\ COMPREHENSIVE REVIEWER IN CRIMINAL LAW Books |.& tt Revised Penal Code and Special Laws Atty. Leonor D. Boado FIRST EDITION 2004 ane JAN @ vaA MEFUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES 1, Penal laws are acts of the Legislature prohibiting certain acts and establishing penalties for their violations. Those that define crimes, treat of their nature and provide for their pun- ishment. (Lacson vs. Executive Secretary, 301 SCRA 298, Janu- ary 1999) 2. Criminal law is a branch of public law because it treats of acts or omissions which are primarily wrongs against the State. 3, Constitutional limitations on the power of Congress to en- act penal laws among the Bill of Rights: a, ‘The law must be general in application (equal protec- tion), b. _ Itmust observe substantive and procedural due proc- 58, ._Itshould not impose cruel and unusual punishment or excessive fines. . Itshould not operate as a bill of atlainder. fe. Itmust not operate as an ex post fecto law. 4. The prohibition on ex post facto law applies solely to penal Iaws. It cannot prohibit the retroactivity of procedural laws such as one that prescribes rules of procedure by which courts applying laws of all kinds can properly administer justice, such as the Extradition Treaty. (Wright vs. CA, G.R. No. 113213, August 15, 1994) 5. Provisions in the Code complementing ex post facto law: 1a, Article 21: no felony shall be punishable by any penalty not prescribed by law prior to its commission. b. Article 22: penal laws shall have a retroactive effect in- sofar as they favor the offender who is not a habitual 1(COMPREHENSIVE REVIIWEK IN CHIMINALLAW delinquent. Therefore, a law which increases the pen- alty for an act or omission cannot be given retroactive effect. 6 Examples of ex post facto law: 2 a, b. e Makes an act or omission criminal which when com- mitted was not criminal. Aggravates the seriousnens of the crime than when it ‘was committed. Imposes a penalty that is higher than when the crime was committed. ‘i Makes it easier for the prosecution to establish the guilt of the accused than when the ¢rime was committed, Requires a lesser quantum of evidence than when the crime was committed. Alters, in relation to the offemw or ita consequences, the situation of a person to his dimad vantage Assumes to regulate civil righty and remedies only but in effect imposes a penalty or deprivation of a right which when done was lawful. Deprives a person accused of crimeof some lawful pro- tection to which he has become entitled, such as the protection of a former conviction or acquittal, or a proc- Jamation of amnesty. (Lacson vs. Executive Secretary, G.R. No, 1280%6, January 20, 1999) Characteristics of penal law: b. Generality — (persons to be governed!) — penal law is binding on all persons who reside or sojourn in the Phil- ippines whether citizens or not, : Basis — Art. 14, Civil Code; Art. HI(), 1987 Con- stitution ‘Territoriality — Gurisdiction or the place where appli- cable) — the law is applicable to ail crimes committed within the limits of Philippine terntory. FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES 3 Basis — Art. 2, Revised Penal Code c _ Prospectivity — (when the law shall be applicable) — the law should have only prospective application ex- cept if it is favorable to the offender, (rretrospectivity prohibits the retroactive application of penal laws.) Basis — Arts, 21 and 22, Revised Penal Code ‘Art. 11122), Constitution (ex post facto) Art. 4, Civil Code 8 Doctrinal application of the prospectivity rule: a. The prospectivity rule applies to administrative rulings whi Plcliars aud to judicial decsions which though not laws, are evidence of what the laws mean, Thus Under Art. 8 of the New Civil Code, judicial decisions applying the laws or the Constitution form part of the legal system. Legis interpretato legis wim obtinet, This is especially true in the construction and application of criminal laws, where it is necessary that the punishability of an act be reasonably foreseen for the ‘guidance of society. (Co vs. CA, G.. No. 10076, Octo- ber 28, 1993) b. Lex prospicit, non respicit. The law locks forward not back- ward, The rationale against retroactivity is that a law usually derides rights which may have already become vested or impairs the obligations of contract, hence, un- constitutional. Prior to the statute's nullification it must have been in force and had to be complied with (doc- trine of operative fact). It would be to deprive the law ofits quality of faimess and justice if there be no recog- nition of what had transpired prior to such adjudica- tion. (id.) c. Incase of conflict between the mala prohibita doctrine and the prospectivity rule, the latter should prevail be- ‘cause all doubts must be resolved in favor of the ac- cused. (id.) Moreover, ex post facto aw isa constitutional edict hence is superior to any doctrine or rule.9. Philosophies under! ‘COMPREHENSIVE REVUIWII IN CRIMINAL LAW Classical or juristie 1. Basis of criminal liability — human free will, 2. Purpose of the penalty — retribution, for the right of the State and /or the privateoffended party must be observed. 3. Imposable penalty — predetermined penalty for every crime the gravity of which is directly pro- portionate to the crime committed. 4, Emphasis of the law —- on the offense. Under the clavoical theory on which the penal code is mainly based, the basis of criminal liability is human free will, Man is essentially a moral creature with an absolutely free will tu choose between good and evil. When he commits a felonious or criminal act (delito doloso), the act is presumed to have been done volun- tarily, ic. with freedom, intelligence and intent. Man therefore, should be adjudged or held accountable for ‘wrongful acts so long, ax free will appears unimpaired. (People vs. Genosa, G.R. No, 135981, September 29, 2000) Positivist or reatistc 1, Basis of criminal liability ~ the co man is inherently good but because of his envi- ronment and upbringing he becomes socially sick. 2, Purpose of the penalty — corrective or curative to reform the offender, 3. Determination of penalty —on an individual ba- sis after considering his circumstances. The Inde- terminate Sentence Law, Probation Law, etc. exem- plify this 4. Emphasis —on the actor. Ecclectic (or mixed) combines the good features of both the classical and the positivist theories. Ideally, the clas- FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES 5 sical theory is applied to heinous crimes, whereas, the positivist is made to work on economic and social crimes. ‘A heinous crime is a grievous, odious and hateful offense which by reason ofits inherent or manifest wick- edness, viciousness, atrocity and perversity, is regarded ‘as seriously outrageous to the common standards or norms of decency and morality ina just, civilized and orderly society. (RA 7659) ‘4. Utilitarian orprotective theory under which the primary function of punishment in criminal law is to protect society from potential and actual wrongdoers. The re- tributive aspect of penal laws should be directed against them. The law should not be applied to further materi- alism and opportunism. (Magno vs. CA, GR.No. 96132, June 26, 1992) 10, Penal laws are construed strictly against the State and liber- ally in favor of the accused. Whenever two interpretations of law or appreciation of evidence are possible, the exculpa- tory interpretation shall prevail, consistent with the rule on presumption of innocence. This principle, for instance, is manifested in the three-fold rule, the niles on mitigation of crimes and the requirement that qualifying circumstance should be proved by the same quantum of evidence neces- sary to establish guilt, among others. Under the equipoise rule, when the evidence of the prosecution and the defense are equally balanced, the scale Should be tilted in favor of the accused in obedience to the constitutional presumption of innocence. (Ursua vs. CA, 256 ‘SCRA 147, 70SCAD, April 1996; Corpuzvs. People, 194SCRA 73, February 1991) Where the State fails to meet the quan- tum of proof required to overcome the constitutional pre- sumption of innocence, the accused is entitled to acquittal, ‘as a matter of right regardless of the weakness or even the absence of his defense. For any conviction must rest on the strength of the prosecution's case and not on the weakness of the defense, (Cosep vs. People, 290 SCRA 378, May 1998)‘ (COMPREHENSIVE HUVHGWINEIN CRIMINAL LAW FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES 7 M1. Classification of crimes d. As to count — composite, compound, complex, As to commission (Article 3) 1. Dolo or felonies committed with deliberate intent 2. Culpa or those committed by means of fault As to stage of execution (Article 6) 1. Attempted 2. Frustrated 3. Consummated Related to this is the elasuification of felonies as to: 1. Formal felonies, those which are always consum- mated because the offender cannot perform the act necestary for their execution without consumumat- ing the offense, for instance physical injuries which are punished ayo result, whether serious, less se- rious, or slight. ‘The degree of injury cannot be de- termined without firit consummating the offense. 2. Material felonies, or those which have various stages of execution. 3. Crimes which huve no frustrated stage, such as, rape because its essence is carnal knowledge. Hence, even thie slight penetration of the female ‘organ consummates the crime. (People vs. Clopino, GAR. No. 110353, May 21, 1998) Likewise arson can only be attempted or consummated, because the slightest burning of the property consummates the crime of arson especially since the amount of dam- age in the property has been deleted in the amend- ments to the faw on arson. As to gravity (Art.9) 1. Grave feloni 2. Less grave felonies; and 3, Light felonies. e. ce : continued, continuing, As to nature — mala in se and mala prohibita 12, Crimes mala in se and mala prokibita Anact or omission may either be inherently evil (mala inse) or evil because there is a law prohibiting the same (mala prohibita), Generally, felonies under the Code are mala in se whereas those in laws are mala prohibita. However, it is really the nature of the act or omission that makes a crime either mala in se or mala prohibita. Also, even if a special law uses the terms of penalties in the Code, that alone will not make the act or omission a crime mala in se, The law may only intend to make the Code apply suppletorily thereto. For instance, Presidential Decree No. 533 is an amendment of Arts. 308, 309, and 310 of the RPC. Thus, cattle rustling is still malurm in se, (Taer vs. CA, 186 SCRA 598, June 1990) ‘Mala in se involve moral turpitude whereas mala pro- hibita do not. The doing of the act itself and not its pro- hibition by statutes fixes moral turpitude. It does not include such acts as are not of thersselves immoral but whose illegality lies in its positively being prohibited. (Dela Torre vs. COMELEC, 258 SCRA 483, July 1996) Distinctions: In mala in 5 1, Basis —_moral state of the offender hence, good faith or lack of criminal intentis a defense. 2° Modifying circumstances — taken into account in imposing the penalty on the cffender because his ‘moral trat is the basis ofthis crime. 3. Degree of participation — penalty is computed on the basis of whether he is a principal offender, or merely an accomplice or accessory.13. 4. ‘COMPREHENSIVE REVIEWER IN CRIMINAL LAW. 4, Stage of accomplishment — the penalty imposed depends on whether the crime is consummated, frustrated, or attempted. tn mala preubitr 1. Basis — voluntarinesy, hence, good faith of lack of criminal intent is not a defense, unless intent is an element of the crime as in Sec. 3(¢) of R.A. No. 3019, 2. Modilying circumstances -- not considered be- cause the law intends to discourage the commis- sion of the act specially prohibited. 3, Degree of participation — the penalty on the oF fenders is the same as they are all deemed princi- pals, 4. Stage of accomplishment — violation of law is punished only when accomplished or consum- mated. Effect of repeal of penal law on the accused: a, Absolute or total repeal or express repeal — the act cr omission is decriminalized. 1. Pending case — dismissed whether the accused is, habitual delinquent ornot.* 2. Offender iy convieted and/or serving sentence — released if he is not a habitual delinquent or the law provides that detention isto coritinue. b, Partial or relative repeal, or implica! repeal or repeal by re-enactment. 1. First law will govern if the accused is habitual de- linquent oF when the favorable second law pro- hibits retroactivity. 