Sep19 Law156 Bautista

Bautista, Angelica A.
Law 156
CASE DIGESTS – Part IV Public Office and Electoral Process
19 September 2022 Atty. Zardi Melito D. Abellera
1. Samson v. Restrivera, 646 SCRA 481, [2011]
Court Supreme Court

Citation G.R. No. 178454
Date March 28, 2011
Petitioner FILIPINA SAMSON
Respondent JULIA A. RESTRIVERA
Ponente VILLARAMA, JR., J
Relevant topic IV. DUTIES, RESPONSIBILITIES, & DISABILITIES WHILE IN PUBLIC OFFICE A. Powers &
Duties 6. Norms of Conduct of Public Officials and Employees; Professionalism
FACTS:
 Petitioner Filipina Samson is the department head of the Population Commission at the Provincial Capitol,
Trece Martirez City, Cavite.
 March 2001: Petitioner agreed to help her friend, respondent Julia A. Restrivera, to have the latter's land
located in Carmona, Cavite, registered under the Torrens System.
o Samson said that the expenses would reach P150,000 and accepted P50,000 from respondent to
cover the initial expenses for the titling of respondent's land.
o However, petitioner failed to accomplish her task because it was found out that the land is
government property.
o When petitioner failed to return the P50,000, respondent sued her for estafa. Respondent also
filed an administrative complaint for grave misconduct or conduct unbecoming a public officer
against petitioner before the Office of the Ombudsman.
 The Ombudsman found petitioner guilty of violating Section 4 (b) of R.A. No. 6713 and suspended her
from office for six months without pay.
o The Ombudsman ruled that petitioner failed to abide by the standard set in Section 4 (b) of R.A.
No. 6713 and deprived the government of the benefit of committed service when she embarked
on her private interest to help respondent secure a certificate of title over the latter's land.
 15 March 2004: Upon motion for reconsideration, the Ombudsman reduced the penalty to three months
suspension without pay. According to the Ombudsman, petitioner's acceptance of respondent's payment
created a perception that petitioner is a fixer. Her act fell short of the standard of personal conduct
required by Section 4 (b) of R.A. No. 6713 that public officials shall endeavor to discourage wrong
perceptions of their roles as dispensers or peddlers of undue patronage. The Ombudsman held:
While it may be true that [petitioner] did not actually deal with the other government
agencies for the processing of the titles of the subject property, we believe, however, that
her mere act in accepting the money from the [respondent] with the assurance that she
would work for the issuance of the title is already enough to create a perception that
she is a fixer. Section 4(b) of [R.A.] No. 6713 mandates that public officials and employees
shall endeavor to discourage wrong perception of their roles as dispenser or peddler of
undue patronage.
 The CA affirmed the Ombudsman's Order dated March 19, 2004. The CA stressed that Section 4 (b) of R.A.
No. 6713 requires petitioner to perform and discharge her duties with the highest degree of excellence,
professionalism, intelligence and skill, and to endeavor to discourage wrong perceptions of her role as a
dispenser and peddler of undue patronage.
 Petitioner’s Contentions: Petitioner insists that where the act complained of is not related to the
performance of official duty, the Ombudsman has no jurisdiction. Petitioner also imputes grave abuse of
discretion on the part of the CA for holding her administratively liable. She points out that the estafa case
was dismissed upon a finding that she was not guilty of fraud or deceit, hence misconduct cannot be
attributed to her.
ISSUE – HELD – RATIO:
SUBSTANTIVE ISSUE #1 HELD

Whether or not the Ombudsman has jurisdiction over a case involving YES
a private dealing by a government employee or where the act
complained of is not related to the performance of official duty?
Page 1 of 26
Bautista, Angelica A. Law 156
RATIO:
The Ombudsman has jurisdiction over respondent's complaint against petitioner although the act complained of
involves a private deal between them.
 Section 13 (1), Article XI of the 1987 Constitution states that the Ombudsman can investigate on its own
or on complaint by any person any act or omission of any public official or employee when such act or
omission appears to be illegal, unjust, or improper.
 Section 16 of R.A. No. 6770, otherwise known as the Ombudsman Act of 1989, the jurisdiction of the
Ombudsman encompasses all kinds of malfeasance, misfeasance, and nonfeasance committed by any public
officer or employee during his/her tenure.
 Section 19 of R.A. No. 6770 also states that the Ombudsman shall act on all complaints relating, but not
limited, to acts or omissions which are unfair or irregular. Thus, even if the complaint concerns an act of
the public official or employee which is not service-connected, the case is within the jurisdiction of the
Ombudsman. The law does not qualify the nature of the illegal act or omission of the public official or
employee that the Ombudsman may investigate. It does not require that the act or omission be related to
or be connected with or arise from the performance of official duty.
SUBSTANTIVE ISSUE #2 HELD

Whether or not the CA committed grave abuse of discretion in NO, the petitioner is administratively liable,
finding petitioner administratively liable despite the dismissal but not under Section 4 (A) (b) of R.A. No. 6713
of the estafa case?
The Court affirmed the CA and Ombudsman that petitioner is administratively liable. Moreover, the Court held
that petitioner is guilty of conduct unbecoming a public officer.
It is wrong for petitioner to say that since the estafa case against her was dismissed, she cannot be found
administratively liable. It is settled that administrative cases may proceed independently of criminal proceedings,
and may continue despite the dismissal of the criminal charges.
Sec. 4 (A) (b) of R.A. No. 6713
 SEC. 4. Norms of Conduct of Public Officials and Employees.

(A) Every public official and employee shall observe the following as standards of personal conduct in the discharge and
execution of official duties:
Commitment to public interest. — Public officials and employees shall always uphold the public interest over and
above personal interest. All government resources and powers of their respective offices must be employed and
used efficiently, effectively, honestly and economically, particularly to avoid wastage in public funds and
revenues.
Professionalism. — Public officials and employees shall perform and discharge their duties with the highest
degree of excellence, professionalism, intelligence and skill. They shall enter public service with utmost devotion
and dedication to duty. They shall endeavor to discourage wrong perceptions of their roles as dispensers or
peddlers of undue patronage.
Professionalism Defined
 Professionalism is defined as the conduct, aims, or qualities that characterize or mark a profession. A
professional refers to a person who engages in an activity with great competence. Indeed, to call a person
a professional is to describe him as competent, efficient, experienced, proficient or polished.
 In the context of Section 4 (A) (b) of R.A. No. 6713, the observance of professionalism also means upholding
the integrity of public office by endeavoring "to discourage wrong perception of their roles as dispensers
or peddlers of undue patronage." Thus, a public official or employee should avoid any appearance of
impropriety affecting the integrity of government services.
 However, it should be noted that Section 4 (A) enumerates the standards of personal conduct for
public officers with reference to "execution of official duties."
 In this case, the Ombudsman concluded that petitioner failed to carry out the standard of professionalism
by devoting herself on her personal interest to the detriment of her solemn public duty. Petitioner's act
deprived the government of her committed service because the generation of a certificate of title was not
within her line of public service. In denying petitioner's MR, the Ombudsman said that it would have been
sufficient if petitioner just referred the respondent to the persons/officials in-charge of the processing of
Page 2 of 26
the documents for the issuance of a certificate of title. While it may be true that she did not actually deal
with the other government agencies for the processing of the titles of the subject property, petitioner's
act of accepting the money from respondent with the assurance that she would work for the issuance of
the title is already enough to create a perception that she is a fixer.
 On its part, the CA rejected petitioner's argument that an isolated act is insufficient to create those
"wrong perceptions" or the "impression of influence peddling." It held that the law enjoins public
officers, at all times to respect the rights of others and refrain from doing acts contrary to law, good
customs, public order, public policy, public safety and public interest. Thus, it is not the plurality of the
acts that is being punished but the commission of the act itself.
 Evidently, both the Ombudsman and CA interpreted Section 4 (A) of R.A. No. 6713 as broad enough to
apply even to private transactions that have no connection to the duties of one's office.
Petitioner may not be penalized for violation of Section 4 (A) (b) of R.A. No. 6713
 Domingo v. Office of the Ombudsman: Failure to abide by the norms of conduct under Section 4 (A) (b)
of R.A. No. 6713, in relation to its implementing rules, is not a ground for disciplinary action.
Said provision merely enunciates "professionalism as an ideal norm of conduct to be observed by

