SDME DS Versshort

See discussions, stats, and author profiles for this publication at: https://www.researchgate.
net/publication/365806107
Some issues on the Evaluation of the Design Safety Margin for Nuclear
Power Plants in view of the Fukushima event
Preprint · November 2022

DOI: 10.10040/RG.2.5.70059
CITATIONS
1 author:
Dan Serbanescu
Romanian Academy
149 PUBLICATIONS 309 CITATIONS
SEE PROFILE
Some of the authors of this publication are also working on these related projects:
Special topics on risk View project
CARGO - Comparison of approaches to risk governance View project
All content following this page was uploaded by Dan Serbanescu on 28 November 2022.
The user has requested enhancement of the downloaded file.

Some issues on the Evaluation of the Design
Safety Margin for Nuclear Power Plants
in view of the Fukushima event
dr.ing. Dan Serbanescu

dan.serbanescu@ec.europa.eu
DOI: 10.10040/RG.2.5.70059
Technical presentation
At the IAEA Consultant meeting on the Evaluation of the Design Safety Margins,
Vienna 3-5 August 2011
What is be the goal of DSME?
Some issues on the Evaluation of the Design Safety Margin for Nuclear Power Plants in view of the Fukushima even, dr.ing. Dan Serbanescu
Technical presentation at the IAEA Consultant meeting on the Evaluation of the Design Safety Margins, Vienna 3-5 August 2011
General Nuclear Safety Objective:
To protect individuals, society and the environment

from harm by establishing and maintaining in
nuclear installations effective defence against
radiological hazards.
• This General Nuclear Safety Objective is supported by two
complementary Safety Objectives dealing with radiation protection
and technical aspects.
• They are interdependent: the technical aspects in conjunction with

administrative and procedural measures ensure defence against
hazards due to ionizing radiation.
IAEA- SAFETY OF NUCLEAR POWER PLANTS: DESIGN SAFETY

REQUIREMENTSSAFETY STANDARDS SERIES No. NS-R-1, Vienna 2000
Radiation Protection Objective
To ensure that in all operational states radiation exposure within the

installation or due to any planned release of radioactive material from the
installation is kept below prescribed limits and as low as reasonably
achievable, and to ensure mitigation of the radiological consequences of any
accidents.
Technical Safety Objective:
To take all reasonably practicable measures to prevent accidents in

nuclear installations and to mitigate their consequences should they occur;
to ensure with a high level of confidence that, for all possible
accidents taken into account in the design of the installation,
including those of very low probability, any radiological consequences
would be minor and below prescribed limits; and to ensure that the
likelihood of accidents with serious radiological consequences is
extremely low.
IAEA- SAFETY OF NUCLEAR POWER PLANTS: DESIGN SAFETY

REQUIREMENTSSAFETY STANDARDS SERIES No. NS-R-1, Vienna 2000
MAIN CHALLENGE
Evaluate available Safety Design Margins

for
• combination of low probability of severe accidents
&
• other identified weaknesses in Fukushima case
AND / BY
Get (ting) international coordination and validation
but as part of the national licensing / relicensing process
What is the status of the rule
framework on SDME?
Example INSAG 3/12 compliant risk targets
Risk targets historical evolution – sample presentation
DEFRA Report No: DEFRA/RAS/01. 001
A representation of the evolution of the risk related targets (3)
Event frequency change by time for different reactor generations
1,0E-02
1,0E-03
Event frequency [1/year]
1,0E-04
1,0E-05
CDFdesigned
Average LRF
1,0E-06 CDF Average
LRF Average
1,0E-07
1,0E-08
Source: IAEA
Risk targets – Defense in Depth (DiD)
targets
How to combine/use them?
Defence in depth as per INSAG 3/12 (1)
A representation of the evolution of the risk related targets/tools as per
most representative IAEA reference milestones (1)
A look on the situation
from
the whole nuclear system perspective
Nuclear Power Plants production and generation evolution as per IAEA documents
Which methods
to use to prove
Safety Margin compliance?
On important issues there are
no totally new issues to
evaluate
Nuclear technology s-curve from safety Margin (SM) perspective
Safety
margin for
Safety Gen. IV NPP
margin for
Gen. III NPP
Safety
margin for
Gen. II and
II+ NPP
Risk requirements real evolution and the “cusp” evolution moments
Safety Paradigms change over time due to major accidents
Main features of the Nuclear Structure Matrix at a certain moment before a major accident
Input to Referrence Structure Matrix (STRM)- Nuclear System

