Chelsea Princess O.

Cabalquinto
JD-1A
Statutory Construction

DOCTRINE OF NECESSITY IMPLICATION

PROVINCE OF CAMARINES SUR, REPRESENTED BY GOVERNOR MIGUEL LUIS R.
VILLAFUERTE, PETITIONER, VS. THE COMMISSION ON AUDIT, RESPONDENT.
G.R. No. 227926, March 10, 2020

FACTS:
To accommodate the growing number of enrollees in public schools, petitioner started hiring in
1999 temporary teaching personnel to handle extension classes of existing public schools, as well
as non-teaching personnel in connection with the establishment and maintenance of these
extension classes. The salaries of the personnel hired were charged to the Special Education
Fund (SEF).
On March 5, 2009, Audit Team Leader (ATL) assigned to the province of Camarines Sur issued
Audit Observation Memorandum dated February 18, 2009 stating that the payments made by the
petitioner for the allowances/honoraria of locally funded teaching and non-teaching personnel of
the DepEd-Division of Camarines Sur from July 2008 to October 2008 in the total amount of
P5,820,843.30 that were charged to the SEF contravene the provisions of Section 272 of Republic
Act (R.A.) No. 7160 or The Local Government Code of 1991 (LGC) and the Department of
Education, Culture and Sports, Department of Budget and Management, and Department of
Interior and Local Government Joint Circular (DECS-DBM-DILG JC) No. 1, Series of 1998 dated
April 15, 1998 on the utilization of the SEF for the operation and maintenance of elementary and
secondary public schools.
OIC-Provincial Treasurer and OIC-Provincial Budget Officer of the petitioner contended that the
payments made did not violate Section 272 of the LGC and other pertinent circulars as the
payments were well within the purpose and intent for which the SEF may be utilized.
On December 23, 2011, the ATL and Supervising Auditor-in-Charge issued Notice of
Disallowance dated November 15, 2011 disallowing the payments of allowances/honoraria to
locally funded teaching and non-teaching personnel of DepEd-Division of Camarines Sur which
were charged to the 2008 SEF.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the COA acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction when it failed to consider that the approval, recommendation, and certification
requirements in the DECS-DBM-DILG joint Circular No. 01-A constitutes an invalid exercise of
the administrative rule-making power and violates the principle of local autonomy granted to LGUs
by the local government code.

RULING:
YES.
The phrase which states that the SEF shall be expended for the organization and operation of
such number of extension classes as may be needed to accommodate all children of school age
desiring to enter Grade 1 shows that the salaries and allowances of non-teaching personnel
which, as previously discussed, are indispensable to the organization and operation of extension
classes, are also included in the list for which the SEF may be utilized. This must be so in light of
the doctrine of necessary implication which states that every statutory grant of power, right or
privilege is deemed to include all incidental power, right or privilege. In Department of Environment
and Natural Resources v. United Planners Consultants, Inc.,[38] the doctrine was explained, thus:
Chelsea Princess O. Cabalquinto
JD-1A
Statutory Construction

No statute can be enacted that can provide all the details involved in its application. There is
always an omission that may not meet a particular situation. What is thought, at the time of
enactment, to be an all-embracing legislation may be inadequate to provide for the unfolding of
events of the future. So-called gaps in the law develop as the law is enforced. One of the rules of
statutory construction used to fill in the gap is the doctrine of necessary implication. The doctrine
states that what is implied in a statute is as much a part thereof as that which is expressed. Every
statute is understood, by implication, to contain all such provisions as may be necessary to
effectuate its object and purpose, or to make effective rights, powers, privileges or jurisdiction
which it grants, including all such collateral and subsidiary consequences as may be fairly and
logically inferred from its terms. Ex necessitate legis. And every statutory grant of power, right or
privilege is deemed to include all incidental power, right or privilege. This is so because the greater
includes the lesser, expressed in the maxim, in eo plus sit, simper inest et minus.
To construe the law otherwise would result in absurdity because the hiring of non-teaching
personnel is but a necessary consequence to the maintenance, operation and organization of the
extension classes.
Contrary to the position of the COA, JC No. 01-B did not restrict the disbursement of the SEF for
the payment of the salaries and allowances only of teaching personnel hired to handle extension
classes. A plain reading of JC No. 01-B will show that it merely clarified JC No. 01-A by including
among the priority items chargeable to SEF the payment of salaries and allowances of teachers
hired to handle new classes as extensions of existing public elementary or secondary schools.
Moreover, JC No. 01-B did not supersede or amend the broad provision of JC No. 01 which made
the expenses for the operation and maintenance of public schools, including the organization of
extension classes chargeable against the SEF. Thus, it stands to reason that the joint circulars
encompass the payment of the salaries and allowances of both the teaching and non-teaching
personnel hired to handle extension classes.
Chelsea Princess O. Cabalquinto
JD-1A
Statutory Construction

