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Reactor dynamic simulation to analyze possible scenarios after a spurious

opening of the safety flapper valve of TRR during the normal operation
regarding the inherently safety fea...

Article in International Journal of Advanced Nuclear Reactor Design and Technology · August 2021
DOI: 10.1016/j.jandt.2021.07.005

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 International Journal of Advanced Nuclear Reactor Design and Technology 3 (2021) 119–133

Contents lists available at ScienceDirect

International Journal of Advanced Nuclear

Reactor Design and Technology
journal homepage: www.sciencedirect.com/journal/international-journal-of-advanced-
nuclear-reactor-design-and-technology

Reactor dynamic simulation to analyze possible scenarios after a spurious

opening of the safety flapper valve of TRR during the normal operation
regarding the inherently safety features and Design Extension Conditions
(DEC) by using the RELAP5 code
Afshin Hedayat *
Reactor and Nuclear Safety Research School, Nuclear Science and Technology Research Institute (NSTRI), End of North Karegar Street, P.O. Box 14395-836, Tehran,
Iran

A R T I C L E I N F O A B S T R A C T

Keywords: LOFA is one of the most important PIE in nuclear reactors. For the pool-type research reactor, the safety flapper
Safety flapper valve is usually located below the reactor core and have a very important rule on the reactor safety especially
LOFA during the loss of the pump accident. In this paper, TRR has been simulated and analyzed against the spurious
RELAP5
opening of the safety flapper valve during normal full power operation. First of all, the steady state parameters
TRR
Safety analysis
are successfully benchmarked against the operational data of TRR. Then, the reactor dynamic calculations are
DEC successfully benchmarked against a sophisticated experimental dynamic test to evaluate the reactor power
changes due to reactivity feedback. Then three different types of possible scenario including both types of DBA
and DEC are simulated and analyzed. Furthermore, inherently safety features are evaluated against temperature
rises. Results indicate that if the anticipated emergency shutdown signal is triggered successfully, the reactor core
remains safe against any physical damage. If the reactor reactivity control system is completely disabled, the
inherently safety features of the reactor decrease the reactor power effectively via negative reactivity feedback
and the reactor fuel assemblies remain safe again. But if the fault diagnosis system of the spurious opening of the
safety flapper valve fails to detect the occurrence or it does not send the emergency shutdown signal, and at the
same time, the automatic power regulation system keeps the normal operating conditions, the hot spot may reach
to the fuel melting point just a few seconds after the accident occurrence.

safety features [5–11] and the availability of the engineering safety

1. Introduction
There are two different types of pool-type research reactors with the
down-ward or up-ward core cooling systems [1–3]. Regarding the
down-ward core cooling system, there is a very important object directly
related to the reactor safety. It is usually called the safety flapper valve
and located below the reactor core. It is usually designed and installed to
feed input water supply for the upward natural core convection after the
reactor shutdown, the loss of pump accident, or any other similar
occurrence in which we lose the required downward mass flow rate such
as a Station Black Out (SBO) accident. But on the other hand, if it
spuriously opens during the normal operation, the most dangerous Loss
od Flow Accident (LOFA) scenario will be occurred for this type of
research reactors [4–6]. Then different transient scenarios may be
occurred in which the event progress is dependent on the inherently
systems.
In this way and to take into account a required safety analysis, we
need a very sophisticated guideline. Nuclear safety experts [6,10] usu­
ally recommend the using of the Best Estimate (BE) tools in addition to
nuclear safety conservative approaches [5,6,12] to trace and analyze
such accident transients [9,13,14].
The well-known thermal-hydraulic RELAP5 code [15] has been
developed for the BE transient simulation of light-water cooling systems
of nuclear reactors during postulated accidents. It is so powerful tool
that it was successfully used to run a reactor simulator [16]. Although
this code, originally have been developed and used for nuclear power
reactors especially PWRs [15–21], there are also some very good ex­
amples and experiences [6,13,14,22–26] of the applications of this code
to perform safety analysis of light water research reactors. Furthermore,
nuclear safety experts and documents have recommend using this code

* Corresponding author.
E-mail addresses: ahedayat@aeoi.org.ir, Af.Hedayat@yahoo.com.

https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jandt.2021.07.005
Received 29 July 2020; Received in revised form 7 July 2021; Accepted 27 July 2021
Available online 14 August 2021
2468-6050/© 2021 Xi’an Jiaotong University. Published by Elsevier B.V. This is an open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND license
(http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).
A. Hedayat International Journal of Advanced Nuclear Reactor Design and Technology 3 (2021) 119–133

Abbreviations k Thermal conductivity, (W/m.K)

K loss factor
B Branch L Equivalent (or characteristic) length
BDBA Beyond Design Basis Accident Nu Nusselt Number
BE Best Estimate P Reactor power {power related eq.} (MW)/Pressure
CFE Control Fuel Elemnet {energy and pressure related eq.} (Pa)
CHF Critical Heat Flux Pf Immediate fission power (MeV/s)
DBA Design Basis Accident Pr Prandtl Number
DEC Design Extension Condition q” heat flux per unit surface
DiD Defence-in-Depth Q Volumetric heat addition rate (w/m3)
DSA Deterministic Safety Analysis Qf Immediate fission energy (MeV)
FSAR Final Safety Analysis Report Ra Rayleigh Number
INRA Iran Nuclear Regulatory Authority Re Reynolds number
J Junction S source
LEU Low Enrichment Uranium t Time (s)
LWR Light Water Reactor Tspt Saturation temperature based on the total pressure (K)
LOFA Loss of Flow Accident U Specific internal energy (J/Kg)
LOCA Loss of Coolant Accident V Phasic Velocity (m/s)
MJ Multiple Junction x, y, z Spatial coordinates, hydrodynamic variable vectors (m)
MTR Material Testing Reactor X Non-condensable quality
OLC Operational Limits and Conditions
ONB Onset of Nucleate Boiling Greek Symbols
P Pipe α Void fraction
PPF Power Peaking Factor β effective delayed neutron fraction {related point kinetic
PIE Postulated Initiating Events Eq.}
PSA Probabilistic Safety Assessment Λ prompt neutron generation time {related point kinetic Eq.}
PWR Pressurized Water Reactor Γ Volumetric mass exchange rate (Kg/m3)
RIA Reactivity Induced Accident ρ Density (Kg/m3); Reactivity {related point kinetic Eq.}
SBO Station Black Out λ Friction factor
SFE Standard Fuel Element ζ Diffusion coefficient
V Valve Δ Parameter changes (ΔP pressure drop)
TDV Time Dependent Volume ∂ Partial derivative
TRR Tehran Research Reactor Σf Macroscopic fission cross section {related point kinetic
Eq.}
Equations’ Parameters ϕ Neutron Flux {related point kinetic Eq.}
A cross sectional area, constant number, the matrix of Ψ Fission Rate (/s) {related point kinetic Eq.}
hydrodynamic coefficient
b Source vector Subscripts
B constant number ave average value
Bx Body force in x coordinate direction (m/s2) f Fluid phase, Fission
C Coefficient of virtual mass F Wall friction
Ci number of neutron precursors of group I {related point g Vapor phase
kinetic Eq.} i, I Interface property, Group i {related point kinetic Eq.}
Cf constant number l Losses
D junction diameter mac Dittus-Boelter (equation)
DISS Energy dissipation function max maximum value
f Fluid velocity (with ~ subscript) mic Forster-Zuber (equation)
fi Fraction of delayed neutrons of group i turb turbulent flow
F total hot channel factor w Wall
FWF,FWG Wall drag coefficient {liquid, vapor}, (s− 1) ~ Vector
FIF, FIG Interface drag coefficient {liquid, vapor}, (s− 1) 1,2 vector indexes
g Acceleration due to gravity (m/s2)/vapor velocity (with ~ Superscripts
subscript) ‘ Derivative
h Heat transfer coefficient (W/K.M2) " Per surface area
h* Phasic enthalpy associated with bulk interface mass * Total derivative of the saturation property with respect to
transfer (J/Kg) pressure/Local variable/bulk, saturation property
h’ Phasic enthalpy associated with wall interface mass 1,2 vector indexes
transfer (J/Kg)
hl head loss

