POWERS IN GENERAL

LACSON V. ROQUE G. R. NO. L-6225 JAN 10, 1953 EB

Marcos v. Manglapus (G.R. No. 88211)

October 27, 1989

FACTS:

On September 15, 1989, the SC voted 8-7 to dismiss the petition of the Marcos family to allow
the return of former President Ferdinand Marcos from Honolulu, Hawaii to the Philippines. The
Court held that President Corazon Aquino did not act arbitrarily with grave abuse of discretion in
determining that the return of former President Marcos and his family at the present time and
under present circumstances pose a threat to national interest and welfare. 

The decision affirmed the constitutionality of President Corazon Aquino's prior refusal, fearing
the instability and security issues that may arise once the remains of former President Marcos
were to be brought back to the country. In a statement, she said:

"In the interest of the safety of those who will take the death of Mr. Marcos in widely and
passionately conflicting ways, and for the tranquility of the state and order of society, the remains
of Ferdinand E. Marcos will not be allowed to be brought to our country until such time as the
government, be it under this administration or the succeeding one, shall otherwise decide."
Hence, this Motion for Reconsideration.

ISSUES:

1. Whether or not President Aquino has the power to deny the return of Marcos' remains. 
2. Whether or not President Aquino's refusal to allow the return of Marcos' remains is
tantamount to dictatorship.

HELD:

1. Yes. Contrary to petitioners' view, it cannot be denied that the President, upon whom executive
power is vested, has unstated residual powers which are implied from the grant of executive
power and which are necessary for her to comply with her duties under the Constitution. The
powers of the President are not limited to what are expressly enumerated in the article on the
Executive Department and in scattered provisions of the Constitution.
 
This is so, notwithstanding the avowed intent of the members of the Constitutional Commission
of 1986 to limit the powers of the President as a reaction to the abuses under the regime of Mr.
Marcos, for the result was a limitation of specific power of the President, particularly those
relating to the commander-in-chief clause, but not a diminution of the general grant of executive
power. Among the duties of the President under the Constitution, in compliance with his (or her)
oath of office, is to protect and promote the interest and welfare of the people. Her decision to bar
the return of the Marcoses and subsequently, the remains of Mr. Marcos at the present time and
under present circumstances is in compliance with this bounden duty.

2. No, the residual powers of the President under the Constitution should not be confused with the
power of the President under the 1973 Constitution to legislate pursuant to Amendment No. 6.
Whereas the residual powers of the President under the 1987 Constitution are implied,
Amendment No. 6 of the 1973 Constitution refers to an express grant of power.

Salvador H. Laurel, petitioner, vs. Ramon Garcia, G.R. No. 92013 July 25, 1990

Facts: The subject property in this case is one of the 4 properties in Japan acquired by the
Philippine government under the Reparations Agreement entered into with Japan, the Roppongi
property. The said property was acquired from the Japanese government through Reparations
Contract No. 300. It consists of the land and building for the Chancery of the Philippine Embassy.
As intended, it became the site of the Philippine Embassy until the latter was transferred to
Nampeidai when the Roppongi building needed major repairs. President Aquino created a
committee to study the disposition/utilization of Philippine government properties in Tokyo and
Kobe, Japan. The President issued EO 296 entitling non-Filipino citizens or entities to avail of
separations' capital goods and services in the event of sale, lease or disposition.

Issues: Whether or not the Chief Executive, her officers and agents, have the authority and
jurisdiction, to sell the Roppongi property.

Ruling: It is not for the President to convey valuable real property of the government on his or
her own sole will. Any such conveyance must be authorized and approved by a law enacted by
the Congress. It requires executive and legislative concurrence. It is indeed true that the Roppongi
property is valuable not so much because of the inflated prices fetched by real property in Tokyo
but more so because of its symbolic value to all Filipinos, veterans and civilians alike. Whether or
not the Roppongi and related properties will eventually be sold is a policy determination where
both the President and Congress must concur. Considering the properties' importance and value,
the laws on conversion and disposition of property of public dominion must be faithfully
followed.

Domingo v. Zamora, G.R. No. 142283 Feb. 6, 2003 EB

Facts: President Estrada issued EO entitled Transferring the Sports Programs and Activities of
the DECS to the Philippine Sports Commission in School-Based Sports. Pursuant to EO 81,
former DECS Secretary Gonzales issued a Memorandum which temporarily reassigned, in the
exigency of the service, all remaining BPESS Staff to other divisions or bureaus of the DECS.

Issue: Is the reassignment valid?

Ruling: Yes. Since EO 81 is based on the Presidents continuing authority under Section 31 (2)
and (3) of EO 292, it is a valid exercise of the Presidents delegated power to reorganize the Office
of the President. The law grants the President this power in recognition of the recurring need of
every President to reorganize his office to achieve simplicity, economy and efficiency. The Office
of the President is the nerve center of the Executive Branch. To remain effective and efficient, the
Office of the President must be capable of being shaped and reshaped by the President in the
manner he deems fit to carry out his directives and policies. After all, the Office of the President
is the command post of the President. This is the rationale behind the Presidents continuing
authority to reorganize the administrative structure of the Office of the President.

APPOINTING POWER

Binamira v. Garrucho G.R. No. 92008 July 30, 1990

Facts:

                Ramon P. Binamira seeks reinstatement to the office of General Manager of the
Philippine Tourism Authority from which he claims to have been removed without just cause in
violation of his security of tenure.

                Binamira claims that since assuming office, he had discharged the duties of PTA
General Manager and Vice-Chairman of its Board of Directors and had been acknowledged as
such by various government offices, including the Office of the President.

