Chapter 11.

POWERS OF THE PRESIDENT

1. Executive Power;
The president as head of State and chief executive of the Republic of the Philippines.

Residual Powers
The president cannot be said to be limited only to the specific powers enumerated in the Constitution,
executive power is more than the sum of specific power so enumerated.

Cases:
 Villena v. Secretary of the Interior, G.R. No. L-46570, April 21, 1939
FACTS
The Division of Investigation of the Department of Justice, upon the request of the
Secretary of the Interior, conducted an inquiry into the conduct of petitioner, as a result of
which the latter was found to have committed bribery, extortion, malicious abuse of
authority and unauthorized practice of the law profession. Upon the respondent’s
recommendation to the President, petitioner was suspended from office and later notified
to investigate herein petitioner Jose D. Villena, mayor of Makati, Rizal, which was
scheduled on March 29, 1939.

The petitioner countered and prayed for the action of prohibition with prayer for a
preliminary injunction against the Secretary of the Interior to restrain him and his agents
from proceeding with the investigation but to no avail, was denied.

Hence, a petition to this court to issue a writ of a preliminary injunction against the
respondent.

ISSUE
Whether or not the respondent has legal authority to order the investigation and
suspension of the petitioner.

RULING
Yes, the suspension of the petitioner should be sustained on the principle of approval or
ratification of the act of the Secretary of the Interior by the President of the Philippines.
The respondent’s legal authority corresponds to his responsibility to act on the matters of
executive policy as a mere concession of the executive, in the absence of valid legislation.
Thus, if the President is the authority in the Executive Department, the respondent also
assumes corresponding responsibility.

The petition is hereby dismissed.

 Marcos v. Manglapus, G.R. No. 88211, October 27, 1989

FACTS
Being deposed from his presidency, former President Marcos and his family fled to
Hawaii. In his deathbed, petitioners filed an action before the Court to order the
respondents to issue their travel documents and enjoin the President’s decision to bar
their return to the Philippines. Petitioners contended that then President Corazon Aquino
was without power to impair the constitutional right on liberty of abode because only a
court may do so within the limits prescribed by law.

ISSUE
Whether or not the President have the power to bar the Marcoses from returning to the
Philippines

RULING
Yes, the Supreme Court held that such power forms part of the residual powers of the
President under the 1987 Constitution which is not similar from those conferred under
the 1973 Constitution and its amendatory provisions.

The Supreme Court held that then President Corazon Aquino did not act arbitrarily or with
grave abuse of discretion in arriving at the decision to prohibit such return. The
President’s powers are not limited to what are expressly enumerated under Article VIII
and in scattered provisions of the Constitution but extends to unstated residual powers
which are implied from the grant of executive power and which are necessary for her to
 comply with her duties under the constitution.

 Laurel v. Garcia, G.R. No. 92013, July 25, 1990

FACTS
The Roppongi property and three others was acquired from the Japanese government
under the Reparations Agreement entered into with Japan and Philippines on May 9,
1956. The property consists of land and building intended for the Chancery of the
Philippine Embassy. The embassy was later transferred to Nampeidai when the Roppongi
building needed major repairs. The Roppongi property has remained underdeveloped due
to the failure of the government to provide necessary funds.

On July 25, 1987, then President Corazon Aquino issued Executive Order No. 296 entitling
non-Filipino citizens or entities to avail of separations’ capital goods and services in the
event of sale, lease or disposition of the properties including the Roppongi.

Two petitions herein seek for prohibition to enjoin respondents, their representatives and
agents from proceeding with the sale of the properties and prayed for temporary
restraining order.

ISSUE
Whether or not the President has the authority and jurisdiction to sell the Roppongi
property.

RULING
No, the President has no authority and jurisdiction as there was no law authorizing the
sale of Roppongi property.

EO No. 296 does not have a provision to expressly authorize the sale of the Roppongi
property procured from Japan for the government sector. It merely intends to make the
properties available to foreigners in case of a sale and thus retains as property belonging
to the State and intended for some public service. The CARP law also does not authorize
the Executive Department to sell the Roppongi property. It merely enumerates possible
sources of future funding to augment as and when needed. Wherefore, petition was
granted and the TRO is made permanent.