I II III IV V
Structure Without Safety Issues BEFORE accident
A GENERAL SITUATION OF THE NUCLEAR ENERGY SYSTEM
1 Nonproliferation / safeguards - their priority and actuality as an issue
2 Design maturity and level of complexity of the plant design - NPP and nuclear infrastructure as complex systems
3 Research progress and support to research by nuclear system and society in general
4 Commercial targets - support for new built plants, operation of existing plants
5 Situation on fuel cycle elements
6 Situation on solving Waste management issues
7 Level of development/complexity of national/regional/international legal and regulatory framework
B NON NUCLEAR ISSUES WITH IMPACT ON NUCLEAR SYSTEM
1 Energy and environmental issues problems (climage change etc.)
2 Security of energy supply
3 General financial situation and problems with impact on nuclear system
4 Terrorist threat/security issues
TOTAL STRM
Main features of the Nuclear Structure Matrix and the safety paradigm evolution
Input to matrix evaluation for the decision process on the dominant aspects to be evaluated
SAMPLE LIST OF ISSUES TO BE EVALUATED AS PART OF CHECK LIST BY VARIOUS APPROACHES
(OPTIONS A TO E) (1)
Issues to be evaluated/Priority in various CATEGORY
Option Option Option Option
A B C E
evaluation options
1 Defense in Depth – risk balanced RIDM as method referrence IPE/IPEEE M-DID&RISK H L L H
Evaluation and /or review of the requirements for classification of systems on

2 M-SCC&IE H L M H
various IE (SCC) and on seismic/flood
M-S
3 Review if considered seismically induced fire/floods IE&INDUCED
H L H H
M-SM DBA &

4 Evaluation of safety margin for SBO in the case of DBA and BDBA BDBA
H H H H
Intrinsic safety and conservative design - Robust (redundancy, diversity, -

M-INSAF&DBA
5 portable etc) alternative sources of electricity for safety systems after BDBA
M H H H
DBA/BDBA
M-SM
6 Review SM for DBA on multiunit plants MULTIUNIT H H H H
DBA
7 Review ventilation in containments after severe accidents M-VENT SA M H M H
M- PRA L2&3
8 Use of PRA level 2 and 3 for Emergency Planning EP
M H L H
9 Hydrogen control inside containments and other buildings (spent fuel) M- HYD M H M H
M-POOL DBA
10 Spent fuel cooling for DBA & BDBA and reduction of spent fuel inventories & BDBA
M H H H
11 I&C availability for BDBA and severe accidents M-I&C BDBA M H H H
SAMPLE LIST OF ISSUES TO BE EVALUATED AS PART OF CHECK LIST BY VARIOUS APPROACHES
(OPTIONS A TO E) (2)
Issues to be evaluated/Priority in various CATEGORY

Option Option Option Option
A B C E
evaluation options
12 Human factor during a complicated SA – research / guidelines M- HRA SA M H L H
13 MCCI –research / guideline M-MCCI L H L H
PROC-EP MULT
15 EP at multiunit sites for postulated IE and SA SA
H H H H
PROC - EP SBO
16 EP for prolonged blackouts LONG
H H H H
17 EP scenarios considering real site post SA conditions PROC-EP REAL L H L H
18 Review process of regulatory oversight including relicensing MNG-REG LIC H H L H
MNG-REG
19 SA regulatory requirements – research/ guideline SA+DBA
L H L H
MNG-SMALL
20 Small utilities coping with catastrophic events UTIL EP
L H L H
MNG-SITE
21 Site accessibility after severe SA AFTER SA
L H L H
MNG-DEC
22 Decision process in catastrophic events CATSTR
L H L H
23 Coordination of international cooperation/help in catastrophic events MNG-INT EP L H L H
Debate on the use of
deterministic versus probabilistic
type of methods
OR
What is more conservative?
Conservatism-an illustration
Main Results of a safety evaluation (1)
DAMAGE
PROBABILITY
RISK
UNCERTANTY
Use of PRA for decision process