2. Second law will gover who is not habitual del as to its retronctivity. favrable to the offender yjuvt or the law is silent ‘The Spanish version should prevail over the English version for the Cade was originally approved and enacted in Eng- FUNDAMENTALPRINCIPLES ° lish (Section 15, Revised Administrative Code).For instance, Article 267 of the Code uses the term “lockup” (encerrar) rather than “kidnap” (secuestar or raptar), thus, the Spanish version should prevail in the interpretction of that Article. (People vs. Astorga, 283 SCRA 420, December 1997) 15. Finality of acquittal rule: the fundamental philosophy high- lighting this rule cuts deep into the humanity of the laws and in a jealous watchfulness over the rights of the citizen, when brought in wiequal contest with the State. The State with all its resources and power should not be allowed to make repeated attempts to convict an individual for an al- leged offense, thereby subjecting him toembarrassment, ex- pense and ordeal and compelling him to live ina continuing state of anxiety and insecurity, as well as enhancing the pos- sibility that even though innocent, he may be found guilty. (People vs. Velasco, G.R. No. 127444, 340 SCRA 207, Septem- ber 13, 2000) ARTICLE 2— Scope of application of the Code 1, Two applications of the Code: a, Intra-territorial application — within the Philippine ar- chipelago, including its atmosphere, interior waters and ‘maritime zone. b, Extra-territorial — the Code may be given application even to those crimes committed outside the Philippine territorial jurisdiction. (Note: when the question asks for the exceptions to the ap- plication of the Code, do not include in the answer the intra- territorial application in paragraph one for that is the gen- eral rule.) 2, Treaties and laws of preferential application prevail over the provisions of the Code such as R.A. No. 75 on immunity of diplomatic representatives of foreign countries. Under inter- national laws, sovereigns, heads of states and their official representatives enjoy immunity from suits.3. (COMPREHENSIVE RIIVIEWLR IN CRIMGNAL LAW {In the case of international bodies, mere invocation of the immunity clause (ADB, in this case) does not ipso facto result in the dropping of the charges in court. There is still a need to inquire whether the accused is covered by the provision of the immunity clause. Under the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic relations, a diplomatic agent enjoys immunity from criminal jurisdiction of the receiving state except in the case of an action relating (o any professional or commercial activity exercised by the diplomatic agent in the receiving state outside of his official functions. (Liang vs. People, 323 SCRA 692, January 2000) First exception —crime committed within a Philippine ship/ airship: subject to the limitation that the vessel is not within the territorial jurisdiction of another country, otherwise, the latter's laws will govern because penal laws are primarily territorial. But f the foreign country did not assume jurisdiction, the Philippines will have jurisdiction. b. The country of registry «letermines the nationality of the ship or airship, not its ownership. Thus a Filipino owned ship registered in a forelygn country is a foreign ship. ¢. French/English Rules refer o the jurisdiction over mer- chant vessels of one country located in another coun- try. The rule does not apply 1o war vessels, The effect on jurisdiction over the crime under either rule com- mitted in a merchant vewsel In about the same because the general rule of one is the exception in the other. Thus: 1. French rule recognizes flag or nationality of ves- sel. The country of registry will have jurisdiction but when the crime violated the peace and order of the host country (wuch as drug-trafficking), the host country will have jurisdiction, (Memory aid ~ ~ French - Flay) 2, English rule adheres strictly to the territoriality principle orsitus of the crime ‘The country of regis- FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES n try will have jurisdiction only where the crime re~ lates tointernal management of the vessel. In other cases (such as drug-trafficking) the host country will have jurisdiction. 5, Second and third exceptions: a. Forgery is committed by giving toa treasury or bank note or any instrument payable to bearer or to order the appearance of a true genuine document or by eras ing, substituting, counterfeiting or altering by any means the figures, letters, words or signs contained therein. (Art. 169) b. If forgery was committed abroad, it must refer only to Philippine coin, currency note or obligations and secu- tities. 6. Fourth exception: a public officer/employee who commits a crime related to the exercise of his office. Without this rela- tion, they are actingin their private capacity and hence bound by the law of the host country. 7. Under the fifth exception: crimes against national security and the law of nations include ‘Treason, Espionage, Provok- ing War and Disloyalty in Case of War, Piracy and Mutiny but not sebellion. When rebellion is committed abroad, the Philippine courts will not have jurisdiciion because rebel- lion is a crime against public order. & The referral to the Government of the Philippine Islands should be changed to Government of the Republic of the Philippines. ARTICLE 3 1. Felony refers exclusively to acts or omissions punished un- der the Code, 2 Intent is the use of a particular means to effect the desired result, The use of alethal weapon would show the criminal intent to kill although death did not result.(COMPREHENSIVE REVBEWEK IN CRIMINAL LAW Intent is a mental state thus the need to determine it by the means used. This intent in demonstrated by the overt acts of a person. Asa general rule, crimina nin presumed such as intent to kill when the victim dies. But where intent is an element ‘of the crime (specific criminal intent, such as intent to gain in theft), or if the act results to variant crimes, such as inju- ries which could give rise (o either attempted / frustrated homicide or physical injuries; actw of lasciviousness or at- tempted rape, intent cannot be jprewumed lt must be estab- lished. ‘Two instances when the offender can be eriminally Liable even if there is no criminal int a, Felonies commi ed by cul, and b. Offenses mala prohibit ‘Actus non facit reum, nisi mens si rea ~ the act cannot be crimi- nal unless the mind is criminal. (Llamoso vs, Sandiganbayan, G.R. Nos. L-63408 & 640126, August 7, 1985) A felony requires criminal intent. Hence, when intent ia absent as the mind is not criminal, no crime is committed. This doctrine applies only to dalo, Motive is the moving power or force (such as vengeance) which impels a person to a desired result, Generally, motive is immaterial in determining, criminal liability, except: fa. When the act brings about variant crimes, eg. kidnap- ping or robbery (People va, Puno, GR, No. 97471, Feb- ruary 17, 1990); b. There is doubt whether the accused committed the crime, of th identity of the accused! is doubtful; and The evidence on the commission of the crime is purely circumstantial. Where the identity of the assailant is in dispute, motive becomes relevant, andl when motive is supported with suffi- FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES 2 lent evidence for a conclusion of guilt, a conviction is sus- tainable. (People vs. Macoy, GR. Nos. 96649-50, July 1997) 8. Art. 3 compared with Art. 365: in Art. 3, culpa is a mode of committing a crime hence killing, for instance, is denomi- nated homicide through reckless imprudence. In Art. 365, culpa itself is the crime punished, thus the killing is denomi- nated reckless imprudence resulting to homicide. While a criminal negligent acts nota simple modality ofa willful crime, (Quizon vs. Justice of the Peace of Bacolor, GR. No. L-6641, July 28, 1995) but a distinct crime in the Penal Code, designated as a quasi-offense however, a conviction for the former can be had under an information ‘exclusively charging the commission ofa willful offense upon the theory that the greater includes the lesser offense. (Cabello vs, Sandiganbayan, 197 SCRA 94, May 14, 1991) 9, Intelligence is the capacity to understand what is right and what is wrong. Discernment is relevant to intelligence, NOT tointent. It does not mean though, that when a person acted. with discernment, he intends the crime or the wrong done. (People vs, Cordova, 224 SCRA 319, July 1993) Intelligence isan element of both dalo and culpa, thus, whether the result- ing felony is intentional or culpable, discernment is an ele- ment. Absent discernment, there is no offense whether dolo nor culpa. 1. When insanity is interposed as a defense or a ground of a motion to quash the burden rests upon the accused to estab- lish that fact, for the law presumes every man to be sane. Hence, in the absence of sufficient evidence to prove insan- ity, the legal presumption of one’s sanicy stands. (Zosa vs. CA, GR. No. 105641, March 10, 1994) ARTICLE 4 1. Article 3 deals with how a felony is committed; Article 4, ‘who commits a felony, There are two kinds of offenders here: those who commita felony, whether doly or culpa, and those who commit an impossible crime.4 COMPREHENSIVE REVIHWIK IE CUMINAL. LAW There are two clauses in no. of this article: a. “By any person committing a felony (delito)" referring to both dole and culpa, Note that the article specifically included in parenthesis the word delito. b. “Although the wrongful act done be different from that which he intended,” referring to dolo because of the pres- ence of intent(note the word “intended”). The elements in the second clause are: 1. Anintentional felony is committed, 2. The wrong done is the dlirect, natural, and logical consequence of the felony committed even though dif- ferent from that intended, Factors affecting intent and correspondingly the criminal li- ability: a. Mistake of fact; b. Aberratio ictus (mistake in the vietim of the blow); c. Error in personae (mistake in identity); d. Practer intentionem (so yeave a wrong caused than that intended); and ¢ cause (the cause of the cause is the cause of eel). Mistake of fact is that which had the facts been true to the belief of the offender, that act he did can be justified, hence, will negative criminal liability (jgnorantia facti excusat), for, the element of criminal intent is absent, Thus, mistake of fact is relevant only in dolo, hence, if the offender is negligent in ascertaining the true state of facts, he may be free from dolo but not from culpe, Mistake of fact refers to the situation itself, and does not apply to identity because in the latter there is criminal intent. In aberratio ictus or error in the victim of the blow the of- fender intends the injury on one person but the harm fell on ce. Proxima the evi | i ' FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES 6 another, There are three persons involved: the offender, the intended victim and the actual victim. Consequently, the act ‘may result in a complex crime (Art. 48) or in two felonies, although there is just one intent. Thus, aberratio ictus may result toa greater criminal liability to the offender. 5. Ervor in personae ormistake in identity involves only one of- fended party but the offender committed a mistakein ascer- taining the identity of the victim Unlike in aberratoictus there are only two persons involved: the actual but unintended victim and the offender, 7. ‘The effect of error in personae depends upon the intended crime and actual crime committed: 8, IF these are of different gravity, Article 49 shall apply — the lower peralty between the intended and the actual felony committed shall be imposed. In effect error in personae is extenuating circumstance. b. _Iftheactual and intended crimes arethe same, then there is no mitigation of penalty for the mistake in the iden- tity of the victim carries the same gravity as when the accused zeroes in on his intended victim. The main rea~ son behind this conclusion is the fact that the accused had acted with such a disregard for the life of the vic- tims without checking carefully the latter’s identity as to place himself on the same legal plain as one who kills another willfully, unlawfully and feloniously. (People vs. Pinto, G.R, No, 39519, November 21, 1991) In practer intentionem, the injury is on the intended victim but the resulting consequence is much more grave than in- tended. Itis a mitigating circumstance (Art. 13, no. 3). But if the means employed in the commission of the crime would logically and naturally bring about the actual felony com- mitted, practer intentionem will not be appreciated. It does not apply to culpa; “intentionem” denotes in- tent. ‘The mitigating circumstance of lack of intent to commit 50 grave a wrong as that committed should be appreciated5 ‘COMPREHENSIVE REVIEW IN CRIMINAL LAW where the accused had no intent to Kill but only to inflict injures when he attacked the victim. People vs. Flores, in- fra 9. Proximate cause is that cause which, in its natural and con- tinuous sequence, unbroken by an efficient intervening cause, produces the injury and without which the result would not have occurred. Proximate cause is to be considered gener- ally in determining whether the consequence of the act should also be borne by the offender, (Art, 4, no.1) ‘The perceived delay in giving medical treatment does ‘not break at all the causal connection hetween the felonious act of the offender and the injuries sustained by the victim. It does not constitule an efficient intervening cause since the victim's death is still duc: (o the injuries inflicted by the of- fender, for which the latter is criminally responsible. (People vs. Acuram, G.R. No. 117954, April 27, 2000) ‘Thus, anyone who inflicts injury voluntarily and with intent is liable for all the consequences of his criminal act, such as death, that supervanes as a consequence of the injue ries. Here, accused-appeliant is liable for the demise of the 1im for such was caused by the violent kicks which he inflicted on the vital parti of the vietim's body. (People vs. Flores, 252 SCRA) Impossible Crime: 1. Elements: a. The acts performed would have been a crime against persons or property; b. There is criminal intent; ©. Ttisnot accomplished! because of the inherent impossi- bility or because the means employed is inadequate or ineffectual. 2. ‘The act performed by the oflenwier cannot produce an offense against persons or property because: (a) the commission of the offense is inherently imparsible of wcomplishment; or FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES wv (b) the means employed is either: (1) inadequate or (2) inef- fectual. (Intod vs, CA, G.R. No. 103119, Cetober 21, 1992) 3. Impossible crime is punished to suppress lawlessness or to teach a lesson to the offender. Subjectively, the offender is a criminal although objectively no crime hes been committed, ‘There is no attempted or frustrated stage. 4, There is now the impossible crime of repe because of the amendment brought about by the Anti-Rape Law which re- classified Rape under Crimes Against Persons as anew chap- ter and renumbered Art. 266 A to D. 5, There is legal impossibility where the intended acts, even if completed would not amount to a crime. Example: stealing property that turned out tobe owned by thestealer. It would apply to those circumstances where: a. Themotive, desire, and expectation isto perform an act in violation of law; >. Thereis an intention to perform the physical act; There is a performance of the intended physical act; d. The consequence resulting from the intended act does not amount toa crime. 