                He complains, though, that on January 2, 1990, his resignation was demanded by
respondent Garrucho as the new Secretary of Tourism. Binamira’s demurrer led to an unpleasant
exchange that led to his filing of a complaint against the Secretary with the Commission on
Human Rights.

                Section 23-A of P.D. 564, which created the Philippine Tourism Authority, provides as
follows:
SECTION 23-A. General Manager-Appointment and Tenure. — The General Manager shall be
appointed by the President of the Philippines and shall serve for a term of six (6) years unless
sooner removed for cause; Provided, That upon the expiration of his term, he shall serve as such
until his successor shall have been appointed and qualified. (As amended by P.D. 1400)

Issue:

                whether Binamira was appointed as General Manager of the Philippine Tourism
Authority or merely designated

Held:

                Petitioner was not appointed by the President of the Philippines but only designated by
the Minister of Tourism. There is a clear distinction between appointment and designation that
the petitioner has failed to consider. Appointment may be defined as the selection, by the
authority vested with the power, of an individual who is to exercise the functions of a given
office. When completed, usually with its confirmation, the appointment results in security of
tenure for the person chosen unless he is replaceable at pleasure because of the nature of his
office. Designation, on the other hand, connotes merely the imposition by law of additional
duties on an incumbent official, as where, in the case before us, the Secretary of Tourism is
designated Chairman of the Board of Directors of the Philippine Tourism Authority, or where,
under the Constitution, three Justices of the Supreme Court are designated by the Chief Justice to
sit in the Electoral Tribunal of the Senate or the House of Representatives. It is said that
appointment is essentially executive while designation is legislative in nature.

Designation may also be loosely defined as an appointment because it likewise involves

the naming of a particular person to a specified public office. That is the common understanding
of the term. However, where the person is merely designated and not appointed, the implication is
that he shall hold the office only in a temporary capacity and may be replaced at will by the
appointing authority. In this sense, the designation is considered only an acting or temporary
appointment, which does not confer security of tenure on the person named.

                Even if so understood, that is, as an appointment, the designation of the petitioner
cannot sustain his claim that he has been illegally removed. The reason is that the decree clearly
provides that the appointment of the General Manager of the Philippine Tourism Authority shall
be made by the President of the Philippines, not by any other officer. Appointment involves the
exercise of discretion, which because of its nature cannot be delegated. Legally speaking, it was
not possible for Minister Gonzales to assume the exercise of that discretion as an alter ego of the
President. The appointment (or designation) of the petitioner was not a merely mechanical or
ministerial act that could be validly performed by a subordinate even if he happened as in this
case to be a member of the Cabinet.

ELPIDIO VALENCIA v. MACARIO PERALTA, GR No. L-20864, 1963-08-23

Facts:
The petitioner, Elpidio Valencia, was, on 4 October 1961, "designated Acting Chairman" of the
board of directors of the said authority by the then President of the Philippines, Carlos P. Garcia.
Allegedly upon information that the then President Garcia had extended him an... adinterim
appointment, petitioner took an oath of office "to the position of Chairman, Ad-lnterim,, Board of
Directors, National Waterworks and Sewerage Authority". This oath of office was couched in the
usual manner, in both form and substance, and was subscribed and sworn to... by the petitioner on
25 October 1961 before President Garcia. On 27 April 1962, the Commission on Appointments
confirmed the appointment of Secretary Valencia "as Chairman of the Board * * * for a term
expiring 20 July 1967 * * *."
On 2 June 1962, however, respondent Secretary of National Defense Macario Peralta, Jr., was
appointed ad-interim to the same position by President Diosdado Macapagal. Thereafter, the
petitioner ceased to attend any board meeting, and on 9 February 1963, he instituted... the present
petition.
e Solicitor General interposed the following defenses
The only choice of which there is any reliable evidence on record is his designation as Acting
Chairman of the NAWASA Board of Directors. This designation, being of revocable and
temporary character, could not ripen into a... permanent appointment, even if it was subsequently
confirmed by the Commission on Appointments, because confirmation presupposes a valid
nomination or recess appointment, of which there is no trace. Neither does the fact that on 25
October 1961 petitioner Valencia subscribed an... oath of office as ad-Interim appointee to the
position help his case, since the oath clearly does not correspond to the temporary designation as
Acting Chairman that was accorded him.
Petitioner argues that his oath and confirmation imply a prior adr-interim appointment
While the petitioner took his oath of office as ad-interim appointee on 25 October 1961, the letter
of transmission received by the Commission... on Appointments recited as follows:
"Hon. Elpidio Valencia, as Chairman of the Board of Directors of the National Waterworks and
Sewerage Authority, for a term expiring July 20, 1967, date of appointment November 6,
1961";... and the Secretary of the Commission has, in turn, certified that said body, on 27 April
1962, confirmed petitioner's appointment of 6 November 1961. In addition, the certificate of the
Office of the President states that the draft of petitioner's ad- interim... appointment, dated 6
November 1961, was processed on 25 December 1961, but was not released and is still in that
office.
Issues:
The petitioner challenges the legality of the respondent's appointment on the ground that the
position in controversy is not vacant, since he (the petitioner) has not resigned nor has he been
removed for cause; and inasmuch as he assumed office on 25 October 1961, his tenure... will
expire on 25 October 1967, a term of six years, as fixed in Section 3 of Republic Act No. 1383.
Ruling:
We fail to see any merit in petitioner's case
We are of the opinion that it was incumbent upon this petitioner to clearly prove under what kind
of appointment he obtained title to the office, if any, and when such appointment was... made
If an ad-intermi appointment existed, either it preceded the petitioner's oath of office of 25
October 1961, and it lapsed because it was not confirmed by the
Commission on Appointments, or else the appointment was only made on 6 November 1961, was
duly confirmed, but also lapsed because petitioner Valencia never took a qualifying oath of office
under it. Certainly he could not have qualified by taking an oath of office on 25 October,... ten
days before the appointment was extended. To cap it all, there is on record only one written
designation of petitioner, but as mere Acting Chairman, dated 4 October 1961, that was not a
permanent appointment, and was revocable at anytime by the Chief Executive, and actually...
revoked by his subsequent designation of respondent Peralta.
Principles:
It would be unfortunate if the title to office of one upon whose official acts public interests and
private rights hinged, did or could be made to depend upon the verbal declaration and statements
of the person having the power to make the appointment, to be proved by parol... and liable to be
forgotten, misunderstood or mis-reported, subject to all the contingencies and infirmities which
are incident to verbal evidence, or evidence by parol, so pregnant of mischief and misfortune as to
have led to the enactment of the statute of frauds. It will not... be presumed that the Legislature,
while making void contracts involving trifling pecuniary interests, unless evidence by some
writing, intended that important civil offices should be conferred without a commission or any
writing, but simply by a verbal statement of an individual... in any form which by the bystanders
should be understood as expressing a present intent to make the appointment; and a liberal
interpretation will be given to the statutes bearing upon the subject if necessary to avoid any such
conclusion.
 SARMIENTO V. MISON G. R. NO.79974 DEC17, 1987 EB

