire
emergency procedures that must be assessed for their impacts on core damage. In appendix
R, the reason you shut off equipment (thereby risking damage to it) is so that you minimize the
risk of spurious equipment functioning. For this reason, you pretty much isolate the off-site
power and try to guarantee that you can get power from the diesels.
QUESTION
Slide 7: How do you know which initiating events correspond to which system failure right
away? Do you have to look at all possible scenarios and screen from there, or can you
immediately only look at certain subsets?
RESPONSE
If it doesn’t affect another of your mitigation systems and it’s just a reactor trip, most of the time
it’s going to screen. The fire actually has to be affecting something in your mitigation system for
you to get that impact. Take, for example, a seal LOCA in a PWR. You have to lose CCW,
thermal barrier cooling, and seal injection. You might think that the fire causes an RCP seal
LOCA. When trying to figure out how to do this, you need to remember that this is all one big
AND gate, so you’re always multiplying by some initiator. What initiator can I use to capture the
effect? If I map to a reactor trip and my cables are hooked up to a CCW and a charging pump, I
could conceivably capture that effect through cable propagation. I don’t need to make a special
seal LOCA, initiator or CCWs because I would have captured that effect through propagation
through my model. In this example, as in the real situation, you don’t want to map every fire
zone to every initiator, you want instead to find a set that seem to match the plant response. If
you have a fire that causes a LOCA, you want to go under the LOCA tree. If you have
something that effectively causes a steam line break, you will want to go under the steam line
break tree. This is where you will need to exercise some judgment on where to map the fire
initiating events, and sometimes you will have to look at the cable impacts, if you have them.
I want to mention that this task 5 is another iteration one. First shot through, you may or may
not have the cables. Although you want them, if you don’t have them, you must assume failure
of that system. So, by definition, if you don’t have the cables, you take a hit on that system.
Once you do have the cables, then you can back off that system and the cable impacts will
come through the system rather quickly.
QUESTION
I’m still confused: can the core damage frequencies inform the event trees?
RESPONSE
Yes. Here is an example: you come in with some transient initiating event in your event tree.
(The event tree is a series of events used to model the steps necessary to core damage.) Then
you ask yourself about the RCS integrity. Each one of these branches has a fault tree under it,
a number of different ways to arrive at an RCS integrity failure. You’re looking for those fire
events that can make PORVs go open, cause seal LOCAs, cause vent valves to open, anything
that can give you a hole in your system that’s equivalent to a small LOCA. The next step is to
figure out how to mitigate a break in your coolant system, and this is a simplified model. You
can inject water into the system for injection, in order to mitigate the loss of coolant. Let’s go
12550194 A-3
back to the basics: up means it did occur, down means it did not. When you go down on this
branch here, it means you have some kind of LOCA on your hands. Success is always up,
failure is always down. You then ask yourself, “what do I need to mitigate this LOCA?”. But
then you put water into the reactor coolant system, and it’s coming out of the PORV, but it’s now
just draining to the bottom of containment. The water in the tank won’t last, so this is where the
recirculation pumps come into the picture. You first ask yourself whether or not you have water
to put in. In this simplistic model, if you don’t have the water, that’s core damage.
Another option is to go up on the coolant injection branch. Yes, you did have injection. But,
remember now, you’re running on water out of the tank. Now you have to realign the suction
from the sump to get suction from the pump so that you can go into recirculation and maintain
core cooling. If you fail recirculation, that’s core damage. If you make it through recirculation,
you’re done.
QUESTION
So where does the CDF come from?
RESPONSE
CDF is the sum of the probabilities of every instance here where you do obtain core damage.
You can fail injection and have core damage, or you can fail recirculation and also have core
damage.
QUESTION
Slide 9: When you say you’re going to map it to the different trees, I guess that there are
enough inputs on the different trees that are different, because of the HRAs and other things,
that wouldn’t you really just copy that event tree structure and have a separate initiator and use
that same structure?
RESPONSE
That’s one way of doing it. You could have an event tree for each initiating event, but what
we’ve found in these initiating events is that the structure is rather similar. The plant responds
in pretty much the same way to different events, it’s just about what’s being affected
underneath. If you have a hole in your system, you will always need injection.
QUESTION
We’ve got deterministic fire houses, and we’ve got actions in some zones that require the
operator to just start shutting stuff down. Operators hate that. That’s where we are, and
hopefully 805 will get us out of that. The procedures will take us to where we want to be. When
you’re building this pump, and you’re building in access to the operator,…
RESPONSE
You can either put it in up-front, or you can build a model without those actions, unless you
know it will degrade something, and then as you run through the model… Take, for example, an
MOV. The procedure might say, “the MOV spuriously opened, send a guy there locally and go
close it.” Initially, I wouldn’t put that operator action in the model, I would just let the fire fail that
12550194 A-4
MOV. Then what I’ll do is add a recovery on that system. I can add a solution and then
simulate the operator recovering from that failure, with some number, and then I’ll see what the
impact of that is. It’s an iterative process.
Now, the ones where they actually turn off equipment, like a HPSI pump, can be initially
mapped as a failure of that particular pump. I’ll then see if there are any associated recoveries.
You have to capture the detrimental effect, and in most cases, you can capture them within the
framework of the PRA model. There are some cases, however, that are so severe that the
structure of the model doesn’t work, and you have to build a special response model for the
FEPs, which hopefully you won’t have to do. An example I gave is an SISBO, or a self-induced
station blackout. When they perceive a fire, the first thing they’ll do is cut off the off-site power
and bring the power from the diesels. All of the unnecessary equipment, except the safe
shutdown equipment, will be turned off. It’s pretty hard to actually determine this structure, and
it will be largely determined by HRA. The necessary human actions are what will bring you into
a stable condition. If you have a LOCA on your hands, which hopefully you won’t, it might not
be the best thing to do. If the off-site power is there, you may wish to consider it. The point
here is that there are some situations where the PRA model may not be adequate. You have to
see what your FEPs are doing and see whether you can operate within the framework of the
existing PRA.
QUESTION
Slide 9: Given a known cause of an event with multiple causes, how do you model the particular
initiating event in the fault tree?
RESPONSE
This is your internal event initiator model in here. You have determined that fire in this
compartment will give you a loss of all water pumps. In order to model this effect, you have to
look at what initiating events are getting you there. One way is to find the loss of water initiating
event in your model, embedded somewhere in your fault trees, then make an OR gate, and slap
this fire initiating model right underneath of it. So now when you solve that model, a fire in that
compartment will have the same impact as a loss of all water.
QUESTION
I’m modeling, over here, the fire initiator. Is this meant to be just one of a number of acceptable
ways to do this? In terms of adding an initiator, I’m looking at the raw water initiator and adding
under there. One could also go in and look at the unavailability term, and calculate a conditional
core damage probability, and multiply by the fire probability term. There are different ways to
approach it.
RESPONSE
Yes. If there were more than one fire initiator, they would all be under the OR gate. There are
different ways to approach it. This method here gives you a CDF. If I multiplied these two
frequencies outside the model, all I want is a CCDP. So instead of putting an initiator under
there, I would put something else, like when I calculate a core damage probability for this
compartment, I would put some logic element there that would fail that gate. If you fail that gate,
it will propagate all up through the front line systems, at which point you will get a core damage
12550194 A-5
probability without considering the probability of the initiator. The initiator has been set to 1. But
then you’ve put some kind of flag in there to fail that gate to simulate the loss of raw water. So,
like I said, there are a couple of ways to do it.
QUESTION
Does the way you approach this affect what capability or category you would be? Is there a
preferred method with the NRC for this? (CCDP or CDF)
RESPONSE
Not that I know of, but people have done it both ways. Any way that you can show a core
damage probability. The example shows here that if you wanted to integrate these fire initiators
into your model for an A4 application, this might be the way you want to go. And when you
solve this model, you will get cutsets, or combinations of fire initiators. You will actually see the
fire initiator in the solution. Whereas, if you were to do CCDP, you’re setting all your initiators to
1.
QUESTION
Slide 14: Shouldn’t that operator action be a 1? Otherwise, you’re taking credit for a failure.
RESPONSE
Yes, you’re right. Usually it is 1. In fact, a lot of times, I don’t even add the AND gate, I just
consider it passed. I’m just showing how, if you wanted to model it explicitly, and someone
could give you a model for that. But usually it’s pretty high, because you’re counting on the
operator to follow standard procedures. It’s kind of a weird thing in this fire thing where, if you
follow procedures, you degrade your equipment.
Session 3: Qualitative/Quantitative Screening

QUESTION
What is the screening process for internal HRA events?
RESPONSE
We follow a similar screening process for internal events and HRA. Generally, we’ll put in a
very high failure probability for all the human error events, something like .3, and then we just let
it propagate through the initial evaluation model. The combinations that come up through the
cut sets, you look at them and you have to evaluate those combinations with regard to the
possibility of dependencies between them. Sometimes they may even be related to the same
procedural steps: you might have failure to initiate one system and failure to initiate another
system, and if they’re the same functions its addresses in the same step of the procedure, its
really the same human error. That’s why, when you do this initially, you put a high screening
value in because potentially a lot of these could be deep, highly dependent almost the same
12550194 A-6
event. If you start to put in 10^-2, they disappear and you miss out on important insights, so
that’s why we use high screening probabilities and I think its sort of the similar concept here is
you need to be very careful in eliminating human error events.
QUESTION
In the KFW example, you’re saying that you’re applying 7-3 to all of these actions in the control
room. Why or what’s the thought process on doing that for recovery actions that don’t have any
interactions with KFW?
RESPONSE
Simply because there exist other performance-shaping factors besides what directly relates to
the systems, the crew will be distracted by other things going on. They have a lot of workload to
address, so its more then just addressing the aux feedwater system itself, you have to address
all the actions that take place.
QUESTION
What do you mean by compartment, is that the same as a room?
RESPONSE
In the fire modeling section of 6850 they define, they have criteria for defining what a fire
compartment is. It could correspond to a fire area, it may not. In some people’s plants the fire
areas are very large and it’s just too much to handle in just one shot, so they actually divide
these things into smaller divisions, which they call compartments. These are the subdivisions of
the plant that were determined in the other task from a fire standpoint, it’s a fire criteria to define
what the boundaries are, what the criteria is. So from this stand point it’s an input to us we say
ok that’s a compartment, we believe you.
QUESTION
How do you screen HRA events before you know their interaction with hardware?
RESPONSE
When we say screening, I’m getting it below a threshold, but later on I put the HRA in and a lot
of those things pop up so I’m not really getting rid of it I’m doing it on step at a time. I’m running
the model with normal HRAs to get a feel for what’s getting me directly by the fire independent
of the HRA. From experience you put them all together, and you don’t know if it’s the HRA or
the hardware. When we first wrote it we said put it all together and see what happens, but in
practice, you can’t see the forest from the trees. You ask yourself, “is it the HRA that’s getting
me or is it the hardware?” So what I do in the first step is forget about the HRA for a while and
take a look at the hardware impacts because of the fire and then start bringing in the HRA to
see what HRAs we have to work on.
12550194 A-7
Session 6: Fire Risk Quantification
QUESTION
When we started using the PRA tool, it was really to try to come up with the best estimate of
risk, but in the last two or three years, especially with the development integrating fire into it, that
approach has really changed, and we’re going to make conservative assumptions in applied
PRA techniques. Why the change from what we had for several years?
RESPONSE
Part of the reason is when we do these applications and these STPs, people ask us the impact
of fire or seismic events. So now, from a risk perspective, and while realizing that maybe the
technology is not as evolved as what we have in the internal events in the other applications,
you have to really the limitations of the model.
QUESTION
How much data do we have to support the fire ignition frequency numbers? Where did we get
that data from?
RESPONSE
Well as part of that effort, the fire database was generated, and it included information that
came from multiple sources, including some from reportable incidents which the NRC keeps
record of. And some instances aren’t necessarily recordable, so all the information that could
be obtained was obtained with regards to fire incidents and put into a database. And that data
essentially was parsed, used to look at the frequencies of fires related to specific components
for example the frequency of fires related to transient combustibles. This is covered in the fire
task.
QUESTION
Should steps 3-6, the analysis of spurious events, be included in steps 1&2?
RESPONSE
Some are included in the fire safe shutdown analysis, but not all of them. The intent here was
to work your way down from a high level. The first step is kind of looking at your PRA at a high
level and looking at the initiators and sequencers in your model, asking yourself if they can be
evolved in a fire. From a fire perspective, you find out at a high level which trees can be
screened out with proper justification, and you’re stuck with maybe one or two event trees that
you really have to deal with. After understanding and screening the internal events model, you
wonder how it can be impacted with fire and its scope. Now you’re looking at it from the
standpoint of your appendix R and safe shutdown analysis, and there’ll be some commonality,
but the reason why we do this is because supposedly appendix R has the components for the
system that have already been analyzed for circuits. You have cable routing, and you have
circuit analysis, so you want to take as much credit as you can for that appendix R when you’re
able to. So we compare, for example, a safety injection pump and you look like you got a match
12550194 A-8
there, and some of the circuits match. However, if you look in your PRA model, the automatic
actuations model, the appendix R manual operations presume that you don’t have the circuitry
for automatic actuations. When we do the comparison, when we get down to the component
level, you can reflect and go back to your high level thinking and get an idea whether you won’t
be comparing oranges and apples; you’ll know the differences. So we start from a high level, of
sequences and event trees, and then compare appendix R and at some point you’re going to
end up at the component level. You’ll have this big database with components. Some
components are in appendix R, and some components are in PRA, and by this point you should
know why.
QUESTION
What percentage do you add when you do steps 3-6?
RESPONSE
There are some plants that I would say are light on their internal events, so by definition, they
are missing a bunch of variables. For the ones that have pretty robust PRA models, it’s mostly
adding more failure models than components. It’s hard to give a number because it varies.
12550194 A-9
12550194
APPENDIX B: SAMPLE EXERCISE SOLUTIONS (MODULE 1, TASK 2)
Step 1: Identify Internal Events PRA Sequences to be Included (and those to be excluded) in the Fire PRA Model
Initiator Average Description Accident Address in Fire

Comments
Frequency Sequence PRA Model?
(per yr) or Event (Y or N)
Tree Model
Y
%T1 7.23E-01 Reactor Trip Transient
Event Tree
Y
%T2 9.33E-02 Loss of Condenser Transient
Vacuum Event Tree
Y
%T3 4.13E-01 Turbine trip Transient
Event Tree
Y
%T4 3.73E-02 Loss of Main Feedwater Transient
Event Tree
Y
%T5P 4.25E-02 Loss of Offsite Power Transient
(Plant-Centered) Event Tree
N Grid-related loss of offsite power due to
%T5C 1.02E-02 Loss of Off-Site Power Transient
internal fire is highly unlikely
(Grid-Related) Event Tree
N Weather-induced loss of offsite power due to
%T5D 6.26E-03 Loss of Off-Site Power Transient
internal fire is highly unlikely
(Weather-Induced) Event Tree
Y Fire-induced pipe break is not likely.
%T6 7.35E-03 Steamline/Feed line Main
However, stuck-open SG PORV/atmospheric
Break Upstream of Main Steamline
relief valve could result in uncontrolled
Steam Isolation valves Break Event
cooldown.
or Downstream of Tree
Feedwater Isolation
Valves (Includes Stuck-
Open Secondary relief
12550194 B-1

Comments
Tree Model
valves)
Y Fire-induced pipe break is not likely.
%T7 5.44E-03 Steamline Break Main
However, condenser steam dump valve(s)
Downstream of Main Steamline
could result in uncontrolled cooldown.
Steam isolation valves Break Event
(Includes Stuck-Open
Secondary relief valves)
Y
%T8 2.94E-04 Loss of 4160 V Bus 1 Transient
Event Tree
Y
%T9 2.94E-04 Loss of 4160 V Bus A Transient
Event Tree
Y
%T10 2.94E-04 Loss of 4160 V Bus B Transient
Event Tree
Y
%T11 2.94E-04 Loss of 4160 V Bus 2 Transient
Event Tree
Y
%T12 3.00E-03 Loss of 125 VDC Bus A Transient
Event Tree
Y
%T13 3.00E-03 Loss of 125 VDC Bus B Transient
Event Tree
Y
%T15 Fault Tree Loss of CCW System Transient
Model Event Tree
%T15-INIT
Y
%T16 Fault Tree Loss of Service Water Transient
Model System Event Tree
%T16-INIT
Y
%T17 Fault Tree Loss of Instrument Air Transient
12550194 B-2

Comments
Tree Model
Model Event Tree
%T17-INIT
Y
%T21 3.41E-02 Closure of MSIV (1 SG Transient
Loop) Event Tree
Y
%T22 1.24E-02 Closure of both MSIVs Transient
Event Tree
Y
%T23 1.78E-01 Partial Load Rejection Transient
Event Tree
Y
%T24 5.79E-02 Spurious Steam Gen. Transient
Isolation Signal Event Tree
Y
%T25 7.23E-02 Reactor Trip With PORV Transient
Opening/Demand Event Tree
Y
%T26 Fault Tree Loss of Power from120 Transient
Model VAC Buses A & B Event Tree
%T26-INIT
See comment Fire-induced pipe break or passive RCP seal
%S 6.8E-03 Small LOCA (pipe Small LOCA
failure is unlikely. However, portion of small
breaks and RCP seal Event Tree
LOCA event tree likely needed to treat
LOCA)
transient-induced small LOCA from Transient
Event Tree such as the pressurizer PORV
demanded and stuck-open or RCP seal
LOCA via loss of RCP seal cooling.
See comment Fire-induced pipe break is unlikely. For our
%M 9.60E-06 Medium LOCA (pipe Medium
simplified plant, any transient-induced LOCA
breaks) LOCA Event
is considered small. If in another plant, a
Tree
transient-induced medium LOCA could occur
based on one or more events (e.g., a single
but large size PORV or multiple PORVs
12550194 B-3

Comments
Tree Model
spuriously opening), then a portion of the
medium LOCA event tree may be needed.
See comment Fire-induced pipe break is unlikely. For our
%A 7.77E-05 Large LOCA (pipe Large LOCA
simplified plant, any transient-induced LOCA
breaks) Event Tree
is considered small. If in another plant, a
transient-induced large LOCA could occur
based on one or more events (e.g., a single
but large size PORV or multiple PORVs
spuriously opening), then a portion of the
large LOCA event tree may be needed.
N Fire-induced rupture of SG tubes is highly
%R 7.93E-03 Steam Generator Tube SGTR Event
unlikely.
Rupture Tree
Y Spurious opening of both RHR suction valves
%I2 2.000E-07 Interfacing Systems ISLRHR
could result in ISLOCA. Since power to the
LOCA at RCS/RHR Sequence
inboard valve is racked out, a 3-phase hot
Interface (2 MOVs in (single event
short would be required to open that valve.
series) model)
Consideration of 3-phase hot shorts is
required for high-consequence lines.
N Fire-induced ISLOCA highly unlikely via a
%I3 Fault Tree Interfacing Systems ISLCCW
passive rupture of the RCP Cooler
Model LOCA at RCS/CCW Sequence
I3QINIT interface (Reactor
Coolant Pump Cooler
rupture)
N Fire-induced rupture of the reactor vessel is
%VR 2.70E-07 Reactor Vessel Rupture Single Event
highly unlikely
in Master
Fault Tree
12550194 B-4
ACCIDENT SEQUENCE OR EVENT TREE MODELS IN THE PRA
Accident Sequence Description Additional Details Address in Comments
or Event Tree Model Fire PRA
Model?
(Y or N)
TRA Transient Includes transient-induced Y
LOCAs such as stuck-open
PORV and RCP seal LOCA
SLOCA Small LOCA Pipe breaks & RCP seal LOCA See comment Fire-induced pipe break or passive
RCP seal failure is unlikely. However,
portion of small LOCA event tree
likely needed to treat transient-
induced small LOCA from Transient
Event Tree such as the pressurizer
PORV demanded and stuck-open or
RCP seal LOCA via loss of RCP seal
cooling.
MLOCA Medium LOCA Pipe breaks See comment Fire-induced pipe break is unlikely.
For our simplified plant, any transient-
induced LOCA is considered small. If
in another plant, a transient-induced
medium LOCA could occur based on
one or more events (e.g., a single but
large size PORV or multiple PORVs
spuriously opening), then a portion of
the medium LOCA event tree may be
needed.
LLOCA Large LOCA Pipe breaks See comment Fire-induced pipe break is unlikely.
For our simplified plant, any transient-
induced LOCA is considered small. If
in another plant, a transient-induced
large LOCA could occur based on
one or more events (e.g., a single but
large size PORV or multiple PORVs
spuriously opening), then a portion of
the large LOCA event tree may be
needed.
ATWS Anticipated Transients Reactor Protection System fails N Fire-induced failure of the reactor
12550194 B-5
Without Scram safe on loss of power. Trip circuits protection system is highly unlikely.
are highly redundant and
confirmed to be physically
separated.
SGTR Steam Generator N Fire-induced rupture of SG tubes is
Tube Rupture highly unlikely.
MSLB Main Steamline Break Includes spurious opening of Y Fire-induced pipe break is not likely.
secondary relief valves. However, stuck-open SG
PORV/atmospheric relief valve or
condenser steam dump valve(s) could
result in uncontrolled cooldown.
ISLCCW Interfacing Systems Rupture of Reactor Coolant Pump N Requires passive failure of RCP
LOCA at RCS/CCW Cooler cooler – not likely coincident with fire.
interface
ISLRHR Interfacing Systems Fire-induced opening of RHR Y Spurious opening of both RHR
LOCA at RCS/RHR suction valves suction valves could result in ISLOCA
Interface
New Spurious Safety Requires multiple spurious valve See comment Need to check on potential to cause
nd
Injection with HPI openings and possibly 2 pump such an event and the number of
start spurious events required. Likely to
cause reactor trip (manual or
automatic on high pressure) if is not
or cannot be terminated by operator.
Could cause subsequent LOCA.
New Feedwater ramp-up or May require multiple spurious See comment Need to check on potential to cause
AFW spurious start events (need to check) such an event and the number of
spurious events required. Likely to
cause reactor trip (manual or
automatic such as on steam/feed
mismatch) if is not or cannot be
terminated by operator. Could cause
damage to AFW-B pump.
New RWST drain down Requires combination of either or See comment Need to check on potential to cause
event both MOV-5,6 with either or both such an event and the number of
MOV-3,4 spuriously opening. spurious events required. Likely to
cause procedure-driven manual reactor
trip due to loss of initial safety injection
water supply / LCO condition for HPI.
12550194 B-6
Step 2: Review of the Internal Events PRA Against the Fire Safe Shutdown Analysis
Table 1: Systems in PRA Model
System Description Additional Details Address in Comments

Fire PRA
Model?
(Y or N)
RCS Reactor Coolant PORV for pressure relief and feed & bleed. Y
System Stuck-open PORV causes small LOCA.
CVCS Chemical and Normal charging and letdown functions are Y Only includes isolation of letdown and
Volume Control not modeled. However, components required charging for operation in HPI mode
System to isolate charging and letdown are modeled
for HPI mode.
HPI High Pressure The charging pumps in the CVCS also Y

Injection System function as safety injection pumps.
RHR Residual Heat Shutdown cooling is not modeled N Will be the same as Internal events
Removal System model
AFW Auxiliary Feedwater Only Trains A and B are modeled Y

System
MFW Main Feed Water Would take considerable effort to get cables N Although credited in the PRA model,
involved and their locations the cost of cable routing out weighs
the risk benefit.
MS Main Steam System Stuck-open secondary relief valves could Y
12550194 B-7

Fire PRA
Model?
(Y or N)
cause equivalent of mainsteam line break.
CS Containment Spray Required for recirculation during LOCA Y
CF Containment Fan Required for recirculation during LOCA Y

Coolers
CI Containment Isolation Modeled in LERF Y
ESFAS Emergency Y
Safeguards Actuation
System
CCW Component Cooling Y

Water System
SW Service Water Y
System
AC AC Power (all voltage To extent power is needed to support Y To extent power is needed to support
levels) equipment in the PRA. equipment in the PRA.
DG Emergency Diesel Y
Generators
DC DC Power To extent power is needed to support Y To extent power is needed to support
12550194 B-8

Fire PRA
Model?
(Y or N)
equipment in the PRA. equipment in the PRA.
IA Instrument Air Required for PORV and other valves. Backup Y

nitrogen is provided for PORV and is what is
credited.
HVAC-HPI HVAC in HPI Pump HVAC is required during 24-hr PRA mission Y
Room
12550194 B-9
Table 2: Systems in Appendix R

Fire PRA
Model?
(Y or N)
RCS Reactor Coolant System PORV to prevent spurious opening Y But need in fire PRA for more than just
and consequential small LOCA. ensuring closure for Appendix R.
CVCS Chemical Volume and Normal charging and letdown N Normal charging and letdown functions are
Control System functions are credited. not credited in PRA. However isolation of
letdown and normal charging is to be
modeled for HPI mode.
RHR Residual heat Removal Shutdown cooling is credited N Shutdown cooling not credited in PRA
System
AFW Auxiliary Feedwater Trains A&C are credited Y Especially since will not credit MFW,
System crediting all trains of AFW in the Fire PRA
may be important for ‘realistic’ risk
estimates.
MS Main Steam System Secondary relief valves and MSIVs Y Review from PRA perspective
are included to prevent spurious
opening causing uncontrolled
secondary depressurization.
CCW Component Cooling Y

Water System
12550194 B-10

Fire PRA
Model?
(Y or N)
SW Service Water System Y
AC AC Power (all voltage But certain buses not credited Y Need to ensure all buses are included that
levels) (especially non-safety) if loads not are needed to support equipment to be
otherwise required for safe modeled in the Fire PRA.
shutdown
DG Emergency Diesel Y
Generators
DC DC Power But certain buses not credited Y Need to ensure all buses are included that
(especially non-safety) if loads not are needed to support equipment to be
otherwise required for safe modeled in the Fire PRA.
shutdown
IA Instrument Air Required for PORV and other Y

valves. Backup nitrogen is provided
for PORV.
RCS Instruments RCS pressure, Required for safe shutdown See Include in model if instruments impact
temperature, nuclear monitoring. comment equipment or human failure events in the
instrumentation, etc PRA. See Step 5.
Secondary Steam Generator level, Required for safe shutdown See Include in model if secondary instruments
12550194 B-11

Fire PRA
Model?
(Y or N)
Instruments Streamline pressure, etc. monitoring. comment impact equipment or human failure events
in the PRA. See Step 5.
HVAC-HPI HVAC in HPI Pump HVAC is required during 72-hr Y Required for PRA during 24-hr mission. 72-
Room Appendix R mission hr mission is for cold shutdown and not part
of PRA.
HVAC-AFW HVAC in AFW Pump HVAC is required during 72-hr N 72-hr mission is for cold shutdown and not
Room Appendix R mission part of PRA. Not required for PRA mission.
12550194 B-12
Table 3: List of Basic Events in Model
%I2 Interfacing Systems LOCA at RCS/RHR Interface (2 MOVs in series)
%I3 Interfacing Systems LOCA at RCS/CCW interface (Reactor Coolant Pump Cooler rupture)
%T15 LOSS OF COMPONENT COOLING WATER (CCW)
%T23 PARTIAL LOAD REJECTION
%T25 REACTOR TRIP WITH PORV OPENING
%T3 TURBINE TRIP
%T4 LOSS OF MAIN FEEDWATER
%T1 REACTOR TRIP
AFWA-FTR AFWA fails to run
AFWA-FTS AFWA fails to start
AFWB-FTR AFWB fails to run
AFWB-FTS AFWB fails to start
AOV-1_FTC PORV AOV-1 fails to CLOSE
AOV-1_FTO PORV AOV-1 fails to open
AOV-3_FTC AOV-3 FAILS TO CLOSE
EPS-120VBUSAF 120V BUS A FAULT
12550194 B-13
EPS-120VBUSAINVF FAILURE OF 120V BUS A INVERTER
EPS-125VDCBUSAF FAULT ON 125V DC BUS A
EPS-125VDCBUSBF FAULT ON 125V DC BUS B
EPS-125VDCPNLAF FAULT ON 125V DC PANEL A
EPS-125VDCPNLBF FAULT ON 125V DC PANEL B
EPS-480VLCAF 480V LOAD CENTER A FAULT
EPS-480VLCAXTF 480V LOAD CENTER A TRANSFORMER FAILS
EPS-480VLCBF 480V LOAD CENTER B FAULT
EPS-480VLCBXTF 480V LOAD CENTER B TRANSFORMER FAILS
EPS-480VMCCA1F 480V MCC A1 FAULT
EPS-480VMCCB1F 480V MCC B1 FAULT
EPS-4VBUSAF 4KV BUS A FAULT
EPS-4VBUSBF 4KV BUS B FAULT
EPS-BATA FAILURE OF BATTERY A
EPS-BATB FAILURE OF BATTERY B
EPS-BCAF FAILURE OF BATTERY CHARGER A
EPS-BCBF FAILURE OF BATTERY CHARGER B
12550194 B-14
EPS-DGAF FAILURE OF DIESEL GENERATOR A
EPS-DGBF FAILURE OF DIESEL GENERATOR B
HPIA_FTS HPIA fails to start
HPIB_FTS HPIB fails to start
MFWFAIL MAIN FEEDWATER SYSTEM FAILURE AFTER REACTOR TRIP
12550194 B-15
OPER-1 Operator fails to switch over to recirculation
OPER-4 Operator fails to establish feed and bleed cooling
OPER-7 OPERATOR FAILS TO TRIP REACTOR COOLANT PUMP
RCPSEAL RCP SEAL LOCA GIVEN LOSS OF CCW AND SUCCESSFUL RCP TRIP
SUTF FAILURE OF START-UP TRANSFORMER (SUT)
UATF FAILURE OF UNIT AUXILIARY TRANSFORMER (UAT)
12550194 B-16
Continuation of Step2 and Including Steps 4 thru 6:
Table 4: Dispostion of Components in PRA and Appendix R (Use Tables 1-3 and Figures 1-3)
In PRA In Appendix Add to Fire PRA Comments

Power
Equipment ID Equipment Description Model? R? (Y or N) Equipment List? (Y or N)
Supply
(Y or N)
High pressure safety Y Y Y

HPI-A 4.16kV Bus A
injection pump A
High pressure safety Y Y Y

HPI-B 4.16kV Bus B
injection pump B
N Y N Not modeling shutdown

cooling and spurious
RHR-B RHR pump 4.16kV Bus B
operation benign to credited
functions (See Step 4)
Instrument air Y Y Y To ensure long-term PORV

COMP-1 480 V LC 1
compressor operation
Motor driven AFW pump Y Y Y

AFW-A 4.16kV Bus A
A
Steam driven AFW Pump Y N Y

AFW-B N/A
B
N Y Y Credited in Appendix R. Will

AFW-C AFW Pump C 4.16 kV Bus 2
be credited for the fire PRA
AOV-1 Pressure operated relief 120VAC Bus Y Y (only to Y Need for both ensuring
12550194 B-17

Power
Supply
(Y or N)
valve A ensure closure (does not spuriously
(SOV-1)
remains open) and to open when
closed) needed for feed and bleed.
AOV-2 125 VDC Bus N Y (for normal Y Especially for isolation when
Letdown isolation valve
B letdown) needed. See Step 4.
(SOV-2)
AOV-3 Charging pump injection 125 VDC Bus Y Y (for normal Y Especially for isolation when
valve B charging) needed.

(SOV-3)
MOV-1 HPI valve 480V MCC A1 Y N Y
Y Y (for normal Y Especially for isolation when

MOV-2 VCT isolation valve 480V MCC B1 suction to needed.
charging)
Y N Y Also see Step 4 for spurious

MOV-3 Cont. sump recirc valve 480V MCC A1
operation concerns
Y N Y Also see Step 4 for spurious

MOV-4 Cont. sump recirc valve 480V MCC B1
operation concerns
Y N Y Need to ensure both open

MOV-5 RWST isolation valve 480V MCC A1
and close when desirable
MOV-6 RWST isolation valve 480V MCC B1 Y N Y Need to ensure both open
12550194 B-18

Power
Supply
(Y or N)
and close when desirable
Y (for Y (for Y PRA will not address

ISLOCA) shutdown shutdown cooling but need
RHR inboard suction cooling) to address for fire-induced
MOV-7 480V MCC A1
valve ISLOCA and possible high
consequence event (see
Step 6)
Y (for Y (for Y PRA will not address

ISLOCA) shutdown shutdown cooling but need
RHR outboard suction cooling) to address for fire-induced
MOV-8 480V MCC B1
valve ISLOCA and possible high
consequence event (see
Step 6)
MOV-9 HPI valve 480V MCC B1 Y N Y
MOV-10 AFW discharge valve 480V MCC A1 Y Y Y
125 VDC Bus Y N Y

MOV-11 AFW discharge valve
B
MOV-13 PORV block valve 480V MCC A1 N Y Y
MOV-14 AFW turbine steam line 125 VDC Bus Y N Y
12550194 B-19

Power
Supply
(Y or N)
isolation valve B
AFW steam inlet throttle 125 VDC Bus Y N Y

MOV-15
valve B
N N N Potential for significant flow

AFW test line isolation
MOV-16 480V MCC A1 diversion is small.
valve
See Step 4

MOV-17 480V MCC B1 diversion is small.
valve
See Step 4
MOV-18 AFW C Pump Discharge 480 V MCC-2 N Y Y

MOV-19 480 V MCC-2 diversion is small.
valve
See Step 4.
N Y (for admin N Unlikely to be

V-12 CST isolation valve N/A purposes to closed/plugged coincident
ensure open) with fire.
120VAC Bus N Y Y See Step 5.

LI-1 RWST level
A
12550194 B-20

Power
Supply
(Y or N)

LI-2 RWST level
B

A

B
Letdown heat exchanger 120VAC Bus N N Y See Step 5.

TI-1
outlet temp A
120VAC Bus N N Y See Step 5.

PT-1 RCS pressure
B
120VAC Bus N N Y See Step 5.

A-1 AFW motor high temp
A
SUT-1 Y Y Y
SWGR-A Train A 4160 V Bus
EDG-A
SUT-1 Y Y Y
SWGR-B Train B 4160 V Bus
EDG-B
UAT-1 N N Y
SWGR-1 Non-Safety 4160 V Bus
SUT-1
12550194 B-21

Power
Supply
(Y or N)
UAT-1 N Y Y
SWGR-2 Non-Safety 4160 V Bus
SUT-1
SUT-1 Startup Transformer OSP Y Y Y
Train A Emergency Y Y Y
EDG-A PNL-A
Diesel Generator
Train B Emergency Y Y Y
EDG-B PNL-B
Diesel Generator
Non-Safety 480 V Load N N Y

LC-1 SST-1
Center
Non-Safety 480 V Load N Y Y

LC-2 SST-2
Center
Train A 480 V Load Y Y Y

LC-A SST-A
Center
Train B 480 V Load Y N Y

LC-B SST-B
Center
Non-Safety Station N N Y
SST-1 SWGR-1
Service Transformer
SST-2 Non-Safety Station SWGR-2 N Y Y
12550194 B-22

Power
Supply
(Y or N)
Service Transformer
Train A Station Service Y Y Y

SST-A SWGR-A
Transformer
Train B Station Service Y N Y

SST-B SWGR-B
Transformer
Non-Safety 480 V Motor N N Y

MCC-1 LC-1
Control Center
Non-Safety 480 V Motor N Y Y

MCC-2 LC-2
Control Center
Train A 480 V Motor Y Y Y

MCC-A1 LC-A
Control Center
Train B 480 V Motor Y N Y

MCC-B1 LC-B
Control Center
Non-Safety Swing Battery MCC-1 N N Y

BC-1
Charger MCC-2
BC-A Train A Battery Charger MCC-A1 Y N Y
BC-B Train B Battery Charger MCC-B1 Y N Y
BAT-1 Non-Safety Battery N/A N N Y
12550194 B-23

Power
Supply
(Y or N)
BAT-A Train A Battery N/A Y Y Y
BAT-B Train B Battery N/A Y Y Y
BC-1 N N Y
DC BUS-1 Non-Safety 125 VDC Bus
BAT-1
BC-A Y Y Y
DC BUS-A Train A 125 VDC Bus
BAT-A
BC-B Y Y Y
DC BUS-B Train B 125 VDC Bus
BAT-B
INV-A Train A Inverter DC BUS-A Y Y Y
INV-B Train B Inverter DC BUS-B N Y Y
Train A 120 VAC Vital Y Y Y

VITAL-A INV-A
Bus
Train B 120 VAC Vital N Y Y

VITAL-B INV-B
Bus
PNL-A Train A 125 VDC Panel DC BUS-A Y Y Y
PNL-B Train B 125 VDC Panel DC BUS-B Y Y Y
12550194 B-24
Step 3: Identify Fire-Induced Initiating Events Based on Equipment Affected
Will need to examine each fire compartment / analysis unit and determine based on the equipment and cables located there, which
of the initiators (from Step 1 of Task 2) can be caused by a fire in that compartment / analysis unit. If any new initiators are identified,
include in the Fire PRA. The Fire PRA will then include fires mapped to initiating events in the model. Each compartment / analysis
unit should have a disposition with regard to the initiating event(s) that occur as a result of a fire in each location (even if “none”).
Hold discussion with instructor.
12550194 B-25
Step 4: Identify Equipment with Potential Spurious Actuations that May Challenge the Mitigating
Capability to be Credited
Considered Description PRA System or Comments/Disposition

spurious equipment Function Possibly
operations Affected
MOV-16 AFW test line Failure of AFW-A due Fire-induced spurious opening of MOV-16
isolation valve to flow diversion could occur but flow diversion is not
significant. Will not be modeled.
MOV-17 AFW test line Failure of AFW-B due Fire-induced spurious opening of MOV-17
MOV-19 AFW test line Failure of AFW-C due Fire-induced spurious opening of MOV-19
MOV-3 Cont. sump Failure of high Fire-induced spurious opening of MOV-3
recirc. valve pressure injection during HPI injection mode will fail HPI –
need to model this failure.
MOV-4 Cont. sump Failure of high Fire-induced spurious opening of MOV-4
recirc. valve pressure injection during HPI injection mode will fail HPI –
need to model this failure.
AOV-2 Letdown Failure of high Loss of CCW with failure to isolate
isolation valve pressure injection letdown (such as spurious open signal)
will result in HPSI pump cavitation
RHR RHR pump Spurious operation of Could fail RHR pump (assuming no pump
pump – investigate suction protection) but RHR shutdown
effect on HPI & RHR cooling not modeled anyway. No adverse
effect on high pressure injection. No need
to model.
12550194 B-26
Step 5: Identify Additional Mitigating, Instrumentation, and Diagnostic Equipment Important to Human
Response
Instrumentation Description Potentially Affected Comments/Disposition

required to perform Human Failure Event
human actions in PRA model
OPER-1 Instrumentation required to identify need to switch over to recirculation. While lots
LI-1 RWST level Failure to align of redundancy with other LI’s, all are in close proximity on MCR board and so one
recirculation fire could affect multiple instruments. Hence will model.
LI-2 RWST level Failure to align of redundancy with other LI’s, all are in close proximity on MCR board and so one
Cont. sump
LI-3 Failure to align of redundancy with other LI’s, all are in close proximity on MCR board and so one
level
Cont. sump
LI-4 Failure to align of redundancy with other LI’s, all are in close proximity on MCR board and so one
level
OPER-2 Instrumentation required to identify need to isolate letdown when CCW is lost
Letdown heat Failure to isolate
TI-1 exchanger letdown on high
outlet temp temperature due to
CCW loss
OPER-4 Instrumentation (indicator) required to identify need for feed and bleed
RCS
PT-1 Failure to align feed
pressure
and bleed
AFW motor N/A Spurious high temperature alarm causes operator to shut down AFW pump
A-1
high temp erroneously
12550194 B-27
Step 6: Include Potentially High Consequence Related Equipment
Equipment or combinations Description of high Comments/Disposition

of equipment that can cause consequence event
high consequence event
MOV-7 and MOV-8 Spurious opening of MOV-7 and Need to model this combination
MOV-8 results in interfacing failure.
system LOCA – meets high
consequence event definition.
12550194 B-28
Step 7: Assemble Fire PRA Equipment List
Table 1: Fire PRA Equipment List Information (For Instructors)

HPIA fails to
HPIA_FTS Standby On Off N/A
start
i High pressure safety Aux Bldg.
HPI-A Pump SWGR-A
injection pump A El. 0 Ft
HPIA fails to
HPIA_FTR On On Off N/A
run
HPIB fails to
HPIB_FTS Standby On Off N/A
start
High pressure safety Aux Bldg.
HPI-B Pump SWGR-B
injection pump B El. 0 Ft
HPIB fails to
HPIB_FTR On On Off N/A
run
Motor driven AFW Turbine Bldg. AFWA fails to
AFW-A Pump SWGR-A AFWA-FTS Standby On Off N/A
pump A El. 0 Ft start
Motor driven AFW Turbine Bldg. Turbine Bldg. AFWA fails to
AFW-A Pump AFWA-FTR On On Off N/A
pump A El. 0 Ft El. 0 Ft run
AFW-B Pump N/A AFWB-FTS Standby On N/A N/A
pump B El. 0 Ft start
AFW-B Pump N/A AFWB-FTR On On N/A N/A
pump B El. 0 Ft run
AFW-C Pump SWGR-2 AFWC-FTS Standby On Off N/A
pump C El. 0 Ft start
AFW-C Pump SWGR-2 AFWC-FTR Standby On Off N/A
pump C El. 0 Ft run
RCP 1 fails to
RCP Reactor coolant pump Pump Containment SWGR-1 RCP1-FTT On Off Off N/A
trip
Instrument air
COMP-1 Compressor LC-1 IA-COMP1_FTS compressor Cycle Cycle Off N/A
compressor El. 0 Ft
fails to start
Instrument air
COMP-1 Compressor LC-1 IA-COMP1_FTR compressor Cycle Cycle Off N/A
compressor El. 0 Ft
fails to run
12550194 B-29
PORV AOV-1
AOV-1_TO Closed Closed Closed Closed
ii
transfers open
AOV-1 Power operated relief
AOV Containment VITAL-A
(SOV-1) valve
PORV AOV-1
AOV-1_FTO Closed Open Closed Closed
fails to open
iii
AOV-2 Letdown isolation Aux Bldg. AOV-2 fails to
AOV DC BUS-B AOV-2_FTC Open Closed Closed Closed
(SOV-2) valve El. 0 Ft close
iv
AOV-3 Charging pump Aux Bldg. AOV-3 FAILS
AOV DC BUS-B AOV-3_FTC Open Closed Closed Closed
(SOV-3) injection valve El. 0 Ft TO CLOSE
MOV-1 HPI discharge valve MOV MCC-A1 MOV-1_FTO Closed Open As Is N/A
El. 0 Ft TO OPEN
v Aux Bldg. MOV-2 fails to
MOV-2 VCT isolation valve MOV MCC-B1 MOV-2_FTC Open Closed As Is N/A
El. 0 Ft close
MOV-3 fails to
MOV-3_FTO Closed Open As Is N/A
open
vi Cont. sump recirc Aux Bldg.
MOV-3 MOV MCC-A1 MOV-3
valve El. -20 Ft
MOV-3_TO TRANSFERS Closed Closed As Is N/A
OPEN
MOV-4 fails to
MOV-4_FTO Closed Open As Is N/A
open
Cont. sump recirc Aux Bldg.
MOV-4 MOV MCC-B1 MOV-4
valve El. -20 Ft
MOV-4 _TO TRANSFERS Closed Closed As Is N/A
OPEN
Aux Bldg. MOV-5 fails to Open/Close
MOV-5 RWST isolation valve MOV MCC-A1 MOV-5_FTO Closed As Is N/A
El. 0 Ft open d
Aux Bldg. MOV-6 fails to Open/Close
MOV-6 RWST isolation valve MOV MCC-B1 MOV-6_FTO Closed As Is N/A
El. 0 Ft open d
MOV-7
vii RHR inboard suction
MOV-7 MOV Containment MCC-A1 MOV-7_TO TRANSFERS Closed Closed As Is N/A
valve
OPEN
MOV-8
RHR outboard suction Aux Bldg.
MOV-8 MOV MCC-B1 MOV-8_TO TRANSFERS Closed Closed As Is N/A
valve El. -20 Ft
OPEN
MOV-9 HPI discharge valve MOV MCC-B1 MOV-9_FTO Closed Open As Is N/A
El. 0 Ft TO OPEN
AFW pump A Turbine Bldg. MOV-10 fails to
MOV-10 MOV MCC-A1 MOV-10_FTO Closed Open As Is N/A
AFW pump B Turbine Bldg. MOV-11 fails to
MOV-11 MOV DC BUS-B MOV-11_FTO Closed Open As is N/A
discharge valve El. 0 F open
12550194 B-30
MOV-13 fails to Open/
MOV-13 PORV block valve MOV Containment MCC-A1 MOV-13_FTC Open As is N/A
close Closed
AFW pump B turbine
Turbine Bldg. MOV-14 FAILS
MOV-14 steam line isolation MOV DC BUS-B MOV-14_FTO Closed Open As-Is N/A
El. 0 Ft TO OPEN
valve
AFW pump B steam Turbine Bldg. MOV-15 FAILS
MOV-15 MOV DC BUS-B MOV-15_FTO Closed Throttled As-Is N/A
inlet throttle valve El. 0 Ft TO OPEN
AFW pump C Turbine Bldg. MOV-18 fails to
MOV-18 MOV MCC-2 MOV-18_FTO Closed Open As-Is N/A
RWST Level
LI-1_FL indication fails Available Available Low N/A
viii low
LI-1 RWST level Instrument Yard VITAL-A
RWST Level
LI-1_FH indication fails Available Available High N/A
high
RWST Level
LI-2_FL indication fails Available Available Low N/A
low
LI-2 RWST level Instrument Yard VITAL-B
RWST Level
LI-2_FH indication fails Available Available High N/A
high
Cont sump
LI-3 Cont. sump level Instrument Containment VITAL-A LI-3_FH Level indication Available Available High N/A
fails high
Cont sump
LI-4 Cont. sump level Instrument Containment VITAL-B LI-4_FH Level indication Available Available High N/A
fails high
Letdown
ix Letdown heat Aux Bldg. temperature
TI-1 Instrument VITAL-A TI-1_FL Available Available Low N/A
exchanger outlet temp El. 0 Ft indication fails
low
RCS pressure
x
PT-1 RCS pressure Instrument Containment VITAL-B PI-1_FH indication fails Available Available High N/A
high
AFW motor
high
AFW motor high SWG Access temperature Non
A-1 Annunciator VITAL-A ANN-1_FH Available Unavailable N/A
temperature Room annunciator spurious
spuriously
indicates high
PNL-A Energized
xi Train A 4160 V Switchgear SUT-1 4KV BUS A Energized
SWGR-A Switchgear EPS-4VBUSAF- from SUT- De-Energized N/A
switchgear Room A DC BUS-A FAULT from SUT-1
1 1
12550194 B-31
PNL-A Energized
EDG-A 4KV BUS A Energized
EPS-4VBUSAF- from SUT- De-Energized N/A
DC BUS-A FAULT from EDG-A
2 1
PNL-B Energized
SUT-1 4KV BUS A Energized
EPS-4VBUSBF- from SUT- De-Energized N/A
DC BUS-B FAULT from SUT-1
1 1
Train B 4160 V Switchgear
SWGR-B Switchgear
switchgear Room B PNL-B Energized
EDG-B 4KV BUS A Energized
EPS-4VBUSBF- from SUT- De-Energized N/A
DC BUS-B FAULT from EDG-B
2 1
SWGR-1 Switchgear EPS-4VBUS1F Energized Energized De-Energized N/A
SWGR-2 Switchgear EPS-4VBUS2F Energized Energized De-Energized N/A
FAILURE OF
START-UP
SUT-1 Startup transformer Transformer Yard OSP SUTF Energized Energized De-Energized N/A
TRANSFORME
R (SUT)
FAILURE OF
Train A emergency Diesel DIESEL
EDG-A DG Bldg. DC BUS-A EPS-DGAF Standby On Off N/A
diesel generator Generator GENERATOR
A
FAILURE OF
Train B emergency Diesel DIESEL
EDG-B DG Bldg. DC BUS-B EPS-DGBF Standby On Off N/A
diesel generator Generator GENERATOR
B
480V LOAD
LC-1 Load Center SST-1 EPS-480VLC1F CENTER 1 Energized Energized De-Energized N/A
center El. 0 ft
FAULT
480V LOAD
LC-2 Load Center SST-2 EPS-480VLC2F CENTER 2 Energized Energized De-Energized N/A
center El. 0 ft
FAULT
480V LOAD
Train A 480 V load Switchgear SST-A
LC-A Load Center EPS-480VLCAF CENTER A Energized Energized De-Energized N/A
center Room A PNL-A
FAULT
480V LOAD
Train B 480 V load Switchgear SST-B
LC-B Load Center EPS-480VLCBF CENTER B Energized Energized De-Energized N/A
center Room B PNL-B
FAULT
480V LOAD
SST-1 Transformer SWGR-1 Energized Energized De-Energized N/A
R FAILS
12550194 B-32
480V LOAD
SST-2 Transformer SWGR-2 Energized Energized De-Energized N/A
R FAILS
480V LOAD
Train A station service Switchgear EPS- CENTER A
SST-A Transformer SWGR-A Energized Energized De-Energized N/A
transformer Room A 480VLCAXTF TRANSFORME
R FAILS
480V LOAD
Train B station service Switchgear EPS- CENTER B
SST-B Transformer SWGR-B Energized Energized De-Energized N/A
transformer Room B 480VLCBXTF TRANSFORME
R FAILS
MCC-1 LC-1 Energized Energized De-Energized N/A
MCC-2 LC-2 Energized Energized De-Energized N/A
Train A 480 V motor Motor Control SWG Access EPS- 480V MCC A1
MCC-A1 LC-A Energized Energized De-Energized N/A
control center Center Room 480VMCCA1F FAULT
Train B 480 V motor Motor Control SWG Access EPS- 480V MCC B1
MCC-B1 LC-B Energized Energized De-Energized N/A
control center Center Room 480VMCCB1F FAULT
AUTOMATIC
Energized
Automatic transfer SWG Access MCC-1 TRANSFER Energized
ATS-1 ATS EPS-ATS1F from De-Energized N/A
switch Room MCC-2 SWITCH ATS-1 from MCC-1
MCC-1
FAILS
FAILURE OF
Non-safety swing Battery Turbine Bldg.
BC-1 ATS-1 EPS-BC1F BATTERY Energized Energized De-Energized N/A
battery charger Charger El. 0 Ft
CHARGER 1
FAILURE OF
Battery Switchgear
BC-A Train A battery charger MCC-A1 EPS-BCAF BATTERY Energized Energized De-Energized N/A
Charger Room A
CHARGER A
FAILURE OF
Battery Switchgear
BC-B Train B battery charger MCC-B1 EPS-BCBF BATTERY Energized Energized De-Energized N/A
Charger Room B
CHARGER B
FAILURE OF
Turbine Bldg.
BAT-1 Non-safety battery Battery N/A EPS-SB STATION Available Available Unavailable N/A
El. 0 Ft
BATTERY
Battery FAILURE OF
BAT-A Train A battery Battery N/A EPS-BATA Available Available Unavailable N/A
Room A BATTERY A
Battery FAILURE OF
BAT-B Train B battery Battery N/A EPS-BATB Available Available Unavailable N/A
Room B BATTERY B
FAULT ON
EPS-
Non-safety 125 VDC Turbine Bldg. BC-1 125V NON-
DC BUS-1 DC Bus 125VNSDCBUS Energized Energized De-Energized N/A
bus El. 0 Ft BAT-1 SAFETY DC
F
BUS
12550194 B-33
FAULT ON
Switchgear BC-A EPS-
DC BUS-A Train A 125 VDC bus DC Bus 125V DC BUS Energized Energized De-Energized N/A
Room A BAT-A 125VDCBUSAF
A
FAULT ON
Switchgear BC-B EPS-
DC BUS-B Train B 125 VDC bus DC Bus 125V DC BUS Energized Energized De-Energized N/A
Room B BAT-B 125VDCBUSBF
B
FAULT ON
Train A 125 VDC Switchgear EPS-
PNL-A Panel board DC BUS-A 125V DC Energized Energized De-Energized N/A
panel Room A 125VDCPNLAF
PANEL A
FAULT ON
Train B 125 VDC Switchgear EPS-
PNL-B Panel board DC BUS-B 125V DC Energized Energized De-Energized N/A
panel Room B 125VDCPNLBF
PANEL A
FAILURE OF
Switchgear EPS-
INV-A Train A inverter Inverter DC BUS-A 120V BUS A Energized Energized De-Energized N/A
Room A 120VBUSAINVF
INVERTER
FAILURE OF
Switchgear EPS-
INV-B Train B inverter Inverter DC BUS-B 120V BUS B Energized Energized De-Energized N/A
Room B 120VBUSAINVF
INVERTER
Train A 120 VAC vital SWG Access EPS- 120V BUS A
VITAL-A 120VAC Bus INV-A Energized Energized De-Energized N/A
bus Room 120VBUSAF FAULT
Train B 120 VAC vital SWG Access EPS- 120V BUS A
VITAL-B 120VAC Bus INV-B Energized Energized De-Energized N/A
bus Room 120VBUSBF FAULT
Notes:
Legend
Appendix R
Components/failures added
to PRA for Fire PRA Model
i
HPI pumps A & B are in Appendix R for normal charging function; not for HPI.
ii
Closed to prevent LOCA /Open for feed and bleed. Appendix R has valve only to ensure remains closed.
iii
AOV-2 in Appendix R only for normal letdown function.
iv
AOV-3 in Appendix R only for normal charging function.
v
MOV-2 in Appendix R only for normal suction to charging.
12550194 B-34
vi
MOV-3 and MOV-4 need to be closed for when using RWST water supply for HPI / Open for recirculation mode of injection. MOVs 5 & 6 are correspondingly open for RWST use
and closed for recirc.
vii
Valve electrically blocked closed. Control power fuses are supposed to be removed. MOV-7 & 8 in Appendix R for both normal isolation and shutdown cooling functions.
viii
If RWST level indication fails high the operator will fail to establish recirculation. If the RWST level fails low and containment sump level fails high, the operator will establish suction
to dry sump and fail the HPI the pumps due to insufficient suction. Need to resolve failure mode.
ix
If letdown temperature indication fails low, the operator will fail to isolate the letdown line on loss of CCW. This will cause HPI pumps to cavitate due to high temperature in the
suction line.
x
If RCS pressure instrument fails high, the low pressure signal to initiate emergency safeguards actuation during a lire-induced LOCA will not be initiated
xi
For SWGR-A or SWGR-B, only one basic event is used in the model. However, the circuit analysis impact to the switchgear is a function of the power supply
12550194 B-35
NRC FORM 335 U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION 1. REPORT NUMBER
(9-2004) (Assigned by NRC, Add Vol., Supp., Rev.,
NRCMD 3.7 and Addendum Numbers, if any.)
BIBLIOGRAPHIC DATA SHEET

(See instructionson the reverse) NUREG/CP-0194 Volume 1
2. TITLE AND SUBTITLE 3. DATE REPORT PUBLISHED

MONTH YEAR
Methods for Applying Risk Analysis to Fire Scenarios (MARIAFIRES) - 2008, July 2010
NRC-RES/EPRI Fire PRA Workshop, Volume 1 - Module 1: PRA/HRA
4. FIN OR GRANT NUMBER
5. AUTHOR(S) 6. TYPE OF REPORT

Conference Proceedings
ConferenceProceedings
Compiled and edited by D. Stroup, F. Gonzalez, and H. Woods (NRC)
7. PERIOD COVERED (Inclusive Dates)
8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION - NAME AND ADDRESS (If NRC, provide Division, Office or Region, U.S. NuclearRegulatory Commission, and mailing address;if contractor,
provide name and mailing address.)
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Office of Nuclear Regulatory Research (RES), Washington, DC 20555-0001
Electric Power Research Institute (EPRI), 3420 Hillview Avenue, Palo Alto, CA 94303
9. SPONSORI NG ORGANIZATION - NAM E AND ADDRESS (IffNRC, type "Same as above",; if contractor,provide NRC Division, Office or Region, U.S. NuclearRegulatory Commission,
and mailing address.)
10. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES

NRC-RES/EPRI Fire PRA Workshops conducted Sept. 28 - Oct. 2, 2008 and Nov. 17-20, 2008 in Bethesda, MD
11. ABSTRACT (200 words or less)
The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) approved the risk-informed and performance-based alternative
regulation 10 CFR 50.48(c) in July 2004, which allows licensees the option of using fire protection requirements
contained in the National Fire Protection Association (NFPA) Standard 805, "Performance Based Standard for Fire
protection for Light-Water Reactor Electric Generating Plants, 2001 Edition," with certain exceptions. To support
licensees' use of that option, the NRC and the Electric Power Research Institute (EPRI) jointly issued NUREG/CR-6850
(EPRI 1011989) "Fire PRA Methodology for Nuclear Power Facilities," in September 2005. That report documents the
state-of-the-art methods, tools, and data for conducting a fire Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA) in a commercial
nuclear power plant (NPP) application. Since the release of NUREG/CR-6850 in 2005, the NRC-RES and EPRI have
conducted a number of joint public workshops to provide training in the use of the methodologies and tools contained in
the document. The workshops have attracted both domestic and international. The material in this NUREG/CP was
recorded during two workshops conducted in 2008. It was adapted by NRC-RES Fire Research Branch (FRB) members
for use as an alternative training method for those who were unable to physically attend the training sessions. This report
can also serve as a refresher for those who attended one or more training sessions, and would be useful preparatory
material for those planning to attend a session.
12. KEY WORDS/DESCRIPTORS (List words or phrases that will assist researchersin locating the report.) 13. AVAILABILITY STATEMENT
unlimited
fire, performance-based, risk-Informed regulation, fire hazard analysis (FHA), fire safety, 14. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION
fire protection, nuclear power plant, probabilistic risk assessment (PRA), fire modeling, circuit (This Page)
analysis Unclassified
(This Report)
unclassified
15. NUMBER OF PAGES
16. PRICE
NRC FORM 335 (9-2004)

12550194 PRINTED ON RECYCLED PAPER
2008
NRC-RES/EPRI Fire PRA Workshop, Volume 2 –
Module 2: Electrical Analysis Based on the Joint
NRC-RES/EPRI Training Workshops Conducted in
2008 September 28–October 2, 2008, and
November 17–20, 2008, Bethesda, MD
1020621 NUREG/CP-0194

M. H. Salley

K. Canavan


12550194
CIRCUMSTANCE; OR
NOTE
12550194
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

D. Stroup
F. Gonzales
Palo Alto, CA 94303
R. Kassawara
1515 Eubank SE
J. S. Hyslop
K. Hill
S. Nowlen
F. Wyant
J. LaChance
J.S. Hyslop
K. Hill
iii
12550194
Campbell, CA 95008
B. Najafi
F. Joglar-Biloch
quality possible.
manner:
Methods for Applying Risk Analysis to Fire Scenarios (MARIAFIRES) – 2008 NRC-RES/EPRI
Fire PRA Workshop, Volume 2 – Module 2: Electrical Analysis Based on the Joint NRC-
RES/EPRI Training Workshops Conducted in 2008 September 28–October 2, 2008, and
November 17–20, 2008, Bethesda, MD. EPRI, Palo Alto, CA and U.S. Nuclear Regulatory
Commission, Office of Nuclear Regulatory Research (RES), Washington, DC: 2010. 1020621.
iv
12550194
ABSTRACT
v
12550194
Keywords
Fire PRA
Fire scenarios
Risk analysis
vi
12550194
LIST OF ACRONYMS

BAT Boric Acid Tank
CR Control Room
DC Direct Current
EF Error Factor
12550194 vii
IS Ignition Source
KS Key Switch
LOC Loss of Control
MG Motor-Generator
MFW Main Feedwater
MS Main Steam
NC No Consequence
12550194 viii
PE Polyethylene
SI Safety Injection
SSD Safe Shutdown
SW Service Water
SWGR Switchgear
12550194 ix
pressurized reactor
12550194 x
ABSTRACT..………………………………………………………………………………………….iii
LIST OF ACRONYMS……..………………………………………………………………..............ix
1 INTRODUCTION - ELECTRICAL ANALYSIS OVERVIEW ................................................... 1-1

1.1 EPRI Perspective ........................................................................................................... 1-2
2 ELECTRICAL ANALYSIS SLIDES ........................................................................................ 2-1

SESSION 1: Fire PRA Circuit Analysis Overview ................................................................. 2-1
SESSION 2: Task 3, Fire PRA Cable Selection .................................................................. 2-10
SESSION 3: Task 9, Detailed Circuit Failure Analysis ........................................................ 2-22
SESSION 4: Task 10, Circuit Failure Likelihood Analysis ................................................... 2-30
SESSION 5: Support Task B, Fire PRA Database.............................................................. 2-44
SESSION 6: Electrical Exercises Overview ........................................................................ 2-54
3 EXAMPLE EXERCISES………………………………………………………………….…………3-1
APPENDICES……………………………………………………………………………....................A-1
APPENDIX B: EXERCISE PROBLEMS AND SOLUTIONS ................................................ B-1
Exercises with Reference Figures .............................................................................. B-2
Instructors Exercise Solutions................................................................................... B-54
Drawings Needed with the Exercises ..................................................................... B-107
Drawing Pack 1 - Electrical Schematic Diagrams .......................................... B-108
Drawing Pack 2 - AOV and MOV Block Diagrams ......................................... B-121
Drawing Pack 3 - More Detailed Electrical Schematics ................................. B-130
12550194 xi
12550194
1 INTRODUCTION - ELECTRICAL ANALYSIS OVERVIEW
The components that constitute the fire probabilistic risk assessment (PRA) model each have
cables associated with them. These cables must be identified, traced, and analyzed. An
electrical analysis is performed to determine the positions that a component could take given
fire-induced cable failures. Because positions of components are critical to fire PRA to credit a
train to mitigate core damage, the electrical analysis is critical to the PRA evaluation. These
elements of the fire PRA are the topic of the Electrical Analysis module.
The first task of the Electrical Analysis module is to identify all cables associated with the
components selected in fire PRA task 2. A PRA analyst can always assume the worst-case
failure mode but must also consider the Appendix R failure mode for those components
addressed by Appendix R. The worst-case failure mode may be dependent on the risk sequence
entered, and care must be taken to ensure that the component failure modes are treated
accordingly. Should a more realistic analysis be beneficial to the PRA sequence in question,
then more detailed failure analysis can be done.
The Electrical Analysis module is divided into five sessions. Session 1 presents an overview of
circuits relevant to nuclear power plants (NPPs) and a discussion of the importance of the
electrical analysis within a fire PRA. Relevant technical specifications and requirements are
discussed as well as an overall strategy for implementation of the electrical analysis within the
fire PRA. Session 2 covers task 3 that addresses cable selection. This provides a method for
choosing electrical cables and a guide for using the location of cables determined in plant
walkdowns to generate reasonable outcomes of postulated fire scenarios. This deterministic
process produces a list of basic events or electrical components and their associated functions
and failure modes within a fire scenario.
Sessions 3 and 4 concern the failure modes of the electrical components as developed in Task 3.
The first part of the failure mode analysis is a deterministic screening process to identify those
cables with no critical effect on system elements. Only those cables that directly affect the
ability of the system elements selected for PRA are further considered in the fourth session,
which quantitatively establishes the likelihood of certain failure modes, including spurious
actuations.
Session 5 of the Electrical Analysis module is actually not unique to the electrical segment of
this course. The generation of a fire PRA database is a complex task that involves the
compilation of all of the data and results collected in a fire PRA. Distinct from the rest of the
electrical tasks, this is actually a database management task that occurs as a supporting function
throughout the process of the assessment. Although elements from all three training modules are
included, the fire PRA database tool is not repeated in either the Fire Analysis or the Systems
Analysis modules, and so trainees in those modules may benefit from this section of the
Electrical Analysis module.
12550194 1-1
1.1 EPRI Perspective
materials that are presented at the Fire PRA course provided by EPRI and the U.S. Nuclear
Regulatory Commission’s (NRC’s) Office of Nuclear Regulatory Research (RES). The training
and resulting presentation material is detailed and represents in excess of 60 hours of classroom
instruction. The training focuses on the Fire PRA methods documented in the joint Electric
Power Research Institute (EPRI)/RES publication 1011989 and NUREG/CR-6850 along with
clarifications, enhancements, and additions provided via the Frequently Asked Question (FAQ)
process for NFPA 805.
The intent of the publication is to provide to the public the training material used at the Fire PRA
the periodically offered fire PRA courses; rather, it is meant to augment that training and serve as
a reference. Enthusiastic future students can use the material to become familiar with the general
principles of fire PRA prior to arrival at the course. Students who have already taken the course
can use the material for reference. The material consists of a series of reports that document the
presentations including some speakers’ notes and text. In addition, an edited version of a
recorded training session is also available via a separate product number. This video version can
be used in a similar manner to the documentation (e.g., for reference or in preparation for the
course) and includes the actual recorded and edited course.
In providing this material, it is hoped that those who plan to attend the course can arrive more
informed, those who have already attended can have a reference, and those who have been
unable to attend have a resource to gain a more complete understanding of the intent and goals of
EPRI 1011989 and NUREG/CR-6850.
12550194 1-2
2 ELECTRICAL ANALYSIS SLIDES
SESSION 1: Fire PRA Circuit Analysis Overview
12550194 2-1
Slide 1 Notes:
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
EPRI/NRC-RES FIRE PRA
___________________________________
METHODOLOGY
___________________________________
Module 2: Fire PRA Circuit Analysis
Overview
___________________________________
___________________________________
D. Funk - Edan Engineering Corp.
F. Wyant - Sandia National Laboratories ___________________________________
Bethesda, MD
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
Slide 2 Notes:
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
CIRCUIT ANALYSIS
Presentation Road Map ___________________________________
___________________________________
• Circuit Analysis “Big Picture” Overview
___________________________________
• Circuit Analysis Strategy & Implementation
___________________________________
• Introduction to Key Considerations & Factors
___________________________________
• Review and Discussion of Tasks
___________________________________
• Relationship to Appendix R & NFPA 805 ___________________________________
• Discussion of Relevant FAQs ___________________________________
• Examples ___________________________________
___________________________________
Slide 2
Module 2: Fire PRA Circuit Analysis Overview Research (RES) & Electric Power Research Institute (EPRI)
___________________________________
___________________________________
12550194 2-2
Slide 3 Notes:
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
CIRCUIT ANALYSIS ___________________________________

Circuit Analysis Tasks
___________________________________
• Task 3 – Fire PRA Cable Selection ___________________________________
• Task 9 – Detailed Circuit Analysis

___________________________________
___________________________________
• Task 10 – Circuit Failure Mode Likelihood Analysis
___________________________________
• Support Task B – Fire PRA Database ___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
Module 2: Fire PRA Circuit Analysis Overview
___________________________________
___________________________________
Slide 4 Notes:
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
Circuit Analysis Overview
___________________________________
• Substantial Technical and Process-Related Advances
___________________________________
– Implication of these Advances: Circuit analysis is more complex and
difficult than analyses performed under Appendix R
___________________________________
• Collective Awareness of Circuit Failure Implications Greatly Improved
___________________________________
• Knowledge Base Improvements
– Fire Tests: EPRI, CAROLFIRE, Duke: Better but not perfect ___________________________________
understanding of fire-Induced circuit failures
– Practical experience from NFPA 805 transition projects ___________________________________
• Important “Lessons Learned” from pilot plants
• Significant insights from “in-progress” transition projects ___________________________________
– Active FAQ Process
• Interpretation of guidance ___________________________________
• New guidance
___________________________________
Slide 4
___________________________________
___________________________________
12550194 2-3
Slide 5 Notes:
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________

Circuit Analysis Overview
___________________________________
• Circuit Analysis is Now an Integral and Formal Part of the ___________________________________
Fire PRA Process
– Rigorous and formal process for correlating cables-to-equipment- ___________________________________
to-affected locations
– Definitive data and criteria has replaced estimations and judgment ___________________________________
– Essential that Fire PRA and NFPA-805 data be fully integrated
Note: The subtleties of aligning Fire PRA and traditional Appendix
___________________________________
R/NFPA-805 data is more complex than originally anticipated. This
primarily shows up in Component Selection (Task 2), but has major ___________________________________
ramifications to the circuit analysis
– Further Refinements to “State-of-the-Art” Techniques Realistic ___________________________________
– Practical aspects of dealing with an integrated data set
– Practical approach for dealing with MSOs ___________________________________
___________________________________
Slide 5
___________________________________
___________________________________
12550194 2-4
Slide 6
CIRCUIT ANALYSIS
PRA Task Flow Chart
TASK 1: TASK 2:
Plant Boundary & Partitioning Fire PRA Component
Selection
TASK 3:
Fire PRA Cable Selection
SUPPORT TASK A:
TASK 4: TASK 5:
Plant Walk Downs
Qualitative Screening Fire-Induced Risk Model
TASK 6:
Fire Ignition Frequencies
SUPPORT TASK B:
TASK 7A: TASK 12A:
Fire PRA Database
Quantitative Screening - I Post-Fire HRA: Screening
TASK 8:
Scoping Fire Modeling
Fire Specific
TASK 7B: Tasks
PRA/HRA Tasks
Quantitative Screening - II
Electrical
B Analysis
Tasks
Notes:
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
12550194 2-5
Slide 7
CIRCUIT ANALYSIS
PRA Task Flow Chart (continued)
TASK 9: TASK 11:

Detailed Circuit Failure Analysis Detailed Fire Modeling
TASK 10: B. Multi-Compartment
Circuit Failure Mode & Likelihood C. Main Control Room

Analysis
TASK 13: TASK 14: TASK 12B:

Seismic-Fire Interactions Fire Risk Quantification Post fire HRA: Detailed & recovery
TASK 15:
Uncertainty & Sensitivity Analyses Fire Specific
Tasks
PRA/HRA Tasks
TASK 16:
Fire PRA Documentation
Electrical Analysis
Tasks
Notes:
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
12550194 2-6
Slide 8 Notes:
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
CIRCUIT ANALYSIS
Overall Strategy & Implementation ___________________________________
___________________________________
• Each Electrical Analysis Task Represents a Refined Level of
Detail, i.e., Graded Approach ___________________________________
• Level-of-Effort for the Electrical Work is a Key Driver for
Project Scope, Schedule, and Resources ___________________________________
– High Programmatic Risk if Not Carefully Controlled
– Analysis and Routing of all Cables can be a Large Resource Sink with ___________________________________
Minimal Overall Benefit
– Concerns Validated by Numerous Projects ___________________________________
• Detailed Analysis Driven by Quantitative Screening Results
– Intelligence-Based Circuit Analysis ___________________________________
– Iterative Process
– Important to screen out obvious “Not Required” cables during the
___________________________________
initial cable selection process, with refinement driven by quantitative
screening ___________________________________
___________________________________
Slide 8
___________________________________
___________________________________
Slide 9 Notes:
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________

Overall Strategy & Implementation, cont…
___________________________________
• Recommended Methods are Consistent with Industry Best Practices ___________________________________
• Use Risk Perspectives to Streamline and Focus Analysis
___________________________________
• Remains a Technically and Logistically Challenging Area
___________________________________
• Limitations to the State-of-the-Art:
– Number of Multiple Hot Shorts/Spurious Actuations
___________________________________
– Spurious Actuation Probabilities
– Timing Considerations (being addressed by FAQ process)
___________________________________
___________________________________
• Existing Appendix R Circuit Analysis is NOT as Useful as Originally
Envisioned
___________________________________
___________________________________
Slide 9
___________________________________
___________________________________
12550194 2-7
Slide 10 Notes:
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________

Overall Strategy – Related FAQ ___________________________________
___________________________________
• FAQ 08-0051 Hot Short Duration (Status: Open)
– Issue: ___________________________________
• The guidance does not provide a method for estimating the duration
of a hot short once formed ___________________________________
• This could be a significant factor for certain types of plant equipment
that will return to a “fail safe” position if the hot short is removed
___________________________________
• Analyze the existing cable failure modes and effects test data to
determine if an adequate basis exists to establish hot short duration ___________________________________
distributions
– Status: ___________________________________
• Initial data analysis has been completed and results are under team
review ___________________________________
• NRC staff and industry review pending
___________________________________
Slide 10
___________________________________
___________________________________
Slide 11 Notes:
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________

Overall Strategy & Implementation, cont…
___________________________________
• Circuit Analysis (including cable tracing) Can Consume ___________________________________
40%-70% of Overall Budget
• Circuit Analysis Scope MUST be a Primary Consideration ___________________________________
During Project Scoping
___________________________________
• Qualified and Experienced Electrical Analysts Must be
Integral Member of PRA Team ___________________________________
• Coordination and Integration with Appendix R Must Occur ___________________________________
Early and Must be Rigorous
• Coordination with Task 2 (Component Section) is ___________________________________
Essential – MUST Understand the EXACT Functionality
Credited for Each Component ___________________________________
___________________________________
Slide 11
___________________________________
___________________________________
12550194 2-8
Slide 12 Notes:
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________

Key Considerations
___________________________________
• Relationship with Appendix R/NFPA 805 Analysis
___________________________________
• Long-Term Strategy for Data Configuration Control – Especially if Shared
Data with Appendix R/NFPA-805
___________________________________
• Availability, Quality, and Format of Cable Data
• Usability of Appendix R Circuit Analysis Data ___________________________________
– Not as useful as originally envisioned
– Automated tools are essential
– Functional state analysis is critical – overly conservative cable selection will not work for ___________________________________
Fire PRA
– Many plants are finding that circuit analysis re-baseline is necessary to support ___________________________________
upgraded Fire PRA and NFPA-805 projects
• User-Friendliness of Electrical Drawings ___________________________________
• Availability of Electrical Engineering Support
– Circuit analysis is a developed expertise ___________________________________
– Do not expect to be a proficient analyst based on a simple introductory course
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
Slide 13 Notes:
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________

Summary
___________________________________
• Do Not Underestimate Scope ___________________________________
• Ensure Proper Resources are Committed to Project
___________________________________
• Doable but MUST Work Smart
• Do Not “Broad Brush” Interface with Appendix R – Have a ___________________________________
Detailed Plan Before Starting
___________________________________
• Constant Interaction with Systems Analysts is Critical
___________________________________
• Develop Project Procedures – But Don’t Get Carried Away
• Compilation and Management of Large Volume of Data ___________________________________
– Automated Tools Imperative for Efficient Process
___________________________________
– Be Mindful of Long-Term Configuration Management
___________________________________
Slide 13
___________________________________
___________________________________
12550194 2-9
SESSION 2: Task 3, Fire PRA Cable Selection
12550194 2-10
Slide 1 Notes:
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
METHODOLOGY
___________________________________
Module 2: Task 3 - Fire PRA Cable
___________________________________
Selection
___________________________________
D. Funk - Edan Engineering Corp
Bethesda, MD
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
Slide 2 Notes:
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
FIRE PRA CABLE SELECTION
Purpose & Scope ___________________________________
___________________________________
• Identify Circuits/Cables Associated with Fire PRA
Components ___________________________________
• Determine Routing/Location of the Identified Cables ___________________________________
• Use Component-to-Cable-to-Location Relationships to ___________________________________
Determine What Components Could be Affected for
Postulated Fire Scenarios ___________________________________
Note: Scenario can be Fire Area, Room, Raceway, or Other
Specific Location
___________________________________
• Identify Fire PRA Power Supplies ___________________________________

___________________________________
___________________________________
Slide 2
Module 2: Task 3 - Fire PRA Cable Selection Research (RES) & Electric Power Research Institute (EPRI)
___________________________________
___________________________________
12550194 2-11
Slide 3 Notes:
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
FIRE PRA CABLE SELECTION ___________________________________

Introduction
___________________________________
• Conducted for all Fire PRA Components ___________________________________
Note: Exceptions do exist
• Deterministic Process ___________________________________
• Cables Associated to Components Based on Specified ___________________________________
Functionality
– Basic circuit analysis (Task 9) incorporated into Task 3 work to ___________________________________
prevent overwhelming the PRA model with inconsequential cable
failures ___________________________________
– Final product is a listing of defined Basic Events (component and
credited function) that could be impacted by a fire for a given ___________________________________
location (Fire Area, Fire Compartment, Fire Scenario)
• Procedure subdivided into six (6) distinct steps
___________________________________
___________________________________
Slide 3
___________________________________
___________________________________
12550194 2-12
Slide 4

Flowchart
Task 3 Interfaces Step 1: Compile and Evaluate

- Inputs from other tasks (1, 2 & support Prerequisite Information
task B) and Data
- Additional plant information needed for - Plant Partitioning Boundary Designations
cable selection - Confirm Fire PRA Equipment List
- Information from plant walkdowns - Cable and Raceway System (CRS)
(Sect ions 3.4.1, 3.4.2, 3.4.3) (Section 3.5.1)
Step 2: Select Fire PRA Circuits/Cables

- Develop strategy for cable selection
- Plant-specific rules for cable selection
- Select Fire PRA cables
(Sect ion 3.5.2)
Step 3: Identify and Select Fire PRA

Power Supplies
- Select Fire PRA power supplies
- Add power supplies to equipment list
(Section 3.5.3)
Step 4: Perform Associated Circuits

Review
- Confirm satisfactory electrical coordination for
Fire PRA power supplies
- Confirm satisfactory electrical overcurrent
protection for common enclosures
- Add Associated Circuits to Fire PRA cable list
(Section 3.5.4)
Module 2: Task 3 - Fire PRA Cable Selection
Notes:
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________________________
12550194 2-13
Slide 5

Flowchart
Step 5: Determine Cable Routing and

Plant Locations
- Determine cable routing and end points
- Determine raceway and end point locations
- Determine raceway fire protection features
(Section 3.5.5)
Step 6: Fire PRA Cable List and Target

Equipment Location Reports
- Assemble Fire PRA cable list
- Generate target equipment location reports
(Section 3.5.6)
Task 3 Outputs Uncertainty

- Fire PRA Database - Plant partitioning and cable location
- Component work packages - Plant-specific cable selection guidelines
(Input to Task 9) - Cable selection process
(Section 3.4.4)
- Cable location and routing accuracy
- Electrical coordination and protection
Notes:
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
12550194 2-14
Slide 6 Notes:
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
Task Interfaces - Input ___________________________________
___________________________________
• Plant Boundary Partitions (Task 1)
___________________________________
• Fire PRA Component List (Task 2)
___________________________________
• Fire PRA Database (Support Task B)
___________________________________
• Appendix R Circuit Analysis
___________________________________
• Plant Cable & Raceway Database ___________________________________
• Plant Drawings ___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
Slide 6
___________________________________
___________________________________
Slide 7 Notes:
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________

Task Interfaces - Output
___________________________________
• Fire PRA Cable List ___________________________________
• Fire PRA Power Supply List ___________________________________
• Associated Circuits review ___________________________________
• Component Analysis Packages ___________________________________

___________________________________
• Target Equipment Loss Reports (Potential Equipment
Functional Losses Broken Down by Location or Scenario) ___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
Slide 7
___________________________________
___________________________________
12550194 2-15
Slide 8 Notes:
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________

Step 1 – Prerequisite Information
___________________________________
• Confirm Plant Partitioning is Compatible
– Do partitions align with cable location data?
___________________________________
– What data is available and what is missing?
___________________________________
• Confirm PRA Equipment List is Final
– Input into a formal and controlled database ___________________________________
– For NFPA-805 transition projects a joint “consistency” review of NSP task
and PRA component selection task is highly recommended
___________________________________
– Critical that electrical analysts understand what the Basic Events really
mean
___________________________________
• Evaluate Database Requirements
– What currently exists? ___________________________________
– What is needed to support work?
– How is data to be managed and controlled? ___________________________________
– This is a “Biggy”
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
Slide 9 Notes:
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
Step 2 – Select Fire PRA Cables
___________________________________
• Analysis Cases ___________________________________
– Appendix R Component with Same Functional Requirements
• Must consider which (if any) automatic features are included in the
existing analysis
___________________________________
• Aligning existing analyses to Fire PRA Basic Events is not
straightforward ___________________________________
– Appendix R Component with Different Functional Requirements
– Non-Appendix R Component with Cable Location Data ___________________________________
– Non-Appendix R Component without Cable Location Data
___________________________________
• Analysis Sub-Steps
– Step 2.1 - Analysis Strategy
___________________________________
– Step 2.2 - Plant Specific Rules
– Step 2.3 - Select Cables
___________________________________
Joint Fire PRA Course, Sept. & Nov. 2008 Slide 9 A Collaboration of U.S. NRC Office of Nuclear Regulatory
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
12550194 2-16
Slide 10 Notes:
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________

Step 2.1 – Analysis Strategy
___________________________________
• Coordinate with Systems Analysts to Establish Functional
Requirements and General Rules
___________________________________
– Equipment functional states, basic events, initiators ___________________________________
– Initial conditions and equipment lines (i.e., normal state)
– Consistent conventions for equipment functions/state/position ___________________________________
– Equipment-level dependencies and primary components
– Multiple function components ___________________________________
– Super components
___________________________________
• Evaluate Appendix R Component & Circuit Data
– Ensure equipment list comparison conducted during Task 2 ___________________________________
– Review in detail the comparison list – ask questions!!!
– Essential that comparison includes detailed review/comparison of ___________________________________
“desired functional state(s)”
___________________________________
Slide 10
___________________________________
___________________________________
Slide 11 Notes:
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________

Step 2.1 – Analysis Strategy (continued)
___________________________________
• Goal – Efficient and Accurate Process to Obtain Required ___________________________________
Information
• Revisit Past Assumptions, Conventions, Approach ___________________________________
• Potential Trouble Areas ___________________________________
– How is off-site power going to be handled?
___________________________________
– Instrument circuits – understand exactly what is credited
– ESAFA, Load-Shed, EDG Sequencer, other automatic functions ___________________________________
– Medium-voltage switchgear control power
___________________________________
• Extent of Detailed Analysis to be Conducted Concurrently
• Determine How Analysis Will be Documented ___________________________________
___________________________________
Slide 11
___________________________________
___________________________________
12550194 2-17
Slide 12 Notes:
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
Step 2.2 – Plant Specific Cable Selection Rules
___________________________________
• Objective is Consistency ___________________________________
• Approach for Groups of Components
___________________________________
• Approach for Spurious Actuation Equipment
___________________________________
• Auxiliary Contacts – Critical Area for Completeness
• System-Wide Actuation Signals ___________________________________
• Bus or Breaker? ___________________________________
• Subcomponents & Primary Components ___________________________________
• Identification of Permanent Damage Scenarios
___________________________________
• Procedure - Develop Circuit Analysis Procedure/Guidelines
___________________________________
Slide 12
___________________________________
___________________________________
Slide 13 Notes:
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
Step 2.2 – Ready to Start?
___________________________________
• Develop Written Project Procedure/Guidelines ___________________________________
– Consistency, Consistency, Consistency
– Checking Process? ___________________________________
– Data Entry
– Problem Resolution ___________________________________
• Training for Analysts

___________________________________
– Prior circuit analysis experience is a prerequisite for key team ___________________________________
members
– Familiarity with plant drawings and circuits is highly beneficial ___________________________________
– A junior engineer with no prior circuit analysis experience will not
be able to work independently ___________________________________
___________________________________
Slide 13
___________________________________
___________________________________
12550194 2-18
Slide 14 Notes:
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________

Step 2.3 – Select Cables
___________________________________
• Case 1: Incorporate Existing Appendix R Analysis ___________________________________
– Confirm adequacy of existing analyses IAW plan
– Careful consideration of automatic functions ___________________________________
– Exact alignment for credited functionality
___________________________________
• Cases 2 & 3: New Functional State/Component: w/ Cable
Routing Data
___________________________________
– Collect drawings and/or past analysis information ___________________________________
– Identify/select cables IAW plant specific procedure/guidelines
– Conduct detailed analysis to the extent decided upon ___________________________________
– Formally document cable selection IAW established
procedures/guidelines ___________________________________
___________________________________
Slide 14
___________________________________
___________________________________
Slide 15 Notes:
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________

Step 2.3 – Select Cables (continued)
___________________________________
• Case 3: New Component: w/o Cable Routing Data ___________________________________
Available
– Same as Case 2 & 3, plus… ___________________________________
– Determine cable routing and associate with plant locations,
including cable end points ___________________________________
• Analysis Work Packages ___________________________________

– Retrieve from Past Appendix R Analysis
___________________________________
– Highly Recommended for New Components
– Major time saver for future work ___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
Slide 15
___________________________________
___________________________________
12550194 2-19
Slide 16 Notes:
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________

Step 3 – Select Fire PRA Power Supplies
___________________________________
• Identify Power Supplies as Integral Part of Cable Selection
___________________________________
– Make sure to differentiate between “Required” and “Not Required” power
supplies
– Switchgear and Instrument power supplies can be tricky
___________________________________
– Useful to identify the applicable breaker/fuse
___________________________________
• Add Power Supplies to Fire PRA Component List
___________________________________
• Make sure Fire PRA model, equipment list, and electrical analysis
are consistent ___________________________________
• Does Fire PRA model consider spurious circuit breaker operations?
___________________________________
– Must understand how this is modeled to correctly select cables
___________________________________
Joint Fire PRA Course, Sept. & Nov. 2008 Slide 16 A Collaboration of U.S. NRC Office of Nuclear Regulatory
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
Slide 17 Notes:
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________

Step 4 – Associated Circuits Review
___________________________________
• Objective is to Confirm Existing Studies Adequate ___________________________________
• View the Process as a “Gap Analysis”
___________________________________
• Common Power Supply Circuits - Assess Plant
Coordination Studies ___________________________________
• Common Enclosure Circuits - Assess Plant Electrical ___________________________________
Protection
___________________________________
• Roll Up Results to Circuit Analysis or Model as
Appropriate ___________________________________
Note: Ensure Switchgear Internal Fusing Supports Analysis
Assumptions ___________________________________
___________________________________
Slide 17
___________________________________
___________________________________
12550194 2-20
Slide 18 Notes:
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________

Step 5 – Determine Cable Routing and Locations
___________________________________
• Correlate Cables-to-Raceways-to-Locations ___________________________________
• Conceptually Straightforward ___________________________________
• Logistically Challenging ___________________________________
– Labor intensive
– Manual review of layout drawings ___________________________________
– Plant walkdowns often required
___________________________________
• Determine Cable Protective Features
– Fire wraps ___________________________________
– Embedded conduit
___________________________________
___________________________________
Slide 18
___________________________________
___________________________________
Slide 19 Notes:
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________

Step 6 – Target Equipment Loss Reports
___________________________________
• Data Entered into Fire PRA Database ___________________________________
• Sorts and Queries to Generate Target Equipment Loss
Reports
___________________________________
___________________________________
Perspective….Cable selection process should be viewed as providing ___________________________________
“Design Input” to the Fire PRA. It does not, however, provide any
risk-based results. In its simplest form it provides a list of equipment ___________________________________
that could be affected by a fire at a specified location or for a specific
scenario. ___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
Slide 19
___________________________________
___________________________________
12550194 2-21
SESSION 3: Task 9, Detailed Circuit Failure Analysis
12550194 2-22
Slide 1 Notes:
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
METHODOLOGY
___________________________________
Module 2: Task 9 - Detailed Circuit Failure ___________________________________
Analysis
___________________________________
F. Wyant - Sandia National Laboratories
___________________________________
___________________________________
Bethesda, MD
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
Slide 2 Notes:
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
DETAILED CIRCUIT FAILURE ANALYSIS
Purpose & Scope ___________________________________
___________________________________
The Detailed Circuit Failure Analysis Task is intended to:
___________________________________
• Identify the potential response of circuits and components
to specific cable failure modes associated with fire-
___________________________________
induced cable damage ___________________________________
• Screen out cables that do not impact the ability of a ___________________________________

component to complete its credited function ___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
Slide 2
Module 2: Task 9 - Detailed Circuit Failure Analysis Research (RES) & Electric Power Research Institute (EPRI)
___________________________________
___________________________________
12550194 2-23
Slide 3 Notes:
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
DETAILED CIRCUIT FAILURE ANALYSIS ___________________________________

Introduction (1)
___________________________________
• Fundamentally a deterministic analysis ___________________________________
• Perform coincident with cable selection (Task 3) to the extent
feasible and cost effective ___________________________________
• Difficult cases generally reserved for situations in which
Quantitative Screening indicates a clear need and
___________________________________
advantage for further analysis ___________________________________
• Detailed Failure Modes Analysis
– Requires knowledge about desired functionality and component ___________________________________
failure modes
– Conductor-by-conductor evaluation (Hot Probe method ___________________________________
recommended)
• Objective is to screen out all cables that CANNOT impact the ___________________________________
ability of a component to fulfill the specific function of interest
___________________________________
Joint Fire PRA Course, Sept. & Nov. 2008 Slide 3
___________________________________
___________________________________
Slide 4 Notes:
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________

Introduction (2)
___________________________________
• Failure Modes Considered ___________________________________
– Single Shorts-to-Ground (Reference Ground)
• Grounded System ___________________________________
• Ungrounded System
___________________________________
• Resistance Grounded System
– Single Hot Shorts ___________________________________
– Compatible Polarity Multiple Hot Shorts for Ungrounded AC and ___________________________________
DC Circuits
– Coincident Independent Hot Shorts On Separate Cables ___________________________________
– Multiple Intra-cable Hot Shorts
___________________________________
– Cables Associated Through Common Power Supply
___________________________________
Slide 4
___________________________________
___________________________________
12550194 2-24
Slide 5 Notes:
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________

Introduction (3)
___________________________________
• Failure Modes NOT Considered ___________________________________
– 3-phase proper sequence hot shorts (except high consequence ___________________________________
equipment with thermoplastic insulated conductor or ungrounded
configuration)
___________________________________
– Inter-cable hot shorts for armored cable and cable in dedicated
conduit ___________________________________
– Open circuit conductor failures ___________________________________
– Multiple high-impedance faults ___________________________________
Note: if conducting a combined NFPA-805 and Fire PRA circuit ___________________________________
analysis, NEI 00-01 suggests that open circuits be considered
___________________________________
Slide 5
___________________________________
___________________________________
Slide 6 Notes:
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________

Assumptions
___________________________________
The Following Assumptions Form the Basis for Task 9: ___________________________________
• An Appendix R analysis for the plant has been completed
and is available for identifying equipment failure ___________________________________
responses to specific cable failure modes
___________________________________
• Component Work Packages have been assembled as
part of the Task 3 activities or previous Appendix R ___________________________________
analyses
• Equipment is assumed to be in its normal position or ___________________________________
operating condition at the onset of the fire – the ___________________________________
equipment state might be variable
• Users of this procedure are knowledgeable on and have ___________________________________
experience with circuit design and analysis methods
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
12550194 2-25
Slide 7

Flowchart
Step 1: Compile and Evaluate

Task 9 Interfaces:
Prerequisite Information
- Inputs from other tasks (2, 7, 11 &
and Data
support task B)
- Confirm Fire PRA Cable List is
- Additional plant information needed
available in the Fire PRA Database
for circuit analysis
- Confirm unscreened plant
- Information from plant walkdowns
compartments and scenarios are
(Sections 9.4.1, 9.4.2, 9.4.3) identified
(Section 9.5.1)
Analysis Work Packages Step 2: Perform Detailed Circuit/Cable

- Input from Task 3 Failure Analysis
- Develop strategy for circuit analysis
(Input to Task 10) - Develop plant-specific rules for
(Sections 9.4.1 and 9.4.4)
performing circuit analysis
- Perform detailed circuit failure analysis
- Document analysis results
(Section 9.5.2)
Step 3: Generate Equipment Failure

Response Reports
- Enter results into Fire PRA Database
- Generate equipment failure response
reports
(Section 9.5.3)
Uncertainty
- Plant-specific circuit analysis
guidelines
- Circuit analysis process
Slide 7
Notes:
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
12550194 2-26
Slide 8 Notes:
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
Task Interfaces - Inputs ___________________________________
• Fire PRA Components List (Task 2)

___________________________________
• Fire PRA Cable List (Task 3) ___________________________________

• Fire PRA Database (Support Task B) ___________________________________
• Results of Quantitative Screenings (Task 7) ___________________________________
• Results of Detailed Fire Modeling (Task 11) ___________________________________
• Appendix R Circuit Analysis ___________________________________
• Plant Drawings ___________________________________
• CRS Database
___________________________________
___________________________________
Slide 8
___________________________________
___________________________________
Slide 9 Notes:
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
Task Interfaces - Outputs ___________________________________
___________________________________
• Equipment Failure Response Reports
___________________________________
• Component Analysis Packages (Updated)
___________________________________
• Revised Cable List ___________________________________
___________________________________
• Fire PRA Database & Model Updates
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
Slide 9
___________________________________
___________________________________
12550194 2-27
Slide 10 Notes:
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
Step 1 - Compile Prerequisite Information ___________________________________
___________________________________
• Ensure that prerequisite information and data is available
and usable before beginning the analyses (ideally the ___________________________________
necessary drawings are already in the Work Packages).
___________________________________
• Step 1.1: Confirm Fire PRA Cable List is Available in the
Fire PRA Database ___________________________________
– Component ⇒ Cable ⇒ Raceway ⇒ Compartment
___________________________________
• Step 1.2: Confirm Unscreened Plant Compartments and
___________________________________
Scenarios are Identified
– Target Equipment Loss Reports ___________________________________
– Equipment ID, Normal Status, Functional Requirements, etc.
___________________________________
___________________________________
Slide 10
___________________________________
___________________________________
Slide 11 Notes:
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
Step 2 - Perform Circuit Failure Analysis ___________________________________
• Perform a Deterministic-Based detailed circuit analysis for ___________________________________
the Fire PRA cables of interest that are located in the
unscreened plant locations.
___________________________________
___________________________________
• Step 2.1: Develop Strategy/Plan for Circuit Analysis
___________________________________
• Step 2.2: Develop Plant-Specific Rules for Performing the
Detailed Circuit Analysis ___________________________________
• Step 2.3: Perform Detailed Circuit Failure Analysis ___________________________________
• Document Analysis Results ⇒ Component Work Packages

___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
Slide 11
___________________________________
___________________________________
12550194 2-28
Slide 12 Notes:
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
Step 3 - Generate Equipment Failure Response Reports
___________________________________
• Enter Results into Fire PRA Database
___________________________________
• Generate Equipment Failure Response Reports
___________________________________
– A Listing by location (room, zone, area) of equipment and
associated cables affected by fire
___________________________________
– Provides specific equipment responses (cable failure
consequences) that affect the credited function being analyzed ___________________________________
– Equipment losses should be correlated to each Basic Event
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
Slide 12
___________________________________
___________________________________
Slide 13 Notes:
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
Caveats & Recommendations ___________________________________
___________________________________
• This Detailed Circuit Failure Analysis Methodology is a Static
Analysis (No Timing Issues are Considered) ___________________________________
• Be Aware of Possible Cable Logic Relationships
___________________________________
• Work Packages (Highly Recommended!)
• “Hot Probe” (Conductor-to-Conductor) Analysis Must be ___________________________________
Rolled-Up to Cable/Component Level
___________________________________
• Outputs Need to Be Compatible with Fire PRA Database
Format and Field Structure ___________________________________
• Coordinate with the Fire PRA Modelers/Analysts Early-On to
___________________________________
Define the Fire PRA Component Failure Modes of Concern
___________________________________
___________________________________
Slide 13
___________________________________
___________________________________
12550194 2-29
SESSION 4: Task 10, Circuit Failure Likelihood Analysis
12550194 2-30
Slide 1 Notes:
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
METHODOLOGY
___________________________________
Module 2: Task 10 - Circuit Failure ___________________________________
Mode Likelihood Analysis
___________________________________
___________________________________
Bethesda, MD
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
Slide 2 Notes:
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
CIRCUIT FAILURE MODE LIKELIHOOD ANALYSIS
Purpose & Scope ___________________________________
___________________________________
The Circuit Failure Mode Likelihood Analysis Task is Intended ___________________________________
to:
___________________________________
• Establish First-Order Probability Estimates for the Circuit
Failure Modes of Interest ___________________________________
AND ___________________________________
• Correlate Those Failure Mode Probabilities to Specific
Components
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
Joint Fire PRA Course, Sept. & Nov. 2008
___________________________________
Module 2: Task 10 - Circuit Failure Mode Likelihood Slide 2 Research (RES) & Electric Power Research Institute (EPRI)
Analysis
___________________________________
___________________________________
12550194 2-31
Slide 3 Notes:
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
CIRCUIT FAILURE MODE LIKELIHOOD ANALYSIS ___________________________________

Introduction (1)
___________________________________
• Probabilistic Based Analysis ___________________________________
• Two Methods Presented ___________________________________
– Expert Panel Results (Look-Up Tables)
– Computation-Based Analysis (Formulas) ___________________________________
• Requires Knowledge About Circuit Design, Cable Type and

___________________________________
Construction, Installed Configuration, and Component ___________________________________
Attributes
___________________________________
• Generally Reserved for Only Those Cases that Cannot be
Resolved Through Other Means ___________________________________
___________________________________
Module 2: Task 10 - Circuit Failure Mode Likelihood Slide 3
Analysis
___________________________________
___________________________________
Slide 4 Notes:
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________

Introduction (2)
___________________________________
• Caveats: ___________________________________
– Our Knowledge is Greatly Improved but Uncertainties are Still High
• Very limited data for many issues
– For This Reason, Implementing Guidance is Conservative
___________________________________
– Practical Implementation is Challenging
– Further Analysis of Existing Test Data and Follow-On Tests Would be ___________________________________
Beneficial:
• Reduce Uncertainties, including conservatisms as appropriate ___________________________________
• Solidify Key Influence Factors
• Incorporate Time as a Factor (FAQ 007-051) ___________________________________
• Incorporate “End-Device” Functional Attributes and States (e.g., latching
circuits vs. drop-out design)
– Computation-based method (formula) is an extrapolation of existing
___________________________________
data; validation remains to be done. Conservatism has not been
established. ___________________________________
• Probabilities of sufficient quality to move ahead
___________________________________
Analysis
___________________________________
___________________________________
12550194 2-32
Slide 5 Notes:
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________

Introduction (3)
___________________________________
• Public and Peer Review Comments ___________________________________
– Several Questions Involving Interpretation of the EPRI Test Data
Lead to Extensive Discussions Regarding the Most Appropriate ___________________________________
Way to Tally Spurious Actuation Probabilities (Many Subtleties for
Implementation) ___________________________________
– Team’s Consensus is that Expert Panel Values are, in General, ___________________________________
somewhat Conservative
– Additional Independent Review of the Computational Method was ___________________________________

Solicited as a Result of Peer and Public Comments
___________________________________
• Review was Favorable, However the Team Acknowledges the Inevitable
Limitations of the Methodology
___________________________________
___________________________________
Analysis
___________________________________
___________________________________
Slide 6 Notes:
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________

Assumptions
___________________________________
___________________________________
The Following Assumptions Form the Basis for Task 10:
• Specific Cable/Circuit Configuration Attributes are Available or Can Be ___________________________________
Determined
___________________________________
• The Equipment is in Its Normal Position or Operating Condition at the
Onset of the Fire ___________________________________
• Users of This Procedure are Knowledgeable and Have Experience with
Circuit Design and Analysis Methods and Probability Estimating ___________________________________
Techniques
• This Analysis Method is Applied to Cables with No More than 15
___________________________________
Conductors
___________________________________
___________________________________
Analysis
___________________________________
___________________________________
12550194 2-33
Slide 7

Flowchart
Step 1: Compile and Evaluate

Task 10 Interfaces:
Prerequisite Information
- Input from support task B
and Data
- Additional plant information needed - Confirm completion of detailed circuit analysis
for likelihood analysis for components of interest
- Information from plant walkdowns - Collect important cable and configuration
attributes
(Section 10.5.1)
(Sections 10.4.1, 10.4.2, 10.4.3)
Step 2: Select Analysis Approach

Analysis Work Packages - Failure mode probability estimate table
- Input from Tasks 3 & 9 - Computational probability estimates
(Section 10.5.2)
(Output to Tasks 11, 12,

& 14)
(Sections 10.4.1 and 10.4.4) Step 3: Perform Circuit Failure Mode
Probability Analyses
- Failure mode probability estimate table
- Computational probability estimates
(Section 10.5.3)
Step 4: Generate Circuit Failure Mode

Probability Reports
- Assemble circuit failure mode probability list
- Generate circuit failure mode probability
reports
(Section 10.5.4)
Uncertainty
- Plant-specific probability analysis
guidelines
- Circuit failure mode analysis process

Module 2: Task 10 - Circuit Failure Mode Likelihood A Collaboration of U.S. NRC Office of Nuclear Regulatory
Slide 7
Analysis
Notes:
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
12550194 2-34
Slide 8 Notes:
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
Task Interfaces - Inputs ___________________________________
___________________________________
• Fire PRA Cable List (Task 3)
___________________________________
• Fire PRA Database (Support Task B)
___________________________________
• Results of Detailed Circuit Failure Analysis (Task 9)
___________________________________
• Specific Scenarios Identifying Affected Cables (Tasks 11
& 14) ___________________________________
• Cable & Circuit Configuration Attributes

___________________________________
___________________________________
• Plant Drawings
___________________________________
___________________________________
Module 2: Task 10 - Circuit Failure Mode Likelihood Slide 8 Research (RES) & Electric Power Research Institute (EPRI)
Analysis
___________________________________
___________________________________
Slide 9 Notes:
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________

Task Interfaces - Outputs
___________________________________
• Quantification of Fire Risk (Task 14) ___________________________________
• Post-Fire HRA (Task 12) ___________________________________
• Detailed Fire Scenario Quantification (Task 11) ___________________________________
• Circuit Failure Mode Probability Reports ___________________________________

___________________________________
• Component Work Packages (Finalized)
___________________________________
• Fire PRA Database & Model
___________________________________
___________________________________
Analysis
___________________________________
___________________________________
12550194 2-35
Slide 10 Notes:
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________

Step 1 - Compile Prerequisite Information
___________________________________
Ensure that Prerequisite Information and Data is Available ___________________________________
and Usable before Beginning the Analyses.
___________________________________
• Confirm Completion of Detailed Circuit Analysis for
Components of Interest ___________________________________
• Collect Important Cable and Configuration Attributes ___________________________________
– Insulation
– Number of Conductors ___________________________________
– Raceway Types
___________________________________
– Power Source(s)
– Number of Source & Target Conductors (for Option #2 Only) ___________________________________
___________________________________
Analysis
___________________________________
___________________________________
Slide 11 Notes:
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________

Step 2 - Select Analysis Approach
___________________________________
Decide Which Analysis Option is Best Suited for Conducting the ___________________________________
Evaluation.
1. Failure Mode Probability Estimate Tables ___________________________________
• Grounded Circuit Design
• Non-Complex Control Circuit
___________________________________
• Single Component Service
• Cable Configuration Matches Table Categories ___________________________________
• Principal Failure Mode of Concern is Spurious Actuation
2. Computational Probability Estimate Formulas ___________________________________
• Ungrounded or Resistance-Grounded Circuit Design
• Complex Circuit or Component ___________________________________
• Failure Potentially Affects Multiple Components
• Cable Configuration Not Easily Categorized in Tables ___________________________________
___________________________________
Analysis
___________________________________
___________________________________
12550194 2-36
Slide 12 Notes:
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________

Step 3 - Estimate Circuit Failure Mode Probabilities
___________________________________
Estimate Circuit Failure Mode Probabilities Employing the ___________________________________
Selected Method
Option #1: Failure Mode Probability Estimate Tables ___________________________________
•Table 10-1, Thermoset Cables with CPTs
___________________________________
•Table 10-2, Thermoset Cables without CPTs
•Table 10-3, Thermoplastic Cables with CPTs ___________________________________
•Table 10-4, Thermoplastic Cables without CPTs
•Table 10-5, Armored or Shielded Cables ___________________________________
Option #2: Computational Probability Estimate Formulas
PCC = (CTot – CG) / [(CTot – CG) + (2 × CG) + n]
___________________________________
CF = {CT × [CS + (0.5 / CTot)]} / CTot
PFM = CF × PCC
___________________________________
Module 2: Task 10 - Circuit Failure Mode Likelihood Slide 12 A Collaboration of U.S. NRC Office of Nuclear Regulatory
___________________________________
Analysis
___________________________________
___________________________________
Slide 13 Notes:
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________

Step 3 – Related FAQ
___________________________________
• FAQ 08-0047 Cable Dependency (Status: Open) ___________________________________
– Issue:
• Guidance (Vol. 2, Page 10-7, Bullet 3) states that when more than one ___________________________________
cable can cause the same spurious actuation you combine probabilities
using “exclusive or”
___________________________________
• This assumes faults/effects are independent
– General approach to resolution: ___________________________________
• Consensus reached that “exclusive or” is not appropriate if faults are
dependent (e.g., a common power supply for both cables) ___________________________________
• Clarify treatment to determine and address dependency
– Status: ___________________________________
• Team draft has been completed
• Staff and final industry review pending ___________________________________
___________________________________
Analysis
___________________________________
___________________________________
12550194 2-37
Slide 14 Notes:
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________

Step 4 - Generate Failure Mode Probability Reports
___________________________________
• Enter Results into Fire PRA Database ___________________________________
• Generate Circuit Failure Mode Probability Reports ___________________________________
– Listing the Probability Estimates for the Circuit Failure Modes of
Concern for Each Component of Interest by Plant Area ___________________________________
(Compartment, Fire Area, Fire Zone, etc.)
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
Analysis
___________________________________
___________________________________
12550194 2-38
Slide 15

Example - SOV Control Circuit
P00
+
Fuse
XK- 33L- 33U- PNL1

SV2
G00 R00
A
PB P00, N00
(CLOSE)
125 VDC
SV1 B
G R MB P00, N00, R00,
V
G00, SV0, SV1,
PB P00, SV2 SP
33U-
(OPEN)
SV0
C
PNL2
SOV ENERGIZE
TO OPEN
Fuse N00
-
VALVE SHOWN CLOSED
QUESTION: What is the probability that damage to Cable B will

result in spurious opening of the SOV?
See next slideÆ

Slide 15
Analysis
Notes:
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
12550194 2-39
Slide 16 Notes:
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
Example – Step 1: Prerequisite Information ___________________________________
• Detailed circuit analysis completed & documented? Yes

___________________________________
Cable +125 VDC Hot Probe -125 VDC Hot Probe ___________________________________
___________________________________
A LOC LOC
B LOC, EI, SO - Open LOC
C NC LOC
___________________________________
• Collect important cable and configuration data:
– Cable insulation? Thermoset ___________________________________
– Number of conductors? Seven
___________________________________
– Raceway type? Tray
– Power source? Ungrounded DC bus (no CPT) ___________________________________
– Number of source & target conductors? 3 sources, 1 target
See next slideÆ ___________________________________
___________________________________
Analysis
___________________________________
___________________________________
Slide 17 Notes:
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________

Example – Step 2: Select Analysis Approach
___________________________________
• Option #1: Failure Mode Probability Tables ___________________________________
– Grounded circuit design? No
– Control circuit cable? Yes ___________________________________
– Single component circuit? Yes
– Known cable configuration? Yes ___________________________________
– Spurious operation concern? Yes
• Option #2: Computational Probability Estimate

___________________________________
– Ungrounded circuit? Yes
___________________________________
– Complex circuit/component? No
– Multiple component circuit? No ___________________________________
– Cable configuration not categorized? No
___________________________________
For this example, we’ll show both methods See next slideÆ

___________________________________
Analysis
___________________________________
___________________________________
12550194 2-40
Slide 18

Example – Step 3: Perform Analysis (1)
• Option #1:
– Which Table to Use? Table 10-2, Thermoset Cable without CPT
Raceway High Confidence

Description of Hot Short Best Estimate
Type Range
Tray M/C Intra-cable 0.60 0.20 – 1.0

1/C Inter-cable 0.40 0.1 – 0.60
M/C → 1/C Inter-cable 0.20 0.1 – 0.40
M/C → M/C Inter-cable 0.02 – 0.1
Conduit M/C Intra-cable 0.15 0.05 – 0.25

1/C Inter-cable 0.1 0.025 – 0.15
M/C → 1/C Inter-cable 0.05 0.025 – 0.1
M/C → M/C Inter-cable 0.01 – 0.02
– SOOpen Probability Estimate, P = 0.62 (0.60 + 0.06 – 0.60*0.06)

See next slideÆ

Slide 18
Analysis
Notes:
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
12550194 2-41
Slide 19

Example – Step 3: Perform Analysis (2)
• Option #2:
– Calculate probability of a conductor-to-conductor short:
PCC = (CTot – CG) / [(CTot – CG) + (2 * CG)]
PCC = (7 – 1) / [(7 – 1) + (2 * 1)]
PCC = 6 / [6 + 2]
PCC = 0.75
– Determine cable configuration factor:

CFSO = {CT * [CS + (0.5 / CTot)]} / CTot
CFSO = {1 * [3 + (0.5 / 7)]} / 7
CFSO = 3.071 / 7
CFSO = 0.44
– Probability of spurious operation, PSO(Open) = 0.75 * 0.44 = 0.33

Analysis
Notes:
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
12550194 2-42
Slide 20 Notes:
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
Example – Step 4: Failure Mode Probability Report ___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
Estimated Probability Estimated Probability
Failure Code
(Calculated) (From Table 10-2)
___________________________________
SO (Open) 0.33 0.62
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
Slide 20
Analysis
___________________________________
___________________________________
12550194 2-43
SESSION 5: Support Task B, Fire PRA Database
12550194 2-44
Slide 1 Notes:
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
METHODOLOGY
___________________________________
Module 2: Support Task B - Fire PRA ___________________________________
Database
___________________________________
___________________________________
July and August 2007
___________________________________
Palo Alto, CA
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
Slide 2 Notes:
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
FIRE PRA DATABASE
Purpose & Scope ___________________________________
___________________________________
• Identify Required Database Functionality
___________________________________
• Assess Capability of Existing Systems
___________________________________
• Implement Structured Process to Obtain the Required ___________________________________
Database Capability
___________________________________
• New Software and Data Management Tools are Finding ___________________________________
Their Way Into the Market
___________________________________
___________________________________
Slide 2
Module 2: Support Task B - Fire PRA Database Research (RES) & Electric Power Research Institute (EPRI)
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
12550194 2-45
Slide 3 Notes:
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
FIRE PRA DATABASE ___________________________________

Introduction
___________________________________
• Task is Distinctly Different from Other Tasks ___________________________________
• Essential Element of PRA

___________________________________
– Proposed Methods Require Manipulation and Correlation of Large ___________________________________
Amounts of Data
– Must be Efficient and User Friendly for Effective Implementation ___________________________________
– Manual Analysis Not Practical
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
Slide 3
___________________________________
___________________________________
12550194 2-46
Slide 4
FIRE PRA DATABASE

Flowchart
Support Task B Interfaces Step 1: Database Structure and

- Inputs from other tasks (1, 2 & 3)
- Plant cable and raceway data Functional Requirements
- Additional plant information needed for - Database Functional Requirements
cable selection - Database Structure and Data Fields
(Sections 18.4.1, 18.4.2) (Section 18.5.1)
Step 2: Database Platform

- Review existing capabilities
- Perform cost-benefit analysis
(Section 18.5.2)
Step 3: Database Augmentation Plan

- Develop Database Augmentation Plan
- Identify barriers & limitations
- Revise functional requirements as necessary
(Section 18.5.3)
Support Task B Outputs

- Fire PRA Database Step 4: Implement Database Upgrades
- Input to tasks 2, 3 & 9 - Implement Database Augmentation Plan
- Conduct "test cases"
(Section 18.4.4)
(Section 18.5.4)
Module 2: Support Task B - Fire PRA Database
Notes:
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
12550194 2-47
Slide 5 Notes:
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
FIRE PRA DATABASE
Step 1.1 - Database Functional Criteria ___________________________________
___________________________________
• Data Input Criteria
– In what shape and format is existing data? ___________________________________
– How and who will entered and control data?
– Will data be shared by separate groups? If so, who can change ___________________________________
data?
___________________________________
• Data Output Criteria ___________________________________
– Define Required Output Reports
– Define Sort and Query Options ___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
Slide 5
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
12550194 2-48
Slide 6
FIRE PRA DATABASE

Step 1.2 - Database Structure (Example A)
Analysis Tables
Critical Cable List
Equipment ID
Critical Equipment List Cable ID
Equipment ID Cable Function
Equipment Description Endpoint From
PRA Basic Event ID Endpoint To
PRA Basic Event Description Equipment Failure Code
System Designation
Equipment Type
Compartment ID Critical Power Supply List
Normal Position-Status Equipment ID
Desired Position-Status Power Supply ID
Failed Electrical Position-Status Breaker / Fuse
Failed Air Position-Status
Indication and Alarm
Comments and Information
Equipment Dependancies Cable Data

Equipment ID Power Supply Pick List Cable ID
Interlocks Power Supply ID Cable Code
Permissives Power Supply Description Cable Size
Cable Description
Reference Drawings Cable Classification
Equipment ID Cable Vias
P&ID Drawing Cable ID
Schematic Diagram Raceway ID
Wiring Drawing
Location Drawing
Raceway Location Endpoint Location

Raceway ID Endpoint ID
Compartment ID Compartment ID
Source Data Tables Raceway Location Reference Endpoint Location Reference
Raceway Fire Rating
Equipment Position-Status Cable Function Pick List

Pick List Cable Function
Equipment Position-Status Plant Compartments Cable Function Code
Compartment ID
Compartment Description
Fire Area ID
Equipment Type Pick List Fault Consequence Pick List
Equipment Type Equipment Failure Code
Failure Description
Systems Pick List

System Designation
System Description
Slide 6
Notes:
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
12550194 2-49
Slide 7
FIRE PRA DATABASE

Step 1.2 - Database Structure (Example A)
Analysis Tables
Adjacent Compartments Detection & Suppression Plant Compartment Fire Modeling

Compartment ID Compartment ID Compartment ID
Adjacent Compartments Smoke {other plant-specific modeling
Smoke Detection Info parameter}
Heat
Heat Detection Info
Flame
Fire Ignition Frequencies Flame Detection Info
Compartment ID CO2
5% Frequency CO2 Acuation
Mean Frequency CO2 System Info
95% Frequency Halon
Halon Actuation
Halon System Info
Water Curtain
Water Curtain Actuation
Water Curtain Info
Sprinkler
Sprinkler Actuation
Sprinkler System Info
Hose
Hose Station Info
Source Data Tables Portable Extinguisher
Portable Extinguisher Info
Plant Compartments
Compartment ID
Fire Area ID
Fire Areas Fire Modeling Pick List

Fire Area ID {plant-specific options based on fire
Fire Area Description modeling parameters}
Slide 7
Notes:
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
12550194 2-50
Slide 8
FIRE PRA DATABASE

Step 1.2 - Database Structure (Example B)
Functional States
Eqipm ent ID
Functional State
PRA Basic Event
PRA BE D escription
Analysis Tables Fire PRA Cable List

Critical
Eqipm entCable
ID List
Equipment
FunctionalIDState
Critical Equipment List Cable
Cable IDID
Equipment ID Cable
CableFunction
Function
Equipment Description Endpoint From
Fault C onsequence
PRA Basic Event ID Endpoint
Com m entsTo
PRA Basic Event Description Equipment Failure Code
System Designation
Equipment Type
Compartment ID Critical Power Supply List
Normal Position-Status Equipment ID
Desired Position-Status Power Supply ID
Failed Electrical Position-Status Breaker / Fuse
Failed Air Position-Status
Indication and Alarm
Comments and Information
Equipment Dependancies Cable Data

Equipment ID Power Supply Pick List Cable ID
Interlocks Power Supply ID Cable Code
Permissives Power Supply Description Cable Size
Cable Description
Reference Drawings Cable Classification
Equipment ID Cable Vias
P&ID Drawing Cable ID
Schematic Diagram Raceway ID
Wiring Drawing
Location Drawing
Raceway Location Endpoint Location

Raceway ID Endpoint ID
Compartment ID Compartment ID
Source Data Tables Raceway Location Reference Endpoint Location Reference
Raceway Fire Rating
Equipment Position-Status Cable Function Pick List

Pick List Cable Function
Equipment Position-Status Plant Compartments Cable Function Code
Compartment ID
Fire Area ID
Equipment Type Pick List Fault Consequence Pick List
Equipment Type Equipment Failure Code
Failure Description
Systems Pick List

System Designation
System Description
Notes:
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
12550194 2-51
Slide 9 Notes:
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
FIRE PRA DATABASE
Step 2 - Database Platform ___________________________________
___________________________________
• Decide on Platform for Database
– Existing System ___________________________________
– New Stand Alone System
– Upgrade Existing System ___________________________________
– Combination of Existing and New
___________________________________
• Vendors are Responding to the Call for New and Improved
Software Functionality ___________________________________
– Highly Integrated Solutions are Emerging as the Standard for NFPA
805 Plants ___________________________________
– Seamless Link to Fire PRA Software is in the Works But Not Yet
Available as Production Software ___________________________________
___________________________________
Slide 9
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
Slide 10 Notes:
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
FIRE PRA DATABASE
Step 3 - Database Augmentation Plan ___________________________________
___________________________________
• Augmentation Plan is Based on the Results of Step 2
___________________________________
• Formalize Process for Upgrades/Changes
___________________________________
• Determine Necessary Resources
– This Effort Can Innocently Affect Many Plant Organizations ___________________________________
– The Cost, Resources, Schedule, Training, Procedural Changes
and Overall Impact of Major Software Changes ALWAYS Seems ___________________________________
to be Underestimated
___________________________________
• Involve IS/IT Department from the Beginning
___________________________________
___________________________________
Slide 10
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
12550194 2-52
Slide 11 Notes:
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
FIRE PRA DATABASE
Step 4 – Implement Database Upgrades ___________________________________
___________________________________
• Have a Clear Plan BEFORE Beginning any Significant
Work ___________________________________
• Consider Long-Term Maintainability ___________________________________
• Plan for De-bugging and Test Runs ___________________________________
• Do Not Overlook Data Integrity and Configuration Control ___________________________________
Features
___________________________________
• Determine All Affected Users and Involve Then Early
• The Days of “Rogue” PRA Databases are Gone!

___________________________________
___________________________________
Slide 11
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
12550194 2-53
SESSION 6: Electrical Exercises Overview
12550194 2-54
Slide 1 Notes:
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
METHODOLOGY
___________________________________
Module 2: Electrical Examples ___________________________________
___________________________________
Bethesda, MD
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
Slide 2 Notes:
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
OVERVIEW OF EXAMPLES ___________________________________
___________________________________
• Provide Hands-On Practical Experience
___________________________________
• Cover Many (But Not All) Typical Cases
___________________________________
• Exposure to Typical Problems and Decisions
___________________________________
• Appreciation for Challenges and Trade-Offs
___________________________________
• A Worn Out Expression, Yes…But for Circuit Analysis the ___________________________________
“Devil is in the Details”
___________________________________
___________________________________
Module 2: Electrical Examples
Slide 2
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
12550194 2-55
Slide 3
SNPP ONE-LINE DIAGRAM

SWYD OFF-SITEPOWER
G EDG-A EDG-B
UAT-1 SUT-1

LC-1 LC-2 LC-A LC-B
COMP-1 MCC-A1 MCC-B1
MCC-1 MCC-2
(RackedOut)
MOV-17
MOV-10
MOV-13
MOV-16
MOV-1
MOV-3
MOV-5
MOV-2
MOV-4
MOV-6
MOV-8
MOV-9
MOV-7
ATS-1
MOV-18
MOV-19
BC-A BC-B
BAT-A BAT-B
BC-1
DC BUS-A DC BUS-B
BAT-1
DC BUS-1 Volt
Reg
PNL-A PNL-B INV-B
MOV-11
INV-A
MOV-14
Non-Vital DC MOV-15
Loads
VITAL-A VITAL-B
SWGR-B
EDG-A
SWGR-A
SOV-3
SOV-2
Slide 3
Module 2: Electrical Examples Research (RES) & Electric Power Research Institute (EPRI)
Notes:
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
12550194 2-56
Slide 4
EXAMPLE PROBLEMS
Example
Component Description of Analysis NUREG/CR-6850 Comments
No.
1 AOV-1 (SOV-1) Std AC Solenoid Control Circuit No Multi-function component - analyzed for open and close
2 AOV-3 (SOV-3) Std DC Solenoid Control Circuit Yes - Figure I-2 Spurious only analysis
3 MOV-9 Typical MOV Control Circuit Yes - Figure I-4 Functional analysis - change of position required
Double Pole DC Motor Control

4 MOV-15 Yes - Figure I-6 Functional analysis - change of position required
Circuit
Ungnd AC, Inverted MOV Control

5 MOV-13 Yes - Figure I-8 Functional analysis - change of position required
Circuit
6 MOV-10 Ungnd AC MOV Control Circuit Yes - Figure I-10 Functional analysis - change of position required
MOV Control Circuit w/ Dual Spurious only, classified as high consequence

7 MOV-8 Yes - Figure I-12
Controls component
8 MOV-11 Typical DC MOV Control Circuit No Functional analysis - change of position required
9 MOV-16 Typical MOV Control Circuit Yes - Figure I-4 Spurious Only
10 PI-1 Instrument Circuit No Indication only
11 ANN-1 Annunciator Circuit No No false indication
12 HPI-B 4.16 kV Motor No Functional analysis
13 COMP-1 480 V Motor No Functional analysis
14 SWGR-B 4.16 kV Bus No Multiple source options
15 LC-B 480V LC No Functional analysis
16 MCC-1B 480V MCC No Functional analysis
Slide 4
Module 2: Electrical Examples Research (RES) & Electric Power Research Institute (EPRI)
Notes:
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
12550194 2-57
Slide 5
HANDS ON WORK
P00
+
Fuse
XK- 33L- 33U-

SV2
G00 R00
PB
(CLOSE)
125 VDC
SV1
G R
PB
33U-
(OPEN)
SV0
SOV ENERGIZE
TO OPEN
Fuse N00
-
VALVE SHOWN CLOSED
Module 2: Electrical Examples
Notes:
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
12550194 2-58
3 EXAMPLE EXERCISES
12550194 3-1
CIRCUIT ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
Exercise 1 (first part)
Component ID : AOV-1 (SOV-1) Component Type: AOV
Component Description: Power-Operated Relief Valve
BE Code: AOV-1_TO (PORV AOV-1 TRANSFERS OPEN)
Required Position: CLOSED

Functional State
Normal Position: CLOSED
Failed Electrical Position: CLOSED
Failed Air Position: CLOSED
High Consequence Component Yes No
Power Supplies: Breaker:
Breaker:
Cable Analysis
Cable ID Required? Function Fault Consequences Comments
Comments:
12550194 3-2
Exercise 1 (second part)
Component ID: AOV-1 (SOV-1) Component Type: AOV
Component Description: Power-Operated Relief Valve
BE Code: AOV-1_FTO (PORV AOV-1 FAILS TO OPEN)
Required Position: OPEN

Functional State
Breaker:
Cable Analysis
Comments:
12550194 3-3
Exercise 2
Component Description: Charging Pump Injection Valve
BE Code: AOV-3_FTC (AOV-3 FAILS TO CLOSE)

Functional State
Normal Position: OPEN
Breaker:
Cable Analysis
Comments:
12550194 3-4
Exercise 3
Component ID: MOV-9 Component Type: MOV
Component Description: High- Pressure Injection Valve
BE Code: MOV-9_FTO (MOV-9 FAILS TO OPEN)

Functional State
Failed Electrical Position: AS-IS
Failed Air Position: N/A
Breaker:
Cable Analysis
Comments:
12550194 3-5
Exercise 4
Component Description: AFW Steam Inlet Throttle Valve
Required Position: THROTTLED

Functional State
Breaker:
Cable Analysis
Comments:
12550194 3-6
Exercise 5
Component Description: PORV Block Valve
BE Code: MOV-13_FTC (MOV-13 FAILS TO CLOSE)
Required Position: OPEN / CLOSED

Functional State
Breaker:
Cable Analysis
Comments:
12550194 3-7
Exercise 6
Component Description: AFW Discharge Isolation Valve

Functional State
Breaker:
Cable Analysis
Comments:
12550194 3-8
Exercise 7
Component Description: RHR Outboard Suction Valve
BE Code: MOV-8_TO (MOV-8 TRANSFERS OPEN)

Functional State
Breaker:
Cable Analysis
Comments:
12550194 3-9
Exercise 8

Functional State
Breaker:
Cable Analysis
Comments:
12550194 3-10
Exercise 9
Component Description: AFW Test Line Isolation Valve

Functional State
Breaker:
Cable Analysis
Comments:
12550194 3-11
Exercise 10
Component ID: PI-1 Component Type: Instrument
Component Description: RCS Pressure
BE Code: PI-1_FL (RCS Pressure Indication Fails High)
Required Position: AVAILABLE

Functional State
Normal Position: AVAILABLE
Failed Electrical Position: LOW
Breaker:
Cable Analysis
Comments:
12550194 3-12
Exercise 11
Component ID: ANN-1 Component Type: Annunciator
Component Description: AFW Motor High Temperature
BE Code: ANN-1_FH (AFW Pump Motor Spurious High Ann)
Required Position: NON-SPURIOUS

Functional State
Failed Electrical Position: UNAVAILABLE
Breaker:
Cable Analysis
Comments:
12550194 3-13
Exercise 12
Component ID: HPI-B Component Type: Pump
Component Description: High-Pressure Injection Pump B
BE Code: HPIA_FTS (HPI-A Fails to Start) HPIA_FTR (HPI-A Fails to Run)
Required Position: ON
Functional State
Normal Position: STANDBY / ON
Failed Electrical Position: Off
Breaker:
Cable Analysis
Comments:
12550194 3-14
Exercise 13
Component ID: COMP-1 Component Type: Compressor
Component Description: Instrument Air Compressor
BE Code: COMP-1_FTR (COMP-1 Fails to Run)
Required Position: CYCLE

Functional State
Normal Position: CYCLE
Breaker:
Cable Analysis
Comments:
12550194 3-15
Not a numbered exercise – Exercise 14 is similar, but its BE Code is PNL-B EPS-4VBUSBF-2
(not BF-1) and its Required Position: Functional State is Energized from EDG-B (not SUT-1)
Component ID: SWGR-B Component Type: Switchgear
Component Description: Train B 4160V Switchgear
BE Code: PNL-B EPS-4VBUSBF-1 (4KV BUS B FAULT)
Required Position: ENERGIZED FROM SUT-1

Functional State
Normal Position: ENERGIZED FROM SUT-1
Breaker:
Cable Analysis
Comments:
12550194 3-16
Exercise 14
Component ID: SWGR-B Component Type: Switchgear
Component Description: Train B 4160V Switchgear
BE Code: PNL-B EPS-4VBUSBF-2 (4KV BUS B FAULT)
Required Position: ENERGIZED FROM EDG-B

Functional State
Normal Position: ENERGIZED FROM SUT-1
Breaker:
Cable Analysis
Comments:
12550194 3-17
Exercise 15
Component ID: LC-B Component Type: Load Center
Component Description: Train B 480 V Load Center
BE Code: EPS-480VLCBF (480V LOAD CENTER B FAULT)
Required Position: ENERGIZED

Functional State
Normal Position: ENERGIZED
Breaker:
Cable Analysis
Comments:
12550194 3-18
Exercise 16
Component ID: MCC-1B Component Type: MCC
Component Description: Train B 480 V Motor Control Center
BE Code: EPS-480MCCB1F (480V MCC B1 FAULT)

Functional State
Breaker:
Cable Analysis
Comments:
12550194 3-19
Circuit Analysis Example Summary
Example Description of NUREG/CR-

Component Comments
No. Analysis 6850
Std AC Solenoid Control Multi-function component - analyzed for open
1 AOV-1 (SOV-1) No
Circuit and close
Std DC Solenoid Control

2 AOV-3 (SOV-3) Yes - Figure I-2 Spurious only analysis
Circuit
Typical MOV Control Functional analysis - change of position

Circuit required
Double Pole DC Motor Functional analysis - change of position

Control Circuit required
Ungnd AC, Inverted MOV Functional analysis - change of position

Control Circuit required
Ungnd AC MOV Control Functional analysis - change of position

Circuit required
MOV Control Circuit w/ Spurious only, classified as high-

Dual Controls consequence component
Typical DC MOV Control Functional analysis - change of position

8 MOV-11 No
Circuit required
Typical MOV Control

9 MOV-16 Yes - Figure I-4 Spurious only
Circuit
10 PI-1 Instrument Circuit No Indication only
11 ANN-1 Annunciator Circuit No No false indication
12 HPI-B 4.16 kV Motor No Functional analysis
13 COMP-1 480 V Motor No Functional analysis
14 SWGR-B 4.16 kV Bus No Multiple source options
15 LC-B 480V LC No Functional analysis
16 MCC-1B 480V MCC No Functional analysis
12550194 3-20
Component ID : Component Type:
Component Description:
BE Code:
Required Position:
Functional State
Normal Position:
Failed Electrical Position:
Failed Air Position:
High Consequence Component Yes □ No □

Breaker:
Cable Analysis:
Cable ID Required? Function Fault Consequence Commments
Comments:
12550194 3-21
Component ID : Continuation Sheet (___ of ___)
Cable Analysis:
Cable ID Required? Function Fault Consequence Comments
12550194 3-22
APPENDICES
represents NRC Conclusions or Regulatory Positions, and should not be interpreted as such.
Session 1:
QUESTION
How do the probability values assigned to certain events differ between Appendix R standpoints
and probabilistic risk assessment (PRA)?
RESPONSE
If I had a motor-operated valve and Appendix R did an analysis in which it picked up a certain
set of cables that were related to the desired function of that valve, which would generate a
cable list. Historically, the guidelines there have been as such: if a valve was closed and an
operator could open it and he could walk over and put the valve in the desired position, that was
how we went for it. That’s how the analysis was made. Of course, if there were contacts or
portions of the circuit that could prevent you from doing that, by the rules of Appendix R, those
were identified. The difference in PRA is that if a valve is normally closed and you wanted it
open, there may be three or four ways that that valve could be opened. For example, an
operator could go to a control switch or a safeguard signal could actuate, and each of these
might have a contact within the circuit that could cause the valve to open. In addition, even
regular interlocks could cause that valve to open. A PRA analysis would go in and determine
that any type of operation that could open those valves, even by way of contacts, also affects
the operation of this circuit. The failure of any of these mechanisms would not prevent the
operator from opening the valve. Now, however, all of these other circuits must be evaluated to
determine their effects on this component. The integrated nature of these circuits makes this
evaluation quite a challenge.
QUESTION
The Appendix R analysis didn’t account for necessary operator action; we were concerned
mostly with the successful operation of warning signs. Is this similar for the PRA?
RESPONSE
From a PRA point of view, though, if the SI came on and they wanted that valve to reposition,
they count on the SI actually repositioning that valve. They don’t rely on the operator. Every
time you have to rely on an operator, they have to credit the operator with diagnosing the
problem, in the midst of all the commotion, and then going over and taking that action. A
probability number, discussed in the Human Factors Analysis portion of this presentation, must
be applied. Even though no circuit capacity has been lost, and the valve can still be opened, in
the PRA world, it’s very different. On-demand, that valve needs to be opened when given the
12550194 A-1
signal by SI. So the key to this analysis is that if a valid SI signal is realized, then the valve
must be opened on demand.
QUESTION
Are the analysts for task 3 and task 9 the same people?
RESPONSE
The people who do task 3 and task 9 are the same people.
QUESTION
Could we screen out certain aspects based on our knowledge of their importance in PRA?
RESPONSE
No. The ways tasks 3 and 9 are set up are meant to be deterministic. No screening is allowed
based on importance at that stage. When we get into how important a cable is to the PRA
model, a different group does that. What we did not want was for the electrical analysts to make
a decision on what is important in the PRA model. No screening other than what can be
screened deterministically by the actual circuit design.
Session 2:
QUESTION
Slide 3: Does fire PRA use alternate power supplies to switch power sources when analyzing
events?
RESPONSE
Yes, they do. In fact, even more so than in Appendix R. If you take your appendix R analysis
and multiply it by 5, you’ll get the number of cross-ties in PRA. PRA solves the problem by
having lots of different ways to accomplish the same thing. Where they have diverse options
(like a bus that has multiple power supplies), that’s a big win for them, whereas in Appendix R it
may mean nothing. Diversity really works in their favor for reducing the core damage frequency
numbers or conditional core damage probabilities. That same windfall doesn’t exist in Appendix
R.
QUESTION
Slide 5: But what if you take too many cables for a given component? How does this affect the
conservatism of your answer?
RESPONSE
There would be no uncertainty with that. The cables you picked don’t provide an uncertainty; in
this case, the analysis would simply be too conservative for what you needed.
12550194 A-2
This is also a good question from a different angle. If I do a very conservative analysis from an
electrical perspective and I pick all these cables and I do that for every component out there, I
have this highly conservative electrical analysis. You may think, “Well, that’ll make your overall
answer conservative, right?” Wrong. This is because if by the nature that you picked cables too
conservatively and for expediency associated particular cables with equipment rather than
dispositioning them and therefore need them, it’s a “required” cable. If I do that for all my
components, as I mentioned, you’ll have a very conservative analysis. Keep in mind that this
circuit analysis feeds into the model. The problem is that if you’re too conservative in a
systematic point of view, you could skew the results of the PRA to suggest that one particular
area is highly risk-significant in comparison to another. Being too conservative in the circuit
analysis could mislead the results of the PRA.
QUESTION
Slide 6: Is there a systematic framework for establishing the task 1 boundaries?
RESPONSE
The first task in the PRA, Task 3, is already available and done. When you do Task 1, setting
up the boundaries for the fire PRA, ensure that what you’re doing aligns with the preexisting
data in the PRA database. If the electrical analysts establish partitions that do not align with the
data in the database, it is too expensive to try to retroactively develop the database to align with
the electrical analysts.
QUESTION
Slide 8: How do you deal with PRA analysts and electrical analysts viewing the same
components different ways?
RESPONSE
This is a typical case for plants that are trying to establish a correlation up-front. Plants that fail
to do this will find out on the back end of Task 9 that they’ll have to pay for their indolence. One
thing that we’ve started doing, which has proven to be extremely effective, is to arrange a
meeting between the PRA analysts, the fire modelers, and the electrical analysts after the PRA
equipment list is done. They must sit together and process every system component and every
functional state. It sounds horribly detailed, but you would be amazed at how much comes out
in those meetings. When you try to reconcile Appendix R and PRA and you see the same valve
and both groups are trying to demonstrate that the plant runs safely and one group wants the
valve open and the other wants it closed, it begs the question: “How can you both be right
here?” The answer is that sometimes they are both right and you figure out what the reason for
that was. In most cases, however, one group will admit that they had it wrong. One
recommendation is that when completing task 2, build into your schedule time to have face-to-
face interactions where you process every component and every functional state in great detail.
QUESTION
Slide 9: How should auxiliary components be included?
12550194 A-3
RESPONSE
Deterministically decide if the components can affect the desired functional state of the
component in question.
QUESTION
Slide 10: What is a supercomponent and how is it employed in this context?
RESPONSE
Some components aren’t actually components. Instead, they’re systems of subcomponents that
are better defined as a component. A perfect example is the load sequencer. One does not
simply walk and touch the load sequencer. Instead, the sequencer is made of sundry
subcomponents. Even though it’s not a component proper, everyone thinks of it as a
component.
Session 3:
QUESTION
Slide 5: what’s the difference between thermoset and thermoplastic cables?
RESPONSE
The difference is largely in the insulation that protects the conductor, not necessarily the cable
jacket.
QUESTION
Slide 5: When specifying a fire-resistant cable, does this imply a certain configuration?
RESPONSE
In a sense, it does imply the thermoset—only because those are the types of cable that are
survivable under those conditions. However, it does not a priori define them as one particular
type or another. Another very rugged material is a silicon rubber insulation. We tried several
times to fail those during the CAROLFIRE tests and were not successful until we hit it with
water.
QUESTION
Slide 5: When you talked about the cable, you spoke little about the jacket. Is that because the
jackets on most of these cables are the same materials?
12550194 A-4
RESPONSE
The jacket’s intent is not an electrical insulation. Instead, its purpose is to provide physical
protection for the electrical insulators that surround the individual conductors. When you’re
pulling it through a conduit, sometimes that conduit has burrs or sticky things that will score the
jacket and hopefully protect the insulation. It’s a sacrificial material. It also binds the conductors
together, making it easier to deal with a multi-conductor cable. Usually a binding tape will be
inside the jacket, just a plastic wrap to bind the strands together. Filler is also used to help
maintain the roundness of the cable.
QUESTION
Slide 5: Is the shielding considered part of the jacket?
RESPONSE
This can be both ways. There are a few insulators where people will have a shield around the
inside of the jacket, surrounding the thing. This is rare. Most cables, especially for
instrumentation wire, shield twisted wire pairs with an aluminized mylar. This has minimal
structural strength and is actually intended to provide protection against radio frequencies and
other electromagnetic interference.
Just as an aside, if your cables are stacked in a tray, the uppermost cables will generally be the
power cables, the next lower group would be control cables, and finally near the bottom are your
instrumentation cables. The whole idea there is that the power cables tend to give off much
more heat, and would likely be more prone to spontaneous combustion if a fault occurs.
QUESTION
Slide 5: Are cables generally given any sort of systematic designation on cables to specify their
function?
RESPONSE
When doing a plant walkdown, generally your cable tray identifiers will have a letter or number
within the identifier that indicates its service function, whether it’s power, control, or
instrumentation. Sometimes they use a variety of letters, not necessarily P, but maybe AB or M
for power. C generally is used to designate control. Instrumentation is designated X or I or
some other designator.
QUESTION
Slide 5: I’m told there are few spurious actuations in power cables.
RESPONSE
This is true. We will elaborate more as we cover the three-phase proper sequence hot short.
The only other possibility would be for DC-powered circuits; since they’re ungrounded, the
possibility exists for a polarity conflict that would result in a short.
12550194 A-5
QUESTION
Slide 5: When do you have to consider inter-cable shorts?
RESPONSE
It doesn’t matter what insulation type is in either cable, we don’t consider it credible that an
external short will be observed through the robust armor to interact with another protected
cable. The same is true for a cable in dedicated conduit sitting by itself. An interaction through
the conduit by an outside source is, again, not credible. However, for both cases, you must still
consider the intra-cable events.
QUESTION
But is inter-cable shorting still possible with thermoset cables?
RESPONSE
This is still credible. We did find one or two cases during CAROLFIRE where this happened.
QUESTION
But you said that thermoset cables only have issues with conductors and not with the jacket.
RESPONSE
The issue is with a cable-to-cable interaction between two thermoset cables.
QUESTION
And does it matter whether it’s thermoplastic or thermoset?
RESPONSE
The existing guidelines indicate no difference between the two. However, we hope that with
additional research we will show that the probability for interaction between the two cables is
much less for thermoset than it is for thermoplastic.
QUESTION
What causes high-impedance faults?
RESPONSE
Fire damage. Again, it’s somewhat of an artificial assumption that the cable will sit and short
with long arcs. The arcing tends to suppress the current. It is actually a resistance to flow
pathway.
12550194 A-6
QUESTION
Do we normally ground power cables?
RESPONSE
Yes. Through the equipment, it does see a ground. But these aren’t normally grounded;
instead, they run with the ground. This is a grounded electrical system because the alternative
(ungrounded) cases are about the same.
Yes. I have a compressor motor here, and it needs to have the proper sequence (A-A, B-B, C-
C) in order to operate. If it’s an MOV, then in order to reverse direction, you have to reverse two
of the phases.
QUESTION
Slide 9: Earlier you talked about using tasks 3 and 9 together, thus removing a lot of cables from
the appendix R safe shutdown list. On your first pass, about how much of the cables are you
able to get rid of by looking at functional states?
RESPONSE
It depends on the failure mode of interest to the fire modelers who generated the component
list, or what functional state is important, and then the circuit design plays a major role in which
cables can be thrown out.
QUESTION
Slide 10: What does a screened compartment look like?
RESPONSE
That’s where your interaction with the fire modelers comes from. They will break down the plant
into a variety of compartments and affirm that certain ones are devoid of combustible materials
or ignition sources where others are not. A screened compartment is one where the fire
modelers have decided that there is no way a fire can occur in that compartment.
QUESTION
Slide 10: How do you define the “normal” state of the plant?
RESPONSE
One of the underlying assumptions of the whole PRA is that all events take place at-power.
QUESTION
Slide 11: We know that the analysis has to be done on a conductor basis. You’ve only identified
the cable as far as the documentation goes, though.
12550194 A-7
RESPONSE
It will take different conductor actions to cause each of these possible events within the cables.
However, for a particular cable, multiple events are listed as possible outcomes.
QUESTION
Slide 11: When looking at a particular consequence, can you work backwards to determine the
possible initiating events?
RESPONSE
Fire damage to the cable can cause some event. For a particular cable, we want to diagnose it
by looking at the overall list of events and discerning what the cable can cause a component to
do. If it gives an erroneous indication by misleading the operator, is that important from a
human factors standpoint? Perhaps. Therefore, it must be identified as a possible failure mode
of this cable. If not, and if the operators plan to use procedures to verify the operating status of
a particular component, then you’ll probably only be looking for the spurious operation case, if
that’s a possibility. This will be determined by inspecting individual cables.
QUESTION
11: If you’re done with the fire analysis on a cable and know which ones cause spurious
operation, how do you make the final determination of what is risk-significant?
RESPONSE
It’s not the decision of the electrical analysts, it’s the systems analysts who make the
determination about what should finally be included in the PRA and decide how risky a fire can
be to their plant. They will have made a set of component selections that they believe are key
to successfully operating their plant. All the electrical engineers do is identify those cables
which could be affected by the fire in such a way as to result in unsuccessful operation of the
plant.
QUESTION
So do the PRA analysts simply disregard the Appendix R analysis and form their component
lists independently?
RESPONSE
When they form their component lists, they too go through the Appendix R components. If they
fail to include an Appendix R component, they justify why. They, too, depend on previous
analyses. However, they have a completely different rationale for their component selection.
QUESTION
How are inter-cable shorts affected by using the raceway system as the ground path?
12550194 A-8
RESPONSE
Based on experience, there may be intra-cable shorting long before one element shorts to
ground, but by the time you have cables shorting across one another, we have generally seen a
short to ground occur prior to that. So even if there isn’t a ground conductor within the cable
itself, and you’re using your raceway as the ground path, it still applies.
Session 4:
QUESTION
What do you mean by a 50-percent margin of safety for the CPT?
RESPONSE
If this CPT is rated for no more than 150 percent of the normal power requirements for the
circuit, including surge current, and the CPT is not overly sized, then you can credit the
reduction in the probability of a spurious actuation. You’ll see that reduction when we get to the
tables. However, if you start getting a number of leakage current paths because the fire
damages the cable, you’ll start drawing down on the CPT to the point where it won’t support a
spurious actuation.
QUESTION
What happens when the CPT margin is greater than 150 percent? Do we analyze it without
further consideration?
RESPONSE
Yeah, we don’t formalize that as part of our process, but that’s really the right way to do it. For
example, if your normal power requirement is on the order of 100 V-A, and you’ve got a 300 V-A
CPT out there, that violates the 150-percent rule. You really shouldn’t take credit for the CPT.
However, we don’t deal with that in the decisionmaking process.
QUESTION
When are you able to allow the internal event risk contribution to be zero?
RESPONSE
If you can justify it by saying that there is no possibility of an internal shorting event and there is
no way to get an intra-cable portion of that event, note it and use your external event (one only).
But it is incumbent upon you to justify why you didn’t use the primary shorting event.
QUESTION
What source do you use for the fire scenario when you have multiple neighboring
compartments?
12550194 A-9
RESPONSE
If, in your plant, you have four neighboring compartments and only have fire concerns in two
compartments; if you have a cable in a tray running through one fire hazard compartment into
the other, but only the conduit exists in the second; then you would have had to do the Task 9
circuit analysis for that particular cable no matter where it ran, now the neighboring
compartment issue does become important. Now, in the tray compartment, you would use the
tray case. If, on the other hand, they wanted you to analyze the fire impact from the conduit
compartment on spurious operation, then you go to the conduit.
QUESTION
What if you have a cable in a tray that extends partway into the room and the rest of the cable
remains in conduit?
RESPONSE
You must then ask the modelers about their postulated fire scenario. Is the fire scenario more
likely to affect the conduit, or is it more likely to affect the cable tray portion of it? If they say
“both,” then my suggestion would be to only investigate the one with the higher probability
value.
QUESTION
Why would you use the table method at all to get probability values if it is so inaccurate?
RESPONSE
It changes the approach so that when you use the table method, you just go with the numbers
that you have. Again, the differences in number of targets and sources and grounds play a role
in the formula there. The table method has one nice aspect in that it is quick and dirty. We
think it is overly conservative. However, it gives you a number, and you don’t spend days
working it out. You instead just go to the cable, write it down, and go to the next cable.
QUESTION
Where do you get the inputs for the PRA model (probability of ignition, severity, duration)?
RESPONSE
The basic probability number is used in the PRA model as whether or not a certain component
will experience an operation and what impact that will have on the plant. There is no means
right now of determining the duration, other than what the fire modelers predict for how long it
will take to damage the cable. This turns around, then, and becomes an HRA issue, which is
something rather alien to me.
QUESTION
What type of cable should we assume for PRA applications if we can’t get in to look at them?
12550194 A-10
RESPONSE
For Appendix R and safety-related applications, my best guess would be that the great majority
of cables are thermoset. But, because this fire PRA will also bring in balance-of-plant-type
components and systems, the ratio for the fire PRA may bring the number of thermoplastic
cables a little closer to the number of thermoset. Again, you need to consider whether or not
you’re talking about an older plant, where a lot of thermoplastic cables were used (i.e., pre
Browns Ferry), or are you talking about a later version, like a Watts-Barr—something that uses
almost exclusively thermoset. In any case, it’s still a plant-specific issue.
Session 5:
QUESTION
Are the functional states of the cables in question described in the PRA database?
RESPONSE
We’d say that the answer to that is “yes” in the sense that it is clearly the intent of the database
where the functional requirements of the database are defined to include the functional
requirements of the critical cable elements that are required. It is the intent of the database to
house the information developed through the circuit analysis project. The cable raceway
information does not typically have that.
My experience to date is that some of the traditional stuff would always be in there—you know,
the worksheet stuff. If you noticed, the worksheet didn’t really cover that. I think what you’ll see
is that when Frank gets into the Task 10, as far as inter-cable, intra-cable, and all the subtleties
and mechanistic things that go into Task 10, those tend to be more of a “here’s a comment field,
write down what you did” rather than one or the other. I think that part could be matured a little
bit, certainly, but to this point, my experience or exposure hasn’t been in instances where it was
as rigorous as the task-end type of data that you’re discussing, that I’ve seen for the other circuit
analysis data. But, your point’s still very valid that when all is said and done, you want to have
some way to capture that in a fairly automated sense. We’re trying to avoid going back and
having volumes and volumes of paperwork that don’t work with the database.
QUESTION
Rather than using the default position of all valves as “open, full power” because this results in
inadequate results, could you use three conditions in your PRA: open, closed, and operating?
RESPONSE
You could. You could define your operating conditions to cover all cases. That’s where, when
you sit down to develop your strategy, you’ll sit down with these guys and know how their basic
events are done. It can become amazingly complicated, based upon how basic events are
captured. At the onset, the way basic events were first presented in the model just seemed
silly. I didn’t get it. After a while, though, when I got really familiar with what the PRA is trying to
do, it makes more sense. Let me give you an example. If the initial state of a motor-operated
valve is closed and the desired position is open, there may be two basic events for this event. I
12550194 A-11
can’t change their model every time I don’t like the way it works for me electrically. If they have
a basic event, called BE-1, where the valve fails to close, and BE-2, where the valve transfers
open, then they split into two events the functioning of the valve. This becomes an embedded
spurious actuation concern of a functional state. You may have to do two separate analyses for
this valve every time you see that. If BE-2 is mapped under a different gate in the model, you
may want to, because it will encompass a smaller subset of cables than BE-1. But when you
consider 400 or 500 valves, it would cost a great deal of money to do this. Is that money well
spent? It depends. If both events are mapped under the same gate in the electrical model, the
dominant basic event will dominate and the other one will become meaningless. If you didn’t
understand that you could do circuit analysis for 300-400 valves, it would be a lot of money and
time for absolutely zero value. You really need to understand how the basic events line up. It’s
okay to map BE-2 to the circuit analysis for BE-1 for one functional state because the functional
state encompasses the second one. You have case after case where it’s just necessary to
drive it down to a detailed level when doing the circuit analysis and making sure it gets mapped
into the PRA and basic events. What seems to be simple is not. If you do your database
correctly, it should be able to accommodate all the different iterations of the functional state. If
you can’t come to terms in an 805 project on the issue of what a functional state means, you
just create another one, which checks 805, not PRA.
12550194 A-12
APPENDIX B: EXERCISE PROBLEMS AND SOLUTIONS
B-1
12550194
Exercises with Reference Figures
B-2
12550194
Component Description: Power Operated Relief Valve