 Philippine Coconut Producers Federation Inc., v. Republic, G.R. Nos. 177857-58,

February 11, 2010
FACTS
This are consolidated cases seeking for the motion for reconsideration of the resolution of
the Court that adverted to, approved, upon motion of the Petitioner Philippine Coconut
Producers Federation, Inc. (COCOFED), the conversion of the sequestered 753,848,312
Class A and B common shares of San Miguel Corporation (SMC), registered in the name of
Coconut Industry Investment Fund into SMC Series 1 Preferred shares.

Oppositors-intervenors Salonga, et al, anchored their plea for reconsideration on the

conversion of the shares is patently disadvantageous to the government and the coconut
farmers, given that SMC’s option to redeem ensures that the shares will be bought at less
than their market value.

ISSUE
Whether or not the government, as opposed to the current administration, is the winning
party and has no incentive to convert.

RULING
No, through the Presidential Commission on Good Government, the executive branch has
given its assent to the conversion, and such a decision may be deemed to be the
government's decision. The current administration or any administration cannot be
detached from the government. The President has the executive power to head the
government, irrespective of any administration to it.

It is the executive branch, either pursuant to the residual power of the President or by
force of her enumerated powers under the laws, that has control over all matters
pertaining to the disposition of the sequestered assets under the administration of the
PCGG.
  Ocampo v. Rear Admiral Ernesto C. Enriquez, G.R. No. 225973, November 8, 2016
FACTS
During the campaign period for the 2016 Presidential Election, then candidate Rodrigo R.
Duterte publicly announced that he would allow the burial of former President Ferdinand
E. Marcos at the Libingan Ng Mga Bayani (LNMB).

Having duly declared as the President of the Philippines, public respondent Secretary of
National Defense Delfin N. Lorenzana issued a Memorandum to the public respondent
chief of Staff of the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP), General Ricardo R. Visaya,
regarding the interment of Marcos at the LNMB.

Herein, consolidated petitions contending the interment of Marcos to the LNMB.

ISSUE
Whether or not respondent committed grave abuse of discretion allowing Marcos burial
to the LNMB.

RULING
No, there is no explicit constitutional or legal basis to hold that there was grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of the respondent's jurisdiction. With his executive
power, it is the President's discretion to allow Marcos his rightful place at the LNMB.
Through the public respondents, the President's discretion acted within the bounds of the
law, and the court must uphold what is legal and just.

Petitions are dismissed.

2. Power of Appointment
a. Kinds of Appointments;
 Ad Interim and Regular Appointments
A regular appointment is one made by the President while Congress is in session, takes
effect only after confirmation by the Commission on Appointments, and once approved,
continues until the end of the term of the appointee. An ad interim appointment is one
made by the President while Congress is not in session, takes effect immediately, but
ceases to be valid if disapproved by the Commission on Appointments or upon the next
adjournment of Congress.
 Midnight Appointments
those made within two months immediately prior to the next presidential elections,
applies only to the President or to the Acting President.

b. Procedure of Appointment for those that need Commission on Appointments Confirmation;

Limitations
 Nomination by the President
 Confirmation by the Commission on Appointments
 Issuance of the Commission
 Acceptance by the appointee.

Cases:
 Sarmiento v. Mison, G.R. No. L-79974, December 17, 1987
the Supreme Court declared that the foregoing are the only categories of appointments
which require confirmation by the Commission on Elections. In this case, it was held that
the appointment of Salvador Mison as Commissioner of Customs needs no confirmation by
the Commission on Appointments, because the Commissioner of the Customs is not among
the officers mentioned in the first sentence, Sec. 16, Art. VII.

FACTS
Respondent Salvador Mison was appointed by the President as Commissioner of the
Bureau of Customs. However, petitioners, who are taxpayers, lawyers, members of the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines and professors of Constitutional Law questioned the
Constitutionality of respondent Salvador Mison for the reason of its not having been
confirmed by the Commission on Appointments. Respondent claimed the constitutionality
of his appointment without the confirmation of the Commission on Appointments.