FACTS: In 1987, Salvador Mison was appointed as the Commissioner of the BOC. The
respondents questioned the appointment as it appears not to have been submitted to the
Commission on Appointments (COA) for approval. Sarmiento insists that under the new
Constitution, heads of bureaus require the confirmation of the COA. Sarmiento also sought to
enjoin Carague, the then Secretary of the Department of Budget, from disbursing the salary
payments of Mison due to the unconstitutionality of the latter’s appointment.

ISSUE: DOES MISON’S APPOINTMENT AS COMMISSIONER OF BUREAU OF

CUSTOMS REQUIRE THE CONFIRMATION/APPROVAL OF THE COA?

HELD – NO.
Under Sec. 16, Art. VII of the 1987 Constitution, there are 4 groups of officers whom the
President shall appoint:

—1. First, the heads of the executive departments, ambassadors, other public ministers and
consuls, officers of the armed forces from the rank of colonel or naval captain, and other officers
whose appointments are vested in him in this Constitution;
—2. Second, all other officers of the Government whose appointments are not otherwise provided
for by law;
—3. Third, those whom the President may be authorized by law to appoint;
—4. Fourth, officers lower in rank 4 whose appointments the Congress may by law vest in the
President alone.

Only those appointments to positions expressly stated in the first group require the consent
(confirmation) of the Commission on Appointments. Appointments made by the President for the
second, third and fourth groups do not require the consent of the COA.

The position of BOC Commissioner is not included in those positions requiring prior
consent of the COA by statutory construction. An express enumeration of subjects excludes
others not enumerated, it follows then that only those appointments to positions expressly stated
in the first group require the consent of the COA.

It is the intent of the Framers of the 1987 Constitution to exclude the second, third and
fourth groups of Presidential appointments from requiring the consent of the COA. The
1935 Constitution required the consent of COA for all Presidential appointments, which rule has
transformed the commission into a venue of “horsetrading” and similar malpractices. Under the
1973 Constitution, the absolute power of appointment is vested in the President without hardly
any check from the legislature. The 1987 Constitution tried to strike a balance between the two
extremes by requiring COA’s consent on appointments for the first group and dispensing it for
the appointments in the other groups. The use of the word ‘also’ in the second sentence does not
mean ‘in the same manner’. The appointments for the second group need not be done in the same
manner as the first group. So, consent is not required.

The power to appoint is fundamentally executive or presidential in character. Limitations on

or qualifications of such power should be strictly construed against them. Such limitations or
qualifications must be clearly stated in order to be recognized. It is only in the first sentence of
Sec. 16, Art. VII where it is clearly stated that appointments by the President to the positions
therein enumerated require the consent of the COA. The effect is to exclude from the requirement
of consent, other appointments not within the scope of the first sentence. The word ‘alone’ in the
third sentence is a mere redundancy which should not defeat the evident intent of the Framers.