NOSCIUR A SOCIIS
MAPALAD AISPORNA, Petitioner, v. THE COURT OF APPEALS and THE PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, Respondents.
G.R. No. L-39419. April 12, 1982

FACTS:
Petitioner, wife of a duly licensed insurance agent, was charged for violation of the first paragraph
of Section 189 of the Insurance Act having acted as agent in the solicitation for insurance in favor
of Eugenio Isidro for and in behalf of Perla Compania de Seguros, Inc. without having first secured
a certificate of authority to act as such agent from the office of the Insurance Commission. The
evidence disclosed at the trial was that petitioner merely left a note on top of her husband’s desk
informing the latter of Isidro’s intention to renew his policy. The trial court found appellant guilty
as charged. On appeal, the Court of Appeals construing the first paragraph of Section 189
independent from the two succeeding paragraphs, affirmed the judgment of conviction and held
that the receipt of compensation for the issuance of an insurance policy is not an essential element
for a violation of the first paragraph of Section 189 of the Insurance Act. Hence, the present
recourse.

The Supreme Court held that receipt of compensation by the agent is an essential element for a
violation of the first paragraph of Section 189; that considering the failure in the information to
allege said element a conviction of the accused could not be sustained based on the well-settled
jurisprudence that to warrant conviction every element of the crime must be alleged and proved.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the responded Court of Appeals erred in finding that the receipt of compensation
is not an essential element of the crime defined by the first paragraph of Section 189 of the
Insurance Act.

RULING:
Yes.
The definition of an insurance agent as found in the second paragraph of Section 189 is intended
to define the word "agent" mentioned in the first and second paragraphs of the aforesaid section.
More significantly, in its second paragraph, it is explicitly provided that the definition of an
insurance agent is within the intent of Section 189. Hence — "Any person who for compensation
. . . shall be an insurance agent within the intent of this section, . . .." Patently, the definition of an
insurance agent under the second paragraph holds true with respect to the agent mentioned in
the other two paragraphs of the said section. The second paragraph of Section 189 is a definition
and interpretative clause intended to qualify the term "agent’’ mentioned in both the first and third
paragraphs of the aforesaid section. Applying the definition of an insurance agent in the second
paragraph to the agent mentioned in the first and second paragraphs would give harmony to the
aforesaid three paragraphs of Section 189. Legislative intent must be ascertained from a
consideration of the statute as a whole. The particular words, clauses and phrases should not be
studied as detached and isolated expressions, but the whole and every part of the statute must
be considered in fixing the meaning of any of its parts and in order to produce harmonious whole.
A statute must be so construed as to harmonize and give effect to all its provisions whenever
possible. The meaning of the law, it must be borne in mind, is not to be extracted from any single
part, portion or section or from isolated words and phrases, clauses or sentences but from a
Chelsea Princess O. Cabalquinto
JD-1A
Statutory Construction

general consideration or view of the act as a whole. Every part of the statute must be interpreted
with reference to the context. This means that every part of the statute must be considered
together with the other parts, and kept subservient to the general intent of the whole enactment,
not separately and independently. More importantly, the doctrine of associated words (Noscitur a
Sociis) provides that where a particular word or phrase in a statement is ambiguous in itself or is
equally susceptible of various meanings, its true meaning may be made clear and specific by
considering the company in which it is found or with which it is associated.
Chelsea Princess O. Cabalquinto
JD-1A
Statutory Construction

EJUSDEM GENERIS
NATIONAL POWER CORPORATION, petitioner, vs. HONORABLE ZAIN B. ANGAS
G.R. Nos. 60225-26, May 8, 1992

FACTS:
Petitioner National Power Corporation, filed two complaints for eminent domain against private
respondents with the Court of First Instance of Lanao del Sur. The complaint which sought to
expropriate certain specified lots situated at Limogao, Saguiaran, Lanao del Sur was for the
purpose of the development of hydro-electric power and production of electricity as well as the
erection of such subsidiary works and constructions as may be necessarily connected therewith.
Subsequently, a consolidated decision was rendered by the lower court, declaring and confirming
that the lots mentioned and described in the complaints have entirely been lawfully condemned
and expropriated by the petitioner, and ordering the latter to pay the private respondents certain
sums of money as just compensation for their lands expropriated “with legal interest thereon until
fully paid.” Two consecutive motions for reconsideration of the said consolidated decision were
filed by the petitioner. The same were denied by the respondent court. Petitioner did not appeal
the aforesaid consolidated decision, which became final and executor.