public servants… However, the Implementing Rules does not provide that they will have to
be sanctioned for failure to observe these norms of conduct. Indeed, Rule X of the
Implementing Rules affirms as grounds for administrative disciplinary action only acts
"declared unlawful or prohibited by the Code." Rule X specifically mentions at least twenty
three (23) acts or omissions as grounds for administrative disciplinary action. Failure to abide
by the norms of conduct under Section 4(b) of R.A. No. 6713 is not one of them.
 In this case, petitioner is NOT administratively liable under Section 4 (A) (b) of R.A. No. 6713. The
implementing rules above issued by the CSC partake the nature of a statute and are binding as if written
in the law itself. They have the force and effect of law and enjoy the presumption of constitutionality and
legality until they are set aside with finality in an appropriate case by a competent court.
Grave Misconduct
 Misconduct is a transgression of some established and definite rule of action, more particularly, unlawful
behavior or gross negligence by a public officer. The misconduct is grave if it involves any of the additional
elements of corruption, willful intent to violate the law or to disregard established rules, which must be
proved by substantial evidence. Otherwise, the misconduct is only simple.
 One cannot be found guilty of misconduct in the absence of substantial evidence.
 In this case, respondent failed to prove:
(1) petitioner's violation of an established and definite rule of action or unlawful behavior or gross
negligence, and
(2) any of the aggravating elements of corruption, willful intent to violate a law or to disregard
established rules on the part of petitioner.
In fact, respondent could merely point to petitioner's alleged failure to observe the mandate that public
office is a public trust when petitioner allegedly meddled in an affair that belongs to another agency and
received an amount for undelivered work.
 Public officers and employees must be guided by the principle enshrined in the Constitution that public
office is a public trust. However, respondent's allegation that petitioner meddled in an affair that belongs
to another agency is a serious but unproven accusation.
o Respondent did not even say what acts of interference were done by petitioner. Neither did
respondent say in which government agency petitioner committed interference.
o And causing the survey of respondent's land can hardly be considered as meddling in the affairs
of another government agency by petitioner who is connected with the Population Commission.
o It does not show that petitioner made an illegal deal or any deal with any government agency.
o The survey shows only that petitioner contracted a surveyor. The survey shows that petitioner
also started to work on her task under their agreement.
o Thus, respondent's allegation that petitioner received an amount for undelivered work is not
entirely correct. Rather, petitioner failed to fully accomplish her task in view of the legal
obstacle that the land is government property.
Page 3 of 26
Conduct Unbecoming of a Public Officer
 For reneging on her promise to return aforesaid amount, petitioner is guilty of conduct unbecoming a
public officer.
o Joson v. Macapagal: Respondents therein were guilty of conduct unbecoming of government
employees when they reneged on their promise to have pertinent documents notarized and
submitted to the Government Service Insurance System after the complainant's rights over the
subject property were transferred to the sister of one of the respondents.
o Assistant Special Prosecutor III Rohermia J. Jamsani-Rodriguez v. Justices Gregory S. Ong,
et al.: Unbecoming conduct means improper performance and applies to a broader range of
transgressions of rules not only of social behavior but of ethical practice or logical procedure or
prescribed method.
 In this case, petitioner should have complied with her promise to return the amount to respondent after
failing to accomplish the task she had willingly accepted. However, she waited until respondent sued her
for estafa, thus reinforcing the latter's suspicion that petitioner misappropriated her money. Although the
element of deceit was not proven in the criminal case respondent filed against the petitioner, it is clear
that by her actuations, petitioner violated basic social and ethical norms in her private dealings. Even if
unrelated to her duties as a public officer, petitioner's transgression could erode the public's trust in
government employees, moreso because she holds a high position in the service.
RULING:
WHEREFORE, we SET ASIDE the Decision dated October 31, 2006 of the Court of Appeals and its Resolution
dated June 8, 2007 in CA-G.R. SP No. 83422, as well as the Decision dated January 6, 2004 and Order dated
March 15, 2004 of the Ombudsman in OMB-L-A-03-0552-F, and ENTER a new judgment as follows:
We find petitioner GUILTY of conduct unbecoming a public officer and impose upon her a FINE of P15,000.00
to be paid at the Office of the Ombudsman within five (5) days from finality of this Decision.
We also ORDER petitioner to return to respondent the amount of P50,000.00 with interest thereon at 12% per
annum from March 2001 until the said amount shall have been fully paid.
With costs against the petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
Page 4 of 26
2. De Rama v. Court of Appeals, 353 SCRA 94 [2001]
Court Supreme Court

Date February 28, 2001
Petitioner CONRADO L. DE RAMA
Respondent THE COURT OF APPEALS (NINTH DIVISION, THE CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION),
ELADIO MARTINEZ, DIVINO DE JESUS, MORELL AYALA, ARISTEO CATALLA,
DAISY PORTA, FLORDELIZA ORIASEL, GRACIELA GLORY, FELECIDAD
ORINDAY, MA. PETRA MUFFET LUCE, ELSA MARINO, BERNARDITA MENDOZA,
JANE MACATANGAY, ADELFO GLODOVIZA and FLORINO RAMOS
Ponente YNARES-SANTIAGO, J
Relevant topic IV. DUTIES, RESPONSIBILITIES, & DISABILITIES WHILE IN PUBLIC OFFICE B. Rights &
Privileges 2. Security of Tenure
FACTS:
 Upon his assumption to the position of Mayor of Pagbilao, Quezon, petitioner Conrado L. de Rama wrote
a letter dated July 13, 1995 to the CSC, seeking the recall of the appointments of fourteen (14) municipal
employees.
o He justified his recall request on the allegation that the appointments of the said employees
were "midnight" appointments of the former mayor, Ma. Evelyn S. Abeja, done in violation of
Article VII, Section 15 of the 1987 Constitution.
 While the matter was pending before the CSC, three of the said employees, namely: Elsa Marino, Morell
Ayala, and Flordeliza Oriazel, filed with the CSC a claim for payment of their salaries, alleging that
although their appointments were declared permanent by Conrado Gulim, Director II of the CSC Field
Office based in Quezon, petitioner de Rama withheld the payment of their salaries and benefits.
 The the Legal and Quasi-Judicial Division of the CSC issued an Order finding that since the claimants-
employees had assumed their respective positions and performed their duties pursuant to their
appointments, they are therefore entitled to receive the salaries and benefits appurtenant to their
positions.
o Rule V, Section 10 of the Omnibus Rules provides, in part, that "if the appointee has assumed
the duties of the position, he shall be entitled to receive his salary at once without awaiting
the approval of his appointment by the Commission," the CSC Legal and Quasi-Judicial Division
ruled that the said employees cannot be deprived of their salaries and benefits by the unilateral
act of the newly-assumed mayor.
 30 April 1996: The CSC denied petitioner's request for the recall of the appointments of the fourteen
employees, for lack of merit.
o The CSC upheld the validity of the appointments on the ground that they had already been
approved by the Head of the CSC Field Office in Lucena City, and for petitioner's failure to
present evidence that would warrant the revocation or recall of the said appointments.
 Petitioner moved for the reconsideration of the CSC's Resolution, as well as the Order of the CSC Legal
and Quasi-Judicial Division.
 21 November 1996: The CSC denied petitioner's motion for reconsideration.
 Petitioner filed a petition for review before the Court of Appeals, but the CA denied it for lack of merit.
 Petitioner assails the findings of both the CSC and the Court of Appeals for being contrary to law and not
being supported by the evidence on record.
 Petitioner’s Contentions: Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration arguing that the appellate court
erred in upholding the CSC's resolutions despite the following defects:
I. No screening process and no criteria were adopted by the Personnel Selection
Board in nominating the respondents;
II. No posting in three (3) conspicuous public places of notice of vacancy as required
by the rules and the law;
III. Merit and fitness requirements were not observed by the selection board and by the
appointing authority as required by the Civil Service rules;
IV. Petitioner has valid grounds to recall the appointments of respondents.
Page 5 of 26
SUBSTANTIVE ISSUE HELD

Whether or not Petitioner De Rama, as mayor, has the authority and valid NO
grounds to recall the appointments of the respondents
RATIO:
Authority of the CSC to Recall Appointments
 Rule V, Section 9 of the Omnibus Implementing Regulations of the Revised Administrative Code
specifically provides that "an appointment accepted by the appointee cannot be withdrawn or revoked
by the appointing authority and shall remain in force and in effect until disapproved by the Commission."
Thus, it is the CSC that is authorized to recall an appointment initially approved, but only when such
appointment and approval are proven to be in disregard of applicable provisions of the civil service
law and regulations.
 In this case, petitioner admits that his very first official act upon assuming the position of town
mayor was to issue Office Order No. 95-01 which recalled the appointments of the private
respondents. There was no previous notice, much less a hearing accorded to the latter. In doing
so, he overstepped the bounds of his authority. While he argues that the appointing power has the
sole authority to revoke said appointments, there is no debate that he does not have blanket
authority to do so. Neither can he question the CSC's jurisdiction to affirm or revoke the recall.
Grounds for the Recall of Appointments
 The appointments of the private respondents may only be recalled on the following grounds.
SECTION 20. Notwithstanding the initial approval of an appointment, the same may be recalled on any of
the following grounds:
(a) Non-compliance with the procedures/criteria provided in the agency's Merit Promotion
Plan;
(b) Failure to pass through the agency's Selection/Promotion Board;
(c) Violation of the existing collective agreement between management and employees
relative to promotion; or
(d) Violation of other existing civil service law, rules and regulations.
 In this case, the grounds for the recall of the appointments that petitioner raised in his supplemental
pleading to the consolidated appeal and motion for reconsideration are that:
(1) the rules on screening of applicants based on adopted criteria were not followed;
(2) there was no proper posting of notice of vacancy; and
(3) the merit and fitness requirements set by the civil service rules were not observed.
These are grounds that he could have stated in his order of recall, but which he did not. Neither did he
raise said grounds in original appeal, but only by way of a supplemental pleading. Failure of the
petitioner to raise said grounds and to present supporting documents constitute a waiver thereof, and
the same arguments and evidence can no longer be entertained on appeal before the CSC, nor in the
Court of Appeals, and much less in a petition for review before the Supreme Court. In fine, the raising of
these factual issues for the first time in a pleading which is supplemental only to an appeal is barred by
estoppel.
 When the petitioner brought the matter of recalling the appointments of the fourteen (14) private
respondents before the CSC, the only reason he cited to justify his action was that these were "midnight
appointments" that are forbidden under Article VII, Section 15 of the Constitution.
o However, the CSC ruled, and correctly so, that the said prohibition applies only to
presidential appointments. In truth and in fact, there is no law that prohibits local
elective officials from making appointments during the last days of his or her tenure.
Legal and Equitable Right to the Position
 Section 10 of the Omnibus Implementing Regulations of the Revised Administrative Code provides:
Page 6 of 26
SECTION 10. An appointment issued in accordance with pertinent laws and rules shall take effect
immediately upon its issuance by the appointing authority, and if the appointee has assumed the
duties of the position, he shall be entitled to receive his salary at once without awaiting the
approval of his appointment by the Commission. The appointment shall remain effective until
disapproved by the Commission. In no case shall an appointment take effect earlier than the
date of its issuance.
 In this case, the fourteen (14) employees were duly appointed following two meetings of the Personnel
Selection Board held on May 31 and June 26, 1995. There is no showing that any of the private respondents
were not qualified for the positions they were appointed to. Moreover, their appointments were duly
attested to by the Head of the CSC field office at Lucena City. By virtue thereof, they had already assumed
their appointive positions even before petitioner himself assumed his elected position as town mayor.
Consequently, their appointments took effect immediately and cannot be unilaterally revoked or recalled
by petitioner.
 Upon the issuance of an appointment and the appointee's assumption of the position in the civil service,
"he acquires a legal right which cannot be taken away either by revocation of the appointment or by
removal except for cause and with previous notice and hearing."
 The person assuming a position in the civil service under a completed appointment acquires a legal, not
just an equitable, right to the position. This right is protected not only by statute, but by the Constitution
as well, which right cannot be taken away by either revocation of the appointment, or by removal, unless
there is valid cause to do so, provided that there is previous notice and hearing.
RULING:
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, the instant petition for review is DENIED and the Resolution of the Court
of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 42896 affirming CSC Resolutions Nos. 96-2828 and 96-7527 is hereby AFFIRMED in toto.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
Page 7 of 26
3. De Leon v. Court of Appeals, 350 SCRA 1 [2001]
Court Supreme Court