6. Physical impossibility is present when extraneous circum- stances unknown to the actor or beyond his control prevent the consummation of the intended crime. Example: stealing, from a vault that isempty. 7. The offender must not know the circumstance which made the crime an impossible crime. For instance killing a person who is already dead, Homicide/murder requires intent to kill. Had the offender known that the victim is already dead, intent to kill will be absent. At most, it will amount to des- ecration of the dead. ARTICLE 5. ‘Nulun crimen mula poena sine lege — there is no crime when there is no law that defines and punishes it. As a civil law coun-6 CCOMPREHIINSIVE REVIEWER IN CRIMINAL. LAW tryin the Philippines penal laws are enacted. Crime is the prod- uct of the law; no matter how evil an act is it is not a crime unless there is a law punishing it. Mc -over, Article 2 prohibit the im- position of a penalty not preseribed by law prior to the commis~ sicn of a felony; and, the Constitution prohibits the retroactive application of a penal law (ex post facto), On the other hand a common law crime is one that is mani- festly contrary to good customs and public policy even though not expressly punished by law. As distinguished from statutory aw created by enactment of legislature, common law comprises the body of those principles and rules of action relating to the government and security of persons and property, which derive their authority solely from usages and customs of i antiquity, or from judgments and decrees of the courts recogniz~ ing, affirming and enforcing such usages and customs, It does rot rest for authority upon any express and positive declaration of the will of the legislature. (Iilack’s Law Dictionary) ARTICLE 6 L In the consummated stage all acts of execution are present, hence the offender is in the objective stage as he no longer has control over the outcome of his acts having performed all that is necessary to accomplish his purpose. In the frustrated stage, the offender haw also reached the ob- jective stage of the offense for he has performed all the acts which would produce the felony but the crime was not com- mitted for reasons independent of his will If the reason is dependent on his will, as when in homicide, the wound is, fatal but he himself brought the victim to the hospital hence the victim survived, it is not frustrated homicide but some other crime like physical injurien. For the attempted felony, the olfender iy still in the subjec- tive stage becaume he hax not performed all acts necessary for its accomplishment, Therefore, he still has control as he may or may not continue his overt acts, The important phrases here are: FUNDAMENTAL FRINCIPLES » a, “Overt acts” or external acts — those which if allowed to continue will logically result in a felony; itis the start of criminal liability. Preparatory act refers toa prior act. Example: buy- {ing poison to kill the intended victim. Preparatory acts are as a rule not criminal unless these acts are in them- selves penalized as independent crimes. Example: Pro- posal and conspiracy to commit a crime are not pun- ished except in those cases provided for by law, e.g. pro- posal and conspiracy to commit retellion: b. ("Directly” — The offender shall be liable for the at- {empted stage of the felony that is directly linked to the overt act irrespective of his intention. Example: a per- son intending to rob a store forced open the window of the building but before he could enter he was appre- hended. He cannot be charged with attempted robbery even if that was his intention because the overt act of forcing open the window is not directly linked with rob- bery. He may be charged with attempted trespass be- cause that actis directly related to entering the store. ¢. “Desistance” —is an absolutory circumstance true only, in the attempted stage. The attempted stage exists up to that time when the offender still has control of his acts. The moment he has lost control of the outcome of his acts the subjective phase is passed; the stage is now either frustrated or consummated (objective phase) where desistance is merely factual and produces no le- gal effect, hence, will not exempt the offender from criminal lability. When the cause of the non-performance of all the acts necessary for the commission of the offense is other than the offender's spontaneous desistance, the felony is attempted. (People vs. Pareja, G.R. No, 88043, Decem- ber 9, 1996) 4, Criteria to determine whether the crime is material or for- mal:0 (COMPREHENSIVE REVIEW1 IN CRIMINAL.LAW “The offender cannot possibly perform all the acts of ex- ‘ecution to bring the desired result without consummat- ing the offense, such ax slander, When the Code defines the felony in such a manner that it cannot be frustrated. lance, since the grava- men of Rape is carnal knowledge, the slightest penetra- tion of the female organ consummates the felony, Since the burning of even a portion of the building is consid ‘ered arson, the mere searching thereof consummates the crime. When the crime requires the concurrence of the will of two parties, there is 1s frustrated stage, as in Corrup- the moment the public officer accepts the gilt, promise ur cunwideration in Bribery, the crime of Corruption ix consummated! but when the pub- licofficer refuses to be corrupted, the crime is attempted only. When the crime is treated ly the Cade in accordance with the results, i., thn result should be there before liability can be determined, eg, physical injuries, the crime is only in the consummated stage. In Physical Injury it cannot b nine whether the injury will be slight, less serious, ar serious unless consummated, Between attempted! and frustrated! felonies a, a As to acts of execution -- in attempted, not all acts of ‘execution had been done whereas in frustrated, all acts of execution had been performed, As to causes of non-accomplishment — in attempted, it is a couse or accident other than the offender's own spontaneous desistance; in frustrated it is some cause independent of the will of the perpetrator, In attempted stage, the offender still in the subjective phase as he still has control of his acts; whereas in the frustrated stage, lw is already in the objective phase. Example: in attempted homicide, the wound is not ‘mortal, hence the oltender should still need to deal an- FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES 2 other blow on the victim, which he was not able to do because he was apprehended, In frustrated homicide, the wound is mortal, sufficient to bring about death hhence, there isno need of another blow but death nev- ‘ertheless did not supervene because of timely medical attendance. ARTICLE 7 1. When light felonies are punishable: a. Only when consummated except for crimes against persons or property. b. _Inall stages ifthe crime is against persons or property. 2. Who are punishable — principals and accomplices. Acces- sories are nat criminally liable for light felonies. (Article 16) ARTICLE 8 1. When the proposal is accepted, it becomes conspiracy. The essence of conspiracy is community of criminal intent. (Peo- ple vs. Tilos, 349 SCRA 281, Jantsary 16,2001) 2, Itisessential for one to be liable for the acts of the others that there be intentional participation in the transaction with a view to the furtherance of the common design. Except when he is the mastermind in a conspiracy, it is necessary that a conspirator should have performed some overt act as a di- rect or indirect contribution in the execution of the crime planned to be committed. The overt act may consist of: ‘a. Active participation in the actual commission of the crime itself; b. Moral assistance to his coconspirators by being present at the commission of the crime; or c._ Bxerting moral ascendancy over the other co-conspira- tors. (Pecho vs. People, G.R. No. 111399, September 27, 1996)COMPREHENSIVE REVIEWENIN CRIMINAL LAW ‘Two concepts of conspiracy: a. Asacrime by itself, the subject of conspiracy is not yet committed but the mere wet of conspiring is defined and punished as a crime, for inwtance, proposal and con- spiracy to commit treason ar rebellion, b. Asa basis of incurring liability, theexecution of the plan is commenced. Conipiracy by itself ceases to be the crime but is absorbed, Hence, the crime above is no longer conspiracy to commit rebellion but Rebellion under Art. 135, ‘Asa basis of incurring lability it ly necessary to determine: a. Whether there was prior agreement on how to commit the crime, in which case, « conspirator is liable as long icone of the crime unless he is the lity ofthe conspiratorsis only for the crime agreed upon excey 1. When the ather crime was committed in their pres- ‘ence and they did not prevent its commission; 2, When the ather crime Ip the natural consequence of the crime planned, ¢.g, homivide resulting, from physical Injuries; 3. When the resulting crime was a composite crime. infra) b, Whether it is implied conspiracy, that is, the offenders acted in concert during the commission of the crime. Here it is essential that the conspirator participated in the commission of the crime to be liable. His mere pres- ence or approval of the crime without more will not make him liable because there would be no basis for deducing conspiracy as to him as there is absent crim- inis particeps. Mere knowledge, acquiescetice to or ap- proval of the act without cooperation or agreement to cooperate, is not enough to constitute one a party to a conspiracy absent the intentional participation in the act with a view to the furtherance of the common de- FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES B sign and purpose. (People vs. Bragaes, GR. No.62359, November 14, 1991) Necessarily, conspiracy as a crime cannot be implied conspiracy. It can only be by pre-agreement or planned. Direct proof of previous agreement to commit a crime is not necessary for conspiracy may be deduced from the mode ‘and manner in which the offense was perpetrated, or inferred from the acts of the accused themselves when such point to a joint purpose and design, concerted ection and commu- nity of interest. Implied conspiracy is one that is deduced from the mode ‘and manner in which the offense was committed. The con- certed acts of the parties to achieve the same objective nify conspiracy, People vs. Guevarra, 179 SCRA 325, Novem- ber 13, 1989 held that “The act of the appellant in holding the victim from behind immediately before the latter was. stabbed by Eduardo constitutes a positive and overt act to- wards the realization of common criminal intent which may be classified as instantaneous. The act was impulsively done ‘on the spur of the moment. Itsprang from the turn ofevents, thereby uniting the criminal design of the slayer immedi- ately before the commission of the offense.” (Gubayco vs. Sandiganbayan, GR, Nos. 117267-117310, August 22, 1996) . Conspiracy is not presumed, Like the physical acts consti- tuting the crime itself, the elements of conspiracy must be proved beyond reasonable doubt. Whileconspiracy need not be established by direct evidence, for it may be inferred from the conduct of the accused before, during and after the com- mission of crime, all taken together, however, the evidence ‘must be strong enough to show community of criminal de- sign. (Magsuci vs, Sandiganbayan, G.R.No. 101545, January 3, 1995; Pecho vs. People, G.R. No. 111399, September 27, 1996) . One who joins a criminal conspiracy adapts in effect the criminal design of his co-conspirators, end he canno longer repudiate the conspiracy after it has materialized. Convic- tion is proper upon proof that the accused acted in concert.2% 10 0. (COMPRERINSVE RUVIEWER IN CHIMINAT. LAW ‘The act of one then becomes the act of all, and each of the accused will thereby be deemed! equally guilty as co-princi- pals of the crime committed Even if appellant never fited a gun, he would still be principally liable as a co-conspirator in the killing of the vic- tims, for while only Benito might have inflicted the fatal blows or wounds, nevertheless, appellant rust be held li- able under the principle that the act of a conspirator is the act of all co-conspirators. ‘Th: clugrev of actual participation in the commission of the crime is immaterial in a conspiracy. (People vs. Maranion, C18, Nos, 90672-73, July 18, 1991) Although conspiracy is a joint act, thereis nothing irregular if a supposed co-conspirator is acquitted and others con- victed. Generally, conspiracy i only a mwans by which crime is committed: the mere act of conspiring is not by it- self punishable. Hence, it does not follow that one conspi tor alone cannot be convicted when there is a conspiracy. ‘As long as the acquittal of 0 co-conspirator does not remove the basis of a charge of conspiracy, other conspirators may be found guilty of the offense, People vs, Tiguman, GR. Nos. 130502-03, May 24, 2001) Mere knowledge, acquiescence or agreement to cooperate is not enough to constitute one ava conspirator absent any ac- tive participation in the commission of the crime pursuant to the common design and purpose. Conspiracy transcends companionship. (People vs. Compo, GR. No. 112990, May 28, 2001) Mere presence at the scene of the incident, know]- ge of the plan or acquiescence thereto is not sufficient ground to hold a person liuble as a co-conspirator. The mere fact that the accused had prior knowledge of the criminal design of the principal perpetrator of the crime does not ipso facto make him as co-conspirator. Participation in the crimi- ‘nal act is essential for he may yet be an accomplice. (People vs. Samudio, G.R. No. 126168, March 7, 2001) ‘An overt act in furtherance of the conspiracy may consist in actively participating in the actual commission of the crime, in lending moral assistarwe to his co-conpirators by being FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES 3 present at the scene of the crime, or in exerting moral as- cendancy. (People vs. Pablo, G.R. Nos. 120394-97, January 16, 2001) 12, Vor conspiracy to exist, there must be a conscious design to ‘commit an offense, Conspiracy is not the product of negli- sence but of intentionality on the part of cohorts (“decides to commit it”). (Magsuci vs. Sandiganbayan, January 3, 1995, supra.) 