PETER JOHN D. CALDERON v. BARTOLOME CARALE, GR No. 91636, 1992-04-23

Facts:
From the three   (3) cases above-mentioned, these doctrines are deducible:
1.  Confirmation by the Commission on Appointments is required only for presidential appointees
mentioned in the first sentence of Section 16, Article VII, including, those officers whose
appointments are expressly vested by the Constitution itself in the... president (like sectoral repre -
sentatives to Congress and members of the constitutional commissions of Audit, Civil Service
and Election).
2.  Confirmation is not required when the President appoints other government officers whose
appointments are not otherwise provided for by law or those officers whom he may be authorized
by law to appoint (like the Chairman and Members of the Commission on
Human Rights).  Also, as observed in Mison, when Congress creates inferior offices but omits to
provide for appointment thereto, or provides in an unconstitutional manner for such
appointments, the officers are considered as among those... whose appointments are not otherwise
provided for by law.
The Chairman, the Division Presiding Commissioners and other Commissioners shall all be
appointed by the President, subject to confirmation by the Commission on Appointments. 
Appointments to any vacancy shall come from the nominees of the... sector which nominated the
predecessor.  The Executive Labor Arbiters and Labor Arbiters shall also be appointed by the
President, upon recommendation of the Secretary of Labor and Employment, and shall be subject
to the Civil Service Law, rules and... regulations."[5]
Pursuant to said law (RA 6715), President Aquino appointed the Chairman and Commissioners of
the NLRC representing the public, workers and employers sectors.  The appointments stated that
the appointees may qualify and enter upon the... performance of the duties of the office.   After
said appointments, then Labor Secretary Franklin Drilon issued Administrative Order No. 161,
series of 1989, designating the places of assignment of the newly appointed commissioners.
Petitioner insists on a mandatory compliance with RA 6715 which has in its favor the
presumption of validity.  RA 6715 is not, according to petitioner, an encroachment on the
appointing power of the executive contained in Section 16, Art. VII,... of the Constitution, as
Congress may, by law, require confirmation by the Commission on Appointments of other
officers appointed by the President additional to those mentioned in the first sentence of Section
16 of Article VII of the Constitution.
The Solicitor General, on the other hand, contends that RA 6715 which amended the Labor Code
transgresses Section 16, Article VII by expanding the confirmation powers of the Commission on
Appointments without constitutional basis.
The Congress may by law vest the appointment of inferior officers in the President... alone, in the
courts or in the heads of the departmen
Petitioner... claims that the Mison and Bautista rulings are not decisive of the issue in this case for
in the case at bar, the President issued permanent appointments to the respondents without
submitting them to the CA for... confirmation despite passage of a law (RA 6715) which requires
the confirmation by the Commission on
Appointments of such appointments.
Issues:
This petition for prohibition questions the constitutionality and legality of the permanent
appointments extended by the President of the Philippines to the respondents Chairman and
Members of the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC), without submitting the same to...
the Commission on Appointments for confirmation pursuant to Art. 215 of the Labor Code as
amended by said RA 6715.
whether or not Congress may, by law, require confirmation by the Commission on Appointments
of appointments extended by the President to government officers... additional to those expressly
mentioned in the first sentence of Sec. 16, Art. VII of the Constitution whose appointments
require confirmation by the Commission on Appointments.
Ruling:
1.  It amends by legislation, the first sentence of Sec. 16, Art. VII of the Constitution by adding
thereto appointments requiring confirmation by the Commission on Appointments; and
2.  It amends by legislation the second sentence of Sec. 16, Art. VII of the Constitution, by
imposing the confirmation of the Commission on Appointments on appointments which are
otherwise entrusted only with the President.
Regretfully, however, the... constitutional infirmity of Sec. 13 of RA 6715 amending Art. 215 of
the Labor Code, insofar as it requires confirmation of the Commission on Appointments over
appointments of the Chairman and Members of the National Labor Relations Commission
(NLRC) is, as we see it, beyond... redemption if we are to render fealty to the mandate of the
Constitution in Sec. 16, Art. VII thereof.
No doctrine or principle of law laid down by the Court in a decision rendered en banc or... in
division may be modified or reversed except by the Court sitting en banc.[11]
The rulings in Mison, Bautista and Quintos-Deles have interpreted Art. VII, Sec. 16 consistently
in one manner.  Can legislation expand a constitutional provision... after the Supreme Court has
interpreted it?
'The rule is recognized elsewhere that the legislature cannot pass any declaratory act, or act
declaratory of what the law was before its passage, so as to give it any binding weight with the
courts.  A legislative definition of a word as used in a statute... is not conclusive of its meaning as
used elsewhere; otherwise, the legislature would be usurping a judicial function in defining a
term.  (
'The legislature cannot, upon passing law which violates a constitutional provision, validate it so
as to prevent an attack thereon in the courts, by a declaration that it shall be so construed as not to
violate the constitutional inhibition
If the Legislature may declare what a law means, or what a specific portion of the Constitution
means, especially after the courts have in actual case ascertained its meaning by interpretation...
and applied it in a decision, this would surely cause confusion and instability in judicial processes
and court decisions.  Under such a system, a final court determination of a case based on a
judicial interpretation of the law or of the Constitution may be... undermined or even annulled by
a subsequent and different interpretation of the law or of the Constitution by the Legislative
department.  That would be neither wise nor desirable, besides being clearly violative of the
fundamental principles of... our constitutional system of government, particularly those governing
the separation of powers.
The function of the Court in passing upon an act of Congress is to "lay the article of the
Constitution which is invoked beside the statute which is challenged and to decide whether the
latter squares with the former" and to "announce its considered judgment upon the... question.
It cannot be overlooked that Sec. 16, Art. VII of the 1987 Constitution was deliberately, not
unconsciously, intended by the framers of the 1987 Constitution to be a departure from the
system embodied in the 1935 Constitution where the
Commission on Appointments exercised the power of confirmation over almost all presidential
appointments, leading to many cases of abuse of such power of confirmation
The deliberate limitation on the power of confirmation of the Commission on Appointments over
presidential appointments, embodied in Sec. 16, Art. VII of the 1987 Constitution, has
undoubtedly evoked the displeasure and disapproval of members of Congress.
Until then, it is the duty of the Court to apply the 1987 Constitution in accordance with what it
says and not in accordance with how the... legislature or the executive would want it interpreted.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED.  Art. 215 of the Labor Code as amended by RA
6715 insofar as it requires the confirmation of the Commission on Appointments of appointments
of the Chairman and Members of the National Labor Relations Commission
(NLRC) is hereby declared unconstitutional and of no legal force and effect.
LACSON V. ROMERO, G. R. NO. L-3081 OCT 14, 1949 EB

FACTS: In July 25, 1946, the Petitioner, Antonio Lacson, was appointed by the President as
provincial fiscal of Negros Oriental which was affirmed by Commission on Appointment. He
took the office and, thereafter, performed his duties. In May 17, 1949, upon recommendation by
Secretary of Justice, the President nominated him to the post of provincial fiscal in Tarlac and,
simultaneously, the President nominated the Respondent, Honorio Romero, to his position as
provincial fiscal of Negros Oriental. Both of them were confirmed by the Commission on
Appointment. The Petitioner neither accepted the appointment nor assumed the office of fiscal of
Tarlac but respondent Romero took his oath of office of the post of fiscal of Negros Oriental,
notified the Solicitor General and, thereafter, proceeded to his station. Commotion started
between the parties as both of them appeared in the hearings of Judge Narvasa and Judge Ocampo
where the latter judges favors the Respondent. When the Petitioner requested payment for his
salary as provincial fiscal of Negros Oriental, it was turned down and instead paid Respondent
Romero.