Date January 22, 2001
Petitioner HON. ALMA G. DE LEON, Chairman, HON. THELMA P. GAMINDE, Commissioner, and
HON. RAMON P. ERENETA, JR., Commissioner, Civil Service Commission, and
SECRETARY RAFAEL M. ALUNAN, III, Department of the Interior and Local
Government
Respondent HON. COURT OF APPEALS and JACOB F. MONTESA
Ponente YNARES-SANTIAGO, J
FACTS:
 28 August 1986: Private respondent Atty. Jacob F. Montesa, who is not a Career Executive Service
Officer (CESO) or a member of the Career Executive Service, was appointed as "Ministry Legal Counsel
- CESO IV in the Ministry of Local Government" (now DILG). This appointment was approved as
permanent by the Civil Service Commission.
 25 July 1987: Then President Corazon C. Aquino promulgated EO 262, reorganizing the Department.
 8 April 1988: then Secretary Luis T. Santos, who succeeded Minister Pimentel, designated Nicanor M.
Patricio as Chief, Legal Service in place of private respondent who, in turn, was directed to report to
the office of the Secretary to perform special assignments.
o Consequently, private respondent filed before this Court a petition for quo warranto against
then Secretary Luis T. Santos and Nicanor Patricio.
 26 September 1990: The Court ruled in favor of private respondent Montesa and ordered his
reinstatement to his former position.
 1 July 1989: Republic Act No. 6758 (otherwise known as the Salary Standardization Law) took effect.
Pursuant thereto, the position of "Department Service Chiefs," which include the Department Legal
Counsel, was reclassified and ranked with "Assistant Bureau Directors" under the generic position title
of "Director III".
o Hence, in the execution of the decision of this Court in G.R. No. 83470, respondent was
reinstated to the position: "Department Legal Counsel and/or Director III."
 26 July 1994: Then Secretary Rafael M. Alunan III issued DO No. 94-370, relieving private respondent
of his current duties and responsibilities and reassigning him as "Director III (Assistant Regional
Director), Region XI."
o Private respondent, however, did not report to his new assigned position. Instead, he filed a
90- day sick leave, and upon the expiration thereof on December 5, 1994, he submitted a
memorandum for then acting Secretary Alexander P. Aguirre, signifying his intention to re-
assume his position as Department Legal Counsel/Chief, Legal Services.
 6 December 1994: Acting Secretary Aguirre, by memorandum reiterated to private respondent that
the issuance of DO No. 94-370, transferring him to Region XI, was in keeping with the interest of the
public service and of the Career Executive Service (CES) provision on assignment, reassignment, and
transfer. Accordingly, private respondent was advised to report to Region XI immediately.
 12 December 1994: Private respondent requested for a reconsideration of DO No. 94-370, but to no
avail. Private respondent appealed to the Civil Service Commission and the latter issued a resolution
which sustained his reassignment to Region XI.
 10 October 1995: The Department directed private respondent to report to his new assigned post in
Region XI, stressing that his continued non-compliance with D.O. No. 94-370 is prejudicial to the
interest of public service, particularly in Region XI. Private respondent was also warned that upon his
failure to comply, the Department shall be constrained to consider him on Absence Without Leave
(AWOL) and as a consequence, drop him from the rolls of public service.
 23 October 1995: Instead of complying, private respondent filed with the Court of Appeals a Petition
for Review with prayer for the issuance of a temporary restraining order and/or preliminary injunction.
No restraining order or preliminary injunction, however, was issued by the court.
 13 December 1995: Then President Ramos, upon the recommendation of the Department, issued
Administrative Order No. 235, dropping private respondent Atty. Jacob F. Montesa, Director III, Legal
Service, from the roster of public servants for serious neglect of duty and absences without leave.
 25 April 1996: CA rendered its decision in favor of private respondent.
Page 8 of 26

Whether or not the respondent Montesa, who holds a temporary appointment, YES
could be transferred or reassigned to other positions without violating his right
to security of tenure
RATIO:
Private Respondent’s Appointment as Merely Temporary

 Private respondent's appointment is merely temporary; hence, he could be transferred or reassigned
to other positions without violating his right to security of tenure.
 The position of Ministry Legal Counsel - CESO IV is embraced in the Career Executive Service. Under
the Integrated Reorganization Plan, appointment thereto shall be made as follows:
c. Appointment. Appointment to appropriate classes in the Career Executive Service shall be
made by the President from a list of career executive eligibles recommended by the Board…The
President may, however, in exceptional cases, appoint any person who is not a Career
Executive Service eligible; provided that such appointee shall subsequently take the
required Career Executive Service examination and that he shall not be promoted to a higher
class until he qualifies in such examination.
 In this case, private respondent does not have the required CES eligibility. As admitted by private
respondent in his Comment, he is "not a CESO or a member of the Career Executive Service."
Permanent Appointment and Security of Tenure
 In Achacoso v. Macaraig, et al, the Court held that: a permanent appointment can be issued only "to
a person who meets all the requirements for the position to which he is being appointed, including the
appropriate eligibility prescribed." Achacoso did not. At best, therefore, his appointment could be
regarded only as temporary. And being so, it could be withdrawn at will by the appointing authority
and "at a moment's notice," conformably to established jurisprudence.
 The mere fact that a position belongs to the Career Service does not automatically confer security
of tenure on its occupant even if he does not possess the required qualifications. Such right will
have to depend on the nature of his appointment, which in turn depends on his eligibility or lack of it.
A person who does not have the requisite qualifications for the position cannot be appointed to it in
the first place or, only as an exception to the rule, may be appointed to it merely in an acting capacity
in the absence of appropriate eligibles. The appointment extended to him cannot be regarded as
permanent even if it may be so designated.
 In this case, private respondent's appointment did not attain permanency. Not having taken the
necessary Career Executive Service examination to obtain the requisite eligibility, he did not at
the time of his appointment and up to the present, possess the needed eligibility for a position in
the Career Executive Service.
 Consequently, his appointment as Ministry Legal Counsel - CESO IV/Department Legal Counsel
and/or Director III, was merely temporary. Such being the case, he could be transferred or
reassigned without violating the constitutionally guaranteed right to security of tenure.
RULING:
WHEREFORE, based on the foregoing, the Petition is GRANTED. The April 25, 1996 Decision and the November 20,
1996 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 38664 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Resolution Nos.
953268 and 955201 of the Civil Service Commission are REINSTATED. No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
Page 9 of 26
4. Province of Camarines Sur v. Gonzales, G.R. No. 185740, July 23, 2013
Court Supreme Court

Date July 23, 2013
Petitioner THE PROVINCIAL GOVERNMENT OF CAMARINES NORTE , represented by GOVERNOR
JESUS O. TYPOCO, JR.
Respondent BEATRIZ O. GONZALES
Ponente BRION, J
FACTS:
 1 April 1991: Gonzales was appointed as the provincial administrator of the Province of Camarines Norte.
Her appointment was on a permanent capacity.
 8 March 1999: Governor Jess B. Pimentel sent Gonzales a memorandum directing her to explain in writing
why no administrative charges should be filed against her for gross insubordination/gross discourtesy in the
course of official duties, and conduct grossly prejudicial to the best interest of the service; this was later
on captioned as Administrative Case No. 001. After Gonzales submitted her comment, an Ad Hoc
Investigation Committee found her guilty of the charges against her, and recommended to Governor Pimentel
that she be held administratively liable.
 30 September 1999: Governor Pimentel adopted the Ad Hoc Investigation Committee's recommendation
and dismissed Gonzales.
 Gonzales appealed Governor Pimentel's decision to the Civil Service Commission (CSC). The CSC issued
Resolution modifying Governor Pimentel's decision, finding Gonzales guilty of insubordination and suspending
her for six months.
o Gonzales then filed a motion for execution and clarification, in which she claimed that she had
already served her six-month suspension and asked to be reinstated. The CSC directed Gonzales'
reinstatement.
 12 October 2000: Governor Pimentel reinstated Gonzales as provincial administrator on October 12, 2000,
but terminated her services the next day for lack of confidence.
 The CSC again directed Gonzales' reinstatement as provincial administrator.
o It clarified that while the Local Government Code of 1991 (Republic Act No. [RA] 7160) made the
provincial administrator position coterminous and highly confidential in nature, this conversion
cannot operate to prejudice officials who were already issued permanent appointments as
administrators prior to the new law's effectivity.
o According to the CSC, Gonzales has acquired a vested right to her permanent appointment as
provincial administrator and is entitled to continue holding this office despite its subsequent
classification as a coterminous position. The conversion of the provincial administrator position from
a career to a non-career service should not jeopardize Gonzales' security of tenure guaranteed to
her by the Constitution. As a permanent appointee, Gonzales may only be removed for cause, after
due notice and hearing. Loss of trust and confidence is not among the grounds for a permanent
appointee's dismissal or discipline under existing laws.
 Petitioner, through Governor Typoco, filed a petition for review before the CA.
 CA supported the CSC's ruling that reinstated Gonzales as provincial administrator or to an equivalent
position.
 Hence, this petition.
 Petitioner’s Contention: The provincial administrator position has been converted into a highly
confidential, coterminous position by RA 7160. Hence, Gonzales no longer enjoyed security of tenure to
the position she held prior to RA 7160's enactment.