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A. Hedayat International Journal of Advanced Nuclear Reactor Design and Technology 3 (2021) 119–133

to perform deterministic safety analyses of the research reactors, too [4, 2. Brief introduction to the Tehran Research Reactor (TRR)
6,10,13,14].
Regarding a short historical review in this field of study, a simulation In this paper, the TRR is chosen as the basic model. The TRR is a 5
and analysis of the Loss of Coolant Accident (LOCA) was previously MW pool-type MTR. This reactor consists of MTR plate-type fuel plates.
performed and benchmarked against the Safety Analyses Report for Fuel meat is composed of porous-type U3O8 of 20% Low Enriched Ura­
Tehran Research Reactor (TRR) by using the RELAP5/MOD3.2 code nium (LEU) within the Aluminum cladding. The primary components
[14]. The LOCA scenario was also simulated and analyzed for another are the reactor core, engineering safety systems, two jointed pools
multi-purpose research reactor [26]. In addition, a phenomenological (Fig. 1), one hold up tank, pumps, the primary heat exchanger and
investigation of LOFA [23] and LOCA analyses [22] of the Greek secondary cooling tower, the primary and secondary piping (Fig. 2 and
Research Reactor (GRR-1, i.e. a similar 5 MW pool-type research reactor Fig. 3), check valves, gate valves and butterfly valves. Table 1 presents
to TRR) were successfully carried out. Recently, a simulation and tran­ the main specifications of the TRR [4], and Fig. 1 shows the vertical 3D
sient analysis of TRR has been successfully carryout against a complete view of the reactor core and pools. Fig. 2 shows the general 3-D overview
Station Black-Out (SBO) and long-term natural convection mode as well of the primary cooling system. Fig. 3 presents a general symbolic plan of
as the LOFA analyses due to loss of pump accident [4,25] even if the all of the TRR cooling and auxiliary systems.
safety flapper valve get stuck at the closed position (i.e. instead of its During normal operating mode, the reactor core is cooled by a
functionality to be open during this event). downward light water cooling system circulated by a primary pump
Moreover, an international benchmark study against measured data
confirmed that the results of the RELAP code could be accurate and
realistic but also results are very sensitive to the input nodalization and
modeling [24,27].
In this paper all possible situations of spurious opening of the safety
flapper valve have been simulated and analyzed carefully for this type of
Material Testing Reactors (MTRs). First of all, it is benchmarked against
operational data of TRR. Moreover, a coupling of the neutron kinetic and
thermal-hydraulic is performed to investigate about the inherently
safety features.
Finally, different possible scenarios are considered and analyzed
carefully. Results are very tremendous and important to protect the
safety of TRR and every other similar MTR worldwide. In other words,
results concern about the necessity of a prominent and continuous
monitoring of the reactor power fluctuations and sudden temperature
changes by the reactor operators. Furthermore, it is recommend that this
type of research reactors should be equipped with an additional diverse
fault diagnosis system (i.e. to detect any mal-function of the safety
flapper valve) or at least a smart agent [28] to detect and alarm against
abnormal conditions or even unknown power transients or sudden
temperature changes during the normal operation. Fig. 2. Primary cooling system of the TRR.

Fig. 1. Vertical sectional view of the reactor pool.

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A. Hedayat International Journal of Advanced Nuclear Reactor Design and Technology 3 (2021) 119–133

Fig. 3. Schematic diagram of the TRR cooling systems.

from (delayed) hold up tank to the reactor pool (Fig. 2 and 3). The
secondary pump circulates the secondary water cooling throughout the
(shell-tube type) heat exchanger and cooling towers. Finally, the outside
air removes the residual decay heat.
During the normal operation, the safety flapper valve (Fig. 4) should
be closed to maintain the downward core flow passages. But during the
shutdown stage or the natural convection mode, the reactor core is
cooled by upward natural convection flow throughout a safety flapper
valve, lower plenum, fuel channels, and reactor pool. Fig. 4 shows the
lower plenum and the safety flapper valve located below the core grid
plate. In order to establish upward free convection, this valve is set to
open when the cooling flow rate falls below the 30% of the flow rate at
the full power operating mode (of 0.1389 m3 s− 1). The following
reference [24] presents more details about the short-term and long-term
natural convection phenomenon in TRR.
accidents such as LOCA, Reactivity Induced Accidents (RIA), and LOFA.
It [15] solves the continuity equations of mass, momentum, and
energy assuming two phase flow, non-equilibrium, and
non-homogeneous conditions. The implemented hydrodynamic model is
one-dimensional, transient following, a mixture of two fluids composed
of vapor and liquid phases, capable of different vapor and liquid ve­
locities, and non-condensable fluid. This is especially suitable to model
and trace hard two-phase transients.
Regarding following conservation equations, the primary dependent
variables are pressure (P), phasic specific internal energies (Ug, Uf),
vapor volume fraction (void fraction) (αg), phasic velocities (Vg, Vf),
non-condensable quality (Xn). The independent variables are time (t)
and distance (x). The relevant equations for the vapor (g) and liquid (f)
phases are as following:
A- Mass Continuity Equations:

∂ ( ) 1 ∂ ( )
3. The RELAP5 modeling For ​ the ​ vapor: ​ αρ + αg ρg Vg A = Γg (1)
∂t g g A ∂x
3.1. The RELAP5 code ∂ ( ) 1 ∂ ( )
And ​ for ​ the ​ liquid ​ phase: ​ α f ρf + αf ρf Vf A = Γ f (2)
∂t A ∂x
The RELAP code [15] has been developed for the best-estimate
transient simulation of Light Water Reactors (LWRs) during postulated where the (Γ ig ) is the mass transferred between the liquid and vapor
accidents. The code can model the coupled behavior of the reactor (gas) in the fluid bulk and the (Γw)is the mass transferred between the
cooling system and the core for operational transients such as antici­ liquid and the gas in the boundary layer of walls, and the total mass
pated transient without scram, loss of offsite electrical power, loss of transferred is defined as:
feed-water, and loss of turbines as well as much more well-known