Issue: Whether or not the confirmation Commission on Appointment alone, without the
acceptance of the nomination by the Petitioner, can create a vacancy in the post of provincial
fiscal of Negro Oriental.

Ruling:
No, the appointment to a government post like that of provincial fiscal to be complete involves
several steps. First, comes the nomination by the President. Then to make that nomination valid
and permanent, the Commission on Appointments of the Legislature has to confirm said
nomination. The last step is the acceptance thereof by the appointee by his assumption of office.
The first two steps, nomination and confirmation, constitute a mere offer of a post. They are acts
of the Executive and Legislative departments of the Government. But the last necessary step to
make the appointment complete and effective rests solely with the appointee himself. He may or
he may not accept the appointment or nomination.

As held in the case of Borromeo vs. Mariano, “there is no Power in this country which can
compel a man to accept an office.” Consequently, since Lacson has declined to accept his
appointment as provincial fiscal of Tarlac and no one can compel him to do so, then he continues
as provincial fiscal of Negros Oriental and no vacancy in said office was created, unless Lacson
had been lawfully removed as Such fiscal of Negros Oriental.
Advertisements

ISIDRO M. JAVIER v. PURIFICACION C. REYES, GR No. L-39451, 1989-02-20

Facts:
The following facts have been admitted by the parties: that petitioner Isidro M. Javier was
appointed Chief of Police of Malolos, Bulacan on November 7, 1967 by the then Mayor
Victorino B. Aldaba, and approved by the Civil Service Commission on May 2, 1968; that
petitioner took... his oath of office as such on November 8, 1967 and immediately assumed the
position and discharged his duties until January 13, 1968 when he was separated from office by
respondent Municipal Mayor Purificacion Reyes; that respondent recalled the said appointment of
petitioner on
January 3, 1968 pursuant to which said appointment was returned by the Civil Service
Commission returning his appointment on the basis of which the said commission reconsidered
the same and approved his appointment on May 2, 1968; that since May 2, 1968 to the present,...
respondent has not reinstated the petitioner notwithstanding a follow-up letter circular dated July
9, 1968 of the Commission of Civil Service, directing the immediate reinstatement of the
petitioner; that one Bayani Bernardo was also appointed Chief of Police of Malolos,... Bulacan on
September 4, 1967, approved by the Commissioner of Civil Service on September 17, 1967; and
that said appointment of Bayani Bernardo by the then Mayor Jovencio Caluag was not referred to
the Police Commission for decision.
Issues:
(1) When an appointment to the position of municipal chief of police was made by a municipal
mayor and said appointment was not approved by the municipal council and such lack of
approval lasted for more than ninety (90) days from the issuance of the appointment, will sec. 8,
of
R.A. 4864, otherwise known as the Police act of 1966 apply?
(2) When two appointments to one and the same position were both approved by the Civil
Service Commission on the basis of two legal provisions, which one will prevail over the other?
Ruling:
It shall be recalled that the petitioner was appointed Chief of Police of Malolos, Bulacan, on
November 7, 1967, by the then Mayor Victorino Aldaba and the following day, took his oath of
office. He discharged the powers of the office until January 13, 1968 when the respondent,... who
meanwhile succeeded as local chief executive, and in apparent political maneuver, removed him
in favor of Bayani Bernardo.
On the other hand, Bernardo never assumed office or took his oath. It cannot be said, then, that he
had accepted his appointment. Such an appointment being ineffective, we hold that the
petitioner's appointment prevails.
Acceptance is indispensable to complete an appointment. The fact that Bernardo's appointment
was confirmed by the Civil Service Commission does not complete it since confirmation or
attestation by the Commission, although an essential part of the appointing process,[3] serves
merely to assure the eligibility of the appointee.
On the other hand, we cannot say the same thing as far as the petitioner is concerned. The records
show that he was appointed on November 7, 1967, and the following day, November 8, 1967, he
took his oath of office and discharged the duties appurtenant thereto until January 13,... 1968,
when the succeeding mayor, the herein respondent Purificacion Reyes, recalled his appointment
and appointed another. Thereupon, the petitioner went to the Civil Service Commission to ask for
reinstatement. Finally, he brought suit for mandamus. These acts amounted... to acceptance and
gave rise to a vested right to the office in his favor.
In the case at bar, Bayani Bernardo never undertook steps that would have convinced us that he
was interested in, or had accepted, the appointment.
AYTONA V. CASTILLOG.R. NO.L-19313 JAN 19, 1962

FACTS; On Dec 29, 1961, incumbent Pres. Garcia issued mass ad interim “midnight” or “last
minute” appointments amounting to about 350 all in all. Among the appointees was petitioner
Aytona as ad interim Governor of Central Bank. Aytona qualified for the appointment in the
same day. The next day, at noon, President-elect Macapagal assumed office. He issued AO 2
which withdrew and cancelled all the said midnight ad interim appointments by his predecessor.
On Jan 1, 1962, respondent Castillo was appointed by Pres. Macapagal in place of Aytona.
Insisting he validly holds the position of Governor, Aytona instituted this original action.