Subsequently. one of the private respondents Sittie Sohra Batara filed an motion for the execution
of the decision, praying that petitioner be directed to pay her the unpaid balance of P14,300.00
for the lands expropriated from her, including legal interest which she computed at 6% per annum.
The said motion was granted by the lower court. Likewise, one of the private respondents,
Pangonatan Cosna Tagol, through counsel, filed with the trial court a motion praying, for the first
time, that the legal interest on the just compensation awarded to her by the court be computed at
12% per annum as allegedly “authorized under and by virtue of Circular No. 416 of the Central
Bank to the effect that legal interest allowed in the judgment of the courts, in the absence of
express contract, shall be computed at 12% per annum.” The lower court granted the said motion
allowing 12% interest per annum. Subsequently, the other private respondents filed motions also
praying that the legal interest on the just compensation awarded to them be computed at 12% per
annum.

Petitioner moved for a reconsideration of the lower court’s last order, alleging that the main
decision had already become final and executory with its compliance of depositing the sums of
money as just compensation for the lands condemned, with legal interest at 6% per annum; that
the said main decision can no longer be modified or changed by the lower court; and that
Presidential Decree No. 116 is not applicable to this case because it is Art. 2209 of the Civil Code
which applies.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the interest that should be applied in the transaction is the interest provided in
Central Bank Circular 416.

RULING:
No.
The Central Bank circular applies only to loan or forbearance of money, goods or credits.
Moreover, The term “judgments” as used in Section 1 of the Usury Law, as well as in Central
Chelsea Princess O. Cabalquinto
JD-1A
Statutory Construction

Bank Circular No. 416, should be interpreted to mean only judgments involving loan or
forbearance of money, goods or credits, following the principle of ejusdem generis. The Central
Bank circular applies only to loan or forbearance of money, goods or credits and to judgments
involving such loan or forbearance of money, goods or credits. This is evident not only from said
circular but also from Presidential Decree No. 116, which amended Act No. 2655, otherwise
known as the Usury Law. On the other hand, Art. 2209 of the Civil Code applies to transactions
requiring the payment of indemnities as damages, in connection with any delay in the performance
of the obligation arising therefrom other than those covering loan or forbearance of money, goods
or credits. In the case at bar, the transaction involved is clearly not a loan or forbearance of money,
goods or credits but expropriation of certain parcels of land for a public purpose, the payment of
which is without stipulation regarding interest, and the interest adjudged by the trial court is in the
nature of indemnity for damages. The legal interest required to be paid on the amount of just
compensation for the properties expropriated is manifestly in the form of indemnity for damages
for the delay in the payment thereof. Therefore, since the kind of interest involved in the joint
judgment of the lower court sought to be enforced in this case is interest by way of damages, and
not by way of earnings from loans, etc. Art. 2209 of the Civil Code shall apply.

As for private respondents’ argument that Central Bank Circular No. 416 impliedly repealed or
modified Art. 2209 of the Civil Code, suffice it to state that repeals or even amendments by
implication are not favored if two laws can be fairly reconciled. The Courts are slow to hold that
one statute has repealed another by implication, and they will not make such an adjudication if
they can refrain from doing so, or if they can arrive at another result by any construction which is
just and reasonable.
Chelsea Princess O. Cabalquinto
JD-1A
Statutory Construction

EXPRESSION UNIUS EST EXCLUSION ALTERUS

ESPIRITU, ET. AL. v CIPRIANO, ET.AL
G.R. No. L-32743, February 15, 1974

FACTS:
This is a petition for certiorari filed by spouses Primitivo and Leonora A. De Espiritu seeking
nullification of two orders of the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Branch XV, the first, dated August
4, 1970 sustaining private respondent Ricardo Cipriano's motion to dismiss "on the authority of
Republic Act 6126", and the second, dated October 16, 1970, denying the motion for
reconsideration of the first order. The question before Us involves the retroactive application of
the provisions of Republic Act 6126, otherwise known as the Rental Law.
The plaintiffs were the owners of the property in question, leased to the defendants since 1952.
In January, 1969, the lease was converted to a month-to-month basis, and the plaintiffs increased
the rent to P30.00 a month. Since then, the defendants have not paid the rent. This is why Espiritu,
et. al, raised the complaint against the defendants Cipriano, et. al. to the Municipal court of Pasig,
Rizal.
The defendants moved to dismiss the plaintiff’s complaint by invoking the prohibitory provision of
R.A. 6126 which states that there should be no increase of rent during a one year period starting
from March 30, 1970, where the rent does not exceed P300.00.
However, the increase of rent happened a year before the enactment of the statute.