Whether Congress has re-classified the provincial administrator position from a YES
career service to a primarily confidential, non-career service position; and
Page 10 of 26
RATIO:
Congress' Reclassification of the Provincial Administrator Position as a Valid Exercise of Legislative Power That
Does Not Violate Gonzales' Security of Tenure
 According to the petitioner, Gonzales lost her security of tenure when the provincial administrator position
became a primarily confidential position.
 Gonzales, on the other hand, retorted that the conversion of the position should not be retroactively
applied to her, as she is a permanent appointee.
 Both the CA and the CSC ruled in favor of the latter, and gave premium to Gonzales' original permanent
appointment under the old LGC. They posit that Gonzales acquired a vested legal right over her position
from the moment she assumed her duties as provincial administrator. Thus, she cannot be removed from
office except for cause and after due hearing; otherwise such removal would amount to a violation of her
security of tenure.
 The arguments presented by the parties and ruled upon by the CA reflect a conceptual entanglement
between the nature of the position and an employee's right to hold a position. These two concepts are
different. The nature of a position may change by law according to the dictates of Congress. The right to
hold a position, on the other hand, is a right that enjoys constitutional and statutory guarantee, but may
itself change according to the nature of the position.
 Congress has the power and prerogative to introduce substantial changes in the provincial administrator
position and to reclassify it as a primarily confidential, non-career service position. Flowing from the
legislative power to create public offices is the power to abolish and modify them to meet the demands of
society; 31 Congress can change the qualifications for and shorten the term of existing statutory offices.
When done in good faith, these acts would not violate a public officer's security of tenure, even if they result
in his removal from office or the shortening of his term. 32 Modifications in public office, such as changes in
qualifications or shortening of its tenure, are made in good faith so long as they are aimed at the office and
not at the incumbent. 33 SDAaTC
 In this case, Congress, through RA 7160, did not abolish the provincial administrator position but significantly
modified many of its aspects. It is now a primarily confidential position under the non-career service tranche
of the civil service. This change could not have been aimed at prejudicing Gonzales, as she was not the only
provincial administrator incumbent at the time RA 7160 was enacted. Rather, this change was part of the
reform measures that RA 7160 introduced to further empower local governments and decentralize the
delivery of public service.
o Thus, Gonzales' permanent appointment as provincial administrator prior to the enactment of RA
7160 is immaterial to her removal as provincial administrator. For purposes of determining whether
Gonzales' termination violated her right to security of tenure, the nature of the position she occupied
at the time of her removal should be considered, and not merely the nature of her appointment at
the time she entered government service.

NO
Whether Gonzales has security of tenure over her position as provincial
administrator of the Province of Camarines Norte.
Executive Order No. 503 does not grant Gonzales security of tenure
 EO 503 does not apply to employees of the local government affected by RA 7160's enactment. The
title of EO 503 clearly provides for its scope of application, to wit:
Executive Order No. 503. Providing for the Rules and Regulations Implementing the Transfer
of Personnel and Assets, Liabilities and Records of National Government Agencies whose
Functions are to be Devolved to the Local Government Units and for other Related
Purposes.
 A reading of EO 503's whereas clauses confirms that it applies only to national government employees whose
functions are to be devolved to local governments:
WHEREAS, Republic Act No. 7160, otherwise known as the Local Government Code
of 1991, hereinafter referred to as the Code, transfers the responsibility for the delivery
Page 11 of 26
of basic services and facilities from the national government agencies (NGAs) concerned
to the local government units (LGUs);
WHEREAS, the Code stipulated that the transfer of basic services and facilities shall
be accompanied by the transfer of the national personnel concerned and assets to ensure
continuity in the delivery of such services and facilities;
WHEREAS, responsive rules and regulations are needed to affect the required
transfer of national personnel concerned and assets to the LGUs[.]
 In this case, paragraph 8, Section 2 (a) of EO 503 cannot apply to Gonzales, a provincial administrator. As
explained earlier, the existence of the provincial administrator position was a prerogative of the
Sanggunian Panlalawigan, and was not even a mandatory public office under the old LGC. It is clearly not
a national government position whose functions are to be devolved to the local governments.
Gonzales has security of tenure, but only as a primarily confidential employee
 Security of tenure in public office simply means that a public officer or employee shall not be suspended
or dismissed except for cause, as provided by law and after due process. It cannot be expanded to grant a
right to public office despite a change in the nature of the office held. In other words, the CSC might have
been legally correct when it ruled that the petitioner violated Gonzales' right to security of tenure when
she was removed without sufficient just cause from her position, but the situation had since then been
changed. In fact, Gonzales was reinstated as ordered, but her services were subsequently terminated under
the law prevailing at the time of the termination of her service; i.e., she was then already occupying a
position that was primarily confidential and had to be dismissed because she no longer enjoyed the trust
and confidence of the appointing authority.
 Both career and non-career service employees have a right to security of tenure. All permanent officers
and employees in the civil service, regardless of whether they belong to the career or non-career service
category, are entitled to this guaranty; they cannot be removed from office except for cause provided by
law and after procedural due process.
o The concept of security of tenure, however, labors under a variation for primarily confidential
employees due to the basic concept of a "primarily confidential" position. Serving at the confidence
of the appointing authority, the primarily confidential employee's term of office expires when the
appointing authority loses trust in the employee.
o When this happens, the confidential employee is not "removed" or "dismissed" from office; his term
merely "expires" and the loss of trust and confidence is the "just cause" provided by law that results
in the termination of employment.
 In this case, where the trust and confidence has been irretrievably eroded, we cannot fault Governor
Pimentel's exercise of discretion when he decided that he could no longer entrust his confidence in
Gonzales.
 Thus, Gonzales' termination for lack of confidence was lawful. She could no longer be reinstated as
provincial administrator of Camarines Norte or to any other comparable position. This conclusion, however,
is without prejudice to Gonzales' entitlement to retirement benefits, leave credits, and future employment
in government service.
RULING:
WHEREFORE, all premises considered, we hereby GRANT the petition, and REVERSE and SET ASIDE the Decision
dated June 25, 2008 and the Resolution dated December 2, 2008 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 97425.
SO ORDERED.
Page 12 of 26
5. GSIS v. Civil Service Commission, 245 SCRA 179 [1995]
Court Supreme Court

Citation G.R. No. 98395/ G.R. No. 102449
Date June 19, 1995
Petitioner GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM
Respondent CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION and DR. MANUEL BARADERO/ CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION
and MATILDE S. BELO
Ponente KAPUNAN, J
Privileges 3. Right to Compensation – Salary and Perquisites a) Forms of Compensation
FACTS:
 In the Court’s decision dated October 28, 1994, the Court held that government service rendered on a
per diem basis is not creditable in computing the length of service for retirement purposes. Thus, we
reversed the questioned resolutions and orders of the Civil Service Commission (CSC) requiring the
Government Service Insurance System (GSIS) to consider creditable the services of private respondents
on a per diem basis.
 However, private respondent Matilde S. Belo in G. R. No. 102449 filed a motion for reconsideration
dated 17 November 1994, of this Court's decision of October 28, 1994.
o She insists that the services rendered by her as Vice Governor of Capiz, between December 31,
1975 to January 1, 1979, be considered as creditable for purposes of retirement.
 22 November 1984: The Government Service Insurance System likewise filed a motion for
reconsideration in behalf of both private respondents Belo and Dr. Manuel Baradero.