15. When may the head of a goverment office be held liable as corprincpal for the acts of his subordinates? If he by an act ‘of reckless imprudence brought about the commission of ‘stafa thru falsification, or malversation through falsification, without which the crime could not have been accomplished. Wher, however, that infraction consists inthe reliance in good faith, albeit misplaced by a head of office on a subordinate upon whom the primary responsibility rests, absent a clear case of conspiracy, the Arias doctrine must be held to pre- vail. (id.) M4, Under the Arias doctrine all heads of offices have to rely toa reasonable extent on their subordinates and on the good faith of those who prepare bids, purchase supplies, or enter into negotiations. There has to be some added reason why he ‘should examine each voucher in such detail. Any executive head of even small government agenciesor commissions can attest to the volume of papers that must be signed. There are hundreds of documents, letters, memoranda, vouchers, and supporting papersthat routinely pass through his hands, The umber in bigger offices or departments is even more ap- palling, (Arias vs. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 81563, 180SCRA 309, December 19, 1989) ARTICLE 9 — Grave, less grave, light folonies 1. Grave felonies are penalized by capital punishment or afflic- tive penalties in any of its period, ie, theminimum, medium or maximum period of the penalty is an afflictive penalty. ‘Afflictive penalties cover prision mayor, disqualification, re- lusion temporal ard reclusion perpetua.% (COMPREHENSIVE RILVIEWER IN CRIMINAL LAW 2. Less grave felonieware punished with penalties which in their maximum period are correctional, thus the maximum pe- riod of the penalty musi be correctional, that is, destierr, sus pension, arresto mayor, or prision correccional. 3. Light felonies are infractions punished with arresto menor or fine of P200.00 or below. (In Art. 26, a P200 fine is correc- tional) 4. The classification of felonies ax to severity is significant to determine: If the felony is punishable; (Art. 7 on light felonies) Whether the accessory is llable; (Art. 16) Whether a complex crime was committed; (Art. 48) ‘The duration of the subsidiary penalty; (Art. 39, no, 2) ‘The duration of the detention in case of failure to post the bond to keep the peace; (Art. 35) {Whether the crime has prescribed; (Art. 90), and The proper penalty for quus/offenses, (Art. 365) sae ge ARTICLE 10 — Special Laws 1, Special penal laws define andl penalize crimes not included in the Code; they are different from those defined and pun- ished therein. 2. The law has long divided crimes into acts wrong in them- selves (mala in se) and acts which would not be wrong but for the fact that positive law forbids them (mala prohibita), This distinction is important with reference to the intent with which a wrongful act is done. In acts mala prohibita, the only inquiry is, has the law been violated? When an act is legal, the intent of the offender is immaterial, (Ounlao vs, CA, GR. No. 111343, August 22, 1996) 3. The general rule is that special laws arv not subject to the provisions of the Revised Penal Code. (Art, 10, first sentence) For instance, the circumstances affecting, criminal liability CIRCUMSTANCES AFFECTING CRIMINAL LIABILITY u (Art, 11 1015) are not applicable to violations of special laws. However, the Code shall have supplementary application to the special laws (second sentence) whenever the latter uses the nomenclature of penalties in the Code, thus indicating the intent of Congress to make the Code apply suppletorily, necessarily, with its duration, correlation and legal effects under its system of penalties. (People vs. Simon, GR. No. 930280, July 29, 1994) 4, ‘The suppletory effect of the Code to special laws under this atticle cannot be invoked where there is legal or physical impossibility of or a prohibition in special law against such supplementary application, Where the special law expressly grants the court discretion in applying the penalty prescribed for the offense, there is no room for the application of the Code. (id.) 5. Dolo is not required in crimes punished by a special statute like the Anti-Fencing Law of 1979 because it is the act alone, irrespective of the motives which constitute the offense. Ver- ily, when it was proved that petitioner committed the un- lawful acts alleged in the information, it was properly pre- sumed that they were committed with full knowledge and with criminal intent, and it was incumbent upon him to re- but such a presumption. (Lim vs. CA, GR. No. 100311, May 18, 1993) CIRCUMSTANCES AFFECTING CRIMINAL LIABILITY 1. Inthe Philippines, penal laws subscribe to the classical theory hence there is a predetermined penalty for each crime. It is, the office of modifying circumstances toincrease or decrease the penalty depending upon their presence or absence. 2. The circumstances which affect or modify criminal liability are: a. Justifying — Art. 11 b, Exempting — Art. 12% ‘COMPREHENSIVE RUVIIWEH IN CRIMINAL, LAW. Mitigating —Arts, 13 and 15 Aggravating — Arts. 14 and 15 Absolutory —exempting circumstances outside Art, 12 Extenuating — mitigating circumstances not found in Art. 13, such as concealment of dishonor in abortion and abandonment in adultery Absolutory circumstances: arr) a, Instigation due to public policy; b. Art. 6(3) — spontaneous desistance in the attempted stage unless the overt act committed constitutes another crime; Art. 7 — attempted / frustrated light felonies except those against pervons or property; Art. 16 — accessories in light felonies; Art. 20 — accessories-relatives other than profiting in the crime; {Art 247 — injucies except serious physical injuries; Art. 332 — certain relatives in thelt, estafa and mali- cious mischief; fh. Somnambulismy; i. Mistake of facts j. Total repeat of penal law. Entrapment is the employment of ways and means for the purpose of trapping or capturing 4 lawbreaker; the idea to commit the crime originates {rom the accused, In induce- ‘ment or instigation the criminal intent originates in the mind of the instigator and the accused is lured into the commis- sion of the offense charged! in order to prosecute him, (Peo- ple vs. Ramos, Jr, G.R. No. BAIOL, October 28, 1991) ‘A buy-bust is a form of entrapment that in recent years has bbeen accepted as.a valid means uf arresting violators of the Dangerous Drugs Law. It is commonly employed by police 2. ‘CIRCUMSTANCTS AFFECTING CRIMINAL LABILITY 2» officers as an effective way of apprehending law offenders in the act of committing a crime. Inentrapment, itis necessary that a buy-bust operation ‘occurred, otherwise it will be consideredin case of doubt as, instigation, Instigation is an absolutory cause akin to an ex- cempting circumstance. (People vs. dela Paz, G.R, No, 104277, 43 SCAD 284) ‘Even without the money to buy the marijuana so long as the police officer went through the motion as a buyer and his offer was accepted by the appellant and the marijuana delivered to police officer, the crime was consummated by the delivery of the goods. (People vs. Utoh Lakibul, January 1993) Instigation and frame-up cannot be both present in 2 case for they are incompatible. In instigation, the crime is actu- ally performed by the accused except that the intent origi- nates from the mind of the inducers. In frame-up, however, the offense is not committed by the accused. Precisely, the accused is only framed or set up in a situation leading to a false accusation against him. ‘An allegation of frame-up and extortion by police of- ficers is a commonand standard defense in most dangerous drug cases. Itis viewed by the court with disfavor, fort can be easily concocted, To substantiate such defense, including instigation, the evidence must be clear and convincing be- ‘cause of the presumption that public officers acted in the regular performance of their official duties. Distinctions: ENTRAPMENT INSTIGATION a. The mens rea originated evil idea originated from the from the accused who peace officer who induced was merely trapped by the accused to commit the the peace officer in fla act grante delicto0 ‘COMPREHENSIVE REVIUWER IN CKIMINAL LAW b. This is not absolutory as to the offender since he authored the evil iden c. Consistent with public policy d. Trap for the unwary criminal (People vs. Marcos, G.R. No. 63525, 185 SCRA 154) ce. The peace officer is with- ‘out criminal liability tor their acts are in aceord- ance with law. absolutory by reason of public policy ‘contrary to public policy ‘Trap for unwary innocent ‘The peace officer is a prin- cipal by mducement (Peo- ple vs. Ramos, supra) ARTICLE 11 — Justifying Circumstances 1 Justifying circumstances un: those whem the acts of the ac- tor are in accordance with Inw and hence he ingurs.ne srimi- ‘Thus, Article 101 slates, “in cases falling with subdivision 4 of article 11, the persons fur whose benefit the harm has been prevented shall be civilly liable in proportion to the benefit which they may have received.” ‘The civil lability is not on the actor but on those who ber from the act, ‘The justifying circumstances are: a. Defense of self, of rel latives, and of strangers; b. State of necessity; Fulfillment of duty; d. Obedience to superior onter. Self-defense includes defense of life, chastity, property and honor of the accused who must prove with clear and con- vincing evidence the following elements: a. Unlawful aggressi 6 10. n. ‘CIRCUMSTANCES AFFECTING CRIMINAL LIABILITY 2 b. _ Reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel it; and . _Lackof sufficient provocation on the part of the person defending himself. ‘The effect of invoking self-defense is to place the burden in the accused to prove to the satisfaction of the court the fact of legitimate defense because thereby headmits the act com- plained. ‘Unlawful aggression is the primordial requisite which must Atall times be present. When unlawful aggression is absent, there is no self-defense whether complete (Article 11) or in- complete (Articles 69 and 13{1)). It must be actual, sudden, unexpected attack or imminent danger thereof, and not merely a threatening or intimidat- ing attitude. The accused must present proof of positively strong act of real aggression. Unlawful aggression must be such as to put in real peri the life ox personal safety of the person defending himself or of others peing defended and. hot an imagined threat. People vs. Bausing, G.R. No. 64965, 199 SCRA 355, July 8, 1991) Unlawful aggression must be real or at least imminent. Real aggression means an attack with physical force or with a weapon such as to cause injury or danger to life or personal safely. Aggression is imminent if an atlack is impending or at the point of happening. Itmustbe offensive and positively strong. ‘That petitioner sustained injuries does not signify that he was a victim of unlawful aggression. (Roca vs. CA, G.R. No. 114917, 350 SCRA 414, January 29, 2001) When the aggression no longer exists, such as when the ag- ‘gressor ran away after the attack or when the defender was, able to wrest the weapon from the aggressor, thereis noneed for self-defense, : 4 ‘The presence and severity of the number of wounds on the part ofthe victim disprove self-defense, so do they belie theM4 1, 1. COMPIIIENSIVE HEVIWIO IN CRIMIIVAL.LAW claim of incomplete defense of one's relative and indicate not the desire to dletend one's relative but a determined ef- fort to kill. (People vs. Santos, G.R. Nos. 99259-60, 69 SCAD 716, March 29, 1996) Reasonable necessity of the means employed depends upon the circumstances surrounding the aggression, the state of mind of the aggressor and the available weapon at the de- fender’s disposal. ‘There isno reasonable necessity of the means of defense when the unlawful aggression on the part of the victim has ceased. It does not imply commensurability belween the means of the attack and defense — the law requires a rational equiva- lence which is determined by the emergency, the imminent danger to which the person attacked is exposed, and the in- stinet, more than the reason, that moves or impels the defense. ‘The proportionateness thereof does not depend upon the harm done, but rests upon the imminent danger of such in- jury. (People vs. Gutual, (,R. No. 115233, 64 SCAD, 254SCRA 37, February 22, 1996) The presence of a large number of wounds inflicted on the victim clearly indicates a determined effort on the part of the accused to kill his prey and belies the reasonableness of the means adopted to prevent or repel an unlawful act of an aggressor. (People vs. Arizala, G.R. No. 10708, October 22, 1999) “Stand ground when in the right” is the rule which applies when the aggressor is armed with a weapon and is espe- cially more liberal if the person attacked ts a peace officer in the performance of his duty, This rule hax superseded the Principle of “retreat to the wall” which makes it a duty of a person assailed to retreat as far as he can before he meets the assault with force. Lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person de- fending himself shows that there may have been provoca- tion but it should not be sufficient and it must not immedi- 18. 19, 21, 2. 