ISSUE
Whether or not the appointment of respondent Salvador Mison is Valid.
 RULING
Yes, his appointment is valid pursuant to Section 16, Article VII of the Constitution.

The President acted her constitutional authority and power to appoint respondent Mison
without submitting his nomination to the Commission of Appointments because his
appointment as Commissioner of Custom is not among the officers mentioned in Section
16, Article VII of the Constitution. Thus, the President's power to appoint is valid without
the COAs consent other than those enumerated in the above-cited provision. Thereby,
petition dismissed.

 De Castro v. JBC, G.R. No. 191002, March 17, 2010

FACTS
The forthcoming compulsory retirement of Chief Justice Puno on May 17, 2010, seven days
after the presidential election, urged the Judicial Bar Council (JBC) to open the position of
Chief Justice for application or recommendation following its January 18, 2010 resolution.
In the foregoing process for the filing of the nominees, JBC is not yet decided on when to
submit the list due to the controversy on whether the President can appoint the next Chief
Justice or not. Several petitions herein were instituted to compel the JBC to submit to the
incumbent President the list of nominees for the position of the next Chief Justice. The
petitioner filed a civil action for certiorari and mandamus.

ISSUE
Whether or not the President can appoint Chief Justice Puno’s successor.

RULING
Yes, the President can appoint Chief Justice Puno's successor upon his retirement on May
17, 2010.

The prohibition provided under Section 15, Article VII against presidential appointments
does not extend to appointments in the Judiciary. This prohibition is not extended to
Judiciary because of the Judicial Bar Council's establishment to nominate and screen the
candidates for judicial positions and to ensure that there would no longer be midnight
appointments to the Judiciary and to avoid vote-buying.

Wherefore petition is dismissed.

 Velicaria-Garafil v. Office of the President, G.R. No. 203372, June 16, 2015
FACTS
Before the May 2010 elections, President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo issued more than 800
appointments to various government office positions. This appointment includes petitioner
Atty. Velicaria-Garafil as State Solicitor II at the Office of the Solicitor General. Petitioner
assumed office on April 6, 2010, following its appointment date on March 5, date of
transmittal on March 8, date of Receipt by MRO on May 13, and Date of Oath of Office on
March 22.

With the succession of President Benigno Aquino, he issued Executive Order No. 2 to recall,
withdraw and revoke appointments issued by President Arroyo in violation of the
Constitutional ban on midnight appointments.

Petitioner contended that her appointment does not fall to the appointment ban started
on March 11, 2010. Herein petitioner filed a petition for certiorari before this court and
prayed for the nullification of EO 2. 

ISSUE
Whether or not the appointment of the petitioners violates Section 15, Article VII of the
1987 Constitution.

RULING
Yes, petitioners’ appointments are midnight appointments and are void for violation of
Section 15, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution. The court upheld the constitutionality of EO
2. However, in this case, the petitioner is referred to the Office of the President by the CA
on his discretion to pass upon the same due to extenuating circumstances that make it fall
outside the ambit of EO 2.
 Petition for certiorari is denied.

3. Power of Removal/Disciplinary Power

Cases:
 Alajar v. Alba, 100 Phil 683
Members of the Cabinet and such officers whose continuity in office depends upon the
pleasure of the President may be replaced at any time, but legally speaking, their
separation is effected not by removal but by expiration of their term.

FACTS
On January 1, 1964, Vivencio Alajar was appointed as Vice-Mayor of the City of Roxas at the
President of the Philippines' pleasure. The Commission of Appointments confirmed his
appointment. In November 1955, Vice Mayor Alajar was usurped from office and was
turned over to Juliano Alba.

Not satisfied with the President's action, Alajar instituted quo warranto proceedings in the
Court of First Instance of Capiz against Alba in which the lower court entitled Alajar to
remain in his office. However, this court considered the merits of Alba's appeal and issued a
writ of a preliminary injunction against petitioner Alajar. Petitioner Alajar contended the
decision of the CFI of Capiz.

ISSUE
Whether or not the President’s removal of petitioner and designating respondent as acting
Vice-mayor is legal.

RULING
Yes, the petitioner's replacement is not removal but the expiration of its tenure designated
by the President.