Whether or not the disputed periods should be credited as service with
YES
compensation for the purposes of retirement
RATIO:
 While that respondents Belo and Baradero received were denominated as " per diem," the amounts
received were actually in the nature of a compensation or pay. What should therefore be considered
as controlling in both cases would be the nature of remuneration, not the label attached to it.
 Respondent Belo held the position of Vice-Governor of Capiz continuously between January 5, 1972
up to February 1, 1988. From January 25, 1972 up to December 31, 1979, she held office by virtue of
an election and was paid a fixed salary. 1 From December 31, 1979 up to February 1, 1988, she held
the position of Vice Governor of Capiz in a holdover capacity, broken down into two periods:
1. A period in which she was paid on a per diem basis — from December 31, 1976 to
December 31, 1979; and
2. A period in which she was paid a fixed salary — from January 1, 1980 to February
1, 1988.
 7 June 1989: CSC held that the services rendered for the first holdover period between January 31,
1976 to January 1, 1979 was creditable for purposes of retirement. CSC noted that during the entire
holdover period, respondent Belo actually served on a full time basis as Vice Governor and was on call
24 hours a day.
 Disagreeing with the CSC's insistence that the period in which respondent Belo was paid on a per diem
basis should be credited in computing the number of years of creditable service to the government,
GSIS subsequently filed a petition for certiorari before this court, questioning the orders of the CSC.
 Agreeing that per diems were not compensation within the meaning of Section 1(c) of R.A. 1573 which
amended Section 1 (c) of R. A. No. 186 (Government Service Insurance Act), the Court granted the
petitions in G. R. Nos. 98395 and 102449, and reversed the CSC Orders and Resolutions in question.
 The "per diem" she received was actually paid for in the performance of her duties as Vice-Governor of
Capiz in a holdover capacity not as the per diem referred to be section 1 (c) of R.A. No. 1573 which
amended Section 1(c) of C.A. No. 186 (Government Service Insurance Act). A closer look at the
Page 13 of 26
aforecited provision, moreover, reveals a legislative intent to make a clear distinction between salary,
pay or compensation, on one hand, and other incidental allowances, including per diems on the other.
Section 1(c) provides:
(c) Salary, pay or compensation shall be construed as to exclude all bonuses, per diems,
allowances and overtime pay, or salary, pay or compensation given to the base pay of the
position or rank as fixed by law or regulations.
 Since it is generally held that an allowance for expenses incident to the discharge of an office is not a
salary of office, it follows that if the remuneration received by a public official in the performance of
his duties does not constitute a mere "allowance for expenses" but appears to be his actual allowance
for expenses but appears to be his actual base pay, then no amount of categorizing the salary as a "per
diem" would take the allowances received by petitioner from the term service with compensation for
the purpose of computing the number of years of service in government. Furthermore, it would grossly
violate the law's intent to reward the public servant's years of dedicated service to government for us
to gloss over the circumstances surrounding the payment of the said remunerations to the petitioner in
taking a purely mechanical approach to the problem by accepting an attached label at face value.
 In the sense in which the phrase "per diem" is used under the Government Service Insurance Law, a per
diem is a daily allowance given for each day an officer or employee of government is away form his
home base. This is its traditional meaning: its usual signification is as a reimbursement for extra
expenses incurred by the public official in the performance of his duties. Under this definition the
per diem is intended to cover the cost of lodging and subsistence of officers and employees when the
latter are on duty outside of their permanent station.
 On the other hand, a per diem could rightfully be considered a compensation or remuneration
attached to an office.
o Under the circumstances obtaining in the case of respondent Belo the per diems received by
her during the period that she acted in holdover capacity obviously were in the nature of
compensation or remuneration for her services as Vice Governor of the Province of Capiz,
rather than as a reimbursement for incidental expenses incurred while away from her home
base.
o In connection with this, it is important to lay stress to the following facts:
1. Petitioner rendered service to the government continuously from January 25,
1972 to February 1, 1988 as Vice Governor of the Province of Capiz. During a
portion of the holdover period, i. e., from December 31, 1976 to January 1,
1979, payment for her services to the government was through per diems for
ever regular or special session of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan attended. 12
2. The CSC noted that: "[F]ormer Vice Governor Belo was on a full time basis
when she served . . . on a hold-over capacity. . . As such provincial official she
is (sic) legally and factually on call by the provincial people and the province
more than eight hours a day, or at any time of the day beyond the prescribed
working hours.
3. She receive no other forms of remuneration during the disputed period."
o The same could be said of the services rendered by respondent Baradero, who, before and
after the period in question had an unblemished record of service to the government as a
member of the army and as a medical officer of the Philippine Medicare Commission. The
disputed period was served on a full-time basis regardless of the denomination given to the
compensation received by him.
Nature of the Remuneration
 Per diem as compensation, is not what the law contemplates. The clear intent of the Government Insurance
Law was to exclude those extra incidental expenses or incurred on a daily basis covered by the traditional
definition of the term per diem.
o In this case, while respondent Belo was paid on a per diem basis during her first holdover period
as Vice-Governor, she was subsequently paid a fixed salary, which apparently rectified an
otherwise anomalous situation. The services rendered by respondent Belo having been continuous,
the disputed period should be credited for purposes of retirement.
o On the other hand, respondent Baradero was willing to serve two additional years of service to
government in order to complete the 15-year period required by our retirement laws. The Civil
Service Commission felt this was unnecessary and denied the same on the ground that the period
served on a per diem basis, was, like the disputed period in the Belo case, creditable.
Page 14 of 26
 Inocencio vs. Ferrer of the Social Security System, we noted with approval the Government Service
Insurance System's explanation that the per diem service which was credited for purposes of retirement
was Commissioner Ferrer's full time service as Hearing Officer not his per diem service for attendance at
Board Meetings. Even then, we indirectly noted the difference between per diem paid as compensation
for services rendered on a full time basis and per diem as allowance for incidental expenses. Respondent
Belo asserts, with reason, that the per diems paid to her, while reckoned on the basis of attendance in
Board Meetings, were for her full time services as Vice Governor of the Province of Capiz. In fact, the same
service, albeit still on a holdover basis, was eventually paid with a fixed salary.
 Retirement benefits given to government employees in effect reward them for giving the best years of
their lives to the service of their country. The basis for the provision of retirement benefits is, therefore,
service to government.
 It cannot be convincingly asserted that petitioners could not avail themselves of the benefits of the policy
because no deductions were made from their salaries during the disputed periods when they were paid on
a per diem basis.
o In respondent Belo's case, before and after that short interregnum, she was paid a fixed salary.
She was not duly informed that short period was not to be credited in computing the length of her
service for retirement purposes. She assumed in all good faith that she continued to be covered
by the GSIS insurance benefits considering that in fact and in practice the deductions are virtually
mandatorily made from all government employees on an essentially involuntary basis.
o Similarly, had respondent Baradero been informed of the need to pay the required deductions for
the purpose of qualifying for retirement benefits, he would have willingly paid the required sums.
In a sense, the contract made between the GSIS and the government employee is done on a take-
it-or-leave-it basis, that is, it is a virtual contract of adhesion which gives the employee no choice
but to involuntarily accede to the deductions made from their oftentimes meager salaries.
o If the GSIS did not deduct, it was by its own choice: contributions were exacted from petitioner
before and after the disputed period. To assert that petitioners would have been entitled to
benefits had they opted for optional deductions at that point misses the principal fact in issue
here, which is the question as to whether or not the disputed periods should be credited as service
with compensation for the purposes of retirement.
 The situation as far as private respondents and the GSIS are concerned could be rectified by deducting a
reasonable amount corresponding to the contributions which should have been deducted during the period
from the amount of retirement benefits accruing to them. It would be grossly inequitable — as it would
violate the spirit of the government retirement and insurance laws — to permanently penalize both
respondents Belo and Baradero by ignoring the fact of actual period of service to government with
compensation, and deny them the retirement privileges that they, for their unselfish service to the
government justly deserve.
RULING:
WHEREFORE, the instant motion is hereby GRANTED, our decision dated October 28, 1994 RECONSIDERED and the
questioned resolutions and orders of the CSC requiring GSIS to consider creditable the services of private
respondents on a per diem basis AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
Page 15 of 26
6. Bitonio, Jr. v. Commission on Audit, 425 SCRA 437 [2004]
Court Supreme Court

Date March 12, 2004
Petitioner BENEDICTO ERNESTO R. BITONIO, JR.
Respondent COMMISSION ON AUDIT and CELSO D. GANGAN, CHAIRMAN OF THE COMMISSION ON
AUDIT
Ponente CALLEJO, SR., J
Privileges 3. Right to Compensation – Salary and Perquisites b) Basis of Right to
Compensation
FACTS:
 In 1994, petitioner Benedicto Ernesto R. Bitonio, Jr. was appointed Director IV of the Bureau of Labor
Relations in the Department of Labor and Employment.
 In a Letter dated 11 May 1995 addressed to Honorable Rizalino S. Navarro, then Secretary of the
Department of Trade and Industry, Acting Secretary Jose S. Brilliantes of the Department of Labor and
Employment designated the petitioner to be the DOLE representative to the Board of Directors of PEZA. 3
Such designation was in pursuance to Section 11 of Republic Act No. 7916, otherwise known as the Special
Economic Zone Act of 1995.
 As representative of the Secretary of Labor to the PEZA, the petitioner was receiving a per diem for
every board meeting he attended during the years 1995 to 1997.
 After a post audit of the PEZA's disbursement transactions, the COA disallowed the payment of per
diems to the petitioner.
 24 November 1998: the petitioner filed his motion for reconsideration to the COA.
 30 January 2001: the COA rendered the assailed decision denying petitioner’s motion for
reconsideration.
 Hence, this petition.

Whether or not the COA correctly disallowed the per diems received by the YES
petitioner for his attendance in the PEZA Board of Directors' meetings as
representative of the Secretary of Labor
RATIO:
 The petitioner posits that R.A. No. 7916 was enacted four (4) years after the case of Civil Liberties Union
was promulgated. It is, therefore, assumed that the legislature, before enacting a law, was aware of the
prior holdings of the courts. Since the constitutionality or the validity of R.A. No. 7916 was never challenged,
the provision on the payment of per diems remains in force notwithstanding the Civil Liberties Union case.
Nonetheless, the petitioner's position as Director IV is not included in the enumeration of officials prohibited
to receive additional compensation as clarified in the Resolution of the Court dated August 1, 1991; thus, he
is still entitled to receive the per diems.
o The petitioner's contentions are untenable.
 It must be noted that the petitioner's presence in the PEZA Board meetings is solely by virtue of his capacity
as representative of the Secretary of Labor. As the petitioner himself admitted, there was no separate or
special appointment for such position. Since the Secretary of Labor is prohibited from receiving
compensation for his additional office or employment, such prohibition likewise applies to the petitioner
who sat in the Board only in behalf of the Secretary of Labor.
 In Dela Cruz v. Commission on Audit: the Court upheld the COA in disallowing the payment of honoraria
and per diems to the officers concerned who sat as members of the Board of Directors of the National
Housing Authority. The officers concerned sat as alternates of their superiors in an ex oficio capacity.
 In this case, the Court did not allow the petitioner who sat as representative of the Secretary of Labor in
Page 16 of 26
the PEZA Board to have a better right than his principal.
o As the representative of the Secretary of Labor, the petitioner sat in the Board in the same capacity
as his principal. Whatever laws and rules the member in the Board is covered, so is the
representative; and whatever prohibitions or restrictions the member is subjected, the
representative is, likewise, not exempted.
o Thus, his position as Director IV of the DOLE which the petitioner claims is not covered by the
constitutional prohibition set by the Civil Liberties Union case is of no moment. The petitioner
attended the board meetings by the authority given to him by the Secretary of Labor to sit as his
representative. If it were not for such designation, the petitioner would not have been in the Board
at all.
 There is also no merit in the allegation that the legislature was certainly aware of the parameters set by
the Court when it enacted R.A. No. 7916, four (4) years after the finality of the Civil Liberties Union case.
The payment of per diems was clearly an express grant in favor of the members of the Board of Directors
which the petitioner is entitled to receive.
 It is a basic tenet that any legislative enactment must not be repugnant to the highest law of the land which
is the Constitution. No law can render nugatory the Constitution because the Constitution is more superior
to a statute. 14 If a law happens to infringe upon or violate the fundamental law, courts of justice may step
in to nullify its effectiveness. 15 It is the task of the Court to see to it that the law must conform to the
Constitution. In the clarificatory resolution issued by the Court in the Civil Liberties Union case on August 1,
1991, the Court addressed the issue as to the extent of the exercise of legislative prerogative.
 The framers of R.A. No. 7916 must have realized the flaw in the law which is the reason why the law was
later amended by R.A. No. 8748 16 to cure such defect.
o The members of the Board of Directors was increased from 8 to 13, specifying therein that it is the
undersecretaries of the different Departments who should sit as board members of the PEZA. The
option of designating his representative to the Board by the different Cabinet Secretaries was
deleted. Likewise, the last paragraph as to the payment of per diems to the members of the Board
of Directors was also deleted, considering that such stipulation was clearly in conflict with the
proscription set by the Constitution.
o Thus, the petitioner is not entitled to receive a per diem for his attendance at board meetings during
his tenure as member of the Board of Director of the PEZA.
RULING:
IN LIGHT OF THE FOREGOING, the petition is DISMISSED. The assailed decision of the COA is AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
Page 17 of 26
7. De La Victoria v. Burgos, 245 SCRA 374 [1995]
Court Supreme Court