ISSUE:
Whether or not R.A. 6126 will have retroactive effect at the case at bar.

RULING:
According to Article 4 of the Civil Code, no law shall be given retroactive effect unless the contrary
is provided. R.A. 6126 is not applicable at the case at bar.
A close study of the provisions discloses that far from being remedial, the statute affects
substantive rights and hence a strict and prospective construction thereof is in order. Article 4 of
the New Civil Code ordains that laws shall have no retroactive effect unless the contrary is
provided and that where the law is clear, Our duty is equally plain. We must apply it to the facts
as found. The law being a "temporary measure designed to meet a temporary situation", it had a
limited period of operation as in fact it was so worded in clear and unequivocal language that "No
lessor of a dwelling unit or land ... shall, during the period of one year from March 31, 1970,
increase the monthly rental agreed upon between the lessor and lessee prior to the approval of
this Act." Hence the prohibition against the increase in rentals was effective on March, 1970, up
to March, 1971. Outside and beyond that period, the law did not, by the express mandate of the
Act itself, operate. The said law, did not, by its express terms, purport to give a retroactive
operation. It is a well-established rule of statutory construction that "Expressium facit cessare
tacitum" and, therefore, no reasonable implication that the Legislature ever intended to give the
law in question a retroactive effect may be accorded to the same.
Chelsea Princess O. Cabalquinto
JD-1A
Statutory Construction

CASUS OMISSUS
PHILIPPINE HEALTH INSURANCE CORPORATION, Petitioner vs. COA
G.R. No. 222838, September 14, 2008

FACTS:
On May 24, 2011, the COA Supervising Auditor issued an Audit Observation Memorandum
(AOM) which showed that reimbursements of Extraordinary and Miscellaneous Expense (EME)
totaling P19.95 million in calendar year 2010 were charged to the Representation Expenses
account under the sub-accounts "Institutional Meeting Expenses (865-10) and Committee
Meeting Expenses (865-20)." The AOM noted that PhilHealth had been using IME and Committee
Meeting Expenses accounts to accommodate reimbursements of EME since charges to the EME
account already far exceeded the General Appropriations Act (GAA) prescribed limitation for each
official. The COA Supervising Auditor viewed the charging of EME against other accounts to be
irregular because the nature and purpose of these expenses fall under the budgetary controls in
the disbursement of EME as stated in the GAA and COA Circular No. 2006-01. The charging of
EME against other accounts likewise increased the amount of the excess from the GAA-
prescribed annual rate for EME. The Supervising Auditor also observed that P5.63 million of the
total amount was reimbursement of expenses made by members of the PhilHealth BOD and
personnel whose positions were not entitled to EME.
The COA affirmed the disallowance of the Institutional Meeting Expenses (IME) for 2010 paid to
members of the Board of Directors (BOD) of Philippine Health Insurance Corporation (PhilHealth)
in the total amount ofP2,965,428.59.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the disallowance of the IME had legal basis.

RULING:
Yes.
Even if we were to relax the rules and entertain the appeal, we find that PhilHealth's case would
still fail on its merits. Section 18(d) of RA No. 7875, which allows the members of the BOD to
receive per diems for every meeting they actually attend, must be understood to refer only to the
appointive members and not to those who are designated in an ex officio capacity or by virtue of
their title to a certain office. The ex officio position being actually and in legal contemplation part
of the principal office, it follows that the official concerned has no right to receive any other form
of additional compensation for his services in the said position; otherwise, it would run counter
with the constitutional prohibitions against holding multiple positions in the government and
receiving additional or double compensation.
Contrary to the posturing of PhilHealth, its charter does not authorize the grant of additional
allowances to the BOD beyond per diems. For one, while Section 18(d) of RA No. 7875 is entitled
“allowances and per diems," its body significantly fails to mention any other allowances or benefits
besides per diems.
It is a basic precept of statutory construction that the express mention of one person, thing, act,
or consequence excludes all others, as expressed in the oft-repeated maxim expressio unius est
exlusio alterius. Elsewise stated, expressium facit cessare tacitum - what is expressed puts an
end to what is implied. Casus omissus pro omisso habendus est. A person, object or thing omitted
must have been omitted intentionally. If the legislature intended to give PhilHealth the authority to
grant allowances to the BOD other than the per diems, it could have facilely mentioned so.
Chelsea Princess O. Cabalquinto
JD-1A
Statutory Construction