Use of PRA/PSA for decision process
EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS
Deterministic versus probabilistic in the definition of the Emergency Zoning zones and tasks (5)
SA RELEASES IN GAS REACTORS
RC0,RC1,RC2, DRC0,DRC1,DRC2
RCF0, DRCF0, DRCF1, Helium Module

SRC1 DRCF2 HVAC PZ3 Exhaust -----------Q1 & Q2 filtered Building
SDRC1 PHrb, VHrb, THrb,
Helium
Helium Room 1- Reactor RHrb stack
Citadel PHst, VHst,
Q4-
THst, RHst
release Q VCR0
from SSS
area 3
after 3
PH1, VH1, TH1, RH1 Q3-dust
VCR0 years of
Helium Room 2- PCU (resuspende VRC1
operatio Citadel d) AND (Q1

n Q1 OR Q2 OR VRC2
VRC1 S0 Q3 )release
via PRS OR DVRC0
Activi PH2, VH2, TH2, RH2 HVAC not

VRC2 Q1 -Initial Q2 filtered)
DVRC1
ty at release
Q2-initial
DVR end of AirRoom 1
release plus DVRC2
C0 Q4 plant Air stack
dust OR AirRoom 2
Room 4
life delayed Past, Vast,
DVR Pa1, Va1, Ta1, Ra1
C1 Spent/ P0, V0, release Pa2, Va2, Ta2, Ra2 Tast, Rast
used Fuel
area T0, R0
DVR Air Module Building - Parb, Varb, Tarb, Rarb
C2
Sample of severe accidents risk evaluation for a generation IV gas reactor (1)
Sample of severe accidents interdependence evaluation for a generation IV gas reactor (3)
Sample of severe accidents interdependence evaluation for a generation IV gas reactor (4)
Calculations compared to the category definitions, which consider only their frequencies
1.80E-01
Frequency
1.60E-01
Category A
1.40E-01
ECP
Transients 1.20E-01 Categ. = max 0.1 %
Category A A
1.00E-01
ECP
8.00E-02 No impact
Categ.B or C
6.00E-02
TOTAL value Category B
for RC 1
4.00E-02
3.75 e-02
TOTAL value for RC1
2.00E-02 to RCPF1
Category
6.2 e-03 BDBA
1.8 e-07 1.00E-08
TOTAL value for RCPF2
RC-1 RCF1toRCPF1 RCPF-2
1e-10
Phase 2
results Series1 Expon. (Series1)
Extrapolated curve for the Phase 2
calculations
Impact of HX leaks The IE frequency for HX failure is
on plant sequences considered unchanged
PRA results as included in SAR Chpt19
Sample of severe accidents risk optimization of the design for a generation IV gas reactor (5)
Improvements in risk oriented design – sample HX case
Difference between areas is

Area of highest impact
logarithmic – orders of magnitude
Selection of sequence in I1
which HX is to operate
Area of medium impact (lower by

several orders of magnitude than
the high area) I2
- I&C, helium detection, MTCE
and test errors undetected, water
side of the Heat Exchangers
Area of lowest impact
I3
-design solutions for the
Sample of severe accidents risk optimization of the design for a generation IV gas reactor (6)
Avoid biases
Myths on Science
Mc Comas, William, Ten Myths of science: Reexamining what we know, vol 96,
School Science & Mathematics, 01-01-1996, pp10
MyS1 Hypotheses become theories which become laws
MyS2 Hypothesis is an educated guess
MyS3 A general and universal scientific method exists
MyS4 Evidence accumulated carefully will result in sure knowledge
MyS5 Science and its methods provide absolute proof
MyS6 Science is procedural more than creative
MyS7 Science and methods can answer all questions
MyS8 Scientists are particularly objective
MyS9 Experiments are the principle route to scientific knowledge
MyS10 All work in science is reviewed to keep the process honest
Isomorphism as identified in Serbanescu- VALDOC summer school 2007
Myths on Risk
Talk at the conference Stockholm thirty years on. Progress achieved and challenges ahead in international environmental co-operation. Swedish Ministry of the Environment, June 17-18, 2000
Sven Ove Hansson, Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm
MyR1 “Risk” must have a single, well-defined meaning.
MyR2 The severity of risks should be judged according to probability weighted averages of the severity of their outcomes.
MyR3 Decisions on risk should be made by weighing total risks against total benefits.
MyR4 Decisions on risk should be taken by experts rather than by laymen.
MyR5 Risk-reducing measures in all different sectors of society should be decided according to the same standards.
MyR6 Risk assessments should be based only on well-established scientific facts.
MyR7 If there is a serious risk, then scientists will find it if they look for it.
Isomorphism as identified in Serbanescu- VALDOC summer school 2007
View publication stats Technical presentation at the IAEA Consultant meeting on the Evaluation of the Design Safety Margins, Vienna 3-5 August 2011