Functional State
Breaker:
Cable Analysis:
Comments:
12550194 B-3
X00
Fuse
33L- 33U-
G00 R00
KPH-
120 VAC
G R
PB
(OPEN)
SV0
ENERGIZE
SOV
TO OPEN
U00
VALVE SHOWN CLOSED
SCHEME VA3 Drawing No.:

SNPP E-03
SCHEMATIC DIAGRAM – Date:
PRESSURE OPERATED 05/04/2007
RELIEF SOLENOID VALVE
Revision No.:
12550194 B-4 SOV-1
1
TITLE: DATE:
SNPP AOV-1 BLOCK DIAGRAM 4/27/07
VITAL-A
A
X00, U00
B
CB-2 X00, U00, R00,
V
G00, SV0
X00, SV0
C
PT-1
SOV-1, SCHEME VA3
B-5
12550194

Functional State
Breaker:
Cable Analysis:
Comments:
12550194 B-6
P00
+
Fuse
XK- 33L- 33U-

SV2
G00 R00
PB
(CLOSE)
125 VDC
SV1
G R
PB
33U-
(OPEN)
SV0
SOV ENERGIZE
TO OPEN
Fuse N00
-
VALVE SHOWN CLOSED
Drawing No.:
VALVE DESCRIPTION SCHEME SWITCH ID
E-02
SOV-2 LETDOWN ISOLATION PB2 AOV-2
SCHEMATIC DIAGRAM -- Date:
SOV-3 CHARGING PUMP INJECTION PB3 AOV-3
PRIMARY MAKEUP SYSTEM 07/25/2008
SOLENOID VALVES
Revision No.:
12550194
B-7 SOV-2 & SOV-3
1
TITLE: DATE:
PNL-B
A
P00, N00
B
CB-5 P00, N00, R00,
V
G00, SV0, SV1,
P00, SV2 SP
C
PNLX
SOV-3, SCHEME PB3
B-8
12550194
Component Description: High Pressure Injection Valve

Functional State
Breaker:
Cable Analysis:
Comments:
12550194 B-9
A
B
C
} 480 V
3φ, 60 Hz
X00
33
4
33
8
FU
TS-O 33 TS-C 33 33 33
11 15 3 7
480/120 V
SO1 SC1 G00 R00

ALL
49-
49X- 49X-
42 42 PB PB
O C (OPEN) (CLOSE)
42O- 42C- G R
S00 SC0
49- 42 42
C- O-
49 42 MECH 42
X- O INTLK C
T1 T2 T3
Y00
Drawing No.:
M VALVE SHOWN IN CLOSED POSITION SNPP E-04
SCHEMATIC DIAGRAM – HIGH Date:
PRESSURE INJECTION
VALVE DESCRIPTION SCHEME SWITCH ID 05/01/2007
MOTOR OPERATED VALVES
MOV-1 HIGH PRESS INJECTION-A MA12 MOV-1 Revision No.:
MOV-1 & MOV-9
MOV-9 HIGH12550194
PRESS INJECTION-B MB15 MOV-9 0
B-10
SNPP MOV BLOCK DIAGRAM - 1 5/4/07
P
T1, T2, T3
A B
MB MCC M
Y00, S01, R00, X00, S01, R00,
G00, SC1, SC0, G00, SC1, 2SP
S00, 2SP
M MCC CUBICLE MB SCHEME

MOV-1 MCC-A1 2 CB-5 MA12
MOV-4 MCC-B1 2 CB-5 MB12
12550194 B-11

Functional State
Breaker:
Cable Analysis:
Comments:
12550194 B-12
P01
REMOTE 43 LOCAL
RAISE RAISE
(REM) (LOC)
REMOTE LOCAL
F03
+48 VDC
LOWER LOWER
(REM) M CR
(LOC)
F02 REMOTE LOCAL
RAISE RAISE
(REM) (LOC)
REMOTE 43 LOCAL
N01
Drawing No.:
SNPP E-09
Motor Shown in Remote Operating Mode AFW- B STEAM THROTTLE 05/01/2007
MOTOR OPERATED VALVE
Revision No.:
MOV-15, SCHEME DB4 B-13 MOV-15
12550194
0
A B
CB-3 TSP MOV-15
P01, N01, F02, P01, N01, F02,
F03, SP F03, SP
MOV-15, SCHEME DB4
B-14
12550194

Functional State
Breaker:
Cable Analysis:
Comments:
12550194 B-15
X00
A
B
C
} 480 V
3φ, 60 Hz TSP
43-
33
4
X01 X02
TS-O 33 TS-C 33 33 33
11 15 7 3
FU FU
480/120 V SO0 SC0
42 MECH 42 R01 G01

ALL O INTLK C
49- 42C- 42O-
YO7 YC5
49X- 49X-
42 42 TSP TSP
O C 43- 43-
YO4 YO6 YC2 YC4
42O- 42C-
PB MB PB
RSP MB RSP
(OPEN) (CLOSE) TSP
43-
49- YO3 YO5 YC1 YC3 R00 G00 R02 G02
49 TSP TSP R G R G
X- 43- 43-
MB RSP
T1 T2 T3
Y01 Y02
TSP TSP
Y00 43- 43-
Drawing No.:
M VALVE SHOWN IN FULL OPEN POSITION SNPP E-10
MOV-13, SCHEME MA17 SCHEMATIC DIAGRAM – PORV Date:
BLOCK MOTOR OPERATED 05/01/2007
VALVE
Revision No.:
B-16 MOV-13
12550194
0
E
X00, G01, R01
C B A
CB-2 TSP MCC-A1 MOV-13
YC2, YO5, R00, Y00, X01, X02, X00, SC0, SO0,
G00, YO6, YC1, YC5, YO7, 4SP 4SP
Y01, 2SP
YC4, Y02, P
R02, G02,
YO4, YC3, T1, T2, T3
YO3, 2SP
RSP
MOV-13, SCHEME MA17
B-17
12550194

Functional State
Breaker:
Cable Analysis:
Comments:
12550194 B-18
X01
X00
A
B
C
} 480 V
3φ, 60 Hz
3-
(CLOSE)
(OPEN)
FU FU
PB
PB
42O- 42C-
480/120 V
S00 SC0 SC3
43 43 43
SO1 SC1
42 42 33
O C 4
74 TS-O 33 TS-C 33
11 1
S02 SC2
49- 49- 42 42
C- O-
42 MECH 42
O INTLK C
T1 T2 T3
Drawing No.:
M VALVE SHOWN IN FULL CLOSED POSITION SNPP E-11
MOV-10, SCHEME MA16 SCHEMATIC DIAGRAM – Date:
AFW-A DISCHARGE MOTOR 05/04/2007
OPERATED VALVE
Revision No.:
B-19 MOV-10
12550194
0
A C
TSP RSP
SO0,SC0, SC3 SO0,SO1, SC0,
SC1, SC3
X01,
SO2, D
SC2,
SC3, SO1, SO2, SC1, SC2, SP
SP
E
B P
CB-3 X00, SO0,SC0
MCC-A1 T1, T2, T3 MOV-10
MOV-10, SCHEME MA16
B-20
12550194

Functional State
Breaker:
Cable Analysis:
Comments:
12550194
B-21
A
B
C
} 480 V
3φ, 60 Hz X02
42-
FU
480/120 V KS W MOV Permissive

Control Circuit
L00 W00
74 42-
Y01 Main MOV
Control
Circuit
X00 42-
X01
FU 33
4 33 33
3 7
TS-O 33 TS-C 33
480/120 V 11 15
ALL
49- SO1 SC1 G00 R00
49X- 49X-
PB PB
42 42 (OPEN) (CLOSE)
O C
42O- 42C- G R
S00 SC0
42 42
49- C- O-
49 42 MECH 42
X- O INTLK C Drawing No.:
42-
SNPP E-12
T1 T2 T3
Y00 SCHEMATIC DIAGRAM – Date:
RHR OUTBOARD SUCTION 05/04/2007
M
VALVE SHOWN IN CLOSED POSITION Revision No.:
MOV-8
12550194
MOV-8, SCHEME MB14 B-22 0
TITLE: DATE:
P
T1, T2, T3
A B
CB-5 MCC-B1 MOV-8
Y00, S01, R00, X00, S01, R00,
G00, SC1, SC0, G00, SC1, X01, SP
S00, 2SP
C
X02, Y01, L00, W00, SP
MOV-8, SCHEME MB14
B-23
12550194

Functional State
Breaker:
Cable Analysis:
Comments:
12550194 B-24
P1
33- 33-
G1 R1
HS- HS-
72C 72O 72C 72O
CLOSE OPEN
G R
A1 ARM A2
F1
125 VDC
72O 72C YC1 YO1
SHUNT
S1
SERIES
72O 72C
C O
YC2 YO2
TS- 33- 33-
N1
VALVE SHOWN IN CLOSED POSITION Drawing No.:

SNPP E-13
MOV-11, SCHEME DB3 SCHEMATIC DIAGRAM – Date:
AFW-B DISCHARGE MOTOR 05/09/2007
OPERATED VALVE
Revision No.:
B-25 MOV-11
12550194
0
TITLE: DATE:
A
CB-3
P1, N1, YC1, YO1, G1, R1, SP
B
N1, YC2, YO2
DC BUS-B MOV-11
C
P1, G1, R1
P
N1, F1, S1, A1, A2
MOV-11, SCHEME DB3
B-26
12550194

Functional State
Breaker:
Cable Analysis:
Comments:
12550194 B-27
A
B
C
} 480 V
3φ, 60 Hz
X00
33
4
33
8
FU
TS-O 33 TS-C 33 33 33
11 15 3 7
480/120 V
SO1 SC1 G00 R00

ALL
49-
49X- 49X-
42 42 PB PB
O C (OPEN) (CLOSE)
42O- 42C- G R
S00 SC0
49- 42 42
C- O-
49 42 MECH 42
X- O INTLK C
T1 T2 T3
Y00
Drawing No.:
SCHEMATIC DIAGRAM – AFW Date:
TEST LINE ISOLATION MOTOR
OPERATED VALVES
MOV-16 AFW TEST LINE ISOLATION MA18 MOV-16 Revision No.:
MOV-16 & MOV-17
MOV-17 AFW TEST LINE ISOLATION
12550194 MB16 MOV-17 0
B-28
P
T1, T2, T3
A B
MB MCC M
Y00, S01, R00, X00, S01, R00,
G00, SC1, SC0, G00, SC1, 2SP
S00, 2SP

B-29
12550194

Functional State
Breaker:
Cable Analysis:
Comments:
12550194 B-30
CB-2
7 3 VB1G 1
I/I +
-
PI-1
VB1C
TB
VB1B
+ + 1
3
- - 2
4 SIRR PB2C
G G G
5
6 VB1D
9 SOV-2
7
10
8
1
B/S
3 SH E-02
G 2 4
G
5 SOV-3
6
XK- SH E-02
PB3C
VB1A VB1F
VB1E
PS1 RPH VA3C
SOV-1
1 3
+
3
2 B/S 4 SH E-03
4
PT-1 -
G
G
KPH-
1 2 G
PRESSURIZER
Drawing No.:
120 VAC E-14
SCHEMATIC DIAGRAM – RCS Date:
PRESSURIZER PRESSURE 05/22/2007
TRANSMITTER
Revision No.:
12550194 B-31 PT-1
1

Functional State
Breaker:
Cable Analysis:
Comments:
12550194 B-32
AFW-A
HIGH TEMP
ANN-1 P8A
P8C
C11L
33
J1005 J1005 J1005
TE-AFWA
AFW-A
TE-AFWA
K
M L
N 33, 34
J
TE-AFW-A H
I
E F
A
B C D
Drawing No.:
SNPP ANN-1
Date:
ANNUNCIATOR 05/20/2007
SCHEME K16
Revision No.:
12550194 B-33
#8
Component Description: High Pressure Injection Pump B
BE Code: HPIA_FTS (HPI-A Fails to Start)

HPIA_FTR (HPI-A Fails to Run)
Functional State
Breaker:
Cable Analysis:
Comments:
12550194
B-34
SWGR-B
HPI-B
SWGR-B
SNPP
Draw ing No.:
SST-B SWGR-B-01
Date:
4.16 KV SWGR-B 05/20/2007
ONE-LINE DIAGRAM
Re vision No .:
12550194 B-35 #6
SNPP
Draw ing No.:
HPI-B-01
Date:
HPI-B SCHEMATIC DIAGRAM 05/20/2007
SHEET 1
Re vision No .:
#6
12550194
B-36
SNPP
Dr aw ing No .:
HPI-B-02
Date:
SHEET 2
Re vision No .:
12550194 B-37 #6

Functional State
Breaker:
Cable Analysis:
Comments:
12550194 B-38
480 V Load Center LC-1 Feeder Bkr LC1-15
52-15
To Air Compressor
COMP-1
SNPP
Dr awing No.:
COMP-1
COMP-1-02
Date:
INSTRUMENTAIR 05/20/2007
COMPRESSORCOMP-1
Re vision No.:
12550194 #6
B-39
LC1-15
SNPP
COMP-1
Dr awing No.:
COMP-1-02
Date:
COMPRESSORCOMP-1
Re vision No.:
12550194 B-40 #6

Functional State
Breaker:
Cable Analysis:
Comments:
Note: This page was erroneously included in the available set of exercises in the proper location
for Exercise 14, but is instead a duplicate of Exercise 4. A later section of this Volume 2 has
a solution for Exercise 4, but not for Exercise 14.
12550194
B-41

Functional State
Breaker:
Cable Analysis:
Comments:
12550194 B-42
-B
SST-B
480 V LC-B (1600 A)
MCC-B1
SNPP
Drawing No.:
LC-B-01
Date:
LOAD CENTER B (LC-B) 05/20/2007
B-43
ONE-LINE DIAGRAM
Revision No.:
12550194
#6
Drawing No.:
SNPP LC-B-02
Date:
52-ED-02 05/20/2007
BREAKER SCHEMATIC
Revision No.:
B-44
12550194 #6
Drawing No.:
SNPP LC-B-03
Date:
52-ED-12 05/20/2007
SCHEMATIC
Revision No.:
B-45 #6
12550194
SST-B
480 V Load Center LC-B
Draw ing No.:

SNPP LC-B-04
Date:
LC-B
INCOMING BREAKER 05/20/2007
INTERLOCKS Revision No.:
B-46 #6
12550194
480 V
480 V/120V 480 V/120V
LC - B
LC - B
Draw ing No.:

SNPP LC-B-05
Date:
LOAD CENTER 05/20/2007
UNDERVOLTAGE SCHEME
B-47 Revision No.:
#6
12550194

Functional State
Breaker:
Cable Analysis:
Comments:
12550194 B-48
-B
SST-B
480 V LC-B (1600 A)
MCC-B1
SNPP
Drawing No.:
LC-B-01
B-49 Date:
ONE-LINE DIAGRAM
Revision No.:
12550194
#6
480 V
Draw ing No.:

SNPP MCC-B1-01
Date:
MOTOR CONTROL CENTER 05/20/2007
MCC-1B
Revision No.:
#6
12550194
B-50
Table 1: Target Equipment Loss Report
Equipment Desired Position/ Target Loss
Equipment ID Equipment Description Location
Type Status Locations
On 1, 2, 3, 10
High pressure safety injection
HPI-A Pump Aux Bldg. El. 0 Ft
pump A
On 1, 2, 3, 10
On 1, 2, 3, 11
High pressure safety injection
HPI-B Pump Aux Bldg. El. 0 Ft
pump B
On 1, 2, 3, 11
Residual heat removal pump

RHR-B Pump Aux Bldg. El. -20 Ft Off 1, 2, 3, 4A, 9, 11
B
AFW-A Motor driven AFW pump A Pump Aux Bldg. EL. 0 Ft On 1, 3, 4B, 9, 10
AFW-B Steam driven AFW pump B Pump Aux Bldg. EL. 0 Ft On 1, 3, 4B, 9, 11
AFW-C Motor driven AFW pump C Pump Turbine Bldg. El. 0 Ft On 1, 3, 12
RCP-1 Reactor coolant pump 1 Pump Containment Off 1, 2, 3, 7, 12
RCP-2 Reactor coolant pump 2 Pump Containment Off 1, 2, 3, 7, 12
COMP-1 Instrument air compressor Compressor Turbine Bldg. El. 0 Ft Cycle 12
Closed 1, 3, 7, 9
AOV-1
Power operated relief valve AOV Containment
(SOV-1)
Open 1, 3, 7, 9, 10
AOV-2
Letdown isolation valve AOV Aux Bldg. El. 0 Ft Closed 1, 2, 3, 9
(SOV-2)
AOV-3 Charging pump injection
AOV Aux Bldg. El. 0 Ft Closed 1, 2, 3, 9
(SOV-3) valve
MOV-1 HPI discharge valve MOV Aux Bldg. El. 0 Ft Open 1, 2, 3, 9, 10
MOV-2 VCT isolation valve MOV Aux Bldg. El. 0 Ft Closed 1, 2, 3, 9, 11
Open/
MOV-3 Cont. sump recirc valve MOV Aux Bldg. El. -20 Ft 2 1, 2, 3, 4A, 9, 10
Closed
Open/
MOV-4 Cont. sump recirc valve MOV Aux Bldg. El. -20 Ft 1, 2, 3, 4A, 9, 11
Closed
MOV-5 RWST isolation valve MOV Aux Bldg. El. 0 Ft Open 1, 2, 3, 12
MOV-6 RWST isolation valve MOV Aux Bldg. El. 0 Ft Open 1, 2, 3, 12
MOV-7 RHR inboard suction valve MOV Containment Closed 4A,7,9,12
MOV-8 RHR outboard suction valve MOV Aux Bldg. El. -20 Ft Closed 4A,9,12
MOV-9 HPI discharge valve MOV Aux Bldg. El. 0 Ft Open 1,2,3,,9
MOV-10 AFW pump A discharge valve MOV Aux Bldg. EL. 0 Ft Open 1,3,4B,9,12
MOV-11 AFW pump B discharge valve MOV Aux Bldg. EL. 0 Ft Open 1,3,4B,9,11,12
Open/
MOV-13 PORV block valve MOV Containment 1 1, 3, 7, 9
Closed
AFW pump B turbine steam
MOV-14 MOV Turbine Bldg. El. 0 Ft Open 1, 3, 4B, 12
line isolation valve
12550194 B-51
AFW pump B steam inlet
MOV-15 MOV Turbine Bldg. El. 0 Ft Throttled 1, 3, 4B, 12
throttle valve
AFW pump A test line
MOV-16 MOV Turbine Bldg. El. 0 Ft Closed 2, 4B, 9
isolation valve
AFW pump B test line
MOV-17 MOV Turbine Bldg. El. 0 Ft Closed 2, 4B, 9
isolation valve
AFW pump C discharge
MOV-18 MOV Turbine Bldg. El. 0 Ft Open 1, 3, 12
valve
AFW pump C test line
MOV-19 MOV Turbine Bldg. El. 0 Ft Closed 1, 3, 12
isolation valve
V-12 CST isolation valve MOV Turbine Bldg. El. 0 Ft Open 12
LI-1 RWST level Instrument Yard Available 1, 3, 12, 13
LI-2 RWST level Instrument Yard Available 1, 3, 12, 13
LI-3 Cont. sump level Instrument Containment Available 1, 3, 7, 12
LI-4 Cont. sump level Instrument Containment Available 1, 3, 7, 12
Letdown heat exchanger

TI-1 Instrument Aux Bldg El. 0 Ft Available 1, 2, 3, 9
outlet temperature
PT-1 RCS pressure Instrument Containment Available 1, 3, 7
ANN-1 AFW motor high temperature Annunciator SWG Access Room Non spurious 1, 2, 3, 9, 4B
Energized from
1, 3, 10, 12, 13
SUT-1
SWGR-A Train A 4160 V switchgear Switchgear Switchgear Room A
Energized from
1, 3, 8A, 10, 12
EDG-A
Energized from
1, 3, 9, 11, 12, 13
SUT-1
SWGR-B Train B 4160 V switchgear Switchgear Switchgear Room B
Energized from
1, 3, 8B, 9, 11, 12
EDG-A
Non-safety 4160 V
SWGR-1 Switchgear Turbine Bldg. El. 0ft Energized 1, 3, 12, 13
switchgear
Non-safety 4160 V
SWGR-2 Switchgear Turbine Bldg. El. 0ft Energized 1, 3, 12, 13
switchgear
SUT-1 Startup transformer Transformer Yard Energized 1, 3, 12, 13
Train A emergency diesel Diesel

EDG-A DG Bldg. On 1, 3, 8A, 10, 12
generator Generator
Train B emergency diesel Diesel
EDG-B DG Bldg. On 1, 3, 8B, 10, 12
generator Generator
LC-1 Non-safety 480 V load center Load Center Turbine Bldg. El. 0 ft Energized 1, 3, 12
LC-2 Non-safety 480 V load center Load Center Turbine Bldg. El. 0 ft Energized 1, 3, 12
LC-A Train A 480 V load center Load Center Switchgear Room A Energized 1, 3,10
LC-B Train B 480 V load center Load Center Switchgear Room B Energized 1, 3, 11
Non-safety station service

SST-1 Transformer Turbine Bldg. El. 0 F Energized 12
transformer
B-52
12550194
Non-safety station service
SST-2 Transformer Turbine Bldg. El. 0 F Energized 12
transformer
Train A station service
SST-A Transformer Switchgear Room A Energized 10
transformer
Train B station service
SST-B Transformer Switchgear Room B Energized 11
transformer
Motor
Non-safety 480 V motor
MCC-1 Control Turbine Bldg El. 0 Ft Energized 12
control center
Center
Motor
Non-safety 480 V motor
MCC-2 Control Turbine Bldg El. 0 Ft Energized 12
control center
Center
Motor
Train A 480 V motor control
MCC-A1 Control SWG Access Room Energized 9, 10
center
Center
Motor
Train B 480 V motor control
MCC-B1 Control SWG Access Room Energized 9, 11
center
Center
Energized from
ATS-1 Automatic transfer switch ATS SWG Access Room 12
MCC-1
Non-safety swing battery Battery
BC-1 Turbine Bldg El. 0 Ft Energized 12
charger Charger
Battery
BC-A Train A battery charger Switchgear Room A Energized 9, 10
Charger
Battery
BC-B Train B battery charger Switchgear Room B Energized 9, 11
Charger
BAT-1 Non-safety battery Battery Turbine Bldg El. 0 Ft Available 12, 15
BAT-A Train A battery Battery Battery Room A Available 5, 10
BAT-B Train B battery Battery Battery Room B Available 6, 11
DC BUS-1 Non-safety 250 VDC bus DC Bus Turbine Bldg El. 0 Ft Energized 12
DC BUS-A Train A 125 VDC bus DC Bus Switchgear Room A Energized 10
DC BUS-B Train B 125 VDC bus DC Bus Switchgear Room B Energized 11
PNL-A Train A 125 VDC panel Panelboard Switchgear Room A Energized 10
PNL-B Train B 125 VDC panel Panelboard Switchgear Room B Energized 11
INV-A Train A inverter Inverter Switchgear Room A Energized 3, 9, 10
INV-B Train B inverter Inverter Switchgear Room B Energized 3, 9, 11
VITAL-A Train A 120 VAC vital bus 120VAC Bus SWG Access Room Energized 9, 10
VITAL-B Train B 120 VAC vital bus 120VAC Bus SWG Access Room Energized 9, 11
B-53
12550194
Instructors’ Exercise Solutions
B-54
12550194
Exercise 1
Component Description: Power Operated Relief Valve

Functional State
Power Supplies: Vital-A Breaker:
Breaker:
Cable Analysis:
VA3A No Power LOP
Hot Short between conductors G00 and SVC

VA3B Yes Control SO-Open can cause valve to cycle open-shut
repeatedly
VA3C Yes Control SO-Open
Comments: Table Formula
P(SO, B) = 0.60+ 0.06 – (0.6*0.06) = 0.62 P(SO, B)= 0.57*0.42= 0.24
P(SO, C) = 0.60+ 0.06 – (.6*0.06) = 0.62 P(SO, C)= 0.67*0.63= 0.42
12550194 B-55
B-56
12550194
B-57
12550194
Exercise 2

Functional State
Power Supplies: Panel B Breaker: 3
Breaker:
Cable Analysis:
PB3A No Power LOP
PB3B Yes Control SO-Open Energize SVO (Also EI, LOP, LOC)
PB3C No Control LOP
Comments: Table Formula
P(SO, B)= 0.60 + 0.06 – (0.60*0.06)= 0.62 PCC= ( 7 − 1)

=
6
=
6
= 0 . 75
( 7 − 1) + ( 2 * 1) 6+ 2 8
CF= {1*[3+(0.5/7)]}/7= 3.07/7= 0.44
P(SO, B)= 0.75* 0.44= 0.33

12550194
B-58
B-59
12550194
B-60
12550194
Exercise 3
Component Description: High Pressure Injection Valve

Functional State
Power Supplies: MCC–B1 Breaker: 5
Breaker:
Cable Analysis:

EI, SO-C, SO-O,
MB15A Yes Control 9-C, 1 ground, 1 target, 2 sources
LOP, LOC
MB15B Yes Control EI, LOP, LOC
MB15P Yes Power LOP
Comments:
P Table 10-1= 0.3+0.03= 0.33 PCC= ( 9 − 1) = 0.727

( 9 − 1) + ( 2 * 1) + 1
Pcalc= 0.727*0.228= 0.17 CF= 1x[2+ (0.5/9)]/9= 0.228
12550194
B-61
12550194
B-62
B-63
12550194
Exercise 4

Functional State
Power Supplies: DC Bus-B Breaker: 4
Breaker:
Cable Analysis:

SO possible only with dual hot
DB4A Yes Control LOP shorts P01-F03 (F02) and N01-F02
(F03)
DB4B Yes Control LOP
Comments:
P(SO) = 0.60+0.06-(0.60*0.06)= 0.62 PCC= 5 − 0 = 1

(5 − 0 ) + 0
CF1= (1*(1+(0.5/5)))/5= .22 CF2= (1*(1+(0.05/3)))/3= 0.39
P(SO)= PCC*CF1*CF2= 1*.22*.39= 0.09

12550194
B-64
B-65
12550194
B-66
12550194
Exercise 5

Functional State
Power Supplies: MCC-A1 Breaker: 7
Breaker:
Cable Analysis:
MA17A Yes Control LOP, LOC
MA17B Yes Control SO-C, LOP, LOC
MA17C Yes Control SO-C, EI, LOC
MA17D Yes Control EI, LOP RSP
MA17P Yes Power LOP
Comments:
Case for both B/C P(SO)= 0.30+0.03-(.3*.03)= 0.32
B: PCC = ( 9 − 1) = 0.8 CF= {1*[1+5/9]}/9= 0.12 P(SO)= 0.8*0.12= 0.10

( 9 − 1) + ( 2 * 1)
C: PCC = (9 − 3) = 0.5 CF= {1*[3+5/9]}/9= 0.34 P(SO)= 0.5*0.34= 0.17
(9 − 3) + ( 2 * 3)
12550194 B-67
12550194
B-68
12550194 B-69
Exercise 6

Functional State
Breaker:
Cable Analysis:
MA16A Yes Control SO-Close
MA16B Yes Control SO-Close 3-C, 0 ground, 1 target, 1 source
MA16C Yes Control SO-Close RSP

SO-Close, LOC-
MA16D Yes Control
Open
SO-Close, LOC-
MA16E Yes Control
Open
MA16P Yes Power LOP
Comments: Note- MOV-10 is an ungrounded control circuit
Ptable= 0.3+0.03= 0.33 PCC= (3 − 0 ) =1

(3 − 0 ) + ( 2 * 0 )
Pcalc= 1.0*0.39= 0.39 CF= 1*[1+(.5/3)]/3= 0.39
Note: only cables B and E have energized conductors

12550194
B-70
12550194 B-71
B-72
12550194
Exercise 7

Functional State
Power Supplies: MCC-B1 Breaker: 4
Breaker:
Cable Analysis:
MB14A Yes Control SO-Open Energize S00 (Also EI, LOC, LOP)
MB14B No Control EI, LOC, LOP
MB14C Yes Control SO-42 Energize L00 (Also EI, LOC)
MB14P Yes Power SO-Open 3Ф “smart short”
Comments:
P(SO, A)= 0.3+ 0.03= 0.33
PCC = (9 − 1) = 0.73 CF={1*[1+5/9]}/9= 0.12

( 9 − 1) + ( 2 * 1) + 1
P(SO, A)= 0.73*0.12= 0.09
12550194
B-73
B-74
12550194
B-75
12550194
Exercise 8

Functional State
Power Supplies: DC Bus-B Breaker: 3
Breaker:
Cable Analysis:
DB3A Yes Control SO-C, EI, LOC, LOP
DB3B Yes Control LOP
DB3C Yes Control EI, LOP
DB3P Yes Power LOC, LOP
Comments:
P(SO, A)= 0.60+0.06 – (0.6*0.06)= 0.62
PCC = 7 − 1 = 0.75 CF= {1*[2+5/7]}/7= 0.30

(7 − 1) + (2 * 1)
P(SO, A)= 0.75*0.30= 0.23
12550194 B-76
12550194
B-77
12550194
B-78
Exercise 9

Functional State
Breaker:
Cable Analysis:
MA18A Yes Control SO-Open Energize S00 (Also EI, LOP, LOC)
MA18B No Control EI, LOP
MA18P No Power LOP
Comments:
P(SO, A)= 0.30+0.03= 0.33
PCC = 9 −1 = 0.73 CF= {1*[2+5/9]}/9= 0.23

( 9 − 1) + ( 2 * 1) + 1
P(SO, A)= 0.73*0.23= 0.17
12550194 B-79
B-80
12550194
B-81
12550194
Exercise 10

Functional State
Power Supplies: Vital-B Breaker: 8
Breaker:
Cable Analysis:
VB1A Yes Indication FH, Error-H
VB1B Yes Indication FH, Error-H
VB1C Yes Indication FL, Error-L
VB1D Yes Indication FL, Error-L
VB1E Yes Indication FL, Error-L
VB1F Yes Indication FL, Error-L
VB1G Yes Indication FL, Error-L
VA3C No Indication None Cannot affect indication
Comments:
1. Shielded Instrument Cable- External hot shorts not considered credible.
12550194 B-82
12550194
B-83
B-84
12550194
Exercise 11

Functional State
Power Supplies: Vital-A Breaker: 4
Breaker:
Cable Analysis:
K16A Yes Indication LOI, SP-ALM
K16N Yes Indication LOI, SP-ALM
K16B-K16M No Indication LOI
Comments:
12550194 B-85
12550194 B-86
Exercise 12
Component Description: High Pressure Injection Pump B
BE Code: HPIA_FTS (HPI-A Fails to Start)

HPIA_FTR (HPI-A Fails to Run)
Functional State
Breaker:
Cable Analysis:
BDG06-P Yes Power LOP
BDG06-N Yes Control
BDG06-D No Indication None Isolated by I/I
BDG06-G No Control None Isolated by SCB/SS
BDG06-E Yes Control
BDG06-Z Yes Control
BDG06-L Yes DC Control Power
Comments:
12550194
B-87
12550194 B-88
12550194 B-89
12550194
B-90
Exercise 13

Functional State
Power Supplies: LC-1 Breaker: LC1-15
Breaker:
Cable Analysis:
YEG06-P Yes Power LOP

Faults could cause LOP to Air
YEG06-A Yes Control LOP
Compressor Skid
Loss of Cooling H2O,
YEQ17-A Yes Control
LOC
YEQ17-B Yes Control LOC
YEQ17-E Yes Control LOC
YEQ17-I Yes Control LOC
YEQ17-H Yes Control Fail off
YEQ17-M Yes Control LOC, fail off
Comments:
1. Air Compressor Sequence Control Mounted on COMP-1 skid
2. Motor winding heater not required
12550194 B-91
12550194 B-92
12550194
B-93
12550194 B-94
B-95
12550194
Exercise 15 (Note: No detailed description, nor solution, of Exercise 14 on prev. pg. is available.)

Functional State
Power Supplies: SST-B Breaker: N/A
PNL-B Breaker: 11
Cable Analysis:
AED02-A Yes Control LOC, Loss-Protection
AED02-B Yes Control LOC, Loss-Protection
AED02-Z Yes Control LOC, Loss-Protection
AED12-A No Control None Kirk-Key Interlock
AED12-B No Control None Kirk-Key Interlock
AED12-P No Power None LOP from LC-1F
AED12-Q No Power None LOP from LC-1F
AED12-R No Power None LOP from LC-1F
Comments:
12550194 B-96
12550194 B-97
B-98
12550194
B-99
12550194
B-100
12550194
B-101
12550194
B-102
12550194
B-103
12550194
Exercise 16

Functional State
Power Supplies: LC-B Breaker: ED-10
Breaker:
Cable Analysis:
BEE10-P Yes Power LOP
BEE10-A Yes Control LOC, SO
BEE10-B Yes Control LOC, SO
BEE10-Z Yes Control LOC, SO
Comments:
1. Breaker control power included in analysis for LC-B.
2. MCC-1B has no main breaker. Power cables connected directly to bus.
3. Annunciation circuits not required for functionality.
12550194 B-104
B-105
12550194
12550194
B-106
Drawings Needed in the Exercises
B-107
12550194
Drawing Pack 1 - Electrical Schematic Diagrams
B-108
12550194
ELECTRICAL DISTRIBUTION SYSTEM - SIMPLIFIED ONE-LINE DIAGRAM
SWYD OFF-SITEPOWER Page B-109
G EDG-A EDG-B
UAT-1 SUT-1
LC-1 LC-2 LC-A LC-B
COMP-1 MCC-B1
MCC-A1
MCC-1 MCC-2
(RackedOut)
MOV-17
MOV-10
MOV-13
MOV-16
MOV-1
MOV-3
MOV-5
MOV-2
MOV-4
MOV-6
MOV-8
MOV-9
MOV-7
ATS-1
MOV-18
MOV-19
BC-A BC-B
BAT-A BAT-B
BC-1
DC BUS-A DC BUS-B
BAT-1
DC BUS-1 Volt
Reg
PNL-A PNL-B INV-B
MOV-11
INV-A
MOV-14
Non-Vital DC MOV-15
Loads
VITAL-A VITAL-B
SWGR-B
EDG-A
SWGR-A
SOV-3
SOV-2
LI-1 LI-3 SOV-1 TI-1 ANN-1 PI-1 LI-2 LI-4
B-109
12550194
X00
Fuse
33L- 33U-
G00 R00
KPH-
120 VAC
G R
PB
(OPEN)
SV0
ENERGIZE
SOV
TO OPEN
U00
VALVE SHOWN CLOSED
SCHEME VA3 Drawing No.:

SNPP E-03
B-110 PRESSURE OPERATED 05/04/2007

RELIEF SOLENOID VALVE
Revision No.:
SOV-1
12550194
1
P00
+
Fuse
XK- 33L- 33U-

SV2
G00 R00
PB
(CLOSE)
125 VDC
SV1
G R
PB
33U-
(OPEN)
SV0
SOV ENERGIZE
TO OPEN
Fuse N00
-
VALVE SHOWN CLOSED
Drawing No.:
VALVE DESCRIPTION SCHEME SWITCH ID
E-02
SOV-2 LETDOWN ISOLATION PB2 AOV-2
SCHEMATIC DIAGRAM -- Date:
SOV-3 CHARGING PUMP INJECTION PB3 AOV-3
PRIMARY MAKEUP SYSTEM 07/25/2008
SOLENOID VALVES
B-111 SOV-2 & SOV-3 Revision No.:
12550194
1
A
B
C
} 480 V
3φ, 60 Hz
X00
33
4
33
8
FU
TS-O 33 TS-C 33 33 33
11 15 3 7
480/120 V
SO1 SC1 G00 R00

ALL
49-
49X- 49X-
42 42 PB PB
O C (OPEN) (CLOSE)
42O- 42C- G R
S00 SC0
49- 42 42
C- O-
49 42 MECH 42
X- O INTLK C
T1 T2 T3
Y00
Drawing No.:
SCHEMATIC DIAGRAM – HIGH Date:
PRESSURE INJECTION
MOTOR OPERATED VALVES
MOV-1 HIGH PRESS INJECTION-A MA12 MOV-1 Revision No.:
MOV-1 & MOV-9
MOV-9 HIGH12550194
PRESS INJECTION-B MB15 MOV-9 B-112 0
A
B
C
} 480 V
3φ, 60 Hz
X00
33
4
33
8
FU
TS-O 33 TS-C 33 33 33
11 15 3 7
480/120 V
SO1 SC1 G00 R00

ALL
49-
49X- 49X-
42 42 PB PB
O C (OPEN) (CLOSE)
42O- 42C- G R
S00 SC0
49- 42 42
C- O-
49 42 MECH 42
X- O INTLK C
T1 T2 T3
Y00
Drawing No.:
SCHEMATIC DIAGRAM – AFW Date:
TEST LINE ISOLATION MOTOR
OPERATED VALVES
MOV-16 AFW TEST LINE ISOLATION MA18 MOV-16 Revision No.:
MOV-16 & MOV-17
MOV-17 AFW TEST LINE ISOLATION
12550194 MB16 MOV-17 0
B-113
P01
REMOTE 43 LOCAL
RAISE RAISE
(REM) (LOC)
REMOTE LOCAL
F03
+48 VDC
LOWER LOWER
(REM) M CR
(LOC)
F02 REMOTE LOCAL
RAISE RAISE
(REM) (LOC)
REMOTE 43 LOCAL
N01
Drawing No.:
SNPP E-09
Motor Shown in Remote Op erating Mode AFW- B STEAM THROTTLE 05/01/2007
B-114 MOTOR OPERATED VALVE
Revision No.:
MOV-15, SCHEME DB4 MOV-15
12550194
B-114 0
X00
A
B
C
} 480 V
3φ, 60 Hz TSP
43-
33
4
X01 X02
TS-O 33 TS-C 33 33 33
11 15 7 3
FU FU
480/120 V SO0 SC0
42 MECH 42 R01 G01

ALL O INTLK C
49- 42C- 42O-
YO7 YC5
49X- 49X-
42 42 TSP TSP
O C 43- 43-
YO4 YO6 YC2 YC4
42O- 42C-
PB MB PB
RSP MB RSP
(OPEN) (CLOSE) TSP
43-
49- YO3 YO5 YC1 YC3 R00 G00 R02 G02
49 TSP TSP R G R G
X- 43- 43-
MB RSP
T1 T2 T3
Y01 Y02
TSP TSP
Y00 43- 43-
Drawing No.:
M VALVE SHOWN IN FULL OPEN POSITION
SNPP E-10
Date:
MOV-13, SCHEME MA17 SCHEMATIC DIAGRAM – PORV
BLOCK MOTOR OPERATED 05/01/2007
B-115 VALVE Revision No.:
12550194 MOV-13
0
X01
X00
A
B
C
} 480 V
3φ, 60 Hz
3-
(CLOSE)
(OPEN)
FU FU
PB
PB
42O- 42C-
480/120 V
S00 SC0 SC3
43 43 43
SO1 SC1
42 42 33
O C 4
74 TS-O 33 TS-C 33
11 1
S02 SC2
49- 49- 42 42
C- O-
42 MECH 42
O INTLK C
T1 T2 T3
Drawing No.:
M VALVE SHOWN IN FULL CLOSED POSITION SNPP E-11
MOV-10, SCHEME MA16 SCHEMATIC DIAGRAM – Date:
AFW-A DISCHARGE MOTOR 05/04/2007
OPERATED VALVE
B-116 Revision No.:
MOV-10
12550194
0
A
B
C
} 480 V
3φ, 60 Hz X02
42-
FU
480/120 V KS W MOV Permissive

Control Circuit
L00 W00
74 42-
Y01 Main MOV
Control
Circuit
X00 42-
X01
FU 33
4 33 33
3 7
TS-O 33 TS-C 33
480/120 V 11 15
ALL
49- SO1 SC1 G00 R00
49X- 49X-
PB PB
42 42 (OPEN) (CLOSE)
O C
42O- 42C- G R
S00 SC0
42 42
49- C- O-
49 42 MECH 42
X- O INTLK C Drawing No.:
42-
SNPP E-12
T1 T2 T3
Y00 SCHEMATIC DIAGRAM – Date:
RHR OUTBOARD SUCTION 05/04/2007
M
VALVE SHOWN IN CLOSED POSITION B-117 MOV-8
Revision No.:
12550194
MOV-8, SCHEME MB14 0
P1
33- 33-
G1 R1
HS- HS-
72C 72O 72C 72O
CLOSE OPEN
G R
A1 ARM A2
F1
125 VDC
72O 72C YC1 YO1
SHUNT
S1
SERIES
72O 72C
C O
YC2 YO2
TS- 33- 33-
N1
VALVE SHOWN IN CLOSED POSITION Drawing No.:

SNPP E-13
MOV-11, SCHEME DB3 SCHEMATIC DIAGRAM – Date:
AFW-B DISCHARGE MOTOR 05/09/2007
OPERATED VALVE
Revision No.:
B-118 MOV-11
12550194
0
CB-2
7 3 VB1G 1
I/I +
-
PI-1
VB1C
TB
VB1B
+ + 1
3
- - 2
4 SIRR PB2C
G G G
5
6 VB1D
9 SOV-2
7
10
8
1
B/S
3 SH E-02
G 2 4
G
5 SOV-3
6
XK- SH E-02
PB3C
VB1A VB1F
VB1E
PS1 RPH VA3C
SOV-1
1 3
+
3
2 B/S 4 SH E-03
4
PT-1 -
G
G
KPH-
1 2 G
PRESSURIZER
Drawing No.:
120 VAC E-14
SCHEMATIC DIAGRAM – RCS Date:
PRESSURIZER PRESSURE 05/22/2007
TRANSMITTER
Revision No.:
12550194
PT-1
B-119 1
AFW-A
HIGH TEMP
ANN-1 P8A
P8C
C11L
33
J1005 J1005 J1005
TE-AFWA
AFW-A
TE-AFWA
K
M L
N 33, 34
J
TE-AFW-A H
I
E F
A
B C D
Drawing No.:
SNPP ANN-1
Date:
ANNUNCIATOR 05/20/2007
B-120 SCHEME K16
Revision No.:
12550194
#8
Drawing Pack 2 - AOV and MOV Block Diagrams
B-121
12550194
TITLE: DATE:
VITAL-A
A
X00, U00
B
CB-2 X00, U00, R00,
V
G00, SV0
X00, SV0
C
PT-1
SOV-1, SCHEME VA3
B-122
12550194
TITLE: DATE:
PNL-B
A
P00, N00
B
CB-5 P00, N00, R00,
V
G00, SV0, SV1,
P00, SV2 SP
C
PNLX
SOV-3, SCHEME PB3
B-123
12550194
P
T1, T2, T3
A B
MB MCC M
Y00, S01, R00, X00, S01, R00,
G00, SC1, SC0, G00, SC1, 2SP
S00, 2SP

12550194 B-124
A B
CB-3 TSP MOV-15
P01, N01, F02, P01, N01, F02,
F03, SP F03, SP
MOV-15, SCHEME DB4
12550194
B-125
E
X00, G01, R01
C B A
CB-2 TSP MCC-A1 MOV-13
YC2, YO5, R00, Y00, X01, X02, X00, SC0, SO0,
G00, YO6, YC1, YC5, YO7, 4SP 4SP
Y01, 2SP
YC4, Y02, P
R02, G02,
YO4, YC3, T1, T2, T3
YO3, 2SP
RSP
MOV-13, SCHEME MA17
B-126
12550194
A C
TSP RSP
SO0,SC0, SC3 SO0,SO1, SC0,
SC1, SC3
X01,
SO2, D
SC2,
SC3, SO1, SO2, SC1, SC2, SP
SP
E
B P
CB-3 X00, SO0,SC0
MCC-A1 T1, T2, T3 MOV-10
MOV-10, SCHEME MA16
B-127
12550194
TITLE: DATE:
P
T1, T2, T3
A B
CB-5 MCC-B1 MOV-8
Y00, S01, R00, X00, S01, R00,
G00, SC1, SC0, G00, SC1, X01, SP
S00, 2SP
C
X02, Y01, L00, W00, SP
MOV-8, SCHEME MB14
12550194 B-128
TITLE: DATE:
A
CB-3
P1, N1, YC1, YO1, G1, R1, SP
B
N1, YC2, YO2
DC BUS-B MOV-11
C
P1, G1, R1
P
N1, F1, S1, A1, A2
MOV-11, SCHEME DB3
B-129
12550194
Drawing Pack 3 - More Detailed Electrical Schematics
B-130
12550194
SWGR-B
HPI-B
SWGR-B
Draw ing No.:
SST-B SWGR-B-01
SNPP Date:
05/20/2007
4.16 KV SWGR-B Revisio:
ONE-LINE DIAGRAM
12550194
B-131 #6
Draw ing No.:
HPI-B-01
SNPP Date:
05/20/2007
HPI-B SCHEMATIC DIAGRAM
SHEET 1
#6
12550194 B-132
Draw ing No.:
SNPP HPI-B-02
Date:
SHEET 2
12550194 B-133 #6
480 V Load Center LC-1 Feeder Bkr LC1-15
52-15
To Air Compressor
COMP-1
Drawing No.:
COMP-1
SNPP COMP-1-02
Date:
COMPRESSOR COMP-1
12550194 #6
B-134
LC1-15
COMP-1
Drawing No.:
SNPP COMP-1-02
Date:
COMPRESSOR COMP-1
B-135
12550194 #6
-B
SST-B
480 V LC-B (1600 A)
MCC-B1
Drawing No.:
SNPP LC-B-01
Date:
ONE-LINE DIAGRAM
B-136
12550194
#6
Drawing No.:
SNPP LC-B-02
Date:
52-ED-02 05/20/2007
BREAKER SCHEMATIC
12550194
B-137 #6
Drawing No.:
SNPP LC-B-03
Date:
52-ED-12 05/20/2007
SCHEMATIC
#6
B-138
12550194
SST-B
480 V Load Center LC-B
Draw ing No.:

SNPP LC-B-04
Date:
LC-B
INCOMING BREAKER 05/20/2007
INTERLOCKS
#6
B-139
12550194
480 V
480 V/120V 480 V/120V
LC - B
LC - B
Draw ing No.:
LC-B-05
SNPP Date:
05/20/2007
LOAD CENTER
UNDERVOLTAGE SCHEME
#6
B-140
12550194
480 V
Draw ing No.:

SNPP MCC-B1-01
Date:
MOTOR CONTROL CENTER 05/20/2007
MCC-1B
#6
12550194
B-141
Draw ing No.:
SNPP LC-B-06
STATION SERVICE Date:
TRANSFORMER 05/20/2007
DIFFERENTIAL PROTECTION
B-142 SCHEME
#6
12550194
NRCMD 3.7 and Addendum Numbers, if any.)

(See instructionson the reverse) NUREG/CP-0194 Volume 2

MONTH YEAR
Methods for Applying Risk Analysis to Fire Scenarios (MARIAFIRES) - 2008,
NRC-RES/EPRI Fire PRA Workshop, Volume 2 - Module 2: Electrical Analysis

ConferenceProceedings
Compiled and edited by D. Stroup, F. Gonzalez, and H. Woods (NRC)
7. PERIOD COVERED (Inclusive Dates)
8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION - NAME AND ADDRESS (If NRC, provide Division, Office or Region, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, and mailing address; if contractor,
9. SPONSORING ORGANIZATION - NAME AND ADDRESS (If NRC, type "Same as above"; if contractor,provide NRC Division, Office or Region, U.S. NuclearRegulatory Commission,
and mailingaddress.)

contained in the National Fire Protection Association (NFPA) Standard 805; "Performance Based Standard for Fire
for use as an alternative training method for those who were unable to physically attend the training sessions. This report
12. KEY WORDS/DESCRIPTORS (List words orphrases that will assist researchersin locatingthe report.) 13. AVAILABILITY STATEMENT
unlimited
analysis unclassified
(This Report)
unclassified
15. NUMBER OF PAGES
16. PRICE
NRC FORM 335 (9-2004) PRINTED ON RECYCLED PAPER
12550194
12550194
2008
Volume 3 – Module 3: Fire Analysis,
Based on the Joint NRC-RES/EPRI Training
Workshops Conducted in 2008 September 28–
October 2, 2008, and November 17–20, 2008,
Bethesda, MD
1020621 NUREG/CP-0194

M. H. Salley

K. Canavan


12550194
CIRCUMSTANCE; OR
NOTE
12550194
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

D. Stroup
F. Gonzales
Palo Alto, CA 94303
R. Kassawara
1515 Eubank SE
J. S. Hyslop
K. Hill
S. Nowlen
F. Wyant
J. LaChance
J.S. Hyslop
K. Hill
iii
12550194
Campbell, CA 95008
B. Najafi
F. Joglar-Biloch
quality possible.
manner:
Methods for Applying Risk Analysis to Fire Scenarios (MARIAFIRES) – 2008 Volume 3 –
Module 3: Fire Analysis, Based on the Joint NRC-RES/EPRI Training Workshops Conducted in
2008 September 28–October 2, 2008, and November 17–20, 2008, Bethesda, MD. EPRI,
Palo Alto, CA and U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Office of Nuclear Regulatory Research
(RES), Washington, DC: 2010. 1020621.
iv
12550194
ABSTRACT
v
12550194
Keywords
Fire PRA
Fire scenarios
Risk analysis
vi
12550194
LIST OF ACRONYMS

BAT Boric Acid Tank
CR Control Room
DC Direct Current
EF Error Factor
12550194 vii
IS Ignition Source
KS Key Switch
LOC Loss of Control
MG Motor-Generator
MFW Main Feedwater
MS Main Steam
NC No Consequence
12550194 viii
PE Polyethylene
SI Safety Injection
SSD Safe Shutdown
SW Service Water
SWGR Switchgear
12550194 ix
pressurized reactor
12550194 x
ABSTRACT..…………………………………………………………………………………………..iii
LIST OF ACRONYMS……..………………………………………………………………..............ix
1 INTRODUCTION - FIRE ANALYSIS OVERVIEW ................................................................. 1-1

1.1 EPRI Perspective ........................................................................................................... 1-1
2 FIRE ANALYSIS SLIDES ....................................................................................................... 2-1

SESSION 1a: Plant Partitioning ............................................................................................ 2-1
SESSION 1b: Example Problems ....................................................................................... 2-14
SESSION 2a: Fire Ignition Frequency................................................................................. 2-19
SESSION 2b: Example Problems ...................................................................................... 2-48
SESSION 3: Scoping Fire Modeling.................................................................................... 2-65
SESSION 4: Heat Release Rate ......................................................................................... 2-83
SESSION 5: Fire Severity ................................................................................................... 2-97
SESSION 6a: Damage Criteria ......................................................................................... 2-108
SESSION 6b: Example Problems .................................................................................... 2-119
SESSION 7: Detailed Fire Modeling and Single Compartment Fire Scenarios ................ 2-130
SESSION 8: Detection and Suppression ......................................................................... 2-148
SESSION 9: Special Fire Models Part 1 ........................................................................... 2-164
SESSION 10a: Special Fire Models Part 2 ....................................................................... 2-192
SESSION 10b: Example Problems ................................................................................... 2-201
SESSION 11a: Main Control Room Fire Analysis ............................................................. 2-215
SESSION 11b: Example Problems ................................................................................... 2-234
SESSION 12: Multi-Compartment Fire Analysis ............................................................... 2-249
SESSION 13: Seismic Fire Interaction .............................................................................. 2-259
12550194 xi
3 CONCLUSION ........................................................................................................................ 3-1
Part 1: Integration .................................................................................................................. 3-1
Part 2: Lessons Learned and Insights ................................................................................... 3-6
Part 3: Perspective .............................................................................................................. 3-20
APPENDICES………………………………………………………………………………………….A-1
APPENDIX B: REFERENCE TABLES AND FIGURES ....................................................... B-1
APPENDIX C: EXERCISE SET SOLUTIONS...................................................................... C-1
SESSION 1b: Example Problems (Plant Partitioning)........................................................ C-1
SESSION 2b: Example Problems (Fire Ignition Frequency) ............................................. C-6
SESSION 6b: Example Problems (Scoping Fire Modeling) ............................................ C-19
SESSION 10b: Example Problems (Detailed Fire Modeling) ........................................... C-31
SESSION 11b: Example Problems (Main Control Room Fire Analysis) .......................... C-53
12550194 xii
1 INTRODUCTION – FIRE ANALYSIS OVERVIEW
Within the context of a nuclear power plant (NPP), fires present a special hazard because fire can
damage multiple equipment intended to mitigate core damage. This determination of fire
damage is made through fire modeling using simple empirical approaches to complex computer
codes such as CFAST or FDS. NUREG/CR-6850 provides the framework for including fire
models in fire probabilistic risk assessment (PRA) and describes simple empirical models to
assess fire damage. Extensive information on the more complex approaches such as CFAST and
FDS is referred to NUREG-1824, the verification and validation of several fire models.
Cables are important fire damage targets in fire PRA models. Simple empirical models to
evaluate cable damage, including damage to cables in different trays, are included in the methods
presented. Thresholds for cable damage, primarily to thermoset and thermoplastic cables, are
also discussed. Besides simple empirical models, more complex rule sets to evaluate high-
energy arcing faults are also presented in this part of the training.
The treatment of heat-release rates has been expanded in NUREG/CR-6850, and distributions of
heat-release rates for many types of fire sources have been provided. For example, heat-release
rates for electrical cabinets depend on the configuration of cables in the cabinet and the cabinet
itself. In addition, the severity factor concept, which refers to that portion of the heat-release rate
above which damage occurs, has been improved.
Besides explicit fire modeling, the “Fire” portion of this training describes how fire-suppression
activities are treated and evaluated. Fire suppression includes prompt suppression, such as for
hot work, and automatic and manual fire suppression. Fire damage is generally evaluated in fire
PRA under success and failure of fire suppression.
This module also describes how to divide the plant into regions to be used for analysis. A fire
compartment is a common region applied in fire PRA. Fires producing damage across regions
are also considered. Moreover, guidance on counting components and transferring those counts
to fire frequency is provided. Guidance for a qualitative assessment of seismic-fire interactions
is included.
1.1 EPRI Perspective

materials that are presented at the fire PRA course provided by the Electric Power Research
Institute (EPRI) and the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission’s (NRC’s) Office of Nuclear
Regulatory Research (RES). The training and resulting presentation material is detailed and
represents in excess of 60 hours of classroom instruction. The training focuses on the fire PRA
methods documented in the joint EPRI/RES publication 1011989 and NUREG/CR-6850 along
with clarifications, enhancements, and additions provided via the Frequently Asked Question
(FAQ) process for NFPA 805.
12550194 1-1
The intent of the publication is to provide to the public the training material used at the fire PRA
the periodically offered fire PRA courses; rather, it is meant to augment that training and to serve
as a reference. Enthusiastic future students can use the material to become familiar with the
general principles of fire PRA prior to arrival at the course. Students who have already taken the
course can use the material for reference. The material consists of a series of reports that
document the presentations including some speakers’ notes and text. In addition, an edited
version of a recorded training session is also available via a separate product number. This video
version can be used in a similar manner to the documentation (e.g., for reference or in
preparation for the course) and includes the actual recorded and edited course.
This material is being provided with the hope that those who plan to attend the course can arrive
more informed, those who have already attended can have a reference, and those who have been
unable to attend can have a resource to gain a more complete understanding of the intent and
goals of EPRI 1011989 and NUREG/CR-6850.
12550194 1-2
2 FIRE ANALYSIS SLIDES
SESSION 1a: Plant Partitioning
12550194 2-1
Slide 1 Notes:
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
METHODOLOGY
___________________________________
Task 1: Plant Partitioning ___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
September, 2008
Washington, DC ___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
Slide 2 Notes:
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
Plant Partitioning
Scope ___________________________________
___________________________________
The following topics are covered:
___________________________________
• Task 1: Plant Partitioning Analysis
___________________________________
– Define Global Analysis Boundary
___________________________________
– Partition into physical analysis units or Compartments
– Problem sets from the Sample Problem

___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
Fire PRA Workshop, 2008, Washington DC A Collaboration of U.S. NRC Office of Nuclear Regulatory
Slide 2
Task 1: Plant Partitioning Research (RES) & Electric Power Research Institute (EPRI)
___________________________________
___________________________________
12550194 2-2
Slide 3 Notes:
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
Support Task A: Plant Walkdowns
Just a Quick Note…. ___________________________________
___________________________________
• You cannot complete a Fire PRA without walkdowns
• Expect to conduct a number of walkdowns, especially for ___________________________________
key areas (e.g., those analyzed in detail) ___________________________________
• Walkdowns can have many objectives and support many
tasks: ___________________________________
– Partitioning features, equipment/cable mapping, fire ignition ___________________________________
source counting, fire scenario definitions, fire modeling, detection
and suppression features, recovery actions HRA ___________________________________
• Walkdowns are generally a team activity so coordinate
___________________________________
them to optimize personnel time and resources
___________________________________
___________________________________
Fire PRA Workshop, 2008, Washington DC Slide 3
___________________________________
___________________________________
Slide 4 Notes:
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
Plant Partitioning
General Comment/Observation ___________________________________
___________________________________
• The recommended practice for Task 1 has changed little
from prior methods. ___________________________________
– That means you can likely benefit from a previous analysis ___________________________________
• e.g., your IPEEE fire analysis ___________________________________
• However: watch out for new equipment/cables, new initiators when ___________________________________
screening
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
Slide 4
___________________________________
___________________________________
12550194 2-3
Slide 5 Notes:
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
Task 1: Plant Partitioning
Key Definitions: Compartment vs. Fire Area/Zone ___________________________________
___________________________________
• We talk mainly about Fire Compartments which are defined
in the context of the Fire PRA only ___________________________________
– Defining Fire Compartments is necessary for analysis management
– Also known as Physical Analysis Units ___________________________________
• Fire Areas are defined in the context of your regulatory ___________________________________
compliance fire protection program
• Fire Zones are generally defined in the context of fire ___________________________________
protection features (e.g., detection, suppression, hazards)
___________________________________
– Fire zones have no direct meaning to the Fire PRA context and we
avoid using this term ___________________________________
• Physical Analysis Unit is another term coined lately
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
Slide 6 Notes:
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
Task Objectives and Output ___________________________________
___________________________________
• There are two main objectives to Task 1:
1. Define the Global Analysis Boundary ___________________________________
• The maximum physical extent of the plant that will be considered in the
Fire PRA ___________________________________
2. Divide the areas within the Global Analysis Boundary into analysis
Compartments (Physical Analysis Units) ___________________________________
• The basic physical units that will be analyzed and for which risk results
will be reported ___________________________________
• Task output is the definition of these two aspects of the ___________________________________
analysis
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
Slide 6
___________________________________
___________________________________
12550194 2-4
Slide 7 Notes:
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
Task Input ___________________________________
___________________________________
• No real input from any other task is required (it is, after all,
Task 1) ___________________________________
– There is a link to the equipment and cable selection Tasks 2 and 3
– You may also find yourself iterating back to this task later in the ___________________________________
analysis – that is fine, just be careful to track any changes
___________________________________
• What do you need to support this Task?
– Layout drawings that identify major structures, walls, openings
___________________________________
• Drawings that identify Fire Areas are especially helpful
___________________________________
– Plan and elevation drawings are helpful
– You will need to do a walkdown to support/verify decisions ___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
Slide 7
___________________________________
___________________________________
Slide 8 Notes:
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
Task Breakdown in Steps ___________________________________
___________________________________
• Task 1 is defined in terms of the following steps:
___________________________________
Step 1: Selection of Global Plant Analysis Boundary
___________________________________
Step 2: Plant Partitioning
___________________________________
Step 3: Compartment Information Gathering and Characterization
___________________________________
Step 4: Documentation ___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
Slide 8
___________________________________
___________________________________
12550194 2-5
Slide 9 Notes:
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
Selection of Global Plant Analysis Boundary
___________________________________
• We want a Liberal definition of the global analysis
boundary ___________________________________
– It’s OK to include obviously unimportant areas, we’ll drop them
quickly, but better to do this formally ___________________________________
• Encompass all areas of the plant associated with both ___________________________________
normal and emergency reactor operating and support
systems, as well as power production ___________________________________
• Sister Units should be included unless they are physically ___________________________________
and functionally separated
___________________________________
– No shared areas, no shared systems, no shared components and
associated cables, no conjoined areas (e.g., shared walls)
___________________________________
Fire PRA Workshop, 2008, Washington DC
Slide 9
___________________________________
___________________________________
Slide 10 Notes:
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
Selection of Global Plant Analysis Boundary (2) ___________________________________
• Begin with your protected area: everything within the

___________________________________
protected area should be included in the Global Analysis ___________________________________
Boundary
– In most cases that will capture all risk-important locations ___________________________________
• If necessary, expand the boundary to include any other ___________________________________
locations that house equipment or cables identified in
Tasks 2 or 3 ___________________________________
– This is the Task 2/3 link mentioned before!
___________________________________
– Example: If your offsite power related equipment is outside the
protected area, you need to expand Global Analysis Boundary to
capture it
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
12550194 2-6
Slide 11 Notes:
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
Selection of Global Plant Analysis Boundary (3) ___________________________________
___________________________________
• Problem Set 01-01
___________________________________
• By the end of the analysis, you need to provide a fire risk
disposition for all locations within the global analysis
___________________________________
boundary ___________________________________
– That may be anything from screened out qualitatively to a detailed
risk quantification result ___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
Slide 11
___________________________________
___________________________________
Slide 12 Notes:
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
Plant Partitioning into Fire Compartments (1) ___________________________________
___________________________________
• We divide the Global Analysis Boundary into smaller
pieces (compartments) for the purpose of tracking and ___________________________________
reporting risk results
___________________________________
• A compartment can be many things, but when it comes ___________________________________
down to it, a compartment is:
___________________________________
A well-defined volume within the plant … that is
___________________________________
expected to substantially contain the adverse effects of
fires within the compartment. ___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
Slide 12
___________________________________
___________________________________
12550194 2-7
Slide 13 Notes:
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
• This task is often subjective – judgment is required
___________________________________
• Ideally: Compartments = Rooms
– Locations that are fully defined by physical partitioning features
___________________________________
such as walls, floors, and ceilings
___________________________________
• But the ideal is not the only solution - other features and ___________________________________
elements may be credited in partitioning
– That’s where judgment comes into play!
___________________________________
– What will you credit as a Partitioning Feature? ___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
Slide 14 Notes:
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
• A good starting point is your Fire Areas, but you are by no ___________________________________
means limited to equating Fire Compartments to Fire Areas
– A Fire Area may be partitioned to two or more Compartments
___________________________________
– You may combine two or more Fire Areas into a single
Compartment
___________________________________
___________________________________
• In the end: { ∑ Compartments } = { Global Analysis Bnd. }
– No omissions
___________________________________
– No overlap!
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
Slide 14
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
12550194 2-8
Slide 15 Notes:
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
• So what can you credit as a partitioning feature:
– Bottom line: anything you can justify – see text for examples
___________________________________
• You do need to justify your decisions with the exception of structural ___________________________________
elements maintained as rated fire barriers
___________________________________
– In the end, your partitioning decisions should not affect the risk
results, but . . ___________________________________
– Don’t go crazy – there are disadvantages to over-partitioning ___________________________________
– General guideline: try to minimize the need to develop and analyze
multi-compartment scenarios
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
Slide 15
___________________________________
___________________________________
Notes:
Slide 16
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
Plant Partitioning into Fire Compartments (6)
___________________________________
• There are some things that you should not credit in
partitioning: ___________________________________
– Partial height walls ___________________________________
– Radiant energy shields
– Beam pockets ___________________________________
– Equipment obstructions (e.g., pipes)
– (ANS Standard says: Raceway or other localized fire barriers may ___________________________________
not be credited in partitioning)
___________________________________
• Problem Set 01-02 ___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
12550194 2-9
Slide 17 Notes:
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
• Final Point: You need a system to identify/name your Fire
Compartments ___________________________________
– Something both consistent and logical – but whatever works for
your application and plant
___________________________________
– Often makes sense to use Fire Area designations in naming ___________________________________

schemes
___________________________________
• Example: Fire Area 42 might become Fire Compartments 42A, 42B…
___________________________________
– Use your naming scheme consistently throughout the Fire PRA
• Documentation, equipment/cable tracing, database, etc.