Date June 27, 1995
Petitioner LORETO D. DE LA VICTORIA, as City Fiscal of Mandaue City and in his personal
capacity as garnishee
Respondent HON. JOSE BURGOS, Presiding Judge, RTC, and RAUL H. SESBREÑO
Ponente BELLOSILLO, J
Privileges 3. Right to Compensation – Salary and Perquisites c) Salary not Subject to
Garnishment
FACTS:
 Respondent Raul H. Sesbreño filed a complaint for damages against Assistant City Fiscals Bienvenido N.
Mabanto, Jr., and Dario D. Rama, Jr., before RTC Cebu City. Judgment was rendered ordering the
defendants to pay P11,000.00 to the plaintiff, private respondent. The decision having become final and
executory, on motion of the latter, the trial court ordered its execution. This order was questioned by
the defendants before the CA. However, on 15 January 1992 a writ of execution was issued.
 4 February 1992: A notice of garnishment was served on petitioner Loreto D. de la Victoria as City
Fiscal of Mandaue City where defendant Mabanto, Jr., was then detailed.
o The Notice directed petitioner not to disburse, transfer, release or convey to any other person
except to the deputy sheriff concerned the salary checks, monies, or cash due or belonging to
Mabanto, Jr., under penalty of law. 1 On 10 March 1992 private respondent filed a motion before
the trial court for examination of the garnishees.<
 25 May 1992: The petition pending before the Court of Appeals was dismissed.
 24 November 1992: Private respondent filed a motion to require petitioner to explain why he should not
be cited in contempt of court for failing to comply with the order of 4 November 1992.
 19 January 1993: Petitioner moved to quash the notice of garnishment claiming that he was not in
possession of any money, funds, credit, property or anything of value belonging to Mabanto, Jr., except
his salary and RATA checks, but that said checks were not yet properties of Mabanto, Jr., until delivered
to him. He further claimed that, as such, they were still public funds which could not be subject to
garnishment.
 9 March 1993: the trial court denied both motions and ordered petitioner to immediately comply with its
order of 4 November 1992.
o It opined that the checks of Mabanto, Jr., had already been released through petitioner by the
Department of Justice duly signed by the officer concerned. Upon service of the writ of
garnishment, petitioner as custodian of the checks was under obligation to hold them for the
judgment creditor. Petitioner became a virtual party to, or a forced intervenor in, the case and
the trial court hereby acquired jurisdiction to bind him to its orders and processes with a view
to the complete satisfaction of the judgment. Additionally there was no sufficient reason for
petitioner to hold the checks because they were no longer government funds and presumably
delivered to the payee, conformably with the last sentence of Sec. 16 of the Negotiable
Instruments Law.
 20 April 1993: The motion for reconsideration was denied.
 Petitioner’s Contention: Petitioner reiterates his position that the salary checks were not owned by
Mabanto, Jr., because they were not yet delivered to him, and that petitioner as garnishee has no legal
obligation to hold and deliver them to the trial court to be applied to Mabanto, Jr.' s judgment debt. The
thesis of petitioner is that the salary checks still formed part of public funds and therefore beyond the
reach of garnishment proceedings.

Whether or not the salary check of a government official or employee funded
NO
with public funds can be subject to garnishment.
Page 18 of 26
RATIO:
 Garnishment is considered as a species of attachment for reaching credits belonging to the Judgment
debtor owing to him from a stranger to the litigation.6 Emphasis is laid on the phrase "belonging to the
judgment debtor" since it is the focal point in resolving the issues raised.
 As Assistant City Fiscal, the source of the salary of Mabanto, Jr., is public funds. He receives his
compensation in the form of checks from the Department of Justice through petitioner as City Fiscal of
Mandaue City and head of office. Under Sec. 16 of the Negotiable Instruments Law, every contract on a
negotiable instrument is incomplete and revocable until delivery of the instrument for the purpose of
giving effect thereto. As ordinarily understood, delivery means the transfer of the possession of the
instrument by the maker or the drawer with intent to transfer title to the payee and recognize him as the
holder thereof.
 According to the trial court, the checks of Mabanto, Jr., were already released by the Department of
Justice duly signed by the officer concerned through petitioner and upon service of the writ of garnishment
by the sheriff petitioner was under obligation to hold them for the judgment creditor. It recognized the
role of petitioner as custodian of the checks. At the same time however it considered the checks as no
longer government funds and presumed delivered to the payee based on the last sentence of Sec. 16 of
the Negotiable Instruments Law which states: "And where the instrument is no longer in the possession of
a party whose signature appears thereon, a valid and intentional delivery by him is presumed." Yet, the
presumption is not conclusive because the last portion of the provision says "until the contrary is proved."
However this phrase was deleted by the trial court for no apparent reason. Proof to the contrary is its own
finding that the checks were in the custody of petitioner. Inasmuch as said checks had not yet been
delivered to Mabanto, Jr., they did not belong to him and still had the character of public funds. In Tiro
v. Hontanosas we ruled that —
The salary check of a government officer or employee such as a teacher does not belong
to him before it is physically delivered to him. Until that time the check belongs to the
government. Accordingly, before there is actual delivery of the check, the payee has no
power over it; he cannot assign it without the consent of the Government.
 As a necessary consequence of being public fund, the checks may not be garnished to satisfy the judgment.
The rationale behind this doctrine is obvious consideration of public policy. The Court succinctly stated in
Commissioner of Public Highways v. San Diego10 that —
The functions and public services rendered by the State cannot be allowed to be
paralyzed or disrupted by the diversion of public funds from their legitimate and specific
objects, as appropriated by law.
 In denying petitioner's motion for reconsideration, the trial court expressed the additional ratiocination
that it was not the duty of the garnishee to inquire or judge for himself whether the issuance of the order
of execution, the writ of execution, and the notice of garnishment was justified, citing our ruling in
Philippine Commercial Industrial Bank v. Court of Appeals.
o Our precise ruling in that case that "[I]t is not incumbent upon the garnishee to inquire or to judge for
itself whether or not the order for the advance execution of a judgment is valid." But that is invoking
only the general rule. We have also established therein the compelling reasons, as exceptions thereto,
which were not taken into account by the trial court, e.g., a defect on the face of the writ or actual
knowledge by the garnishee of lack of entitlement on the part of the garnisher. It is worth to note that
the ruling referred to the validity of advance execution of judgments, but a careful scrutiny of that
case and similar cases reveals that it was applicable to a notice of garnishment as well. In the case at
bench, it was incumbent upon petitioner to inquire into the validity of the notice of garnishment as he
had actual knowledge of the non-entitlement of private respondent to the checks in question.
Consequently, we find no difficulty concluding that the trial court exceeded its jurisdiction in issuing
the notice of garnishment concerning the salary checks of Mabanto, Jr., in the possession of petitioner.
RULING:
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The orders of 9 March 1993 and 20 April 1993 of the Regional Trial Court
of Cebu City, Br. 17, subject of the petition are SET ASIDE. The notice of garnishment served on petitioner dated
3 February 1992 is ordered DISCHARGED. SO ORDERED.
Page 19 of 26
8. Re Gross Violation of Civil Service Law on the Prohibition Against Dual Employment and Double
Compensation in the Government Service Committed by Mr. Eduardo V. Escala, SC Chief Judicial Staff Officer,
Security Division, Office of the Administrative Services, A.M. No. 2011-04-SC, July 5, 2011
Court Supreme Court

Citation A.M. No. 2011-04-SC
Date July 5, 2011
Petitioner RE: Gross Violation of Civil Service Law on the Prohibition Against Dual
Employment and Double Compensation in the Government Service
Committed by Mr. Eduardo V. Escala, SC Chief Judicial Staff Officer,
Security Division, Office of Administrative Services
Respondent
Ponente PER CURIAM
Privileges 3. Right to Compensation – Salary and Perquisites d) Prohibition against
Receiving Additional, Double, or Indirect Compensation
FACTS:
 Respondent was appointed by the Court as SC Chief Judicial Staff Officer, Security Division, OAS on July 14,
2008. His application papers show he has experience and training as a police officer, having been employed
as Chief Inspector of the Philippine National Police (PNP) Aviation Security Group at the time of his
appointment in the Supreme Court.
 During the course of his employment, an anonymous letter1 reached the OAS reporting the respondent's
gross violation of the Civil Service Law on the prohibition against dual employment and double
compensation in the government service. The letter alleged that respondent accepted employment, and
thus received salaries and other benefits, from the Court and also from the PNP of which he remained an
active member.
 Considering the seriousness of the matter, respondent was preventively suspended by the Court pending the
results of the IAO's investigations and the separate administrative investigation of the OAS. 2
 6 May 2011: In the OAS Memorandum, respondent was directed to explain why he should not be
administratively charged with gross dishonesty and conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service
for violation of the Civil Service Law on the prohibition against dual employment and double compensation
in the government service.
 26 May 2011: respondent submitted to the findings of the OAS but "humbly implore your magnanimity not
to charge him with gross dishonesty and conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service"
 Offering no justification and admitting his fault, and cognizant of the consequences of his wrong judgment,
respondent extends his apologies to the Court and to the PNP. He also informed the OAS that he made
arrangements with the PNP for the return, as in fact he had already returned, the total amount of
P560,982.86 representing his salaries and allowances which he received from the PNP covering the period
July 2008 to September 2009. He allegedly made such restitution to shield the PNP from undue prejudice
and to erase the stigma which the incident has caused upon his person and honor.
 Finally, advancing his track record of good performance both in the PNP and the Court, respondent seeks
compassion and prays that the consequences be tempered.