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A. Hedayat International Journal of Advanced Nuclear Reactor Design and Technology 3 (2021) 119–133

Table 1 ∂V ∂Vf2
And for the liquid phase:αf ρf A ∂tf + 12αf ρf A ∂x = − αf A ∂∂Px + αf ρf Bx A −
Specifications and main operating conditions of the equilibrium core of TRR.
(αf ζf A)FWF(Vf )
Core material
( ) ( ) ( )
Nuclear fuel MTR (LEU) − Γ g A VfI − Vf − αf ρf A FIF Vf − Vg
Fuel element Plate-type clad in Al [ ( ) ]
( ) ∂ Vf − Vg ∂Vf ∂Vg
Fuel meat 235
U (12.44%),238U(49.78%), O(11.17%), − α f α g ρm A + Vg − Vf (5)
Al (26.50%)
∂t ∂x ∂x
Coolant and moderator Light water
C- The Energy Conservation:
Reflector Graphite/Light water
Thermo-hydraulics For the vapor phase:
Nuclear thermal power (W) 5
Pool water volume (m3) 477.8
∂( ) 1 ∂( ) P∂αg P ∂ ( )
αρU + α g ρ g U g Vg A = − − αg Vg A + Qwg + Qig
Hold up tank water volume (m3) 37.417 ∂t g g g A ∂x ∂t A ∂x
Pump head (m) 30.48 + Γig h*g + Γ w h′g + DISSg
Fuel thermal conductivity (W/m. K) 10.0
(6)
Cladding thermal conductivity (W/m. 167.0
K) P∂αf
And for the liquid phase: ∂t (αf ρf Uf ) + A ∂x (αf ρf Uf Vf A)
∂ 1 ∂
= − ∂t −
Total power peaking factor (for codes) 3.0
Inlet coolant temperature (0 C) 37.8
P ∂
A ∂x
( f Vf A)
α
Primary cooling loop mass flow rate 0.1389
(m3.s− 1) +QWF + Qif − Γig h*f − Γw h′f + DISSf (7)
Secondary cooling loop mass flow rate 0.145
(m3.s− 1) where in the two-phase energy equations, Qwg and Qwf are the two-phase
Total heat transfer surfaces for SFE 14022.0
wall heat transfer rates per unit volume and Qis the total heat transfer
(cm2)
Total heat transfer surfaces for CFE 10332.0 rate as:
(cm2)
Fuel element dimensions
Q = Qwg + Wwf (8)
Length (cm) 8.1
In order to influence the non-condensable part additional terms are
Width (cm) 7.071
Height (cm) 70.5 included to the mass and quality of the vapor phase. Then, a more
Number of plates in SFEs 19 convenient set of differential equations upon which to base the nu­
Number of plates in CFEs 14 merical scheme is obtained from the basic density and energy differen­
Plate meat (mm) 0.7 tial equations by expanding the time derivative in each equation. The
Width (cm) 6.0
Height (cm) 61.5
mass and momentum equations are used as sum and difference equa­
Water channel between plates (mm) 2.7 tions in the numerical scheme. Discussing all about such a huge and
Plate clad thickness (mm) 0.4 powerful numerical solver is out of the scope of this paper. For more
Passing cooling water cross section 33.92 details about this field of study please read [15].
(cm2) at SFE
In this research, all of required initial and boundary conditions and
Passing cooling water cross section 25.81
(cm2) at CFE also main characteristics of piping and other components (e.g. valves)
are chosen from the operating parameters, drawing sheets, Final Safety
Analysis Report (FSAR) for TRR [4,29–31], and reference engineering
books [32,33] respectively as much as possible. A complete set of ma­
terial roughness and all of pressure losses are introduced to the code
input in detail for all of chosen components even valves and piping
system. In other words, all main components are introduced to the code
input in detail. In addition, the viscous dissipation in the thin boundary
layer is involved in calculations via the best available experimental
correlations of the RELAP5 code to calculate the heat transfer coefficient
and heat fluxes over fuel elements. Then it can enhance the calculations
to be more realistic in which even thin boundary layers over influential
heat structures (i.e. omitted in a one-dimensional thermal-hydraulic)
affect the heat transfer phenomena by using the most relevant experi­
mental correlations to estimate heat transfer coefficient.
It seems that the numerical solver is completely compatible with the
chosen problem. Furthermore, the primary cooling system is completely
introduced in the code input in detail. Therefore, it is expected that it
Fig. 4. Lower plenum and safety flapper valve. can conduct the parameters and transient patterns truly according to the
physics of the problem. Anyway, we verified our model and bench­
Γ g = Γ ig + Γ w (3) marked our results against usual operational data (i.e. regarding steady
state) and a dynamic test (i.e. regarding a transient) as much as possible.
3.2. B- momentum conservation
3.3. Reactor nodalization
∂V ∂V 2
For the vapor phase: αg ρg A ∂tg + 12αg ρg A ∂xg = − αg A ∂∂xp + αg ρg Bx A −
(αg ρg A)FWG(Vg ) Fig. 5 presents the planned nodalization for the simulation of the
( ) ( ) ( ) cooling system of TRR (Figs. 1–4) with the RELAP5 code. It includes all
+Γ g A VgI − Vg − αg ρg A FIG Vg − Vf of the basic objects required for a complete simulation. Specifications of
( )
( )
[
∂ Vg − Vf ∂Vg ∂Vf
] the nodalization are introduced according to the actual data of TRR in
− αg αf ρm A + Vf − Vg (4) detail for all main components of the primary cooling system. The sec­
∂t ∂x ∂x
ondary cooling system is modeled as a boundary condition by using time

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A. Hedayat International Journal of Advanced Nuclear Reactor Design and Technology 3 (2021) 119–133

Fig. 5. RELAP nodalization for TRR.

dependent volumes and junctions. separated by an Aluminum gate plate. In this nodalization, the pool is
Table 2 presents the main components of the introduced nodalization divided into six parts which are modeled by P130, B200, P285 (1, 2, 3),
for TRR. The reactor pool of TRR consists of two parts that can be p290 and three major channels for the core. The hot, average and bypass
channels (irradiating channels or empty boxes) are modeled by P201,
P202 and P203, respectively. These channels are connected to B200 and
Table 2
B205 at the top and bottom of volumes respectively. B205 is the lower
Main nodalilization components and their relative reference code for the RELAP
code. plenum located at the bottom of the core. This volume is connected to
the pool exit coolant pipe (P210) during normal operating state and
Component Reference code
connected to the water surrounding the core at pool section (II), P290,
Average channel P201 by the safety flapper valve (V206) during free convection mode or after
Hot channel P202
the reactor shutdown. P290 is also connected to the volume 1 of P285
Bypass channel P203
Main coolant pump Pump 240 and B200. Hence, the operation of pointed systems based on the cross
Natural convection valve V206 and direct flow (through these volumes) can be similar to a realistic
Heat exchanger P251–P260, (P,B)405–455 circulation in the reactor pool and core. TDV110 simulates the air
Holdup tank P220,TDV226 enclosed in reactor containment at the top of the pool. The collection of
Reactor pool P130,B200,P285,P290,
Pool atmosphere simulator TDV110
TDV100, V105 and their trip systems can model the operation of the
Makeup system TDV100,V105 makeup system.