___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
Slide 18 Notes:
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
Compartment Information Gathering and . . . (1) ___________________________________
___________________________________
• Later tasks need certain information about each
compartment. They include, but are not limited to the ___________________________________
following:
– Compartment boundary characteristics ___________________________________
– Ventilation features, and connections
___________________________________
– Fire protection features
– Fire source hazards ___________________________________
– Identification of all adjacent compartments
___________________________________
– Identification of components/systems/cables
– Access routes to the fire compartment ___________________________________
– SSD human actions credited in each compartment
___________________________________
___________________________________
Slide 18
___________________________________
___________________________________
12550194 2-10
Slide 19 Notes:
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
Compartment Information Gathering and . . . (1) ___________________________________
___________________________________
• A thorough plant walkdown is needed to confirm and
gather information about each fire compartment. ___________________________________
• Initially it is not expected that all information pieces to be ___________________________________
collected and documented.
___________________________________
• As work on fire PRA progresses, additional information, as
needed, is collected and documented ___________________________________
___________________________________
• This task, similar to other later tasks, is expected to be
revisited and compartment definitions modified as ___________________________________
additional information is obtained.
___________________________________
___________________________________
Slide 19
___________________________________
12550194 2-11
Slide 20

Compartment Information Gathering and . . . (2)
Fire Compartment ID # 9
Fire Compartment Switchgear Access Room
Building Auxiliary Building
Boundary Characteristics The compartment is bounded by 3-hr rated fire walls, ceiling and floor.
Ventilation Features The ventilation is provided by the Auxiliary Building HVAC system(1). The
equipment housed in this compartment can function properly and perform their
safe shutdown duties in case of total loss of the HVAC system.
Fire Protection Features The fire protection features of this compartment includes:
1. Handheld extinguishers inside the compartment (2 units) (1)
2. Wet hose reel outside the door inside the stairwell(1)
3. Smoke detectors attached to the ceiling (6 units) (1)
Fire Sources The following ignition sources were identified in this compartment.
1. MCC-A
2. MCC-B
3. 125VAC-A
4. 125VAC-B
5. ATS
6. Lighting Fixtures (10 units)(1)
Additionally the following combustibles are present:

1. Cable trays containing thermoset control cables
2. Wooden desk used by the electrical department(1)
Adjacent Compartments The following compartments share a wall, ceiling or floor with this compartment:
1. Switchgear Room A
2. Switchgear Room B
3. Stairwell
4. Charging pump room
5. Cable spreading room
Access Routes 1. This room can be accessed from outside through the stairwell
2. Switchgear Rooms A and B are accessed through this room
Components/Systems/Cables See the component and cable lists provided in Tasks 2 and 3.
Present
SSD Human Actions Credited To be completed after Task 12 is completed.
in this Compartment
(1) Provided here to demonstrate how this part of the step may be addressed. These features are not intended to
be included in the fire PRA of this example plant.
Notes:
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
12550194 2-12
Slide 21 Notes:
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
Summary ___________________________________
___________________________________
• Plant Partitioning is the first step of fire PRA.
___________________________________
• Done in three steps
1. Define global plant analysis boundaries to include all those area
___________________________________
that will be addressed by the fire PRA
___________________________________
2. Define fire compartments in such a way that all the areas
identified in the preceding step are covered, there are no overlaps
and there is a balance between size and number of compartments
___________________________________
selected
___________________________________
3. Confirm the selected compartments through a walkdown and
record important information that will be used later.
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
Slide 21
___________________________________
___________________________________
12550194 2-13
SESSION 1b: Example Problems
12550194 2-14
Workshop Problems for Task 1: Plant Boundary Definition and Partitioning
Workshop Problem Set 01-01

Step 1 - Selection of Global Plant Analysis Boundary: Using Drawing # 01 in the Sample
Package and the information provided in other drawings, identify the Global Plant Analysis
Boundaries in terms of plant areas. Make a complete list of plant areas shown on Drawing #01
in the matrix provided below. Specify whether or not the area shall be included within the
Global Plant Analysis Boundaries and then provide the basis of your decision.
Plant Area Included? Basis
12550194 2-15
12550194 2-16
Step 2: Plant Partitioning: Using the drawings provided in the Sample Package, identify the set
of fire compartments that you will consider for the fire PRA. In the following matrix (1) list
selected compartments, (2) give each an identification number, (3) identify the associated plant
area for each compartment from the Solution Statement for Problem Set 01-01. Provide
comments where warranted.
Fire Comp. Fire Compartment

Plant Area Comments
ID # Descriptor
12550194 2-17
Plant Area Comments
ID # Descriptor
12550194 2-18
SESSION 2a: Fire Ignition Frequency
12550194 2-19
Slide 1 Notes:
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
METHODOLOGY ___________________________________
Task 6: Fire Ignition Frequency ___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
September, 2008 ___________________________________
Washington DC
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
Slide 2 Notes:
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
FIRE IGNITION FREQUENCIES
Purpose of Task 6 ___________________________________
___________________________________
In Task 6, the ignition frequencies associated with fire ignition
sources are established. ___________________________________
– Generic frequencies
– Plant specific experience ___________________________________
– Uncertainties
___________________________________
To be presented in two parts:
• 1. How to estimate location specific frequencies
___________________________________
• 2. How generic frequencies were put together
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
Task 6: Fire Ignition Frequency Slide 2
___________________________________
___________________________________
12550194 2-20
Slide 3 Notes:
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
Assumptions ___________________________________
___________________________________
The model developed for estimating fire ignition frequencies
is based on the following assumptions: ___________________________________
– Frequencies remain constant over time
– Total ignition frequency for an equipment type is the same for all
___________________________________
plants
___________________________________
– Within each plant, ignition frequency is the same for all equipment of
the same type. ___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
Slide 4 Notes:
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
General Approach ___________________________________
___________________________________
To establish the fire frequency of a fire compartment, the
ignition frequencies associated with each ignition source of ___________________________________
the compartment are added together.
– λJ,L = Σ λIS W L W IS,J,L
___________________________________
summed over all ignition sources
___________________________________
Where:
λJ,L : Fire frequency associated with compartment J at location L ___________________________________
λIS: Plant level fire ignition frequency associated with ignition
source IS
___________________________________
W L: Location weighting factor ___________________________________
W IS,J,L: Ignition source weighting factor
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
12550194 2-21
Slide 5 Notes:
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
Plant Level Frequency (λIS) ___________________________________
___________________________________
Plant level fire ignition frequency covers all the equipment of
the same type in the entire unit. ___________________________________
Examples: ___________________________________
– 2.1E-02 is the frequency per year of fires within a unit that involve
pumps.
___________________________________
– 7.4E-03 is the frequency per year of transient fires within the turbine ___________________________________
building of a unit.
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
12550194 2-22
Slide 6

Plant Level Frequencies (λIS)
Table 6 -1
Fire Frequency Bins and Generic Frequencies
Generic Split Fractions for Fire Type
Ignition Source Freq
ID Location Mode 1
(Equipment Type) (per rx yr) Electrical Oil Transient Hotwork Hydrogen HEAF
1 Battery Room Batteries All 7.5E-04 1.0 0 0 0 0 0
2 Containment (PWR) Reactor Coolant Pump Power 6.1E-03 0.14 0.86 0 0 0 0
4 Control Room Main Control Board All 2.5E-03 1.0 0 0 0 0 0
8 Diesel Generator Diesel Generators All 2.1E-02 0.16 0.84 0 0 0 0

Room
11 Plant-Wide Cable fires caused by Power 2.0E-03 0 0 0 1.0 0 0

Components welding and cutting
Ignition Frequency Bin
14 Plant-Wide Electric Motors All 4.6E-03 1.0 0 0 0 0 0
Components
15 Plant-Wide Electrical Cabinets All 4.5E-02 1.0 0 0 0 0 0

Components
20 Plant-Wide Off-gas/H2 Recombiner Power 4.4E-02 0 0 0 0 1.0 0

Components (BWR)
2
27 Transformer Yard Transformer – Catastrophic Power 6.0E-03 1.0 0 0 0 0
32 Turbine Building Main Feedwater Pumps Power 1.3E-02 0.11 0.89 0 0 0 0

1. See Appendix M for a description of high-energy arcing fault (HEAF) fires.
2. See Section 6.5.6 below for a definition.
Task 6: Fire Ignition Frequency Slide 6 Research (RES) & Electric Power Research Institute (EPRI)
Notes:
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
12550194 2-23
Slide 7

Table 6 -1
ID Location Mode 1

Room
11 Plant-Wide Cable fires caused by Power 2.0E-03 0 0 0 1.0 0 0

Components welding and cutting
ID Location
Components
15 Plant-Wide 1 Battery
ElectricalRoom
Cabinets All 4.5E-02 1.0 0 0 0 0 0
Components
20 Plant-Wide
2 Containment (PWR)Power
Off-gas/H2 Recombiner 4.4E-02 0 0 0 0 1.0 0
Components (BWR)
27
4
Transformer Yard
Control Room
Transformer – Catastrophic 2
Power 6.0E-03 1.0 0 0 0 0

8 Diesel Generator Room
Notes:
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
12550194 2-24
Slide 8

Table 6 -1
ID Location Mode 1

Room
Ignition Source
11 Plant-Wide ID Cable fires caused by Location
Power 2.0E-03 0 0 0 1.0 0 0
Components welding and cutting (Equipment Type)
Components 1 Battery Room Batteries
15 Plant-Wide Electrical Cabinets All 4.5E-02 1.0 0 0 0 0 0
Components 2 Containment (PWR) Reactor Coolant Pumps
20 Plant-Wide Off-gas/H2 Recombiner Power 4.4E-02 0 0 0 0 1.0 0
Components 4 Control Room
(BWR) Main Control Boards
2
8 Diesel Generator Room Diesel Generators
Notes:
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
12550194 2-25
Slide 9

Table 6 -1
ID Location Mode 1

Room
Ignition Source
11 Plant-Wide fires caused Freq
CableMode by Power 2.0E-03 0 0 0 1.0 0 0 1
(Equipment Type)
Components (per rx yr) Electrical Oil Transient Hotwork Hydrogen HEAF
welding and cutting
14 Plant-Wide Electric Motors All

Batteries Components All 7.5E-04 1.04.6E-03 0 1.0 0
0 0
0 0 0
0 0
0
Reactor15Coolant
Plant-Wide
Pump
Components
Electrical Cabinets
Power 6.1E-03 All 4.5E-02
0.14 0.861.0 0
0 0
0 0 0
0 0
0
Transients and Hotwork

20 Plant-Wide Power
Off-gas/H2 2.0E-03
Recombiner Power 0 4.4E-02 0 0 0.44
0 0 0.560 1.00 0 0
Components (BWR)
Main Control Board All 2.5E-032 1.0 0 0 0 0 0

Notes:
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
12550194 2-26
Slide 10 Notes:
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
Location Weighting Factor (WL) ___________________________________
___________________________________
Location weighting factor adjusts the plant level frequencies
for those cases where a common location is shared among ___________________________________
units of the same plant.
– All frequencies were developed per unit basis

___________________________________
– Examples: Turbine Building, Auxiliary Building, Control Room ___________________________________
– Example: W L = 2.0 if the Turbine Building is shared between two ___________________________________
units
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
Slide 11 Notes:
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
Ignition Source Weighting Factor (WIS,J,L) ___________________________________
___________________________________
Ignition source weighting factor is the fraction of an ignition
source type found in a specific compartment. ___________________________________
– Need to count all the items belonging to one ignition source type in
one unit ___________________________________
• Necessitates a thorough plant walk-down and review of engineering ___________________________________
documents
___________________________________
– Example: if there are two battery rooms in one unit, each housing
one battery set, W IS,J,L = 0.5 ___________________________________
– Transients and cables are based on specific models
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
12550194 2-27
Slide 12 Notes:
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
Procedure ___________________________________
The following procedure can be used to estimate location

___________________________________
specific fire ignition frequencies:
___________________________________
• Step 1. Mapping plant ignition sources to generic sources,
• Step 2. Plant fire event data collection and review, ___________________________________
• Step 3. Plant specific updates of generic ignition
frequencies, ___________________________________
• Step 4. Mapping plant-specific locations to generic locations, ___________________________________
• Step 5. Location weighting factors,
• Step 6. Fixed fire ignition source counts, ___________________________________
• Step 7. Ignition source weighting factors, and ___________________________________
• Step 8. Ignition source and compartment fire frequency
evaluation. ___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
Slide 13 Notes:
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
Step 1. Mapping Plant Ignition Sources ___________________________________
___________________________________
Every plant equipment item should be mapped to one of the
ignition frequency bins. ___________________________________
– Must be capable of initiating a fire
– Must be located in the buildings, compartments and plant areas ___________________________________
considered for fire risk analysis
– If no matching bin, then the following approach may be used: ___________________________________
– Characteristics of the source
– Percentage of the time in operation ___________________________________
– Past fire histories within the plant
– Relevant past fire histories or frequency estimates not associated ___________________________________
with the plant
• Problem Set 06-01 ___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
12550194 2-28
Slide 14 Notes:
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
Step 2. Plant Fire Event Data Collection ___________________________________
___________________________________
Plant specific fire event data is needed to establish plant
specific fire ignition frequencies. ___________________________________
– Are plant specific fire ignition frequencies warranted?
• Repeated set of events
___________________________________
• Events that cannot be mapped to a bin
___________________________________
– Unusual fire occurrence patterns
___________________________________
– May be selective in plant specific frequencies
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
Slide 15 Notes:
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
Step 2. Plant Fire Event . . . (2) ___________________________________
___________________________________
Example:
– The following events have taken place: ___________________________________
• Event 1: Fire in MCC-A because of breakers not properly engaging the
bus bars. ___________________________________
• Event 2: Fire in 125VAC-A panel. The fire was extinguished when 4kV
bus-A was de-energized from the control room. Fire resulted from arcing ___________________________________
of supply lead to one of the fittings connecting to a controller to the bus.
– Both fires can be included in the frequency analysis. ___________________________________
– Plant has been in commercial operation for 10 years.
– Both events should be mapped to Bin # 15 “Electrical Cabinets” ___________________________________
– 2/10 = 0.2, is 4 time greater than 0.045, Bin #15 frequency
___________________________________
• Problem Sets 06-02 and 06-03 (Examples)
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
12550194 2-29
Slide 16 Notes:
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
Step 3. Plant Specific Frequencies (λIS) ___________________________________
___________________________________
Bayesian approach can be used to estimate plant specific fire
ignition frequencies. ___________________________________
– Uncertainty distributions of generic frequencies as the prior
___________________________________
– Possible double accounting of FEDB events
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
12550194 2-30
Slide 17

Steps 4/5. Plant-Specific Locations and WL
Plant specific locations should be mapped to the bin definition

locations.
Example:
Plant Specific
Bin Location WL
Location
Emergency Battery Battery Room Number of site units that
Enclosure share common set of
batteries.
Main Control Room Control Room Number of site units that
share the same control
room.
Control Building Control / Auxiliary / Number of site units that
Primary Auxiliary Reactor Building share the same building
Building type.
• Problem Sets 06-04 and 06-05
Notes:
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
12550194 2-31
Slide 18 Notes:
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
Step 6. Fixed Fire Ignition Source Counts ___________________________________
___________________________________
To establish ignition source weighting factor, W IS,J, for each
compartment, it is necessary to obtain the total number of ___________________________________
relevant items per bin.
– For shared locations, entire site should be considered
___________________________________
– Visual examination (recommended approach) ___________________________________

– Document review or computerized database ___________________________________
– Counting method for each bin ___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
Slide 19 Notes:
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
FIRE IGNITION FREQUENCIES ___________________________________

Step 6. (cont’d)
___________________________________
Examples:
___________________________________
• Bin 1– Batteries: Each bank of interconnected sets of batteries
located in one place should be counted as one battery set. ___________________________________
Cells may not be counted individually.
• Bin 5– Cable Fires Caused by Welding and Cutting: . . . ___________________________________
Assume that all exposed cables (i.e., cables that are not in
conduits or wrapped by noncombustible materials) have an ___________________________________
equal likelihood of experiencing a fire caused by welding and
cutting across the entire location. . . . ___________________________________
• Bin 14– Electric Cabinets: Electrical cabinets represent . . ___________________________________
switchgears, motor control centers, DC distribution panels,
relay cabinets. . . . Free standing electrical cabinets should be ___________________________________
counted by their vertical segments, . . .
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
12550194 2-32
Slide 20

Step 6. Related FAQs
• FAQ 06-0016 - Ignition source counting guidance for electrical cabinets.

(Status: Closed)
Cabinet is not an outlier –
Count = 1
Cabinet is same as standard –

Count = 1
Internal dividers are not solid –

Count = 6
Internal dividers are solid –

Count = 6
Notes:
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
12550194 2-33
Slide 21

Step 6. Related FAQs (cont’d)
• FAQ 06-0016 - Continued.

Three independent cabinets –
Count = 3
Panel is an outlier, using a 4’

12 ft wide, 3 ft deep standard cabinet –
Count = 3
Cabinet is an outlier, no evaluation of

9 ft wide, 6 ft deep contents, based on reference cabinet –
Count = 3 due to variation from the
standard length and depth
The counts should depend on the

9 ft wide, 6 ft deep cable termination load and devices
walk through cabinet in the panel by comparing it with a
reference cabinet.
Notes:
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
12550194 2-34
Slide 22 Notes:
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
Step 6. Related FAQs (cont’d) ___________________________________
• FAQ 06-0017 - Ignition source counting guidance for high

___________________________________
energy arcing faults. (Status: Closed) ___________________________________
– Split Bin # 16 into:
• Bin 16a – Low-voltage panels (480 to 1,000 V) - 4.8E-04/ry (mean)
• Bin 16b – medium-voltage panels (> 1,000V) – 1.4E-03/ry (mean)
___________________________________
– Counting method remains unchanged (i.e., vertical sections) ___________________________________
– Self consistent within each new bins
• FAQ 06-0018 - Ignition source counting guidance for main ___________________________________
control board. (Status: Closed)
– There is a one-to-one correspondence between App. L and Bin 4. ___________________________________
– Main Control Board is just the horseshoe.
– All other electrical cabinets in the Main Control Room should be ___________________________________
counted with other cabinets in the plant.
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
Slide 23 Notes:
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
• FAQ 06-0031: Ignition source counting guidance ___________________________________
clarifications and extensions (Status: Closed)
– Bin 14 – Electric motors: clarifies guidance, provides for excluding ___________________________________
small motors of 5hp or less and totally enclosed motors.
– Bin 21 – Pumps: provides for excluding small sampling pumps, and
___________________________________
other pumps of 5hp or less
– Bin 23 – Transformers: provides for excluding dry transformers of
___________________________________
45KVA or less
– Bin 26 – Ventilation subsystems: clarifies that intent is to exclude
___________________________________
small subsystems powered by motors of 5hp or less (consistent with
electric motors bin 14)
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
12550194 2-35
Slide 24 Notes:
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
• FAQ 07-0035: High energy arc faults in bus ducts (Status: ___________________________________
Open)
– Issue: ___________________________________
• Guidance document is silent on topic
___________________________________
• Acknowledge potential for such events (e.g., Diablo Canyon 5/2000)
___________________________________
• Provide plant wide frequency and counting/partitioning guidance
• Provide zone of influence and scenario development guidance ___________________________________
– Status:
• FAQ resolution has been drafted and reviewed ___________________________________
• Final revisions in process
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
Slide 25 Notes:
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
• FAQ 08-0042: Cabinet Fire Propagation (Status: Open) ___________________________________
– Issue:
• Guidance provides conflicting language regarding propagation of fire from ___________________________________
cabinets (Chapter 6 versus Appendix G) and definition of “well-sealed
cabinets)
• Implication for Step 6: you exclude well-sealed cabinets from cabinet
___________________________________
count if contents are below 440V (see Vol. 2, Page 6-17)
• Clarify and expand definition of “well-sealed and robustly secured
cabinets” (which will not propagate fires) ___________________________________
– Status:
• FAQ resolution has been drafted and reviewed by RES/EPRI team ___________________________________
• Industry and NRC staff reviews pending
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
12550194 2-36
Slide 26 Notes:
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
• FAQ 08-0048 Fire Frequency Trends (Status: Open) ___________________________________
– Issue:
• Fire frequency analysis may not reflect industry trends (i.e., towards ___________________________________
reduced fire frequencies)
• Work is under way within EPRI team to determine if statistically significant
fire frequency trends can be demonstrated ___________________________________
• Fire frequencies for one or more ignition source bins may be modified (up
or down depending on trends) ___________________________________
– Status:
• Work to date remains largely within the EPRI team ___________________________________
• Review/input by RES team pending
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
Slide 27 Notes:
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
Step 7. Ignition Source Weighting Factor (WIS,J,L) ___________________________________
___________________________________
Ignition source weighting factors are evaluated for all the
compartments identified in Task 1 and for all ignition sources ___________________________________
identified in Step 1 of this Task.
– Countable items ___________________________________
• Example: 2 pumps in compartment J of 50 pumps in the unit
W IS,J,L = 2/50 = 0.04 ___________________________________
– Transients – apportioned based on maintenance, occupancy and
storage ___________________________________
– Large systems – ad-hoc method based on specific characteristics of ___________________________________
the system
• Examples: hydrogen gas distribution system, turbine/generator oil system ___________________________________
• Problem Sets 06-08, 06-09 and 06-10
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
12550194 2-37
Slide 28 Notes:
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
Step 7. WIS,J,L – Transients ___________________________________
Transient fire frequencies are apportioned based on

___________________________________
qualitatively estimated rating levels for (1) maintenance
activities, (2) occupancy level and traffic density and (3) ___________________________________
storage (temporary and permanent) of combustible and
flammable materials. ___________________________________
– Five rating levels are used:
• No (0) - Can be used only for those compartments where transients are
___________________________________
precluded by design (administrative restrictions do not apply).
• Low (1)–Reflects minimal level of the factor.
___________________________________
• Medium (3)–Reflects average level of the factor.
• High (10)–Reflects the higher-than-average level of the factor.
___________________________________
• Very high (50)–Reflects the significantly higher-than-average level of the
factor (only for “maintenance” influencing factor).
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
12550194 2-38
Slide 29

Step 7. WIS,J,L – Transients (2)
Table 6-3
Description of Transient Fire Influencing Factors
Influencing
No (0) Low (1) Medium (3)
Factor
Maintenance Maintenance Small number Average
activities of PM/CM number of
during power work orders PM/CM work
operation are compared to orders.
precluded by the average
design. number of
work orders
for a typical
compartment.
Occupancy Entrance to Compartment Compartment
the with low foot not
compartment traffic or out of continuously
is not possible general traffic occupied, but
during plant path. with regular
operation. foot traffic.
Notes:
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
12550194 2-39
Slide 30

Step 7. WIS,J,L – Transients (3)
The following normalization equations are used:

– For General Transients:
WGT,J,L = (nm,J,L + no,J,L + ns,J,L)/NGT,L
NGT,L = Σ (nm,i,L + no, i,L + ns, i,L)
(summed over i, all compartments of location L)
– For Transient Fires Caused by Welding and Cutting:
WWC,J,L = nm,J /NWC
NWC = Σ nm,i,L
(summed over i, all the compartments of location L)
– For Cable Fires Caused by Welding and Cutting:
WCF,J = nm,J WCable,J /NCF
NCF = Σ nm,i,L WCable,I
(summed over i, all compartments of location L)
• Problem Sets 06-11
Notes:
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
12550194 2-40
Slide 31

Step 8. Fire Frequency Evaluation
The fire frequency (generic or plant-specific) for each ignition

source, λIS,J, can now be calculated using the data quantified
in the preceding steps.
λJ,L = Σ λIS W L W IS,J,L

summed over all ignition sources
Notes:
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
12550194 2-41
Slide 32 Notes:
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
Determination of Generic Fire Frequencies ___________________________________
The generic fire frequencies are based on the collective ___________________________________

experience of U.S. nuclear power industry.
___________________________________
– Large uncertainties
___________________________________
– Two stage Bayesian approach
___________________________________
– EPRI Fire Event Database (FEDB)
___________________________________
– Analysis of each event
___________________________________
• FAQ 08-0048 - Fire Ignition Frequency (in process)
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
Slide 33 Notes:
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
Fire Event Data ___________________________________
EPRI’s Fire Event Data Base (FEDB) was used to establish

___________________________________
the historical fire events for generic fire frequency estimation.
___________________________________
– Licensee event reports
___________________________________
– Industry sources (e.g., NEIL and ANI)
___________________________________
– Various studies
___________________________________
– Specific plant data
___________________________________
– Individual event follow-up
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
12550194 2-42
Slide 34 Notes:
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
Event Data Analysis ___________________________________
For each event, information was reviewed and the following ___________________________________
were established:
___________________________________
Event Report Contents Event Analysis and Assignments
– Occurrence date – Challenging? ___________________________________
– Plant type (i.e., PWR vs. BWR) – Location
– Plant status (operating mode) – Ignition source ___________________________________
– Fire Location – Operating mode
– Fire Cause – High energy arcing (electrical ___________________________________
– Initiating equipment and cab.)
combustibles – Suppression data ___________________________________
– Detection and suppression • Prompt?
information • Supp. Curve Category (e.g. ___________________________________
– Severity related information electrical)
– Event description (narrative)
• Duration
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
12550194 2-43
Slide 35

Number of Events
For each plant and bin combination, the number of events

were estimated using the following eight possible event
classifications:
Table C-1
Fire Event Classifications and Frequency Estimation Action
Frequency Estimation
Information Deficiencies
Action
Class. #
Known Op. Challenging Method of
Known Plant Multiplier
Mode Fire inclusion
1 Yes Yes Yes 1 As is
2 Yes Yes Undetermined q As is
3 Yes No Yes p As is
4 Yes No Undetermined qp As is
Distribute
5 No Yes Yes 1
among units
Distribute
6 No Yes Undetermined q
among units
Distribute
7 No No Yes p
among units
Distribute
8 No No Undetermined qp
among units
Notes:
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
12550194 2-44
Slide 36 Notes:
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
Reactor Years ___________________________________
For each plant, two time periods were established – (1)

___________________________________
power production mode and (2) low power or shutdown mode
___________________________________
– Assumed 62% capacity factor prior to 1994
___________________________________
– NUREG-1350 data for post 1994 capacity factors
___________________________________
– Total reactor years since initial commercial operation
___________________________________
– Added the reactor years of the units for multi-unit sites
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
12550194 2-45
Slide 37

Generic Fire Ignition Frequencies
Total RDAT Output

# of
# Location Ignition Source Reactor
Events Mean 5% 50% 95%
Years
1 Battery Room Batteries 1.0 2486 7.5E-04 2.0E-05 3.2E-04 2.4E-03
2 Containment (PWR) Reactor Coolant Pump 6.5 1089 6.1E-03 3.1E-04 3.6E-03 1.7E-02
3 Containment (PWR) Transients and hotwork 2.4 1089 2.0E-03 1.3E-04 1.1E-03 5.9E-03
4 Control Room Main control board 5.5 2486 2.5E-03 8.4E-05 1.2E-03 7.3E-03
5 Control/Auxiliary/Rea Cable fires caused by 2.0 1674 1.6E-03 3.1E-05 6.4E-04 5.0E-03
ctor Building welding and cutting
6 Control/Auxiliary/Rea Transient fires caused by 12.6 1674 9.7E-03 8.9E-05 2.4E-03 3.3E-02
ctor Building welding and cutting
7 Control/Auxiliary/Rea Transients 6.0 1674 3.9E-03 1.6E-04 2.2E-03 1.1E-02
ctor Building
8 Diesel Generator Diesel generators 49.5 2486 2.1E-02 1.9E-03 1.2E-02 6.6E-02
Room
9 Plant-Wide Air compressors 5.0 2486 2.4E-03 3.8E-05 9.0E-04 7.9E-03
Components
Notes:
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
12550194 2-46
Slide 38 Notes:
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
Concluding Remarks ___________________________________
___________________________________
Fire ignition frequency evaluation (Task 6) uses a mix of plant
specific and generic information to establish the ignition ___________________________________
frequencies for specific compartments and from that for
specific fire scenarios.
___________________________________
– Generic fire ignition frequencies based on industry experience
___________________________________
– Elaborate data analysis method
___________________________________
– Frequencies binned by equipment type
___________________________________
– Methodology to apportion frequencies according to relative
characteristics of each compartment ___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
12550194 2-47
12550194 2-48
Workshop Problems for Task 6: Fire Ignition Frequency

Step 1: Mapping plant ignition sources to generic sources: Using the information provided in
this Sample Package, map the items listed in the following table to generic sources.
Equipment Equipment
Equipment Description Bin # Bin Description / Comment\
ID Type
HPI-B High pressure safety injection pump B
MOV-1 HPI valve
MOV-5 RWST isolation valve
BAT-B Train B Battery
RCP-1 Reactor coolant pump 1
AOV-1 /
Pilot operated relief valve
(SOV-1)
PT-1 RCS pressure transmitter
EDG-A Train A Emergency Diesel Generator
MCC-B1 Train B 480 V Motor Control Center
ATS-1 Automatic Transfer Switch Panel
VITAL-A Train A 120 VAC Vital Bus
SWGR-A Train A 4160 V Bus
LC-A Train A 480 V Load Center
SST-A Train A Station Service Transformer
BC-A Train A Battery Charger
DC BUS-A Train A 125 VDC Bus
PNL-A Train A 125 VDC Panel
INV-A Train A Inverter
AFW-A Motor driven AFW pump A
AFW-B Steam driven AFW Pump B
SUT-1 Startup Transformer
12550194 2-49
Workshop Problem Set 06-02 (Example)
Step 2: Plant Fire Event Data Collection and Review: The following tables provide examples
of fire events data collected for the sample nuclear power plant.
Fire Event # 1
Event date: January 1, 2007
Event Description: At approximately 16:49, a fire resulted from a short caused by the slabs on the
MCC-A breakers not properly engaging the bus bars. As a result of a short, insulation on some
wires ignited, resulting in a fire. The fire was discovered immediately by employees who
extinguished the blaze with portable fire extinguishers. Damage was confined to the cabinet where
the fire occurred, located inside the motor control center.
Should this event be considered in fire frequency calculation? Yes
Basis: The event occurred during power operation. Extent of damage was sufficient to render the
ignition source inoperable and the flames and hot gases threatened the integrity of other items
nearby.
Associated Bin ID # per Table 6-1 of Ref.1: 15

Bin Location: Plant-wide components
Bin Description: Electrical Cabinets
Basis: The fire was initiated in an MCC. An MCC is considered an electrical cabinet.
Fire Event # 2
Event date: February 1, 2007
Event Description: A fire occurred in the 120VAC-A panel. The fire was extinguished when 4kV
bus-A was de- energized from the control room. Fire resulted from arcing of supply lead to one of
the fittings connecting to a controller to the bus. Problems have been previously experienced with
this type of devices in other plants.
Should this event be considered in fire frequency calculation? Yes

Basis: The event occurred during power operation. Extent of damage was sufficient to render the
ignition source (i.e., 120VAC bus) inoperable and threaten the integrity of other items nearby.
Associated Bin ID # per Table 6-1 of Ref.1: 15

Bin Location: Plant-wide components
Bin Description: Electrical Cabinets
Basis: The fire was initiated in a 120VAC panel, which is considered as an electrical cabinet.
12550194 2-50
Workshop Problem Set 06-03 (Example)
Step 3: Plant Specific Updates of Generic Ignition Frequencies: The following bullets
provide a sample discussion of how the fire events presented in the previous sections were
treated in the Fire PRA.
• The two events identified in the preceding step are certainly significant and should be
included in a statistical analysis of fire frequency (e.g., Bayesian update of generic
frequencies.)
• Plant has been in commercial operation for 10 years.
• Both events should be mapped to Bin # 15 “Electrical Cabinets”
• The resulting frequency can be approximated by 2/10 = 0.2 per electrical cabinet year
• The estimated frequency is 4 times greater than 0.045, Bin #15 generic frequency
• Fire PRA analysts decided not to include this plant specific experience in the fire frequency
analysis. The decision is based on the following: “The two events do not point out an
unusual trend in electrical cabinet fires. The two panels where the fires had occurred were
dissimilar items. Therefore, the plant experience is not deemed to be indicative of unusually
high electrical cabinet fire tendency at this plant.”
• For all other bins, the experience is no events in 10 years (both power and shutdown) or 8
years (assuming 20% outages). If subjected to Bayesian update, the impact of this
experience on bin frequencies is minimal.
12550194 2-51
Step 4: Mapping Plant-Specific Locations to Generic Locations: Using the information
provided in this Sample Package, map the items listed in the following table to the applicable
generic locations provided in NUREG/CR 6850. Note that some of the compartments may map
to more than one Generic Location.
Step 5: Location Weighting Factors: Assign the location weighting factors of the Fire
Compartments in the following table.
Fire
Plant Fire Compartment Plant Area Generic Location WL
Comp. #
1 Main Control Room Auxiliary Building
2 Aux Bldg El. 0 Ft Auxiliary Building
3 Cable Spreading Room Auxiliary Building
4A RHR Pump Room Auxiliary Building
4B AFW Pump Room Auxiliary Building
5 Battery Room A Auxiliary Building
6 Battery Room B Auxiliary Building
9 SWG Access Room Auxiliary Building
10 Switchgear Room A Auxiliary Building
11 Switchgear Room B Auxiliary Building
14 Stairway Auxiliary Building
7 Containment Containment
8A DG-A Room DG Bldg.
8B DG-B Room DG Bldg.
12 Turbine Bldg El. 0 Ft Turbine Building
15 Battery Room 1 Turbine Building
13 Yard Yard
14 Intake Structure Intake Structure
12550194 2-52
Step 5: Location Weighting Factors: At a two-unit nuclear power plant, the Main Control Room
is shared between the two units. The control room consists of two separate Main Control Boards
that do not share any controls and are dedicated to one unit each. There are 5 electrical cabinets
in the control room in addition to the Main Control Boards that are shared between the two units.
a. For Unit 1, establish the Location Weighting Factor of the Main Control Board
b. For Unit 1, establish the Location Weighting Factor of the electrical cabinets.
c. For Unit 1, establish the Location Weighting Factor of transient fires in the Main Control Room
12550194 2-53
Step 6: Fixed Fire Ignition Source Counts: Estimate the ignition source counts for only those
items that are noted under each picture and are visible in the foreground of the picture:
Electrical Panels: _________________ Electrical Panels: _________________

Transformers: _________________
Transformers: _________________ Electrical Panels: _________________

Transformers: _________________
12550194 2-54
Electrical Panels: _________________

(These are sealed panels with low voltage
circuits)
12550194 2-55
Step 6: Fixed Fire Ignition Source Counts: Estimate the ignition source counts for the components identified in Step 1 above.
Bin # and Description (per Table 6-1)
1 2 8 4 9 10 14 15 16 21 23a 23b 29
High Energy Arcing

Main Control Board
Transformers (Dry)
Electrical Cabinets
Yard transformers
Diesel Generators
Transformers (Oil
Air Compressors
Battery Chargers
Reactor Coolant
Electric Motors
Batteries
(Others)
Pumps
Faults
Pump
filled)
XFMR- XFMR- XFMR-
# Compartment Plant Area BAT RCP DG MCB AC BC EM EC HEAF PMP
Dry Oil Yard
1 Main Control Room Control/Aux/Reactor Building
2 Aux Bldg El. 0 Ft Control/Aux/Reactor Building
3 Cable Spreading Room Control/Aux/Reactor Building
4A RHR Pump Room Control/Aux/Reactor Building
4B AFW Pump Room Control/Aux/Reactor Building
5 Battery Room A Plant Wide Components
6 Battery Room B Plant Wide Components
9 SWG Access Room Plant Wide Components
10 Switchgear Room A Plant Wide Components
11 Switchgear Room B Plant Wide Components
14 Stairway Plant Wide Components
8A DG-A Room Plant Wide Components
8B DG-B Room Plant Wide Components
12 Turbine Bldg El. 0 Ft Plant Wide Components
15 Battery Room 1 Plant Wide Components
13 Yard Plant Wide Components
14 Intake Structure Plant Wide Components
Total
12550194 2-56
Step 7: Ignition Source Weighting Factors: For an NPP, the fire PRA analysts have counted 23
pumps within the Plant Analysis Boundary.
• For RHR Pump RHRP-C located in RHR Pump room (FZ-03A), which in turn is located
in the Auxiliary Building, establish the IS, J and L subscripts of:
WIS,J,L =
• For the same RHR Pump, RHRP-C, calculate the Ignition Source Weighting Factor
W=
• RHR Pump room FZ-03A contains three pumps. Calculate the ignition source weighting
factor for the pumps in this compartment.
W=
12550194 2-57
Step 7: Ignition Source Weighting Factors: For an NPP, the fire PRA analysts have counted
351 electrical cabinet vertical sections within the Plant Analysis Boundary.
• 480VAC MCC-A is composed of 32 breakers arranged in 8 vertical segments. Calculate
the ignition source weighting factor for this MCC.
WMCC-B =
• 4kV non-1E Switchgear 1 is composed of 8 breakers. Each breaker takes up one vertical
segment of the switchgear. Calculate the ignition source weighting factor for this
electrical panel.
WSWG-1 =
• The local control panel, CP-1, for the chemicals addition system located in the Reactor
Building has the following dimensions: 2’ Deep, 12’Long, 8’High. There are no
partitions within the panel. Calculate the ignition source weighting factor for this
electrical panel.
WCP-1 =
12550194 2-58
Step 7: Ignition Source Weighting Factors: Using the information provided in the solution for Problem Set 06-07, calculate the
component weighting factors for the components listed below.
1 2 8 4 9 10 14 15 16 21 23a 23b 29
High Energy Arcing

Main Control Board
Transformers (Dry)
Electrical Cabinets
Yard transformers
Diesel Generators
Transformers (Oil
Air Compressors
Battery Chargers
Reactor Coolant
Electric Motors
Batteries
(Others)
Pumps
Faults
Pump
filled)
XFMR- XFMR- XFMR-
Dry Oil Yard
1 Main Control Room Control/Aux/Reactor Building
2 Aux Bldg El. 0 Ft Control/Aux/Reactor Building
4A RHR Pump Room Control/Aux/Reactor Building
4B AFW Pump Room Control/Aux/Reactor Building
5 Battery Room A Plant Wide Components
6 Battery Room B Plant Wide Components
9 SWG Access Room Plant Wide Components
10 Switchgear Room A Plant Wide Components
11 Switchgear Room B Plant Wide Components
8A DG-A Room Plant Wide Components
8B DG-B Room Plant Wide Components
12 Turbine Bldg El. 0 Ft Plant Wide Components
13 Yard Plant Wide Components
12550194 2-59
Transient Ignition Source Weighting Factors: An NPP is composed of three compartments
with the following characteristics:
Compartment 1:
• Houses the Steam Driven Auxiliary Feedwater Pump
• The pump has required major maintenance once per year
• The room is at a corner of the Auxiliary Building separated from other parts of the
building with 3-hour rated walls and one access door
• The lubricating oils of this and other large safety related pumps are stored in this room.
• All cables are in open bottom and open top cable trays
• The total amount of cables in the room is 1,000 lbs.
Compartment 2:
• Houses the one of three High Pressure Injection Pumps
• The pump has required major maintenance once per three years
• The room is at a corner of the Auxiliary Building separated from other parts of the
building with 3-hour rated walls and one access door
• There are no other items in this room except for the pump.
• All cables are inside conduits
Compartment 3:
• Houses 480VAC MCC
• The MCC has never required any major maintenance since installation 15 years ago
• The room is the passageway between the radiation control and other parts of the
Auxiliary Building
• The room contains coveralls and other radiation protection related clothing items
• All cables are in open bottom and open top cable trays
12550194 2-60
A. Enter the influencing factors for each compartment and category:
Influencing Factor Cable Run (self-

ignited cable
Compartment Maintenance Occupancy Storage fires)
Compartment 1
Compartment 2
Compartment 3
Total
B. Calculate the ignition source weighting factors for each compartment
Transients fires Cable fires

Cable Run (self-
General caused by caused by
Compartment ignited cable
Transients welding and welding and
fires)
cutting cutting
Compartment 1
Compartment 2
Compartment 3
Total
C. Calculate the ignition frequencies for each compartment

Cable Run (self-
ignited cable
fires)
cutting cutting
Total Location
3.90E-03 9.70E-03 1.60E-03 4.40E-03
Frequency (/ry)
Compartment 1
Compartment 2
Compartment 3
12550194 2-61
Transients and Cable Fire (Count, Ignition Source Weighting Factor and Frequency)
Count Weighting Factors Frequency
Cable Quantity
x Maintenance
Maintenance
Cable Fires
Cable Fires
Occupancy
Cable Run
Transients
Transients
Transients
Transients
(106 BTU)
Hotwork
Hotwork
Hotwork
Hotwork
General
General
Storage
Due to
Due to
due to
due to
Control / Aux. / Reactor Building
1 Main Control Room 300 1 10 10 300 0.64 3.5E-01 0.2 2.5E-03 5.6E-04 1.9E-03
2 Aux Bldg El. 0 Ft 6 1 1 1 6 0.09 7.0E-03 0.2 3.5E-04 1.1E-05 1.9E-03
3 Cable Spreading Room 549 1 1 1 549 0.09 6.4E-01 0.2 3.5E-04 1.0E-03 1.9E-03
4A RHR Pump Room 1 1 1 1 1 0.09 1.2E-03 0.2 3.5E-04 1.9E-06 1.9E-03
4B AFW Pump Room 1 1 1 1 1 0.09 1.2E-03 0.2 3.5E-04 1.9E-06 1.9E-03
Total 5 14 14 857 3.90E-03 1.60E-03 9.70E-03
Plant Wide Components
5 Battery Room A 1 1 1 1 1 0.05 4.2E-04 0.03 4.5E-04 8.3E-07 1.5E-04
6 Battery Room B 0 1 1 1 0 0.05 -- 0.03 4.5E-04 -- 1.5E-04
9 SWG Access Room 1.6 1 1 1 1.6 0.05 6.7E-04 0.03 4.5E-04 1.3E-06 1.5E-04
10 Switchgear Room A 10 3 1 3 30 0.11 1.3E-02 0.09 1.1E-03 2.5E-05 4.6E-04
11 Switchgear Room B 80 3 1 3 240 0.11 1.0E-01 0.09 1.1E-03 2.0E-04 4.6E-04
14 Stairway 0 1 1 3 0 0.08 -- 0.03 7.5E-04 -- 1.5E-04
7 Containment 0 1 1 1 0 0.05 -- 0.03 4.5E-04 -- 1.5E-04
8A DG-A Room 218 3 1 1 654 0.08 2.7E-01 0.09 7.5E-04 5.5E-04 4.6E-04
8B DG-B Room 218 3 1 1 654 0.08 2.7E-01 0.09 7.5E-04 5.5E-04 4.6E-04
12 Turbine Bldg El. 0 Ft 80 10 1 3 800 0.21 3.3E-01 0.31 2.1E-03 6.7E-04 1.5E-03
15 Battery Room 1 0 1 1 1 0 0.05 -- 0.03 4.5E-04 -- 1.5E-04
13 Yard 0 1 1 1 0 0.05 -- 0.03 4.5E-04 -- 1.5E-04
14 Intake Structure 6 3 1 1 18 0.08 7.5E-03 0.09 7.5E-04 1.5E-05 4.6E-04
Total 32 13 21 2398.6 9.90E-03 2.00E-03 4.90E-03
12550194 2-62
Ignition Frequencies by Bin and Compartment (part 1 of 2)
Air Compressors
Reactor Coolant
Electric Motors
Transformers
Transformers
Arcing Faults
High Energy
Generators
(Oil filled)
Chargers
Electrical
Cabinets
Batteries
Battery
Pumps
Diesel
Pump
(Dry)
Generic Frequency 7.5E-04 6.1E-03 2.1E-02 2.4E-03 1.8E-03 4.6E-03 4.5E-02 1.5E-03 2.1E-02 9.9E-03 9.9E-03
Compartment and Associated Freq.
1 Main Control Room 1.1E-02 3.3E-04
2 Aux Bldg El. 0 Ft 7.2E-03 2.0E-03 6.0E-03
3 Cable Spreading Room 6.2E-03
4A RHR Pump Room 7.2E-03 2.0E-03 3.0E-03
4B AFW Pump Room 6.4E-03 6.0E-03
5 Battery Room A 4.7E-04 2.5E-04
6 Battery Room B 9.1E-04 2.5E-04
9 SWG Access Room 1.1E-02 9.9E-03
10 Switchgear Room A 1.5E-02 6.0E-04 7.9E-03 3.8E-04 5.0E-03
11 Switchgear Room B 1.7E-02 6.0E-04 7.9E-03 3.8E-04 5.0E-03
14 Stairway 6.6E-04
7 Containment 3.2E-03 6.6E-04 3.0E-03
8A DG-A Room 1.8E-02 1.1E-02
8B DG-B Room 1.8E-02 1.1E-02
12 Turbine Bldg El. 0 Ft 6.5E-02 2.5E-04 2.4E-03 6.0E-04 1.9E-02 7.5E-04 3.0E-03 9.9E-03
15 Battery Room 1 4.5E-04
13 Yard 2.6E-03
14 Intake Structure 1.1E-03
12550194 2-63
Ignition Frequencies by Bin and Compartment (part 2 of 2)
TG Hydrogen
MFW Pumps
Junction Box
Main Control
transformers
TG Exciter
Cable Run
MG Sets
(Others)
TG Oil
Board
Yard
Generic Frequency 2.2E-03 2.5E-03 4.4E-03 1.9E-03 1.6E-03 1.3E-02 9.5E-03 3.9E-03 6.5E-03
Compartment
1 Main Control Room 2.5E-03 9.0E-04
2 Aux Bldg El. 0 Ft 1.8E-05 7.7E-06
3 Cable Spreading Room 1.6E-03 7.1E-04
4A RHR Pump Room 3.0E-06 1.3E-06
4B AFW Pump Room 3.0E-06 1.3E-06
5 Battery Room A 3.0E-06 1.3E-06
6 Battery Room B
9 SWG Access Room 4.8E-06 2.1E-06
10 Switchgear Room A 3.0E-05 1.3E-05
11 Switchgear Room B 2.4E-04 1.0E-04
14 Stairway
7 Containment
8A DG-A Room 6.5E-04 2.8E-04
8B DG-B Room 6.5E-04 2.8E-04
12 Turbine Bldg El. 0 Ft 2.4E-04 1.0E-04 9.5E-03 3.9E-03 6.5E-03
15 Battery Room 1
13 Yard 2.2E-03
14 Intake Structure 1.8E-05 7.7E-06
12550194 2-64
SESSION 3: Scoping Fire Modeling
12550194 2-65
Slide 1 Notes:
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
METHODOLOGY
___________________________________
Module III: Scoping Fire Modeling Task 8
and Appendix F ___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
Bethesda, MD
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
Slide 2 Notes:
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
SCOPING FIRE MODELING
Objectives ___________________________________
___________________________________
The objectives of this module are:
___________________________________
• Describe the process of screening ignition sources
___________________________________
• Describe the concept of zone of influence (ZOI)
___________________________________
• Describe the recommended walk down
___________________________________
• Review the walk down forms
___________________________________
• Describe how to update the fire ignition frequencies ___________________________________
calculated in Task 6 with the screening results
___________________________________
___________________________________
Module #: Scoping Fire Modeling Task 8 & Appendix F
___________________________________
___________________________________
12550194 2-66
Slide 3 Notes:
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
Interfaces ___________________________________
___________________________________
• Inputs for this task
– PRA equipment list, Task 2 ___________________________________
– List of ignition sources in each compartment, Task 6
– Room geometry ___________________________________
– Types of ignition sources and targets
___________________________________
• Output from this task
___________________________________
– Revised compartment fire ignition frequencies
– List of potential fire scenarios to be analyzed in Task 11 ___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
Slide 4 Notes:
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
Screening Ignition Sources ___________________________________
___________________________________
Any ignition source can be screened if a postulated fire will
not damage or ignited equipment in the compartment. ___________________________________
• By screening the ignition source, its frequency contribution

___________________________________
is eliminated, reducing the compartment frequency. ___________________________________
• It is recommended to use the 98th percentile of the ___________________________________

probability distributions for peak HRR. ___________________________________
• A walk down is strongly recommended. ___________________________________

___________________________________
___________________________________
Slide 4
Module #: Scoping Fire Modeling Task 8 & Appendix F Research (RES) & Electric Power Research Institute (EPRI)
___________________________________
___________________________________
12550194 2-67
Slide 5

The Zone of Influence (ZOI)
The zone of influence is the region in the compartment where a

target will be damaged if exposed to fire conditions generated by a
specific ignition source.
• The ZOI has 5 distinct regions:

– Flames
– The fire plume
– The ceiling jet
– The hot gas layer
– Flame radiation region
Slide 5
Notes:
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
12550194 2-68
Slide 6 Notes:
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
Task 8: Recommended Steps ___________________________________
___________________________________
5 steps for conducting Task 8
___________________________________
1. Preparation for walk down
___________________________________
2. Plant walk down and screen ignition sources
___________________________________
3. Verification of screened ignition sources
___________________________________
4. Calculation of severity factors ___________________________________
5. Calculation of revised fire frequency ___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
Slide 6
___________________________________
___________________________________
Slide 7 Notes:
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
Step 1: Preparation for Walk down ___________________________________
It is recommended that walk down forms are prepared for each

___________________________________
compartment to be visited
___________________________________
• Create a list of ignition sources in each compartment.
– Equipment counted in Task 6 ___________________________________
– Flag equipment in the PRA equipment list created in Task 2
– Assigned a HRR to each ignition source (98th percentile of the pdf) ___________________________________
• Workshop Problem 08-01
___________________________________
• Collect damage criteria information for the equipment in the
room
– Qualified/Unqualified cables, solid state equipment etc. ___________________________________
• Workshop Problem 08-02
___________________________________
• Develop and document zone of influences in each
compartment ___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
12550194 2-69
Slide 8

Step 1: Example of ZOI Form
Slide 8
Notes:
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
12550194 2-70
Slide 9

Step 1: Alternative Models for Zone of Influence
• Smoke or hot gas layer: MQH model

13
⎛ Q& 2f ⎞
T = Tamb + 6.85 ⋅ ⎜ ⎟
⎜A H h A ⎟
⎝ o o k T ⎠
⎧ k ⋅ dm ⋅ cp
⎪⎪ t < tp th 2
hk = ⎨ t tp =
⎛ ⎞
⎪ 4⋅⎜ k
( )
k
t ≥ tp ⋅ ⎟
⎩⎪ th ⎝ d m c p ⎠
Input Parameters:
Tamb: Ambient temperature (oC)
Qf: Fire heat release rate (kW)
Ao: Opening area (or sum of opening areas) (m2)
Ho: Height of opening [m]
AT: Internal surface area of the room (not including opening area) (m2)
k: Thermal conductivity of wall material (kW/m-oC)
dm: Density of wall material (kg/m3)
cp: Specific heat of wall material (kJ/kg-oC)
th: Wall thickness (m)
t: Time value (sec)
Notes:
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
12550194 2-71
Slide 10

Step 1: Example Calculation for Room Temperature
MQH Temperature Correlation
Inputs
Ambient temperature [C] 20
13
⎛ Q& 2f ⎞ Duration [sec] 1200
T = Tamb + 6.85 ⋅ ⎜ ⎟ Opening area [m2] 3
⎜A H h A ⎟ Height of opening [m] 3
⎝ o o k T ⎠
Room length [m] 37
⎧ k ⋅ dm ⋅ cp Room width [m] 37
⎪⎪ t < tp th 2
hk = ⎨ t tp = Room height [m] 8
⎛ ⎞ Thermal conductivity [kW/mK] 0.0014
⎪ 4⋅⎜ k
( )
k
t ≥ tp ⋅ ⎟
⎪⎩ th ⎝ d m c p ⎠ Density [kg/m3] 2000
Specific heat [kJ/kg] 0.88
Wall thickness [m] 0.6
HRR [kW] 9500
Results
Room Temp [C] 327
Notes:
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
12550194 2-72
Slide 11

• Flame height and fire plume: Heskestad’s models
L = 0.235Q& f 5 − 1.02 D
2
Input Parameters:
D: Fire diameter (m)
( )
53
⎛ k Q& (1 − χ ) 2 5 ⎞
T pl = Tamb + 25⎜ ⎟
f f r
⎜ ((H p − Fe ) − z o ) ⎟
⎝ ⎠
z o = 0.083Q& f 5 − 1.02 D
2
Input Parameters:
Tamb: Ambient temperature (oC)
kf: Fire location factor
Fe: Fire elevation (m)
Hp: Target height measured from the floor (m)
Xr: Irradiated fraction of the heat release rate (FIVE recommends 0.4)
D: Plume diameter (m)
Notes:
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
12550194 2-73
Slide 12

Step 1: Example Calcs for Flame Height and Plume Temp
( )
53
⎛ k Q& (1 − χ ) 2 5 ⎞
T pl = Tamb + 25⎜ ⎟
f f r
L = 0.235Q& f 5 − 1.02 D ⎜ ((H p − Fe ) − z o ) ⎟
2
⎝ ⎠
z o = 0.083Q& f 5 − 1.02 D
2
Heskestad's Plume Temperature Correlatio
Inputs
Heskdestad's Flame Height Correlation Ambient temperature [C] 20
Fire location factor 1
Inputs HRR [kW] 1375
Fire diameter [m] 0.6 Fire elevation [m] 0
HRR [kW] 250 Target Elevation [m] 3.7
Radiation Fraction 0.40
Results [m] Fire Diameter [m] 1
Flame height [m] 1.5
Results
Plume Temp [C] 328
Notes:
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
12550194 2-74
Slide 13 Notes:
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
Step 1: Related FAQ ___________________________________
___________________________________
• FAQ 08-0043
– Issue: ___________________________________
• Guidance for placement of a cabinet fire (the source location) suggests
inspecting cabinet contents and placing fire at fuel location ___________________________________
• Applicants would prefer a “one size” approach less conservative than
placing on top of cabinet that would not require internal inspection
___________________________________
• RES/EPRI teams are debating merits of general application of fire ___________________________________
protection SDP approach – place fire 1 foot below cabinet top (unless top
is unsealed or vented)
___________________________________
– Status: Open
• Team position has been drafted and is under review ___________________________________
• Staff final review pending
___________________________________
___________________________________
Slide 13
___________________________________
___________________________________
12550194 2-75
Slide 14

• Flame Radiation: Point Source Model
Q& f χ r
′′ =
q&irr
4πR 2
Input Parameters:
R: Distance from flames (m)
Xr: Irradiated fraction of the heat release rate (FIVE recommends 0.4)
D: Fire diameter (m)
Notes:
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
12550194 2-76
Slide 15

Step 1: Example calculation for flame radiation
Q& f χ r
′′ =
q&irr
4πR 2
Point Source Flame Radiation Model
Inputs
Fire heat release rate [kW] 317
Radiation fraction 0.40
Distance from flames [m] 1.5
Results
Heat flux [kW/m2] 4.5
• Workshop problem 08-03

Slide 15
Notes:
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
12550194 2-77
Slide 16 Notes:
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
Step 2: Plant Walk down and Screening IS ___________________________________
During the walk down, equipment in the room is subjected to

___________________________________
fire conditions from each ignition source using the ZOI. ___________________________________
• Take the opportunity to verify & improve task 6 counting
• Document location of ignition sources and reasons for screen/no- ___________________________________
screen decisions
___________________________________
• If ignition sources are not screened, document location of affected
equipment and which fire generated condition affected it. ___________________________________
• Do not screen:
– Oil fires
___________________________________
– Cables
___________________________________
– Interconnected cabinets
• Workshop problem 08-04 ___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
Slide 17 Notes:
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
Step 3: Verification of Screened IS ___________________________________
It is important to verify that fire damage to the ignition source

___________________________________
itself is not risk significant
___________________________________
1. Do not screen equipment in the PRA equipment list
2. If loss of the ignition source results in a trip (automatic or ___________________________________
manual) but no equipment contributing to the CCDP are
lost, compare the ignition source fire frequency with the ___________________________________
random frequency of the trip it causes.
___________________________________
3. If loss of the ignition source results in both a trip (automatic
or manual) and loss of one or more components ___________________________________
contributing to the CCDP, add a fire-induced sequence
using the ignition source fire frequency and the ___________________________________
corresponding CCDP model with the damaged components
set to fail. ___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
12550194 2-78
Slide 18 Notes:
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
Task 8: Calculation of Severity Factors ___________________________________
___________________________________
For each unscreened ignition source, calculate the severity
factor using the appropriate probability distribution for peak ___________________________________
HRR.
___________________________________
• Determine the heat release rate required for damaging
equipment ___________________________________
• This require information gathered during the walk downs! ___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
12550194 2-79
Slide 19

Task 8: Calculation of Severity Factors
Pr
Gamma distribution
Severity factor
Q critical Q (kW)
HRR Gamma
kW (Btu/s) Distribution
Case Ignition Source HRR 98th α β
Vertical cabinets with qualified cable, fire limited
1 69 211 0.84 59.3
to one cable bundle
Vertical cabinets with qualified cable, fire in
2 211 702 0.7 216
more than one cable bundle
Vertical cabinets with unqualified cable, fire
3 90 211 1.6 41.5
limited to one cable bundle
Vertical cabinets with unqualified cable, fire in
4 232 464 2.6 67.8
more than one cable bundle closed doors
Vertical cabinets with unqualified cable, fire in
5 232 1002 0.46 386
more than one cable bundle open doors
6 Pumps (electrical fires) 69 211 0.84 59.3
7 Motors 32 69 2 11.7
8 Transient Combustibles 142 317 1.8 57.4 • Workshop problem 08-05
Slide 19
Notes:
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
12550194 2-80
Slide 20

Task 8: Calculation of Revised Fire Frequency
Slide 20
Notes:
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
12550194 2-81
Slide 21 Notes:
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
Task 8 is intended for screening fixed ignition sources. As a ___________________________________

result of the screening, the compartment frequencies may be
reduced, and a preliminary list of potential fire scenarios for ___________________________________
detailed evaluation in Task 11 is developed.
___________________________________
• A detailed walk down is recommended
___________________________________
• Analysts should take the opportunity to review the ___________________________________
equipment count made for task 6 and/or improve it.
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
Slide 21
___________________________________
___________________________________
12550194 2-82
SESSION 4: Heat Release Rate
12550194 2-83
Slide 1 Notes:
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
METHODOLOGY
___________________________________
Module III: Heat Release Rates ___________________________________
Appendix G
___________________________________
___________________________________
Bethesda, MD
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
Slide 2 Notes:
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
HEAT RELEASE RATES
Objectives ___________________________________
___________________________________
1. Define heat release rate and heat release rate profile ___________________________________
2. Review the recommended peak heat release rate values ___________________________________
for typical ignition sources in NPP
___________________________________
3. Describe the method provided for developing heat release
rate profiles for fixed and transient ignition sources in NPP ___________________________________
NOTE: Appendix G recommends values for ignition sources

___________________________________
only. Heat release rates associated with fires propagating
outside of the ignition source have to be evaluated ___________________________________
accordingly.
___________________________________
___________________________________
Joint Fire PRA course, Sept. & Nov. 2008 Slide 2
Module III: Heat Release Rates Appendix G Research (RES) & Electric Power Research Institute (EPRI)
___________________________________
___________________________________
12550194 2-84
Slide 3
HEAT RELEASE RATES

Definition
Definition: Heat generated by a burning object per unit time.