Whether or not the respondent guilty of gross dishonesty and conduct YES
prejudicial to the best interest of the service, which are grave offenses
punished by dismissal.
RATIO:
 All court personnel ought to live up to the strictest standards of honesty and integrity, considering that
their positions primarily involve service to the public. For knowingly and willfully transgressing the
Page 20 of 26
prohibition on dual employment and double compensation, as well as the Court's rules for its personnel
on conflict of interest, respondent violated the trust and confidence reposed on him by the Court.
Considering the sensitive and confidential nature of his position, the Court is left with no choice but to
declare the respondent guilty of gross dishonesty and conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the
service, which are grave offenses punished by dismissal.
 The OAS found respondent's indirect claim of good faith unavailing. His regular receipt of his salaries
from the PNP despite presumably exclusively working with the Court implies a deliberate intent to give
unwarranted benefit to himself and undue prejudice to the government especially so by his regular
submission of monthly/daily time record as a mandatory requirement for inclusion in the payroll.
 The OAS also found that respondent became aware of the approval of his application for retirement as
early as September 30, 2009. Notwithstanding such knowledge, he did not immediately refund his
overpayment, if that was indeed the case, and that his act of returning his salaries after the period of
20 months was also a mere afterthought as he did so only because the Court became aware of it and
directed him to explain. Would he have done so if no report of his actuation was ever brought to the
attention of the Court? The lapse of almost 2 years without him doing so speaks of his intent not to
return the same.
Good faith, here understood, is an intangible and abstract quality with no technical
meaning or statutory definition, and it encompasses, among other things, an honest belief,
the absence of malice and the absence of design to defraud or to seek an unconscionable
advantage. An individual's personal good faith is a concept of his own mind and, therefore,
may not conclusively be determined by his protestations alone. It implies honesty of
intention, and freedom from knowledge of circumstances which ought to put the holder
upon inquiry. The essence of good faith lies in an honest belief in the validity of one's right,
ignorance of a superior claim, and absence of intention to overreach another. 13 DIESaC
 The OAS found respondent's actuation even amounts to gross dishonesty. His receipt of salaries from
the PNP despite not rendering any service thereto is a form of deceit. Jurisprudence states that
dishonesty implies a "disposition to lie, cheat, deceive, or defraud; untrustworthiness; lack of integrity;
lack of honesty, probity or integrity in principle; lack of fairness and straightforwardness; disposition
to defraud, deceive or betray."
 That respondent actually rendered services to the PNP, if any, despite employment in the Court, is
inconsequential. The prohibition against government officials and employees, whether elected or
appointed, from concurrently holding any other office or position in the government is contained in
Section 7, Article IX-B of the 1987 Constitution which provides:
Unless otherwise allowed by law or by the primary functions of his position, no

appointive official shall hold any other office or employment in the Government, or any
subdivision, agency or instrumentality thereof, including government-owned or controlled
corporations or their subsidiaries.
The prohibition on dual employment and double compensation in the government service is further
specified under Sections 1 and 2, Rule XVIII of the Omnibus Rules Implementing Book V of E.O. No. 292, viz.:
Sec. 1. No appointive official shall hold any other office or employment in the Government or
any subdivision, agency or instrumentality thereof, including government-owned or
controlled corporations with original charters or their subsidiaries, unless otherwise
allowed by law or by the primary functions of his position.
Sec. 2. No elective or appointive public officer or employee shall receive additional, double, or
indirect compensation, unless specifically authorized by law, . . . .
 Section 5, Canon III of the Code of Conduct for Court Personnel, specifically provides that:
Sec. 5. The full-time position in the Judiciary of every court personnel shall be the personnel's
primary employment. For purposes of this Code, "primary employment" means the position that
consumes the entire normal working hours of the court personnel and requires the personnel's
exclusive attention in performing official duties.
Page 21 of 26
 With the undisputed facts of the case, the OAS considers that there is sufficient evidence to support a
finding that respondent is liable for gross dishonesty and conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the
service. His non-disclosure of the material fact that he was still employed as an active member of the
PNP and receiving his monthly salaries therein during the period that he is already a Court employee is
considered substantial proof that he tried to cheat/defraud both the PNP and the Court. This is an
affront to the dignity of the Court. Indeed, respondent has transgressed the Constitution and the Civil
Service law on the prohibition on dual employment and double compensation in the government
service.
 Thus, after its due investigation, the OAS submitted its report to the Court finding respondent guilty
of the charges and recommending:
a. that Mr. Eduardo V. Escala, SC Chief Judicial Staff Officer, Security Division, Office of
Administrative Services, be held liable for gross dishonesty and conduct prejudicial to
the best interest of the service for not disclosing the fact that despite accepting
employment with and receiving salaries from the Supreme Court, he is still receiving
his salaries and benefits from the Philippine National Police as an active member
thereof; and
b. that he be dismissed from the service with forfeiture of all benefits, except accrued
leave credits, if he has any, and with prohibition from reemployment in any branch,
agency or instrumentality of the government including government owned or controlled
corporations.
RULING:
WHEREFORE, the Court finds respondent Eduardo V. Escala, SC Chief Judicial Staff Officer, Security Division,
OAS GUILTY of gross dishonesty and conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service, and imposes on him
the penalty of DISMISSAL from the service and forfeiture of all benefits with prejudice to re-employment in any
government agency, including government-owned and controlled corporations.
SO ORDERED.
Page 22 of 26
9. SSS Employees Association v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 85279, July 28, 1989
Court Supreme Court

Date July 28, 1989
Petitioner SOCIAL SECURITY SYSTEM EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION (SSSEA), DIONISIO T. BAYLON,
RAMON MODESTO, JUANITO MADURA, REUBEN ZAMORA, VIRGILIO DE ALDAY, SERGIO
ARANETA, PLACIDO AGUSTIN, VIRGILIO MAGPAYO
Respondent THE COURT OF APPEALS, SOCIAL SECURITY SYSTEM (SSS), HON. CEZAR C. PERALEJO
RTC, BRANCH 98, QUEZON CITY
Ponente CORTES, J
Privileges 6. Right to Self-Organization
FACTS:
 11 June 1987: The SSS filed with the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City a complaint for damages with a
prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction against petitioners, alleging that:
 On 9 June 1987, the officers and members of SSSEA staged an illegal strike and barricaded
the entrances to the SSS Building, preventing non-striking employees from reporting for work
and SSS members from transacting business with the SSS; that the strike was reported to the
Public Sector Labor-Management Council, which ordered the strikers to return to work; that
the strikers refused to return to work; and that the SSS suffered damages as a result of the
strike. The complaint prayed that a writ of preliminary injunction be issued to enjoin the strike
and that the strikers be ordered to return to work; that the defendants (petitioners herein) be
ordered to pay damages; and that the strike be declared illegal.
 It appears that the SSSEA went on strike after the SSS failed to act on the union's demands, which included:
implementation of the provisions of the old SSS-SSSEA collective bargaining agreement (CBA) on check-off
of union dues; payment of accrued overtime pay, night differential pay and holiday pay; conversion of
temporary or contractual employees with six (6) months or more of service into regular and permanent
employees and their entitlement to the same salaries, allowances and benefits given to other regular
employees of the SSS; and payment of the children's allowance of P30.00, and after the SSS deducted
certain amounts from the salaries of the employees and allegedly committed acts of discrimination and
unfair labor practices.
 11 June 1987: The court a quo issued a temporary restraining order pending resolution of the application
for a writ of preliminary injunction.
 In the meantime, petitioners filed a motion to dismiss alleging the trial court's lack of jurisdiction over the
subject matter.
 To this motion, the SSS filed an opposition, reiterating its prayer for the issuance of a writ of injunction.
 22 July 1987: in a four-page order, the court a quo denied the motion to dismiss and converted the
restraining order into an injunction upon posting of a bond, after finding that the strike was illegal [Rollo,
pp. 83-86].
 As petitioners' motion for the reconsideration of the aforesaid order was also denied on August 14, 1988,
petitioners filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition with preliminary injunction before this Court.
 21 October 1987: The Court, through the Third Division, resolved to refer the case to the Court of Appeals.
Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration thereof, but during its pendency the Court of Appeals on
March 9, 1988 promulgated its decision on the referred case.
o Petitioners moved to recall the Court of Appeals' decision. In the meantime, the Court on June
29, 1988 denied the motion for reconsideration in G.R. No. 97577 for being moot and academic.
Petitioners' motion to recall the decision of the Court of Appeals was also denied in view of this
Court's denial of the motion for reconsideration.
 Hence, the instant petition to review the decision of the Court of Appeals.
Page 23 of 26