124
A. Hedayat
The primary piping circuit between the pool and butterfly valve is
modeled by P210 and V212. Remaining path up to holdup tank is
introduced via P215 and P218 where a pit valve (V217) is located be­
tween them. This position (V217) is also used to measure the outlet
coolant flow rate. The water-filled volume of holdup tank during normal
operational state is presented by five volumes within P220 and the un­
filled upper part is modeled via TDV226 which is a Time Dependent
Volume (TDV). Whenever the reactor is shutdown, after the pump coast
down, it is filled up by the gravity driven force due to the elevation
change of the water level between the reactor pool and hold up tank. The
next important component after the holdup tank is the main pump
(Pump240) of the primary circuit which is connected to the holdup tank
with P236. P240, V242, P244, J245, P246, V242, and P249 that are a
collection of pipes, elbows, junctions, check and gate valves connect the
pump outlet flow to the inlet shell part of the heat exchanger.
The last main thermal-hydraulic component of the primary cooling
system is the heat exchanger. In order to simulate this part, each section
is chosen as a separate component connected to others with conjunc­
tions and branches such as MJ250 in the shell parts and B415, B425,
B435, and B445 in the tube parts of the heat exchanger. The heat
transfer phenomenon is modeled between heat structure components
associated and jointed with each other via boundary conditions.
Boundaries where the heat can transfer between them are specified by
dashed lines along one side of those objects. Shell parts of the heat
exchanger (which connect to the primary cooling system) are modeled
by P251, P255 and P260. Remaining parts (tube parts) of the heat
exchanger are connected to the secondary cooling system. Inlet and
outlet flow of tube parts of the secondary cooling system are simulated
by the TDV400 and TDV460 respectively. They are modeled as Time
Dependent Volumes (TDV). Horizontal tubes of the heat exchanger are
classified into four separate parts. These tubes are modeled by P410,
P420, P440, and P450. They are connected to each other with internal
branches (located inside each shell) and with P430 between the two
primary shells, respectively.
The remaining parts of the piping system and valves from the heat
exchanger outlet to the reactor pool inlet are P262, a gate valve (V263),
P265, a butterfly valve (V270), and finally P285. Usually, each pipe
contains a number of volumes that have some special geometrical
characteristics such as internal junction flow area, horizontal angle,
vertical angle and elevation change from the reference point. Hence,
each pipe such as P210 can have some elbows, straight pipes or abrupt
area changes. They are completely modeled and included for simulation
according to the FSAR for TRR and TRR drawing sheets [4,29–31,34,35]
and engineering reference books [32,33] in detail as much as possible.
3.4. Form loss calculations
The wall friction is determined based on the volume flow regime map
using Darcy - Weisbach friction factors. Terms of the wall friction force
include only wall shear effects [15]. There are two different types of
abrupt area changes including expansion and contraction. For flow
expansion, the head loss factor is obtained by Borda – Carnot formula­
tion [36] as follows:
( )2
A2
hL = 1 2 1 −
/
V22 (9)
A1
Hence, the friction factor is:
( )2
K= 1−
A2
(10)
A1
Then, the pressure drop is:
ΔPL = ρhL (11)
Similarly, in case of the flow contraction, these factors can be taken
into account by mentioned correlations if only A2 is replaced with Ac
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International Journal of Advanced Nuclear Reactor Design and Technology 3 (2021) 119–133
(minimum cross section of passing flow).
In this paper, all pressure drops are included in the simulation as a
function of Reynolds number as much as possible in detail. Remaining
form losses created by valves, junctions and branches (which are
dependent on experimental values) are obtained from a practical
reference book to thermal-hydraulic [33]. In RELAP5 code, user speci­
fied form losses can be given in the following form:
kf = Af + Bf R−e Cf (12)
In this simulation, the Darcy–Weisbach friction factor based on
Reynolds number from the Moody chart is calculated by the following
correlation:
/
0.221
fturb = 0 0032 + 0/237 (13)
Re
Then, the form loss factors can be calculated by this correlation:
L
k=f × (14)
D
where F, L and D are Darcy factor, equivalent length and hydraulic
diameter, respectively.
In this research, form losses of all components of the primary cooling
system (Figs. 1–5) are introduced to the code input in detail. Then the
code input includes characteristics of piping (from corresponding
drawing sheets), core structure (fuel assemblies and irradiating chan­
nels), the reactor pool sections, the reactor pool inputs and outputs, hold
up tank, safety flapper valve, grid plate, butterfly and gate valves, el­
bows, and heat exchangers [4,29–34].
3.5. Modeling heat structures
In this paper, in order to model the thermal power of the reactor, two
different types of channels (including average and hot channels) are
considered. This is usually called using Best Estimate (BE) tools with
conservative approach. The average channel is responsible for the gen­
eral and almost all of the thermal power production of the reactor core
while the hot channel is responsible for providing sufficient safety
margins to conservative safety analyses. In addition, irradiating chan­
nels and empty boxes are modeled as the bypass channel to introduce the
bypass cooling flow from the fuel assemblies.
A cosine function is considered for both radial and axial heat gen­
erations in fuel plates. Hence, the power generation in the fuel plates of
the average channel can be approximated as follows:
(πx) (πz)
P(x,z)average− channel = P × faverage− channels × cos × cos (15)
a L
where a is the width of the fuel plates, and L is the active height of the
fuel plates, and f average-channels is the fraction of heat structures in the
reactor core corresponding of the average channel. In this study, all fuel
assemblies except that one chosen as the hot channel are selected as the
average channel.
It should be noted that, the RELAP5 code automatically normalizes
the radial shape factor; then it is necessary to introduce the (π/2) factor,
only for axial normalization of the introduced cosine shape factor
throughout axial nodes.
The hot channel is considered because of its importance for a con­
servative safety analysis. The maximum heat flux at hot channel is
calculated as follows [37,38]:
q′′max = q′′ave × F (16)