The term of the petitioner is not fixed by law. The creation and tenure of the petitioner's
office are expressly dependent upon the President’ pleasure. His term, being implicitly fixed
by the President, which subsequently expired, results in his right to hold office. Thus, his
right to hold office was caused by the expiration of his term.

The court, as a result of this, dismissed the quo warranto proceedings.

4. Power of Control
The power of an officer to alter or modify or nullify or set aside what a subordinate officer had done in
the performance of his duties and to substitute the judgement of the former for that of the latter.

a. Power of Supervision
Overseeing or the power or authority of an officer to see that subordinate officers perform
their duties. If the latter fail or neglect to fulfill them, the former may take such action or steps
as prescribe by law to make them perform these duties.

b. Doctrine of Qualified Political Agency

Acts of heads of departments performed and promulgated in regular course of business, are,
unless disapproved or reprobated by the Chief Executive, presumptively the acts of the Chief
Executive.

Cases:
 Mondano v. Silvosa, G.R. No. L-7708, May 30, 1955
Control is the power of an officer to alter or modify or nullify or set aside what a
subordinate officer had done in the performance of his duties and to substitute the
judgment of the former for that of the latter

FACTS
Petitioner Jose Mondano is the duly elected and qualified mayor of the municipality of
Mainit, Surigao. On February 27, 1954, Consolacion Vda. De Mosende filed a sword
complaint with the Presidential Complaints and Action Committee, accusing the petitioner
of rape and concubinage against his daughter Carided Mosende. The Assistant Executive
Secretary endorse the complaint to respondent provincial governor Fernando Silvosa for
 immediate investigation. The respondent herein issued Administrative order no. 1
suspending petitioner from office.

Petitioner prays for a writ of prohibition with a preliminary injunction to enjoin

respondents to declare that the order of suspension issued by the respondent provincial
governor is illegal and without legal effect.

ISSUE
Whether or not the suspension of the provincial governor to petitioner is valid.

RULING
No, the petitioner's suspension as mayor of the municipality of Mainit is unlawful and
without the authority of law.

The petitioner's suspension is not one of those specified in section 2188 of the Revised
Administrative Code. The President's authority to order an investigation of the petitioner
does not extend to local governments, over which the President only exercises general
supervision as may be provided by law. Section 86 of the RAC adds nothing to the power of
supervision to be exercised by the Department head over the administration of the
municipalities and section 79 of the same because such power was abrogated by Section
10(1), Article VII of the Constitution.

 Drilon v. Lim, G.R. No. 112497 August 4, 1994

Sec. 187, R.A. 7160, which authorizes the Secretary of Justice to review the constitutionality
or legality of a tax ordinance — and, if warranted, to revoke it on either or both grounds —
is valid, and does not confer the power of control over local government units in the
Secretary of Justice, as even if the latter can set aside a tax ordinance, he cannot substitute
his own judgment for that of the local government unit

FACTS
Secretary of Justice Franklin Drilon declared Ordinance No. 7794, otherwise known as the
Manila Revenue Code, null and void for non-compliance with the prescribed procedure in
enacting tax ordinances and containing specific provisions contrary to law and public key.

In a petition for certiorari, the City of Manila filed a petition to RTC Manila to revoke the
Secretary’s resolution and sustained the ordinance. The RTC Manila declared Section 187 of
the LGC as unconstitutional because of its vesture in the Secretary of Justice the power of
control over local governments in violation of local autonomy policy mandated in the
Constitution.

Secretary argued that Section 187 is constitutional and that the procedural requirements
for enacting tax ordinances as specified in LGC had not been observed.

ISSUE
Whether or not Section 187 of the Local Government Code is Constitutional.

RULING
Yes, section 187 of the LGC is constitutional.

In Section 187 of the LGC, Petitioner acted in his authority to review the Manila Revenue
Code's constitutionality or legality. His act did not replace what the provision of the code
should be. He acted with supervision vested in him to oversee lower officers perform their
duty in accordance with the law. Thus, Secretary Drilon did precisely, no more nor less than
to perform an act not of control but mere supervision.

The RTC decision is hereby reversed.