ISSUES: Does the new President have the power to issue the order of cancellation of the ad
interim appointments made by the past President, even after the appointees have already
qualified?

RULING: Yes. Such mass midnight ad interim appointments may be regarded as an abuse of

presidential prerogatives for apparently mere partisan considerations. When the President makes
ad interim appointments, he exercises a special prerogative and is bound to be prudent to insure
approval of his selection either by previous consultation with the members of the Commission on
Appointments (CA) or by thereafter explaining to them the reason for such selection.* Where,
however, as in this case, the CA that will consider the appointees is different from that existing at
the time of the appointment (for the 4th Congress expired at midnight Dec 29, 1961) and where
the names are to be submitted by his successor, who may not wholly approve of the selections,
the President should be doubly careful. Now, it is hard to believe that in signing 350
appointments in one night, Pres. Garcia exercised such “double care”; and therefore, it seems to
be tenable that these appointments fall beyond the intent and spirit of the constitutional provision
granting to the Executive authority to issue ad interim appointments. Moreover, the underlying
reason for denying the power to revoke after the appointee has qualified is the latter’s equitable
rights. Yet it is doubtful if such equity might be set up as in the present case, considering the
hurried maneuvers detracting from that degree of good faith, morality and propriety which form
the basic foundation of claims to equitable relief. Action dismissed.

SORIANO V. LISTA G. R. NO. 153881, MARCH 24, 2003

The President shall nominate and, with the consent of the Commission on Appointments,
appoint the heads of the executive departments, ambassadors, other public ministers and
consuls, or officers of the armed forces from the rank of colonel or naval captain, and other
officers whose appointments are vested in him in this Constitution. He shall also appoint all
other officers of the Government whose appointments are not otherwise provided for by
law, and those whom he may be authorized by law to appoint. The Congress may, by law,
vest the appointment of other officers lower in rank in the President alone, in the courts, or
in the heads of departments, agencies, commissions, or boards.

The President shall have the power to make appointments during the recess of the
Congress, whether voluntary or compulsory, but such appointments shall be effective only
until after disapproval by the Commission on Appointments or until the next adjournment
of the Congress. (Sec. 16, Art. VII, 1987 Constitution) 

Facts: 

President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo appointed public respondents to different positions in the

Philippine Coast Guard (PCG). Petitioner questioned the said appointments for failure to undergo
the confirmation process in the Commission on Appointments.

ISSUES:
1. Does petitioner have any legal personality to file the instant petition?
2. Do the appointments of respondents required confirmation of the CA?

Held:

1. No. A private citizen is allowed to raise constitutional questions only if he can show that he has
personally suffered some actual or threatened injury as a result of the allegedly illegal conduct of
the government, the injury is fairly traceable to the challenged action and the injury is likely to be
redressed by a favorable action. In the case at bar, petitioner has failed to clearly demonstrate that
he has personally suffered actual or threatened injury. It should be emphasized that a party
bringing a suit challenging the constitutionality of an act or statute must show not only that the
law or act is invalid, but also that he has sustained or is in immediate, or imminent danger of
sustaining some direct injury as a result of its enforcement and not merely that he suffers thereby
in some indefinite way.

The instant petition cannot even be classified as a taxpayers suit because petitioner has no interest
as such and this case does not involve the exercise by Congress of its taxing power.

MIDNIGHT APPOINTMENTS

Velicaria-Garafil v. OFFICE of the President G.R. NO. 203372 JUJNE 16, 2015 EB
FACTS:  The present consolidated cases involve four petitions: G.R. No. 203372 with Atty.
Cheloy E. Velicaria-Garafil, who was appointed State Solicitor II at the Office of the Solicitor
General, as petitioner; G.R. No. 206290 with Atty. Dindo G. Venturanza, who was appointed
Prosecutor IV of Quezon City, as petitioner; G.R. No. 209138 with Irma A. Villanueva , who was
appointed Administrator for Visayas of the Board of Administrators of the Cooperative
Development Authority, and Francisca B. Rosquita, who was appointed Commissioner of the
National Commission of Indigenous Peoples, as petitioners; and G.R. No. 212030 with Atty.
Eddie U. Tamondong, who was appointed member of the Board of Directors of the Subic Bay
Metropolitan Authority, as petitioner. Prior to the conduct of the May 2010 elections, then
President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo issued more than 800 appointments to various positions in
several government offices. The ban on midnight appointments in Section 15, Article VII of the
1987 Constitution reads: Two months immediately before the next presidential elections and up
to the end of his term, a President or Acting President shall not make appointments, except
temporary appointments to executive positions when continued vacancies therein will prejudice
public service or endanger public safety. Thus, for purposes of the 2010 elections, 10 March 2010
was the cutoff date for valid appointments and the next day, 11 March 2010, was the start of the
ban on midnight appointments. Section 15, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution recognizes as an
exception to the ban on midnight appointments only "temporary appointments to executive
positions when continued vacancies therein will prejudice public service or endanger public
safety." None of the petitioners claim that their appointments fall under this exception. On 30
June 2010, President Benigno S. Aquino III (President Aquino) took his oath of office as
President of the Republic of the Philippines. On 30 July 2010, President Aquino issued EO 2
recalling, withdrawing, and revoking appointments issued by President Macapagal-Arroyo which
violated the constitutional ban on midnight appointments.