where q"max, q"ave and F are maximum heat flux in hot channel (the
hottest assembly), average heat flux in average channel and overall hot
spot factor, respectively. Now, because of the proportionality between
heat flux and thermal power, similar correlation is obtained as
A. Hedayat
following:
(Pmax )hot− channel = (Pave )one− averaged− channel ×F
It is noted that the overall hot spot factor or total hot channel factor
for safety analyses done by thermal hydraulic codes should be consid­
ered 3 [4,31] according to the established Operating Limits and Con­
ditions (OLC) of TRR. This value is higher than the real value over all
operating core configurations. It includes radial power distribution over
different fuel assemblies, axial power distribution, perturbing effects
due to control rod positioning, engineering factors and calculating errors
[39–43].
Similar to the previous discussion a cosine distribution for both
radial and axial heat flux in fuel plates is chosen for the hot channel.
Hence, the power distribution in the hot channel can be approximated as
following equation where a total power peaking factor of 3 is chosen for
overall hot spot contribution, conservatively:
(πx) (π z)
P(x,z)hot− channel = 3 × P × fone− averaged− channel × cos × cos
a L
After that we need to influence experimental effects of thin boundary
layers over heat structures to model a natural and realistic heat transfer
phenomenon. Then the best way is to use the most compatible experi­
mental correlation to calculate Nu number and heat transfer coefficient
(h). Following equations proposed for vertical rods or single wall (or
even for infinite parallel plates) by developers [15] as following:
hDH
Nu =
K
where Nu (Nusselt Number) can be used to predict the heat transfer rate.
For turbulent force convection, following Dittus-Boelter correlation [44]
is chosen and used:
Nu = C Re0.8 Pr0.3
And also, following Churchill and Chu correlation [45] is chosen and
used to estimate Nu number and heat transfer coefficient during the
natural convection mode as follows:
1 suppression factor, S, for the boiling part, where hmac is the
NuL = 0.825 + [
0.387(RaL )6
( )169 ]278
1 + 0.492
Pr
where parameters are completely introduced in the nomenclature table
and following numbers:
RaL = Rayleigh Number = GrL × Pr
μ × Cp
Pr = Prandtl Number =
K ΔP ​ = ​ Pressure ​ based ​ on ​ wall ​ temperature ​ minus ​ total ​ pressure
ρ2 g β (TW − Tb )L3
GrL = Grashof Number =
μ2
It should be noted that: “The Churchill-Chu correlation (Eq. (21)) is
reported to be valid over the full laminar and turbulent Rayleigh number
range [15].
Similarly, hydraulic parts of the heat exchanger (shell-tubes type)
modeled in detail from its drawing sheet [35]. Each separate part is
taken as a specific heat structure with its boundary conditions jointing
them to the secondary cooling system. Secondary cooling system is
modeled using TDV and junctions, successfully. The type of the bundle
with in-line rods or tubes (i.e. for both cross and parallel flow) is chosen
as the heat structure geometry of the heat exchanger to contribute
related experimental correlations (i.e. especially to estimate the heat
transfer coefficient). It should be noted that, this type is proposed to
model horizontal shell-tubes heat exchangers by developers [15].
International Journal of Advanced Nuclear Reactor Design and Technology 3 (2021) 119–133
3.6. Additional experimental correlations to simulate two phase flow
regimes
(17)
There are different types of two-phase flow regimes and experi­
mental correlations within the RELAP5 code. Correlations include
models to define and detect flow regimes. They also include flow regime
dependence models for inter-phase drag and shear forces, the coefficient
of virtual mass, wall friction, wall heat transfer, and inter-phase heat and
mass transfer. Furthermore, heat transfer regimes are defined and used
to select and influence relevant correlations of wall heat transfer. Dis­
cussing about all required models in this paper is quietly impossible and
out of the scope of this paper. Then for more detail please kindly study
[15]. In this part of research, we briefly review the most important
concepts that should be considered to model hydrodynamics of a
two-phase flow over fuels.
For a vertical flow, two-phase regime map includes: bubbly (sub-
cooled boiling), slug, annular-mist, dispersed (droplet or mist) flows in
(18) post-dryout, and vertically stratified for sufficiently low-mixture veloc­
ities. They will be used for the prediction of the flow state during a two
phase flow state. Fig. 6 depicts different two phase flow regime via both
dry out phenomenon for a low mass flow rate but high quality flow
regime and Departure from Nucleate Boiling (DNB) for a high mass flow
rate but low quality flow regime.
Depending on the wall heat transfer mode, different correlations are
taken into account wall convection heat transfer phenomenon. In chosen
thermal-hydraulic geometry, a single-phase fluid or even a fluid that
(19) contributes to a minor sub-cooled wall (with voidg < 0.1) use similar
correlations (Eq. (19)–24) to calculate and interpret the heat transfer
coefficient, but flow regimes of the sub-cooled boiling, saturated boiling,
and transition on boiling use the Chen correlation [46]. He proposed
that the boiling heat transfer contains a macroscopic and a microscopic
term as follows:
(20)
( ) ( )
q˝ = hmac Tw − Tspt F + hmic Tw − Tspt S (25)
Chen [46] chose Dittus-Boelter times a Reynolds number factor, F,
for the convection part and Forster-Zuber [47] pool boiling times a
(21) Dittus-Boelter equation (Eq. 20), and hmic is the Forster-Zuber equation
as follows:
[ ]
kf0.79 Cpf0.45 ρ0.49 g0.25
(26)
f f
hmic = 0.00122 0.5 0.29 0.24 0.24 ΔTw0.24 ΔP0.75
σ μf hfg ρg
where the subscript f means liquid, and the subscript g means gas, and
(22)
ΔTw ​ = ​ Tw ​ minus ​ Tspt ​ ( ​ based ​ on ​ the ​ total ​ pressure) (27)
(23)
(28)
(24) Finally the Bromley [48] equation (Eq. (29)) is used for the film
boiling within this chosen geometry. Perhaps, this film boiling state
occurs in inverted annular, slug, or dispersed flow regime maps.
[ ( ) ′ ]0.25
gρg kg2 g ρf − ρg hfg Cpg
h=c ( ) (29)
L Tw − Tspt Prg
where hfg is a correction to heat of vaporization in which hfg includes the
′
energy absorbed by the vapor surrounding the tube. Bromley [48] took
this additional energy to be described by the arithmetic average tem­
perature of the vapor film; also L is the tube diameter and the C value is
determined from the fitting data, then:
Tw + Tspt
Tfilm = (30)
2
( )
(31)
′
hfg = hfg + 0.5Cpg Tw − Tspt
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A. Hedayat International Journal of Advanced Nuclear Reactor Design and Technology 3 (2021) 119–133