• Q& = m & ′′ ⋅ ΔH c ⋅ A BTU/sec or KW
• m” is burning rate [kg/s-m2], ΔHc is heat of comb [kJ/kg], A is
area [m2]
• Equivalent terms: energy release rate, fire intensity, fire
power
• HRR profile describes fire intensity (Q) as a function of time
Peak
Developed
Q
Growth
Decay
Incipient
Fully
Time
Joint Fire PRA course, Sept. & Nov. 2008 A Collaboration of U.S. NRC Office of Nuclear Regulatory
Slide 3
Notes:
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
12550194 2-85
Slide 4 Notes:
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
HEAT RELEASE RATES
HRR Profile ___________________________________
The HRR profile can be expressed as a constant or as a ___________________________________
function of time
• Incipient stage: Not recommended to be modeled ___________________________________
– Duration and intensity are uncertain
• Growth: Depends on the fuel and geometry of the scenario
___________________________________
– Based on engineering judgment and/or experimental observations
___________________________________
• Fully developed: Usually after the fire reaches its peak
intensity ___________________________________
– Also known as steady burning
– Starts at ignition if the growth period is not considered ___________________________________
– A constant fire intensity should the the peak heat release rate of the
profile ___________________________________
• Decay: In general, less hazardous conditions than the growth
and fully developed stage ___________________________________
___________________________________
Slide 4
___________________________________
___________________________________
Slide 5 Notes:
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
HEAT RELEASE RATES
HRR Profile – Related FAQs ___________________________________
___________________________________
• FAQ 08-0045 Cabinet Fires (Status: Open) ___________________________________
– Issue:
• Fire growth recommendations for electrical cabinets does not include ___________________________________
consideration of an incipient stage (e.g., pre-ignition heating and
generation of un-burned pyrolysates which might be detected) ___________________________________
• No clear resolution approach has yet been developed ___________________________________
– Status:
• A problem statement has been generated ___________________________________
• FAQ may be withdrawn - not amenable to short-term solution
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
12550194 2-86
Slide 6 Notes:
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
HEAT RELEASE RATES
HRR Profile – Related FAQs (continued) ___________________________________
___________________________________
• FAQ 08-0052 Transient Fires (Status: Open) ___________________________________
– Issue:
• No guidance on fire growth times for transient fires ___________________________________
• Guidance not clear as to which non-suppression curve would apply to
transient fires in the MCR (i.e., transient curve or MCR curve) ___________________________________
• Review existing test data and develop guidance for transient fire
___________________________________
growth times
• Clarify non-suppression curve application for this case ___________________________________
– Status:
• Initial team position drafted and undergoing review within the teams
___________________________________
• Staff and industry reviews pending
___________________________________
___________________________________
Slide 6
___________________________________
___________________________________
Slide 7 Notes:
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
HEAT RELEASE RATES
HRR Profile – Related FAQs (continued) ___________________________________
___________________________________
• FAQ 08-0044 Pump Oil Fires (Status: Open) ___________________________________
– Issue:
• Guidance for large oil spill and fire is generating conservative results ___________________________________
especially in the case of MFW pump fires (high frequency of large
release compared to experience base)
___________________________________
• Provide an alternative approach and revised fire frequencies for leaks
and spills from higher volume circulating oil/lubrication systems ___________________________________
– Status:
• General consensus that a revised treatment is appropriate and ___________________________________
needed
• RES/EPRI team discussion of the specific resolution approach ___________________________________
continues, reviews ongoing
• NRC 805 team and industry 805 task force reviews pending
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
12550194 2-87
Slide 8 Notes:
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
HEAT RELEASE RATES
Fixed Ignition Sources ___________________________________
The methodology recommends heat release rate values for ___________________________________

various fixed ignition sources
___________________________________
• Vertical cabinets
– Open/closed ___________________________________
– Qualified/Unqualified cables
___________________________________
• Pumps (electrical fires)
• Electric motors ___________________________________
• HRR for flammable liquid fires should be calculated ___________________________________
as Q& = m& ′′ ⋅ ΔH c ⋅ A
___________________________________
• Separate guidance for cables, pressurized oil and hydrogen
fires ___________________________________
___________________________________
Slide 8
___________________________________
___________________________________
Slide 9 Notes:
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
HEAT RELEASE RATES
Recommended Peak HRR Values ___________________________________
Recommended peak HRR values were developed based on ___________________________________

expert judgment
___________________________________
• Expert panel included the EPRI/NRC-RES Fire Risk Re-
quantification Study research team with expertise in fire ___________________________________
behavior/phenomena.
• Values are expressed as probability distributions. The panel ___________________________________
identified the 75th and 98th percentiles of the distribution for
peak HRR. ___________________________________
• Primary sources of information included NUREG/CR 4527
and VTT publications ___________________________________
• Gamma distribution selected:
___________________________________
– Only positive values starting at 0 kW
– Values in the same order of magnitude ___________________________________
___________________________________
Slide 9
___________________________________
___________________________________
12550194 2-88
Slide 10
HEAT RELEASE RATES

Recommended Peak HRR Values
Example distribution developed

by the expert panel Peak HRR Distribution
• 75th = 232 kW
• 98th = 464 kW
• α = 2.6
• β = 67.8
0 500 1000
HRR
Slide 10
Notes:
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12550194 2-89
Slide 11
HEAT RELEASE RATES

Recommended Peak HRR Values
*See report for footnotes
Slide 11
Notes:
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12550194 2-90
Slide 12
HEAT RELEASE RATES

Fire Growth in Electrical Cabinets
The methodology suggests a fire

growth rate for electrical cabinet
fires
• The fire grows to its peak HRR

in approximately 12 min
• The fire burns at its peak HRR

for approximately 8 min
• Based on experiments reported

in NUREG/CR4527
Slide 12
Notes:
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____________________________________________________________________________
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____________________________________________________________________________
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12550194 2-91
Slide 13
HEAT RELEASE RATES

Fire Growth in Electrical Cabinets
The t2 function is recommended for modeling the growth phase of

the fire ⎛ 2
⎞ ⎛t⎞
Q& (t ) = Min⎜ Q& peak ,Q& peak ⋅ ⎜ ⎟ ⎟
⎜ ⎝ τ ⎠ ⎟⎠
⎝
Heat Release Rate
Peak HRR
kW
τ = time to
peak
0 5 10 15 20
Time [min]
Module III: Heat Release Rates Appendix G
Notes:
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12550194 2-92
Slide 14 Notes:
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
HEAT RELEASE RATES
Assigning HRR Values to Electrical Cabinets ___________________________________
A visual examination of the interior of the cabinet is

___________________________________
recommended
___________________________________
• Identify openings in the cabinet walls
___________________________________
• Identify type of cable: qualified/unqualified
___________________________________
• Identify cable bundles
___________________________________
• Qualitatively determine if a fire can propagate from one
bundle to another ___________________________________
• Select the appropriate peak HRR probability distribution ___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
12550194 2-93
Slide 15
HEAT RELEASE RATES

Examples
By visual examination:
• More than one cable bundle
• Assuming qualified cable, select distribution with 75th = 211
kW, 98th =702 kW
Slide 15
Notes:
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12550194 2-94
Slide 16
HEAT RELEASE RATES

Examples
By visual examination:
• Only one cable bundle
• Assuming qualified cable, select distribution with 75th = 69
kW, 98th = 211 kW
Module III: Heat Release Rates Appendix G
Notes:
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____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
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12550194 2-95
Slide 17 Notes:
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
HEAT RELEASE RATES
Transient Ignition Sources ___________________________________
___________________________________
The peak HRR for transient fires is also characterized with a
gamma probability distribution ___________________________________
• Gamma distribution:
___________________________________
– 75th = 135 BTU/s, 98th = 300 BTU/s
– α = 1.9, β = 53.7 ___________________________________
• Applicable only to localized transient combustibles (trash ___________________________________
cans, etc.)
___________________________________
• Not applicable to flammable liquid transient fires
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
Slide 17
___________________________________
___________________________________
Slide 18 Notes:
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
HEAT RELEASE RATES
___________________________________
Peak HRR values are recommended for some typical fixed
and transient ignition sources in NPP fire scenarios ___________________________________
• Values are for localized ignition source (not for fires
___________________________________
propagating outside the ignition source)
• HRR for flammable liquid fires can be calculated from

___________________________________
fundamental equations ___________________________________
• HRR for “solid” ignition sources are generally expressed as ___________________________________
probability distributions based on experimental data and
expert judgment ___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
Slide 18
___________________________________
___________________________________
12550194 2-96
SESSION 5: Fire Severity
12550194 2-97
Slide 1 Notes:
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
METHODOLOGY
___________________________________
Module III: Fire Severity ___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
Joint RES/EPRI Public Workshop ___________________________________
September 2008
Washington DC
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
Slide 2 Notes:
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
FIRE SEVERITY
Purpose ___________________________________
___________________________________
• A uniform methodology has been developed to define the
severity of a fire. ___________________________________
– Severity factor concept
___________________________________
– Based on heat release rate
___________________________________
– Standardized cases
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
Slide 2
Module III: Fire Severity Research (RES) & Electric Power Research Institute (EPRI)
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
12550194 2-98
Slide 3 Notes:
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
FIRE SEVERITY
Severity Factor Concept ___________________________________
___________________________________
• Severity Factor is . .
– A simplified, one parameter representation of a very complex

___________________________________
phenomenon (i.e., fire) influenced by a large number of factors.
___________________________________
– Defined as the conditional probability that given a fire has occurred,
it is of certain severity (it is defined here through heat release rate). ___________________________________
– Quantified in combination with Non-Suppression Probability. ___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
Slide 3
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
12550194 2-99
Slide 4
FIRE SEVERITY
Severity Factor Concept (cont’d)
The combination of Severity and Non-Suppression Factors

are calculated from the following equation:
dPdam (t )
SFk ⋅ PNS ,k = ∫
All t damage
dt
Psup p (tsup p > t )dt
Where:
Pdam(t) : The probability of target set damage before time t.
Psupp (tsupp > t): Probability of suppression taking place after time t
Slide 4
Notes:
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12550194 2-100
Slide 5
FIRE SEVERITY
Probability of Damage Estimation
• Probability of damage before time t is estimated using

complex fire spread and propagation models.
– Heat release rate is a key parameter of the analysis
– Assuming a known heat release rate, specific features of the
compartment, ignition source, and target set configuration, time to
damage can be calculated.
– Since heat release rate is expressed with a probability distribution,
the time to damage can be expressed with a probability distribution
Probability Density
Probability Density
Heat Release Rate (HRR) Time to Damage (t)
Module III: Fire Severity
Notes:
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
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____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
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12550194 2-101
Slide 6
FIRE SEVERITY
Severity Factor Estimation Process
Severity factor is estimated using discretized probability

distributions for heat release rate and non-suppression.
P3 P3
Probability Density
P4 P4
P2 P2
P5 P5
Probability
P1
Probability
P1
Pn Pn
. . . .\ . . . . .\ .
HRR1 HRR2 HRR3 HRR4 HRR5 . . . . . HRRn

Heat Release Rate (HRR) t1 t 2 t 3 t4 t 5 .. tn
Heat Release Rate
Time
HeattoRelease
Damage (t)
Rate
Probability
Time to Suppress (tNS)
HRR Values HRR1 HRR2 HRR3 HRR4 .... HRRn
Individual Severity Factor P1 P2 P3 P4 .... Pn
Time to damage t1 t2 t3 t4 .... tn
Prob. of supp. after damage PNS1 PNS2 PNS3 PNS4 .... PNSn
Notes:
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
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12550194 2-102
Slide 7
FIRE SEVERITY
Heat Release Rate Distributions
The heat release rate of the following equipment classes

have been defined:
HRR (Btu/s)
Case Ignition Source
75th 98th
1 Vertical cabinets with qualified cable, fire limited to 65 200
one cable bundle
2 Vertical cabinets with qualified cable, fire in more 200 665
than one cable bundle
3 Vertical cabinets with unqualified cable, fire limited 85 200
to one cable bundle
4 Vertical cabinets with unqualified cable, fire in more 220 440
than one cable bundle closed doors
5 Vertical cabinets with unqualified cable, fire in more 220 950
than one cable bundle open doors
6 Pumps (electrical fires) 65 200
7 Motors 30 65
8 Transient Combustibles 135 300
Notes:
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____________________________________________________________________________
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12550194 2-103
Slide 8
FIRE SEVERITY
Heat Release Rate Distribution - Example
Table E-1
HRR Distribution for Vertical Cabinets with Qualified Cables, Fire
Limited to One Cable Bundle
Heat Release Rate (Btu/s) Severity Factor
Bin
Lower Upper Point Value (Pi)
1 0 25 10.5 0.446
2 25 50 36 0.219
3 50 75 61 0.129
4 75 100 87 0.078
5 100 125 112 0.048
6 125 150 137 0.030
7 150 175 162 0.019
8 175 200 187 0.012
9 200 225 212 0.007
10 225 250 237 0.005
11 250 275 262 0.003
12 275 300 287 0.002
13 300 325 312 0.001
14 325 350 337 0.001
15 350 Infinity 405 0.001
Notes:
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12550194 2-104
Slide 9 Notes:
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
FIRE SEVERITY ___________________________________
Severity Factor for Oil Spill Fires
___________________________________
• The severity factor for oil spills are recommended to be
established from the following steps: ___________________________________
1. Determine the amount of oil that can be spilled in the room. ___________________________________
2. Assign a severity factor of 0.02 to a scenario consisting of 98% or ___________________________________
more of the amount of oil spilled and ignited.
___________________________________
3. Assign a severity factor of 0.98 to a scenario consisting of 10% of
the amount of oil spilled and ignited.
___________________________________
• This approach is being revisited in FAQ 07-0044. ___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
Slide 10 Notes:
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
FIRE SEVERITY
Severity Factor for Other Ignition Sources ___________________________________
• The following notes address ignition sources not covered in

___________________________________
the preceding discussions: ___________________________________
– Cable fires:
• Heat release rate is established using fire propagation modeling
• Severity factor = 1.0 may be used where target damage can be
___________________________________
ascertained
– High-energy arcing faults: ___________________________________
• Severity factor = 1.0 within zone of influence
– Catastrophic transformer fires in the transformer yard : ___________________________________
• Severity factor = 1.0 within zone of influence
– Non-catastrophic transformer fires in the transformer yard : ___________________________________
• Generally not modeled, otherwise use severity factor = 1.0 within zone of
influence
– Other fires in the transformer yard:
___________________________________
• Depending on the item burning, the heat release rate of similar devices
may be used. ___________________________________
Slide 10
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
12550194 2-105
Slide 11
FIRE SEVERITY
Frequency Bins and HRR Distributions
Table 11-1
Recommended Severity Factors . . . for Ignition Sources in the Frequency
Model
ID Location Ignition Source HRR Distribution Category
1 Battery Room Batteries Electric motors
2 Containment Reactor coolant Pump Pumps (Electrical)/Oil spills
(PWR)
4a Control Room Electrical cabinets Applicable electrical cabinet

4b Control Room Main control board See Appendix L
5 Control/Auxiliary/ Cable fires caused by Assume 1.0
Reactor Building welding and cutting
6 Control/Auxiliary/ Transient fires caused Transients
Reactor Building by welding and cutting
21 Plant-Wide Pumps Pump (Electrical)/Oil spills

Components
Notes:
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12550194 2-106
Slide 12 Notes:
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
FIRE SEVERITY
___________________________________
• Severity Factor provides an adjustment to ignition frequency
to account for the severity of the fire. ___________________________________
– It is tied to the heat release rate ___________________________________
– It is estimated in concert with probability of non-suppression

___________________________________
___________________________________
– Specific cases have been developed
___________________________________
– Guidance is provided for other cases
___________________________________
___________________________________
Slide 12
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
12550194 2-107
SESSION 6a: Damage Criteria
12550194 2-108
Slide 1 Notes:
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
METHODOLOGY
___________________________________
Module III: Damage Criteria ___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
Bethesda, MD ___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
Slide 2 Notes:
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
Damage Criteria
Damage Thresholds ___________________________________
___________________________________
• Damage (or Failure) Threshold: the minimum value of an
exposure environment parameter that can lead to the failure ___________________________________
of the damage target of interest within the timescale of the
fire ___________________________________
– Can be a temperature – exposure to high temperatures such as in a
hot gas layer or fire plume
___________________________________
– Can be a radiant heat flux – generally due to direct radiant heating ___________________________________
from the luminous flame zone of a fire
___________________________________
– In theory, it could be a minimum smoke density, but we aren’t that
smart (more on smoke shortly) ___________________________________
___________________________________
Slide 2
Module III: Damage Criteria Research (RES) & Electric Power Research Institute (EPRI)
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
12550194 2-109
Slide 3 Notes:
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
Damage Criteria
___________________________________
• Damage thresholds are of primary interest to Task 8 –
Scoping Fire Modeling ___________________________________
– We use damage thresholds mainly when screening out specific fire ___________________________________
ignition sources
• If a fire source cannot damage any target, or ignite any secondary
combustible, then we screen that source out of the analysis as non-
___________________________________
threatening (more on Task 8 later)
___________________________________
– Also Note: If an electrical cable is damaged, we assume that it will
also be ignited ___________________________________
• Arcing when a cable short circuits will ignite the cable based on testing
experience ___________________________________
___________________________________
Module III: Damage Criteria
Slide 3
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
Slide 4 Notes:
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
Damage Criteria
___________________________________
• Damage Threshold is specific to the damage target and
procedure deals mainly with the following: ___________________________________
– Electrical Cables
• Thermoset ___________________________________
• Thermoplastic
– Electronics and integrated circuit devices ___________________________________
___________________________________
• For other devices (e.g., motors, switchgear, etc.) look at the
cables and supporting controls or electronics ___________________________________
– Example: A pump is fed by power cables, and those cables are
generally more vulnerable to fire damage than the pump itself ___________________________________
___________________________________
Slide 4
___________________________________
___________________________________
12550194 2-110
Slide 5 Notes:
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
Damage Criteria
___________________________________
• Some items are considered invulnerable to fire-induced
damage: ___________________________________
– Ferrous metal pipes and tanks
– Passive components such as flow check valves ___________________________________
– Concrete structural or partitioning elements except when considering
random failure likelihood in multi-compartment scenarios ___________________________________
• i.e., we do not consider fire-induced structural failure of concrete
___________________________________
• Things you still need to watch for:
– Soldered piping (e.g., air/gas lines that are soldered copper) ___________________________________
– Flexible boots/joints/sleeves on piping (e.g., the Vandellos scenario)
– Exposed structural steel given a very large fire source (e.g., ___________________________________
catastrophic loss of the main TG set – more later)
___________________________________
Slide 5
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
12550194 2-111
Slide 6
Damage Criteria
Damage Thresholds
• The following are defined as generic damage thresholds for

the most common damage targets – cables:
Table H-1‎ Damage Criteria for Electrical Cables – Generic
Screening Criteria for the Assessment of the Ignition and Damage
Potential of Electrical Cables [See Ref 8-1]
Radiant Heating Criteria Temperature Criteria

Cable Type
Thermoplastic 6 kW/m2 (0.5 BTU/ft2s) 205°C (400°F)
Thermoset 11 kW/m2 (1.0 BTU/ft2s) 330°C (625°F)
• And electronics:
– 3 kW/m2 (0.25 BTU/ft2) and 65oC (150°F)
– If needed, assume ignition properties same as thermoplastic cables:
6 kW/m2 (0.5 BTU/ft2) and 205oC (400°F).
Notes:
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12550194 2-112
Slide 7 Notes:
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
Damage Criteria
___________________________________
• For additional rules related to damage criteria, see H.1.1;
e.g.: ___________________________________
– Cables in conduit: potential damage targets, but will not contribute to ___________________________________
fire growth and spread – no credit to conduit for delaying the onset of
thermal damage. ___________________________________
– Cables coated by a fire-retardant coating: treat as exposed cables for ___________________________________
damage purposes – coating may slow the subsequent spread of fire,
but we are NOT specific here. ___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
Slide 7
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
12550194 2-113
Slide 8
Damage Criteria
Damage Thresholds
• Plant-specific or product-specific damage thresholds may

be used if appropriate basis is established
– Report provides some references for information specific to many
popular types and brands of cables
– Example:
Slide 8
Notes:
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12550194 2-114
Slide 9 Notes:
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
Damage Criteria
Damage Time ___________________________________
___________________________________
• It is both appropriate and desirable to consider damage time
during Task 11 – Detailed Fire Modeling ___________________________________
– At the threshold exposure condition, damage times may be
prolonged (e.g., 30 minutes or more)
___________________________________
– As exposure conditions increase in severity, time to damage ___________________________________

decreases (e.g., to as little as a few seconds)
___________________________________
– Consideration of time to damage allows for a more realistic
assessment of the non-suppression probability ___________________________________
• How long do you have to put the fire out before damage occurs?
___________________________________
___________________________________
Slide 9
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
Slide 10 Notes:
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
Damage Criteria
Damage Time ___________________________________
___________________________________
• Two general approaches to damage time analysis:
– Direct modeling of target thermal response

___________________________________
• Use a fire model to predict the temperature response of the target
___________________________________
• When the predicted temperature of the target reaches the damage
threshold, assume target failure
• Catch: need fire model that does target response calculation
___________________________________
– Empirical approach (e.g. SDP) ___________________________________

• Predict the peak exposure condition (temperature or heat flux)
• Use a look-up table to estimate time to damage
___________________________________
• Catch: look-up tables currently only available for generic thermoset and
thermoplastic cables ___________________________________
___________________________________
Slide 10
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
12550194 2-115
Slide 11
Damage Criteria
Damage Time
• Example of the Table H-5: Failure Time-Temperature Relationship for

Time to Damage Thermoset cables (Table A.7.1 from reference H.6).
Exposure Temperature Time to Failure
look-up tables: (minutes)
oC oF
330 625 28
350 660 13
370 700 9
390 735 7
410 770 5
430 805 4
450 840 3
470 880 2
490 (or greater) 915 (or greater) 1
Slide 11
Notes:
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12550194 2-116
Slide 12 Notes:
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
Damage Criteria
Smoke Damage ___________________________________
___________________________________
• Appendix T provides an extended discussion of current
knowledge regarding smoke damage ___________________________________
– This is about smoke and the failure of equipment
– It is not about the impact of smoke on people ___________________________________
___________________________________
• We are interested in short-term damage
– Within the time scale of the fire scenario including plant shutdown ___________________________________
– We do not consider longer term issues such as corrosion leading to
failure some days or weeks after a fire ___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
Slide 12
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
Slide 13 Notes:
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
Damage Criteria
Smoke Damage ___________________________________
___________________________________
• Bottom Line: Some components are known to be vulnerable
to smoke damage, but it takes a dense exposure to cause ___________________________________
short term damage
___________________________________
• So what are the vulnerable components?
– High voltage switching equipment (arcing) ___________________________________
– High voltage transmission lines (arcing)
– Devices such as strip chart recorders that are dependent on fine
___________________________________
mechanical motion (binding)
___________________________________
– Un-protected printed circuit cards (deposition and shorting)
• e.g., exposed within a panel and not provided with a protective coating ___________________________________
___________________________________
Slide 13
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
12550194 2-117
Slide 14 Notes:
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
Damage Criteria
Smoke Damage ___________________________________
___________________________________
• Smoke damage is assessed on an empirical basis:
___________________________________
– We don’t set quantitative thresholds
___________________________________
– We don’t try to use fire models
___________________________________
– You should consider the potential failure of vulnerable ___________________________________
components due to smoke as a part of your damage target set
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
Slide 14
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
Slide 15 Notes:
___________________________________
___________________________________
Damage Criteria
Smoke Damage ___________________________________
___________________________________
• Assume that vulnerable components adjacent to or
connected to the fire source will be damaged by smoke: ___________________________________
– Within the same electrical cabinet or housing as a fire source
___________________________________
• e.g. given a panel fire, the whole panel is lost due to smoke and/or heat
– In an adjacent cabinet if the cabinet-to-cabinet partitions is not well-

___________________________________
sealed
___________________________________
– In a common stack of electrical cubicles
___________________________________
– In a nearby cabinet with a direct connection to the fire source
• e.g., a shared or common bus-duct ___________________________________
___________________________________
Slide 15
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
12550194 2-118
12550194 2-119
Workshop Problems on Task 8: Scoping Fire Modeling
This handout includes workshop problems on the different steps of Task 8: Scoping Fire
Modeling. Problems are grouped by steps.
Step 1: Preparation for Walkdown

Step 1 has three sub-steps: 1) Estimate heat release rate for fixed ignition source screening, 2)
Target and intervening combustibles damage or ignition criteria, and 3) Develop a zone of
influence.
Workshop problem 08-01:
Step 1.1: Estimate heat release rate for fixed ignition source screening: Assign a heat
release rate to the ignition sources depicted in the pictures of the following Table 08-01. For
this exercise, assume that the plant has a mix of qualified and unqualified cables. The heat
release rates are listed in Table E-1 of NUREG/CR-6850.
Table 08-01: Inputs for Workshop problems 1
98th Percentile
Ignition Source Table E-1 Case Justification
HRR
Dry transformer
Fire protection panel
Ventilation sub-system
12550194 2-120
98th Percentile
HRR
Pumps
12550194 2-121
Workshop Problem Set 08-02:
Step 1.2: Target and intervening combustible damage and ignition criteria: Assign
damage criteria to the ignition sources depicted in Table 08-01. For this exercise, assume that
the plant has a mix of thermoset and thermoplastic cable. Generic damage criteria are listed in
Table H-1 of NUREG/CR-6850.
Table 08-02: Inputs for workshop problem 2

Target/Intervening
Damage Criteria Justification
Combustible
Cables in a ladder back tray
Cables in a solid tray
Theromset cable in a conduit
Motor operated valve (MOV).
Cabinet with a solid state device
12550194 2-122
Step 1.3: Develop zone of influence: Calculate the heat release rate required for generating
target damage for the following ignition source/target combination and determine if the ignition
source can be screened. Use the engineering calculations described in NUREG-1805 for
determining the heat release rate value.
• Target in the hot gas layer:
A cable tray target is located near the ceiling in a room approximately 21’ by 7’ and has
a normally closed door on each end. The room is approximately 20’ high. The inside
walls of the MCC room are reinforced concrete. There is one MCC cabinet in the room.
The MCC cabinet has unqualified cable.
12550194 2-123
• Target subjected to flame impingement or fire plume temperatures:
A vertical cable tray is located 5’ ft from a floor based ventilation subsystem.
12550194 2-124
• Target subjected to flame radiation:
A conduit is located 3 ft from a battery charger with qualified cable.
12550194 2-125
Step 2: Plant Walkdown: Inspect the ignition source and target combination in the pictures
included in Table 08-03 and determine the appropriate zone of influence calculation necessary.
Table 08-03: Inputs for Workshop problems 1

Ignition
Ignition Source Zone of Influence Distance
Source/Target
12550194 2-126
Ignition
Source/Target
12550194 2-127
Step 3: Verification of Screened Ignition Sources
No workshop problem for Step 3.

Step 4: Calculation of Severity Factors: Calculate the severity factors for the ignition source
and target combinations listed in Workshop Problem 08-03. Use the results of Workshop
Problem Set 08-03 as inputs to this exercise.
• Target in the hot gas layer
• Target subjected to flame impingement or plume temperatures
• Target subjected to flame radiation
12550194 2-128
Step 5: Calculation of Revised Compartment Fire Frequency: Determine a revised
compartment ignition frequency for switchgear room A assuming the walkdown results listed in
Table 08-04.
Table 08-04: Summary of Task 8 calculations

Tab Roo
Equipme Measur Roo Roo Severi Cou
le Critical m Calculat
nt Cou Fire ed m m Screen ty nt
E-1 HRR Heig ed HRR
Descripti nt Condition Distanc Area Tem ed Facto Tas
Cas (Table E-1) ht (kW)
on e (ft) (ft2) p (F) r k8
e (ft)
Train A
flame or Do Not
4160 V 8 1.7 9 1350 20 7 N/A No 1.00 8.00
plume Screen
Bus
Train A
480 V flame Do Not
6 4.9 9 1350 20 401 N/A No 1.00 6.00
Load radiation Screen
Center
Train A
Station
flame Do Not
Service 1 4.5 9 1350 20 336 N/A No 1.00 1.00
radiation Screen
Transfor
mer
Train A
flame or
Battery 1 2.9 4 464 1350 20 25 264 No 0.98 0.98
plume
Charger
Train A
flame or
125 VDC 8 0.7 4 464 1350 20 1 264 No 1.00 8.00
plume
Bus
Train A
flame
125 VDC 1 2.8 4 464 1350 20 129 264 No 0.60 0.60
radiation
Panel
Train A flame
1 2.0 4 464 1350 20 64 264 No 0.88 0.88
Inverter radiation
Table 08-05: Comparison of switchgear room A ignition frequency

Task 6 Switchgear Room A ≈ 1.5E-02
12550194 2-129
SESSION 7: Detailed Fire Modeling and Single Compartment Scenarios
12550194 2-130
Slide 1 Notes:
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
METHODOLOGY ___________________________________
Module III: Task 11a - Detailed Fire ___________________________________
Modeling and Single Compartment Fire
Scenarios ___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
Bethesda, MD
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
Slide 2 Notes:
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
Module II-10: TOPICS ___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
• Describe the process of fire modeling for a single fire
compartment ___________________________________
• The outcome of this activity is the extent and timing of fire ___________________________________
damage within the compartment
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
Slide 2
Module III: Task 11a - Detailed Fire Modeling & Single
Compartment Fire Scenarios
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
12550194 2-131
Slide 3 Notes:
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
Module II-10: FIRE MODELING
Role and Scope ___________________________________
• Fire modeling: An approach for predicting various aspects of

___________________________________
fire generated conditions ___________________________________
– Requires idealization and/or simplifications of the physical processes
involved ___________________________________
– Departure of the fire system from this idealization can affect the
accuracy and validity ___________________________________
• Fire scenario: A set of elements representing a fire events
– Fire source/initiation ___________________________________
– Fire growth
– Fire propagation (room heating, HEAF, intervening combustibles, etc.)
___________________________________
– Active fire protection features, e.g., detection/suppression
___________________________________
– Passive fire protection features, e.g., fire stops
– Target sets, i.e., cables, habitability, etc. ___________________________________
Slide 3
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
12550194 2-132
Slide 4
Module II-10: PROCESS

General Task Structure
Module III: Task 11a - Detailed Fire Modeling & Single Slide 4 Research (RES) & Electric Power Research Institute (EPRI)
Notes:
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
12550194 2-133
Slide 5 Notes:
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
Characterize Fire Compartment ___________________________________
• Information on compartment geometry that can impact fire growth

___________________________________
– Size and shape, e.g., ceiling soffit or beam pocket ___________________________________
– Boundary construction and material
– Ventilation ___________________________________
• Fire protection systems and features
___________________________________
– Fixed detection systems
– Fixed fire suppression systems, water or gaseous ___________________________________
– Manual detection
___________________________________
– Fire brigade
– Internal fire barriers and stops, e.g., ERFBS ___________________________________
• Problem 11a-01, 11a-02
___________________________________
Slide 5
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
Slide 6 Notes:
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
Identify/Characterize Fire Sources ___________________________________
___________________________________
• Location within the compartment, type, size, initial intensity, growth
behavior, severity/likelihood relationship, etc. ___________________________________
• Estimate frequency of ignition for the ignition source.
• Example of fires events involving typical ignition sources ___________________________________
– Oil or liquid spill fires (Characterization described in appendix G)
– Oil or flammable liquid spray fires (Characterization described in appendix G) ___________________________________
– General fires involving electrical panels (Characterization described in
appendices G, L & S) ___________________________________
– High energy arcing faults events (Characterization described in appendix M)
– Cable fires (Characterization described in appendix R) ___________________________________
– Hydrogen fires (Characterization described in appendix N)
– Transient fuel materials (Characterization described in appendices G & S)
___________________________________
• Problem 11a-03
___________________________________
Slide 6
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
12550194 2-134
Slide 7 Notes:
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
Identify/Characterize Secondary (intervening) Combustibles ___________________________________
___________________________________
• May include,
– Overhead raceways, ___________________________________
– Cable air-drops,
– Stored materials, ___________________________________
– Electrical panels,
– Construction materials, etc.
___________________________________
• The information provided should describe

___________________________________
– Relative proximity of the secondary combustibles to the fire ignition ___________________________________
source
– Configuration of the secondary combustible. ___________________________________
• Example problem on step 4
___________________________________
Slide 7
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
Slide 8 Notes:
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
Identify/Characterize Target Sets ___________________________________
• Each target set should be a subset of the fire PRA components and ___________________________________
circuits (i.e., cables) present in the compartment.
– Target sets associated to PRA components can be identified by examining
the associated CCDP.
___________________________________
– Those subgroups with very small CCDP may be ignored as insignificant
contributors to fire risk. ___________________________________
– Check for possibility of spurious actuations due to cable fires inside the
compartment under analysis. Spurious actuations may generate the need of
evaluating important scenarios. ___________________________________
• Fire modeling should have information on target location within the
compartment available. ___________________________________
– If complete routing information is not available, the analyst must justify target
selection process and the corresponding impacts in the Fire PRA model.
– Routing by exclusion OK (from a compartment, from a set of raceways…)
___________________________________
• Identify failure modes of equipment due to fire damage to the equipment
or associated circuits. ___________________________________
• Example problem on Step 5
___________________________________
Slide 8
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
12550194 2-135
Slide 9 Notes:
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
Select Fire Scenarios ___________________________________
___________________________________
• Fire scenarios should take the following into consideration:
– Selected scenarios should reflect the objective of fire modeling, in this ___________________________________
case impacting the components and circuits of interest to safety
___________________________________
– Selected scenarios should represent a complete set of fire conditions
that are important to the objective ___________________________________
– Selected scenarios should challenge the conditions being estimated,
e.g., scenarios that challenge habitability if manual action is of interest ___________________________________
– The list of postulated fire scenarios should include those involving ___________________________________
fixed and transient ignition sources
___________________________________
___________________________________
Slide 9
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
Slide 10 Notes:
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
Select Fire Scenarios (cont’d) ___________________________________
• Approach to selection of fire scenarios is highly dependent on fire

___________________________________
compartment hazard profile, i.e., location and amount of fire source and
combustibles and the location and number of potential targets. In ___________________________________
general,
– In compartment with few fire source and many target sets (e.g., a switchgear ___________________________________
room), start with an ignition source, postulate potential growth and
propagation to other combustibles and postulate damage to the closest target ___________________________________
set that may be exposed to the specific fire
– In compartments with many fire sources and few potential targets (e.g., a
PWR turbine building), start with potential target sets
___________________________________
– In compartments with many fire sources and many potential target (e.g., a
PWR auxiliary building), ___________________________________
• Close source/target combinations, and
• Always include that fire scenario most likely (all factors considered) to cause wide-
spread damage (may be driven by fire source characteristics, fire spread potential,
___________________________________
or by fire protection systems and features)
• Workshop problem 11a-04 ___________________________________
Slide 10
___________________________________
___________________________________
12550194 2-136
Slide 11 Notes:
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
Conduct Fire Growth and Propagation ___________________________________
___________________________________
• Select fire modeling tool depending on the characteristics of
each scenario ___________________________________
– Empirical rule sets
– Hand calculations ___________________________________
– Zone models
– Field models
___________________________________
• Analyze fire growth and spread to secondary combustibles ___________________________________
• Estimate resulting environmental conditions ___________________________________
• Estimate time to target set damage
___________________________________
• Workshop problem 11a-05 to 11a-08
___________________________________
Slide 11
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
12550194 2-137
Slide 12

Hand Calcs – NUREG 1805
02.1_Temperature_NV.xls
02.2_Temperature_FV.xls
02.3_Temperature_CC.xls
03_HRR_Flame_Height_Burning_Duration_Calculation.xls
04_Flame_Height_Calculations.xls
05.1_Heat_Flux_Calculations_Wind_Free.xls
05.2_Heat_Flux_Calculations_Wind.xls
05.3_Thermal_Radiation_From_Hydrocarbon_Fireballs.xls
06_Ignition_Time_Calculations.xls 09_Plume_Temperature_Calculations.xls
07_Cable_HRR_Calculations.xls 10_Detector_Activation_Time.xls
08_Burning_Duration_Soild.xls 13_Compartment_ Flashover_Calculations.xls
09_Plume_Temperature_Calculations.xls 14_Compartment_Over_Pressure_Calculations.xls
15_Explosion_Claculations.xls
16_Battery_Room_Flammable_Gas_Conc.xls
17.1_FR_Beams_Columns_Substitution_Correlation.xls
17.2_FR_Beams_Columns_Quasi_Steady_State_Spray_Insulated.xls
17.3_FR_Beams_Columns_Quasi_Steady_State_Board_Insulated.xls
17.4_FR_Beams_Columns_Quasi_Steady_State_Uninsulated.xls
18_Visibility_Through_Smoke.xls
Notes:
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
12550194 2-138
Slide 13

Hand Calcs – NUREG 1805
CHAPTER 2. PREDICTING HOT GAS LAYER TEMPERATURE AND SMOKE

LAYER HEIGHT IN A ROOM FIRE WITH NATURAL VENTILATION
COMPARTMENT WITH THERMALLY THICK/THIN BOUNDARIES
Version 1805.0 (SI Units)
The following calculations estimate the hot gas layer temperature and smoke layer height in enclosure fire.
Parameters in YELLOW CELLS are Entered by the User.
Parameters in GREEN CELLS are Automatically Selected from the DROP DOWN MENU for the Material Selected.
All subsequent output values are calculated by the spreadsheet and based on values specified in the input
parameters. This spreadsheet is protected and secure to avoid errors due to a wrong entry in a cell(s).
The chapter in the NUREG should be read before an analysis is made.
INPUT PARAMETERS SI UNITS

COMPARTMENT INFORMATION
Compartment Width (wc) 17.40 m 57.09 ft
Compartment Length (lc) 14.40 m 47.24 ft
Compartment Height (hc) 4.00 m 13.12 ft
Vent Width (wv) 1.00 m 3.28 ft

Vent Height (hv) 2.00 m 6.56 ft
Top of Vent from Floor (VT) 2.00 m 6.56 ft
Interior Lining Thickness ( ) 0.60 m 23.62 in
AMBIENT CONDITIONS
Ambient Air Temperature (Ta) 20.00 °C 68.00 °F
293.00 K
Specific Heat of Air (cp) 1.00 kJ/kg-K
3
Ambient Air Density ( a) 1.20 kg/m
THERMAL PROPERTIES OF COMPARTMENT ENCLOSING SURFACES FOR
Interior Lining Thermal Inertia (k c) 2.9 (kW/m2-K)2-sec
Interior Lining Thermal Conductivity (k) 0.0016 kW/m-K
Interior Lining Specific Heat (c) 0.75 kJ/kg-K
Interior Lining Density ( ) 2400 kg/m3
Note: Air density will automatically correct with Ambient Air Temperature (Ta) Input
EXPERIMENTAL THERMAL PROPERTIES FOR COMMON INTERIOR LINING MATERIALS
k c k c Select Material
Material 2 2 3
(kW/m -K) -sec (kW/m-K) (kJ/kg-K) (kg/m ) Concrete
Aluminum (pure) 500 0.206 0.895 2710 Scroll to desired material then
Steel (0.5% Carbon) 197 0.054 0.465 7850 Click the selection
Concrete 2.9 0.0016 0.75 2400
Brick 1.7 0.0008 0.8 2600
Glass, Plate 1.6 0.00076 0.8 2710
Brick/Concrete Block 1.2 0.00073 0.84 1900
Gypsum Board 0.18 0.00017 1.1 960
Plywood 0.16 0.00012 2.5 540
Fiber Insulation Board 0.16 0.00053 1.25 240
Chipboard 0.15 0.00015 1.25 800
Aerated Concrete 0.12 0.00026 0.96 500
Plasterboard 0.12 0.00016 0.84 950
Calcium Silicate Board 0.098 0.00013 1.12 700
Alumina Silicate Block 0.036 0.00014 1 260
Glass Fiber Insulation 0.0018 0.000037 0.8 60
Expanded Polystyrene 0.001 0.000034 1.5 20
User Specified Value Enter Value Enter Value Enter Value Enter Value
Reference: Klote, J., J. Milke, Principles of Smoke Management, 2002, Page 270.
FIRE SPECIFICATIONS
Fire Heat Release Rate (Q) 200.00 kW
Calculate
Module III: Task 11a - Detailed Fire Modeling & Single Slide 13
Notes:
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
12550194 2-139
Slide 14 Notes:
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
Hand Calcs – FIVE-Rev1 ___________________________________
• More than ten years after FIVE, most of the equations are still
___________________________________
considered “State-of-the-Art”
___________________________________
• A revision of the quantitative fire hazard techniques in FIVE
• Most of the hand calculations in the original EPRI publication and ___________________________________
some other models available in the fire protection engineering
literature ___________________________________
– 4 stage heat release rate profile based on t2 growth
– Heskestad’s flame height model ___________________________________
– A radiation model from a cylindrical flame to targets
– Models for velocity of plume and ceiling jet flows ___________________________________
– Model for plume diameter as a function of height
– MQH model for room temperature ___________________________________
– Model for visibility through smoke
___________________________________
Slide 14
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
12550194 2-140
Slide 15

Hand Calcs – FIVE-Rev1
Notes:
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
12550194 2-141
Slide 16
CFAST Doorway Cable target locations

and directions
Liquid spray fire
Burn room
Target room
Specified Leakage
110 kW gas
burner fire
Heptane
Pan Fire
Ceiling exhaust vent

Compartment
Vent
Mechanical ventilation
supply 1.2 m below ceiling
Controlled
gas fire
Kerosene
Pan Fire
Notes:
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
12550194 2-142
Slide 17
MAGIC
Notes:
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
12550194 2-143
Slide 18
FDS
Notes:
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
12550194 2-144
Slide 19 Notes:
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
Fire Detection/Suppression Analysis ___________________________________
• Assess fire detection timing

___________________________________
___________________________________
• Assess timing, reliability, and effectiveness of fixed-fire suppression
systems ___________________________________
___________________________________
• Assess manual fire brigade response
___________________________________
• Estimate probability of fire suppression as a function of time ___________________________________
• Workshop problem 11a-09

___________________________________
___________________________________
Slide 19
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
Slide 20 Notes:
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
Calculate Severity Factor ___________________________________
• The time to target damage, and as a result the non-suppression

___________________________________
probability is a function of the postulated heat release rate
___________________________________
• The severity factor should be calculated in combination with the

___________________________________
non-suppression probability ___________________________________
___________________________________
• Workshop problem 11a-10, 11a-11
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
Slide 20
___________________________________
___________________________________
12550194 2-145
Slide 21

Calculate Fire Scenario Frequency
Severity factor for

scenario k
λk = λi ,k ⋅ SFk ⋅ Pns ,k
Ignition frequency for Non-suppression

scenario k probability for scenario k
Notes:
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
12550194 2-146
Slide 22 Notes:
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
Document Analysis Results ___________________________________
• The first tier documentation should be sufficient in detail to

___________________________________
allow for an independent reader to understand ___________________________________
– Scenarios postulated, the basis for their selection and analysis,
– The tools utilized in the analysis and basis for selection, ___________________________________
– The final results of the analysis
• The second tier documentation should provide the details
___________________________________
of each individual analysis performed including: ___________________________________
– Details of scenario selection process,
– The fire modeling analyses performed ___________________________________
• All specific considerations and assumptions should be
recorded clearly. ___________________________________
___________________________________
Slide 22
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
12550194 2-147
SESSION 8: Detection and Suppression
12550194 2-148
Slide 1 Notes:
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
METHODOLOGY ___________________________________
Module III: Detection and Suppression ___________________________________
Appendix P
___________________________________
___________________________________
Bethesda, MD
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
Slide 2 Notes:
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
DETECTION & SUPPRESSION
Objectives ___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
• Describe the process for calculation the non-suppression ___________________________________
probability
___________________________________
• Describe the assumptions underlying the recommended
approach for determining the non-suppression probability.
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
Slide 2
Module III: Detection and Suppression Appendix P Research (RES) & Electric Power Research Institute (EPRI)
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
12550194 2-149
Slide 3 Notes:
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
Generalities ___________________________________
State of the art fire models do not have the capabilities of

___________________________________
modeling the effects of all the different fire detection and
suppression strategies available in NPP fire scenarios. ___________________________________
___________________________________
• Time to target damage and non suppression probabilities
are independent calculations ___________________________________
___________________________________
• The time to target damage is an input to the
detection/suppression analysis ___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
Slide 3
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
Slide 4 Notes:
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
Crediting a Fire Det or Supp System ___________________________________
Detection and suppression systems can be credited in the ___________________________________

fire PRA if they are effective and available
___________________________________
• Effectiveness – Will the system detect/control the fire? ___________________________________
– Designed, installed and maintained according to the code of record
and fire protection engineering judgment ___________________________________
– Based on the specific characteristics of the postulated fire scenario
___________________________________
• Available – Probability of the system operating upon ___________________________________
demand
___________________________________
___________________________________
Module III: Detection and Suppression Appendix P
Slide 4
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
12550194 2-150
Slide 5 Notes:
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
Fire Detection and Suppression Systems ___________________________________
The following fire detection and suppression systems are ___________________________________
considered in the recommended approach:
___________________________________
• Fire Detection
– Prompt detection
___________________________________
– Automatic detection
___________________________________
– Delayed detection
___________________________________
• Fire Suppression
– Prompt suppression ___________________________________
– Automatic suppression
– Manually actuated fixed suppression ___________________________________
– Manual suppression
___________________________________
Slide 5
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
12550194 2-151
Slide 6

Detection-Suppression Event Tree
Pns = E + I + M + N
Notes:
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
12550194 2-152
Slide 7

Detection-Suppression Event Tree
Notes:
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
12550194 2-153
Slide 8 Notes:
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
Prompt Detection and Suppression ___________________________________
• Prompt detection
___________________________________
– Assume 1.0 if a continuous fire watch is credited or in-cabinet ___________________________________
detection is available for fires postulated inside cabinets
– Justify the use of 1.0 if an incipient fire detection system is available ___________________________________
– Assume 0 if automatic or delayed detection only are credited
___________________________________
• Prompt suppression ___________________________________
– Credit prompt suppression in hot work fire scenarios
– Probability is obtained from the welding suppression curve ___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
Slide 8
___________________________________
___________________________________
Slide 9 Notes:
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
Automatic Detection and Suppression ___________________________________
___________________________________
• Automatic detection
– Assume a probability of failure no larger than 0.05. This the ___________________________________
unreliability for halon systems reported in NSAC 179L.
– Check for availability! ___________________________________
___________________________________
• Automatic suppression (from NSAC 179L)
– Halon systems = 0.05 ___________________________________
– CO2 systems = 0.04
– Wet pipe sprinklers = 0.02 ___________________________________
– Deluge or pre-action = 0.05
– Check for availability!
___________________________________
___________________________________
Slide 9
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
12550194 2-154
Slide 10 Notes:
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
Delayed Detection and Suppression ___________________________________
• Delayed detection ___________________________________

– Assume 1.0 – All fires will eventually be detected ___________________________________
– Compare time to target damage Vs time to detection and
suppression ___________________________________
• Delayed suppression ___________________________________

– Probability of fire brigade suppression is obtained from the ___________________________________
suppression curves
– Manual actuation of fixed fire suppression systems should include ___________________________________
human reliability analysis.
___________________________________
___________________________________
Slide 10
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
Slide 11 Notes:
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
Detection - Related FAQ ___________________________________
___________________________________
• FAQ 08-0046 Incipient Detection (Status: Open) ___________________________________
– Issue:
• Methodology provides no approach for crediting incipient fire detection ___________________________________
systems
• Develop an approach that would credit these systems
– Status:
___________________________________
• Initial drafts of a proposed approach are under discussion within the
RES/EPRI teams
___________________________________
• Work continues to try to establish a firm technical basis
___________________________________
___________________________________
Slide 11
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
12550194 2-155
Slide 12 Notes:
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
Suppression Curves ___________________________________
___________________________________
The suppression curves were developed using FEDB data after
1/1/81 ___________________________________
• Developed with the “suppression time” field. If the suppression ___________________________________
time was not available, the “duration” field was used.
___________________________________
• Data do not include supervised burn-outs, fires suppressed with ___________________________________
automatic systems, and self-extinguished fires.
___________________________________
• Do not include time to detection or fire brigade response.
___________________________________
___________________________________
Slide 12
___________________________________
___________________________________
Slide 13 Notes:
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
Suppression Curves – Related FAQ ___________________________________
___________________________________
• FAQ 08-0050 Fire Brigade Response (Status: Open) ___________________________________
– Issue:
• The fire non-suppression curves as cited as reflecting suppression ___________________________________
performance after fire brigade response time but a significant fraction of
the duration data used in curves includes brigade response time
• Fire brigade may not be getting adequate credit for suppressing fires prior ___________________________________
to damage
• EPRI team has reviewed data and proposed an alternative set of non-
suppression curves that would include fire brigade response time ___________________________________
– Status:
• Work to date has largely been confined to EPRI team ___________________________________
• NRC team is currently reviewing proposed resolution
• Staff and industry reviews pending ___________________________________
Slide 13
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
12550194 2-156
Slide 14 Notes:
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
Selection of Suppression Curves ___________________________________
___________________________________
The suppression curve should be selected based on the type of
postulated fire.
___________________________________
• For prompt suppression by a welding fire watch, use the ___________________________________
welding suppression curve
___________________________________
• If the fire watch is not successful, an appropriate suppression ___________________________________
curve should be selected depending on the combustibles
ignited due to hot work activities. ___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
Slide 14
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
12550194 2-157
Slide 15

Suppression Curves
Slide 15
Notes:
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____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
12550194 2-158
Slide 16

Suppression Curves
Notes:
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____________________________________________________________________________
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____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
12550194 2-159
Slide 17
DETECTION & SUPPRESSION P = e − λtdam

Suppression Curves
th th th
5 50 95
Suppression curve n T Mean
Percentile Percentile Percentile
T/G fires 21 749 0.03 0.02 0.03 0.04
Control room 6 18 0.33 0.15 0.32 0.58
PWR containment 3 23 0.13 0.04 0.12 0.27
Outdoor transformers 14 373 0.04 0.02 0.04 0.06
Flammable gas 5 195 0.03 0.01 0.02 0.05
Oil fires 36 404 0.09 0.07 0.09 0.11
Cable fires 5 21 0.24 0.09 0.22 0.44
Electrical fires 114 942 0.12 0.10 0.12 0.14
Welding fires 19 99 0.19 0.13 0.19 0.27
Transient fires 24 199 0.12 0.08 0.12 0.16
High energy arcing faults 3 239 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.03
All fires 250 3260 0.08 0.07 0.08 0.08
Notes:
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
12550194 2-160
Slide 18 Notes:
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
Dependencies ___________________________________
___________________________________
The following dependencies in suppression analysis could
be important: ___________________________________
• Between automatic detection and suppression ___________________________________
– Example: control panel for a gaseous suppression system
___________________________________
• Between actuated barriers and fire suppression systems
___________________________________
• Between safe shutdown capabilities and automatic
suppression ___________________________________
– Example: crediting fire fighting water for core injection, heat removal
or secondary heat removal ___________________________________
• Between manual and automatic suppression ___________________________________
Slide 18
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
Slide 19 Notes:
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
Example ___________________________________
___________________________________
The scenario consists of an MCC fire affecting a target in the
hot gas layer. ___________________________________
• The room is equipped with a smoke detection system and a
manually activated fire suppression system ___________________________________
• Using fire modeling ___________________________________
– Time to smoke detection = 1 min
– Time to target damage = 15 min ___________________________________
• From fire drill records and/or plant procedures
– Brigade response time = 7 min
___________________________________
– Time to manually actuate the suppression system will not be less ___________________________________
than 10 min
– Time to delayed detection assumed to be 15 min ___________________________________
Slide 19
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
12550194 2-161
Slide 20

Example
• Time available for

supp:
– 15-1-7 = 7 min
• Using the electrical
curve
– P = EXP(-0.12x7)
– P = 0.43
• Failure of gaseous
supp system:
– P = 0.05 + 0.1
Pns = E + I + M + N
Pns = 6.9 E − 2
Notes:
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
12550194 2-162
Slide 21 Notes:
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
The non-suppression probability is credited in Task 11,
detailed fire modeling ___________________________________
• Target damage is evaluated assuming no
detection/suppression capabilities in the room ___________________________________
• The time to target damage is an input to the detection and ___________________________________
suppression analysis.
___________________________________
• The recommended approach includes an event tree
capturing prompt, automatic, and delayed detection and ___________________________________
suppression capabilities
___________________________________
• The event tree may need to be modified depending on the
scenario ___________________________________
Slide 21
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
12550194 2-163
SESSION 9: Special Fire Models Part 1
12550194 2-164
Slide 1 Notes:
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
METHODOLOGY
___________________________________
Module III: Task 11, Special Fire Models ___________________________________
Part 1
___________________________________
___________________________________
Bethesda, MD
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
Slide 2 Notes:
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
FIRE MODELS ___________________________________
___________________________________
• Generally computational fire models are developed to
estimate extent and timing of fire growth ___________________________________
___________________________________
• There are fire scenarios critical to NPP applications that
are beyond capability of existing computational fire ___________________________________
models
___________________________________
– Special models are developed for prediction of consequences of
such scenarios, based on a combination of:
___________________________________
• Fire experiments,
• Operating experience, actual fire events ___________________________________
• Engineering judgment
___________________________________
Module III: Task 11, Special Fire Models Part 1
Slide 2
___________________________________
___________________________________
12550194 2-165
Slide 3 Notes:
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
SPECIAL MODELS ___________________________________
• Cable fires (modified from IPEEE approaches)

___________________________________
– Cable spreading room and cable tunnel fire risk ___________________________________
• High energy arcing faults (new) ___________________________________
– Switchgear room
___________________________________
• Fire propagation to adjacent cabinets (consolidation)
– Relay room
___________________________________
___________________________________
• Passive fire protection features (consolidation)
___________________________________
___________________________________
Slide 3
___________________________________
___________________________________
Slide 4 Notes:
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
SPECIAL MODELS (Part 2) ___________________________________
___________________________________
• Main control board (new)
___________________________________
• Hydrogen fires (new) ___________________________________
___________________________________
• Turbine generator fires (new)
___________________________________
• Smoke damage (consolidation of research – new ___________________________________

risk analysis guidance) ___________________________________
___________________________________
Slide 4
___________________________________
___________________________________
12550194 2-166
Slide 5 Notes:
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
CABLE FIRES (1 of 9) ___________________________________
___________________________________
• No generalized analytical theory is available to accurately
model cable fires in all possible configurations in ___________________________________
commercial nuclear plants.
• Most of the information compiled for this appendix is in the ___________________________________
form of flammability parameters derived from experiments or ___________________________________
correlations also developed from experimental data.
• The amount of experimental evidence and analytical tools ___________________________________
available to model cable tray fires is relatively small when
compared to the vast number of possible fire scenarios that ___________________________________
can be postulated for NPPs ___________________________________
• Simplification of these scenarios will be needed
___________________________________
Slide 5
___________________________________
___________________________________
Slide 6 Notes:
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
CABLE FIRES (2 of 9) ___________________________________
Scenarios involving cable fires may start as: ___________________________________

___________________________________
• Self-ignited cable fires
– Postulate self ignited cable fires in unqualified cables only ___________________________________
– Self ignited cable fires should be characterized by a cable mass ratio
(mass of cables in the room / mass of cables in the plant) ___________________________________
representative of the scenario.
– Cable mass ratio is equivalent to the severity factor ___________________________________
• Or as secondary fires caused by fixed or transient fire ___________________________________
sources
– Cable fires caused by welding & cutting should be postulated in both
___________________________________
qualified and unqualified cables.
___________________________________
Slide 6
Module III: Task 11, Special Fire Models Part 1 Research (RES) & Electric Power Research Institute (EPRI)
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
12550194 2-167
Slide 7
CABLE FIRES (3 of 9)
Cable tray ignition: Simplified cases
Slide 7
Notes:
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
12550194 2-168
Slide 8
Heat release rate from cable

fires Q& ct = 0.45 ⋅ q& bs ⋅ A
• qbs: bench scale heat release
rate per unit area
• A: burning area
– Length of the ignition source
times tray width
Notes:
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
12550194 2-169
Slide 9
Flame spread
Cable tray
• kf is a constant with a value

of 0.01 m2/kW zf
(
z f = x p ⋅ k f Q& ′′ − 1 ) Fire
xp
Slide 9
Notes:
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
12550194 2-170
Slide 10
4(q& ′f′ ) δ f
2
Flame spread model
v=
π (kρc )(Tig − Tamb )2
• Vertical trays
– δ is assumed to be 2 mm Cable tray
– q” is assumed as 25 kW/m2
• Horizontal trays zf
– δ is assumed to be zf
– q” is assumed as 70 kW/m2
xp
Fire
Slide 10
Notes:
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
12550194 2-171
Slide 11 Notes:
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
CABLE FIRES (7 of 9) ___________________________________
___________________________________
Example
• Material properties ___________________________________

• PVC cables: • XPE cables: ___________________________________
– K = 0.000192 kW/m K – K = 0.000235 kW/m K
– ρ = 1380 kg/m3 – ρ = 1375 kg/m3 ___________________________________
– Cp = 1.289 kJ/kg K – Cp = 1.390 kJ/kg K
– Tig = 218°C – Tig = 330°C ___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
Slide 11
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
Slide 12 Notes:
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
CABLE FIRES (8 of 9) ___________________________________
___________________________________
Example
___________________________________
• Horizontal trays ___________________________________
– Flame spread for XPLE cable = 0.3
mm/sec (~0.05′/min) ___________________________________
– Flame spread for PVC cable = 0.9
mm/sec (~0.2′/min) ___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
Slide 12
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
12550194 2-172
Slide 13
Example
• Vertical spread in cables

Cable tray
• PE/PVC cables
zf
• The heat release rate for XPE cable is xp

178 kW/m2. Using these inputs, the Fire
estimated flame spread is 11 mm/sec
(2 ft/min)
Slide 13
Notes:
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
12550194 2-173
Slide 14
FIRE PROPAGATION IN CABLE TRAY STACKS

WITH RG 1.75 SEPARATION (1 of 2)
35 o 35 o
n=3
Cable tray stack

n=2
h
n=1
Ignition Source
(
Ln +1 = Ln + 2 hn +1Tan 35 o ( ))
Characteristic length
Slide 14
Notes:
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
12550194 2-174
Slide 15 Notes:
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
WITH RG 1.75 SEPARATION (2 OF 2) ___________________________________
• First tray to second tray: 4 minutes after ignition of first tray

___________________________________
___________________________________
• Second tray to third tray: 3 minutes after ignition of second
first tray ___________________________________
• Third tray to fourth tray: 2 minutes after ignition of third tray ___________________________________
• Fourth tray to fifth tray: 1 minute after ignition of fourth tray ___________________________________
• Balance of trays in stack: 1 minute after ignition of fifth tray

___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
Slide 15
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
Slide 16 Notes:
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
WITH RG 1.75 SEPARATION (2 OF 2) (cont’d) ___________________________________
___________________________________
• If there is a second stack of cable trays next to the first
stack, spread to the first (lowest) tray in the second stack will ___________________________________
be assumed to occur concurrent with spread of fire to the
third tray in the original stack . ___________________________________
• Subsequent spread of fire in the second stack will mimic the ___________________________________
continued growth of fire in the first stack (e.g., the second
tray in the second stack will ignite within 2 minutes of the ___________________________________
first tray in the second stack - at the same time as the fourth
___________________________________
tray in the first stack.)
___________________________________
• Fire spread will occur at the same rate to stacks on either or
both sides of the original stack ___________________________________
Slide 16
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
12550194 2-175
Slide 17 Notes:
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
Related FAQ ___________________________________
• FAQ 08-0049 (Status: Open)

___________________________________
– Issue: ___________________________________
• The cable fire empirical spread model (tray-to-tray, stack-to-stack) has
been misapplied in pilot applications
• Reviewers concluded that misapplication resulted in very conservative ___________________________________
fire growth and risk results
• Clarify the bounds of the empirical model to avoid misapplication
– Status: ___________________________________
• Proposed resolution has recently completed final review within the RES
and EPRI teams ___________________________________
• Staff and industry final review pending
• Final revision, as needed, pending ___________________________________
– Note: as a follow-on, team plans to generate a new FAQ to address
broader needs relative to cable fire growth modeling ___________________________________
Slide 17
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
Slide 18 Notes:
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
HIGH ENERGY ARCING FAULTS (1 of 16) ___________________________________
___________________________________
Definition
___________________________________
• Rapid release of electrical energy in the form of heat,
vaporized copper, and mechanical force. ___________________________________
• An arc is a very intense discharge of electrons between two ___________________________________
electrodes that are carrying an electric current. The arc is
created by the flow of electrons through charged particles of ___________________________________
gas ions that exist as a result of vaporization of the ___________________________________
conductive material.
___________________________________
___________________________________
Slide 18
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
12550194 2-176
Slide 19 Notes:
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
Scope
___________________________________
___________________________________
• Switchgears
___________________________________
• Load centers More than 440 V
___________________________________
• Bus bars ___________________________________
• Oil filled outdoor transformers are addressed separately

___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
Slide 19
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
Slide 20 Notes:
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
General characteristics of HEAF events (from FEDB)

___________________________________
• Indications of heavy smoke in the area, which may delay ___________________________________
identification of the fire origin and whether the fire is still
burning. ___________________________________
• In nearly all of these events, the HEAF initiates in the feed ___________________________________
breaker cubicle. This is because this is where most of the
electrical energy in a high-energy cabinet resides. ___________________________________
• HEAFs occurring in 480V switchgears did not report ___________________________________
damage beyond the switchgear itself, but some resulted in
the cabinet opening. ___________________________________
___________________________________
Slide 20
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
12550194 2-177
Slide 21 Notes:
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
• Initial use of fire extinguishers may be ineffective in severe ___________________________________
HEAF events regardless of the extinguishing agent (CO2,
Halon, or dry chemical). The fires were eventually ___________________________________
suppressed with water by the fire brigade.
• No conclusions can be made regarding the effectiveness of ___________________________________
fixed fire suppression systems for the ensuing fire. Only
one event was successfully suppressed with an automatic
___________________________________
Halon system. ___________________________________
• Durations of the fires involving HEAF range from minutes to
over an hour. The short durations generally reflect events ___________________________________
that do not result in large ensuing fire(s), either in the
device itself or external fires. ___________________________________
Slide 21
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
Slide 22 Notes:
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
• Sustained fires after the initial HEAF involve combustible
materials (cable insulation, for the most part) near the ___________________________________
cabinet. ___________________________________
• Damage may extend to cables and cabinets in the vicinity of ___________________________________
the high-energy electrical cabinet.
___________________________________
• Damage to cabinet internals and nearby equipment (if
___________________________________
observed) appears to occur relatively early in the event.
___________________________________
Slide 22
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
12550194 2-178
Slide 23 Notes:
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
The arcing or energetic fault scenario in these electrical
devices consists of two distinct phases, each with its own ___________________________________
damage characteristics and detection/suppression response
and effectiveness.
___________________________________
___________________________________
• The first phase is a short, rapid release of electrical energy
followed by ensuing fire(s) that may involve the electrical ___________________________________
device itself, as well as any external exposed combustibles,
such as overhead exposed cable trays or nearby panels, ___________________________________
that may be ignited during the energetic phase.
___________________________________
___________________________________
Slide 23
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
Slide 24 Notes:
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
HIGH ENERGY ARCING FAULTS (6 of 16) (cont’d) ___________________________________
___________________________________
• The second phase, i.e., the ensuing fire(s), is treated similar
to electrical cabinet fires described else where in this ___________________________________
procedure, with one distinction. Any closed electrical cabinet
subject to a HEAF is opened to a fully ventilated fire. In ___________________________________
dealing with postulated switchgear and load center fires,
both phases should be considered. ___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
Slide 24
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
12550194 2-179
Slide 25
HIGH ENERGY ARCING FAULTS (7 of 16)
The zone of influence
Slide 25
Notes:
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
12550194 2-180
Slide 26 Notes:
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
High-Energy Phase: The zone of influence
• The initial arcing fault will cause destructive and ___________________________________
unrecoverable failure of the faulting device, e.g., the feeder
breaker cubicle, including the control and bus-bar sections. ___________________________________
• The next upstream over-current protection device in the
power feed circuit leading to the initially faulting device will ___________________________________
trip open, causing the loss of all components fed by that
electrical bus. This fault may be recoverable if the initial
___________________________________
faulting device can be isolated from the feeder circuit. ___________________________________
• The release of copper plasma and/or mechanical shock will
cause the next directly adjoining/adjacent switchgear or load ___________________________________
center cubicles within the same cabinet bank and in all
directions (above, below, to the sides) to trip open. ___________________________________
Slide 26
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
Slide 27 Notes:
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
• Any unprotected cables that drop into the top of the panel in ___________________________________
an open air-drop configuration will ignite.
– Cables in conduit or in a fire wrap are considered protected in this ___________________________________
context. In other words, if cables are protected (i.e., not exposed) by
conduit or fire wrap, they are assumed damaged, but not ignited, and ___________________________________
they do not contribute to the fire load.
– Armored cables with an exposed plastic covering are considered ___________________________________
unprotected in this context.
• Exposed cables, or other exposed flammable or ___________________________________
combustible materials or transient fuel materials located
within this same region (0.9 m (3′) horizontally) will be
___________________________________
ignited. ___________________________________
Slide 27
___________________________________
___________________________________
12550194 2-181
Slide 28 Notes:
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________

___________________________________
• Any unprotected cables in the first overhead cable tray will be ignited
concurrent with the initial arcing fault provided that this first tray is within
___________________________________
1.5 m (5′ ) vertical distance of the top of the cabinet. The cable tray fire
will propagate to additional trays consistent with the approach provided ___________________________________
for the treatment of cable tray fires elsewhere in this document,
assuming that the time to ignition of the first tray is zero rather than the ___________________________________
normal 5 minutes.
– This applies to any cable tray located directly above the panel. ___________________________________
– This applies to any cable tray above the aisle way directly in front of, or
behind, the faulting cabinet, provided some part of that tray is within 0.3 m
(12") horizontally of the cabinet’s front or rear face panel.
___________________________________
– Cables in conduit or in a fire wrap are considered protected in this context.
– Armored cables with an exposed plastic covering are considered ___________________________________
unprotected in this context
___________________________________
Slide 28
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
Slide 29 Notes:
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________

___________________________________
• Any vulnerable component or movable/operable structural element located
within 0.9 m (3′) horizontally of either the front or rear panels/doors, and at
___________________________________
or below the top of the faulting cabinet section, will suffer physical damage
and functional failure. ___________________________________
– This will include mobile/operable structural elements like fire dampers and fire
doors. ___________________________________
– This will include potentially vulnerable electrical or electromechanical
components such as cables, transformers, ventilation fans, other cabinets, etc. ___________________________________
– This will exclude fixed structural elements such as walls, floors, ceilings, and
intact penetration seals.
– This will exclude large components and purely mechanical components such
___________________________________
as large pumps, valves, major piping, fire sprinkler piping, or other large piping
(1" diameter or greater). ___________________________________
– This may include small oil feed lines, instrument air piping, or other small
piping (less than 1" diameter). ___________________________________
Slide 29
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
12550194 2-182
Slide 30 Notes:
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
• In the case of bus ducts, the following equipment should be
assumed damaged and/or ignited ___________________________________
– The entire length of the bus duct.
___________________________________
– Any cable (damage or ignition) or combustibles (ignition only)
immediately adjacent to the bus duct. ___________________________________
– Equipment connected to the bus duct.
– If there are fire barriers along the length of the bus duct, these can
___________________________________
be credited to limit damage and/or ignition. It may be assumed that
the damage and/or ignition from a arcing fault in the bus duct is ___________________________________
limited to one side of the fire barrier, except when analyzing multi-
compartment fire scenarios that account for failure of the fire ___________________________________
barrier(s).
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
Slide 31 Notes:
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
Detection and Suppression
• The amount of smoke from any damaging HEAF event

___________________________________
expected to activate any smoke detection system in the ___________________________________
area.
___________________________________
• Manual suppression by plant personnel and the fire brigade
may be credited to control and prevent damage outside the ___________________________________
initial ZOI from ensuing fires.
___________________________________
• Separate suppression curves are developed for these fires
documented in Appendix P to the Fire Modeling procedure. ___________________________________
___________________________________
Slide 31
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
12550194 2-183
Slide 32 Notes:
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
Modeling HEAF in the Fire PRA
___________________________________
• Identify the equipment in the room where a HEAF can be
generated. As indicated earlier, this equipment includes, for ___________________________________
the most part, 4160 V to 440 V switchgear cabinets, load
centers, and bus bars. ___________________________________
• Two types of initiating events should be postulated for each ___________________________________

identified equipment: ___________________________________
– A HEAF event with an ensuing fire, and
– A regular equipment fire (no HEAF). ___________________________________
___________________________________
Slide 32
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
Slide 33 Notes:
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
Non Suppression Probability and Severity Factors

___________________________________
• Assign a generic frequency for HEAFs listed in Task 6, and apportion it ___________________________________
with the location and ignition source weighting factors to the equipment
under analysis. ___________________________________
• Assume targets in the ZOI are damaged at time zero.
• The probability of no manual suppression for the targets in the ZOI is ___________________________________
1.0.
• The severity factor for a scenario consisting of targets in the ZOI only is ___________________________________
1.0.
• Probability of no automatic suppression for targets in the ZOI is 1.0 ___________________________________
• The probability of no manual suppression for targets outside the ZOI
can be calculated using the detection suppression event tree described ___________________________________
in Appendix P, with the HEAF manual suppression curve.
___________________________________
Slide 33
___________________________________
___________________________________
12550194 2-184
Slide 34 Notes:
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
Example
• Consider a HEAF scenario consisting of a switchgear cabinet ___________________________________
affecting two targets. A stack of three cable trays is above the
cabinet. The first tray in the stack is 0.9 m (3′) above the cabinet. ___________________________________
It has been determined that one of the targets is in the first tray.
The other target is in the third tray. ___________________________________
• According to the approach provided in Section M.3, the first target
is assumed ignited at the time of the HEAF. The second target is ___________________________________
damaged at time 7 minutes (4 minutes for fire propagation from
the first to the second tray, and 3 minutes for fire propagation ___________________________________
from the second to the third tray).
– A scenario involving target in the first tray CDFi = λ g ⋅ W L ⋅ Wis ⋅ CCDPi
___________________________________
– A scenario involving the two targets CDFi = λ g ⋅ W L ⋅ Wis ⋅ Pns ⋅ CCDPi
___________________________________
Slide 34
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
Slide 35 Notes:
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
FIRE PROPAGATION TO ADJACENT
ELECTRICAL CABINETS (1 of 3) ___________________________________
___________________________________
Analytical fire models may be used in all types of fire
propagation and damage scenarios. ___________________________________
• This appendix discusses empirical approaches for ___________________________________
determining:
– Fire propagation to adjacent cabinets ___________________________________
– Fire induced damage in adjacent cabinets
___________________________________
• Empirical approach based on SNL and VTT experiments
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
Slide 35
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
12550194 2-185
Slide 36 Notes:
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
The empirical model for fire propagation consists of the

___________________________________
following rules:
___________________________________
• Assume no fire spread if either:
– Cabinets are separated by a double wall with an air gap, or ___________________________________
– Either the exposed or exposing cabinet has an open top, and there
is an internal wall, possibly with some openings, and there is no ___________________________________
diagonal cable run between the exposing and exposed cabinet.
• If fire spread cannot be ruled out, or cabinets are separated ___________________________________
by a single metal wall, assume that no significant heat
___________________________________
release occurs from the adjacent cabinet for 10 minutes if
cables in the adjacent cabinet are in direct contact with the ___________________________________
separating wall, and 15 minutes if cables are not in contact
with the wall. ___________________________________
Slide 36
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
Slide 37 Notes:
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
The empirical model for fire damage consists of the following rules: ___________________________________
• Assume loss of function in an adjacent cabinet if there is not a double
wall with an air gap. ___________________________________
• Assume no damage in the second adjacent cabinet occurs until after the
fire propagates to the adjacent cabinet. Assume damage can occur ___________________________________
earlier if there are large openings in a wall and plenum areas in which a
hot gas layer is likely to form. ___________________________________
• Assume no damage to an adjacent cabinet if:
– There is a double wall with an air gap, and ___________________________________
– There are no sensitive electronics in the adjacent cabinet (or the sensitive
electronics have been “qualified” above 82oC).
• Assume damage to sensitive electronics occurs at 10 minutes if there is a
___________________________________
double wall with an air gap.
• Assume damage to sensitive electronics can be prevented before 10
___________________________________
minutes if the fire is extinguished and the cabinet is cooled, e.g., by CO2
extinguishers. ___________________________________
Slide 37
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
12550194 2-186
Slide 38 Notes:
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
PASSIVE FIRE PROTECTION FEATURES
(1 of 6) ___________________________________
Most of the fire protection capabilities of passive fire

___________________________________
protection features cannot be evaluated using analytical fire
modeling tools. ___________________________________
___________________________________
• Empirical approaches
___________________________________
• Limited analytical approaches ___________________________________
___________________________________
• Probabilistic approaches
___________________________________
___________________________________
Slide 38
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
Slide 39 Notes:
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
(2 of 6) ___________________________________
Passive fire protection refers to fixed features put in place for

___________________________________
reducing or preventing fire propagation. Some examples are:
___________________________________
• Coatings
___________________________________
• Cable tray barriers Empirical approach
• Fire stops
___________________________________
• Dampers ___________________________________
Probabilistic approach
• Penetration seals ___________________________________
• Doors
Limited analytical approach
___________________________________
• Walls
___________________________________
Slide 39
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
12550194 2-187
Slide 40 Notes:
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
(3 of 6) ___________________________________
The analytical approach for modeling the response of passive

___________________________________
fire protection features to fire generated conditions consists of
a heat transfer analysis.
___________________________________
• The boundary conditions are the fire generated conditions. In ___________________________________
general, these consist of the heat flux exchanges at the
surface of the passive feature. ___________________________________
– Thermo-physical properties of the material are necessary. These
properties are readily available for some materials like concrete or steel. ___________________________________
• Models can be used for estimating the temperature profile
___________________________________
throughout the thickness of the barrier
• Effects of cracks and gaps in doors or walls can be evaluated ___________________________________
only with the objective of analyzing smoke migration.
___________________________________
Slide 40
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
12550194 2-188
Slide 41

(4 of 6)
The empirical approaches consist of replicating the thermal

response of fire protection features observed in fire tests in the
postulated fire scenarios.
• Coatings: SNL tests
– The cable tray configurations included both a single cable tray and a two-tray
stack. Exposure fires included either a gas burner or a diesel fuel pool fire.
• Assume coated, nonqualified cables will not ignite for at least 12 minutes,
and coated, nonqualified cables will not be damaged for at least 3
minutes for large exposure fires, and for cable tray fires, more likely about
10 minutes.
Notes:
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
12550194 2-189
Slide 42 Notes:
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
(5 of 6) ___________________________________
The empirical approaches consist of replicating the thermal

___________________________________
response of fire protection features observed in fire tests in the
postulated fire scenarios.
___________________________________
___________________________________
• Cable tray barriers and fire stops: SNL tests (same
configuration as coating tests) ___________________________________
• The following systems were tested: ___________________________________
– Ceramic wool blanket wrap, solid tray bottom covers, solid tray top
cover with no vents, solid tray bottom cover with vented top cover,
one-inch insulating barrier between cable trays, and fire stops. ___________________________________
• Propagation of the fire to the second tray was prevented in

___________________________________
each case. ___________________________________
Slide 42
___________________________________
___________________________________
Slide 43 Notes:
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
(5 of 6) (cont’d) ___________________________________
___________________________________
• Barriers seem to substantially delay cable damage for
qualified cable. The barriers did not delay cable damage for ___________________________________
nonqualified cable.
___________________________________
• Results considered most appropriate to exposure fires with
smaller HRR and to cable trays ___________________________________
in a stack threatened by fires in lower trays.
– Each barrier prevents cable tray ignition until well after the fire
___________________________________
brigade reaches the scene
(i.e., greater than 20 minutes), ___________________________________
– Each barrier prevents damage in qualified cable with solid tray
bottom covers until well after the fire brigade reaches the scene.
___________________________________
___________________________________
Slide 43
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
12550194 2-190
Slide 44 Notes:
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
(6 of 6) ___________________________________
___________________________________
Probabilistic modeling of passive fire suppression systems
___________________________________
• Dampers: Equipment unavailability obtained from ___________________________________
inspection results
___________________________________
• Penetration seals: Equipment unavailability obtained from ___________________________________

inspection results ___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
Slide 44
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
12550194 2-191
SESSION 10a: Special Fire Models Part 2
12550194 2-192
Slide 1 Notes:
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
METHODOLOGY
___________________________________
Module III Pt. 2: Special Fire Models Part 2 ___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
September 2008
___________________________________
Washington DC
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
Slide 2 Notes:
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
Module III-11, Pt. 2: Special Models Part 2
Scope of this Module ___________________________________
___________________________________
• Module III-11, Pt. 2 covers the three remaining “Special
Models” ___________________________________
– Main Control Board Fires (Appendix L) ___________________________________
– Turbine Generator (TG) Set Fires (Appendix O)
___________________________________
– Hydrogen Fires (Appendix N)
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
Module III Pt. 2: Special Fire Models Part 2
___________________________________
___________________________________
12550194 2-193
Slide 3 Notes:
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
Main Control Board Damage Likelihood Model ___________________________________
___________________________________
• The main control board (MCB) presents many analysis
challenges ___________________________________
– Design practices vary widely
• Configuration of the boards themselves ___________________________________
• Relay rack room versus main control room
• Separation and partitioning within MCB ___________________________________
– MCB may be important to risk, but IPEEE vintage approaches were
identified as a weakness of those studies ___________________________________
– Fire models cannot currently predict in-panel fire behavior so an
alternative approach is needed ___________________________________
• A method is provided to assess the likelihood that a fire in ___________________________________
the MCB will grow large enough to damage a specific target
set as defined by a specific physical region of the board ___________________________________
Slide 3
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
Slide 4 Notes:
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
• The MCB model is built on several assumptions that are
specific to the MCB and the MCR ___________________________________
– MCB fire frequency partitioning approach
– Suppression times for MCR fires ___________________________________
– Fire characteristics of a MCR type control panel (peak HRR and
growth profile) ___________________________________
– Damage limits for control components
___________________________________
• This model applies ONLY to the MCB itself
– Not intended for other electrical cabinets/panels ___________________________________
– Not intended for MCR “back-panels”
– Not intended for the relay rack room or other similar areas
___________________________________
___________________________________
Slide 4
Module III Pt. 2: Special Fire Models Part 2 Research (RES) & Electric Power Research Institute (EPRI)
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
12550194 2-194
Slide 5 Notes:
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
Module II-11, Pt. 2: Special Models Part 2
___________________________________
• To use the model you must first identify your target set
– Example: two control switches on the MCB ___________________________________
• Determine the minimum separation distance between the
most remote members of the damage set ___________________________________
– Consider cable routing within the panel!
___________________________________
• Using this distance, go to the probability curve and estimate
the conditional probability that given a fire somewhere in the ___________________________________
MCB, the specific zone encompassing the target set will be
damaged ___________________________________
• The resulting number includes BOTH the severity factor
___________________________________
AND the probability of non-suppression
– It does not include fire frequency! ___________________________________
Slide 5
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
12550194 2-195
Slide 6

Main Control Board Damage Likelihood Model
• Example:
Probability of Target Damage: [SF*Pns](d)
– Target set is two switches 0.0 0.5 1.0 1.5 2.0 2.5 3.0
located 0.5 m apart from each 1.00E-01
other
Qualified
– Inspection shows that the cables 1.00E-02 Unqualified
leading to each switch are routed

in opposite directions such that 2 1.00E-03
ft is the minimum separation
distance between the switches
1.00E-04
– The MCB contains only IEEE-
383 certified low-flame-spread
1.00E-05
cables Damage Distance [m]
– The conditional probability that a

fire occurring somewhere in the
MCB will damage the target set
is approximately 3.0E-3
Slide 6
Notes:
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
12550194 2-196
Slide 7 Notes:
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
Module II-11, Pt. 2: Special Models Part 2
Turbine Generator Set Fires ___________________________________
___________________________________
• Four types of fires can occur involving the turbine generator
set, and each is treated differently: ___________________________________
– Electrical fires in the exciter
___________________________________
– Hydrogen fires:
___________________________________
– General oil fires
___________________________________
– Catastrophic failure (e.g., blade ejection)
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
Slide 7
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
Slide 8 Notes:
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
Turbine Generator Set Fires: Exciter Fires ___________________________________
___________________________________
• Exciter fires do occur, but all evidence indicates fires remain
small and non-threatening ___________________________________
– No evidence of any exciter fire that led to damage to anything other
than the exciter itself ___________________________________
– No attempt was made to estimate likelihood of a severe exciter fire
(one that challenges external targets) ___________________________________
• Recommended Practice: ___________________________________
– Assume exciter fires remain confined to the exciter
– Verify for your application, but should not represent a significant risk
___________________________________
contributor
___________________________________
___________________________________
Slide 8
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
12550194 2-197
Slide 9 Notes:
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
Turbine Generator Set Fires: Hydrogen Fires ___________________________________
___________________________________
• Database shows 13 TG set hydrogen fires, two categorized
as severe, the rest were small leaks (generally associated ___________________________________
with seals) with limited damage range
___________________________________
• For small fires:
– Assume damage will be limited to within a few feet of the point of ___________________________________
release
– Secondary ignitions should be considered and treated if there are ___________________________________
nearby combustibles
– See more in Hydrogen Fires discussion (Appendix N) ___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
Slide 9
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
Slide 10 Notes:
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
Turbine Generator Set Fires: Hydrogen Fires ___________________________________
___________________________________
• For severe fires, widespread damage may occur due to an
explosion or detonation of the hydrogen gas. ___________________________________
– Assume fire may damage all Fire PRA cables and equipment within ___________________________________
the line of site of the generator and its bearings (including above and
below) ___________________________________
– Hydrogen explosion could cause some structural damage as well ___________________________________
___________________________________
– For further discussion – see Hydrogen Fires
___________________________________
___________________________________
Slide 10
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
12550194 2-198
Slide 11 Notes:
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
Turbine Generator Set Fires: Catastrophic Failure ___________________________________
___________________________________
• International experience includes a few fires initiated by
catastrophic turbine failure that resulted in widespread ___________________________________
damage including structural damage
– Examples: Vandellos (1989), Narora (1993), Chernobyl Unit 2 ___________________________________
(1991)
– Events involve a combination of turbine blade ejection, hydrogen ___________________________________
release, and large oil fires.
• Domestically, only one event came close to involving all of ___________________________________
these elements (Salem, 1991)
– Event involved minor damage due to existence of an automatic ___________________________________
suppression system and prompt fire brigade response
– Indicates that both automatic fire suppression systems and fire ___________________________________
brigade should be credited to prevent catastrophic consequences
observed internationally ___________________________________
Slide 11
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
Slide 12 Notes:
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
Turbine Generator Set Fires: Catastrophic Failure ___________________________________
___________________________________
• Screening approach: assume that the conditional probability
that given a T/G set fire, the event will involve catastrophic ___________________________________
failure (e.g., blade ejection), hydrogen, and oil fires:
1 over 38 events or 0.025
___________________________________
– With successful suppression, damage would be limited to the T/G ___________________________________
system, as was the case at Salem
___________________________________
– In case of failure of all suppression, automatic and manual, assume
loss of all Fire PRA cables and equipment in the Turbine Building
___________________________________
• Possible failure of exposed structural steel as well
___________________________________
– Estimate screening CDF contribution, refine as appropriate
___________________________________
Slide 12
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
12550194 2-199
Slide 13 Notes:
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
Hydrogen Fires ___________________________________
___________________________________
• This discussion (Appendix N) applies to general hydrogen
fires ___________________________________
– Including TG set fires
___________________________________
– Also other source of hydrogen leaks and releases (e.g., recombiners,
storage tanks, piping, etc.) ___________________________________
• The intent was to provide general discussion of hydrogen ___________________________________
fires and their potential effects
___________________________________
• The discussion stops short of recommending modeling
approaches, but does provide references to various ___________________________________
information resources
___________________________________
Slide 13
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
Slide 14 Notes:
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
Hydrogen Fires ___________________________________
___________________________________
• Two general types of fires:
– Jet fires originating at point of a H2 leak

___________________________________
• Critical question will be flame length
___________________________________
– Explosions
• If there is a mechanism for the release of large quantities of H2 (e.g., a
___________________________________
large leak, a prolonged leak that might not be ignited early) then
likelihood of a hydrogen explosion is high ___________________________________
• References provide additional resources for assessing damage potential
for an explosion scenario ___________________________________
• Critical question will be the severity of the overpressure
___________________________________
___________________________________
Slide 14
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
12550194 2-200
12550194 2-201
Workshop Problems on Task 11a: Detailed Fire Modeling
This handout includes workshop problems on the different steps of Task 11: Detailed Fire
Modeling. Problems are grouped according to the steps defined in NUREG/CR-6850. Detailed
fire modeling will be conducted in the switchgear access room (Room 9) located in elevation 20
ft of the auxiliary building.
Workshop Problem Set 11a-01

Step 1a: Identify and Characterize Compartments: Review the following information
necessary for fire modeling purposes.
- Room size: For the purpose of this exercise, assume the size of the room is 45’ by 22’
by 20’ high.
- Wall boundaries: The surfaces, floor, ceiling, and walls are reinforced concrete. All the
surfaces are 2’ thick.
- Doors: The room has three doorways: 1) a double door connecting to switchgear room
A, 2) a double door connecting to switchgear room B, and 3) a single door connecting to
the stairwell. The size of a single door is 6.5’ by 3’.
- Mechanical Ventilation: The switchgear access room has a mechanical ventilation
system with a balance 5 air changes per hour.
12550194 2-202
Step 2a: Identify and Characterize fire Detection and Suppression Features and
Systems: Review the following information necessary for fire modeling purposes.
- Prompt detection: Prompt detection is not credited since there is no incipient fire
detection system in the room and no continuous fire watch.
- Prompt suppression: Prompt suppression is not credited since there is no continuous
fire watch in the room.
- Fixed fire detection system/s (type, and sensor location): An automatic fire detection
system is credited since the room is equipped with an automatic fire detection system.
The location of the relevant detectors is specified in the corresponding scenario
descriptions later in this document.
- Fixed fire suppression system/s (type and nozzle location): An automatic CO2 system is
credited since the room is equipped with an automatic CO2 system. Upon smoke
detection alarm, a timer starts providing 60 seconds delay for life safety purposes. The
CO2 is released after the delay time. The soak time is approximately 20 min.
- Fire brigade arrival time: The fire brigade arrival time is assumed to be 15 min.
- Delayed detection: Delayed detection is credited and assumed to be 15 minutes
(consistent with the example in page P-14 of NUREG/CR-6850).
12550194 2-203
Step 3a: Characterize Fire Ignition Sources: From the Task 6 (Fire Ignition Frequencies)
calculation package, list the fixed ignition sources located in the switchgear access room (room
9) and assign a heat release rate probability distribution to each of them from Table G-1 of
NUREG/CR-6850.
Solution: Table 1 lists the recommended answer to workshop problem 3.
Table 1: Summary of ignition source characteristics in the switchgear access room.