ISSUE:  Whether petitioners' appointments violate Section 15, Article VII of the 1987
Constitution 

DECISION:  the petitions in G.R. Nos. 203372, 206290, and 212030 are DENIED, and the
petition in G.R. No. 209138 is DISMISSED. The appointments of petitioners Atty. Cheloy E.
Velicaria-Garafil (G.R. No. 203372), Atty. Dindo G. Venturanza (G.R. No. 206290), Irma A.
Villanueva, and Francisca B. Rosquita (G.R. No. 209138), and Atty. Eddie U. Tamondong (G.R.
No. 212030) are declared VOID. 

RATIO DECIDENDI:  The following elements should always concur in the making of a valid
(which should be understood as both complete and effective) appointment: (1) authority to
appoint and evidence of the exercise of the authority; The President's exercise of his power to
appoint officials is provided for in the Constitution and laws. Discretion is an integral part in the
exercise of the power of appointment. Considering that appointment calls for a selection, the
appointing power necessarily exercises a discretion. (2) transmittal of the appointment paper and
evidence of the transmittal; It is not enough that the President signs the appointment paper. There
should be evidence that the President intended the appointment paper to be issued. It could
happen that an appointment paper may be dated and signed by the President months before the
appointment ban, but never left his locked drawer for the entirety of his term. Release of the
appointment paper through the MRO is an unequivocal act that signifies the President's intent of
its issuance. (3) a vacant position at the time of appointment; and (4) receipt of the appointment
paper and acceptance of the appointment by the appointee who possesses all the qualifications
and none of the disqualifications. Acceptance is indispensable to complete an appointment.
Assuming office and taking the oath amount to acceptance of the appointment. An oath of office
is a qualifying requirement for a public office, a prerequisite to the full investiture of the office.
Petitioners have failed to show compliance with all four elements of a valid appointment. They
cannot prove with certainty that their appointment papers were transmitted before the
appointment ban took effect. On the other hand, petitioners admit that they took their oaths of
office during the appointment ban.  

ARTURO M. DE CASTRO vs. JUDICIAL AND BAR COUNCIL (JBC) and PRESIDENT
GLORIA MACAPAGAL – ARROYO
G.R. No. 191002, March 17, 2010
FACTS: The compulsory retirement of Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno by May 17, 2010 occurs
just days after the coming presidential elections on May 10, 2010.
These cases trace their genesis to the controversy that has arisen from the forthcoming
compulsory retirement of Chief Justice Puno on May 17, 2010, or seven days after the
presidential election. Under Section 4(1), in relation to Section 9, Article VIII, that “vacancy shall
be filled within ninety days from the occurrence thereof” from a “list of at least three nominees
prepared by the Judicial and Bar Council for every vacancy.” Also considering that Section 15,
Article VII (Executive Department) of the Constitution prohibits the President or Acting
President from making appointments within two months immediately before the next presidential
elections and up to the end of his term, except temporary appointments to executive positions
when continued vacancies therein will prejudice public service or endanger public safety.

The JBC, in its en banc meeting of January 18, 2010, unanimously agreed to start the process of
filling up the position of Chief Justice.

Conformably with its existing practice, the JBC “automatically considered” for the position of
Chief Justice the five most senior of the Associate Justices of the Court, namely: Associate
Justice Antonio T. Carpio; Associate Justice Renato C. Corona; Associate Justice Conchita
Carpio Morales; Associate Justice Presbitero J. Velasco, Jr.; and Associate Justice Antonio
Eduardo B. Nachura. However, the last two declined their nomination through letters dated
January 18, 2010 and January 25, 2010, respectively.
The OSG contends that the incumbent President may appoint the next Chief Justice, because the
prohibition under Section 15, Article VII of the Constitution does not apply to appointments in
the Supreme Court. It argues that any vacancy in the Supreme Court must be filled within 90 days
from its occurrence, pursuant to Section 4(1), Article VIII of the Constitution; that had the
framers intended the prohibition to apply to Supreme Court appointments, they could have easily
expressly stated so in the Constitution, which explains why the prohibition found in Article VII
(Executive Department) was not written in Article VIII (Judicial Department); and that the
framers also incorporated in Article VIII ample restrictions or limitations on the President’s
power to appoint members of the Supreme Court to ensure its independence from “political
vicissitudes” and its “insulation from political pressures,” such as stringent qualifications for the
positions, the establishment of the JBC, the specified period within which the President shall
appoint a Supreme Court Justice.

A part of the question to be reviewed by the Court is whether the JBC properly initiated the
process, there being an insistence from some of the oppositors-intervenors that the JBC could
only do so once the vacancy has occurred (that is, after May 17, 2010). Another part is, of course,
whether the JBC may resume its process until the short list is prepared, in view of the provision
of Section 4(1), Article VIII, which unqualifiedly requires the President to appoint one from the
short list to fill the vacancy in the Supreme Court (be it the Chief Justice or an Associate Justice)
within 90 days from the occurrence of the vacancy.

ISSUE: Whether the incumbent President can appoint the successor of Chief Justice Puno upon
his retirement.

HELD:
Prohibition under Section 15, Article VII does not apply to appointments to fill a vacancy in the
Supreme Court or to other appointments to the Judiciary.

Two constitutional provisions are seemingly in conflict.

The first, Section 15, Article VII (Executive Department), provides: Section 15. Two months
immediately before the next presidential elections and up to the end of his term, a President or
Acting President shall not make appointments, except temporary appointments to executive
positions when continued vacancies therein will prejudice public service or endanger public
safety.