Fig. 6. Different two phase flow regimes via both dry out phenomenon for a low mass flow rate but high quality flow regime (i.e. the left side) and Departure from
Nucleate Boiling (DNB) for a high mass flow rate but low quality flow regime (i.e. the right side).

For the chosen geometry (vertical plate or rod) the Critical Heat Flux American National Standard for Decay Heat Power in Light Water Re­
(CHF) is estimated by using a look up table. The RELAP\MOD3.2 uses actors, ANSI/ANS-5.1-1979) is taken into account.
the 1986 AECL-UO Critical Heat Flux Lookup Table [49] method. Then it But in order to simulate reactor dynamic due to any functional
is not compatible for conventional MTR like TRR. reactivity changes, control rod effects, prompt neutrons and especially
neutron generation time, delayed neutrons of precursors, and different
types of the reactivity feedback, the RELAP 5 code uses prominent point-
3.7. Reactor dynamic via the coupling of the thermal-hydraulic and kinetic equations to contribute reactor reactivity changes to the power
neutronic point kinetic estimation as follows:
∑Nd
The next and perhaps the most important thing to do is a realistic dϕ(t)
=
[ρ(t) − β]ϕ(t)
+ λi Ci + S (32)
collaboration between the reactor neutronic and thermal-hydraulic dt Λ i=1
usually called the reactor dynamic [37,50]. For those reactor power
estimations belong to the decay heat (i.e. after emergency reactor dCi (t)
=
βfi
ϕ(t) − λi Ci i =1,2, …, Nd (33)
shutdown), the built in library of RELAP code [15] by means of the dt Λ
American Nuclear Society Proposed Standard ANS 5.1 (i.e. Decay En­
Ψ (t) = Σ f ϕ(t) (34)
ergy Release Rates Following Shutdown of Uranium-Fueled Thermal
Reactors) firstly published in 1971 and revised in 1979 (i.e. the

127
A. Hedayat
Pf (t) = Qf Ψ (t)
where t, ϕ, Ci, β, Λ, ρ, fi, Xi, S, Ψ , Σ f, Pf, Qf are: time; neutron flux; number
of neutron precursors of group i; effective delayed neutron fraction;
prompt neutron generation time; reactivity; fraction of delayed neutrons
of group i; source; fission rate (/s); macroscopic fission cross section;
immediate fission power (MeV/s); immediate fission energy (MeV),
respectively.
The first scenario (please see subsection 2-10) is considered to
analyze a simple Postulated Initiating Events (PIE) regarding DBA
category. The second and third transient scenarios (please see sub sec­
tion 2-10) are considered to investigate about inherently safety feature
of the reactor. Moreover, the third scenario are considered to analyze a
Design Extension Condition (DEC). Then in this research, our first sce­
nario used the built in library to estimate decay heat of the produced
radioisotopes while the second and third scenarios used the reactor
dynamic modeling. It is also worth mentioning that for the third scenario
a virtual control system by using the RELAP code is simulated to keep
the power constant something like the auto-regulation power system of
TRR.
It is also worth mentioning that inherently safety features are the
main and one of the most important safety characteristics of the reactor
goes back to the optimized design of the TRR fuel assemblies with
respect to a near touch under moderator design point [42]. Then we
have negative reactivity feedback. The negative reactivity feedback
should gain the total negative reactivity feedback via effecting the fuel
temperature coefficient (Doppler Effect), coolant temperature and
density coefficient [4,31,35,42].
These parameters and the other kinetic parameters (i.e. the effective
delayed neutron fraction and neutron generation time) should be
calculated independently by using the deterministic diffusion codes [41,
42] or Monte Carlo codes mainly MCNP [4,41,51]. For the chosen
operating core, the mentioned reactivity coefficients and also other ki­
netic parameters have been calculated accurately by using the MCNP
code and registered at the Safety Analysis Report of the TRR [4]. Table 3
shows the chosen kinetic parameters and reactivity coefficients. The
separable model of the RELAP code [15] is chosen to introduce reac­
tivity feedback coefficients. Furthermore, material volumes (in the
average, hot, and irradiating channels), the general cosine shape of the
power, and PPFs [13] are introduced to the code input to effect the
related weights for the point kinetic calculation [15]. This consideration
turn a fully point kinetic model to a semi-3D dynamic model in which
meshes are taken into account by means of relevant weights in a cosine
shape. A full 3D dynamic simulation needs the RELAP 3D version
coupled with the PARCS code.
4. Methodology of the safety analyses
4.1. Chosen Operational Limits and Conditions (OLCs)
To protect a nuclear reactor against any harmful situation or radia­
tion protection hazard, a complete set of Operational Limits and Con­
ditions [8,9] should be established and taken into account,
conservatively.
Safety margins are usually important for the normal operation with
Table 3
Main kinetic parameters.
Parameter Value
Effective Delayed Neutron Fraction (βeff) 753 pcm
Neutron Generation Time (Λ) 55.1 μs
Fuel Temperature Coefficient (Doppler Effect) ¡2.3 (pcm/K)
Coolant Temperature Coefficient (Only Temperature) ¡1.93 (pcm/K)
Coolant Density Coefficient (Only Density) ¡8.08 (pcm/K)
Void Coefficient ¡314 (pcm/% Void)
International Journal of Advanced Nuclear Reactor Design and Technology 3 (2021) 119–133
(35) respect to the anticipated transients, malfunctions of engineering safety
systems, uncertainties of calculations, measuring tolerances and errors,
and also human factors. For the TRR, the first non-dominated safety
limit is the 105 ◦ C (378 K) for long-term normal operation. This tem­
perature is even below the Onset of Nucleate Boiling (ONB) point of
about 115 ◦ C (388 k) at the center of fuel assemblies and should be
established to protect the fuel cladding from a long-term corrosion [4].
But during Design Basis Accident (DBAs), a PIE starts and the acci­
dent progress should be stopped or at least dampen down. In this situ­
ation, all of the physical Defence-in-Depth (DiD) barriers [5,6,9] shall be
kept physically intact to protect against any radioactive release. It means
that we have to protect the fuel assemblies against any physical damage.
Primitive safety studies and reports [31] usually had considered and
recommend the melting point of the fuel cladding as the required safety
limit that should be established during a DBA. But further studies [4,6,9,
10,13] indicated and concerned that there might be other safety
checkpoints such as blistering or swelling limits that might change the
progress of an accident before an anticipated meltdown. In this case
study, the temperatures of the blistering and melting points of the Al
cladding are chosen 400 ◦ C (673 K) and 660 ◦ C (933 K), respectively [4,
6,13].
4.2. Reactor dynamic test
First of all, we need to evaluate our calculations; for this purpose, we
benchmarked our calculations against experimental steady state reactor
parameters registered at the SAR for TRR [4]; finally we benchmarked
our dynamic calculations against a permissible experimental test by the
reactor safety committee. It is worth mentioning that any extra experi­
mental conditions including those experiments that should bypass the
any safety channel during a PIE of the category DBAs is forbidden ac­
cording to the TRR safety committee and Iran Nuclear Regulatory Au­
thority (INRA).
In this experiment the reactor were operating at the total reactor
power of 4.5 MWth and the total mass flow rate of 2060 GPM (130.12
kg/s). Then the reactor operators change the butterfly valve position to
get the core outlet flow rate of 2800 GPM (176.87 kg/s) during 10 Sec.
After that, the core flow rate increases and the core temperature de­
creases. This occurrence induce a positive reactivity feedback and in­
crease the reactor power. Finally the reactor takes an emergency scram
by the limit of 5.5 MW. The linear power channel taken into account the
reactor power versus the core flow rate. This is the best way to bench­
mark dynamic core calculations without any in-core instrumental fuel
assembly.
It is also worth mentioning that any further investigation needs high-
tech accurate instrumental tools [10,21,27,52]. Anyway, high reliability
of the performed safety analyses can be kept by choosing conservative
approaches.
4.3. Accident scenarios
In this paper, we have presented and discussed about all possible
accident progressions based on the inherently safety features and safety
systems after a spurious opening of the safety flapper valve (i.e. as the
chosen PIE). The possible progressive events also include DEC and
selected as follows:
• Case A: A spurious opening of the safety flapper valve whenever it is
followed by a successful emergency shutdown (i.e. as a DBA);
• Case B: A spurious opening of the safety flapper valve whenever the
reactivity control system is completely unavailable or disabled (i.e. as a
DEC);
• Case C: A spurious opening of the safety flapper valve whenever the
automatic regulating power system is properly working but the mal-
function of the safety flapper is not detected (i.e. as a DEC).
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A. Hedayat International Journal of Advanced Nuclear Reactor Design and Technology 3 (2021) 119–133