Case (Table E-1 of HRR Profile
Equipment ID Equipment Description
NUREG/CR-6850) (Page G-6 in NUREG/CR-6850)
MCC-A1
MCC-B1
VITAL-A
VITAL-B
Transients
12550194 2-204
Step 4a: Identify Secondary Combustibles: No workshop problem is associated with this
step. The following discussion provides an example of how to identify and characterize
secondary combustibles.
Sample Analysis for Step 4a:

For the purpose of this example, let’s assume that there is one cable tray stack above each
cabinet in the room. Each stack has two trays. The first tray is 1’ above each cabinet. The
second tray in the stack is 1.5’ above the first tray. The trays are ladder-back. A pictorial
representation of the secondary combustibles in provided in Figure 1.
1.5’
Secondary Secondary
combustibles combustibles
1’
Cabinet in Cabinet in switchgear

switchgear access room
access
room Side view
Front view
Figure 1: Pictorial representation of the secondary combustibles. Drawing not to scale.
From Table 1, the cabinets in the switchgear access room will have a peak heat release rate of
211 kW. Heskestad’s flame height correlation (Chapter 3 of NUREG 1805) suggests a flame
height of approximately 4.6’ above the ignition source. Therefore, the cable tray stack above
the cabinet is expected to ignite and contributing to the fire intensity. Table 2 lists the
Heskestad’s flame height correlation analysis.
Table 2: Heskestad’s flame height correlation analysis.

Heskdestad's Flame Height Correlation
Inputs
Fire diameter [m] 0.6
HRR [kW] 211
Results
Flame height [ft] 4.6
12550194 2-205
Step 5a: Identify and Characterize Target Sets: No workshop problem is associated with this
step. The following discussion provides an example of how to identify and characterize target
sets. In practice, this step requires highlighting of cable tray and conduit targets in room layout
drawings based on cable routing analysis and plant walkdowns.

For the purpose of this exercise, let’s assume that there are two target sets in the room:
1) HCBT-35A and HCBT-35B, and 2) VCBT-20A, and VCBT-20B. These trays are identified in
Figure 2. The trays have both thermo-set and thermo-plastic cables. Specifically, a fire
damaging either the two horizontal trays or the two vertical trays will generate the postulated
plant condition.
Figure 2: Cable tray locations in the switchgear access room
Tray locations:
• HCBT 35A: This horizontal tray comes into the switchgear access room from switchgear
room A. The tray is the second tray in an elevated stack. The lowest tray in the stack is at
elevation 33’ (13’ from the floor). The target tray, HCBT 35A, is at elevation 35’ (15’ ft from
the floor and 2’ above the lowest tray in the stack).
• HCBT 37B: This horizontal tray comes in the south direction into the switchgear access
room from switchgear room B and turns west. The tray is the first tray in an elevated stack.
It is located at elevation 37’ (17’ from the floor). At the point the cable tray crosses HCBT
35A, it is the third tray in the stack.
• VCBT 20A: This is a vertical cable tray in the south west corner of the room. The tray
comes into the room through a floor penetration at elevation 20’ and runs up to the ceiling.
• VCBT 20B: This is a vertical cable tray in the south west corner of the room. The tray
Workshop Problem 11a-04

Step 6a: Define the Fire Scenarios to be Analyzed: Define the fire scenarios to be analyzed
in the switchgear access room using the information provided or collected in the first five steps.
• Fixed ignition source fire scenarios:

Solution:
12550194 2-206
• Transient ignition source fire scenarios:
Solution:
12550194 2-207
Step 7a: Conduct Fire Growth and Propagation Analysis: For the purpose of this workshop,
only two of the fire scenarios listed in the previous section are analyzed in detail: Scenario 1,
and Scenario 4.
Workshop Problem 11a-05:

Determine if a fire in the ignition sources associate with scenarios 1 and 4 can produce room
wide damage in the switchgear access room. If the ignition sources alone are not expected to
generate room wide damage, determine the amount of secondary combustibles necessary to
achieve it.
Solution:
12550194 2-208
Determine the time to target damage, time to smoke detection, time to automatic suppression
and the fire brigade arrival time for scenario 1.
Solution:
12550194 2-209
Solution:
12550194 2-210
Let’s assume that MCC-A1, which is the ignition source in scenario 1 it’s a 4160V switchgear.
In this case, a high energy arcing fault event should be also postulated and evaluated.
Determine if the cable tray targets will be within the zone of influence of a high energy arcing
fault.
Solution:
12550194 2-211
Step 8a: Conduct Fire Detection and Suppression Analysis: The detection and suppression is
reflected in the risk analysis with the non-suppression probability, which is calculated using a
Detection/Suppression event tree approach discussed in Appendix P of NUREG/CR-6850,
Detection and Suppression Analysis. Recall that the switchgear access room is equipped with a
smoke detection system, and an automatic CO2 system. The CO2 system has a 60 second
warning alarm delay. In addition to these fixed systems, the fire brigade can also provide manual
suppression activities.
Considering the above fire protection features, the suppression strategy in the switchgear
access room can be summarized as:
1. Indication of smoke detection in control room
2. Control room sends an operator to the switchgear access room to confirm the fire
3. If fire is confirmed, the operator first if the automatic CO2 system operated.
4. If further suppression activities are warranted after any of the automatic systems, manual
suppression by the fire brigade may be used.

Develop a detection suppression event tree for the fire protection strategy defined above.
Solution:
12550194 2-212
Step 9a: Calculate Conditional Non-Suppression Probability and Severity Factor:
Determine the severity factor and the non-suppression probability for scenario 1.
Solution:
12550194 2-213
Step 10a: Calculate Scenario Frequency: Using the ignition frequency calculated in Task 6
for the ignition sources in the switchgear access room, and the severity factor and non-
suppression probability calculated in the previous step for scenario 1, determine the frequency
for fire scenario 1.
Solution:
12550194 2-214
SESSION 11a: Main Control Room Fire Analysis
12550194 2-215
Slide 1 Notes:
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
METHODOLOGY
___________________________________
Task 11b - Main Control Room Fire ___________________________________
Analysis
___________________________________
___________________________________
September 2008
Washington DC
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
Slide 2 Notes:
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
Main Control Room Fire Analysis
Objectives ___________________________________
___________________________________
The objective of this module is:
• Describe the recommended approach for detailed fire ___________________________________
modeling in the main control room. Specifically:
___________________________________
– Differences between the main control room and other
compartments ___________________________________
– Criteria for abandonment due to fire generated environmental
conditions ___________________________________
– Description of how to calculate:
___________________________________
• Forced control room abandonment time
• Conditional probability of damage to a target set ___________________________________
___________________________________
Slide 2
Task 11b - Main Control Room Fire Analysis Research (RES) & Electric Power Research Institute (EPRI)
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
12550194 2-216
Slide 3 Notes:
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
What is Different in the MCR? ___________________________________
___________________________________
• The control and instrumentation circuits of all redundant
trains for almost all plant systems are present in the control ___________________________________
room.
– Redundant train controls may be installed within a short distance ___________________________________
– Small fires within control panels may be risk-significant.
___________________________________
• The room is continuously occupied, which provides the
capability of “prompt detection and suppression.” ___________________________________
• Evaluating control room abandonment conditions is
necessary. ___________________________________
– Abandonment refers to situations in which control room operators are
forced to leave due to untenable fire generated conditions
___________________________________
(temperature, toxicity, and visibility).
___________________________________
Task 11b - Main Control Room Fire Analysis
Slide 3
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
Slide 4 Notes:
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
Recommended Steps ___________________________________
• Step 1: Identify and characterize main control room features

___________________________________
• Step 2: Estimate control room fire frequency
• Step 3: Identify and characterize fire detection and suppression features
___________________________________
and systems
• Step 4: Characterize alternate shutdown features ___________________________________
• Step 5: Identify and characterize target sets
• Step 6: Identify and characterize ignition sources ___________________________________
• Step 7: Define fire scenarios
• Step 8: Conduct fire growth and propagation analysis ___________________________________
• Step 9: Fire detection and suppression analysis and severity factor
• Step 10: Estimate failure probability of using alternate shutdown ___________________________________
features
• Step 11: Estimate probability of control room abandonment ___________________________________
• Step 12: Calculate scenario frequencies
• Step 13: Document analysis results ___________________________________
Slide 4
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
12550194 2-217
Slide 5 Notes:
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
Step 1: Identify and Characterize MCR Features ___________________________________
The specific features of the control room and the control board are ___________________________________
identified.
• Control room dimensions ___________________________________
• Other adjacent compartments included in the MCR proper
• Location, shape, dimensions and special features of the control panels ___________________________________
and other electrical panels
• Main control board layout and location of various controls and displays ___________________________________
• Cable penetration into the control room and into the control panels
• Ventilation system characteristics
• Wall construction type and thickness;
___________________________________
• False ceiling features and the ceiling above it
• False floor and cable channels under the floor ___________________________________
• Openings in the false ceiling should be specifically noted as potential
pathway for hot gases entering the area between the two ceilings. ___________________________________
• Problem Set 11b-01 (Example)
___________________________________
Slide 5
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
12550194 2-218
Slide 6

Step 2: Control Room Fire Frequency
The MCR fire frequency includes contributions from the Main Control Board (bin #4), PWC -
Electrical cabinets (bin #15), PWC- Self Ignited Cable Fires (bin #12), Control/Aux/Reactor
Bldg. - general transient fires (bin #7), transient fires caused by welding and cutting (bin
#6) and cable fires caused by welding and cutting (bins #5) as follows:
λMCR = WL,MCR(λMCB + WPWC,Elec.Cab,MCR λPWC,Elec.Cab.
+ WPWC,SICF λPWC,SICF + WCAR,trans,MCRλtransient
+ WCAR,weld,MCRλCAR,welding+ WCAR,weld-cables,MCR λCAR, weld-cables)
Problem Set 11.b-02
Slide 6
Notes:
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
12550194 2-219
Slide 7 Notes:
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
Step 3: Fire Detection and Suppression Features ___________________________________
The detection and suppression features that may be credited

___________________________________
when analyzing the fire scenarios are identified in this step.
___________________________________
• Smoke detectors (false and main ceilings and control
panels) ___________________________________
• Detectors in the ventilation ducts and their function ___________________________________
• Fixed fire suppression systems inside and outside the
___________________________________
control panels,
• Location and characteristics of portable fire extinguishers ___________________________________
• Location and characteristics of hose reels. ___________________________________
• Problem Set 11b-03 (Example) ___________________________________
Slide 7
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
Slide 8 Notes:
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
Step 4: Characterize Alternate Shutdown Features ___________________________________
The features of alternate shutdown capability vary widely among

___________________________________
NPP’s
• In general, a control panel is installed at a location away from the ___________________________________
control room where the operators can control and monitor key
core cooling functions and parameters independent of the MCR. ___________________________________
• In other plants, alternate shutdown capability is achieved through
a set of control points and control panels located at various ___________________________________
points of the plant requiring coordinated actions of several
operators. ___________________________________
• It is necessary for the fire risk analysts to understand the
alternate shutdown capability of the plant. ___________________________________
– For example, the analyst may select safety-related target sets on the
panel that are not backed up by an alternate shutdown control or
instrumentation circuit.
___________________________________
• Problem Set 11b-04 (Example) ___________________________________
Slide 8
___________________________________
___________________________________
12550194 2-220
Slide 9 Notes:
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
Step 5: Identify and Characterize Target Sets ___________________________________
The target sets can be identified by systematically examining ___________________________________
combinations of control and instrumentation items found on the
control panels, electrical cabinets, wireways, and cable raceways ___________________________________
inside the MCR.
• Examine the control panels from one end to the other ___________________________________
• Groups of adjacent controls and instrumentation ___________________________________
• Cursory and conservative estimation of the CCDP/CLERP as
the basis ___________________________________
• Elements of a set are located within the reach of a potential fire ___________________________________
• Exposure fire affecting multiple cabinets
___________________________________
• Problem Set 11.b-05
___________________________________
Slide 9
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
Slide 10 Notes:
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
Step 6: Identify and Characterize Ignition Sources ___________________________________
The final product of this step is a list of ignition sources, their

___________________________________
relevant characteristics, and fire ignition frequencies
associated with each source ___________________________________
• Similar to Step 3.a of single compartment analysis
• Type, quantity, dimensions and heat release rate profile of each ___________________________________
source
• Main control board as ignition source
___________________________________
• Assume fire might occur at any point on a control panel
• Other control panels, electrical cabinets, wireways, and cable
___________________________________
raceways ___________________________________
• Kitchen appliances and other electrical devices?
• Transient combustible fires ___________________________________
• Frequency of fire ignition based on Step 2b analysis
• Problem Set 11.b-06 ___________________________________
Slide 10
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
12550194 2-221
Slide 11 Notes:
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
Step 7: Define Fire Scenarios ___________________________________
Four types of fire scenarios are specifically recommended for

___________________________________
evaluation
___________________________________
• Fire inside the main control board and stand-alone
electrical cabinets that are open into each other,
___________________________________
• Fires affecting two adjacent electrical cabinets that do not ___________________________________

open into each other; and
___________________________________
• Fires affecting two non-adjacent electrical cabinets,
___________________________________
• Transient fires
___________________________________
___________________________________
Slide 11
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
12550194 2-222
Slide 12

Step 8: Fire Growth and Propagation Analysis
The methodology suggests the following specific approach

for conducting fire growth and propagation analysis:
• Fire inside the main control board
– Use Appendix L
Notes:
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12550194 2-223
Slide 13

Step 8: Fire Growth . . . (cont’d)
A probabilistic model of the main control board fire spread

estimates the likelihood that a set of targets separated by a
predetermined distance would be affected by a fire.
• Difficult to model fire spread within a cabinet using current
state-of-the-art analytical tools.
• Probabilistic model based on EPRI’s Fire Events Database
and cabinet fire experiments reported in NUREG/CR-4527.
• The likelihood is a combination of severity factors and non-
suppression probabilities
λ (d ) = λ MCB [ SF ⋅ Pns ](d )

Notes:
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12550194 2-224
Slide 14

The likelihood is a combination of severity factors and non-suppression

probabilities integrated over all possible fire events inside the panel that
may damage the postulated target set.
• All possible fire origin locations
d
H
h
λ (d ) = λ MCB [ SF ⋅ Pns ](d ) φ
1 HW
[ SF ⋅ Pns ](d ) = ∫ ∫SF (d , w, h ) ⋅ Pns ( d , w, h ) dwdh
⋅
H W 00
Notes:
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12550194 2-225
Slide 15

• Two adjacent but separated control cabinets

– No propagation if panels are separated by a double wall with an air
gap (Appendix S)
– If separated by a single wall,
– If open back panels, check for direct radiation or other damaging fire
generated conditions
• Non-Adjacent cabinets
λ Adjacent Cabinets (d a ) = λMCB [ SF ⋅ Pns ](d a ) Pns (15 min)
– Very small likelihood of damage among non-adjacent cabinets
– Check for transient fires between cabinets
– Assume time to target damage of 15 min if there is direct exposure
from the fire to the panel walls
• Problem Set 11.b-07
Slide 15
Notes:
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12550194 2-226
Slide 16 Notes:
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
Step 9: Non-Supp Prob & Severity Factor ___________________________________
The non-suppression probability and severity factors are ___________________________________

calculated as recommended in the approach for single
compartment fires ___________________________________
• For fires inside a control panel, use the method described

___________________________________
in Appendix L ___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
Slide 16
___________________________________
___________________________________
Slide 17 Notes:
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
Step 10: Estimate Failure Prob Using ASP ___________________________________
___________________________________
Two approaches may be followed:
___________________________________
• An overall failure probability is estimated representing the
failure of the alternate shutdown means. ___________________________________
• The alternate shutdown procedure is integrated in the plant ___________________________________
response model (i.e., the fault trees and event trees). The
core damage sequences are adjusted to include failures ___________________________________
associated with alternate shutdown means, and the human
___________________________________
error probabilities are reevaluated based on the alternate
shutdown procedures. ___________________________________
___________________________________
Slide 17
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
12550194 2-227
Slide 18 Notes:
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
Step 11: Estimate Prob of Control Room Abandonment ___________________________________
The final decision to abandon the control room is assumed ___________________________________

to depend on habitability conditions.
___________________________________
• The analyst may postulate that the alternate shutdown ___________________________________
procedure would be activated
___________________________________
• The time to activate the alternate shutdown procedure is
suggested to be established based on plant operating ___________________________________
procedures rather than control room habitability conditions
___________________________________
• Abandonment possibility should be examined for all
postulated target damage scenarios ___________________________________
___________________________________
Slide 18
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
12550194 2-228
Slide 19

Step 11: Estimate Prob of Control Room Abandonment
Abandonment criteria based on habitability conditions

• Temperature, or heat flux
– The heat flux at 6′ above the floor exceeds 1 kW/m2. This can be
considered as the minimum heat flux for pain to skin. A smoke layer
of approximately 95°C (200°F) could generate such heat flux.
q& ′′ = σ ⋅ Tsl4 ≈ 1.0 kW m 2
• The smoke or hot gas layer descends below 6′ from the floor
• Visibility
– Optical density of the smoke is less than 3.0 m-1. With such optical
density, a light-reflecting object would not be seen if its more than
0.4m away. A light-emitting object will not be seen if it is more than
1m away.
• A panel fire affects two target items 2.13 m (7′) apart.
Slide 19
Notes:
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12550194 2-229
Slide 20 Notes:
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
Step 11: Estimate Prob of Control Room Abandonment ___________________________________
The conditional probability of abandonment can be estimated

___________________________________
based on the calculated evacuation time.
___________________________________
• Determine the heat release rate generating abandonment
conditions ___________________________________
• Calculate the severity factor for fires of this size ___________________________________
• Determine the time for abandonment ___________________________________
– Time to reach untenable conditions such as 200oF hot gas layer or
smoke density conditions of 3.0 m-1 ___________________________________
• Calculate non-suppression probability
___________________________________
• Multiply the severity factor and non-suppression probability
to determine conditional abandonment probability. ___________________________________
Slide 20
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
12550194 2-230
Slide 21

Example
• Credit prompt detection

• Suppression by fire brigade Inputs
– Pns from CR suppression Duration [sec]
curve Opening area [m2] 4
Height of opening [m] 2
• SF from probability Room length [m] 20
distribution for vertical Room width [m]
Room height [m]
15
6
cabinets with unqualified Thermal conductivity [kW/mK] 0.0014
Density [kg/m3] 2000
cable and fire propagating to Specific heat [kJ/kg] 0.88
more than one bundle. Wall thickness [m] 0.15
Temperature for abandonment [C] 93
• Problem Set 11.b-08 (Example)
Slide 21
Notes:
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12550194 2-231
Slide 22

Example (cont’d)
2.5E-01 900
800
2.0E-01 700
600
1.5E-01
500
[kW]
Prob
400
1.0E-01
300
5.0E-02 200
100
0.0E+00 0
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70
Time for a 200 F HGL
SF Pns HRR [kW]
Duration [Min] Required HRR [kW] SF Pns SF*Pns

5 794 3.2E-02 1.9E-01 6.1E-03
10 668 4.8E-02 3.7E-02 1.8E-03
15 603 6.0E-02 7.1E-03 4.2E-04
20 561 6.9E-02 1.4E-03 9.4E-05
25 531 7.7E-02 2.6E-04 2.0E-05
Notes:
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12550194 2-232
Slide 23 Notes:
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
The main control room has unique characteristics that are

___________________________________
addressed in detail in Task 11b.
___________________________________
• Recommended fire scenarios for the MCR ___________________________________
___________________________________
• Evaluation of MCR abandonment due to fire generated
conditions ___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
Slide 23
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
12550194 2-233
12550194 2-234
Workshop Problems for Task 11b: Detailed Fire Modeling in the Main
Control Room
Workshop Problem Set 11b-01 (Example)

Step 1.b: Identify and Characterize Main Control Room Features: The following list
summarizes the key features of the Main Control Room (MCR):
• The MCR is located at Elevation 55ft of the Auxiliary Building. See Drawings A-01 and A-
07 for details.
• In this analysis, the kitchen and shift supervisor’s office are included as part of Main Control
Room proper.
• The dimensions of the MCR proper are as follows:
- 15’ft high
- 50 ft long
- 30 ft wide
• Access to the kitchen and shift supervisor’s office are solely from the control room
• The kitchen includes an electric water heater and a microwave oven, a refrigerator, a sink,
kitchen cabinets and a small dining table and chairs.
• The shift supervisor’s office includes a desk, a computer and printer, chairs and large
quantity of reports, engineering documents and other paper documents.
• The Main Control Room includes the following:
- A horse shoe shaped main control board (MCB) (see Drawing A-09 for details)
- One free standing electrical panel where fire protection system display and controls are
mounted
- Two desks, assortment of chairs, book cases containing paper documents
- Two printers with continuous feed paper roll.
• The main control board (MCB) is 22 feet long and 9 feet tall
• The fire protection panel has only one segment (there are no divisional walls within the
panel). The panel is 8 feet tall, 3feet deep and 6 feet wide.
• The walls of the MCR are made of reinforced concrete with no penetrations in the ceiling and
the walls except for a ventilation opening in the east wall. There are sealed control cable
penetrations under the MCB and fire protection panel.
• Ventilation (heating, cooling and fresh air supply) is provided by a dedicated unit that
provides fresh air from outside and can be shut closed by the MCR operators and put on a
recirculation mode.
• There is a false ceiling 3 feet below the control ceiling of the MCR. The false ceiling is
composed of light non-combustible boards held by an aluminum structure.
12550194 2-235
The following list summarizes the key features of the Main Control Board (MCB):
• The Main Control Board is composed of 7 segments (CB-1 through Cb-7). See Drawings A-
01 and A-07 for details.
• Each Main Control Board segment is separated from the adjacent segments by a partial wall
that extends halfway inside the panel.
• All cables enter the panel from below through sealed penetrations.
• The insulation of the cable and wires is a mixture of thermoset and thermoplastic insulation.
• The back and top of the control panel is closed. There are doors on the side walls that are
normally closed.
• Instrumentation technicians enter the Main Control Board for various tasks no more than
once per week.
• There are no power cables in the Main Control Board.
12550194 2-236
Workshop Problem Set 11b-02
Step 2.b: Estimate Control Room Fire Frequency: For the overall MCR fire frequency the
equation provided on pages 11-33 and 11-34 of NUREG/CR-6850 has been updated to read as
follows:
λMCR = WL,MCR(λMCB + WPWC,Elec.Cab,MCR.λPWC,Elec.Cab. + Wtransients,MCRλtransient +
Wwelding,MCRλwelding + WCable,MCRλcable )
where:
λMCR : Main Control Room fire frequency
WL, MCR : Location weighting factor for the MCR
λMCB : Main Control Board fire frequency (Table 6-1, bin 4)
WPWC, Elec. Cab, MCR.: Ignition source weighting factor of Plant Wide Electrical Cabinets
found in the Main Control Room.
λPWC, Elec. Cab. : Fire frequency of Plant Wide Electrical Cabinets (applies to all electrical
cabinets in the plant including those panels in the MCR that were not
labeled as MCB.) (Table 6-1, bin 15)
Wtransients, MCR : Ignition source weighting factor of Control/Aux/Rx Bldg Transient Fire
events that may occur in the MCR. This fraction should be computed
using the same method as for transients for other parts of the location
using the following influencing factors:
- Maintenance – Low
- Occupancy – High
- Storage – High (reflecting large quantity of paper materials)
λtransient : Control/Aux/Rx Bldg Transient fire frequency (Table 6-1, bin 7).
Wwelding, MCR : If welding is allowed in the MCR during power operation, this ignition
source weighting factor should be evaluated in the same way as that for
transient fire using the following influencing factors:
λwelding : Control/Aux/Rx Bldg, transient fires caused by welding frequency
(Table 6-1, bin 6).
WCable,MCR: Ignition source weighting factor of Control/Aux/Rx Bldg Cable Fires
Caused by Welding and Cutting that may occur in the MCR. This fraction
should be computed using the same method as for transients for other parts
of the location using the following influencing factors:
λcable : Control/Aux/Rx Bldg, cable fires caused by welding frequency
(Table 6-1, bin 5).
12550194 2-237
Workshop Problem Set 11b-02 (continued)
Step 2.b: Estimate Control Room Fire Frequency: Using the information provided in this
Sample Package, and the above formula copied from NUREG/CR 6850, estimate the frequency
of fire for the SNPP MCR.
WL, MCR = per ________
λMCB = per ________
WPWC, Elec. Cab, MCR. = per ________
λPWC, Elec. Cab. = per ________
Wtransients, MCR = per ________
λtransient = per ________
Wwelding, MCR = per ________
λwelding = per ________
WCable,MCR: = per ________
λcable = per ________
λMCR =
12550194 2-238
Step 3.B: Identify and Characterize Fire Detection and Suppression Features and Systems:
The following list summarizes the key features of the fire detection and suppression systems of
the Main Control Room (MCR):
• At least two qualified operators are present in the MCR at all times.
• There are smoke detectors under the false ceiling
• There are smoke detectors above the false ceiling
• There are portable fire extinguishers inside the kitchen and inside the Control Room area
• There is a wet hose reel in the Control Room Access area that can reach anywhere within the
control room
• The ventilation system can be switched to smoke purge mode to exhaust the air from the
control room to the outside.
12550194 2-239
Step 4.B: Characterize Alternate Shutdown Features: The following list summarizes the key
features of the Alternate Shutdown Panel:
• The Alternate Shutdown Panel is located at El. +20ft, in the SWG Access Room. The panel
is located at the North wall between the two switchgear room doors.
• The following list of components can be controlled from the Alternate Shutdown Panel.
Control Room
Equipment ID Equipment Description Power Supply
Panel
HPI-A High pressure safety injection pump A 4.16kV Bus A CB-5
HPI-B High pressure safety injection pump B 4.16kV Bus B CB-5
AFW-A Motor driven AFW pump A 4.16kV Bus A CB-3
AFW-C Motor driven AFW pump C 4.16 kV Bus 2 CB-3
AOV-2 (SOV-2) Letdown isolation valve 125 VDC Bus B CB-5
MOV-1 HPI valve 480V MCC A1 CB-5
MOV-2 VCT isolation valve 480V MCC B1 CB-5
MOV-9 HPI valve 480V MCC B1 CB-5
MOV-10 AFW discharge valve 480V MCC A1 CB-3
MOV-11 AFW discharge valve 125 VDC Bus B CB-3
MOV-14 AFW turbine steam line isolation valve 125 VDC Bus B CB-3
MOV-15 AFW steam inlet throttle valve 125 VDC Bus B CB-3
MOV-18 AFW C Pump Discharge 480 V MCC-2 CB-3
MOV-19 AFW test line isolation valve 480 V MCC-2 CB-3
LI-1 RWST level 120VAC Bus A CB-5
LI-2 RWST level 120VAC Bus B CB-5
A-1 AFW motor high temp 120VAC Bus A CB-3
EDG-A Train A Emergency Diesel Generator PNL-A CB-6
EDG-B Train B Emergency Diesel Generator PNL-B CB-6
• To activate the alternate shutdown panel, the operators have to enter each switchgear room
separately and transfer the controls of the desired components from the Main Control Board
to the Alternate Shutdown Panel.
• A separate set of procedures exists for taking control at the Alternate Shutdown Panel.
12550194 2-240
Step 5.b: Identify and characterize target sets: Identify at least five target sets for the Main
Control Room by inspecting drawings DWG A-07 and A-09 and other information provided in
this Sample Package.
Target Set
Items in the target set Basis for selecting target set
ID
12550194 2-241
Steps 6.b: Identify and Characterize Ignition Sources:
Steps 7.b: Define Fire Scenarios: For the target sets provided in the solution of the preceding
problem set, identify the corresponding ignition sources and fire scenarios.
Target Set
Ignition Sources Fire Scenarios
ID
MCR-01
MCR-02
MCR-03
MCR-04
MCR-05
12550194 2-242
Step 8b: Conduct Fire Growth and Propagation Analysis
Step 9b: Detection and Suppression Analysis and Severity Factor: Using the information
provided in the solution to Problem Set 11b-03 and Figure L-1, conduct fire propagation,
detection and suppression analysis for the following fire scenarios and calculate scenario
frequency:
MCR-03.1
SFxPNS =
λMCR-03.1 =
MCR-04.1
SFxPNS =
λMCR-04.1 =
12550194 2-243
Step 11.B: Estimate Probability of Control Room Abandonment: The following is an
example case presented here as an illustration on how the probability of abandonment can be
estimated
The probability of abandonment represents the likelihood of a fire generating adverse
environmental conditions meeting the criteria for control room evacuation described in Task 11
of NUREG/CR-6850. The abandonment criteria suggests that analysts must assume operators
will leave the control room if:
• The room or hot gas layer temperature reaches 200 oF (93 oC).
• The heat flux to the control room floor is above 1 kW/m2,
• The hot gas layer is 6 ft or lower above the floor and has and optical density of 3.0 1/m.
Such optical density will prevent operators to see through smoke.
Considering these criteria, the abandonment probability was calculated as follows:
1. From Task 6, the ignition sources in the main control room are:
- the main control board,
- vertical electrical cabinets and
- transients.
2. The probability distribution for heat release rate Case 5 in Table E-1 of NUREG/CR-6850
has been assigned to the main control board and other electrical cabinets. This distribution
applies to cabinets with un-qualified cables and fire spreading to more than one cable bundle.
3. The time to abandonment was calculated deterministically for the range of heat release rate
values defined by the probability distributions listed in item 1 above. The zone model
MAGIC was used for these calculations. Relevant inputs to MAGIC include the geometry of
the main control room complex, and the mechanical ventilation system. The time to
abandonment is the shortest time when one of the three defined above criteria is met.
4. Each MAGIC result (i.e., the time to abandonment resulting from a specific heat release rate
input) is associated with a severity factor from the corresponding probability distribution for
heat release rate. Similarly, there is a corresponding non-suppression probability for each
MAGIC result. The non-suppression probability captures the likelihood that the fire will not
be suppressed before the calculated abandonment time.
5. The resulting abandonment probability and average abandonment times are a weighted
average of all the probabilities of fire sizes and corresponding non-suppression probabilities.
Table 3 summarizes the calculation of abandonment probabilities and average abandonment
times for electrical cabinets. The first column in Table 3 refers to the heat release rate value used
in MAGIC for determining the time to abandonment. The column labeled SF lists the severity
factor associated with the heat release rate value (taken from Appendix E of NUREG/CR-6850).
The Time column lists the resulting time to abandonment calculated with MAGIC. The column
labeled Pns lists the non-suppression probabilities. In general, Pns = exp(-λt) where λ for the
control room is 0.33 (see Appendix P of NUREG/CR-6850), and t is the time listed in the
“Time” column.
12550194 2-244
The average abandonment time is calculated as
tˆab =
∑ t ⋅ SF ⋅ P
i i ns −i
∑ SF ⋅ P i ns −i
which is the weighted average of the abandonment times calculated with MAGIC. The
abandonment probability is calculated as
Pab = ∑ SFi ⋅ Pns −i
which can also be interpreted as an average non-suppression probability since the SFi’s for all
possible heat release rates add to one. The following results are obtained using the two equations
above:
• Electrical cabinets: Average abandonment time is approximately 8 minutes and the
probability of abandonment is approximately 1.3E-2.
• Transient fires: For the purpose of this study, the time to abandonment and the
abandonment probability calculated for electrical cabinet fires is assumed to be the same as
for transient fires. This is a conservative assumption since the heat release rate profiles for
the electrical cabinet fire suggests higher fire intensities with faster profiles that are expected
to result in faster abandonment times.
Table 3: Time to abandonment and abandonment probability analysis for electrical cabinet fires.
Calculations assume no mechanical ventilation system in the room.
Time to Abb
HRR [kW] SF (min) Pns SF·Pns
1 0.0E+00 60 2.5E-09 0.0E+00
42 6.4E-01 60 2.5E-09 1.6E-09
197 1.6E-01 16 5.1E-03 7.9E-04
337 8.1E-02 11 3.1E-02 2.5E-03
475 4.7E-02 9 4.9E-02 2.3E-03
612 2.9E-02 8 6.4E-02 1.9E-03
749 1.8E-02 8 8.0E-02 1.4E-03
886 1.1E-02 7 9.4E-02 1.0E-03
1024 7.0E-03 7 1.1E-01 7.7E-04
1162 5.0E-03 6 1.2E-01 6.2E-04
1299 3.0E-03 6 1.4E-01 4.1E-04
1436 2.0E-03 6 1.5E-01 2.9E-04
1573 1.0E-03 6 1.5E-01 1.5E-04
1710 1.0E-03 6 1.6E-01 1.6E-04
1847 1.0E-03 5 1.7E-01 1.7E-04
2276 1.0E-03 5 2.0E-01 2.0E-04
Simulations with MAGIC Software Package

As mentioned earlier, time to abandonment calculations were conducted using the zone model
MAGIC. MAGIC is a fire two-zone model, which provides the capability of simulating the
development of a hot gas layer in rooms with and without mechanical ventilation systems. Key
12550194 2-245
inputs to MAGIC includes: 1) room geometry, 2) wall thickness and construction, 3)
specifications of the mechanical ventilation system, 4) fire size and 5) fuel properties.
The control room was modeled in MAGIC as a single room. The fire was located in the center
of the common control room area. Figure 3 illustrates the geometry as modeled in MAGIC.
Notice that the control room area was modeled as having a rectangular floor base with equivalent
floor area. Simulation times were 20 minutes.
Figure 3: Control room geometry as modeled in MAGIC
The following were considered when running MAGIC:

• Room size and construction: The control room area was modeled with an effective floor area
of 67’ x 60’ and a ceiling height of 23’.
• All wall materials were modeled as 2’ thick concrete.
• Horizontal openings: As illustrated in Figure 3 above, the control room was modeled as
having one 3’ x 6’ open door.
• Mechanical ventilation: The mechanical ventilation system is modeled as a balanced
supply/exhaust system with a flow rate of 2.73 m3/s. The room also has a smoke extraction
system with two vents, each extracting 3.7 m3/s. This system is manually activated by the
fire brigade.
• For the purpose of the simulation, it is assumed that the smoke extraction system operates
10 minutes after the fire starts. At this point, the normal system is turned off.
12550194 2-246
• Heat release rate profiles: The heat release rate profiles follow the guidance provided in
Appendices E & G of NUREG/CR-6850. That is, the peak heat release rates listed in
Tables E-6 and E-9 in NUREG/CR-6850 for electrical cabinets and transients respectively
were used. It was assumed that the growth profile is t2 growing to a peak in approximately
12 minutes.
• Fuel Properties: Fuel was assumed to have a soot yield of 0.18.
Relevant outputs/Abandonment criteria
MAGIC creates one output file for each simulation. The output files contain the information
necessary for determining the time to abandonment. Specifically, the following outputs were
evaluated:
- hot gas layer temperature in the MCR area,
- hot gas layer height in the MCR area,
- Total heat flux to Target 1, and
- optical density in the MCR area.
Specific MAGIC inputs are included in the MAGIC input files. Figure 4 illustrates a snapshot of
a MAGIC simulation with and without mechanical ventilation. Notice that the simulation with no
mechanical ventilation suggests the development of a hot gas layer and flows moving out
through the open doors.
12550194 2-247
Figure 4: Pictorial representation of a MAGIC simulation of the control room fire
12550194 2-248
SESSION 12: Multi-Compartment Fire Analysis
12550194 2-249
Slide 1 Notes:
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
METHODOLOGY
___________________________________
Task 11c - Multi-Compartment Fire ___________________________________
Analysis
___________________________________
___________________________________
September 2008
Washington DC
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
Slide 2 Notes:
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
MULTI-COMPARTMENT FIRES
Objective ___________________________________
___________________________________
Fire scenarios involving multiple, interconnected or adjacent
fire compartments are analyzed in this part of Task 11. ___________________________________
• Fire propagation ___________________________________
• Smoke propagation ___________________________________
• A rare event in U.S. NPP fire experience ___________________________________
• Screening process
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
Slide 2
Task 11c - Multi-
Multi-Compartment Fire Analysis Research (RES) & Electric Power Research Institute (EPRI)
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
12550194 2-250
Slide 3 Notes:
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
Overall Approach ___________________________________
___________________________________
Multi-compartment analysis is focused on screening of
potential scenarios before any detailed analysis is attempted. ___________________________________
– Single compartment analysis to be conducted before this step
___________________________________
– Reduce number of multi-compartment combinations
___________________________________
– Same analytical approach as in Detailed Fire Modeling
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
Slide 3
Task 11c - Multi-
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
Slide 4 Notes:
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
Definitions ___________________________________
The following two terms are specifically defined for this part of
___________________________________
the analysis:
___________________________________
– Exposing Compartment: The compartment where fire ignition occurs
___________________________________
– Exposed Compartment: The compartments where fire from the
exposing compartment propagates to ___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
Slide 4
Task 11c - Multi-
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
12550194 2-251
Slide 5 Notes:
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
Analysis Steps ___________________________________
___________________________________
The following steps define one possible approach for multi-
compartment fire risk analysis: ___________________________________
– Step 1.c: Exposing and Exposed Compartments Matrix
___________________________________
– Step 2.c: First Screening–Qualitative
– Step 3.c: Second Screening–Low Fire Load Exposing Compartments

___________________________________
– Step 4.c: Third Screening–Frequency of Occurrence ___________________________________
– Step 5.c: Fourth Screening–CDF Based ___________________________________
– Step 6.c: Detailed Analysis
___________________________________
– Step 7.c: Document the Analysis
___________________________________
Task 11c - Multi-
Multi-Compartment Fire Analysis
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
Slide 6 Notes:
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
Step 1.c: Exposing and Exposed Compartments Matrix ___________________________________
Develop a matrix to identify all potential multi-compartment ___________________________________

fire scenarios that start with an exposing compartment and
propagate into a set of exposed compartments. ___________________________________
– Well defined pathways ___________________________________
– Means of propagation (i.e., hot gas, smoke, etc.) ___________________________________
– Special characteristics to be noted (e.g., self closing doors, fire ___________________________________
dampers and vents near the ceiling)
___________________________________
– More than one exposed compartment
___________________________________
– Supported by a walk-down
___________________________________
Task 11c - Multi-
Slide 6
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
12550194 2-252
Slide 7 Notes:
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
Step 1.c: Exposing and Exposed Matrix (cont’d) ___________________________________
The following rules are suggested to identify multi-

___________________________________
compartment scenarios:
___________________________________
– Postulate only one barrier failure (e.g., door left open) ___________________________________
• Unless there is a clear reason to assume common cause failure of
multiple barriers ___________________________________
– Assume minimal smoke damage ___________________________________
– Hot gas can travel to all physically possible exposed compartments ___________________________________
• For a large number of compartments open into each other, detailed
analysis may be warranted ___________________________________
___________________________________
Slide 7
Task 11c - Multi-
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
12550194 2-253
Slide 8
Step 1.c: Exposing and Exposed Matrix (cont’d)
Example:
Exposing Compartment Exposed Compartment
# # # Path Comments
ID Name ID Name
1 9 SW G Access Room 1.1 10 Swtich Gear Room A 1.1.1 Door The door is 3-hr rated and normally closed
1.1.2 Opening Ventilation opening between rooms with
fusible link activated fire dampers.
1.2 11 Swtich Gear Room B 1.2.1 Door The door is 3-hr rated and normally closed
1.2.2 Opening Ventilation opening between rooms with
fusible link activated fire dampers.
1.3 -- Stairway 1.3.1 Door The door is 3-hr rated and normally closed
2 4A RHR Room 2.1 4B AFW Pump Room 2.1.1 Door The door is 3-hr rated and normally closed
2.1.2 HVAC Duct There are two HVAC ducts with opening in
both compartments providing intake and
discharge
2.2 -- Stairway 2.2.1 Door The door is 3-hr rated and normally closed
3 4B AFW Pump Room 3.1 4A RHR Room 3.1.1 Door The door is 3-hr rated and normally closed
3.1.2 HVAC Duct There are two HVAC ducts with opening in
both compartments providing intake and
discharge
Slide 8
Task 11c - Multi-
Notes:
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
12550194 2-254
Slide 9 Notes:
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
Step 2.c: First Screening – Qualitative ___________________________________
___________________________________
The first screening of the scenarios can be based on the
contents of the exposed compartments. ___________________________________
___________________________________
The following criteria may be used:
– The exposed compartment(s) do not contain any Fire PRA ___________________________________
components or cables, or
– The Fire PRA components and cables of the exposed ___________________________________
compartment(s) are identical to those in the exposing compartment.
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
Slide 9
Task 11c - Multi-
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
Slide 10 Notes:
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
Step 3.c: Second Screening–Low Fire Load ___________________________________
Exposing compartments that do not include combustible ___________________________________

loading sufficient for generating a hot gas layer in any of the
exposed compartments can be screened out. ___________________________________
– Conservative HRR values

___________________________________
• Ignition sources with highest 98% HRR
• Add HRR of intervening combustibles
___________________________________
___________________________________
– Determine damaging HRR values
• Hand calculations ___________________________________
• Hot gas layer damage in exposed compartment
___________________________________
– Compare HRRs
___________________________________
Slide 10
Task 11c - Multi-
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
12550194 2-255
Slide 11 Notes:
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
Step 4.c: Third Screening–Occurrence Frequency ___________________________________
___________________________________
Scenario likelihood is established from the following three
parameters: ___________________________________
– Ignition frequency ___________________________________
– Combined severity factor and non-suppression probability ___________________________________
• HRR comparison (preceding step) can give the severity factor
• May assume PNS = 1.0 ___________________________________
– Barrier failure probability

___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
Slide 11
Task 11c - Multi-
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
Slide 12 Notes:
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
Step 4.c: Third Screening / Barrier Failure ___________________________________
Generally, data on barrier failure probability is sparse, and

___________________________________
what is available is subject to many limitations.
___________________________________
– Initial attempt may be based on a screening value
• May use Pr(barrier failure) = 0.1 for screening
___________________________________
– For scenarios that do not screen out, may use the following: ___________________________________
• For water curtain, use detection and suppression approach
• Verify that there are no plant-specific barrier failure problems
___________________________________
• Use the following generic barrier failure probabilities
– Type 1 – fire, security, and water tight doors – 7.4E-03
___________________________________
– Type 2 - fire and ventilation dampers – 2.7E-03
– Type 3 - penetration seals, fire walls – 1.2E-03
___________________________________
___________________________________
Task 11c - Multi-
Slide 12
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
12550194 2-256
Slide 13 Notes:
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
Step 5.c: Fourth Screening–CDF Based ___________________________________
Those scenarios that survive the preceding screening steps

___________________________________
may be screened based on their CDF. ___________________________________
___________________________________
– Assume all PRA components and cables of exposing and exposed
compartments are failed
___________________________________
– Estimate CCDP
___________________________________
___________________________________
– Use scenario frequency of preceding step
___________________________________
___________________________________
Slide 13
Task 11c - Multi-
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
Slide 14 Notes:
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
Step 6.c: Detailed Analysis ___________________________________
Those scenarios that do not screen out in the preceding

___________________________________
steps may be analyzed using the same methods as for single
compartments. ___________________________________
___________________________________
– Same set of steps as in single compartment analysis
___________________________________
– Include target sets from exposed compartment(s) ___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
Slide 14
Task 11c - Multi-
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
12550194 2-257
Slide 15 Notes:
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
Multi-compartment fire analysis should be performed to
ensure completeness of the Fire PRA. ___________________________________
– Compartment partitioning process (Task 1) has a direct impact on
this task ___________________________________
– Develop a matrix of exposing and exposed compartments to ensure ___________________________________
completeness
___________________________________
– Screening analysis is necessary to limit the level of effort
___________________________________
– Barrier failure probabilities should be treated conservatively
___________________________________
– May have to revisit some of the partitioning definitions
___________________________________
Slide 15
Task 11c - Multi-
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
12550194 2-258
SESSION 13: Seismic Fire Interaction
12550194 2-259
Slide 1 Notes:
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
METHODOLOGY
___________________________________
Task 13: Seismic Fire Interactions ___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
Joint RES/EPRI Public Workshop ___________________________________
September 2008
Washington DC
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
Slide 2 Notes:
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
Task 13 - Seismic Fire Interactions
Scope of this Task ___________________________________
• Task 13 covers the Seismic Fire Interactions review

___________________________________
– You will find that little has changed compared to the guidance ___________________________________
available in the IPEEE days
___________________________________
– The review remains a qualitative, walk-down based approach to
identify and address potential vulnerabilities or weaknesses ___________________________________
– The procedure does not recommend any quantitative work in this
area ___________________________________
The main goal of the outlined methodology is to verify that the ___________________________________
the risk associated with seismically induced fires is low.
___________________________________
___________________________________
Slide 2
Task 13: Seismic Fire Interactions Research (RES) & Electric Power Research Institute (EPRI)
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
12550194 2-260
Slide 3 Notes:
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
Task 13: Seismic Fire Interactions
Seismically Induced Fires ___________________________________
___________________________________
A severe seismic event may cause fires inside or outside an
NPP by damaging . . . ___________________________________
– Pipes and storage tanks containing flammable liquids or gases ___________________________________
– Electrical equipment
___________________________________
___________________________________
An EPRI study and NPPs experiencing earthquakes have
demonstrated that these events are rare. ___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
Slide 3
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
Slide 4 Notes:
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
Background ___________________________________
___________________________________
• Seismic Fire Interactions originated with the Fire Risk
Scoping Study (NUREG/CR-5088, 1989) ___________________________________
• The conclusion of that study was: ___________________________________
“It would appear that this is an issue which is more ___________________________________
easily corrected than quantified. A series of simple
steps was outlined which if implemented on a plant ___________________________________
specific basis would significantly reduce the potential
impact of such considerations.”
___________________________________
This conclusion remains valid today. ___________________________________
___________________________________
Slide 4
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
12550194 2-261
Slide 5 Notes:
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
Key Compartments ___________________________________
___________________________________
• The review should focus on those compartments that house
equipment and cables needed to support post-seismic safe ___________________________________
shutdown
– Review your seismic-related procedures and identify key equipment ___________________________________
(components and cables) and any required manual actions
– To the extent possible, map equipment to compartments ___________________________________
– Identify the associated compartments and focus efforts on these
compartments ___________________________________
• Areas/compartments housing the key equipment (components and
cables) ___________________________________
• Areas where a manual action takes place
• Access paths for manual actions ___________________________________
___________________________________
Slide 5
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
Slide 6 Notes:
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
Seismically-Induced Fires ___________________________________
___________________________________
• Potential sources:
– Unanchored electrical equipment such as where motion during ___________________________________
seismic event might cause a fire
– Unanchored gas cylinders ___________________________________
– Flammable gas piping
– Flammable liquid piping or storage tanks ___________________________________
• If any significant sources are identified, consider potential ___________________________________

plant modifications to minimize potential hazard. ___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
Slide 6
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
12550194 2-262
Slide 7 Notes:
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
Degradation of FP Systems and Features ___________________________________
___________________________________
• Review:
– General plant practice related to seismic restraints for fire ___________________________________
protection systems and features
– Installed systems and features and assess potential for seismic- ___________________________________
induced failure
___________________________________
• Assess potential significance of system or feature failure to
post-seismic event operations. ___________________________________
• If any potential vulnerabilities are identified, consider fixes ___________________________________
to reduce likelihood of failure.
___________________________________
___________________________________
Slide 7
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
Slide 8 Notes:
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
Spurious Detection Signals ___________________________________
___________________________________
• A seismic event will likely trigger activation of various fire
detection systems – especially smoke detectors ___________________________________
• Consider how the operators will respond to multiple fire ___________________________________
detection signals
– You can’t ignore them even though many may be false ___________________________________
– Have you identified the issue in your response procedures?
– Have you (can you) prioritize your response based on the important ___________________________________
compartments?
___________________________________
• Consider potential procedural enhancements to recognize
and deal with this issue ___________________________________
___________________________________
Slide 8
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
12550194 2-263
Slide 9 Notes:
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
Spurious Suppression Actuation/Release ___________________________________
___________________________________
• Review the fixed fire protection systems in key areas for the
potential that they might spuriously operate ___________________________________
– Got any of those mercury switches left?
– How about a non-seismic deluge valve? ___________________________________
– What happens if a sprinkler head is damaged or a pipe breaks?
– Are storage tanks for gaseous suppressants seismically robust?
___________________________________
___________________________________
• If any potential vulnerabilities are identified, consider fixes to
reduce likelihood of spurious suppressant release. ___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
Slide 9
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
Slide 10 Notes:
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
Manual Fire Fighting ___________________________________
___________________________________
• Access pathways to key areas – could something block the
path and are there alternative paths? ___________________________________
• Required fire fighting assets – will assets remain available ___________________________________
after an earthquake
– Especially fire water system and fire hoses ___________________________________
• Do post-seismic response procedures allow for manual fire ___________________________________

fighting needs and responsibilities ___________________________________
• If any potential vulnerabilities are identified, consider fixes ___________________________________
___________________________________
Slide 10
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
12550194 2-264
Slide 11 Notes:
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
Summary ___________________________________
___________________________________
• Seismic fire interaction is considered a low risk phenomena
___________________________________
• NPP and other industry experiences partly verify this
premise ___________________________________
• A qualitative approach is suggested for verifying that plant ___________________________________
specific conditions confirm low risk notion
___________________________________
• Systemic or procedural upgrades are recommended for
___________________________________
identified potential vulnerabilities
___________________________________
___________________________________
Slide 11
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
12550194 2-265
3 Conclusion
Part 1: Integration
12550194 3-1
Slide 1 Notes:
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
METHODOLOGY
___________________________________
Integration, Lessons Learned and ___________________________________
Insights
___________________________________
Bijan Najafi, SAIC
Steve Nowlen, SNL
___________________________________
___________________________________
Sept. 29 – Oct. 2, and Nov. 17-20, 2008
Bethesda, MD ___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
Slide 2 Notes:
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
PART I ___________________________________
Integration ___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
Slide 2
Integration, Lessons Learned and Insights Research (RES) & Electric Power Research Institute (EPRI)
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
12550194 3-2
Slide 3 Notes:
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
Integration
Modules ___________________________________
Module 3: Fire Module 2: Module 1:

___________________________________
scenario Cable/circuit Plant/operator
response response
___________________________________
Fire-induced Circuit CCDP/
damage failure CLERP ___________________________________
• Module 1: PRA/HRA ___________________________________
– Post-fire plant response model, including systems, components and
operator manual actions (CCDP, CLERP)
___________________________________
• Module 2: Cable selection, circuit failure mode analysis
– Electrical response, embedded in the Post-fire plant response model ___________________________________
(Pcf)
• Module 3: Fire analysis ___________________________________
– Fire hazard; ignition frequency, fire severity, fire growth,
detection/suppression (IF * SF * Pns) ___________________________________
Slide 3
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
12550194 3-3
Slide 4
Overview Of Fire PRA Process and Module

Structure
TASK 1: Plant Boundary & TASK 2: Fire PRA Component
Partitioning Selection
TASK 3: Fire PRA Cable

Selection
SUPPORT TASK A: Plant Walk

Downs TASK 4: Qualitative Screening TASK 5: Fire-Induced Risk
Model
TASK 6: Fire Ignition

Frequencies
SUPPORT TASK B: Fire PRA

Database TASK 7A: Quantitative TASK 12A: Post-Fire HRA:
Screening - I Screening
TASK 8: Scoping Fire Modeling
Module 3: Fire
TASK 7B: Quantitative
Screening - II Module 1: PRA/HRA
Module 2: Circuits
B
Integration, Lessons Learned and Insights Slide 4
Notes:
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
12550194 3-4
Slide 5
Overview Of Fire PRA Process and Module

Structure (2)
B
TASK 9: Detailed Circuit Failure

Analysis TASK 11: Detailed Fire Modeling
TASK 10: Circuit Failure Mode &
Likelihood Analysis C. Main Control Room
TASK 13: Seismic-Fire TASK 14: Fire Risk Quantification TASK 12B: Post fire HRA:
Interactions Detailed & recovery
TASK 15: Uncertainty &

Sensitivity Analyses Fire Module
PRA/HRA Module
TASK 16: Fire PRA
Documentation Circuits Module
Notes:
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
12550194 3-5
Part 2: Lessons Learned and Insights
12550194 3-６
Slide 6 Notes:
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
PART II
___________________________________
Lessons Learned and Insights to-
to-date
___________________________________
on Use of
___________________________________
EPRI 1011989, NUREG/CR-
NUREG/CR-6850 ___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
Slide 6
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
Slide 7 Notes:
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
Lessons Learned and Insights
Scope of this Module ___________________________________
___________________________________
• Demonstration studies / Pilots
– Focus today is on NFPA-
NFPA-805 pilot plants and other “early adopters”
adopters” ___________________________________
• FAQ process and methods-related topics ___________________________________
___________________________________
• General insights; Programmatic & Technical
___________________________________
• Path forward with EPRI 1011989 , NUREG/CR-6850
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
Slide 7
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
12550194 3-7
Slide 8 Notes:
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
Demonstration /Pilot Studies ___________________________________
___________________________________
• The procedures were individually tested during development ___________________________________
• All the procedures worked, and seemed to be of reasonable ___________________________________
depth, scope, and clarity to make implementation practical
___________________________________
• First top-to-bottom testing as a full, consolidated, and
complete set ongoing by 805 pilots and other early adopters ___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
Slide 8
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
Slide 9 Notes:
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
Demonstration /Pilot Studies (continued) ___________________________________
___________________________________
• Numerical results are being developed, but remain
preliminary ___________________________________
• The potential for “hidden surprises” was acknowledged from
the outset, and there have been some… ___________________________________
– Others likely remain to be discovered, and you may find them
• The NFPA-805 FAQ process is the primary mechanism ___________________________________
currently available to address application issues
– As a user, you should monitor the FAQ process
___________________________________
– FAQ resolutions may resolve your questions as well
___________________________________
• We continue to seek user feedback and experience – the
procedures are intended to be “living documents” to at least ___________________________________
some extent
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
12550194 3-8
Slide 10 Notes:
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
Pilot Studies – Our Early Experience Showed and Pilots ___________________________________
Confirm that…
___________________________________
• It’s Easy to get distracted, e.g.:
– If you want to re-baseline Appendix R, do that first, then do your ___________________________________
fire PRA – the objectives are NOT the same although the Fire
PRA would benefit ___________________________________
– Work together with the Appendix R re-baseline to ensure the final
product is useful for Fire PRA purposes ___________________________________
• Get a team of the right people with the right knowledge to ___________________________________
do the job, e.g.:
– The PRA gurus may think they know circuits, but you really need
___________________________________
those with true electrical expertise
– You NEED your team to include expertise in fire, systems, PRA,
___________________________________
plant operations, HRA, and electrical circuits/analysis
___________________________________
Slide 10
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
Slide 11 Notes:
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
Frequently Asked Questions (FAQ) ___________________________________
___________________________________
• The NPFA-805 FAQ process is the primary vehicle for
feedback to EPRI TR 1011989, NUREG/CR-6850 ___________________________________
– Managed by the NEI/NRC NFPA-805 task force and NRC/NRR
NFPA-805 team ___________________________________
• FAQs cover a range of topics and not all are related to the ___________________________________
fire PRA methodology
___________________________________
• FAQs come from various sources including the RES/EPRI
team, the 805 pilot plants, and other early adopters ___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
Slide 11
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
12550194 3-9
Slide 12 Notes:
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
Frequently Asked Questions (FAQ) (continued) ___________________________________
___________________________________
• To date 52 FAQs have been initiated
• Of these 52, 16 are related to implementation of EPRI TR-1011989, ___________________________________
NUREG/CR-6850
• Of these 16: ___________________________________
– 4 are closed (i.e., resolution complete and docketed)
___________________________________
– 12 are pending (i.e., resolution is not yet final)
• Various stages from near complete to in the initial “problem statement” stage ___________________________________
• Caveat:
– Although a resolution may be complete and docketed, a FAQ still remains ___________________________________
“unofficial” until endorsed in a revision of Regulatory Guide 1.205 (either
directly, or by endorsing a NEI-04-02 revision that incorporates the FAQ) ___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
Slide 13 Notes:
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
Frequently Asked Questions (FAQ) (cont) ___________________________________
___________________________________
• Fire PRA “Methodology” FAQs include
– Clarifications to existing guidance ___________________________________
– Filling in methodology “gaps”
– Refinements to existing approaches ___________________________________
– Revised guidance for specific aspects of the analysis
___________________________________
• 14 of the 16 methodology FAQs are “fire” questions
– These FAQs cover a range of topics ___________________________________
• The other two are “electrical” questions
– Spurious actuation dependency given multiple cables with HS
___________________________________
potential impacted by the same fire
– Hot short duration
___________________________________
___________________________________
Slide 13
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
12550194 3-10
Slide 14 Notes:
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
Lessons Learned and Insights ___________________________________

Closed FAQs ___________________________________
• FAQ 06-0016: Electrical cabinet counting guidance ___________________________________
– Provides clarifying examples of “vertical section” counting guidance
• FAQ 06-0017: High Energy Arc Faults in electrical cabinets ___________________________________
– Provides clarifying guidance for counting cabinets in the context of
HEAF ignition frequency ___________________________________
– Provides a frequency split between low and medium voltage cabinets
___________________________________
– Clarifies treatment of HEAF in MCCs
• FAQ 06-018: Main control board (MCB) fires ___________________________________
– Clarifies definition of MCB (what to include, what to exclude)
– Clarifies direct link between model in Appendix L and the as-defined
___________________________________
MCB
___________________________________
Slide 14
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
Slide 15 Notes:
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________

Closed FAQs (continued) ___________________________________
___________________________________
• FAQ 06-0031: Ignition source counting guidance
clarifications and extensions ___________________________________
– Bin 14 – Electric motors: clarifies guidance, provides for excluding
small motors of 5hp or less and totally enclosed motors. ___________________________________
– Bin 21 – Pumps: provides for excluding small sampling pumps, and
other pumps of 5hp or less ___________________________________
– Bin 23 – Transformers: provides for excluding dry transformers of
45KVA or less
___________________________________
– Bin 26 – Ventilation subsystems: clarifies that intent is to exclude
small subsystems powered by motors of 5hp or less (consistent with
___________________________________
electric motors bin 14)
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
12550194 3-11
Slide 16 Notes:
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________

In-process FAQs ___________________________________
___________________________________
• FAQ 07-0035: High energy arc faults in bus ducts
– Issue: ___________________________________
• Guidance document is silent on topic
___________________________________
• Acknowledge potential for such events (e.g., Diablo Canyon 5/2000)
___________________________________
• Provide plant wide frequency and counting/partitioning guidance
• Provide zone of influence and scenario development guidance ___________________________________
– Status:
• FAQ resolution has been drafted and reviewed ___________________________________
• Final revisions in process
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
Slide 17 Notes:
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________

In-process FAQs (continued) ___________________________________
• FAQ 08-0042 ___________________________________
– Issue:
• Guidance provides conflicting language regarding propagation of fire from ___________________________________
cabinets (Chapter 6 versus Appendix G)
• Clarify and expand definition of “well-sealed and robustly secured
cabinets” (which will not propagate fires) ___________________________________
– Status:
• FAQ resolution has been drafted and reviewed by RES/EPRI team ___________________________________
• Industry and NRC staff reviews pending
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
12550194 3-12
Slide 18 Notes:
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________

• FAQ 08-0043 ___________________________________
– Issue:
• Guidance for placement of a cabinet fire (the source location) suggests ___________________________________
inspecting cabinet contents and placing fire at fuel location
• Applicants would prefer a “one size” approach less conservative than ___________________________________
placing on top of cabinet that would not require internal inspection
• RES/EPRI teams are debating merits of general application of fire
protection SDP approach – place fire 1 foot below cabinet top (unless top
is unsealed or vented)
___________________________________
– Status: ___________________________________
• Team position has been drafted and is under review
• Staff final review pending ___________________________________
Slide 18
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
Slide 19 Notes:
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________