2. CCIRCUMSTANCDS AFFECTING CRIMINAL LABILITY = ately precede the act. It is not enough that the provocative ‘act be unreasonable or annoying. , 3 In defense of one’s chastity, there must be imminent an immediate danger of rape to justify Killing, If it were only acts of lasciviousness, killing is an unreasonable means. But it Slander may be a necessary means to repel slander. ‘must not be more than needed to defend himself from the defamatory remarks. ili tin In defense of property killing is not justified. There mus! addition be the necessity to save another life. If the aggres- sion is on property even if there was no attack on the de- fender or owner oF possessor defense is proper but not to the extent of killing the aggressor otherwise the means us to repel or prevent the aggression will be not reasonable, (People vs. Narvaez, GR. Nos. L-33466-67, 21 SCRA 389, Aprit 20, 1983) "| For defense of relatives the third requisite becomes: “in case the provocation was given by the person attacked, the per- son defending had no part therein.” For defense of strangers, the third requisite is that the per- son defending is not induced by revenge, resentment or other evil motives. Beyond 4 degrees of consanguinity is defense of strangers a the third element in defense of relatives will bereplaced. ‘The presence or lack of all or some of the requisites for the defense have the following effects: : a, All requisites are present — justifying circumstance; (Art. 11) b. Tworequisites are present, unlawful aggression plus an- other — privileged mitigating circumstance; (Article 69) One requisite present which mustbe unlawful aggres- sion — ordinary mitigating circumstance. (Article 13, no. 1)26. 27. The elements of state of necessity ai ‘COMPREHENSIVE REVIEWH IN CHIMIVAL-LAW a. The evil sought to be avoided actually exists; b. The injury feared be greater than that done to avoid it; and © There is no other practical and less harmful means of preventing it The state of necessity must not be caused by the negli- ‘gence or violation of the law of the actor otherwise this ben- fit cannot be invoked; Under Art. 101, the civil liability shall be borne not by the actor but the ones benefited by the avoidance of the evil, The elements of fulfillment of duty or exercise of right or office are: a. The offender acted in the performance of a duty or the lawful exercise of a right or office; b. The injury caused or the offense committed is the nec- essary consequence ofthe du performance of such ight or office. Under the doctrine of “self-help” in Art. 429 of the Civil Code, the law justifies the act of the owner or lawful posses- sor of a thing in using force necessary to protect his propri- etary or ory Tights. He must however exercise this right at the very moment that he is being deprived of his property. If sufficient time elapsed from the deprivation, he must seek the help of the proper authorities in reclaiming his property, otherwise he could be liable for coercion. Appellant was not in the performance of his duties at the time of the shooting for the reason that the girls he was at- tempting to arrest were not committing any act of prostitu- tion in his presence. [fat all, the only person he was author- ized to arrest during the time was “R,” who offered him a service of a prostitute, for acts of vagrancy. Even then, the fatal injuries that the appellant cause the victim were not a necessary consequence of appellant's performance of his duty asa police officer. His duty to urrent the female suspects did ‘CIRCUMSTANCES AFFECTING CRIMINAL ABILITY 3 not include any right to shoot the victim to death. (People vs, Peralta, G.R. No, 128116, 350 SCRA 158, January 24, 2001) 28, ‘The elements of obedience to superior order are: a. Anorder has been issued by a superior; "The order is for a legal purpose; ¢. The means used to carry out such order is lawful. Even if the order is illegal if it is apparently legal and the subordinate is not aware of its illegality, the subordinate is not liable. (Tabuena vs. Sandiganbayan, G.R. Nos. 103501- 03, 268 SCRA 332, February 17, 1997) ARTICLE 12 — Exempting circumstances 1. The exempting circumstances are: a. Imbecility/insanity b. Minority c Accident Compulsion of irresistible force fe. Impulse of uncontrollable fear £._Insuperable or lawful cause 2. Distinctions between justifying and exempting circumstances JUSTIFYING EXEMPTING a, Theactis legal ‘The actis criminal, ‘There is no crime, hence There is a crime, hence a no criminal criminal. c. Since there is no crime, There is a crime and civil li- there is no criminal and ability but the law exempts civil liabilities the actor from criminal li- abilities. . ‘The emphasis of the law ‘The emphasis of the law is is on the act on theactor.(COMPREHENSIVE REVIEWEK IN CRIMINAL LAW . Insanity under Section 1039 of the Revised Administrative Code is “a manifestation in language or conduct of disease or defect of the brain or a more or less permanently diseased or disordered condition of the mentality, functional or or- ganic, and characterized by perversion, inhibition, oF disor- dered function of the sensory ot of the intellective faculties or by impaired or disordered volition.” |. There must be a complete deprivation of intelligencein com- ‘mitting the act, that is, the accused is deprived of reason, he acts without the least discernment because there is complete absence of power to discem, or there is atotal deprivation of freedom of the will. (People vs. Dungo, G.R. No, 89420, July 31, 1991) Mere abnormality of the mental faculties will not ‘exclude imputability. (People vs, Dana, November 1992) . When insanity is interposed as a defense or a ground of a motion to quash the burden rests upon the accused to estab- lish that fact, for the law presumes every man to be sane, ‘Hence, in the absence of sufficient evidence to prove insan- ity, the legal presumption of one’s sanity stands. (Asticle 800, Civil Code) (Zosa vs. CA, G.K. No. 105641, 231 SCRA 22, March 10, 1994) The law presumes all acts to be voluntary. Not every aberration of the mind or exhibition of mental deficiency is insanity. (id.) When insanity is alleged, the evidence on this point must refer to the time preceding the act or to the very moment of its execution. If the evidence pointed to the insanity subse- quent to the commission of the crime, the accused cannot be acquitted. He is presumed (o be sane when he committed it. (id) 7. Insanity is a defense in the nature of confession and avoid- ance, and as such must be proved beyond reasonable doubt. 1. Article 79 refers to the insanity occurring, after the commis- sion of the crime, whereas, insunity in article 12 refers to that at the very moment the crime ix being committed. “When the convict shall become insane or an imbecile after final sen- tence has been pronounced, the execution of said sentence shall be suspended only with regard to the personal penalty, 10. i. CIRCUMSTANCES AFFECTING CRIMINAL LIABILITY a the provisions of the second paragraph of circumstance tuarber 1of article 12 being observed in the corresponding, ‘cases, fat any time the convict shall recover his reason his sentence shall be executed, unless the penalty shall have pre- teribed in accordance with the provisions of {the] Code, Where the imbecile or an insane has committed a felony, the court shall order his confinement in one of the hospitals or asylums established for thus afflicted, which he shall not ke permitted to leave without frst ob- taining the permission of the same court. (People vs. Rafanan, Jn, GR. No, 54135, 204 SCRA 65, November 21, 1991) Care must be taken to distinguish between lack of reason (insanity) and failure to use reason or good judgment due to extreme anger (passion). Mere mental depravity or moral insanity which resulls not from any disease of mind, but from. a perverted condition of the moral system, where the person js mentally sane, does not exempt one from the responsibil- ity for crimes committed under its influence. Thus, before the defense of insanity may be accepted as an exempting cir- ‘cumstance, there must be a complete deprivation of intelli- igence— not only ofthe will — in committing the criminal ett, In the case of Refanan, the fact that the appellant threat- toned the victim with death in case she reported her ravish- tment indicated thathe was aware of the reprehensible moral depravity of that assault and that he was not deprived of intelligence. In Dungo, that the accused knew the nature of what he had done negated his claim thathe was insane when he fatally stabbed the victim. In Aquino, appellant who ‘consumed cough syrup and 3 marijuana sticks before rap- ing his victim and killing her had some form of mental ill zness which did not deprive him of intelligence. Mere abnor- ality of the mental faculties does not exclude criminal cul- pability. (People vs. Medina, G.R. No. 113691, 286 SCRA 44, February 6, 1998) “The two tests are: (a) Cognition test or complete deprivation of intelligence in committing the crimiral act, and (b) Voli- tion test ora total deprivation of the freedom of the will. TheRD 2B. uu 15. (COMPREHENSIVE REVIEW IN CRIMINAL LAW volition test does not suffice to exempt from liability; it must bbe accompanied by the cognition test which alone is suffi- cient to exempt from I (id) loss of intelligence it is al most a mitigating circumstance under Article 13(9) of the Revived Penal Code: “such illness of the offender as would diminish the exercise of the will- power of the offender without however depriving him of the consciousness of his acts.” ia been described! as a chronic mental disorder characterized by inability to dintinguishbetween fantasy and reality, and often accompanied hy hallucinations and delu- sions. Formerly called dementia praecox, it is said to be the ‘most common form of psychinin and unally develops be- tween the ages of 13 and 30, (1d.) In cases where schizophrenia way interposed, it has mostly been rejected for if there was impairment of the men- tal faculties, such impairment wos not so complete as to de- prive that accused of intelligence or the consciousness of his acts. Schizophrenic reaction, although not exempting because itdoes not completely deprive the offender of the eonscious- ness of his acts, may be considered as a mitigating circum- stance under Article 13(9). Imbecility, like insanity, is a delernse which pertains to the mental condition of a person. The same standards in respect of both insanity and imbecility obtain. (Peuple vs. Buenaflor, GAR. No, 93752, 211 SCRA 492, July 15,1992) ‘There is legal and jurispructential lacuna with respect to the so-called “battered woman syndrome” as a possible modi- fying circumstance that could affect the criminal liability or penalty of the accused. The syndrome deserves serious con- sideration, especially in the light of its possible effect on her very life. Itcould be that very thin line divides between death and life or even acquittal. The Court cannot, for mere techni- cal or procedural objections, deny appellant the opportunity to offer this defense, for any criminal conviction must be “CIRCUMSTANCES AFFECTING CRIMINALLIABILITY » based on proof of guilt beyond reasonable doubt. Accused persons facing the possibility of the death penalty must be given fair opportunities to proffer all defenses possible that could save them from capital punishment. (People vs. Genosa, G.R, No, 135981, 341 SCRA 493, September 29, 2000) ‘The trial judge is not a psychiatrist or psychologist equipped with the specialized knowledge of determining the state of a person’s mental health. 16. The youthful offenders are: a. Nine (9) or under where the law itself presumes lack of intelligence hence no proof will be admitted to prove the contrary even if the minor has superior intelligence. b, Over9 but under 15 who is not criminally liable: unless he acted with discernment. But even if he did so, he is ‘ALWAYS entitled to AT LEAST two degrees’ lowering of penalty. (Article 68) However, discernment is not rel- evant to intent but to intelligence. While there may be discernment, it does not necessarily mean that the mi- nor intended the crime, (People vs. Cordova, july 1993) If intent is not likewise proved, the accused will be ac- ‘quitted from the offense charged. ¢ 1Sbutunder18, Under PD 603 as amended by PD.1179, aminor 15 years old but less than 18 may apply for sus- pension of sentence provided that: 1. The penalty prescribed for the crime is not death of life imprisonment; 2. He must not have been given a suspended sen- tence before since the privilege is available once only; and 3. Atthe time sentence is promulgated, he is still be- low 18 and qualified for commitment to reforma- tory. 17, The allegation that the minor committed the imputed acts ‘with intent to kill” has been held as sufficient compliance to the requirement of allegation in the information that the18 19. 2. COMPREHENSIVE REVI IN CRIMINAL. LAW child had acted with discernment. (People vs. Cordova, et al, July 1993) For accident to be appreciated, the following must concur: a. theaccused was performing, lawful act with due care; b. the injury is eaused by mere accident; and there was no fault or intent of causing the injury, (Peo- ple vs. Mal-an, December 1992) “This is because when the act is with fault, it will fall ‘under culpa; when with intent it will become an intentional felony. The accident must not he foreseeable or there will be fault or criminal negligence. ‘The exemption from criminal liability for accident is based. ‘on the lack of criminal intent. For an accident to become an ‘exempting circumstance, the act has to be lawful. The act of firing a shotgun at another ia not a lawtul act. (People vs. Agliday, G.R. No. 140794, 367 SCRA 273, October 16, 2001) Having claimed that the shooting was accidental, petitioner must prove the same by clear and convincing evidence. However, the burden of proving the commission of the crime remained with the prosecution. (People vs. CA, G.R. No. 1036613, 352 SCRA 599, Hebruary 23, 2001) Anaccident is an accurrence that “happens outside the sway of our will, and although il comes about through some act of ‘our will, lies beyond the hounds of humanly foreseeable con- sequences.” It connotes the absence of criminal intent, In- tent is a mental state, the existence of which is shown by a person's overt acts. In the case at bar, appellant got his shot- ‘gun and returned to the kitchen to shoot his son, who had intervened in the quarrel between the former and Conchita. A shotgun would not have fired off without first being ‘cocked. Undoubtedly, appellant cocked the shotgun before discharging it, showing a cleur intent to fire it at someone. {People ve Aglday, G.R.No. 140794, 367 SCRA 273, October 16, 2001) ‘CIRCUMSTANCES AFFECTING CRIMINAL LIABILITY a 22, Negligence is the omission to do something which a reason- able man, guided by those considerations which ordinarily regulate the conduct of human affairs, would do, or the do- ing of something which a prudent and reaconable man would not do, (Raynera vs, Hiceta, G.R. No. 120824, April 21, 1999) Drivers of vehicle who bump the rear of another vehi- cle are presumed tobe the cause of the accident, unless con- tradieted by other evidence. The rationale behind this pre- sumption is that the driver ofthe rear vehicle has fll control “of the situation as he isin a position to observe the vehicle in. front of him. Consequently, the responsibility to avoid the collision with the front vehicle lies with the driver of the rear Vehicle. His is the last chance of avoiding the accident, (Id.) In case of accident, the actor must not abandon the vic- tim or else he will be liable for abandonment in Art. 275. 