Whether or not the employees of the SSS are covered by the prohibition YES
against strikes?
RATIO:
 The 1987 Constitution, in the Article on Social Justice and Human Rights, provides that the State "shall
guarantee the rights of all workers to self-organization, collective bargaining and negotiations, and
peaceful concerted activities, including the right to strike in accordance with law" [Art. XIII, Sec. 3].
 The Court is of the considered view that the employees are covered by this provision. Considering that
under the 1987 Constitution "[t]he civil service embraces all branches, subdivisions, instrumentalities, and
agencies of the Government, including government-owned or controlled corporations with original
charters" [Art. IX(B), Sec. 2(1); and that the SSS is one such government-controlled corporation with an
original charter, having been created under R.A. No. 1161, its employees are part of the civil service
[NASECO v. NLRC, G.R. Nos. 69870 & 70295, November 24, 1988] and are covered by the Civil Service
Commission's memorandum prohibiting strikes. This being the case, the strike staged by the employees of
the SSS was illegal.
 E.O. No. 180, which provides guidelines for the exercise of the right to organize of government employees,
while clinging to the same philosophy, has, however, relaxed the rule to allow negotiation where the
terms and conditions of employment involved are not among those fixed by law. Thus:
SECTION 13. Terms and conditions of employment or improvements thereof, except those that
are fixed by law, may be the subject of negotiations between duly recognized employees'
organizations and appropriate government authorities.
 The same executive order has also provided for the general mechanism for the settlement of labor
disputes in the public sector, to wit:
SECTION 16. The Civil Service and labor laws and procedures, whenever applicable, shall be
followed in the resolution of complaints, grievances and cases involving government employees.
In case any dispute remains unresolved after exhausting all the available remedies under existing
laws and procedures, the parties may jointly refer the dispute to the [Public Sector Labor-
Management] Council for appropriate action.
 Government employees may, therefore, through their unions or associations, either petition the Congress
for the betterment of the terms and conditions of employment which are within the ambit of legislation
or negotiate with the appropriate government agencies for the improvement of those which are not fixed
by law. If there be any unresolved grievances, the dispute may be referred to the Public Sector Labor-
Management Council for appropriate action. But employees in the civil service may not resort to strikes,
walkouts and other temporary work stoppages, like workers in the private sector, to pressure the
Government to accede to their demands.
 As now provided under Sec. 4, Rule III of the Rules and Regulations to Govern the Exercise of the Right of
Government Employees to Self-Organization, which took effect after the instant dispute arose, "[t]he
terms and conditions of employment in the government, including any political subdivision or
instrumentality thereof and government-owned and controlled corporations with original charters are
governed by law and employees therein shall not strike for the purpose of securing changes thereof."
 The strike staged by the employees of the SSS belonging to petitioner union being prohibited by law, an
injunction may be issued to restrain it.
RULING:
WHEREFORE, no reversible error having been committed by the Court of Appeals, the instant petition for review
is hereby DENIED and the decision of the appellate court dated March 9, 1988 in CA-G.R. SP No. 13192 is AFFIRMED.
Petitioners' "Petition/Application for Preliminary and Mandatory Injunction" dated December 13, 1988 is DENIED.
SO ORDERED.
Page 24 of 26
10. Tantuico, Jr. v. Domingo, 230 SCRA 391 [1994]
Court Supreme Court

Date February 28, 1994
Petitioner FRANCISCO S. TANTUICO, JR.
Respondent HON. EUFEMIO DOMINGO, in his capacity as Chairman of the Commission on Audit,
ESTELITO SALVADOR, MARGARITO SILOT, VALENTINA EUSTAQUIO, ANICIA CHICO and
GERMINIANO PASCO
Ponente QUIASON, J
Privileges 7. Other Rights – Leave of Absence, GSIS Retirement, Absences, Insurance,
Employees Compensation a) Construction of Retirement Laws
FACTS:
 This is a petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus, with prayer for temporary restraining order
or preliminary injunction, under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court.
 The petition mainly questions the withholding of one-half of petitioner's retirement benefits.
 26 January 1980: Petitioner was appointed Chairman of the Commission on Audit (COA) to serve a term of
seven years expiring on January 26, 1987. Petitioner had discharged the functions of Chairman of the COA
in an acting capacity since 1975.
 31 December 1985: Petitioner applied for clearance from all money, property and other accountabilities in
preparation for his retirement. He obtained the clearance applied for, which covered the period from 1976
to December 31, 1985. The clearance had all the required signatures and bore a certification that petitioner
was "cleared from money, property and/or other accountabilities by this Commission." (Rollo, p. 44).
 22 January 1990: Petitioner requested full payment of his retirement benefits.
 Petitioner was furnished a copy of the report of the special audit team in the letter dated December 21,
1989 of respondent Chairman on January 29, 1990, nearly a year after its completion. Attached to a copy of
the report was a letter dated November 14, 1989 from respondent Chairman, who required petitioner to
submit his comment within 30 days (Rollo, p. 153).
 Petitioner submitted a letter-comment, wherein he cited certain defects in the manner the audit was
conducted. He further claimed that the re-audit was not authorized by law since it covered closed and
settled accounts.
 Petitioner then filed the instant petition.
 17 January 1991: The Court issued a temporary restraining order.
 Petitioner’s contention: Notwithstanding the two clearances previously issued, and respondent Chairman's
certification that petitioner had been cleared of money and property accountability, respondent Chairman
still refuses to release the remaining half of his retirement benefits — a purely ministerial act.

Whether or not the withholding of one-half of petitioner’s retirement benefits NO
is valid
RATIO:
 Regardless of petitioner's monetary liability to the government that may be discovered from the audit
concerning his fiscal responsibility or accountability as former COA Chairman, respondent Chairman cannot
withhold the benefits due petitioner under the retirement laws.
 Under Section 4 of R.A. No. 1568 (An Act to Provide Life Pension to the Auditor General and the Chairman
or Any Member of the Commission on Elections), the benefits granted by said law to the Auditor General and
the Chairman and Members of the Commission on Elections shall not be subject to garnishment, levy or
execution. Likewise, under Section 33 of P.D. No. 1146, as amended (The Revised Government Service
Insurance Act of 1977), the benefits granted thereunder "shall not be subject, among others, to attachment,
garnishment, levy or other processes."
 Well-settled is the rule that retirement laws are liberally interpreted in favor of the retiree because the
Page 25 of 26
intention is to provide for the retiree's sustenance and comfort, when he is no longer capable of earning his
livelihood (Profeta vs. Drilon, 216 SCRA 777 [1992]).
 Petitioner also wants us to enjoin the re-audit of his fiscal responsibility or accountability, invoking the
following grounds:
1. The re-audit involved settled and closed accounts which under Section 52 of the Audit Code
can no longer be re-opened and reviewed.
2. The re-audit was initiated by respondent Chairman alone, and not by the Commission as a
collegial body;
3. The report of the special audit team that recommended the re-audit is faulty as the team
members themselves admitted several constraints in conducting the re-audit, e.g.
unavailability of the documents, frequent turn-over and movement of personnel, etc.;
4. The re-audit covered transactions done even after petitioner's retirement;
5. He was not given prior notice of the re-audit;
6. He was not given access to the working papers; and
7. Respondents were barred by res judicata from proceeding with the re-audit (Rollo, pp. 19-
40).
 The petition must fail insofar as it seeks to abort the completion of the re audit. While at the beginning
petitioner raised objections to the manner the audit was conducted and the authority of respondents to
re-open the same, he subsequently cooperated with the examination of his accounts and transactions as a
COA official.
 With respect to the legal objections raised by petitioner to the partial findings of the respondents with
respect to his accountability, such findings are still tentative. As petitioner has requested, he is entitled to
a reasonable time within which to submit his comment thereon.
 But in order to prepare his comment, petitioner should be given access to the working papers used by the
special audit team. The audit report covered a period of ten years (1976-1985) and involved numerous
transactions. It would be unfair to expect petitioner to comment on the COA's findings of the report
without giving him a chance to verify how those findings were arrived at.
 It has been seven years since petitioner's retirement. Since then he was only paid half of his retirement
benefits, with the other half being withheld despite the issuance of two clearances and the approval of his
retirement application. As of the filing of this petition on December 21, 1990, no criminal or
administrative charge had been filed against petitioner in connection with his position as former Acting
Chairman and Chairman of the COA.
RULING:
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED insofar as it seeks to compel respondent Chairman of the COA to pay
petitioner's retirement benefits in full and his monthly pensions beginning in March 1991.
The petition is DENIED insofar as it seeks to nullify COA Office Order No. 88-10677 and the audit report dated
February 28, 1989 but petitioner should be given full access to the working papers to enable him to prepare his
comment to any adverse findings in said report. The temporary restraining order is LIFTED.
SO ORDERED.
Page 26 of 26

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Bautista, Angelica A.

1. Samson v. Restrivera, 646 SCRA 481, [2011]

Court Supreme Court

ISSUE – HELD – RATIO:

SUBSTANTIVE ISSUE #1 HELD

SUBSTANTIVE ISSUE #2 HELD

 SEC. 4. Norms of Conduct of Public Officials and Employees.

Said provision merely enunciates "professionalism as an ideal norm of conduct to be observed by

With costs against the petitioner.

2. De Rama v. Court of Appeals, 353 SCRA 94 [2001]

Court Supreme Court

SUBSTANTIVE ISSUE HELD

Authority of the CSC to Recall Appointments

Grounds for the Recall of Appointments

Legal and Equitable Right to the Position

Court Supreme Court

ISSUE – HELD – RATIO:

SUBSTANTIVE ISSUE HELD

Private Respondent’s Appointment as Merely Temporary

Permanent Appointment and Security of Tenure

Court Supreme Court

SUBSTANTIVE ISSUE HELD

SUBSTANTIVE ISSUE HELD

Gonzales has security of tenure, but only as a primarily confidential employee

Court Supreme Court

ISSUE – HELD – RATIO:

SUBSTANTIVE ISSUE HELD

Court Supreme Court

ISSUE – HELD – RATIO:

SUBSTANTIVE ISSUE HELD

Court Supreme Court

SUBSTANTIVE ISSUE HELD

Court Supreme Court

ISSUE – HELD – RATIO:

SUBSTANTIVE ISSUE HELD

Unless otherwise allowed by law or by the primary functions of his position, no

Court Supreme Court

SUBSTANTIVE ISSUE HELD

Court Supreme Court

ISSUE – HELD – RATIO:

SUBSTANTIVE ISSUE HELD

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