• FAQ 08-0044 ___________________________________
– Issue:
• Guidance for large oil spill and fire is generating conservative results ___________________________________
especially in the case of MFW pump fires (high frequency of large release
compared to experience base)
___________________________________
• Provide an alternative approach and revised fire frequencies for leaks ___________________________________
and spills from higher volume circulating oil/lubrication systems
– Status: ___________________________________
• General consensus that a revised treatment is appropriate and needed
• RES/EPRI team discussion of the specific resolution approach continues, ___________________________________
reviews ongoing
• NRC 805 team and industry 805 task force reviews pending ___________________________________
Slide 19
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
12550194 3-13
Slide 20 Notes:
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
• FAQ 08-0045
– Issue: ___________________________________
• Fire growth recommendations for electrical cabinets does not include
consideration of an incipient stage (e.g., pre-ignition heating and
generation of un-burned pyrolysates which might be detected)
___________________________________
• No clear resolution approach has yet been developed
– Status: ___________________________________
• A problem statement has been generated
• FAQ may be withdrawn - not amenable to short-term solution ___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
Slide 20
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
Slide 21 Notes:
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
• FAQ 08-0046
– Issue: ___________________________________
• Methodology provides no approach for crediting incipient fire detection
systems ___________________________________
• Develop an approach that would credit these systems ___________________________________
– Status:
• Initial drafts of a proposed approach are under discussion within the ___________________________________
RES/EPRI teams
• Work continues to try to establish a firm technical basis ___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
Slide 21
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
12550194 3-14
Slide 22 Notes:
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
• FAQ 08-0047
– Issue: ___________________________________
• Guidance states that when more than one cable can cause the same
spurious actuation you combine probabilities using “exclusive or” ___________________________________
• This assumes faults/effects are independent
• Consensus reached that “exclusive or” is not appropriate if faults are
dependent (e.g., a common power supply for both cables) ___________________________________
• Clarify treatment to determine and address dependency
– Status: ___________________________________
• Team draft has been completed
• Staff and final industry review pending ___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
Slide 23 Notes:
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
• FAQ 08-0048
– Issue: ___________________________________
• Fire frequency analysis may not reflect industry trends (i.e., towards
reduced fire frequencies ___________________________________
• Work is under way within EPRI team to determine if statistically significant ___________________________________
fire frequency trends can be demonstrated
• Fire frequencies for one or more ignition source bins may be modified (up ___________________________________
or down depending on trends)
– Status: ___________________________________
• Work to date remains largely within the EPRI team
• Review/input by RES team pending ___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
12550194 3-15
Slide 24 Notes:
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
• FAQ 08-0049
___________________________________
– Issue: ___________________________________
• The cable fire empirical spread model (tray-to-tray, stack-to-stack) has
been misapplied in pilot applications
• Reviewers concluded that misapplication resulted in very conservative ___________________________________
fire growth and risk results
• Clarify the bounds of the empirical model to avoid misapplication
– Status: ___________________________________
• Proposed resolution has recently completed final review within the RES
and EPRI teams ___________________________________
• Staff and industry final review pending
• Final revision, as needed, pending ___________________________________
– Note: as a follow-on, team plans to generate a new FAQ to address
broader needs relative to cable fire growth modeling ___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
Slide 25 Notes:
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
• FAQ 08-0050
– Issue: ___________________________________
• The fire non-suppression curves as cited as reflecting suppression
performance after fire brigade response time but a significant fraction of
the duration data used in curves includes brigade response time
___________________________________
• Fire brigade may not be getting adequate credit for suppressing fires prior
to damage
___________________________________
___________________________________
• EPRI team has reviewed data and proposed an alternative set of non-
suppression curves that would include fire brigade response time
___________________________________
– Status:
• Work to date has largely been confined to EPRI team
___________________________________
• NRC team is currently reviewing proposed resolution
Slide 25
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
12550194 3-16
Slide 26 Notes:
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
• FAQ 08-0051
– Issue: ___________________________________
• The guidance does not provide a method for estimating the duration of a
hot short once formed ___________________________________
• This could be a significant factor for certain types of plant equipment that
will return to a “fail safe” position if the hot short is removed
___________________________________
• Analyze the existing cable failure modes and effects test data to ___________________________________
determine if an adequate basis exists to establish hot short duration
distributions
– Status:
___________________________________
• Initial data analysis has been completed and results are under team
review
___________________________________
___________________________________
Slide 26
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
Slide 27 Notes:
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
• FAQ 08-0052
– Issue: ___________________________________
• No guidance on fire growth times for transient fires
• Guidance not clear as to which non-suppression curve would apply to ___________________________________
transient fires in the MCR (i.e., transient curve or MCR curve)
• Review existing test data and develop guidance for transient fire growth
times ___________________________________
• Clarify non-suppression curve application for this case
– Status: ___________________________________
• Initial team position drafted and undergoing review within the teams
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
12550194 3-17
Slide 28 Notes:
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
• Resource intensive and critical, for the most part due to ___________________________________
consideration of multiple spurious operation (MSO)
– ANS Fire PRA Standard is identifying requirements on MSOs
___________________________________
• Defines the scope of the Fire PRA as it relates to post-fire ___________________________________
plant (system and operator) response
– Ongoing discussions re: instrumentation in NFPA 805 pilot program ___________________________________
• Fire PRA component list will be larger than your Appendix
R and PRA component list ___________________________________
– New components whose omission will be non-conservative
• For MSO considerations ___________________________________
• For fire-specific operator manual actions (OMAs)
– Expect that you will want/need to consider others to get a realistic
risk result ___________________________________
• NMP-1 pilot follows the EPRI/NRC-RES method on MSO
consideration
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
Slide 29 Notes:
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
Cable Selection ___________________________________
___________________________________
• Cable selection is probably the single biggest factor that
will drive your resource requirements ___________________________________
– The burden comes largely with the need to trace selected cables
– You also need an accessible cable database, and constructing ___________________________________
such a database from your existing system may not be so easy
– This is going to depend a lot on the depth of your cable tracing ___________________________________
and the nature of your current tracking system
___________________________________
• Exercise judgment
– You may initially want to trace all your cables, but that may not be ___________________________________
the best choice – you are taking on quite a job at most plants
– Take advantage of the iterative approaches to cable tracing ___________________________________
___________________________________
Slide 29
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
12550194 3-18
Slide 30 Notes:
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
Circuit Analysis ___________________________________
___________________________________
• Circuit analysis need not be a huge burden
___________________________________
• Compared to cable tracing, circuit analysis should be far
less resource intensive – although it does require ___________________________________
participation of key personnel (the electrical guru)
___________________________________
• The procedure provides various approaches that have
been drawn from past practice and experience ___________________________________
– Make use of those options! ___________________________________
– Go after the “bang for the buck” circuits and “take the hit” when it is
not risk important ___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
Slide 31 Notes:
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
Fire Ignition Frequency and Fire Modeling ___________________________________
• Understand the scope of work of Tasks 1, 6, 8 and 11 ___________________________________

– One walkdown effort for collecting information for all the tasks
– Use of a relational database for organizing and analyzing data is ___________________________________
recommended
– It is recommended that Task 8, Scoping Fire Modeling be conducted ___________________________________
with Task 6, Fire Ignition Frequencies or Task 11, Detailed Fire Modeling
• Fire modeling in single compartments ___________________________________
– Hand calculations will suffice for many cases, but more sophisticated
modeling (e.g., compartment fire models) also has a place ___________________________________
– Create fire modeling drawing packages. These are room layout drawings
with ignition sources and Fire PRA targets highlighted. ___________________________________
• Fire modeling in the main control room
– Fire zone or field models are necessary ___________________________________
– Will require detailed system analysis and HRA
– Smoke removal system can significantly impact abandonment and risk
___________________________________
Slide 31
___________________________________
__________________________________
12550194 3-19
Part 3: Perspective
12550194 3-20
Slide 1 Notes:
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
METHODOLOGY
___________________________________
Module III-2: Perspective
___________________________________
Ken Canavan - EPRI

___________________________________
J.S. Hyslop - RES
___________________________________
Joint EPRI/RES Fire PRA Course
September 29 – October 2, & November 17-20, 2008
___________________________________
Bethesda, MD
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
Slide 2 Notes:
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
On The Requantification Project
___________________________________
• A consensus methodology for Fire PRA that is facilitating ___________________________________
implementation of risk-informed fire protection
___________________________________
• Remains the best available method to estimate fire risk &
obtain insights ___________________________________
___________________________________
• Guidance is producing greater agreement among technical
experts ___________________________________
• Much activity ongoing in NFPA 805 FAQ program due to ___________________________________
fire PRAs being performed during transition
___________________________________
Fire PRA Workshop, 2008, Bethesda MD A Collaboration of U.S. NRC Office of Nuclear Regulatory
___________________________________
Module III-
III-2: Perspective Slide 2
___________________________________
___________________________________
12550194 3-21
Slide 3 Notes:
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
Continued Cooperation
___________________________________
• We established a framework for future research cooperation ___________________________________
– Quality of work and positive technical reviews pave the way for
continued cooperation ___________________________________
• The cooperation under the MOU is continuing ___________________________________
– Fire Model User’s Guide
– Fire Human Reliability Analysis (HRA)
___________________________________
– Fire Low Power and Shutdown ___________________________________
– Others….
___________________________________
___________________________________
Fire PRA Workshop, 2008, Bethesda MD
Slide 3
___________________________________
Module III-
III-2: Perspective Research (RES) & Electric Power Research Institute (EPRI)
___________________________________
___________________________________
12550194 3-22
12550194
APPENDICES
represents NRC conclusions or Regulatory Positions, and should not be interpreted as such.
Session 1: Plant Partitioning

QUESTION
Slide 21: Who conducts these plant walkdowns? Are they done in-house or by contractors, for
example?
RESPONSE
All of the people you mentioned are part of this effort. Contractors, utility people, co-ops, recent
graduates, everyone. The level of experience and knowledge needed to do this must not be
taken for granted.
Session 2: Fire Ignition Frequency

QUESTION
Presentation b, page 6: I still don’t get how to consider WL.
RESPONSE
I basically try to start fresh and say how I’m going to count the equipment, and once you make
that decision, this becomes simpler. For example, if it’s very easy for you to assign equipment
to one unit or another, which is not always the case, then you just count them by unit and forget
about this stuff. It’s all 1. The reason I’m saying that it’s not all that easy is because if we’re
trying to count equipment by unit, where one panel is assigned to unit 1 and another to unit 2.
Then, you go to a room and there is a panel with no label. You don’t know what it is, so your
ideal situation breaks down. So, this helps you count things. Then, you bring into the picture
the question of whether or not the equipment is shared. At this point, you can do what Marty
said, like counting half of a pump. Usually, in the control room, it can be discerned what
corresponds to unit 1 or unit 2, and either you can split them in half or assign the board to one
unit. If there is the case of a problem that is swinging, it may be better just to count it as half. If
you are clear on how you are counting, then this does not pose a problem; either count it as half
if it’s shared, or count it as one.
If, on the other hand, you have a shared control room and you counted only one unit, without
even considering the other unit, then the ignition sources for that room are twice what you have
counted. So the contribution for the fire source is twice the ignition frequency. If you have a
generic frequency for a single unit but have twice the units, then you have to double it. My
advice, therefore, is to consider how and what you are counting in the interest of being
systematic. If you’re just doing a localized analysis for the control room, you can just count
12550194 A-1
something as one unit, but if you have a shared room, you need to add that multiplier because
you are not counting the rest otherwise. (The answer to B is 2.)
The key to this is that the frequency in 6-1 applies to the cabinet in the unit that you are
analyzing. That is the count on which Francisco is focusing. That frequency is the total
frequency of fire ignition for a specific type of component. If you count that accurately as best
you can, then in a room where the other unit is in there also, you can do what I suggested and
you will be fine. The point is that this whole thing is unit based and that any new components
must have units that match the existing components.
QUESTION
Page 6: Would this be equivalent to saying that a fire that starts in unit 2’s control board is
guaranteed to spread to unit 1’s board?
RESPONSE
No. It is not necessarily guaranteed, but it is a possible contributor. You’re establishing the
frequency of fire within that room. Any fire. Actually, we’re trying not to count it twice. That’s
what we need to be careful with, double-counting. This is equivalent to counting the two units,
such that where you have 400 panels instead of 800, to simply double all the frequencies.
When you do that, you will get the right weighting factors. Whatever you do, prevent that double
counting, because the frequencies are per unit, and you have two units. Make sure you don’t
double-count.
QUESTION
Page 6: I think you hit the nail on the head that if you’re doing the per-component count for the
entire space, that you wouldn’t need the sign there, a WL of 2, if you count every source in
there. If you know what’s in unit 1 but are unsure of what’s in unit 2, but you know that it has a
similar configuration, then you could assume a WL of 2 for that space, that time in your analysis,
right?
RESPONSE
If you count everything, and you counted it well, you will get the weighting factors correctly.
QUESTION
Presentation A, slide 22: Suppose they’re done horizontally?
RESPONSE
Again, you need to define your own reference cabinet and compare that against the reference
cabinet. Define vertical segments of some kind and count it that way. You see, what it comes
down to is that that specific cabinet vs. the rest of the cabinets in the plant that are within that
group; all of the frequencies from 6-1 will be assigned to all of them. You must ask yourself how
much of the frequency you will assign to this cabinet from another cabinet. If you come up with
an internally consistent scheme, this will give you the best approach for use. All of your
cabinets are horizontally divided, right? All of them are. Each horizontal division will be
assigned one count. It comes down to pro-rating your total frequency to each item.
12550194 A-2
Session 3: Scoping Fire Modeling
A BRIEF REVIEW
Reviewing the risk equation.
Points to lambda sub G; This is the generic frequency. Where does it come from? Inaudible
answer. Points to W sub is-1. What is this? Where is it coming from? Walkdowns, and counts
of ignition sources. This is a split fraction of ignition sources. What is this? Points to severity
factor. Where is it coming from? Heat release rate. Somebody can tell me how we come up
with the severity factor? Where does it come from? HRR that would damage your target. We
assign a distribution to each ignition source, right? We found the HRR that would damage the
target, found that value in the distribution, and the area under the curve to the right is, what
Dean said, 2% or less, then you can screen it. We say that it is unlikely that the fire will get that
big.
QUESTION
Slide 13: So we screen ignition SOURCES if the critical value is higher than the 98th percentile?
RESPONSE
Yes. The only cautionary note is that the critical value should come only from the ignition
source. If you have trays above the ignition source, the HRR may not come only from the
ignition source. That may be one you have to further analyze to see what the cable trays would
do. Only an isolated ignition source, incapable of propagating, would be able to be screened.
This admittedly limits its applicability, given some of the complex geometries that we have, but
that’s the way to use it.
QUESTION
Slide 13: How do you determine whether or not an ignition source will screen?
RESPONSE
Let’s do two cases. If, above your cabinet, you have a stack of cable trays, and you start a fire;
if the only cable you care about is in a tray remote from the ignition source, then you can screen
the source. If, however, you have the ability to propagate a fire up, you can not simply screen
the fire, even if the actual target is remote from the fire.
QUESTION
Slide 7: How would you organize your list of design fires?
12550194 A-3
RESPONSE
I would strongly suggest a section, when you are dealing with either scoping fire modeling or
detailed fire modeling, that clearly says “these are the types of fires I have, and I’m going to use
this generic values, or I have these plant-specific values,” and you just get it over with in a clear
section that you can reference, writing justifications for what your damage criteria are. Keep the
HRRs in a centralized place where you know where your justifications are. That should work
fine.
QUESTION
Slide 7: What conduit do you use in this fire modeling?
RESPONSE
The conduit is the same as the type of cable that you have inside. That was thermoset cable in
a conduit, so we used 625.
QUESTION
Slide 13: Do you treat transient fires in the same probabilistic manner as other ignition sources,
by saying where they are most likely to be located?
RESPONSE
What Walt is telling me is that this FAQ will need to be more detailed in addressing types of
panels and transient fires. It is also silent on when to put a transient fire. People love to talk
about trash bags. Where do you place a trash can fire? All of these are questions that are not
addressed in 6850. Hopefully this FAQ will address it.
QUESTION
Slide 13: What I’m hearing is that one thing being accounted for in the FAQ is that these
correlations have not been developed for use in multi-dimensional cabinet fires. It seems that
this is not an appropriate application for this model. A fire inside of an enclosure has an
obstructed plume, resulting in a three-dimensional fire, rather than a two-dimensional fire. Now,
there are ways to get around that. When I’m putting on my peer review pack, or I’m doing the
analysis myself, what, when you’re talking about justification, has been done in the way of
discussion about whether these are really applicable to these cables and, if you recognize that
they aren’t, what documentation do you need to provide to be able to say “we handled this in a
manner that deals conservatively with the answer to that question”?
RESPONSE
You’re right in all your points. For fires inside cabinets, you’re right, these are not applicable,
and I think our treatment has been “forget about the cabinet, we just put our fire there.”
Hopefully the effects of the cabinet walls will be to the benefit of those targets, so not having it
adds that conservative approach.
12550194 A-4
QUESTION
You could say that we measured the heat release rates and determined how much energy is
being released there, and that the distribution of this release is unimportant because the plumes
have different amounts of energy. You can postulate a single plume coming out. Like you said,
I’m not saying that this is a show-stopper, but what I would do is go back to the FAQ and say
“what’s the bounding analysis where I can locate my fire?” The answer to your analysis may not
be favorable, and that’s what I’m reading in this FAQ; that this answer is too conservative, and
that we want something a little better, but we don’t have the means to really do that. At this
point, I don’t think there are enough test data or analysis calculations.
RESPONSE
In a way, that’s why 6850 was silent, because this task is somewhat beyond the state of the art.
That was the task of these documents, state of the art. I agree with that argument. I’m telling
you that so far, once you assume this fire, the guidance is to use an unobstructed plume up to
where you encounter this obstruction. In my example, I intentionally included intervening trays
that are not targets and advised you to screen them if you have obstructions.
QUESTION
Looking at some of these analyses, though, if you just plug and chug this, I will have to flag it
and ask you to show me why this limitation is valid. There may be a valid reason, though, if you
take that HRR and situate it atop the cabinet. You may not have a decent argument if it is
situated on the floor. It is by no means a showstopper, but have there been discussions about
this issue? When you get to the end of this, it could be a showstopper.
RESPONSE
There is either limited guidance or questions being raised on the FAQ. The only point I want to
make about the FAQ is that its focus is very narrow, and is not intended to expand into a
research-wide paper. Another point to be made is that some of the arguments used in this may
come on risk terms, rather than on fire modeling terms. They may choose to be very
conservative, rather than using the best inputs, because they can accept the more conservative
plant impacts.
QUESTION
So then these equations are justified by guesses about conservatism?
RESPONSE
I’m not saying that that’s the justification. I am saying that the equations we have are what we
have, not something new developed for the nuclear industry or something, and that there are
documents and training describing its use and limitations. Analysts are using them within the
limitations. I suggested that not all of the justifications will be on a fire modeling basis. There
are other issues that provide these checks, not just because of the use of the model. In a risk
analysis, the justification will not simply be the use of this model. By the time you know what the
impact is, you must also know the cables involved, what the impact is, how the circuit behaves,
and many other things involved in it.
12550194 A-5
Are you suggesting that the models we have are not conservative? Because the models can be
quite conservative, we hope. Are you suggesting that we are guiding people in the wrong
direction?
QUESTION
I don’t think that there’s sufficient guidance to tell people how to take correlations developed
from two-dimensional pool fires and three-dimensional wood grids and apply them to an
electrical cabinet. What you’re saying with the lack of guidance here is that it’s okay to do that.
I don’t see anything here that says “electrical cabinets: beware, because this is how these
empirical correlations have been developed.” They’re outliers.
RESPONSE
I don’t see that when we suggest “view the fire and forget about these cabinet walls” we are
misapplying the correlation.
QUESTION
I don’t think that you are. I think that one solution would be to do a bounding analysis where
you find the HRR and find a reasonable representation of the area of the fire, and that will be all
I’ve got. What I see in the FAQ is that this tends to be the most conservative approach, and
we’re asking for a less conservative approach. I don’t think we’re there yet, I don’t think that we
have the fundamentals to put forth this less conservative approach. That is guidance that could
be provided to people, by saying “look, we understand this stuff doesn’t work, but here’s how
you get around it.”
RESPONSE
It’s not that it doesn’t work, it just yields a very conservative answer.
QUESTION
We don’t know if it yields a conservative answer.
RESPONSE
That’s the impression I’m getting, is that they’re getting very short time periods, and that’s giving
them headaches.
QUESTION
We never validated the cabinet fires with the correlations. That’s never been done. It’s just
been in applications.
RESPONSE
Then what you’re suggesting is that what we have in the guidance is not conservative. That’s
the key here. What we have here is the important element that we have to fault on the side of
the conservative.
12550194 A-6
QUESTION
The bounding analysis places the fire on the exterior of the cabinet, and thus far, I fail to see this
addressed in the FAQ.
RESPONSE
Any reading that you’re doing on this FAQ is not final yet. The FAQ is still in process, and these
concerns that you raised are being considered. FAQ is a misleading term; it’s actually only one
question. This is currently under analysis. I am the first one to agree with you; from an
experimental, analytical perspective, we may not have the tools to address it with math. That’s
not the only place in risk analysis where this is an issue.
QUESTION
But it has to be addressed, I think. There is a workaround, and it just needs to be put forth so
that everybody knows exactly how we’re getting around the limitation. All of these correlations
were verified, right?
RESPONSE
Well, verified by experiment. That’s how it’s done.
QUESTION
But in the DMD study, if I remember correctly, you screened those out because they weren’t the
correct equipment. You can’t use that in your correlation because it was essentially the junk
data from another experiment. You did it for other well-known, well-characterized fires.
RESPONSE
We have to be careful here. I agree with you in that these correlations are applicable if you
have a fire inside a panel and you want to consider this panel, walls, and the effect that the
cabinet will have. Do we have a correlation for that? Do we have guidance on how to do that?
No. People report a heat release rate and assume there is no cabinet. In this case, if there are
no obstructions, we have said “yes, use this plume correlation”. Would I want to see further
research and a model to account for that? Probably yes. Do we have it? No, that’s why it’s not
here.
QUESTION
But then specifically, how do you justify the use of the correlations this case?
RESPONSE
By assuming no cabinet. Is there an argument that yes, you actually have a cabinet and aren’t
accounting for it? Of course.
12550194 A-7
QUESTION
So that’s an assumption and the engineering validates these assumptions, and so, to me, the
best guidance would be to take the equipment fire and measure that heat release rate, and then
place it at the top of the cabinet as the bounding analysis.
RESPONSE
That’s fine. That’s what Walt says that his inspectors are doing, and I know plants are doing
that in some cases.
RESPONSE
I think that people who are doing these analyses need to understand that this is merely a
workaround to do this.
QUESTION
Why isn’t fire modeling used every time? Wouldn’t that help to evaluate each scenario in
context?
RESPONSE
The general approach in PRA is that you start with several failures. Rather than postulating no
damage, you start with fires that damage everything. From there, you make reductions. When
you apply fire modeling, you do so with the goal of proving that the target is undamaged,
because this disproves the initial assumption. You start assuming all these failures. If you have
high-risk, sharpen your pencils and see what you can get. It is in this reduction that you start
being less conservative because you’re not killing everything, but within the application, your
conservatism is built in, and hopefully, the way you use these models is on the conservative
end, given that they are not the exact geometries present in each nuclear power plant scenario.
When we were doing the validation work, this is a point we raised. To get validation for every
single nuclear power plant scenario is probably impractical in the near future, due to all of the
geometries that can be observed in different plants. This is part of the state of the audience.
Session 6: Damage Criteria

QUESTION
Slide 3: How were the cables tested? Did they short and that caused the ignition?
RESPONSE
Well, it’s just cables under a big flame. Those tests were trying to figure out the probabilities
and how this circuit behaves. So, yes, the cable is exposed to either a plume or flames.
QUESTION
Was there a documented pilot, a point where the cable ignited each time?
12550194 A-8
RESPONSE
Once the experimenters observed a short, the cable shortly thereafter ignited and this was the
pilot you were talking about.
Session 7: Detailed Fire Modeling and Single

QUESTION
Slide 10: Can you set boundaries for ignition by saying “this is the closest ignition source,
therefore since it doesn’t catch, all of the others won’t ignite also”?
RESPONSE
Why, yes. With the right tools like a well-organized database that can talk to the PRA, you can
play games like failing all of the conduits and see if you can use that approach to screen the
cable trays for something. That sounds easier than what it is if you don’t have the right tools,
because when it’s not hooked up, this becomes a manual process. But once it is, and you
understand your ID systems of how trays and conduits are labeled, then you can do cable
database events on a larger scale in order to screen things. I have seen databases where the
cable and raceways would have so-called “rooms” within compartments, based on column lines,
because the cable and raceway database was based on these column lines. So we defined
these rooms within the fire compartments. Since everything was so well-labeled, we could go
and say “fail a room” in that compartment. That would be a portion of it defined by column lines
where all the conduits and trays there could be set with trays associated to them. This would
allow us to see where we really needed to go and sharpen our pencils. I stress that this sounds
simpler than what it is, because it requires a well-structured database with good data. In plants
that have that, it is straightforward by postulating fires once you have your ignition sources. But
if it takes some building to do and some data cleanup, then so be it.
QUESTION
If you use CFAST, you don’t have to verify and validate your model, do you?
RESPONSE
That’s our intent. We want it to be such that if you use CFAST within reasonable bounds of
what was V&Ved, then that’s your V&V. But a V&V has its own limitations, a set of extrema that
were set for it, so not every single feature in CFAST was V&Ved. The sprinkler feature, for
example, lacks the verification process applied to the cable fire modeling within CFAST. The
way it works is that we classify the results, and say “this kind of overestimates”, or says that one
part is right on target. Our intent, to the best extent possible, is that if you use CFAST, you don’t
have to write an appendix explaining your validation. I agree with you, that before the V&V, we
would have to write an explanation of the model we were choosing, which is why we have this
suggestion now: it is very convenient.
12550194 A-9
QUESTION
If you use CFAST, do you need to have it V&Ved on each computer? Is it workstation-specific,
like in DOE?
RESPONSE
I will let higher pay grades answer that question. I don’t know.
Session 8: Detection and Suppresion

QUESTION
Slide 15: Where is the data for the BWR containment? Four of them are not directed. Wouldn’t
we then use the PWR containment?
RESPONSE
I would say so. We didn’t have data for the BWR containment to develop this. We knew that
there were a few that were not. There are four in this country, but we only thought there was
one. I guess we were off.
QUESTION
Does this assume a standpipe with a hose is available, or a fire extinguisher, or perhaps a mix?
RESPONSE
This is the deal with these curves. We have the data from the fire events database, and some
of that data lists time (fire duration), or time to suppression, or both. So a subset of the data that
we use for the frequency has that kind of information. In addition, we only use data after 1980,
which is when appendix R kicked in. That’s the data we use for these curves. Admittedly, not
all of the data has this information. When available, we use the time to suppression, but if the
duration was available and not suppression we will use the duration. This is part of the FAQ,
saying “well, those duration times are longer than the actual time to suppression”. By the way,
the Browns Ferry fire was listed in order of minutes that they finally decided to use water after
hours of trying to use extinguishers. You have to be careful with those numbers. The bottom
line is that if the suppression was available, we picked that number. If not, then if the duration
was available, we picked that number. That may be a limitation of this. I’m talking now about a
subset of the data, post-1980, and data that had either suppression or duration available, and
then we started excluding events that were suppressed by fixed systems, or self-extinguished.
So all of this is basically someone with an extinguisher or the fire brigade coming. These are
the events that made it to these curves, and with those events we developed this thing.
QUESTION
So for anything other than a brigade we don’t use this time as a factor in the previous chart?
12550194 A-10
RESPONSE
Wrong. Like I was telling him, even for the activation of the sprinkler system, you need to
calculate the time for that activation.
QUESTION
The suppression probability you gave on slide 9: this is the probability of non-suppression?
RESPONSE
No, this is the probability of failure of the system. If you go back to the event tree, the PNS is
the sum of the non-suppression branches. When I’m crediting a smoke detection system, I
would put here the probability of failure (the split fraction) for the smoke detection system.
These are just probabilities of failure to put in these branches, but it is not the aggregate
probability of non-suppression. Those numbers in slide 9 are inputs to the event tree.
QUESTION
The curve shown here is only manual?
RESPONSE
Yes, only for the suppression probability for the fire brigade. There are more curves, and one of
the longest ones is the high-energy arcing faults. In this one, the quickest one to suppress was
the cable fire, which took only about ten minutes. You see that you very quickly go to very low
probabilities of the system.
QUESTION
Is there a curve for automatic suppression as well?
RESPONSE
No. The automatic suppression numbers will come out of the event tree when you do the same
thing. This is the same in table format, and this is the curve, so if you have a lambda, that
would be this mean here, and you stick it in and get this probability as a function of time.
QUESTION
Slide 20: Is your fire brigade response time just the time it takes them to get there?
RESPONSE
Well, it should be the time to start suppression activities. We usually go through the real
records of things within the plant, through all of your fire compartments in task 1, but places
close to it, and average drill records, and come up with numbers.
12550194 A-11
QUESTION
So if I have a damage time of 15 minutes and a brigade response time of 15 minutes,…
RESPONSE
The brigade fails. I was doing work in one international plant, and asked for the brigade drill
records, and they were all very good (~5 minutes), but then I tried to find out what was going on,
and the drill was always to the same place, and they knew where the fire was. They would say
“oh, gosh. We have a fire in that room. Perhaps, you know, if you want, you can go and fight it
or something.” If every week you go to the same place, they start becoming very, very good.
They don’t have an addressable fire detection system, so when the alarm sounds they don’t
know where it is, so for the drill they tell them where to go. This doesn’t really represent the real
story. I have been in plants here, not to draw comparisons, but when I go through them, some
of them are very detailed, with times for everything on reports for each drill, and we pick out of
that the time to start the suppression activities. I put that as input data in my rooms tables,
where I have time to brigade response, and this becomes the time input to the event tree.
QUESTION
To take it a step further, if the damage time is longer than the response time, is there a
suppression time you add on top of the response time?
RESPONSE
No. If you can start suppression activities in 13 minutes and the damage time is 15, then you go
to your curve for 2 minutes and see numbers very close to failure. That assumes, of course,
that the fire brigade immediately begins doing the correct thing, rather than just wandering
around.
Session 9: Special Fire Models Part 1

QUESTION
Slide 8: Why are the units for the bench scale HRR given as flux?
RESPONSE
The bench scale is a small piece of material that you subject to heat flux and measure its HRR.
They express that HRR per unit area, and then we multiply it by total area to get the total
answer in kW. In this case, it is the area of the cable that is burning.
QUESTION
I know you mentioned qualified and non-qualified, what makes a cable qualified?
12550194 A-12
RESPONSE
It’s just that 383 flame spread rate, whether or not it can propagate. It’s not exactly the same,
but there are two conditions: qualified and non-qualified, just like thermoset and thermoplastic
materials. The best description of a thermoset cable vs a thermoplastic cable, as I heard from
MARK SALLEY, is that a thermoplastic just melts and drips, and the insulation falls. The
thermoset is like a hot dog that you leave on the grill on the 4th of July, in that it just chars
around and the insulation doesn’t fall, it just remains there. Unqualified and qualified comes
from the IEEE test, where we pass or fail that test. We kind of use thermoset / thermoplastic to
mean qualified / unqualified, even though that’s not really what it means. But this PVC is clearly
thermoplastic. Some of the others are thermoset. You would need to decide on a number, and
this is all we have. There is a NIST report on this, and the NIST report has the most guidance.
The SFPE handbook has a condensed version, which is essentially the same thing as what is
shown in the slides, and 1805 has somewhere in the middle a discussion of where this is
coming from.
QUESTION
Slide 14: How far apart were the trays when you saw the fires jump between them?
RESPONSE
1 to 2 feet apart. Definitely not 10 feet.
QUESTION
Slide 15: If a plant uses some computational fluid dynamics and fire models, do they match this
model? If I built a model of that room and ran the calculations that you suggested here, would it
realistically match the expected results and propagate?
RESPONSE
Permit me to answer your inquiry in two parts.
Will it do some propagation? Absolutely.
The other part of your answer, a rather political topic, is that these models have not been
experimentally verified, and we don’t have input parameters for the model, to V&V it. Even if we
take the experiments that were used for it and put it in a model, we would not have the
properties of the cables and other inputs that a fire modeler would need to say “this is V&V”.
That’s why we have it this way, and we say “go put it in a CFD code and see what it does”,
because we don’t have properties.
QUESTION
Why do you expect a disconnect between the model and the experiment?
12550194 A-13
RESPONSE
Obviously, some of the variables are not valid for it. But I have seen simulations of fires like
this, and there is no question that the fire jumps all over the place. My own opinion, by looking
at those simulations and these experiments, is that definitely this happens, and until we have
more data or better properties, we are not ready to go into those calculations, but at the same
time, I am not ready to say that propagation will not happen. I mean, models show that, for
whatever properties you put in, and experiments show it, for whatever experimental conditions
you have. I am being careful in my answer, because that is the discussion we have been
having.
QUESTION
Is there a stated limitation in how far, when you get outside of the test parameters, that you can
apply this model?
RESPONSE
The configuration of the test is described there.
QUESTION
Slide 19: When you say “segmented”, you’re talking about bus bars that are bolted together,
rather than what we call bus ducts, which essentially consist of concrete holes with cables
running through them.
RESPONSE
Actually, you can screen those, because it’s only one piece of a cable that goes from one side
to the other with no junction points, right? FAQ allows you to screen it.
QUESTION
Wouldn’t it be much better if you abandon the control room and go to the backup where your
probability of success is much higher?
RESPONSE
Yeah.
QUESTION
Why would you even try and stay in a place even if the temp of 85 degrees? Isn’t the probability
of making a mistake 50% or higher?
RESPONSE
I am finding the probability that at these temperatures the operator cannot even be there, risk
analysis says that if there is a fire big enough, the operator should leave because this might be
their only chance, it is going to raise the risk if you stay under these conditions that are slightly
less than this limit, It is going to raise the risk than if you abandon the control room and shut the
plan down from elsewhere. You are penalizing yourself.
12550194 A-14
QUESTION
Are they just giving you a limit where you can’t stay in the control room from the fire analysis
side? You got to take what they are doing and reintegrate it back into the model. One must
establish the appropriate abandonment criteria on when you are going to leave versus when
you going to stay. I am just saying that you start weighing how well are you’re weighing your
leave the room methodology versus staying in the control room.
RESPONSE
I believe that people will want to learn how to improve their smoke purge techniques among
other things before they would want to worry about shutdown methodology. Fuel will burn fast,
and the creation of smoke will be rapid. But to be completely honest, most of these control room
monitors have to act on instinct because there is nobody in the background that tells you exactly
what to do in fires such as these.
QUESTION
Should we expect any procedures that are below the levels than the ones that were included in
this presentation, such as ones below the ultimate shutdown methodology? What we are
learning as of now is the steps that we should take in these situations and what is the allowable
time a operator should stay in the control room, From that information, it seems that we can
determine the realistic criteria for abandoning a control room and we can also consider the
shape factor and likelihood of making special actions.
RESPONSE
Not usually based on specific fire conditions they are more specific on what Walter was talking
about, I lose some of her ability and I usually take positions and waiting for judgments from the
operators you went and that might mean that people can stay and some in the control and
others do their own things. If you get to this stage, forget about the control, you are out of it.
Session 10: Special Fire Models Part 2

QUESTION
Slide 8: In the case of these fires, should you postulate a plant trip?
RESPONSE
What else is failing besides the trip? An extreme example is an RHR pump room fire. If you’re
testing the RHR pump and the motor catches fire, will the plant trip? Most likely not. Of course,
the shift super may panic and say “shut down the plant”, but there’s no reason for them to lower
the power level and start a shutdown. You could argue that some of these events are a part of
the internal event, something that other people have already modeled, because a plant trip can
happen for many causes, including this one. You need to be careful how you do this, in order to
ensure that anything else that could be affected is not. If you can convince yourself that nothing
else is being affected by it, then you can say that it is a part of the failure probability that the
internal events people already considered.
12550194 A-15
QUESTION
Slide 8: When you look at the nature of these analyses, does it make sense that they would not
be a non-threatening fire? The data tells you something, but when you actually look at the
component, does it make sense that there’s something about the way that the exciters are put
together that your fires are always hot and bright, because there’s nothing to burn around them?
RESPONSE
That’s exactly what I’m suggesting. Don’t take this word and say “because evidence is confined
every time, therefore there’s no need to worry”; you should look into the exciter and see if
there’s anything nearby that is on the fire PRA component list. If it’s on that list, you should look
at it carefully and see if it can be affected or not. This will come up again when we discuss the
catastrophic failures.
QUESTION
Slide 14: How do you resolve the fire size of the hydrogen formulas? I don’t see a formula here.
RESPONSE
We didn’t provide you a formula there. We have references. If you need the flame length, there
are formulas to find it, found in appendix N. I would suggest that you assume everything in that
room is destroyed, and if you can’t screen that, then you should use these formulas. If the room
is huge, then use a smaller zone, but if it’s a small room (which is typically where I find the
hydrogen piping), then assume everything is gone. If you can’t screen that, then use the
appendix N formulas.
QUESTION
Slide 14: For battery fires, did fires result in structural damage to the buildings?
RESPONSE
The pictures I’ve seen have been in non-nuclear environments. In a nuclear plant, typical
battery rooms are inside buildings and they’re well-established. They’re in isolated rooms with
rated fire walls and ceilings. But the ones I’m familiar with were on the outside of another
building with a regular frame-type construction.
QUESTION
Slide 14: Have you ever encountered any catastrophic hydrogen deflagrations?
RESPONSE
I think the majority of the events in nuclear plants have been deflagrations. I don’t remember
any detonations in the nuclear events, because the quantity generally is small. The large
quantity releases have been outside, where the relief valve has vented and created a hydrogen
fire on top of the hydrogen storage tank and created a large fire. In this case, the fire brigade
has correctly said “okay, we’re not going to put it out, just let it burn itself out”. By the way,
hydrogen flame (I think) is not visible.
12550194 A-16
Session 11: Main Control Room Fire Analysis
QUESTION
Why would analyze the fire impact on the farthest element from the postulated ignition source?
Wouldn’t it screen more efficiently if you addressed the closest element?
RESPONSE
I wouldn’t pick the farthest one, I’d pick the closest. That’s exactly what I’m saying. You need
to be careful to see what set you’re selecting. You will select the minimal selection that does
your damage.
QUESTION
Are you trying to say that you want to find the scenarios that could take out all aux feedwater
pumps? Or is there an exercise up front that will select those components you think you can
seek, so if I was going in looking at aux feedwater pumps, will I look for those things that will
take out all aux feed and measure those?
RESPONSE
In principle, you should look at every possible combination of these controls and
instrumentation. Obviously, that’s an impossible task, so minimal cutsets is one idea, albeit
imperfect, because often times you don’t have a perfect minimal cutest. You may have a partial
minimal cutset, so you basically need to pass judgment to see which areas are the most
important. Actually, it’s a spatial exercise. You’re basically going through the panel and
imagining a glob of fire of different dimensions moving about and around and affecting things.
QUESTION
As per the chart, I will take auxiliary feedwater and measure the distance to main feedwater,
with the assumption of no intervening barriers. Do we retroactively account for that?
RESPONSE
Not unless there is a very clear separation, a perfect wall. Cabinet walls can be considered
perfect walls, so long as there is no air gap. Imagine two cabinets put next to one another: a
perfect wall. Then, we give you a fifteen-minute credit in the methodology. Follow the
associated guidelines where they are listed. The main control board is no exception, although it
is generally open in the back. That opening has associated options with it, like half-walls, or
channels coming in, where things are put through. Some of them are completely open, with
spaghetti of wiring in the back well within sight.
QUESTION
If you postulate this type of fire, you discount the possibility that some of these elements with
potentially massive ramifications (very large CCDP) will be affected by the postulated fires.
12550194 A-17
RESPONSE
In this case, you can not say “I don’t care”, because you need to be very specific which pump
you will pick. You need to measure that distance. It may be difficult to establish the very fine
resolution, saying that one will be affected and not another. I would not recommend it. If things
are so close to one another, it is unrealistic to say that the fire will hit one element and not the
one next to it. The best thing to do is to form your list of possible fire events and then examine
all of those for which you think the CCDP will be significant. Significant CCDP in this world is
probably anything above .01. Anything above this number probably has some contribution.
QUESTION
What about a fire in the back of the control board? Something that affects the wiring?
RESPONSE
This method includes damage to the wiring. I have seen cases where people have chosen to
be so thorough as to walk it down and note where things cross from one part to another. That
raises another important point. If you have two elements separated by a certain large distance,
but whose wiring comes together in a small area of the control board, then a fire necessary to
take out both elements is not the large fire that affects the distance of separation, but rather a
fire only large enough to damage the control board at the point of contact, large enough only to
affect the distance that the wires are separated. The presumption is that the fire happens in the
back of the control board, or underneath.
QUESTION
What are some possible fire scenarios in this case? Where could the fire come from?
RESPONSE
Shorts, relays, smoking; there are some events inside panels that start with circuit guards.
Some start in the wires. I think it has happened internally within wires, although usually this
stems from a short somewhere else in the plant with a side effect of overheating within the
panel.
Let me recap. By doing this exercise, you effectively are also analyzing everything in the
immediate back of the panel that serves the front panel. Now if you have another back panel
with its own instruments and devices back there, you treat it as an electrical cabinet. This does
not change the exercise, though, in that you still walk the cabinet down and say “I care about
this part because it has a high CCDP”.
QUESTION
Is there an indication that they’re relying on their damage temperature for MCR abandonment
higher than 200 F?
12550194 A-18
RESPONSE
In the control room, usually some cables and sensitive electronics will be damaged below this
temperature. That can happen even with a fire that requires abandonment. This does not
assume that the entire room reaches a temperature of 200 F, just the gas layer at the top. If the
board is at a lower temperature, the room can still be tenable. When I have done these
analyses, I have seen that the HVAC in the MCR becomes a very significant factor that should
be included in your fire model. You may not even develop a hot gas layer, because the rate of
smoke removed from the room may be higher than the rate of smoke produced. Of course, the
HVAC systems are also subject to failure, which can be represented in the same way as any
other component, with a probability of failure. I have seen plants with detailed procedures for
smoke purge. It is a mode, clearly defined, with operator guidance on usage. Push a button,
and a certain fan starts the smoke purge. There are others that do not have such specific
requirements; the only options are normal operation and emergency mode, which is designed to
contend with such things as radiation as well as fire. If smoke purge is not clearly defined, then
it is more of a challenge. I have seen others that it is there, but for some reason, it is behind a
plate that makes it completely inaccessible during emergency conditions. They knew the
procedure, and there was certainly a way to make it automatic, but it was completely
counterintuitive.
Session 12: Multi-Compartment Fire Analysis

QUESTION
Slide 2: Spreading that you speak of here is just the gas and not the flame?
RESPONSE
Unless you have a direct line of sight for the radiation effects of the flame, you should take the
gas into consideration, but generally what we have in mind is that a very hot gas forms under
the ceiling, and it moves out. There are situations where there is a complete opening between
rooms, and this task is to do a screening analysis in a stepwise way to arrive at specific
scenarios that merit a more detailed analysis. You can appreciate that we could easily have a
very large combination of compartments that are adjacent to one another, and would
communicate with one another. Effectively, you must consider all combinations of rooms and
screen them out.
QUESTION
Slide 10: In this case, will you include all of the fuel in the room, not just the burning cabinet?
RESPONSE
Yes. Add the intervening combustibles when considering your multi-compartment fire.
QUESTION
Slide 11: When calculating all of the combustibles in the room, how do you add the transient
combustibles?
12550194 A-19
RESPONSE
We have a distribution for the transients, there is a 98 percentile HRR for the transients. We
recommend you use the worst-case fire you have in the room, and see if you can do damage
next door. In this step, something less than the worst case could do the damage, so this gives
you a severity factor, and also in this step, you must consider the probability of failure of a
certain fire barrier if it is required as a means of egress.
QUESTION
Slide 14: Do I need to subtract (1 – the barrier probability) from the other analysis that I did? In
the other analysis, we examined the potential for damage to the walls of the compartment
during a fire, so do I need to examine this scenario when assessing the probability that the
flame will spread?
RESPONSE
In principle, yes. But I think the impact will probably be insignificant.
QUESTION
If you can not screen out a fire spreading to a second compartment, do you then use that
second compartment as a source for the third compartment?
RESPONSE
Yes, you follow the same procedure that you followed for a single compartment analysis, but
then in this case the new target set is based on the elements in the new room. At this point, do
the same analysis that was done for a single analysis.
QUESTION
Could this lead to a domino effect, where rooms concatenate to form an extreme fire? In
practice, how does the fire brigade play into all of this?
RESPONSE
The detailed analysis addresses this. In this task, the multi-compartment analysis is only
screening-level analysis. This merely eliminates some scenarios and arrives at some others
that can not be eliminated, and then applies the detailed analysis for only that subset.
QUESTION
In your experience, how readily do you see individual rooms that fail to screen?
RESPONSE
Very many of these rooms will screen, making multi-compartment fires rather unlikely. You
need to consider barrier failure probabilities. The key is that the most important discriminator
will be the things that are failing in the second room. In other words, the CCDP will play a very
significant role in all of this. This is one area that requires a great deal of judgment. Over the
years, some plants involve fire zones, and some have no walls. Some have 20 feet on the floor
12550194 A-20
and say “this is my separation”, with cable databases and documents all identifying this
distinction. They find it very difficult to redefine everything and remap all the cables in the
database. What I have commented on is that if you put fires in those boundaries and figure out
very quickly what your targets there are, and in those areas, place fires and check the
ramifications. One noteworthy exclusion is addressing what to do with oil. You could make
such a big fire that it is difficult to screen. You then need to decide which oil fire size you will
use, something that is not clearly defined in 6850. This is one thing that requires
documentation.
Session 13: Seismic Fire Interactions

QUESTION
Can you stay in a room that is on fire with temperatures rising to 90 degrees Celsius?
RESPONSE
If it gets to that temperature, that best course of action is just to abandon the room.
QUESTION
Would you be able to do anything within the control room once temperatures reaches these
extreme conditions?
RESPONSE
Yeah, you will be able to do things at these temperatures. But it is known that smoke that is
coming from the fire will affect your sight as well as your ability to breathe, so it will be assumed
when the first signs of a fire are witnessed, you are geared up and you have your breathing
equipment on.
QUESTION
A limitation of a 0.4 meter radius to see what is around you during an intense fire gives very low
visibility to do anything. Usually, control room operators are about 6-8ft away from the actual
control board. What should operators do in these situations?
RESPONSE
I mean, even with breathing equipment and everything I am not suggesting that you will have all
the crew doing everything that they suppose to do. I am talking about a fire accident and we are
just trying to find out where definitely they really have can’t really do anything else in that room.
Everyone who is in this vicinity should be equipped with equipment in order to protect
themselves for the short time to evacuate the premises or do their specified duties.
QUESTION
At 95 degrees Celsius, aren’t those temperatures where most people will gain 2nd degree burns
in a matter of 10 min?
12550194 A-21
RESPONSE
Yes they are, but we aspect our staff to be fully and properly geared up.
QUESTION
Do operator success probabilities change with room tenability? Obviously, they can not effect
changes within the control room after it has been abandoned, but does performance change
over time while the room is burning?
RESPONSE
One of the things that I think wasn’t fully translated is if you assume that this operator stay in
this control room at these conditions, there are significant changes on the performance shaping
factor on the success of the operator. We are assuming that they are suited up as well as other
things to keep them safe during a fire. Those operators are sweating and their success rates are
low. I mean you got a high probability at play here for their actions within the main control room.
QUESTION
Do you know the location of the switches that transfer the controls are?
RESPONSE
The switches are always located outside of the control room.
A Brief Review: by Mardy Kazarians

Here is my version of it. If you have an incident at all plants to the tune of about once every ten
years, your CDF is to the tune of a serious incident at one plant about once every 500000 years.
So to go from an incident every decade to a CDF of about 1 in 500,000 is a large step. I am not
saying that the basis for a CDF is weak, but merely that it requires a very solid basis.
In order to achieve this, we had to develop a frequency for ignition sources. We multiplied this
ignition frequency by a whole bunch of parameters, which became the fire scenario frequency.
We then multiplied this by a CCDP, something that came from the PRA model.
There is something wedged in between, which is the circuit analysis. This is not a trivial part!
The circuit analysis wedges between the fire scenario frequency and the CCDP because it may
identify events that are probabilistic. If we ignore the probabilities on that one, it affects the
CCDP, but sometimes we look at circuits and say “it probably won’t happen, but here’s the
likelihood that it will.” That is wedged in between the scenario frequency and the CCDP. The
circuit analysis is a very important part of fire risk analysis for several reasons. The weakness
of a NPP is really in the cables that run from one place to another, because they are bunched
together. Common cause failure happens because they are bunched together and one fire can
affect many elements. Cables are part of a circuit, so understanding how circuits work is
important because the control circuit can cause failures that are not part of the risk model, like a
spurious actuation. Not all circuit failures can do that, so an understanding of how it can happen
is very important.
12550194 A-22
Our focus was completely on the fire frequency. We established the ignition frequency based
on component type. We also said that fire is a localized phenomenon, so we will focus on
compartments, a convenient way of looking at it. Ultimately, we will look at fire scenarios.
Thus, the way we should think about this is by starting with a very specific item or device, and
propagate that fire and its effects onto other items. This is the fire scenario, but it is too much
work at the beginning. In order to have a complete analysis without doing an excessive amount
of work, we use fire compartments and base our analysis on the compartments. We then take
this component type as an identifier for our ignition frequency and say that it is the same for all
components in the plant of that type.
We then need to multiply this by a factor that will correct it, to make it specific to either a certain
device, or to all possible ignition sources within a compartment. This is the ignition source
weighting factor. I don’t want to talk about location factors, because this is the multi-unit factor,
but that is something you may wish to consider if you want to do a multi-unit analysis. This
establishes the initial fire. Now we must say that this fire must be strong enough, because not
all fires are strong enough to damage each item. Smaller fires can damage these components,
but they will take a very long time. A very strong fire is also possible from here, that can
damage these components quickly, so the discrimination between fires that can damage these
components quickly is the non-suppression probability. I can have a spectrum of severities of
the fire, and if it is medium strength, there is more time to suppress the fire than if I have an
extremely strong fire. It is an integral of all possible severities. We showed you how to do this,
and that there is a range of HRRs based on a gamma distribution. Based on the gamma
distribution, we showed you how to calculate the propagation rate to the targets, to establish the
time to damage, and then we also talked about how to establish the probability of non-
suppression based on location-specific features. If this event is a welding and cutting related
event, then we have a prompt detection and probability of prompt suppression. If it is a
component fire, then will the automatic systems come on? How long will it take the fire brigade
to show up? With this, we have established a scenario frequency, and this entire thing will be
multiplied with the CCDP and other things.
This is a summary of the parts we have discussed. Obviously, some of the parts are pretty
complicated, and the methodology behind it is very, very complicated. Effectively, we will use
relatively simplistic models to model what happens in nature. That basically gives you an
overview of what we tried to cover in the past few days.
12550194 A-23
12550194
APPENDIX B: REFERENCE TABLES AND FIGURES
12550194 B-1
Table 1

Ignition Source
ID Location Mode Freq
(Equipment Type) 1
(per rx yr) Electrical Oil Transient Hotwork Hydrogen HEAF
3 Containment (PWR) Transients and Hotwork Power 2.0E-03 0 0 0.44 0.56 0 0
5 Control/Aux/Reactor Cable fires caused by Power 1.6E-03 0 0 0 1.0 0 0

Building welding and cutting
6 Control/Aux/Reactor Transient fires caused by Power 9.7E-03 0 0 0 1.0 0 0

Building welding and cutting
7 Control/Aux/Reactor Transients Power 3.9E-03 0 0 1.0 0 0 0

Building
8 Diesel Generator Room Diesel Generators All 2.1E-02 0.16 0.84 0 0 0 0
9 Plant-Wide Components Air Compressors All 2.4E-03 0.83 0.17 0 0 0 0
10 Plant-Wide Components Battery Chargers All 1.8E-03 1.0 0 0 0 0 0
11 Plant-Wide Components Cable fires caused by Power 2.0E-03 0 0 0 1.0 0 0

welding and cutting
12 Plant-Wide Components Cable Run (Self-ignited cable All 4.4E-03 1.0 0 0 0 0 0

fires)
13 Plant-Wide Components Dryers All 2.6E-03 0 0 1.0 0 0 0
14 Plant-Wide Components Electric Motors All 4.6E-03 1.0 0 0 0 0 0
12550194 B-2
Table 6-1
Fire Frequency Bins and Generic Frequencies (Continued)

Ignition Source
ID Location Mode Freq
(Equipment Type) 1
(per rx yr) Electrical Oil Transient Hotwork Hydrogen HEAF
15 Plant-Wide Components Electrical Cabinets All 4.5E-02 1.0 0 0 0 0 0
16 Plant-Wide Components High Energy Arcing Faults1 All 1.5E-03 0 0 0 0 0 1.0
17 Plant-Wide Components Hydrogen Tanks All 1.7E-03 0 0 0 0 1.0 0
18 Plant-Wide Components Junction Boxes All 1.9E-03 1.0 0 0 0 0 0
19 Plant-Wide Components Misc. Hydrogen Fires All 2.5E-03 0 0 0 0 1.0 0
20 Plant-Wide Components Off-gas/H2 Recombiner Power 4.4E-02 0 0 0 0 1.0 0

(BWR)
21 Plant-Wide Components Pumps All 2.1E-02 0.54 0.46 0 0 0 0
22 Plant-Wide Components RPS MG Sets Power 1.6E-03 1.0 0 0 0 0 0
23a Plant-Wide Components Transformers (Oil filled) 0 1.0 0 0 0 0

All 9.9E-03
23b Plant-Wide Components Transformers (Dry) 1.0 0 0 0 0 0
24 Plant-Wide Components Transient fires caused by Power 4.9E-03 0 0 0 1.0 0 0

welding and cutting
12550194 B-3
12550194 B-4
Table 2
Description of Transient Fire Influencing Factors
Influencing Very High

No (0) Low (1) Medium (3) High (10) (50)
Factor
Maintenance Maintenance Small Average Large number Should be

activities number of number of of (PM)/(CM) assigned to
during power PM/CM work PM/CM work work orders plant areas
operation are orders orders. compared to that may
precluded by compared to the average experience
design. the average number of significantly
number of work orders more
work orders for a typical (PM)/(CM)
for a typical compartment. work orders
compartment. compared to
the average
number of
work orders
for a typical
compartment.
Occupancy Entrance to Compartment Compartments Continuously Not applicable

the with low foot not occupied
compartment traffic or out continuously compartment.
is not of general occupied, but
possible traffic path. with regular
during plant foot traffic.
operation.
Storage Entrance to Compartment Compartments Compartments Not applicable

the where no where all where
compartment combustible/ combustible/ combustible/
is not flammable flammable flammable
possible materials are material is materials may
during plant stored. stored in closed sometimes be
operation. containers brought in and
placed in left in either
dedicated fire- open
safe cabinets. containers for
a short time or
in a closed
container, but
outside a
dedicated fire-
safe cabinet
for an
extended time.
12550194 B-5
From Page 6-24 of NUREG/CR-6850
For general transients (i.e., Bins 3, 7, 25, and 37), the following equation should be used to
establish the ignition source weighting factor:
WGT,J,L = (nm,J,L + no,J,L + ns,J,L)/NGT,L
NGT,L = Σ (nm,i,L + no, i,L + ns, i,L)
(summed over i, all compartments of location L).
where:
nm,J,L = Maintenance influence factor rating of compartment J of location L,
no,J,L = Occupancy influence factor rating of compartment J of location L, and
ns,J,L = Storage influence factor rating of compartment J of location L.
In the case of transient fires caused by welding and cutting (i.e., Bins 6, 24, and 36), the
following equation should be used:
WWC,J,L = nm,J/NWC
NWC = Σ nm,i,L
(summed over i, all the compartments of location L).
For cable fires caused by welding and cutting (i.e., Bins 5, 11, and 31), the following
equation should be used:
WCF,J = nm,J WCable,J /NCF
NCF = Σ nm,i,L WCable,i
(summed over i, all compartments of location L),
where:
WCable,i = Cable load of compartment i, based on the ratio of quantity of cables in
compartment i over the total quantity of cables in the location.
12550194 B-6
Table 3
List of Heat Release Rate Distributions
HRR Gamma
Case Ignition Source kW (Btu/s) Distribution Reference
75th 98th α β
1 Vertical cabinets with qualified cable, fire 69 211 0.84 59.3 Table G-1
limited to one cable bundle (65) (200) (0.83) (56.6)
2 Vertical cabinets with qualified cable, fire 211 702 0.7 216 Table G-1
in more than one cable bundle (200) (665) (0.7) (204)
3 Vertical cabinets with unqualified cable, 90 211 1.6 41.5 Table G-1
fire limited to one cable bundle (85) (200) (1.6) (39.5)
4 Vertical cabinets with unqualified cable, Table G-1
232 464 2.6 67.8
fire in more than one cable bundle closed
(220) (440) (2.6) (64.3)
doors
5 Vertical cabinets with unqualified cable, Table G-1
232 1002 0.46 386
fire in more than one cable bundle open
(220) (950) (0.45) (366)
doors
6 Pumps (electrical fires) 69 211 0.84 59.3 Table G-1
(65) (200) (0.83) (56.6)
7 Motors 32 69 2.0 11.7 Table G-1
(30) (65) (2.0) (11.1)
8 Transient Combustibles 142 317 1.8 57.4 Section G-4
(135) (300) (1.9) (53.7)
Table 4
Discretized Distribution for Case 1 Heat Release Rate (Vertical Cabinets with Qualified
Cable, Fire Limited to One Cable Bundle)
Heat Release Rate – kW (Btu/s) Severity Factor

Bin
Lower Upper Point Value (Pi)
1 0 (0) 26 (25) 11 (10.5) 0.446
2 26 (25) 53 (50) 38 (36) 0.219
3 53 (50) 79 (75) 64 (61) 0.129
4 79 (75) 106 (100) 92 (87) 0.078
5 106 (100) 132 (125) 118 (112) 0.048
6 132 (125) 158 (150) 145 (137) 0.030
7 158 (150) 185 (175) 171 (162) 0.019
8 185 (175) 211 (200) 197 (187) 0.012
9 211 (200) 237 (225) 224 (212) 0.007
10 237 (225) 264 (250) 250 (237) 0.005
11 264 (250) 290 (275) 276 (262) 0.003
12 290 (275) 317 (300) 303 (287) 0.002
13 317 (300) 343 (325) 329 (312) 0.001
14 343 (325) 369 (350) 356 (337) 0.001
15 369 (350) Infinity 427 (405) 0.001
12550194 B-7
Table 5
Discretized Distribution for Case 2 Heat Release Rate (Vertical Cabinets with Qualified
Cable, Fire in more than One Cable Bundle)
Heat Release Rate – kW (Btu/s)

Severity Factor
Bin
(Pi)
Lower Upper Point Value
1 0 (0) 90 (85) 34 (32.7) 0.506
2 90 (85) 179 (170) 130 (123) 0.202
3 179 (170) 269 (255) 221 (209) 0.113
4 269 (255) 359 (340) 310 (294) 0.067
5 359 (340) 448 (425) 400 (379) 0.041
6 448 (425) 538 (510) 490 (464) 0.026
7 538 (510) 628 (595) 579 (549) 0.016
8 628 (595) 717 (680) 669 (634) 0.010
9 717 (680) 807 (765) 759 (719) 0.006
10 807 (765) 897 (850) 848 (804) 0.004
11 897 (850) 986 (935) 938 (889) 0.003
12 986 (935) 1076 (1020) 1028 (974) 0.002
13 1076 (1020) 1166 (1105) 1118 (1060) 0.001
14 1166 (1105) 1255 (1190) 1208 (1145) 0.001
15 1255 (1190) Infinity 1462 (1386) 0.001
12550194 B-8
Table 6
Discretized Distribution for Case 3 Heat Release Rate (Vertical Cabinets with
Unqualified Cable, Fire Limited to One Cable Bundle)
Heat Release Rate - kW (Btu/s)

Severity Factor
Bin
(Pi)
1 0 (0) 26 (25) 15 (14.2) 0.227
2 26 (25) 53 (50) 39 (37) 0.261
3 53 (50) 79 (75) 65 (62) 0.192
4 79 (75) 106 (100) 92 (87) 0.126
5 106 (100) 132 (125) 118 (112) 0.079
6 132 (125) 158 (150) 143 (136) 0.048
7 158 (150) 185 (175) 170 (161) 0.028
8 185 (175) 211 (200) 196 (186) 0.016
9 211 (200) 237 (225) 223 (211) 0.010
10 237 (225) 264 (250) 249 (236) 0.005
11 264 (250) 290 (275) 275 (261) 0.003
12 290 (275) 317 (300) 302 (286) 0.002
13 317 (300) 343 (325) 328 (311) 0.001
14 343 (325) 369 (350) 354 (336) 0.001
15 369 (350) Infinity 414 (392) 0.001
12550194 B-9
Table 7
Unqualified Cable, Fire in more than One Cable Bundle Closed Doors)

Severity Factor
Bin
(Pi)
1 0 (0) 53 (50) 36 (34) 0.082
2 53 (50) 106 (100) 80 (76) 0.213
3 106 (100) 158 (150) 131 (124) 0.224
4 158 (150) 211 (200) 184 (174) 0.177
5 211 (200) 264 (250) 235 (223) 0.122
6 264 (250) 317 (300) 288 (273) 0.077
7 317 (300) 369 (350) 341 (323) 0.046
8 369 (350) 422 (400) 394 (373) 0.027
9 422 (400) 475 (450) 446 (423) 0.015
10 475 (450) 528 (500) 499 (473) 0.008
11 528 (500) 580 (550) 552 (523) 0.004
12 580 (550) 633 (600) 603 (572) 0.002
13 633 (600) 686 (650) 656 (622) 0.001
14 686 (650) 739 (700) 709 (672) 0.001
15 739 (700) Infinity 816 (773) 0.001
12550194 B-10
Table 8
Unqualified Cable, Fire in more than One Cable Bundle Open Doors)

Severity Factor
Bin
(Pi)
1 0 (0) 137 (130) 42 (39.5) 0.638
2 137 (130) 274 (260) 197 (187) 0.155
3 274 (260) 411 (390) 337 (319) 0.081
4 411 (390) 549 (520) 475 (450) 0.047
5 549 (520) 686 (650) 612 (580) 0.029
6 686 (650) 823 (780) 749 (710) 0.018
7 823 (780) 960 (910) 886 (840) 0.011
8 960 (910) 1097 (1040) 1024 (971) 0.007
9 1097 (1040) 1234 (1170) 1162 (1101) 0.005
10 1234 (1170) 1372 (1300) 1299 (1231) 0.003
11 1372 (1300) 1509 (1430) 1436 (1361) 0.002
12 1509 (1430) 1646 (1560) 1573 (1491) 0.001
13 1646 (1560) 1783 (1690) 1710 (1621) 0.001
14 1783 (1690) 1920 (1820) 1847 (1751) 0.001
15 1920 (1820) Infinity 2276 (2157) 0.001
12550194 B-11
Table 9
Discretized Distribution for Case 6 Heat Release Rate (Pumps – Electrical Fires)

Severity Factor
Bin
(Pi)
1 0 (0) 26 (25) 11 (10.5) 0.446
2 26 (25) 53 (50) 38 (36) 0.219
3 53 (50) 79 (75) 64 (61) 0.129
4 79 (75) 106 (100) 92 (87) 0.078
5 106 (100) 132 (125) 118 (112) 0.048
6 132 (125) 158 (150) 145 (137) 0.030
7 158 (150) 185 (175) 171 (162) 0.019
8 185 (175) 211 (200) 197 (187) 0.012
9 211 (200) 237 (225) 224 (212) 0.007
10 237 (225) 264 (250) 250 (237) 0.005
11 264 (250) 290 (275) 276 (262) 0.003
12 290 (275) 317 (300) 303 (287) 0.002
13 317 (300) 343 (325) 329 (312) 0.001
14 343 (325) 369 (350) 356 (337) 0.001
15 369 (350) Infinity 427 (405) 0.001
12550194 B-12
Table 10
Discretized Distribution for Case 7 Heat Release Rate (Motors)

Severity Factor
Bin
(Pi)
1 0 (0) 7 (7) 5 (4.4) 0.132
2 7 (7) 15 (14) 12 (11) 0.227
3 15 (14) 22 (21) 18 (17) 0.205
4 22 (21) 30 (28) 25 (24) 0.153
5 30 (28) 37 (35) 33 (31) 0.105
6 37 (35) 44 (42) 40 (38) 0.069
7 44 (42) 52 (49) 47 (45) 0.043
8 52 (49) 59 (56) 55 (52) 0.027
9 59 (56) 66 (63) 62 (59) 0.016
10 66 (63) 74 (70) 70 (66) 0.010
11 74 (70) 81 (77) 77 (73) 0.006
12 81 (77) 89 (84) 84 (80) 0.003
13 89 (84) 96 (91) 92 (87) 0.002
14 96 (91) 103 (98) 99 (94) 0.001
15 103 (98) Infinity 116 (110) 0.001
12550194 B-13
Table 11
Discretized Distribution for Case 8 Heat Release Rate (Transients1)

Severity Factor
Bin
(Pi)
1 0 (0) 37 (35) 22 (21.2) 0.169
2 37 (35) 74 (70) 55 (52) 0.249
3 74 (70) 111 (105) 92 (87) 0.205
4 111 (105) 148 (140) 128 (121) 0.143
5 148 (140) 185 (175) 165 (156) 0.093
6 185 (175) 222 (210) 202 (191) 0.058
7 222 (210) 258 (245) 238 (226) 0.035
8 258 (245) 295 (280) 275 (261) 0.020
9 295 (280) 332 (315) 312 (296) 0.012
10 332 (315) 369 (350) 349 (331) 0.007
11 369 (350) 406 (385) 386 (366) 0.004
12 406 (385) 443 (420) 423 (401) 0.002
13 443 (420) 480 (455) 460 (436) 0.001
14 480 (455) 517 (490) 497 (471) 0.001
15 517 (490) Infinity 578 (548) 0.001
12550194 B-14
Table 12
Damage Criteria for Electrical Cables – Generic Screening Criteria for the Assessment
of the Ignition and Damage Potential of Electrical Cables [See Ref 8-1]
Cable Type Radiant Heating Criteria Temperature Criteria
Thermoplastic 6 kW/m2 (0.5 BTU/ft2s) 205°C (400°F)

2
Thermoset 11 kW/m (1.0 BTU/ft2s) 330°C (625°F)
12550194 B-15
Probability of Target Damage: [SF*Pns](d)
0.0 0.5 1.0 1.5 2.0 2.5 3.0
1.00E-01
Qualified
1.00E-02 Unqualified
1.00E-03
1.00E-04
1.00E-05
Damage Distance [m]
Figure 1
Likelihood of Target Damage Calculated as the Severity Factor Times the Probability
of Non-suppression for MCB Fires
12550194 B-16
Table 13
Probability Distribution for Rate of Fires Suppressed per Unit Time, λ
Number of
Total 50th 95th
Suppression Curve Events in λ Mean 5th Per
Duration Per Per
Curve
T/G fires 21 749 0.03 0.02 0.03 0.04
Control room 6 18 0.33 0.15 0.32 0.58
PWR containment 3 23 0.13 0.04 0.12 0.27
Outdoor transformers 14 373 0.04 0.02 0.04 0.06
Flammable gas 5 195 0.03 0.01 0.02 0.05
Oil fires 36 404 0.09 0.07 0.09 0.11
Cable fires 4 11 0.24 0.12 0.33 0.70
Electrical fires 112 937 0.12 0.10 0.12 0.14
Welding fires 19 99 0.19 0.13 0.19 0.27
Transient fires 24 199 0.12 0.08 0.12 0.16
High energy arcing faults 5 118 0.01 0.02 0.04 0.08
All fires 250 3260 0.08 0.07 0.08 0.08
12550194 B-17
Table 14
Numerical Results for Suppression Curves
High energy arcing faults
Outdoor transformers
PWR containment
Flammable gas
Transient fires
Electrical fires
Control room
Cable fires
Time (min)
T/G fires
Welding
Oil fires
All fires
0 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
5 0.87 0.94 0.83 0.88 0.64 0.55 0.55 0.52 0.38 0.19 0.30 0.68
10 0.76 0.88 0.69 0.77 0.41 0.30 0.30 0.27 0.15 0.04 0.09 0.46
15 0.66 0.83 0.57 0.68 0.26 0.16 0.16 0.14 0.06 0.01 0.03 0.32
20 0.57 0.78 0.47 0.60 0.17 0.09 0.09 0.07 0.02 0.00 0.01 0.22
25 0.50 0.73 0.39 0.53 0.11 0.05 0.05 0.04 0.01 * 0.00 0.15
30 0.43 0.69 0.32 0.46 0.07 0.03 0.03 0.02 0.00 * * 0.10
35 0.37 0.64 0.27 0.41 0.04 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.00 * * 0.07
40 0.33 0.61 0.22 0.36 0.03 0.01 0.01 0.01 * * * 0.05
45 0.28 0.57 0.18 0.32 0.02 0.00 0.00 0.00 * * * 0.03
50 0.25 0.53 0.15 0.28 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 * * * 0.02
55 0.21 0.50 0.13 0.24 0.01 0.00 0.00 * * * * 0.01
60 0.19 0.47 0.11 0.21 0.00 * * * * * * 0.01
65 0.16 0.44 0.09 0.19 0.00 * * * * * * 0.01
70 0.14 0.42 0.07 0.17 0.00 * * * * * * 0.00
75 0.12 0.39 0.06 0.15 0.00 * * * * * * 0.00
80 0.11 0.37 0.05 0.13 * * * * * * * 0.00
85 0.09 0.34 0.04 0.11 * * * * * * * 0.00
90 0.08 0.32 0.03 0.10 * * * * * * * 0.00
95 0.07 0.30 0.03 0.09 * * * * * * * *
100 0.06 0.29 0.02 0.08 * * * * * * * *
* A value of 1E-3 should be used
12550194 B-18
APPENDIX C: EXERCISE SET SOLUTIONS
SESSION 1b: Example Problems (Plant Partitioning)
12550194 C-1
Workshop Problems for Task 1: Plant Boundary Definition and Partitioning

Step 1 - Selection of Global Plant Analysis Boundary: Using Drawing # 01 in the Sample
Package and the information provided in other drawings, identify the Global Plant Analysis
Boundaries in terms of plant areas. Make a complete list of plant areas shown on Drawing #01
in the matrix provided below. Specify whether or not the area shall be included within the
Global Plant Analysis Boundaries and then provide the basis of your decision.
Auxiliary Building Yes Contains equipment and cables that may be included in the
fire PRA analysis
Containment Yes Contains equipment and cables that may be included in the
fire PRA analysis
Diesel Generator Building Yes Contains equipment and cables that may be included in the
fire PRA analysis
Turbine Building Yes Contains equipment and cables that may be included in the
fire PRA analysis
Yard Yes Contains equipment and cables that may be included in the
fire PRA analysis
Security Building No There are no equipment or cables in this building needed

for safe shutdown
Switchyard No Offsite power is impacted from equipment or cable failure in

the Switchyard. However, the impact of a fire event in the
switchyard would be limited to loss of offsite power and no
other safe shutdown related functions. Therefore,
switchyard fires are considered a part of loss of offsite
Intake Structure Yes Contains equipment and cables that may be included in the
fire PRA analysis
12550194 C-2
Step 2: Plant Partitioning: Using the drawings provided in the Sample Package, identify the set
of fire compartments that you will consider for the fire PRA. In the following matrix (1) list
selected compartments, (2) give each an identification number, (3) identify the associated plant
area for each compartment from the Solution Statement for Problem Set 01-01. Provide
comments where warranted.