 

 Manubay vs. Garilao, G.R. No. 140717, April 16, 2009

The Supreme Court declared that the President of the Philippines is the Executive of the
Government of the Philippines and no other, and that all executive authority is thus vested
in him.

FACTS
 Petitioners and Manubay Agro-Industrial Development Corporation owned a 124-hectare
land in Barrio Cadlan, Pili, Camarines Sur. The Municipal Agrarian Reform Officer (MARO) of
Pili issued a notice that the said property was placed under the Comprehensive Agrarian
Reform Program (CARP). The petitioner herein applied to the Department of Agrarian
Reform to convert the property from agricultural to residential. The Sangguniang Bayan of
Pili passed Resolution No. 145 approving the Comprehensive Zoning Ordinance of 1996.
The ordinance reclassified the property from agricultural to highly urbanized intended for
residential and commercial use.

Petitioner requested DAR Regional Director Percival C. Dalugdug to set aside MARO
coverage notice as the property was no longer suitable for agricultural purposes but, to no
avail, was denied. Respondent subsequently upheld Director Dalugdug and denied
petitioners’ application for conversion.

Petitioners filed a petition for certiorari in the CA, assailing the denial of their application
for conversion but was dismissed.

ISSUE
Whether or not the act of department secretary is valid.

RULING
Yes, under the doctrine of qualified political agency, department secretaries are alter-egos
or the President's assistants. Their acts are presumed to be those of the latter unless
disproved by him. Thus, aggrieved petitioners affected by a cabinet secretary's decision
need not appeal to the Office of the President.

The resolutions of CA are hereby affirmed.

5. “Take Care” Clause/Faithful Execution Clause

The power to take care that the laws be faithfully executed makes the President a dominant figure in
the administration of the government. The energy or indifference with which he discharges this power
will determine the measure of his success as Law Enforcer
Cases:
 Biraogo v. The Philippine Truth Commission, G.R. No. 192935, December 7, 2010
FACTS
Petitioner Louis Biraogo assails the Executive Order No. 1, known as the Philippine Truth
Commission of 2010, for being violative of the legislative power of Congress under Section
1, Article VI of the Constitution as it usurps the constitutional authority of the legislature to
create public office and to appropriate funds therefor. Petitioner asked the Court to declare
it unconstitutional and enjoin the PTC from performing its functions.

ISSUE
Whether or not EO No. 1 is Constitutional.

RULING
No, EO No. 1 is declared unconstitutional. The president has the power of control to take
care that laws be faithfully executed in the government's administration. The Chief
Executive's power to create the PTC cannot be doubted as it is a necessary vehicle for the
faithful execution of laws. Being violative of the Constitution's equal protection clause, the
PTC's mandate is to investigate and fund out the truth concerning reported cases of graft
and corruption during the previous administration only. The intent to single out the
previous administration is plain, patent, and manifest.

6. Military Powers (Article VII, Section 18)

a. Calling Out Power
The president is given vast powers in the making and carrying out of military decisions.
b. Suspension of the Writ of Habeas Corpus
The president is entrusted the power to suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus.
c. Declaration of Martial Law
d. Limitations
 The president can call out armed forces on when it is on lawless violence, invasion or
rebellion only
 Writ of habeas corpus is limited only to invasion or rebellion.
 Duration of suspension/proclamation shall not exceed 60 days.
  Within 48 hours, President shall inform the Congress for the suspension/proclamation
 By majority vote of all its members, congress may revoke president’s action.
 The congress may extend the suspension/proclamation.
 Action of congress and president is subject for review in the Supreme Court
 "(1) a time limit of sixty days; (2) review and possible revocation by Congress; [and] (3) review and
possible nullification by the Supreme Court

Cases:
 Kulayan v. Abdusakur M. Tan, G.R. No. 187298, July 3, 2012
FACTS
The Abu Sayyaf Group kidnapped three members from the International Committee of the
Red Cross (ICRC) in the Provincial Capitol's vicinity in Patikul, Sulu. In the kidnapping
incident, described as a terrorist act under RA 9372 (Human Security Act), respondent
Governor Tan issued Proclamation No. 1, Series of 2009, declaring a state of emergency in
the province of Sulu.