5. Results and discussion

5.1. Steady state results and benchmarking process against normal

operating conditions of the basic reference core

Table 4 presents a comparison between registered operational results

of the basic reference core of the TRR [4,31] and simulation results. It
indicates a very good agreement between operating parameters and
simulation results.

5.2. Experimental evaluation of the reactor core dynamic calculations via

a permissible reactor power changes due to the changes of the core flow
rate

As it noted, the initial conditions are the steady state reactor oper­
ation at 5 MWth and core outlet flow rate of 130 (kg/s). The scenario
Fig. 7. Reactivity feedbacks (Experiment).
stated to happen when the reactor supervisor turned off the automated
reactor power regulation and the relevant reactor operator changed the
reactor butterfly valve (i.e. Figs. 1–3 and V212 of Fig. 5) to change the
core outlet flow rate to 177 (kg/s) within about 10 s. This is simulated by
using the RELAP code.
Fig. 7 shows the reactivity feedback. It includes the total reactivity
effect, moderator effect (i.e. including both the coolant density and
temperature effects), and fuel temperature (i.e. fuel Doppler effect). As
we expected, the prompt effect of Doppler broadening of the neutron
absorption over the fuel region dominated the coolant effect. Anyway,
we have a positive reactivity because of the temperature decreases.
Fig. 8 presents the reactor power changes. As we expected, the power
started increasing until the reactor taken emergency scram at 5.5 MWth.
It is worth mentioning that this experiment completely pass the exper­
imental safety conditions where we do not have any instrumental fuel
assembly; any temperature rises or thermal shock to fuel elements; all of
emergency safety channel are active and enabled; and the reactor power
rises would be stopped by the emergency signal at the power of 5.5
MWth. Furthermore, results are quietly promising for evaluating the Fig. 8. Total reactor power (Experiment).
reactor dynamic calculations (i.e. particularly with respect to the ex­
pected tolerances of a more than 50 years-old linear power channel).
1000 s.

5.3. LOFA simulation and analysis 5.3.1. Case A

In this case study, reactor normally takes a scram by about 1 Sec.
Following calculations are performed for the current operating core after the spurious opening of the safety flapper valve, with respect to the
of the TRR. The first 1000 s of results review and recheck safety pa­ required establishments of DBAs of TRR. Fig. 9 shows the decay heat
rameters of the current operating core against the basic reference core, profile after the reactor shutdown. As it noted previously, the decay heat
successfully [4,13]. Then, the chosen PIE starts suddenly at the time of is calculated by using the RELAP5 code based on the ANS-79 standard (i.
e. ANSI/ANS-5.1-1979). Moreover, a continuous operation of about 70
Table 4 days at full-power operation is considered to influence the initial burn-
A comparison between the results of simulation and the experimental data of the up and build-up inventory. It is completely conservative and fulfill the
equilibrium core of the TRR.
Thermo-hydraulic variables Results SAR for
TRR

Hot channel outlet coolant temperature 58 C __

◦

Heat exchanger inlet primary coolant 45.5 C 46.5 C

◦ ◦

temperature
Heat exchanger outlet primary coolant 38.9 C 37.8 C
◦ ◦

temperature
Heat exchanger inlet secondary coolant 30.6 C 30.6 C
◦ ◦

temperature
Heat exchanger outlet secondary coolant 38.7 C 38.9 C
◦ ◦

temperature
Average velocity of coolant flowing 1.36 m/s 1.36 m/s
through the core
2
Average heat flux 13.84 W/cm 13.4 W/
cm2
2
Maximum heat flux 42 W/cm 40.1 W/
(Conservative) cm2
Maximum pool water temperature 38.9 C 37.8 C
◦ ◦

Average channel outlet coolant 48.76 C __

◦

temperature
Fig. 9. Decay heat (Case A).

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A. Hedayat International Journal of Advanced Nuclear Reactor Design and Technology 3 (2021) 119–133

operational conditions of TRR. Fig. 10 shows the temperature profile at

hot spot. It includes the average temperature of the heat structures,
external fuel cladding, saturation point, and liquid bulk of the coolant
just around the hot spot in the hot channel. Results indicate that we have
only a very small duration of a safe nucleate boiling and there is not any
dangerous or damaging physical effect on the fuel cladding. In other
words, the safety criteria of a DBA is completely satisfied in this case.

5.3.2. Case B
In the second case study, the reactivity control system is completely
disabled. This situation may be occurred during a severe accident like an
earthquake [53] in which control rod may be completely stuck and fail
to scram the reactor. In this situation, after the about 80% reduction of
the core flow passage (Fig. 11), the temperature rises rapidly. Then
reactivity feedback (Fig. 12) from fuel temperature (Doppler effect),
coolant density, and coolant temperature (spectral effect) take place and
reduce the reactor power (Fig. 13) effectively. Then, thanks to the Fig. 11. Liquid mass flow rate through and toward to the reactor core (Case B).
well-established inherently safety feature of the reactor, the temperature
profile of the hot spot (Fig. 14) shows a very rapid decrease after the first
sharp increase. This goes back to the rapid responses of the natural
reactivity feedback especially the Doppler effect of the fuel temperature
(Fig. 12). After that, the negative reactivity feedback gain a stabilized
state of the reactor power according to the reduced core flow passage
(Fig. 11). Moreover, the both initial flow rate through the core and the
total reactor power are decreased, coordinately due to inherently safety
features of the reactor. But there is small safety point of view in which
we may expect a very small duration Onset of Nucleate Boiling (ONB) or
even a partial dry out around the hot spot. Fig. 15. Shows the relevant
flow regime map (i.e. please also see the Table 5) around this very short
duration of time. Then we may have a short duration (i.e. up to 1 s) of a
complicated two-phase flow regime map of slug, annular mist, or even
mist flow model around the hot spot. This also may form a very short
local flow blockage and tolerances (Fig. 11).