SDME DS Versshort

Uploaded by

Document Information

Original Description:

Original Title

Copyright

Share this document

Share or Embed Document

Sharing Options

Did you find this document useful?

Is this content inappropriate?

Copyright:

SDME DS Versshort

Uploaded by

Copyright:

See discussions, stats, and author profiles for this publication at: https://www.researchgate.

Preprint · November 2022

Special topics on risk View project

CARGO - Comparison of approaches to risk governance View project

The user has requested enhancement of the downloaded file.

dr.ing. Dan Serbanescu

To protect individuals, society and the environment

• They are interdependent: the technical aspects in conjunction with

IAEA- SAFETY OF NUCLEAR POWER PLANTS: DESIGN SAFETY

To ensure that in all operational states radiation exposure within the

Technical Safety Objective:

To take all reasonably practicable measures to prevent accidents in

IAEA- SAFETY OF NUCLEAR POWER PLANTS: DESIGN SAFETY

Evaluate available Safety Design Margins

DEFRA Report No: DEFRA/RAS/01. 001

Event frequency change by time for different reactor generations

How to combine/use them?

Input to Referrence Structure Matrix (STRM)- Nuclear System

1 Nonproliferation / safeguards - their priority and actuality as an issue

5 Situation on fuel cycle elements

6 Situation on solving Waste management issues

7 Level of development/complexity of national/regional/international legal and regulatory framework

B NON NUCLEAR ISSUES WITH IMPACT ON NUCLEAR SYSTEM

1 Energy and environmental issues problems (climage change etc.)

2 Security of energy supply

3 General financial situation and problems with impact on nuclear system

4 Terrorist threat/security issues

Evaluation and /or review of the requirements for classification of systems on

M-SM DBA &

Intrinsic safety and conservative design - Robust (redundancy, diversity, -

7 Review ventilation in containments after severe accidents M-VENT SA M H M H

11 I&C availability for BDBA and severe accidents M-I&C BDBA M H H H

Issues to be evaluated/Priority in various CATEGORY

13 MCCI –research / guideline M-MCCI L H L H

17 EP scenarios considering real site post SA conditions PROC-EP REAL L H L H

18 Review process of regulatory oversight including relicensing MNG-REG LIC H H L H

23 Coordination of international cooperation/help in catastrophic events MNG-INT EP L H L H

Use of PRA for decision process

Use of PRA/PSA for decision process

RCF0, DRCF0, DRCF1, Helium Module

operatio Citadel d) AND (Q1

Activi PH2, VH2, TH2, RH2 HVAC not

Difference between areas is

Area of medium impact (lower by

MyS1 Hypotheses become theories which become laws

MyS2 Hypothesis is an educated guess

MyS3 A general and universal scientific method exists

MyS4 Evidence accumulated carefully will result in sure knowledge

MyS5 Science and its methods provide absolute proof

MyS6 Science is procedural more than creative

MyS7 Science and methods can answer all questions

MyS8 Scientists are particularly objective

MyS9 Experiments are the principle route to scientific knowledge

MyS10 All work in science is reviewed to keep the process honest

Isomorphism as identified in Serbanescu- VALDOC summer school 2007

MyR1 “Risk” must have a single, well-defined meaning.

MyR4 Decisions on risk should be taken by experts rather than by laymen.

MyR6 Risk assessments should be based only on well-established scientific facts.

Isomorphism as identified in Serbanescu- VALDOC summer school 2007

You might also like