DOCTRINE OF LAST ANTECEDENT

MARCELINO B. FLORENTINO and LOURDES T. ZANDUETA, petitioners-appellants, vs.
PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK
G.R. No. L-8782, April 28, 1956

FACTS:
The petitioners and appellants filed a petition for mandamus against Philippine National Bank to
compel it to accept the backpay certificate of petitioner Marcelino B. Florentino to pay an
indebtedness in the sum of P6,800 secured by real estate mortgage plus interest. The debt
incurred on January 2, 1953, which is due on January 2, 1954. Petitioner is a holder of Backpay
Acknowledgment No. 1721 dated October 6, 1954, in the amount of P22,896.33 by virtue of
Republic Act No. 897 approved on June 20, 1953. Petitioners offered to pay their loan with the
respondent bank with their backpay certificate, but the respondent bank, on December 29, 1953,
refused to accept the latter's backpay certificate. Under section 2 of Republic Act No. 879,
respondent-appellee contends that the qualifying clause refers to all the antecedents, whereas
the appellant's contention is that it refers only to the last antecedent.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the clause “who may be willing to accept the same for settlement” refers to all
antecedents mentioned in the last sentence of section 2 of Republic Act No. 879.

HELD:
No. Grammatically, the qualifying clause refers only to the last antecedent; that is, "any citizen of
the Philippines or any association or corporation organized under the laws of the Philippines." It
should be noted that there is a comma before the words "or to any citizen, etc.," which separates
said phrase from the preceding ones. But even disregarding the grammatical construction, to
make the acceptance of the backpay certificates obligatory upon any citizen, association, or
corporation, which are not government entities or owned or controlled by the government, would
render section 2 of Republic Act No. 897 unconstitutional for it would amount to an impairment of
the obligation of contracts by compelling private creditors to accept a sort of promissory note
payable within ten years with interest at a rate very much lower than the current or even the legal
one. It was also found out in the Congressional Record that the amendatory bill to Sec. 2 was
made which permits the use of backpay certificates as payment for obligations and indebtedness
in favor of the government. Another reason is that it is matter of general knowledge that many
officials and employees of the Philippine Government, who had served during the Japanese
Occupation, have already received their backpay certificates and used them for the payment of
the obligations to the Government and its entities for debts incurred before the approval of
Republic Act No. 304.

Florentino incurred his debt to the PNB on January 2, 1953. Hence, the obligation was subsisting
when the Amendatory Act No. 897 was approved. Consequently, the present case falls squarely
under the provisions of section 2 of the Amendatory Act No. 897.
Chelsea Princess O. Cabalquinto
JD-1A
Statutory Construction

REDDENDO SINGULA SINGULIS

AMADORA v. COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. No. L-47745. April 15, 1988

FACTS:
Amadora was shot and killed by his classmate Pablito Daffon. Daffon was convicted of homicide
thru reckless imprudence. Additionally, petitioners filed a civil action for damages against the
Colegio de San Jose-Recoletos, its rector, the high school principal, the dean of boys, and the
physics teacher, together with Daffon and two other students, through their respective parents.
The complaint against the students was later dropped. After trial, the CFI held the remaining
defendants liable to the plaintiffs in the sum of P294,984.00. On appeal, the CA reversed the
decision, and all the defendants were completely absolved.
Petitioners contend that their son was in the the custody of the private respondents. The private
respondents submit that Amadora was no longer in their custody because the semester had
already ended.

ISSUES:
Whether or not Article 2180 covers even establishments which are technically not schools of arts
and trades.