23, The elements of impulse of uncontrollable fear are: ‘4, Threat which caused the fear of an evil greater than or at least equal to that which the accused was required to commit; bb. Itpromised an evil of such gravity and imminence that the ordinary man would have sucoambed to it. 24, Irresistible force has the following elements: a. The force must be physical, must come from an outside source, and the accused must act not only without a will but also against his will. b. ‘The actor must be reduced to a mere instrument, such that the element of freedom is wanting, c. The duress, force, fear or intimidation must be present, imminent and impending and of such a nature as to induce a well-grounded fear of death or serious bodily injury if the act is not done. 25, Insuperable cause is an exempting circumstance which ap- plies to felonies by omission. The law imposes a duty on the offender to perform an act but his failure to do sois due toa lawful or insuperable cause. For instance, Asticle 125 pro-‘COMPREHENSIVE REVIEWHR IN CRIMINAL LAW vides for the number of hours when a person arrested must be delivered to the udicial authorities. ARTICLE 13 — Mitigating Circumstances 1 Mitigating circumstances shows lesser perversity of the of- fender and are considered to lower the penalty imposable generally to the minimum period of the penalty prescribed in the law. They are matters of defense which do not have to be alleged inthe information, Article 13 enumerates ordinary mitigating circumstances. Outside of Article 13, are extenuating circumstances such as concealment of dishonor on the part of the mother in infan- ticide which have the effect of reducing the penalty. Unlike in aggravating circumstance, there are analogous mitigating circumstances. ‘The rationale behind the whole concept of mitigating circum- stance is to show mercy anid some extentof leniency in favor ‘of an accused who has nevertheless shown lesser perversity in the commission of an offense, Thus, where the evidence on record bespeaks of vilenoss and depravity, no mercy nor leniency should be accorded an accused who should be made to suffer in full for acts perpetrated with complete voluntari- ness and intent for their tragic consequences. (People vs. Santos, supra.) Kinds of mitigating circumstances: a. Ordinary — lowers the penalty to the minimum period. Privileged — lowers the penalty prescribed by one or ‘more degrees whether it is a divisible or indivisible pen- alty. ©. Specific — applies to a specific felony like concealment of dishonor in the case of aborticn by the pregnant woman. Distinctions between ordinary and privileged mitigating ciz- cumstances: (CIRCUMSTANCES AFFECTING CRIMINAL LABILITY * a. Ordinary can be offset by generic aggravating circum- stance; Privileged cannot be offset by any kind of ag gravating circumstance. b. Ordinary mitigating lowers the penalty prescribed to Seki evcptin cle wher thereat? ordinary mitigating and no aggravating circumstance in which case the penalty is lowered by one degree only. Privileged mitigating lowers the penalty by degree. ‘Thus, if a provision of the Revised Penal Code states that the penalty for a particular felony is lowered by one or two degrees in view of the presence of a particu- lar circumstance, that is a privileged mitigating circum~ ‘stance which cannot be offset by any genericaggravat- ing. Example Article 69 on incomplete | justification/ex- emption. c. Ordinary mitigating is not considered in the determi- nation of the proper penalty when the penalty pre- scribed is a single indivisible penalty. Privileged is con- sidered whatever penalty is imposeble. (One and the same fact should not give credit to more than ‘one mitigating circumstance in favor of the accused. For in- stance, passion, vindication of a grave offense or provoca- tion cannot co-exist if all are based upon the same fact, hence only one circumstance should mitigate the criminal liability ofthe offender. |. The mitigating circumstances are: Incomplete justifying or exempting circumstances; Minority /senility: Praeter intentionem; (supra,) Sufficient provocation or threat; Immediate vindication of a grave offense; Passion or obfuscation; Voluntarily surrender; Voluntarily plea of guilt; Ferme ao ee“ (COMPREHENSIVE REVIEW IN CRIMINAL LAW Deaf and dumb, blind or physical defect; j. Miness; k. Analogous circumstances. 9, The first mitigating circumstance pertains to the incomplete- ness of the requirements lo justify the act or exempt from criminal liability under Articles 11 and 12, This should be related to Article 69 which prescribes a privileged mitigat- ing circumstance if majority of the requisites to exempt or justify are present, Otherwise, Article 13, no. 1 shall apply, and the penalty shall be lowered o theninimum period only. Any first year law stuclent knows that unlawful aggres- sion is not a mitigating circumstance. (Estoya vs, Singson, ‘Adm. Mat, RTJ-91-759, Sept. 1994) It is not unlawful aggres- sion but the incompleteness of the requisite for defense that is mitigating. 10, Minority is always a privileged mitigating circumstance be- cause: a, Article 47 dictates that if the death penalty is imposed, the penalty will be lowered to reclusion perpetua, (if the minor is less than 15 the penalty should be lowered to reclusion temporal) b. Article 68(1) mandates that if the minor is over 9 but under 15, and he acted with discernment he shall al- ways be entitied toat lvasl two degnes reduction of the penalty, and Article 68(2) requires that if the minor is over 15 but under 18, he shall be entitle! to a wcluction of penalty to the next lower penalty bul in the proper period. . fhe is exactly 15, following the rule on liberal interpre- tation, he should be classilied under paragraph 1 of Article 68 but the Supremw Court on one occasion placed the 15 year-old in no. 2 TL Inone instance, appellant was only 16 yearsof age when she committed the offense. I she were prusecuted under the 2 1B 4 15 16. cv CIRCUMSTANCES AFFECTING CRIMINAL LIABILITY s Code, she is entitled to a reduction of penalty by one degree (Art. 68, RPC). But the benign provisions of the Code are not applicable to offenders prosecuted under special laws. (Peo~ ple vs. Ondo, 227 SCRA 562) PD. 603 is not applicable to: ‘a. One who has once enjoyed its benefits; b. One whois convicted for an offense punishable by death or life imprisonment; c Ayouth who has been convicted for an offense by the Military Tribunals. Suspension of sentence shall not apply toa youthful offender who is convicted of an offense punishable by death or life imprisonment. A eee ig ecrliment and ‘was sentenced to suffer ty of life imprisonment clearly falls under the exception provided for by the Child and Youth Welfare Code, (i.) It can be inferred from Article 191 of RD. 603 that the provi- sion is operative only during the trial or pending appeal. Nevertheless the law uses the word “may,” which denotes that it is directory in nature and implies discretion on the partof the tral court to place the minor under the custody of his or her parents or any suitable person. (id.) What Article 189 of PD 603 modified is Article 80 of the Re- vised Penal Code on suspension of sentence; and not para graph 2, Article 13 of the same Code which treats of minor- ity asa mitigating circumstance. Thus, for minority tobe con- sidered as 8 mitigating circumstance, the offender must be lunder 18 years of age at the time the crime was committed. “The age of the minor is reckoned at the time of the commis- sion of the crime to determine if he is qualified for suspen- ‘ion of sentence, but the age at the time of rendition of ser tence is considered ifthe application will be granted. ‘The judge committed error in suspending the sentence since the crime of the minor, robbery with homicide, is punish- able by reclusion perpetua to death. However, since the deci18, 19. 21. (COMPREHENSIVE REVIEWER IN CRIMINAL LAW sion has become final, even the Supreme Court can no longer alter that judgment no matter how erroneous it may have been. (People vs. Galit, GR. No. 97432, March 1, 1994) Itis not for the Supreme Court to order the release of the minor from the training school without the benefit of a re- view of the recommendation of the DSWD by the trial court. Under Art. 196 of PD 603, it is the trial court who should review the report and recommendation which per se is not sufficient to warrant the release of youthful offender, The court should seek out concrete, material and relevant facts to confirm thathe had indeed been reformed and is ready to reenter society as a productive and law abiding citizen. But, he is not to be tried anew for the same act he was charged with. The inquiry isnot a criminal prosecution but the deter- mination of his proper education and rehabilitation during, his commitment in the Center and his moral and social fit- ness to rejoin the community. (id,) . Penal laws should be liberally construed in favor of the of- fender, Thus, considering the gravity of the offense and in the interest of justice, the Supreme Court allowed the pres- entation of and admitted the birth certificate of the accused to prove minority although said birth certificate was not px sented or offered in the trial court. An official document pre- pared by the DSWD in the exercise ofits functions and which document is incorporated in the records of this case can be taken judicial notice ex mero motu. (People vs. Regalario, 220 SCRA 368) ‘To benefit from PD 603, the accused must be a youthful of- fender not only at the time of the commission of the crime but also at the time of trial, When the accused is no longer a youthful offender at the time of sentencing, he cannot ‘anymore avail of the benefit of suspension of sentence. Nei- ther can his “minority” [19 years old] at the time of commis- sion of the crime be appreciated as a mitigating factor. (Peo- ple vs. delos Reyes, G.R. No. 44112, October 22, 1992) ‘Arminor found criminally responsible may still escape pen- alty for Article 196 of PD 603 provides that if it is shown to 22. 24, 26. m7. ” “CARCUMSTANCES APLECTING C the satisfaction of the court that the youthful offender whose sentence has been suspended has behaved properly and has shown his capability to be a tuseful member of the commu nity, even before reaching the age of majority, upon recom- mendation of the DSWD, it shall dismiss the case and order his final discharge. Under Sectinn 197, the youth is to be returned to court for pronouncement of judgment if he has shown himself to be incorrigible, he failed to comply with the condition of his rehabilitation or his continued stay tn training institution is not advisable. Senility (over 70) iv an otlinary mitigating circumstance ex- cept when the penalty imposable Is death in which case, it Shell be reduced to clusion perpetua pursuant Article 83, thus partaking the nature ofa privileged mitigating circumstance. “The elements of sufficient provocation are: a, The provocation must be suffident; b. Tt must be immediate to the commission of the crime; c._ It must originate from the offended party. Provocation is immediate if ro interval of time elapsed be- tween the provocation and the commission of the crime, (Peo ple vs, Pagal, 79SCRA 570) ‘Accused cannot claim that he was provoked when the of- fended ran away from him becnuse the hapless victim feared for his life having been beaten up twice by his assailants that same evening, To flee when danget lurks is human andcan never be regarded asa source of tion sufficient within the ambit of the Code. In fact, when an offended party flees from his apgressor, the latter has no reason to pursue and attack him. (People vs, Padilla, GR.No.75508, June 10, 1994) Sufficient provocation as a requisite of incomplete self- defense is different from sufficient provocation as a mitigat- ing circumstance, As an clement of self-defense, it requires its absence on the part of the person defending himeelf;as a sitigating circumstance, itpertainsto its presence on thepart31. 32. (COMPREHENSIVE KEVIEWIICIN CRIMINAL.LAW of the offended party. (People ve. CA, Gk, No, 103613, Feb- ‘ruary 2001) Inimmediate vindication of grave offense “offense” need not be a crime. It may be any act or event which offends the ac- cused causing mental agony tohim and moves him to vindi- cate himself of such offenne. For instance, insulting an old man (US. vs. Ampar, 37 Phil. 301) or eluping with the of- fender's daughter. (People vs. Diokno, 63 Phil. 601) “Immediate” means proximate, unlike in sufficient provo- cation, and allows an interval of time between the commis- sion of the offense and its vindicution as long as the offender ig till eufering from the mental agony brought about by the “offense” to him, (People vs, Varana, 64 Phil. 331) ‘The benefit of mitigating circumstance of immediate vindi- cation of a grave offense cannot be considered in favor of the accused when he had sufficient time to recover his serenity. (People vs. Santos, supra.) In passion or obfuscation il iy necessary that it arose from awful sentiments, There must be an acl unlawful and suffi- cient to excite passion or obfuscation on the accused. Said act must not be farremovedl [rom the commission of the crime by a considerable length of time during which the offender might have recovered his serves, ‘The court will not appreciate passion or obfuscation inas- much as the anger of Eduardo at Francis dlid not arise from lawful sentiments. The delay of Francis in obeying Eduardo’s request to buy a balleasterbearing is too trivia a matter as to fairly and justly cause such overreaction on the part of Eduardo, (People vs, Tiongco, September 1994) The acts of the accused were done in the spirit of revenge and lawless- ness, for which no mitigating circumstance of passion or ‘obfuscation can arise. (People vs. CA, G.8. No. 103613, Feb- ruary 23, 2001) Voluntary surrender and voluntary plea are independent of ‘each other and can be separately considered in favor of the offender. 