5.3.3. Case C
In this case of study, the spurious opening of the reactor is assumed to Fig. 12. Reactivity feed backs (Case B).
be occurred when the system of the fault diagnostic system is disabled.
For more details, the reactivity control system is properly working and it
should also control the reactor power to adjust and keep the reactor
power constant with respect to the normal operating power (at 5 MW).
Undoubtedly, this will be a very hazardous situation. Fig. 16 presents
the temperature profile at the hot spot. As we expected, just after a few
Sec., the cladding temperature may reach to the blistering point tem­
perature of about 673 K and even very rapidly the hot spot may reach to
the melting point of about 933 K just only by about 8 Sec. after the
initiating accident.
Fig. 17 shows the flow regime map just around the hot spot in the hot

Fig. 13. Reactor.

channel. Table 5 presents the relevant flow regimes assigned to each

Fig. 10. Temperature profile at hot spot (Case A).
flow regime number. It also highlights the activated flow regimes and
instabilities. Results show that just around the hot spot might immedi­
ately reach to a harsh two-phase regime, blistering point, and even
melting point. In other words, just after a few Sec (3.5 Sec), a stable mist
flow might be formed and cause the melting condition (i.e. temperature)
just after the 8 Sec. Then a very simple fault of the detection system can
make a very serious physical damage in the reactor core even in a pool-
type research reactor. Fig. 18 depict the void fraction at the center of the
hot channel. This is completely compatible with the predicted flow

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A. Hedayat International Journal of Advanced Nuclear Reactor Design and Technology 3 (2021) 119–133

Fig. 14. Temperature profile at hot spot (Case B) power (Case B). Fig. 16. Temperature profile at hot spot (Case C).

Fig. 15. Flow regime number according to the Table 5 (Case B). Fig. 17. Two-phase flow regime map near touch the hot spot according to the
Table 5 (Case C).

Table 5
Assigned numbers to the predicted flow regime maps by the RELAP code.
Assigned Numbers Flow Regime

1 High Mixing Bubbly

2 High Mixing Bubbly/Mist Transition
3 High Mixing Mist
4 Bubbly
5 Slug
6 Annular Mist
7 Mist Pre-CHF
8 Inverted Annular
9 Inverted slug
10 Mist
11 Mist Post CHF
12 Horizontal Stratified
13 Vertical Stratified
14 Level Tracking

regime map. In other word, they present a high-quality low-mas flow

rate mist flow regime. In the next, Fig. 19 presents the liquid mass flow
rate through different parts of the reactor core and around it (i.e.
through the safety flapper and pool outlet). Exactly, just after the first
3.5 Sec, a very unstable flow condition could be seen around the hot spot
region due to formed two-phase mist flow regime map (Fig. 17). Finally,
Fig. 20 presents temperature changes versus time at different parts of the
reactor core and around it. This figure indicates that the existent ther­
mocouple at the reactor pool outlet could not help us anymore to detect
such a harmful DEC. But on the other hand, at least a simple thermo­
couple at the fuel coolant channel (i.e. especially at position with higher
Fig. 18. Void Fraction changes at the center of the hot channel (Case C).
values of PPF) might detect immediately and fruitfully such a harmful
and disastrous DEC.
Briefly, results show that if we lost the fault diagnostic system of the
safety flapper valve, just a few Sec. after the accident occurrence, a
partial dry-out or mist flow regime might be occurred. This means and
leads to the sudden blistering and then melting of the hot spot. In this
situation, the permanent monitoring of the reactor parameters by the
corresponding reactor operators is very important to do especially

131
A. Hedayat
Fig. 19. Liquid mass flow rate through and toward to the reactor core (Case.
Fig. 20. Liquid temperature profile through and around the reactor core
(Case C).
whenever there is not any instrumented fuel assembly. Furthermore, an
additional smart agent [28] shall be established to detect and alarm any
unknown transients.
6. Conclusion
In this paper, different types of the LOFA due to the spurious opening
of the safety flapper valve are simulated and analyzed for TRR. They are
considered to be completely practical for the safety analysis of this type
of nuclear reactors. Then, different states are assigned to different traces
of event series. The transient traces depend on the availability of the
engineering safety systems. Furthermore, passive safety systems and
inherently safety features are introduced to the input code as well as
complete and accurate modelling of the primary cooling system.
Moreover, the modeling is successfully benchmarked against normal
operational data and a dynamic test. Results are quietly suitable and
good enough for further safety analyses.
The first cast study (Case A) assumes a DBA scenario in which the
reactor protection system can immediately detect the mal-function and
trigger the emergency shutdown signal. Then just by one Sec., the
reactor takes scram and the decay heat is taken into account. As we
expected, there is not any harmful situation or possible potential of
physical damage to the fuel cladding.
The second case study (Case B) is considered to be analyzed with
respect to the inherently safety feature of the reactor. In this situation,
the reactivity control system is assumed to be completely disabled. Re­
sults show a very permanent control of the reactor power due to the
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International Journal of Advanced Nuclear Reactor Design and Technology 3 (2021) 119–133
reduction of core flow passage. Similarly, there is not observed any
physical damage to the fuel cladding but except a very short duration of
confused two-phase flow regime map around the hot spot (less than 1
Sec). In other words, thanks to the well-established inherently safety
features of TRR, the negative reactivity feedback especially the Doppler
effect of the fuel temperature decrease the reactor power effectively to
be stabilized according to the core flow passage, coordinately.
The third case study (Case C) is considered to be analyzed with re­
gard to the possible malfunction of the fault diagnosis system of the
safety flapper valve. In this situation, the reactivity control system is
available. Furthermore, the power regulating system should automati­
cally adjust the reactor power to the expected operating power at 5 MW.
Unfortunately, at this situation, the hot spot might reach the blistering
point and even melting point just after a few Sec. after the initiated
accident occurred. On the other hand, any physical damage like the fuel
blistering could harshen the situation. Moreover, even if the fuel as­
sembly tolerate such a hard thermal shock along with the possible strong
mist flow regime in the hot channel, the hot spot might reach to the
melting point by about only 8 Sec after the initiating accident.
In conclusion, although inherently safety features of TRR are fully
functional and well established, a prominent monitoring of the reactor
parameters, additional diverse or at least a redundant diagnostic mal-
function system for the safety flapper valve, and also a smart agent
(observer) for unknown transients are highly recommended to be
installed and established for TRR especially whenever there is not any
on-line fuel monitoring system or even instrumental fuel assembly. Such
a smart agent should detect and alarm the abnormal power oscillation
and instabilities even regarding unknown transients.
Declaration of interests
The authors declare that they have no known competing financial
interests or personal relationships that could have appeared to influence
the work reported in this paper.
Acknowledgement
The author would like to tell very special thanks to all of TRR dear
supervisor and operators for contributing in the reactor dynamic test.
Appendix A. Supplementary data
Supplementary data to this article can be found online at https://doi.
org/10.1016/j.jandt.2021.07.005.
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