RULING:

The provision in question should apply to all schools, academic as well as non-academic. Where
the school is academic rather than technical or vocational in nature, responsibility for the tort
committed by the student will attach to the teacher in charge of such student, following the first
part of the provision. This is the general rule. In the case of establishments of arts and trades, it
is the head thereof, and only he, who shall be held liable as an exception to the general rule. In
other words, teachers in general shall be liable for the acts of their students except where the
school is technical in nature, in which case it is the head thereof who shall be answerable.
Following the canon of reddendo singula singulis, “teachers” should apply to the words “pupils
and students” and “heads of establishments of arts and trades” to the word “apprentices.”
The Court thus conforms to the dissenting opinion expressed by Justice J.B.L Reyes in Exconde:
the phrase ‘teachers or heads of establishments of arts and trades’ used in Art. 1903 of the old
Civil Code, the words ‘arts and trades’ does not qualify ‘teachers’ but only ‘heads of
establishments.’ The phrase is only an updated version of the equivalent terms ‘preceptores y
artesanos‘ used in the Italian and French Civil Codes.
There is really no substantial distinction between the academic and the non-academic schools
insofar as torts committed by their, students are concerned. The same vigilance is expected from
the teacher over the students under his control and supervision, whatever the nature of the school
where he is teaching.
Art 2180 must be interpreted by the Court according to its clear and original mandate until the
legislature, taking into account the changes in the situation subject to be regulated, sees fit to
enact the necessary amendment.
Chelsea Princess O. Cabalquinto
JD-1A
Statutory Construction

MENS LEGISLATORES
Borromeo v. Mariano
G.R. No. 16808. January 3, 1921
FACTS:
Andres Borromeo was appointed and commissioned as Judge. he was appointed Judge of the
Twenty-first Judicial District, and Fermin Mariano was appointed Judge of the Twenty-fourth
Judicial District. Judge Borromeo has since the latter date consistently refused to accept
appointment to the Twenty-first Judicial District.
Judges of First Instance are appointed by the Governor-General with the consent of the Philippine
Senate to serve until they reach the age of 65 years. (Adm. Code, secs. 65, 66, 148.) One Judge
of First Instance is commissioned for each judicial district, except the ninth. (Sec. 154.) The oath
of office of the judge is "filed with the clerk of the court to which the affiant pertains and shall be
entered upon its records." (Sec. 128.) Judges of First Instance may only be detailed by the
Secretary of Justice to temporary duty in a district other than their own for the purpose of trying
land registration cases and for vacation duty. (Sec. 155.) The concluding portion of section 155
of the Administrative Code, to which particular attention is addressed by the Attorney-General, is,
"but nothing herein shall be construed to prevent a judge of first instance of one district from being
appointed to be judge of another district." A Judge of First Instance can be removed from office
by the Governor-General only if in the judgment of the Supreme Court sufficient cause shall exist
involving serious misconduct or inefficiency in office. (Sec. 173.)
Leaving out of consideration for the moment the last part of section 155 of the Administrative
Code, the provisions of the Judiciary Law are plain and unambiguous. Judges of First Instance
are appointed judges of the courts of first instance of the respective judicial districts of the
Philippine Islands. They are not appointed judges of first instance of the Philippine Islands. They
hold these positions of judges of first instance of definite districts until they resign, retire, or are
removed through impeachment proceedings. The intention of the law is to recognize separate
and distinct judicial offices.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Judge Borromeo of first instance shall be required to do duty in any other district
than that for which he is commissioned.

Ruling:
The effect to be given to the word "appoint" is corroborated by the principles of the law of public
officers. Appointment and qualification to office are separate and distinct things. Appointment is
the sole act of those vested with the power to make it. Acceptance is the sole act of the appointee.
Persons may be chosen for office at pleasure; there is no power in these Islands which can
compel a man to accept the office. (22 R. C. L., 423.) If, therefore, anyone could refuse
appointment as a judge of first instance to a particular district, when once appointment to this
district is accepted, he has exactly the same right to refuse an appointment to another district. No
other person could be placed in the position of this Judge of First Instance since another rule of
public officers is, that an appointment may not be made to an office which is not vacant. (29 Cyc.,
1373.) In our judgment, the language of the proviso to section 155 of the Administrative Code,
interpreted with reference to the law of public officers, does not empower the Governor-General
to force upon the judge of one district an appointment to another district against his will, thereby
removing him from his district.
The cardinal rule of statutory construction requires the court to give effect to the general legislative
intent if that can be discovered within the four corners of the Act. When the object intended to be
Chelsea Princess O. Cabalquinto
JD-1A
Statutory Construction

accomplished by the statute is once clearly ascertained, general words may be restrained to it
and those of narrower import may be expanded to embrace it, to effectuate the intent. Along with
this fundamental principle is another, equally well-established, that such a construction is, if
possible, to be adopted, as will give effect to all provision of the statute. (2 Lewis' Sutherland,
Statutory Construction, pp. 662, et seq.; In re Allen [1903], 2 Phil., 630; Code of Civil Procedure,
sec. 287.)