34. ‘CIRCUMSTANCES AFFECTING CRIMINAL LIABILITY * ‘The elements of voluntary surrender are: a. The offender surrendered to a person in authority or his agent; b. The offender surrendered before arrest is effected; It must be voluntary, i, spontaneous and must show the intentof the accused tosubmit himself uncondition- y to the authorities, either because he acknowledges i guilt or he wishes to save them the trouble and ex- ‘pense incidental to his search and capture; d. There is no pending warrant of arrest or information led. (People vs. Taraya, GAR. No, 195851, October 27, 2000) For instance, when Ampie leamed that the police were looking for him for the death of Salvador, he im- mediately wentto the police stationwherehe confessed to killing Salvador in self-defense. However, the said surrender does not constitute as a mitigating circum: stance for atthe time of his surrender, he had a pending, warrant of arrest issued five days before his: surrender. His arrest by that time was imminent. (id) Voluntary surrender can be appreciated even if the accused turned themselves one week after the crime, The fact is they voluntarily surrendered to the police before arrest could be effected, (People vs. Amaguin, G.R. Nes. 54344-45, January 10, 1994) Since it was the police officer who wert looking for the ac- ‘cused immediately after obtaining information from eyewit- nesses as to who had fated the crime even if he did rnot resist arrest or deny his criminal act, this cannot be equated with voluntary surrender. (People vs. Rebamontan, 305 SCRA 609, April 1999) ‘On the day following the killing, accused surrendered to the Provincial Commander. That the Provincial Commander announced over the radio thathe would issue a shoot-to-kill order unless accused voluntarily surrerders, and that he was persuaded to surrender by his employer do not militate40. 41. 2, ‘COMPREHENSIVE REVIIWUN IN CRIMINAL LAW against the consideration of his voluntary surrender. The stubbom fact was that he was not arrested and that he pre- sented himself to the Provincial Commander to surrender. (People vs. Morato, 224 SCRA 361, July 1993) ‘The offender himself should surrender. Ifthe offender did not submit himself to the authorities and it was his superior who surrendered him to the custody of the court, such is not the voluntary surrender contemplated by law. (People vs. Acuram, supra.) ‘That accused surrendered because of fear of reprisal does not detract from the spontaneity of his surrender and the fact that he had saved the State the time and trouble of search- ing for him. (People vs. Amazan, G.R. No. 136251, Jan. 16, 2001) The fact that accused yielded his weapon at the time of the incident albeit with some persuasion should be consid- ‘ered in his favor. (People vs, Anion, G.R No, 140511, March 1, 2001) ‘The elements of voluntary plea of guilty are: a. The plea was made in open court (judicial confession) b. It was spontaneous and unconditional c. Made before presentation of the evidence by the pros- ecution An extra-judicial confession ix not mitigating because not made in open court, The court must be one of original juris- diction because it must be made at the earliest opportunity and before the presentation of the prosecution's evidence. Voluntary plea of guilty is mitigating because itis an act of repentance and respect for the law. It indicates a moral dis- position in the accused favorable to his reform. Plea of guilty in capital offenses must not be accepted with alacrity but the accused must be made tv understand fully thenature of his plea and its consequences. The accused must be acquitted if the only evidence of his guilt is his improvi- dent plea due to the prodding of his PAO lawyer. (People vs. Mendoza, 231 SCRA 264, March 1994) 45. 46. 47. “CIRCUMSTANCES AFFECTING CRIMINAL LIABILITY a ‘Accused did not plead to a lesser offense but pleaded guilty to the rape charges and only bargained for a lesser penalty. In short, he did not plea bargain but made conditions on the penalty to be imposed. This is erroneous because by plead ing guilty to the offense charged, he should be sentenced to the penalty to which he pleaded. It isthe essence ofa plea of ‘guilty that the accused admits absolutely and uncondition- ally his guilt and responsibility for the ojfense imputed to him. Hence, he may not foist a conditional plea of guilty on the court by admitting his guilt provided that a certain pen- alty will be meted unto him. (People vs Magat, GR. No. 130026, 332 SCRA 517) ‘The offender’s being deaf and dumb or blind or otherwise suffering from some physical defect must be related to the offense committed because the law requires that the defect has the effect of restricting his means of action, defense, or ‘communication to his fellow beings. Illness must only diminish and not deprive the offender of the consciousness of his acts. Otherwise he will be exempt from criminal liability. Analogous circumstances must be similar to those enumer- ated in Article 13. Examples of these are: ‘a, Restitution of the questioned funds by petitioner may be considered mitigating circumstance in malversation of public funds (Nizurtado vs, Sandiganbayan, 239 SCRA 33, December 1994) as analogous to voluntary plea of guilty. b. That petitioner voluntarily took the cow to the munici- pal hall to place it unconditionally in the custody of the Authorities and thus save them the trouble of recover- ing the cow, can be analogous to voluntary surrender, (Canta vs. People, G.R. No. 140937, February 28, 2001) c. Extreme poverty is not among the mitigating circum- ‘stances enumerated in Article 13 of the Code and it is doubtful whether it may be considered as a circum- stance of a similar nature or analogous to those men-a2 CCOMPREHUNSIVE REVIWVENC IN CRIMINAL LAW tion in said Article, (Gallardo vs. Tabamo, Je, Adm. Mat. RTJ-92-881, June 1994) d. Even if their formal education were ignored, such at- tenuating circumstance is nonetheless unavailing. The fact that defendants belong to the non-Christian cultural minorities cannot reduce from the subjective point of view their awareness of the gravity of the offense for robbery and killing are by their very nature just as wrong to the ignorant as to the enlightened. ARTICLE 14 — Aggravating Circumstances 1. Aggravating circumstances are those which show greater perversity of the offender, hence, they have the effect of in- creasing the penalty. 2. Aggravating and mitigating circumstances may be distin- ‘guished in the following manner: a. ‘The list in Article 13 includes analogous circumstances showing the liberality of the law in favor of the accused; in Article 14, the list is exclusive to curtall discretion of the judge to determine what other circumstances may increase the penalty. b. Mitigating cizcumstance may lower the penalty by de- agrees as in the case of Article 64, no. 5; aggravating cix- ‘cumstances, no mater how many can only increase the penalty to the maximum period within that penalty prescribed by law. The inerense can never be by degree. Mitigating circumstance is a matter of defense which does not have to be alleged in the Information; aggra~ vating circumstances must be alleged in the Informa- tion before they can be proved and appreciated. 3. Examples of 2b: a, Where the accused killed 3 persons by reason or on the ‘occasion of the robbery the ine of multiplicity of homi- cide was the subject of conflicting views. In some cases. it was held that the wdditional rapes/homicides com- CIRCUMSTANCES AFFECTING CRIMINAL LIABILITY 3 mitted on the occasion of robbery would not increase the penalty; while in other cases, the ruling was, the multiplicity of rapes/homicides committed would be appreciated as an aggravating circumstances. People 0s. Regala settled the issue where the court ruled that no Jaw provides that the additional rape or homicide should be considered as aggravatingcircumstance. (Peo- ple vs. Gano, GR. No. 134373, February 28, 2001) b. Immoral motive, while it may find support in evidence may not be considered as it does not fall under any of the aggravating circumstances enumerated in Article 14 of the Revised Penal Code. (People vs. Villaver, G.R. No. 1-32104, March 25, 1983) 4, The four kinds of aggravating circumstances are: a. Generic aggravating circumstances which: 1. Have the effect of the penalty being imposed in the maximum period. Note that the penalty pre- seribed in Book If of the Code is the maximum imposable, thus the increase in the penalty cannot bbe to the next higher degree but only to the maxi- mum period; 2. Apply toall felonies; and 3, Can be offset by an ordinary mitigating circum- stance. Prior to the amendment of the Rules on Criminal Procedure, aqualifying circumstance not alleged in the Information but proved may be appreciated as.a generic ‘aggravating circumstance because this is not an element ofthe crime, hence, its appreciation does not violate the right of the accused to be informed of the nature of the accusation against him. However, with the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure, the Information must specify the qualifying and aggravating circumstances. ‘Gection 8, Rule 110) ‘A cursory examination of the Information filed against accused-appellant would show that the aggra-COMPREHENSIVE RUVIEWER IN CRIMINAL. LAW vating circumstances of nighttime and dwelling are not specified therein. Now, at the time the trial court ren- dered its decision, the non-allegation of generic aggra- vating circumstances in the information was immate- rial, since the rule then prevailing was that generic ag- ‘gravating circumstances duly proven in the course of the trial could be taken into account by the trial court in determining the proper imposable penalty even ifsuch circumstances were notalleged in the information. (Peo- ple vs, Deberto, 205 SCRA 291; People vs. Legaspi, 357 SCRA 240) ‘The circumstances enumerated in Article 14 are generic circumstances although some are qualifying in particular crimes such as treachery, evident premedita- tion, ete. in murder. (Qualifying circumstances which: 1. Cannotbe offset by any mitigating circumstance. 2. Change the nature of the crime and the designa- tion of the offense. 3. Must be alleged! in the information, otherwise it cannotbe considered agains! the offender as such because it will violate right of the accused to be informed of the nature of the secusation against him since a qualifying circumstance changes the nature of the offense. ‘This is beside the fact that the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure now re- quires specification of qualifying, circumstances in the Information, 4. Must be proved as conclusively as the guilt of the offender because it changes the nature of the offense with corresponding increase in the penalty. For instance, homicide is penalized with reclusion temporal (20 years maximurn). With one qualify- ing circumstance, it becomes murder penalized with reclusion perpetua (40 years maximum), thus the penalty is doubled, c. ‘CIRCUMSTANCES AFFECTING CRIMINAL LIABILITY 35 Special or specific aggravating, circumstances which apply 2 Particular felony. They do not change the cheracter of the offense charged but guide the court in imposing the proper penalty. (People vs. Agguihao, March 10, 1994) The same rae os in genes agra ing applies to special aggravating as) as apPange te cheracer of the offense charged. RA 7659 added the circumstance of “organized / ted group" in Article 62(1a). Thisis a special ag- gravating circumstance because Article 14 was not cor Fespondingly amended to include the same. The maxi- mum penalty shall be imposed if the offense was com- mitted by any person belonging to an organized /syn- dicated crime group which is defined as a group of 2 or ‘more persons collaborating, confederating, Or ‘mutually helping one another for purposes of gan in the commis- sion of any crime. Inherent aggravating circumstance whichis an element of the felony thus no longer considered against the of- fender in the determination of the genalty. (Art. 62, no. 2) ‘The Revised Rules of Criminal Proceduse (effective Decem- ‘ber 1, 2000) requires that every complaint or information must expressly and specifically allege not only the qualifying but Slso the genoric aggravating circumstances; otherwise, the Jame will not be considered by the courteven it proved dur- ing the trial. The Revised Rules is applicable in. all criminal aces, notonly in cases where the aggravating circumstances would increase the penalty to death. (Pecple vs. Legaspi, G.R. Nos. 1336164-5, April 20, 2001) Prior to the Revised Rules the norvallegation of generic aggravating circumstances duly proven in the course ofthe trial could be taken into account by the trial court in determining the imposable; penalty. (Peo- ple vs. Legaspi, GR, Nos, 136164-65, April 20, 2001) ,. The rationale for the requirement to be informed of the ex- jstence of the qualifying circumstance is for accused to pre- pare properly for his defense to meet head-on the qualifying Prrourrstance and because such circumstance changes the% ‘COMPREHENSIVE RIEVIEWR IN CRIMINAL LAW nature of the charge against him. (People vs. Abuyen, Sep- tember 1992) 7. Article 335 as amended by RA 7659, (now 266-A, RA. 8353) prescribes the death penalty when the rape victim is under ‘Band the offender is a parent, ascendant, step-parent, guard- iany relative by consanguinity or affinity within the third civil degree, or the common-law spouse of the parent ofthe vic- tim. The relationship of the accused and the victim and the ‘minority of the offended party must be specifically pleaded in the Information to be appreciated for the purpose of im- posing the death penalty, (People vs. Ranilla, July 1999) For instance, the description of the offender in the Information as uncle is insufficient to inform the offender as the law re- quires “affinity within third civil degree." It mightbe that he is an uncle being a cousin of the victim's parent, outside of the third civil degree. 