Plant Area Comments
ID # Descriptor
1 Main Control Room Auxiliary Building Includes the kitchen and Shift
Supervisor's Office
2 Aux Bldg El. 0 Ft Auxiliary Building
3 Cable Spreading Room Auxiliary Building
4A Aux Bldg. El. -20 Ft, Auxiliary Building

RHR Room
4B Aux Bldg. El. -20 Ft, Auxiliary Building

AFW Room
5 Battery Room A Auxiliary Building 1 hour rated walls and 2 hour rated
ceiling within the Switchgear rooms
6 Battery Room B Auxiliary Building 1 hour rated walls and 2 hour rated
8A DG-A Room Diesel Generator Building
12550194 C-3
Plant Area Comments
ID # Descriptor
8B DG-B Room Diesel Generator Building
9 SWG Access Room Auxiliary Building
10 Switchgear Room A Auxiliary Building
11 Switchgear Room B Auxiliary Building
12 Turbine Bldg El. 0 Ft Turbine Building
13 Yard Yard Includes the Transformers next to the

Diesel Generator Building and the two
safety related tanks.
14 Intake Structure Intake Structure A long building with some divisions

with large openings among them with
no doors isolating each compartment
from other compartments.
15 Battery Room 1 Turbine Building 1 hour rated walls and 2 hour rated
16 Stairway Auxiliary Building All doors are 1 hour rated
17 Control Room Access Auxiliary Building
12550194 C-4
Workshop Example
Step 3: Compartment Information Gathering and Characterization: The following tabulation
provides an example of the information about fire compartments that may be used in a fire PRA
project.
Item Resolution
Fire Compartment ID # 9
Fire Compartment Switchgear Access Room
Building Auxiliary Building
Boundary Characteristics The compartment is bounded by 3-hr rated fire walls, ceiling and floor.
Ventilation Features The ventilation is provided by the Auxiliary Building HVAC system (1).
The equipment housed in this compartment can function properly and
perform their safe shutdown duties in case of total loss of the HVAC
system.
Fire Protection Features The fire protection features of this compartment includes:
1. Handheld extinguishers inside the compartment (2 units) (1)
2. Wet hose reel outside the door inside the stairwell(1)
3. Smoke detectors attached to the ceiling (6 units) (1)
4. Automatic CO2 system
Fire Sources The following ignition sources were identified in this compartment.
1. MCC-A
2. MCC-B
3. 125VAC-A
4. 125VAC-B
5. ATS
(1)
6. Lighting Fixtures (10 units)
Additionally the following combustibles are present:

1. Cable trays containing thermoset control cables
2. Wooden desk used by the electrical department(1)
Adjacent Compartments The following compartments share a wall, ceiling or floor with this
compartment:
1. Switchgear Room A
2. Switchgear Room B
3. Stairwell
4. Charging pump room
5. Cable spreading room
Access Routes 1. This room can be accessed from outside through the stairwell
2. Switchgear Rooms A and B are accessed through this room
Components /Systems / See the component and cable lists provided in Tasks 2 and 3.
Cables Present
SSD Human Actions To be completed after Task 12 is completed.
Credited in this
Compartment
(1) Provided here to demonstrate how this part of the step may be addressed. These features are not intended to be
included in the Fire PRA of this Sample Package.
12550194 C-5
SESSION 2b: Example Problems (Fire Ignition Frequency)
12550194 C-6
Workshop Problems for Task 6: Fire Ignition Frequency

Step 1: Mapping plant ignition sources to generic sources: Using the information provided in
this Sample Package, map the items listed in the following table to generic sources.
Equipment Equipment Bin Description /
Equipment Description Bin #
ID Type Comment\
HPI-B High pressure safety injection pump B Pump 21 Pumps
MOV-1 HPI valve MOV 14 Electric Motors
MOV-5 RWST isolation valve MOV -- Less than 5hp motor
BAT-B Train B Battery Battery 1 Batteries
RCP-1 Reactor coolant pump 1 Pump 2 Reactor Coolant Pump
AOV-1 / Assumed as insignificant

Pressure operated relief valve AOV --
(SOV-1) ignition source.
Assumed as insignificant
PT-1 RCS pressure Instrument --
ignition source.
Diesel
EDG-A Train A Emergency Diesel Generator 8 Diesel Generators
Generator
Motor Control
MCC-B1 Train B 480 V Motor Control Center 15 Electrical Cabinets
Center
ATS-1 Automatic Transfer Switch ATS 15 Electrical Cabinets
VITAL-A Train A 120 VAC Vital Bus 120VAC Bus 15 Electrical Cabinets
SWGR-A Train A 4160 V Bus Switchgear 15/16 Electrical Cabinets/HEAF
LC-A Train A 480 V Load Center Load Center 15/16 Electrical Cabinets/HEAF
SST-A Train A Station Service Transformer Transformer 23a Transformers (Dry)
BC-A Train A Battery Charger Battery Charger 10 Battery Chargers
DC BUS-A Train A 125 VDC Bus DC Bus 15 Electrical Cabinets
PNL-A Train A 125 VDC Panel Panelboard 15 Electrical Cabinets
INV-A Train A Inverter Inverter 15 Electrical Cabinets
AFW-A Motor driven AFW pump A Pump 21 Pumps
AFW-B Steam driven AFW Pump B Pump 21 Pumps
SUT-1 Startup Transformer Transformer 29 Yard transformers (Others)
The following table provides the components specifically addressed in the Fire PRA of this Sample
Package.
12550194 C-7
ID Type Comment\
TI-1 Letdown heat exchanger outlet temp Instrument -- Comment 1 (below)
HPI-A High pressure safety injection pump A Pump 21 Pumps
HPI-B High pressure safety injection pump B Pump 21 Pumps
AOV-2 /
Letdown isolation valve AOV -- Comment 1
(SOV-2)
AOV-3 /
Charging pump injection valve AOV -- Comment 1
(SOV-3)
MOV-2 VCT isolation valve MOV 14 Electric Motors
RHR-B RHR pump B Pump 21 Pumps
MOV-3 Cont. sump recirc valve MOV 14 Electric Motors
MOV-4 Cont. sump recirc valve MOV 14 Electric Motors
MOV-8 RHR outboard suction valve MOV 14 Electric Motors
BAT-A Train A Battery Battery 1 Batteries
BAT-B Train B Battery Battery 1 Batteries
RCP-1 Reactor coolant pump 1 Pump 2 Reactor Coolant Pump
AOV-1 /
Pressure operated relief valve AOV -- Comment 1
(SOV-1)
MOV-7 RHR inboard suction valve MOV 14 Electric Motors
MOV-13 PORV block valve MOV -- Comment 2
LI-3 Containment sump level Instrument -- Comment 1
LI-4 Containment sump level Instrument -- Comment 1
PT-1 RCS pressure Instrument -- Comment 1
Diesel
EDG-A Train A Emergency Diesel Generator 8 Diesel Generators
Generator
Diesel
EDG-B Train B Emergency Diesel Generator 8 Diesel Generators
Generator
ANN-1 AFW motor high temp Annunciator -- Comment 1
Motor Control
MCC-A1 Train A 480 V Motor Control Center 15 Electrical Cabinets
Center
Motor Control
MCC-B1 Train B 480 V Motor Control Center 15 Electrical Cabinets
Center
ATS-1 Automatic Transfer Switch ATS 15 Electrical Cabinets
VITAL-A Train A 120 VAC Vital Bus 120VAC Bus 15 Electrical Cabinets
VITAL-B Train B 120 VAC Vital Bus 120VAC Bus 15 Electrical Cabinets
SWGR-A Train A 4160 V Bus Switchgear 15/16 Electrical Cabinets/HEAF
LC-A Train A 480 V Load Center Load Center 15/16 Electrical Cabinets/HEAF
SST-A Train A Station Service Transformer Transformer 23a Transformers (Dry)
BC-A Train A Battery Charger Battery Charger 10 Battery Chargers
DC BUS-A Train A 125 VDC Bus DC Bus 15 Electrical Cabinets
PNL-A Train A 125 VDC Panel Panelboard 15 Electrical Cabinets
INV-A Train A Inverter Inverter 15 Electrical Cabinets
SWGR-B Train B 4160 V Bus Switchgear 15/16 Electrical Cabinets/HEAF
LC-B Train B 480 V Load Center Load Center 15/16 Electrical Cabinets/HEAF
SST-B Train B Station Service Transformer Transformer 23a Transformers (Dry)
12550194 C-8
The following table provides the components specifically addressed in the Fire PRA of this Sample
Package.

ID Type Comment\
BC-B Train B Battery Charger Battery Charger 10 Battery Chargers
DC BUS-B Train B 125 VDC Bus DC Bus 15 Electrical Cabinets
PNL-B Train B 125 VDC Panel Panelboard 15 Electrical Cabinets
INV-B Train B Inverter Inverter 15 Electrical Cabinets
LC-1 Non-Safety 480 V Load Center Load Center 15/16 Electrical Cabinets/HEAF
LC-2 Non-Safety 480 V Load Center Load Center 15/16 Electrical Cabinets/HEAF
SWGR-1 Non-Safety 4160 V Bus Switchgear 15/16 Electrical Cabinets/HEAF
SWGR-2 Non-Safety 4160 V Bus Switchgear 15/16 Electrical Cabinets/HEAF
COMP-1 Instrument air compressor Compressor 9 Air Compressors
MOV-10 AFW discharge valve MOV -- Comment 2
MOV-11 AFW discharge valve MOV -- Comment 2
MOV-18 AFW C Pump Discharge MOV -- Comment 2
SST-1 Non-Safety Station Service Transformer Transformer 23b Transformers (Oil filled)
SST-2 Non-Safety Station Service Transformer Transformer 23b Transformers (Oil filled)
Motor Control
MCC-1 Non-Safety 480 V Motor Control Center 15 Electrical Cabinets
Center
Motor Control
MCC-2 Non-Safety 480 V Motor Control Center 15 Electrical Cabinets
Center
BC-1 Non-Safety Swing Battery Charger Battery Charger 10 Battery Chargers
BAT-1 Non-Safety Battery Battery 1 Batteries
DC BUS-1 Non-Safety 250 VDC Bus DC Bus 15 Electrical Cabinets
AFW-A Motor driven AFW pump A Pump 21 Pumps
AFW-B Steam driven AFW Pump B Pump 21 Pumps
AFW-C AFW pump C Pump 21 Pumps
MOV-14 AFW turbine steam line isolation valve MOV -- Comment 2
MOV-15 AFW steam inlet throttle valve MOV -- Comment 2
MOV-16 AFW test line isolation valve MOV -- Comment 2
V-12 CST isolation valve MOV -- Comment 2
LI-1 RWST level Instrument -- Comment 1
LI-2 RWST level Instrument -- Comment 1
SUT-1 Startup Transformer Transformer 27/28 Yard transformers (Others)
Comment 1: Assumed as insignificant ignition source.
Comment 2: Less than 5hp motor
12550194 C-9
Step 4: Mapping Plant-Specific Locations to Generic Locations: Using the information
provided in this Sample Package, map the items listed in the following table to the applicable
generic locations provided in NUREG/CR 6850. Note that some of the compartments may map
to more than one Generic Location.
Step 5: Location Weighting Factors: Assign the location weighting factors of the Fire
Compartments in the following table.
Fire
Plant Fire Compartment Plant Area Generic Location WL
Comp. #
1 Main Control Room Auxiliary Building See Note 1 1.0
2 Aux Bldg El. 0 Ft Auxiliary Building See Note 2 1.0
3 Cable Spreading Room Auxiliary Building See Note 2 1.0
4A RHR Pump Room Auxiliary Building See Note 2 1.0
4B AFW Pump Room Auxiliary Building See Note 2 1.0
5 Battery Room A Auxiliary Building See Note 3 1.0
6 Battery Room B Auxiliary Building See Note 3 1.0
9 SWG Access Room Auxiliary Building See Note 2 1.0
10 Switchgear Room A Auxiliary Building See Note 2 1.0
11 Switchgear Room B Auxiliary Building See Note 2 1.0
14 Stairway Auxiliary Building See Note 2 1.0
7 Containment Containment Containment 1.0
8A DG-A Room DG Bldg. See Note 4 1.0
8B DG-B Room DG Bldg. See Note 4 1.0
12 Turbine Bldg El. 0 Ft Turbine Building See Note 5 1.0
15 Battery Room 1 Turbine Building See Note 6 1.0
13 Yard Yard See Note 7 1.0
14 Intake Structure Intake Structure Plant-Wide Components 1.0
Note 1: Control Room (for the Main Control Board) and Control/Aux/Reactor Building (for cable and transient fires)
Note 2: Control/Aux/Reactor Building (for cable and transient fires) and Plant-Wide Components for all other items
Note 3: Battery Room (for the batteries) and Control/Aux/Reactor Building (for cable and transient fires)
Note 4: Diesel Generator Room (for the Diesel Generators), Control/Aux/Reactor Building (for cable and transient
fires), and Plant-Wide Components for all other items
Note 5: Turbine and Plant-Wide Components (for all items not specifically assigned to the Turbine Building)
Note 6: Battery Room (for the batteries) and Turbine Building (for cable and transient fires)
Note 7: Transformer Yard and Plant-Wide Components for all other items
12550194 C-10
Step 5: Location Weighting Factors: At a two-unit nuclear power plant, the Main Control Room
is shared between the two units. The control room consists of two separate Main Control Boards
that do not share any controls and are dedicated to one unit each. There are 5 electrical cabinets
in the control room in addition to the Main Control Boards that are shared between the two units.
a. For Unit 1, establish the Location Weighting Factor of the Main Control Board
WL, MCR, Main Control Board = 2.0
b. For Unit 1, establish the Location Weighting Factor of the electrical cabinets.
WL, MCR, Electrical Cabinets = 2.0
c. For Unit 1, establish the Location Weighting Factor of transient fires in the Main Control Room
WL, MCR, Transients = 2.0
12550194 C-11
Step 6: Fixed Fire Ignition Source Counts: Estimate the ignition source counts for only those
items that are noted under each picture and are visible in the foreground of the picture:
Electrical Panels: _8 vertical sections Electrical Panels: _7 vertical sections

Transformers: __1_
Transformers: _1_ Electrical Panels: _5 vertical sections

Transformers: __2_
Electrical Panels: _2 vertical sections Electrical Panels: _3 vertical sections
12550194 C-12
Electrical Panels: _2 vertical sections Electrical Panels: _1vertical sections
Electrical Panels: _ No count –Sealed with low

voltage circuits
12550194 C-13
Step 6: Fixed Fire Ignition Source Counts: Estimate the ignition source counts for the components identified in Step 1 above.
1 2 8 4 9 10 14 15 16 21 23a 23b 29
High Energy Arcing

Main Control Board
Transformers (Dry)
Electrical Cabinets
Yard transformers
Diesel Generators
Transformers (Oil
Air Compressors
Battery Chargers
Reactor Coolant
Electric Motors
Batteries
(Others)
Pumps
Faults
Pump
filled)
XFMR- XFMR- XFMR-
Dry Oil Yard
1 Main Control Room Control/Aux/Reactor Building 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0
2 Aux Bldg El. 0 Ft Control/Aux/Reactor Building 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 0 0 2 0 0 0
3 Cable Spreading Room Control/Aux/Reactor Building 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
4A RHR Pump Room Control/Aux/Reactor Building 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 0 0 1 0 0 0
4B AFW Pump Room Control/Aux/Reactor Building 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 0 0 0
5 Battery Room A Plant Wide Components 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
6 Battery Room B Plant Wide Components 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
9 SWG Access Room Plant Wide Components 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 31 0 0 0 0 0
10 Switchgear Room A Plant Wide Components 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 25 14 0 1 0 0
11 Switchgear Room B Plant Wide Components 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 24 14 0 1 0 0
14 Stairway Plant Wide Components 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
7 Containment Containment 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0
8A DG-A Room Plant Wide Components 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
8B DG-B Room Plant Wide Components 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
12 Turbine Bldg El. 0 Ft Plant Wide Components 0 0 0 2 1 0 57 28 1 0 2 0
15 Battery Room 1 Plant Wide Components 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
13 Yard Plant Wide Components 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 3
14 Intake Structure Plant Wide Components 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Total 3 0 2 1 2 3 7 136 56 6 2 2 3
12550194 C-14
Step 7: Ignition Source Weighting Factors: For an NPP, the fire PRA analysts have counted 23
pumps within the Plant Analysis Boundary.
• For RHR Pump RHRP-C located in RHR Pump room (FZ-03A), which in turn is located
in the Reactor Building, establish the IS, J and L subscripts of:
WIS,J,L = W RHRP-C,FZ-03A,AUX BLDG
• For the same RHR Pump, RHRP-C, calculate the Ignition Source Weighting Factor
W = 1/23 = 0.043
• RHR Pump room FZ-03A contains three pumps. Calculate the ignition source weighting
factor for the pumps in this compartment.
W = 3/23 = 0.13
12550194 C-15
Step 7: Ignition Source Weighting Factors: For an NPP, the fire PRA analysts have counted
351 electrical cabinet vertical sections within the Plant Analysis Boundary.
• 480VAC MCC-A is composed of 32 breakers arranged in 8 vertical segments. Calculate
the ignition source weighting factor for this MCC.
WMCC-A = 8/351 = 0.023
• 4kV non-1E Switchgear 1 is composed of 8 breakers. Each breaker takes up one vertical
segment of the switchgear. Calculate the ignition source weighting factor for this
electrical panel.
WSWG-1 = 8/351 = 0.023

• The local control panel, CP-1, for the chemicals addition system located in the Reactor
Building has the following dimensions: 2’ Deep, 12’Long, 8’High. There are no
partitions within the panel. Calculate the ignition source weighting factor for this
electrical panel.
WCP-1 = 1/351 = 0.0028
12550194 C-16
Step 7: Ignition Source Weighting Factors: Using the information provided in the solution for Problem Set 06-07, calculate the
component weighting factors for the components listed below.
1 2 8 4 9 10 14 15 16 21 23a 23b 29
transformers
Main Control
High Energy
Transformer
Transformer
Compressor
s (Oil filled)
Generators
Electrical
Chargers
Batteries
Cabinets
(Others)
Reactor
Coolant
Electric
Battery
Motors
Pumps
s (Dry)
Arcing
Diesel
Faults
Board
Pump
Yard
Air
s
XFMR- XFMR- XFMR-
# Compartment Plant Area BAT RCP DG MCB AC BC EM EC HEAF PMP Dry Oil Yard
1 Main Control Room Control/Aux/Reactor Building 1.0E+00 7.4E-03
2 Aux Bldg El. 0 Ft Control/Aux/Reactor Building 4.3E-01 3.3E-01
4A RHR Pump Room Control/Aux/Reactor Building 4.3E-01 1.7E-01
4B AFW Pump Room Control/Aux/Reactor Building 3.3E-01
5 Battery Room A Plant Wide Components 3.3E-01
6 Battery Room B Plant Wide Components 3.3E-01
9 SWG Access Room Plant Wide Components 2.2E-01
10 Switchgear Room A Plant Wide Components 3.3E-01 1.8E-01 2.5E-01 5.0E-01
11 Switchgear Room B Plant Wide Components 3.3E-01 1.8E-01 2.5E-01 5.0E-01
7 Containment Containment 1.0E+00 1.4E-01
8A DG-A Room Plant Wide Components 5.0E-01
8B DG-B Room Plant Wide Components 5.0E-01
12 Turbine Bldg El. 0 Ft Plant Wide Components 3.3E-01 1.0E+00 3.3E-01 4.2E-01 5.0E-01 1.7E-01 1.0E+00
13 Yard Plant Wide Components 1.0E+00
12550194 C-17
Transient Ignition Source Weighting Factors: An NPP is composed of three compartments
with the following characteristics:
A. Enter the influencing factors for each compartment and category:
Influencing Factor Cable Run (self-

ignited cable
Compartment Maintenance Occupancy Storage fires)
Compartment 1 10 1 10 1,000
Compartment 2 3 1 3 --
Compartment 3 1 10 10 10,000
Total 14 12 23 11,000
B. Calculate the ignition source weighting factors for each compartment

Cable Run (self-
Compartment ignited cable
fires)
cutting cutting
Compartment 1 43% 10/14 50% 9.1%

Compartment 2 14% 3/14 -- --
Compartment 3 43% 1/14 50% 90.9%
Total 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0%
C. Calculate the ignition frequencies for each compartment

Cable Run (self-
ignited cable
fires)
cutting cutting
Total Location
Frequency (/ry)
3.90E-03 9.70E-03 1.60E-03 4.40E-03
Compartment 1 1.67E-03 6.93E-03 8.0E-04 4.00E-04

Compartment 2 5.57E-04 2.08E-03 -- --
Compartment 3 1.67E-03 6.93E-04 8.0E-04 4.00E-03
12550194 C-18
SESSION 6b: Example Problems (Scoping Fire Modeling)
12550194 C-19
Workshop Problems on Task 8: Scoping Fire Modeling
This handout includes workshop problems on the different steps of Task 8: Scoping Fire
Modeling. Problems are grouped by steps.
Step 1: Preparation for Walkdown

Step 1 has three sub-steps: 1) Estimate heat release rate for fixed ignition source screening, 2)
Target and intervening combustibles damage or ignition criteria, and 3) Develop a zone of
influence.
Workshop problem 08-01:

Step 1.1: Estimate heat release rate for fixed ignition source screening: Assign a heat
release rate to the ignition sources depicted in the pictures of the following Table 08-01. For
this exercise, assume that the plant has a mix of qualified and unqualified cables. The heat
release rates are listed in Table E-1 of NUREG/CR-6850.
12550194 C-20
Table 08-01: Inputs for Workshop Problems 1
98th Percentile
HRR
Table 8-1 in
NUREG/CR-6850
suggests the use of
7 69 kW the “Electric Motors”
heat release rate
probability distribution
for dry transformers
Dry transformer
Fire protection panels
have usually moderate
to high combustible
loading (including
relays circuit cards
4 464 kW etc.). It is therefore
assumed that the fire
may be able to
propagate to more
than one cable
Fire protection panel bundle.
Table 8-1 in
NUREG/CR-6850
suggests the use of
the “Electric Motors”
7 69 kW
heat release rate
probability distribution
for ventilation sub-
systems
Ventilation sub-system
fc
Table 8-1 in
NUREG/CR-6850
suggests not to screen
pumps due to the
6 211 kW need of evaluating oil
fires. Table E-1
suggests a heat
release rate of 211 kW
for electrical fires only.
Pumps
12550194 C-21
Workshop Problem Set 08-02:
Step 1.2: Target and intervening combustible damage and ignition criteria: Assign
damage criteria to the ignition sources depicted in Table 08-01. For this exercise, assume that
the plant has a mix of thermoset and thermoplastic cable. Generic damage criteria are listed in
Table H-1 of NUREG/CR-6850.
Table 08-02: Inputs for Workshop Problem 2

Target/Intervening
Damage Criteria Justification
Combustible
From Table H-1 in NUREG/CR-
6850. Page H-2 of
NUREG/CR-6850 suggests
6 kW/m2 (0.5 BTU/ft2s) or using the “weakest link” for
Cables in a ladder back tray
205°C (400°F) determining damage criteria.
Therefore the damage criteria
for thermoplastic cable were
selected.
Page H-2 of NUREG/CR-6850
suggests using the “weakest
link” for determining damage
criteria. Therefore the damage
6 kW/m2 (0.5 BTU/ft2s) or
Cables in a solid tray criteria for thermoplastic cable
205°C (400°F)
were selected. Solid trays are
treated as conduits in this task.
See second bullet in page H-1
of NUREG/CR-6850.
From Table H-1 in NUREG/CR-

11 kW/m2 (1.0 BTU/ft2s) or
Theromset cable in a conduit 6850. See second bullet in
330°C (625°F)
page H-1 of NUREG/CR-6850.
See section H.2 in NUREG/CR-

2
6 kW/m (0.5 BTU/ft2s) or 6850. Cables connecting the
Motor operated valve (MOV).
205°C (400°F) MOV are assumed
thermoplastic in this example.
3 kW/m2 (0.25 BTU/ft2s) or See section H.2 in NUREG/CR-

Cabinet with a solid state device
65°C (150°F) 6850.
12550194 C-22
Step 1.3: Develop zone of influence: Calculate the heat release rate required for generating
target damage for the following ignition source/target combination and determine if the ignition
source can be screened. Use the engineering calculations described in NUREG-1805 for
determining the heat release rate value.
• Target in the hot gas layer:
A cable tray target is located near the ceiling in a room approximately 21’ by 7’ and has
a normally closed door on each end. The room is approximately 20’ high. The inside
walls of the MCC room are reinforced concrete. There is one MCC cabinet in the room.
The MCC cabinet has unqualified cable.
The MQH room temperature correlation described in Section 2.6 of NUREG-1805 was selected
for calculating the hot gas layer temperature in the room. Input values for the MQH model are
listed in Table 08-03. Notice that a heat release rate of 600 kW generates room temperatures
of approximately 205 oC. This calculation assumes a 20-min fire duration and one open door in
the room.
Table 08-03: MQH Room Temperature Correlation Analysis

MCC Room
Length [ft]: 21
Width [ft]: 7
Height [ft]: 20
MQH Temperature Correlation
Inputs
Duration [sec] 1200
Opening area [m2] 2
Height of opening [m] 2
Room length [m] 6
Room width [m] 2
Room height [m] 6
Thermal conductivity [kW/mK] 0.0014
Density [kg/m3] 2000
Specific heat [kJ/kg] 0.88
Wall thickness [m] 0.6
HRR [kW] 600
Results
Room Temp [C] 205
12550194 C-23
• Target subjected to flame impingement or fire plume temperatures:
A vertical cable tray is located 5’ ft from a floor based ventilation subsystem.
The Heskestad’ flame height and plume temperature correlations described in Chapter 3 and 9
of NUREG-1805 respectively were selected for calculating flame height and room temperature.
Input values for the models are listed in Table 08-04 and Table 08-05. Notice that a heat
release rate of 250 kW generates a flame height of 5’. In the case of the plume temperature
correlation, a heat release rate of 165 kW generates damage temperatures of approximately
205 oC at the location of the target.
Table 08-04: Heskestad Flame Height Correlation

Inputs
HRR [kW] 250
Results [m] [ft]

Flame height [m] 1.5 5.0
Table 08-05: Heskestad Plume Temperature Correlation

Heskestad Plume Temperature Correlation
Inputs
Fire location factor 1
HRR [kW] 165
Fire elevation [m] 0
Target Elevation [m] 1.5
Radiation Fraction 0.40
Fire Diameter [m] 1
Results
Plume Temp [C] 202
12550194 C-24
• Target subjected to flame radiation:
A conduit is located 3 ft from a battery charger with qualified cable.
The point source flame radiation model described in section 5.3 of NUREG-1805 was selected
for calculating the incident heat flux at the location of the target. Input values for the point
source model are listed in
Table 08-06. Notice that a heat release rate of 160 kW generates incident heat fluxes of 5
kW/m2.
Table 08-06: Point Source Flame Radiation Model

Inputs
Distance from flames [m] 1
Results
12550194 C-25
Step 2: Plant Walkdown: Inspect the ignition source and target combination in the pictures
included in Table 08-07 and determine the appropriate zone of influence calculation necessary.
Table 08-07: Inputs for Workshop Problems 1
Ignition
Source/Target
Targets in the conduits will

be affected by flame or
plume conditions.
Fire protection Depending on the fire size
~4’
panel/Conduits above and the characteristics of
the room, the target may
also be affected by hot gas
layer temperatures.
Targets in the conduits will

plume conditions.
Electrical Depending on the fire size
~3’
cabinets/Conduit and the characteristics of
layer temperatures.
Adjacent ventilation
subsystem will be affected
by flame radiation.
Ventilation
Depending on the fire size
Subsystem/Ventilation ~2’
and the characteristics of
Subsystem
layer temperatures.
12550194 C-26
Ignition
Source/Target
MOV’s and associated

cables will be affected by
flame radiation from a fire in
the ventilation subsystem.
Ventilation
Depending on the fire size ~3’
Subsystem/MOV’s
and the characteristics of
layer temperatures.
Targets in the cable tray will

plume conditions.
Electrical Depending on the fire size
~4’
cabinet/Cable tray and the characteristics of
layer temperatures.
Targets in the cable tray will

plume conditions.
Transformer/Cable Depending on the fire size
~5’
tray and the characteristics of
layer temperatures.
Adjacent pump will be

affected by flame radiation.
Depending on the fire size
Pump/Pump and the characteristics of ~4’
layer temperatures.
12550194 C-27
Step 3: Verification of Screened Ignition Sources
No workshop problem for Step 3.

Step 4: Calculation of Severity Factors: Calculate the severity factors for the ignition source
and target combinations listed in Workshop Problem 08-03. Use the results of Workshop
Problem Set 08-03 as inputs to this exercise.
• Target in the hot gas layer

Ignition source: MCC cabinet with unqualified cable
Heat release rate probability distribution: Case 4, Gamma distribution with
α = 2.6 & β = 67.8.
Critical heat release rate: 600 kW
Severity factor: Using a Microsoft Excel function,
SF = 1-GAMMADIST(600,2.6,67.8,TRUE) ≈ 0.004
• Target subjected to flame impingement or plume temperatures

Ignition source: Ventilation subsystem
α = 2.0 & β = 11.7.
Critical heat release rate: 250 kW or 165 kW
SF = 1-GAMMADIST(250,2,11.7,TRUE) ≈ 1.2E-8 or
SF =1-GAMMADIST(165,2,11.7,TRUE) ≈ 1.1E-5
• Target subjected to flame radiation

Ignition source: Battery charger with qualified cable
α = 0.7 & β = 216.
Critical heat release rate: 160 kW
SF =1-GAMMADIST(160,0.7,216,TRUE) ≈ 0.83
It should be noted that this problem can also be solved using the discretized Gamma distribution tables in Appendix
E of NUREG/CR-6850. Consider the target subjected to flame radiation, which was assigned the following Case 2
gamma distribution for heat release rate:
12550194 C-28
Figure 1: Table E-3 from NUREG/CR-6850
The severity factor is the sum of the severity factor column after the “Point Value”
160 kW (highlighted values in Figure 1).
12550194 C-29
Step 5: Calculation of Revised Compartment Fire Frequency: Determine a revised compartment ignition frequency for
switchgear room A assuming the walkdown results listed in Table 08-08.
Table 08-08: Summary of Task 8 Calculations

Measured
Equipment Table E- Critical HRR Room Room Calculated Room Severity Count
Count Fire Condition Distance Screened
Description 1 Case (Table E-1) Area (ft2) Height (ft) HRR (kW) Temp (F) Factor Task 8
(ft)
Train A 4160 V Do Not
8 flame or plume 1.7 9 1350 20 7 N/A No 1.00 8.00
Bus Screen
Train A 480 V Do Not
6 flame radiation 4.9 9 1350 20 401 N/A No 1.00 6.00
Load Center Screen
Train A Station
Do Not
Service 1 flame radiation 4.5 9 1350 20 336 N/A No 1.00 1.00
Screen
Transformer
Train A Battery
1 flame or plume 2.9 4 464 1350 20 25 264 No 0.98 0.98
Charger
Train A 125 VDC
8 flame or plume 0.7 4 464 1350 20 1 264 No 1.00 8.00
Bus
Train A 125 VDC
1 flame radiation 2.8 4 464 1350 20 129 264 No 0.60 0.60
Panel
Train A Inverter 1 flame radiation 2.0 4 464 1350 20 64 264 No 0.88 0.88
Table 08-09: Comparison of Switchgear Room A ignition Frequency

12550194 C-30
SESSION 10b: Example Problems (Detailed Fire Modeling)
12550194 C-31
WORKSHOP PROBLEMS ON TASK 11A: DETAILED
FIRE MODELING
This handout includes workshop problems on the different steps of Task 11: Detailed Fire
Modeling. Problems are grouped according to the steps defined in NUREG/CR-6850. Detailed
fire modeling will be conducted in the switchgear access room (Room 9) located in elevation 20
ft of the auxiliary building.

Step 1a: Identify and Characterize Compartments: Review the following information
necessary for fire modeling purposes.
- Room size: For the purpose of this exercise, assume the size of the room is 45’ by 22’
by 20’ high.
- Wall boundaries: The surfaces, floor, ceiling, and walls are reinforced concrete. All the
surfaces are 2’ thick.
- Doors: The room has three doorways: 1) a double door connecting to switchgear room
A, 2) a double door connecting to switchgear room B, and 3) a single door connecting to
the stairwell. The size of a single door is 6.5’ by 3’.
- Mechanical Ventilation: The switchgear access room has a mechanical ventilation
system with a balance 5 air changes per hour.
12550194 C-32
Step 2a: Identify and Characterize fire Detection and Suppression Features and
Systems: Review the following information necessary for fire modeling purposes.
- Prompt detection: Prompt detection is not credited since there is no incipient fire
detection system in the room and no continuous fire watch.
- Prompt suppression: Prompt suppression is not credited since there is no continuous
fire watch in the room.
- Fixed fire detection system/s (type, and sensor location): An automatic fire detection
system is credited since the room is equipped with an automatic fire detection system.
The location of the relevant detectors is specified in the corresponding scenario
descriptions later in this document.
- Fixed fire suppression system/s (type and nozzle location): An automatic CO2 system is
credited since the room is equipped with an automatic CO2 system. Upon smoke
detection alarm, a timer starts providing 60 seconds delay for life safety purposes. The
CO2 is released after the delay time. The soak time is approximately 20 min.
- Fire brigade arrival time: The fire brigade arrival time is assumed to be 15 min.
- Delayed detection: Delayed detection is credited and assumed to be 15 minutes
(consistent with the example in page P-14 of NUREG/CR-6850).
12550194 C-33
Step 3a: Characterize Fire Ignition Sources: From the Task 6 (Fire Ignition Frequencies)
calculation package, list the fixed ignition sources located in the switchgear access room (room
9) and assign a heat release rate probability distribution to each of them from Table G-1 of
NUREG/CR-6850.
Solution: Table 10 lists the recommended answer to workshop problem 3.
Table 10: Summary of ignition source characteristics in the switchgear access room.
Case (Table E-
1 of HRR Profile (Page G-6 in NUREG/CR-
Equipment ID Equipment Description
NUREG/CR- 6850)
6850)
2
t grow to a peak of 211 kW in 12 min
MCC-A1 Train A 480 V Motor Control Center Case 3 followed by steady burning for 8
additional minutes
2
MCC-B1 Train B 480 V Motor Control Center Case 3 followed by steady burning for 8
additional minutes
2
VITAL-A Train A 120 VAC Vital Bus Case 3 followed by steady burning for 8
additional minutes
2
VITAL-B Train B 120 VAC Vital Bus Case 3 followed by steady burning for 8
additional minutes
2
Transients Regular solid transient ignition sources. Case 8 followed by steady burning for 8
additional minutes
12550194 C-34
Step 4a: Identify Secondary Combustibles: No workshop problem is associated with this
step. The following discussion provides an example of how to identify and characterize
secondary combustibles.

For the purpose of this example, let’s assume that there is one cable tray stack above each
cabinet in the room. Each stack has two trays. The first tray is 1’ above each cabinet. The
second tray in the stack is 1.5’ above the first tray. The trays are ladder-back. A pictorial
representation of the secondary combustibles in provided in Figure 2.
1.5’
Secondary Secondary
combustibles combustibles
1’
Cabinet in Cabinet in switchgear

switchgear access room
access
room Side view
Front view
Figure 2: Pictorial representation of the secondary combustibles. Drawing not to

scale.
From Table 10, the cabinets in the switchgear access room will have a peak heat release rate of
211 kW. Heskestad’s flame height correlation (Chapter 3 of NUREG 1805) suggests a flame
height of approximately 4.6’ above the ignition source. Therefore, the cable tray stack above
the cabinet is expected to ignite and contributing to the fire intensity. Table 11 lists the
Heskestad’s flame height correlation analysis.
Table 11: Heskestad’s flame height correlation analysis.

Inputs
HRR [kW] 211
Results
Flame height [ft] 4.6
12550194 C-35
Step 5a: Identify and Characterize Target Sets: No workshop problem is associated with this
step. The following discussion provides an example of how to identify and characterize target
sets. In practice, this step requires highlighting of cable tray and conduit targets in room layout
drawings based on cable routing analysis and plant walkdowns.

For the purpose of this exercise, let’s assume that there are two target sets in the room:
1) HCBT-35A and HCBT-37B, and 2) VCBT-20A, and VCBT-20B. These trays are identified in
Figure 3. The trays have both thermo-set and thermo-plastic cables. Specifically, a fire
damaging either the two horizontal trays or the two vertical trays will generate the postulated
plant condition.
Figure 3: Cable tray locations in the switchgear access room
Tray locations:
• HCBT 35A: This horizontal tray comes into the switchgear access room from switchgear
room A. The tray is the second tray in an elevated stack. The lowest tray in the stack is at
elevation 33’ (13’ from the floor). The target tray, HCBT 35A, is at elevation 35’ (15’ ft from
the floor and 2’ above the lowest tray in the stack).
• HCBT 37B: This horizontal tray comes in the south direction into the switchgear access
room from switchgear room B and turns west. The tray is the first tray in an elevated stack.
It is located at elevation 37’ (17’ from the floor). At the point the cable tray crosses HCBT
35A, it is the third tray in the stack.
• VCBT 20A: This is a vertical cable tray in the south west corner of the room. The tray
• VCBT 20B: This is a vertical cable tray in the south west corner of the room. The tray
12550194 C-36
Step 6a: Define the Fire Scenarios to be Analyzed: Define the fire scenarios to be analyzed
in the switchgear access room using the information provided or collected in the first five steps.
Solution: The following tables and figures describe the fire scenarios defined for analysis. For
the purpose of this exercise, only the scenarios that will be analyzed in detail in upcoming
workshop problems have been defined in detail.
• Fixed ignition source fire scenarios: Fixed ignition source fire scenarios are postulated in
the two closest cabinets to the target trays.
Table 12: Summary of Scenario 1.

Scenario 1: A fire in the MCC-A cabinet affecting the two horizontal cable tray targets. The targets could be affected by
hot gas layer temperatures, flame radiation or horizontal flame spread.
Ignition Source MCC-A cabinet. The fire is postulated 1’ below the top of the cabinet. The
cabinet is 7’ high.
Secondary combustibles Cable tray stack above the electrical cabinet.
Target HCBT-35A, HCBT-37B. The pinch point is located 2’ horizontally from the
cabinet (closest distance from fire to pinch point).
Credited detection Automatic fire detection system
Credited suppression Automatic CO2 system and fire brigade
Figure 4 provides a pictorial representation of this scenario.
5’
2’ Smoke det
2’ HCBT 37B
Int
HCBT 35A combustibles
MCC Cabinet 17’

13’
7’
Figure 4: Pictorial representation of fire scenario 1. Drawing not to scale.
Table 13: Summary of scenario 2.

Scenario 2: A fire in the 120VAC-A cabinet affecting the two horizontal cable tray targets. The targets could be affected
by hot gas layer temperatures, direct flame radiation, or horizontal flame spread.
Ignition Source 120VAC-A cabinet
Secondary combustibles Cable tray stack above the electrical cabinet.
Target HCBT-35A, HCBT-37B
12550194 C-37
Scenario 3: A fire in the 120VAC-A cabinet affecting the vertical cable tray targets. The targets could be affected by hot
gas layer temperatures, direct flame radiation, or horizontal flame spread..
Ignition Source 120VAC-A cabinet
Secondary combustibles
Target HCBT-35A, HCBT-37B
Finally, Figure 4 illustrates the location of the postulated fires.
Figure 5: Pictorial representation of the location of the postulated fire scenarios.
• Transient ignition source fire scenarios: Only regular solid transient fire scenarios at floor
level are postulated in this room. Since the room does not contain any mechanical
equipment requiring lubrication or oil, fires resulting from combustible liquid spills are not
postulated.

Scenario 4: A transient fire at floor level affecting the two horizontal cable tray targets. The targets could be affected by
hot gas layer temperatures, flame impingement or fire plume temperatures.
Ignition Source Floor based transient fire
Target VCBT-20A, VCBT-20B
Figure 6 provides a pictorial representation of this scenario.
12550194 C-38
8’
2’
Smoke det
HCBT 37B
HCBT 35A
17’
MCC Cabinet
13’
Transient fire
Figure 6: Pictorial representation of fire scenario 4. Drawing not to scale.

Scenario 5: A transient fire at floor level affecting the two vertical cable tray targets. The targets could be affected by
hot gas layer temperatures, flame impingement or direct flame radiation.
Ignition Source Floor based transient fire
Target VCBT-20A, VCBT-20B
Figure 7 illustrate the location of the postulated transient fires.
Figure 7: Pictorial representation of the location of the postulated fire scenarios.
• Additional scenarios that should be considered include self-ignited cable fires and junction
box fires since this room has unqualified cable.
12550194 C-39
Step 7a: Conduct Fire Growth and Propagation Analysis: For the purpose of this workshop,
only two of the fire scenarios listed in the previous section are analyzed in detail: Scenario 1,
and Scenario 4.
Workshop Problem 11a-05:

Determine if a fire in the ignition sources associate with scenarios 1 and 4 can produce room
wide damage in the switchgear access room. If the ignition sources alone are not expected to
generate room wide damage, determine the amount of secondary combustibles necessary to
achieve it.
Solution:
A 1.1 MW fire is necessary for generating room wide damage in the aux switchgear access
room. Using the MQH Room Temperature correlation (NUREG 1805), a 1.1 MW fire may
generate a room temperature of 205 oC, which is the assumed damage temperature (Appendix
H of NUREG/CR-6850) for thermoplastic cables in the aux control room. The aux control room
has approximately 1000 ft2 floor and 20 ft high ceiling. All room surfaces are concrete. The
calculation assumes one single open door and a 20 min fire duration. Table 17 lists the inputs
and output of the MQH room temperature analysis.
Table 17: Summary of room temperature analyses using the MQH model.
MQH Temperature Correlation MQH Temperature Correlation MQH Temperature Correlation
Single cabinet cubicle fire Transient fire Limiting fire size
Inputs Inputs Inputs

Ambient temperature [C] 20 Ambient temperature [C] 20 Ambient temperature [C] 20
Duration [sec] 1200 Duration [sec] 1200 Duration [sec] 1200
Opening area [m2] 2 Opening area [m2] 2 Opening area [m2] 2
Height of opening [m] 2 Height of opening [m] 2 Height of opening [m] 2
Room length [m] 14 Room length [m] 14 Room length [m] 14
Room width [m] 7 Room width [m] 7 Room width [m] 7
Room height [m] 6 Room height [m] 6 Room height [m] 6
Thermal cond [kW/mK] 0.0014 Thermal cond [kW/mK] 0.0014 Thermal cond [kW/mK] 0.0014
Density [kg/m3] 2000 Density [kg/m3] 2000 Density [kg/m3] 2000
Specific heat [kJ/kg] 0.88 Specific heat [kJ/kg] 0.88 Specific heat [kJ/kg] 0.88
Wall thickness [m] 0.6 Wall thickness [m] 0.6 Wall thickness [m] 0.6
HRR [kW] 211 HRR [kW] 317 HRR [kW] 1100
Results Results Results

Room Temp [C] 82 Room Temp [C] 102 Room Temp [C] 205
Both an electrical cabinet and a transient fire are postulated at floor level in the switchgear
access room. Appendix G of NUREG/CR-6850 suggests that the 98th percentile heat release
rates for these fires are 211 kW and 317 kW (see also Table 10). These fire intensities are
lower than the critical value of 1.1 MW calculated earlier required for room wide damage.
Consequently, fire propagation to nearby cable trays or secondary combustibles (if available) is
necessary to reach the critical fire intensity.
12550194 C-40
The cable tray heat release rate model described in Chapter 7 of NUREG-1805 suggests a heat
release rate of 265 kW for a 1 m2 for a bench scale HRR of 589 kW/m2 (PE/PVC material). With
this approximation:
• If the fire starts in an electrical cabinet, approximately 5 trays will need to burn to produce a
1.9 MW fire assuming a 1 m2 of tray on fire: (1100 – 211)/265 ≈ 4 (assuming a tray length of
approximately 3’).
• If the fire starts as a transient fire, approximately 6 trays will need to burn to produce a 1.9
MW fire assuming a 1 m2 of tray on fire: (1100 – 317)/265 ≈ 3 (assuming a tray
length of approximately 3’).
In the case of self ignited or junction box fires, a total of 1100/265 ≈ 5 trays will need to be on
fire in order to generate room wide damage.
This analysis will serve as basis for decision making in selecting and analyzing fire scenarios in
the aux control room. In this particular room, it appears that there are not enough trays above
the cabinets or transients where the fire is postulated to generate room wide damage without
significant horizontal flame spread and if suppression activities fail before fire propagates
upward to at least five or six trays.
12550194 C-41
Solution:
• Time to target damage: Time to target damage is assumed to be: 1) the time required for
the fire to heat up the cable trays to its damage temperature by direct flame radiation, or 2)
the time to room heat up to cable damage temperature. In either case, the fire growth
profile will be an important factor in this analysis.
Heat release rate profile for the ignition source: Table 10, the heat release rate profile for
this ignition source is t2 grow to a peak of 211 kW in 12 min followed by steady burning for 8
additional minutes. This is the profile recommended in NUREG/CR-6850 for this electrical
cabinet, page G-6.
Heat release rate from secondary combustibles: Recall that the secondary combustibles
(cable tray stack above the panel) is expected to contribute to the fire intensity.
Consequently, the heat release rate profile should include such contribution. Appendix R of
NUREG/CR-6850 describes the following model for fire propagation in cable trays: the first
tray above the ignition source will ignited at the calculated time using fire modeling tools.
The second tray will ignite 4 minutes after the first one. Evaluating the flame height and
plume temperature using the corresponding correlations from Heskestad (Chapters 3 & 9 in
NUREG 1805), both models suggest ignition of the first tray in approximately 3 to 5 min.
Therefore, ignition of the second tray is expected in approximately 9 min after ignition.
Table 18 lists the solution of the correlations as a function of time. Notice that between
times 4 and 5 min, the flame height reaches 1’ (the location of the first tray above the
cabinet). At this time however, the plume temperature has exceeded the cable damage
temperature.
Table 18: Summary of Heskestad’s flame height and plume temperature analysis as a
function of time.
Time (min) HRR (kW) Flame height (ft) Plume Temp (F)
0 0 0.0 68
1 1 0.0 123
2 6 0.0 226
3 13 0.2 380
4 23 0.7 596
5 37 1.2 895
6 53 1.8 1305
7 72 2.3 1871
8 94 2.7 2663
9 119 3.2 3794
10 147 3.7 5458
12 211 4.6 12138
14 211 4.6 12138
16 211 4.6 12138
12550194 C-42
Considering that the cables above the cabinet are expected to ignite, the contribution from
the cable tray fire should be included in the analysis. The heat release rate profile listed in
Table 19 is obtained using the cable tray heat release rate model described in Chapter 7 of
NUREG-1805 with a bench scale HRR of 589 kW/m2 (PE/PVC material). Notice that the
total heat release rate profile includes the contribution from both, the cabinet fire and the
cable tray fire. .
Table 19: Summary of heat release rate profile and room temperature analysis as a
function of time.
Tray width [m]: 0.6
Tray sep [m]: 0.46
Bench Scale HRR
2
[kW/m ] 589
Fire HRR for
Length Duration HRR [kW] for electrical cab Total Room
Ignition Source [m] [min] cable trays [kW] HRR [kW] Temp [F]
Electrical cabinet 0 0 0 Ambient
Tray 1 0.6 5 95 37 132 134
Tray 2 1.03 9 164 119 283 187
10 147 311 197
12 211 375 219
14 211 375 223
16 211 375 226
18 211 375 229
20 211 375 232
In the case of room heat up, Table 19 suggests that the fire will not generate hot gas layer
temperatures capable of producing room wide damage. These temperatures were
calculated using the MQH model for room temperature. The results are also consistent with
the analysis in workshop problem 5.
In the case of direct flame radiation, the pinch point is located approximately 2’ from the fire.
The point source flame radiation model (see Chapter 5 of NUREG 1805), suggest a
damaging incident heat flux 2’ from the ignition source from a fire intensity of 60 kW. This
intensity is lower than the peak calculated earlier and listed in Table 19. A 60 kW fire is
expected somewhere in between 5 and 9 min due to the fire quickly propagating to cable
trays above. The point source flame radiation analysis is documented in Table 20. This
heat flux result bounds the flame spread analysis since the fire at the ignition source location
is capable of impacting the target.
Table 20: Summary of point source flame radiation model analysis

Inputs
Distance from flames [m] 0.6
12550194 C-43
Results
• Time to smoke detection:

The time to smoke detection is assumed to be 1 min. The technical basis for this assumption
is as follows: The time to smoke detection listed in Table 21 below are calculated using the
model described in Chapter 11 of NUREG 1805. Notice that for vertical and horizontal
distances from the ignition source in the order of 6 meters, calculated times to detection are
in the order of seconds, which suggests that the 1 min assumption is conservative. The time
to detection calculations were conducted conservatively assuming a low heat release rate of
25 kW. It should be noted that these activation times are not considering any incipient stage
of the fire development, e.g., smoldering.
Table 21: Time to detector activation
Horizontal Radial Distance (m)
Seconds 1 2 3 4 5 6
1 0.5 1.3 2.4 3.9 5.7 7.9
2 0.8 1.3 2.1 3.2 4.5 6.0
Vertical Height
Above Fire (m)
3 1.2 1.6 2.2 3.1 4.2 5.4

4 1.6 2.0 2.5 3.3 4.2 5.3
5 2.1 2.4 2.9 3.6 4.4 5.4
6 2.6 2.9 3.4 4.0 4.7 5.6
• Time to automatic suppression: Assuming a smoke detection signal in 1 min, and

considering the delay time of 60 for the automatic CO2 system, the time for automatic
suppression is estimated as 2 min.
• Time to fire brigade arrival: The time to fire brigade arrival at the room is estimated as 15
min from brigade drill records.
12550194 C-44
Solution:
• Time to target damage: Time to target damage is assumed to be: 1) the time required for
the fire to heat up the cable trays to its damage temperature from fire plume exposure, or 2)
the time to room heat up to cable damage temperature, whichever is less. In either case,
the fire growth profile will be an important factor in this analysis.
Heat release rate profile for the ignition source: From Table 10, the heat release rate profile for
this ignition source is t2 growth to a peak of 317 kW in 12 min followed by steady burning for 8
additional minutes. This is the profile recommended in page G-6 of NUREG/CR-6850 for this
electrical cabinet. Similar to the flame height and plume temperature analysis in workshop
problem 6, Table 22 lists the corresponding results for the transient fire. The results suggest
that the fire will not affect cable trays located 13’ above the floor since the plume temperature
does not reach 405 oF.
Table 22: Summary of Heskestad’s flame height and plume temperature analysis as a
function of time.
Plume Temp (F) (at
13’ above the
Time (min) HRR (kW) Flame height (ft) floor)
0 0 0.0 68
1 2 0.0 72
2 9 0.0 79
3 20 0.5 88
4 35 1.2 98
5 55 1.8 110
6 79 2.4 123
7 108 3.0 137
8 141 3.6 152
9 178 4.1 168
10 220 4.7 186
12 317 5.7 226
14 317 5.7 226
16 317 5.7 226
• Time to smoke detection: Time to smoke detection is assumed to be 1 min based on the
results presented in Table 21.
• Time to automatic suppression: Assuming a smoke detection signal in 1 min, and

considering the delay time of 60 for the automatic CO2 system, the time for automatic
suppression is estimated as 2 min.
• Time to fire brigade arrival: The time to fire brigade arrival at the room is estimated as 15
min from brigade drill records.
12550194 C-45
Let’s assume that MCC-A1, which is the ignition source in scenario 1 it’s a 4160V switchgear.
In this case, a high energy arcing fault event should be also postulated and evaluated.
Determine if the cable tray targets will be within the zone of influence of a high energy arcing
fault.
Solution: The two horizontal trays, HCBT-35A and HCBT-37B are located 6’ vertically and 2’
horizontally from the cabinet. According to the criteria listed in pages M-13 and M-14 or
NUREG-CR/6850, the target trays will be outside the zone of influence. However, the stack of
cable trays above the cabinet (the secondary combustibles) will be within the zone of influence,
and therefore, will ignite at time zero. The time to target damage calculated in workshop
problem 6 will be affected due to different ignition time of secondary combustibles.
12550194 C-46
Step 8a: Conduct Fire Detection and Suppression Analysis: The detection and suppression is
reflected in the risk analysis with the non-suppression probability, which is calculated using a
Detection/Suppression event tree approach discussed in Appendix P of NUREG/CR-6850,
Detection and Suppression Analysis. Recall that the switchgear access room is equipped with a
smoke detection system, and an automatic CO2 system. The CO2 system has a 60 second
warning alarm delay. In addition to these fixed systems, the fire brigade can also provide manual
suppression activities.
Considering the above fire protection features, the suppression strategy in the switchgear
access room can be summarized as:
1. Indication of smoke detection in control room
2. Control room sends an operator to the switchgear access room to confirm the fire
3. If fire is confirmed, the operator first determines if the automatic CO2 system operated.
4. If further suppression activities are warranted after any of the automatic systems, manual
suppression by the fire brigade may be used.

Develop a detection suppression event tree for the fire protection strategy defined above.
Solution:
The above strategy is reflected in the event tree depicted in Figure 8 (similar to the one
described in Appendix P of NUREG/CR-6850). The event tree is then applied to each of the fire
scenarios producing a non-suppression probability for each. The non-suppression probability
results from the summation of the failure to suppress branches in the event tree. The event tree
includes the events listed in Table 23:
Table 23:Events included in the detection suppression event tree

Sequence Detection Suppression
A Prompt detection Prompt suppression
B Prompt detection Automatic suppression
C Prompt detection Fire brigade
D Prompt detection Fire brigade failure
E Prompt detection Fire brigade
F Prompt detection Fire brigade failure
G Automatic detection Automatic suppression
H Automatic detection Fire brigade
I Automatic detection Fire brigade failure
J Delayed detection Fire brigade
K Delayed detection Fire brigade failure
12550194 C-47
Sequence Detection Suppression
L Delayed detection failure
Prompt detection and prompt suppression are not credited in the analysis since the switchgear
access room has no continuous fire watch or is equipped with an incipient fire detection system.
Automatic detection is credited since the room has a fire detection system. Fixed automatic
suppression is also credited since the room has an automatic CO2 system. Delayed detection is
not credited since time to ignition of the first tray occurs in approximately 7 to 10 min, which is
less than the recommended 15 min for delayed detection in NUREG/CR-6850. Finally, manual
suppression by the fire brigade could be credited but will not have any impact since the CO2
release is expected to occur first and the room must remain close during the CO2 soak time.
Figure 8: Detection/suppression event tree for the switchgear access room
Prompt Prompt Auto Fixed Delayed Manual

Ignition Detection Suppression Detection Suppression Detection Suppression Branch
A
B
C
D
E
F
G
H
I
J
K
L
12550194 C-48
Step 9a: Calculate Conditional Non-Suppression Probability and Severity Factor:
Determine the severity factor and the non-suppression probability for scenario 1.
Solution:
This scenario consists of a fire propagating to cable trays above. From Table 9, a heat release
rate of approximately 13 to 23 kW (based on plume results) is necessary for a fire to affect the
cables above. For the purpose of this example, a value of 15 kW is selected. Per Table 1, the
ignition source is assigned a Case 3 probability distribution for heat release rate from Table E-1
in NUREG/CR-6850. This is a Gamma distribution with α = 1.6 and β = 41.5. The severity
factor values for heat release rates greater than 15 kW is (using the gamma distribution function
in Microsoft Excel):
SF = 1-GAMMADIST(15,1.6,41.5,TRUE) = 0.89
This is interpreted as the probability of a fire spreading to the cable trays above.
Solving the event tree depicted in Figure 8 for a damage time of 5 min, the non suppression
probability is ≈ 0.1. The solution of the event tree is presented in Figure 9. The general inputs
to the event tree are listed in Table 24. Additional inputs to the event tree, developed from the
fire modeling analysis described in the previous step are listed in Table 25.
Table 24: General inputs to detection/suppression event tree

Prompt Detection: FALSE
Auto Det: TRUE
Prompt Suppression: FALSE
Fixed Suppression: TRUE
Fixed Supp Type: Automatic
Supp Agent: CO2
Delay time (Min): 1
Brigade Arrival (min): 15
Target Damage (min): 5
Det reliability: 0.95
Supp system reliability: 0.95
Traditional Sprinklers: FALSE
HEP: 1
Supp Curve (Table P-3): Electrical Fires
12550194 C-49
Table 25: Fire modeling inputs to detection/suppression event tree
Time to (Min)
Ignition: 0
Prompt Det: 0
Prompt Supp: 0
Auto Det: 1
Fixed Supp: 2
Delayed Det: 15
Target Damage (min): 5
Figure 9: Solution of the detection/suppression event tree
Prompt Prompt Auto Fixed Delayed Manual Branch

Ignition Detection Suppression Detection Suppression Detection Suppression Branch Probability
0 0.00 A --
1.00 0.95 0.95 B --
0.05 0.00 C 0.0E+00
1.00 D --
0.05 0.00 E --
1.00 F 0.0E+00
1 0.95 0.95 G --
0.05 0.00 H --
1.00 I 4.8E-02
0.05 0 0.00 J --
1.00 K 0.0E+00
1 L 5.0E-02
PNS 0.098
12550194 C-50
Step 10a: Calculate Scenario Frequency: Using the ignition frequency calculated in Task 6
for the ignition sources in the switchgear access room, and the severity factor and non-
suppression probability calculated in the previous step for scenario 1, determine the frequency
for fire scenario 1.
Solution:
Recall that this scenario consists of a fire propagating to a cable tray stack above and
generating target damage due to direct flame radiation. This sequence of events is captured in
the event tree depicted in Figure 10.
• The first event is the ignition frequency calculated in Task 6 of the Fire PRA as documented
in NUREG/CR-6850.
• The second event refers to the fire propagating to the cable tray stack above. The
probability of propagating is given by the severity factor calculated in Step 9.
• The third event is defined by the probability of suppressing the fire before target damage, as
calculated earlier in Step 9.
Only one outcome in the event tree refers to cable damage before suppression. The frequency
of this outcome is 8.8E-5.
Figure 10: Event tree depicting the sequence of events leading to target damage
Propagation to cable Suppression fails

Ignition Frequency trays above before target damage Frequency Outcome
0.1 8.8E-05 Damage
Yes
0.89
Yes
No
= 9.9E-3(3/30) = 9.9E-04 0.9 7.9E-04 Damage
No
No
0.11 1.1E-04 Damage
No
12550194 C-51
SESSION 11b: Example Problems (Main Control Room Fire Analysis)
12550194 C-52
Workshop Problems for Task 11b: Detailed Fire Modeling in the Main
Control Room
Workshop Problem Set 11b-02 (Solution)

Step 2.b: Estimate Control Room Fire Frequency: Using the information provided in this
Sample Package, and the above formula copied from NUREG/CR 6850, estimate the frequency
of fire for the SNPP MCR.
WL, MCR = 1 per ___N/A_____

There is only one unit and one MCR for the unit.
λMCB = 2.5E-03 per reactor year

From Table 6-1 of NUREG/CR 6850, bin # 4
WPWC, Elec. Cab, MCR. = 7.4E-03 per ___N/A_____

From Results of Task 6 Problem Set 06-09
λPWC, Elec. Cab. = 4.5E-02 per reactor year

Wtransients, MCR = 0.64 per ___N/A_____

From Task 6 Calculations
λtransient = 3.9E-03 per reactor year

Wwelding, MCR = 0.2 per ___N/A_____

λwelding = 9.7E-03 per reactor year

WCable,MCR: = 0.35 per ___N/A_____

λcable = 1.6E-03 per reactor year

λMCR = 1 x (2.5E-03 + 7.4E-03 x 4.5E-02 + 0.64 x 3.9E-03 + 0.2 x 9.7E-03 + 0.35 x 1.6E-03 =
= 2.5E-03 + 3.3E-04 + 2.5E-03 + 1.9E-03 + 5.6E-04 = 7.79E-03 per reactor year
12550194 C-53
Step 5.b: Identify and characterize target sets: Identify at least five target sets for the Main
Control Room by inspecting drawings DWG A-07 and A-09 and other information provided in
this Sample Package.
Target Set
ID
MCR-01 Control room habitability Of potential scenarios involving control room

abandonment without any damage to the Main
Control Board, a fire in the kitchen could be severe
enough forcing the operators out.
MCR-02 Service water controls Service water and CCW are controlled from a small
part of the Main Control Board. A fire within CB-7
CCW Controls may fail both systems. Loss of Service Water alone,
may have a significant CCDP.
MCR-03 HPI-A High pressure safety CB-5 contains a large number of safety related
injection pump A component controls. A fire limited to this part of the
HPI-B High pressure safety panel, affecting the equipment controlled from this
injection pump B panel may have a significant CCDP.
RHR-B RHR pump
AOV-2 (SOV-2) Letdown
isolation valve
AOV-3 (SOV-3) Charging
pump injection valve
MOV-1 HPI valve
MOV-2 VCT isolation valve
MOV-3 Cont. sump recirc
valve
MOV-4 Cont. sump recirc
valve
MOV-5 RWST isolation
valve
MOV-6 RWST isolation
valve
MOV-7 RHR inboard suction
valve
MOV-8 RHR outboard
suction valve
MOV-9 HPI valve
LI-1 RWST level
LI-2 RWST level
TI-1 Letdown heat
exchanger outlet
temp
12550194 C-54
Target Set
ID
MCR-04 AFW-A Motor driven AFW CB-3 contains all post shutdown secondary cooling
pump A equipment controls. A fire limited to this part of the
AFW-C Motor driven AFW panel, affecting the equipment controlled from this
pump C panel may have a significant CCDP.
MOV-10 AFW discharge
valve
MOV-11 AFW discharge
valve
MOV-14 AFW turbine steam
MOV-15 AFW steam inlet
throttle valve
MOV-16 AFW test line
isolation valve
isolation valve
MOV-18 AFW C Pump
Discharge
isolation valve
A-1 AFW motor high
temp
MCR-05 HPI-A High pressure safety The shortest distance between the controls of the HPI
injection pump A and AFW systems that can render the pumps from
HPI-B High pressure safety both system inoperable is the distance from MOV-15
injection pump B control switch to HPI-A control switch. Loss of both
AOV-2 (SOV-2) Letdown systems may have a significant CCDP.
isolation valve
MOV-2 VCT isolation valve
AFW-A Motor driven AFW
pump A
AFW-C Motor driven AFW
pump C
MOV-14 AFW turbine steam
MOV-15 AFW steam inlet
throttle valve
12550194 C-55
Steps 6.b: Identify and Characterize Ignition Sources:
Steps 7.b: Define Fire Scenarios: For the target sets provided in the solution of the preceding
problem set, identify the corresponding ignition sources and fire scenarios.
Target Set ID Ignition Sources Fire Scenarios
MCR-01 1. Water heater in the kitchen MCR-01.1. An electrical short in the water heater leads to a
fire in the kitchen that becomes severe enough to lead to
control room abandonment.
2. Microwave oven in the kitchen MCR-01.2. An electrical short in the microwave oven or a
food item fire inside the oven leads to a fire in the kitchen
that becomes severe enough to lead to control room
abandonment.
MCR-02 1. Main Control Board – Fire in MCR-02.1. A fire inside Main Control Board due to internal
CB-7 causes. The fire initiates inside CB-7. Operator response
in putting the fire is not fast enough to prevent damage to
CB-7 contents. But the fire is controlled before it
propagates to other parts of the panel.
2. Transient fire MCR-02.2 A transient fire inside Main Control Room, but
outside the Main Control Board, occurs near CB-7 such that
only CB-7 is affected either because of the location of the
fire or fire fighting efforts.
3. Transient fire due welding and MCR-02.3. A transient fire due to welding and cutting inside
cutting Main Control Room, but outside the Main Control Board,
occurs near CB-7 such that only CB-7 is affected either
because of the location of the fire or fire fighting efforts.
4. Cable fire due welding and MCR-02.4. A cable fire occurs due to welding and cutting
cutting. inside Main Control Board occurs near CB-7 such that only
CB-7 is affected because fire fighting efforts limit the reach
of the fire.
in putting out the fire is not fast enough to prevent damage
to CB-5 contents. But the fire is controlled before it
2. Transient fire MCR-03.2. A transient fire inside Main Control Room, but
12550194 C-56
Target Set ID Ignition Sources Fire Scenarios
cutting. inside Main Control Board occurs in CB-5 such that only
of the fire.
in putting the fire is not fast enough to prevent damage to
CB-3 contents. But the fire is controlled before it
cutting. inside Main Control Board occurs in CB-3 such that only
of the fire.
MCR-05 1. Main Control Board – Fire MCR-05.1. A fire inside Main Control Board due to internal
starting either in CB-3 or in CB-5 causes. The fire initiates inside CB-3 or CB-5. Operator
response in putting the fire is not fast enough to prevent
damage to the postulated target set. But the fire is
controlled before it propagates to other parts of the panel.
outside the Main Control Board, occurs near CB-3 and CB-5
such that only the postulated target set is affected either
occurs near CB-3 and CB-5 such that only the postulated
target set is affected either because of the location of the
cutting. inside Main Control Board occurs in CB-3 or CB-5 such that
only the postulated target set is affected because fire
fighting efforts limit the reach of the fire.
12550194 C-57
Step 8b: Conduct Fire Growth and Propagation Analyiss
Step 9b: Detection and Suppression Analysis and Severity Factor: Using the information
provided in the solution to Problem Sets 11b-05 and 06 and Figure L-1, conduct fire propagation,
detection and suppression analysis for the following fire scenarios and calculate scenario
frequency:
MCR-03.1
The farthest distance between the postulated control devices on the board is 4 ft.
d = 4 ft = 1.2 m
Assumed non-qualified cables since a portion of the cables are non-qualified.
From Figure L-1 it is concluded:
[SFxPNS]MCR-03.1 = 3.0E-03
λMCR-03.1 = 2.5E-03 x 3.0E-03 = 7.5E-06 per reactor year
MCR-04.1
The farthest distance between the postulated control devices on the board is 2 ft.
d = 2 ft = 0.6 m
Assumed non-qualified cables since a portion of the cables are not qualified.
From Figure L-1 it is concluded:
[SFxPNS]MCR-04.1 = 5.0E-03
λMCR-04.1 = 2.5E-03 x 5.0E-03 = 1.25E-05 per reactor year
12550194 C-58
NRCMD 3.7 and Addendum Numbers, If any.)

(See instructions on the reverse) NUREG/CP-0194 Volume 3

MONTH YEAR
Methods for Applying Risk Analysis to Fire Scenarios (MARIAFIRES) - 2008, July 2010
NRC-RES/EPRI Fire PRA Workshop, Volume 3 - Module 3: Fire Analysis

and H. Woods (NRC)
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Methods for Applying Risk Analysis to Fire Scenarios

2010 TECHNICAL REPORT

A single copy of each NRC draft report for comment is

Final Report, December 2010

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission

EPRI Project Manager

This document does NOT meet the requirements of

ELECTRIC POWER RESEARCH INSTITUTE

The following organizations prepared this report:

ACB Air-cooled Circuit Breaker

OVERALL COURSE…..………………………………………………………..…………………… 1-1

1 COURSE OVERVIEW…..………………………………………………………………………… 1-1

MODULE 1: PRA/HRA (SYSTEMS ANALYSIS)

PRA/HRA ................................................................................................................................... 3-1

APPENDICES ........................................................................................................................... A-1

1.1.3 EPRI Perspective

Module 3: Fire Analysis

Detailed Fire Scenario Analysis

TASK 13: TASK 14: TASK 12B:

Module 2: Electrical Analysis TASK 16:

Module 3: Fire Analysis

1.2.1 Overall Plant Description

1.2.2 Systems Description

1.2.2.1 Primary Coolant System

Status on Loss of Power Position During

AOV-2 Air-Operated Valve Fail Closed Open

AOV-3 Air-Operated Valve Fail Closed Open

MOV-1 Motor-Operated Fail As Is Closed

MOV-2 Motor-Operated Fail As Is Open

MOV-3 Motor-Operated Fail As Is Closed

• MOV-1 and MOV-9 open.

1.2.2.3 Residual Heat Removal System

Status on Loss of Position During

MOV-7 Motor-Operated Fail As Is Closed

MOV-8 Motor-Operated Fail As Is Closed

1.2.2.4 Auxiliary Feedwater System

1.2.2.5 Electrical System

1.2.2.6 Other Systems

SWGR-1 SWGR-2 SWGR-A SWGR-B

RCP-1 RCP-2 AFW-C HPI-A AFW-A RHR-B HPI-B

SST-1 SST-2 SST-A SST-B

LC-1 LC-2 LC-A LC-B

COMP-1 MCC-A1 MCC-B1

PNL-A PNL-B INV-B

LI-1 LI-3 SOV-1 TI-1 ANN-1 PT-1 LI-2 LI-4

1.4 MODULE 2: Electrical Analysis

1.5 MODULE 3: Fire Analysis

1.6 FORMAT OVERVIEW

1.6.1 Video Series

MODULE 2: ELECTRICAL ANALYSIS

MODULE 3: FIRE ANALYSIS

1.6.3 General Comments Regarding This Course

SESSION 1: NRC Welcome

• Unique Training Opportunity

• Domestic Attendees: ___________________________________

• Based on MOU between NRC-RES and EPRI on fire risk

• Covers all technical disciplines critical to Fire PRA

• Prior to IPEEE; Mostly simple approximate method for order- ___________________________________

• The methodology is presented in the form technical

• Procedures cover the following technical areas ___________________________________

• Three parallel modules: ___________________________________

OVERVIEW OF FIRE PRA PROCESS AND

TASK 3: Fire PRA Cable