The other, Section 4 (1), Article VIII (Judicial Department), states: Section 4. (1). The Supreme
Court shall be composed of a Chief Justice and fourteen Associate Justices. It may sit en banc or
in its discretion, in division of three, five, or seven Members. Any vacancy shall be filled within
ninety days from the occurrence thereof.
Had the framers intended to extend the prohibition contained in Section 15, Article VII to the
appointment of Members of the Supreme Court, they could have explicitly done so. They could
not have ignored the meticulous ordering of the provisions. They would have easily and surely
written the prohibition made explicit in Section 15, Article VII as being equally applicable to the
appointment of Members of the Supreme Court in Article VIII itself, most likely in Section 4 (1),
Article VIII. That such specification was not done only reveals that the prohibition against the
President or Acting President making appointments within two months before the next
presidential elections and up to the end of the President’s or Acting President’s term does not
refer to the Members of the Supreme Court.

Had the framers intended to extend the prohibition contained in Section 15, Article VII to the
appointment of Members of the Supreme Court, they could have explicitly done so. They could
not have ignored the meticulous ordering of the provisions. They would have easily and surely
written the prohibition made explicit in Section 15, Article VII as being equally applicable to the
appointment of Members of the Supreme Court in Article VIII itself, most likely in Section 4 (1),
Article VIII. That such specification was not done only reveals that the prohibition against the
President or Acting President making appointments within two months before the next
presidential elections and up to the end of the President’s or Acting President’s term does not
refer to the Members of the Supreme Court.

Section 14, Section 15, and Section 16 are obviously of the same character, in that they affect the
power of the President to appoint. The fact that Section 14 and Section 16 refer only to
appointments within the Executive Department renders conclusive that Section 15 also applies
only to the Executive Department. This conclusion is consistent with the rule that every part of
the statute must be interpreted with reference to the context, i.e. that every part must be
considered together with the other parts, and kept subservient to the general intent of the whole
enactment. It is absurd to assume that the framers deliberately situated Section 15 between
Section 14 and Section 16, if they intended Section 15 to cover all kinds of presidential
appointments. If that was their intention in respect of appointments to the Judiciary, the framers,
if only to be clear, would have easily and surely inserted a similar prohibition in Article VIII,
most likely within Section 4 (1) thereof.

Provincial Government of Aurora v. Hilario Marco,

G.R. No. 202331 April 22, 2015
Doctrine:
The prohibition on midnight appointments only applies to presidential appointees,
not to appointments made by local chief executives. However, the Civil Service
Commission may nonetheless promulgate rules and regulations that would prohibit
such on local chief executives. It may issue rules and regulations prohibiting local
chief executives from making appointments during the last days of their tenure.
Appointments of local chief executives must conform to these civil service rules and
regulations in order to be valid.
FACTS:
Governor Ramoncita P. Ong (Governor Ong) permanently
Provincial Government of Aurora v. Hilario Marco,
G.R. No. 202331 April 22, 2015
Doctrine:
The prohibition on midnight appointments only applies to presidential appointees,
not to appointments made by local chief executives. However, the Civil Service
Commission may nonetheless promulgate rules and regulations that would prohibit
such on local chief executives. It may issue rules and regulations prohibiting local
chief executives from making appointments during the last days of their tenure.
Appointments of local chief executives must conform to these civil service rules and
regulations in order to be valid.
FACTS:
Governor Ramoncita P. Ong (Governor Ong) permanently
THE PROVINCIAL GOVERNMENT OF AURORA VS. HILARIO M. MARCO GR NO.
202331, APRIL 22, 2015; SECOND DIVISION; LEONEN, J.PONENTE
DOCTRINE: The prohibition on midnight appointments only applies to presidential appointees,
not to appointments made by local chief executives. However, the Civil Service Commission may
nonetheless promulgate rules and regulations that would prohibit such on local chief executives. 

FACTS: Marco was appointed as Cooperative Development Specialist II by outgoing Governor

Ong, five (5) days prior to the election, together with other 25 appointees. However, during the
assumption of office of the subsequent Governor Castillo, the provincial budget manifested that
they did not have enough funds to cover the 26 appointees made by Ong, which included Marco.
This was a deviation from the prior certification issued by the same that funds were available.
Proceedings were then instituted on the issue on whether or not the subsequent withdrawal of the
certification of funds was a valid ground to make the appointment void before the Civil Service
Commission Regional Office, then to the National Office. However, on appeal to the Court of
Appeals, the provincial government averred that the appointment was void because the
appointment was a midnight appointment. The provincial government of Aurora averred that the
ruling by the Court in Nazareno, et.al. vs. City of Dumaguete should apply, when in that case, the
Court declared that the 89 appointments made were void in violation the prohibition on midnight
appointments, and CSC Resolution No. 010988 which prohibited mass appointments made by an
outgoing Local Chief Executive without no apparent need for their immediate issuance.

ISSUE: Is the appointment of Marco in violation of the rules on Midnight Appointment? 

RULING: No. The appointment of Marco is not violative of the rules on Midnight Appointment,
and the application of Nazareno is misplaced. First, it must be noted that the prohibition of
Midnight Appointments under Sec. 15 of Art. VII of the Constitution only applies to presidential
appointments. However, the Civil Service Commission, as the central personnel agency of the
government, may establish rules to promote efficiency and professionalism in the civil service.
Second, Nazareno was decided on the basis of CSC Resolution No. 101988, which was
superseded by CSC Resolution No. 030918, the applicable rule in this case. The rule applicable in
this case provides that appointments covered by the rule in Midnight Appoints should be
disapproved, except if the appointee is fully qualified for the position and had undergone regular
screening processes before the Election Ban as shown in the Promotion and Selection Board
(PSB) report or minutes of meeting. In this case, records show that Marco was fully qualified for
the position, and had undergone regular screening processes before the election ban, unlike in
Nazareno where there was no showing that the appointees possessed such qualification and
undergone regular screening processes. Moreover, the fact that the appointments were in bulk
does not invalidate the appointments, unlike the previous CSC Resolution.