8 Where one of the aggravating circumstances has been used as a qualifying circumstance, the others will be deemed as generic, Since treachery has already been used to qualify the Crime as murder, evident premeditation should be consid- ered as only a yeneric aggravating circumstance, (People vs. Fabros, October 1992) 9. Conspiracy is neither apgravating nor qualifying but is ‘manner of incurring collective criminal liability among every co-conspirator in an equal degree such that the act of one becomes the actof all. The presence of conspiracy cannot per se qualify a killing to murder, (People vs. Feran, October 1992) Taking advantage of official position 1. Intaking advantage of official position the testis: “Did the accused abuse his office in order to commit the crime? If he imestance i present, (Sanchez vs. Demetriou, ered present when for instance the offender falsifies a document in connection with the duties of his o!- fice which consist of either making or preparing or other- wise intervening in the preparation of a document, (Layno vs. People, September 1992) (See notes under Article 62) ‘CIRCUMSTANCES AFFECTING CRIMINAL LIABILITY a 2. ‘That accused appellant used his service firearm in shooting the victim should not be considered as taking advantage of public position. For such to be considered aggravating, the Public official must use the influence, prestige and ascend Ency whichis office gives him in realizing is purpose. (Peo- ple vs. Amion, G.R. No. 140511, March 1,201) In contempt of or with Insult to public authorities: 1. Requisites: a. _ The public authority is engaged in the discharge of his duties; 'b. Offender knows the identity of the public authorit The crime was committed in his emus not be against the person in authority for then the crime would be direct assault and this circumstance will be absorbed being inherent therein. 2, A person in authority is one vested with jurisdiction or au thority. A chief of police is a public authority because he is specifically duty bound to prosecute ard apprehend viola- were of the laws and municipal ordinances. He heads and supervises the entire police force in the municipality. A Barangay Chairman is also a person in authority ‘because he has jurisdiction over the barangay and as expressly provided under the Local Government Code. ‘Ago, Sex, Rank, Dwelling 1, There are four circumstances in this paragraph but only one credit should be given if al are present for they all refer to the circumstance of lack of respect duetto the offended. 2. There must be proof that offender deliberately intended to offend or insult the age or sex of the offended, Thus, this Circumstance cannot co-exist with passion or obfuscation. because here the offender lost his contol or reason. 3, Themere fact thatthe victim is a female does not suffice. The aggravating circumstance of sex is not sustained solely by‘COMPREHENSIVE RAVIIWIN IN CRIMINAL, LAW. the fact that the victim was a woman, It must further appear that in the unlawful taking of her life, there was some spe- cific insult or disrespect shown to her womanhood. (People vs. Ursal, 121 SCRA 409) ‘These are considered in crimes against persons, security or honor. It is not considered in crimes where gender is an ele- ment as in parricide, rape, abduction, or seduction; or in crimes against property such as the special complex crime of robbery with homicide. (People vs. Paraiso, G.R. No. 127840, November 29, 1999) However, in People vs. de los Reyes, (October 1992, the aggravating circumstance of dwelling was taken into account in the imposition of the proper penalty because robbery with homicide can be committed without necessarily tranegressing the sanctity of the home. "Rank" should be given a plain, ordinary meaning, hence refers to high social position or standing, It is absorbed in the crime of direct assuult since rank is an element there- of, It should be clearly demonstrated that the accused deliber- ately intended to act with insult or in disregard of the re- spect due the victim on account of his rank. That the accused ‘was cognizant of the rank of the deceased police officer or that he articulated hatred against all policemen in general does not per se sulfice to prove this aggravating circumstance. (Or when the raiding police officers were not even in uni- form. (People vs. Verchez, June 1954) ‘Age refers to both the elderly and the youth, For instance, Jayvee was barely six years old when cuthlessly stabbed fourteen times before his body was submerged in the pail. It was error for the court not to have considered his age as an aggravating circumstance, (People vs. Lapan, July 1992) “Dwelling” (morada) includes dependencies, staircase, and enclosures under the house. Its not necessary that the house be owned by the offended. It includes a room in a boarding house. Home is that which the law seeks to protect or up- 10, nN. rv 2B. CIRCUMSTANCES AFFECTING CRIMINAL LIABILITY 2 hold against any intruder whether the dweller is a lessee, 2 boarder or a bed spacer. ‘A dwelling must bea building or structure exclusively used for rest and comfort. Where the crime was committed in a store which is about fifteen meters away from the complain- ant’s house, the aggravating circumstance of dwelling can- notbe considered. Obviously, the store cannot be considered 2 dwelling or even a dependency of complainant's home, (People vs. Joya, October 1993) Dwelling is not aggravating when: . the offended has given provocation b. both the offended and offender live therein c. dwelling is inherent in the crime such as trespass to ‘dwelling or robbery in an inhabited place Reason for this aggravating circumstance — the offender's greater perversity in deliberately invading the tranquility of another's domicile. (People vs. Lapan, July 1992) Im the crimes of abduction and illegal detention where the offended is taken from his house, dwelling may ‘be taken as an aggravating circumstance, However, this ‘circumstance has no effect when the imposable penalty isindivisible. (Article 63) (People vs. Grefiel, November 1992) Itis not necessary that the accused should have entered the dwelling of the victim to commit the offense; it is enough that the victim was attacked inside his cwn house, although the assailant may have devised means to perpetrate the as- sault from outside the house, Thus, although the attack was ‘made not from inside but from below the floor of the hoisse, ‘dwelling may be considered as in fact the target victim was hitinside his own house (People vs. Dacibar, G.R. No. 111286, February 2000) or when the victim was abducted while she ‘was in the staircase, (People vs. Magat, GR. No, 130026, 332 SCRA S517)@ ‘COMPREHENSIVE REVIEWEI IN CRIMINAL LAW Abuse of confidence/obvious ungratefulness 1. Requisites of abuse of confidence /obvious ungratefulness: a. Offended had trusted the offender b, Offender abused such trust c. Such abuse of confidence facilitated commission of the crime 2, The confidence between the parties must be immediate and personal. Committed in the palace of the Chlof Executive, etc. 1. Performance of function is not necessary in the circumstances of the offense being committed in the palace of the Chief Executive, in a place devoted to religious worship or in the presence of the Chief Executive. 2. Offender must have sought any of the four places in para- graph 5 for the commission of the crime. Nighttime, uninhabited place, band, ald of armed men 1. “Nighttime” isthe period of darkness beginning at dusk and ‘ending at dawn or from sunsot to sunrise, The crime must be committed exclusively at nighttime and not started at daytime. It is not considered in crimes where nighttime is a mereaccident or has no influence in the perpetration thereof. 2, Nighttime is absorbed in (reachery if its part of the treach- ‘erous means to insure execution of crime. (People vs. Ong, January 30, 1975) 3. The aggravating circumstance of nocturnity cannot be con- sidered where the prosecution vatablished no more than the simple fact that thecrime was committed at night, Nighttime must be deliberately sought in the perpetration of the crime. (People vs. Ferrer, 255 SCRA) 4. The crime must be covered by darkness. Ifthe light was bright enough to see whal was going, on and lo recognize the as- sailants, nocturnity docs not qualify as an aggravating cir- 5. 10. u CURCUNSTANCES AFFECTING CRIMINAL LIABILITY a cumstance under either the subjective or objective tests. (Peo- ple vs, Bigcas, July 1992) By and of itself, nightiimeis notan aggravating circumstance, It becomes so only when it is especially sought by the of- fender, or taken advantage by him to facibtate the commis- sion of the crime (objective test) or to ensure his immunity from capture (Subjective test). (People vs. Pasiliao, October 1992) Nighttime is nota qualifying circumstanceunder Article 248 of the Code, (People vs. Valeriano, ‘September 1993) Ininhabited place” is determined by the reasonable possi- bility of the victim receiving some help or where there are no people or any number of houses within a perimeter of less than 200 meters. Band consists of more than three (at least four) armed mal- efactors organized with the intention of carrying out any unlawful design. They should have acted together in the ‘commission of the crime. (People vs. Rebiego, November 1993) Bands inherent in brigandage. Its similar to abuse of supe- rior strength whose essence is the utilization of the combined strength of the assailants to overpower the victim to con- summate the offense, : ‘The elements of aid of armed men are: a, Armed men or persons took part in the commission of the crime, directly or indirectly, and b. The accused availed himself of their aid or relied upon them when the crime was committed, Compared with the circumstance of aid of armed men: a. Inband there must be at least four armed men; in aid of ‘armed men, there is no required number of malefac- tors. b. The band members are all principa for they take part in the commission of the felony under the same plana (COMPREHENSIVE REVAWEK IN CRIMINAL LAW and for the same purpose. The armed men who aided the principal offencler are miereaccomplices for they give material and moral aicl and encouragementin the com- mission of the crime, Band absorbsaid of armed men. (On the occasion and by means of calamity or misfortune ‘The “other calamity or misfortune” in paragraph 7 refers to the occasion of conflagration, shipwreck, earthquake of epidemic when the offense was commitied. In paragraph 12, the calamity is the means in the commission of the crime. Aggravating because ofthe offender instead of lending aid to the victims, adds to their sufferings. Recidivism, reiteracion, habitual delinquency and quast-recidivism 1. There are four forms of habituality, to wit: recidivism, reiteracion, habitual delinquency (Article 62, No.5) and quasi- recidivism (Att. 160). Arecidivist is one who, at the time of his trial for one crime, shall have been previously convicted by final judgment of an- other crime embraced in the same tlle of thy Code. There must be two convictions. 3, "Final judgment” means executory, i. a. 15 days have elapsed from Its promulgation without the convict appealing the conviction; b, offender started serving s nee; che expressly waived his right to appeal; or d. he applied for probation 4. Recidivism cannot be appreciated where the prosecution failed to present “certified true copies of the judgment of conviction” in the other case since the same is not cured by the failure of the accused to abject to such lack of presenta- tion. Recidivism isan affirmative allegation whenever alleged ‘CIRCUMSTANCES AFFECTING CRIMINAL LIABILITY ° in the information and when the accused enters a plea of not ‘guilty to such information, there is a joirder of issues not only as tohis guilt orinnocence but also asto the presence or absence of the modifying circumstances s9 alleged. (People vs, Molina, G.R. Nos, 1477-8, July 24, 2600) . Inreiteracion, the offender has been previously punished (has served sentence). The first offense was punished with an ‘equal or greater penalty; orhe committed two or more crimes previously where he was meted lighter penalty. The ration- ‘ie here is that despite the previous punishment, offender did not learn his lesson. ;. Recidivism compared with reiteracion: ‘a. _ Recidivism requires a previous conviction by final judg- ‘ment; reiteracion requires service ofsentence. b. In recidivism the offenses are under the same Title; in reiteracion, itis not so required. ¢. Inthe former, here is no requirement as to penalty; in the latter the prior crime must have been imposed with a penalty equal to or greater than the second crime or he must have served for two or more crimes carrying lighter penalty. 1, Habitual delinquency is a special aggravating circumstance and unlike the other kinds of aggrava:ing circumstances ‘which mercly increases the penalty for the offense commit- ted, habitual delinquency has its own penalty which escalates with the increase in the number of convictions. Thus the pen- ally is for the felony committed plus forthe habitual delin- {quency the total of which should not be more than 30 years. A person is a habitual delinquent if within a period of ten years from the date of his release or last conviction of the ‘crimes of Falsification, Robbery, Estafa, Theft, Serious or Less Serious Physical Injuries (memory aid — FRETSeL) he is found guilty of said crimes a third time or oftener. Falsifica- tion is a crime against public interest, Robbery, a and ‘Theft are against Property and the last two are against per- sons. An offender may be a recidivist and a habitual delin-