Doubted to be linked to the ASG, petitioners were captured and detained. Petitioners filed
in this court a petition for certiorari and prohibition claiming that Proclamation 1-09 was
issued with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, as it
threatened fundamental freedoms guaranteed under Article III of the 1987 Constitution.

ISSUE
Whether or not the respondent governor is authorized to declare a state of emergency and
exercise power to conduct general searches and seizures.

RULING
No, the respondent provincial governor is not endowed with the power to call upon the
armed forces at his bidding. In issuing the assailed proclamation, the respondent governor
exceeded his authority when he declared a state of emergency and called upon the Armed
Forces, the police, and his own Civilian Emergency Force. The calling-out powers are a clear
textual commitment under the constitution that is exclusive to the President to call out the
armed forces and determine the necessity for such power. Therefore, the respondent
governor acted in grave abuse of discretion, amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.

Proclamation No. 1, Series of 2009 was declared null and void.

 Lagman v. Medialdea, G.R. No. 231658, July 4, 2017

FACTS
Effective May 23, 2017, President Rodrigo Roa Duterte issued Proclamation NO. 216
declaring a state of martial law and suspending the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus in
the Mindanao region for a period not exceeding 60 days.

The proclamation resulted in lawless activities of the Abu Sayyaf Group, Maute Group, and
other criminals to establish a seat of power in Marawi City, positing act of rebellion,
invasion, and imminent danger of public safety.

Several cases were consolidated wherein petitioners, in this case, claimed that the
declaration of martial law has no sufficient factual basis, that the president’s report
contained false, inaccurate, contrived, and hyperbolic accounts. Petitioners ask the court to
exercise its specifical and special jurisdiction to review the sufficiency of the factual basis of
Proclamation No. 216 and render a decision voiding and nullifying Proclamation No. 216 for
lack of sufficient factual basis.

ISSUE
Whether or not Proclamation No. 216 is constitutional.

RULING
Yes, the court finds factual bases to declare Proclamation No. 216 and declares
constitutional.

The sequence of facts obtained by the President is sufficient probable cause to declare
martial law and suspension of the writ of habeas corpus, believing that he did not err that
what is going on in Marawi City is one contemplated under the crime of rebellion. The facts
obtained are contemplated to the President's calling-out power to address the acts of
 rebellion immediately. With Proclamation No. 216, the President has sufficient factual basis
to believe that rebellion exists, and public safety requires the martial law declaration and
the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus.

Verily, the court upholds the validity of the declaration of martial law and suspension of the
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus in the entire Mindanao region.

7. Pardoning Power/Power of Executive Clemency

Executive clemency is granted for the purpose of relieving the harshness of the law or correcting in the
administration of justice.

a. Definitions:
 Pardon (Article VII, Section 19)
Act of grace which exempts the individual on whom it is bestowed from the punishment
which the law inflicts for the crime he has committed.
 Commutation
Reduction or mitigation of penalty
 Reprieve
Postponement of a sentence to a date certain, or stay of execution.
b. Limitations
 Pardon cannot be granted in cases of impeachment.
 No pardon can be granted for the violation of any election law, rule or regulation without
the favorable recommendation of the Commission on Elections.
 Pardon cannot be extended to a person convicted of legislative contempt
 Pardon cannot extend for the purpose of absolving the pardonee of civil liability.
c. Effects of Pardon
To restore offender’s liberty and his civil and political rights.
d. Kinds of Pardon:
 Plenary
Extinguishes all the penalties imposed upon the offender, including accessory
disabilities.
 Partial
Extinguishes all the penalties imposed upon the offender, excluding accessory
disabilities.
 Absolute
Pardon extended without any strings attached
 Conditional
Pardon which the convict is required to comply with certain requirements.

Cases:
 Magdalo v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 190793, June 19, 2012
FACTS
Petitioner Magdalo sa Pagbabago (MAGDALO) filed its Petition for Registration with the
COMELEC, seeking its registration and/or accreditation as a regional political party based in
the National Capital Region (NCR) for participation in the May 10, 2010 National and Local
Election. MAGDALO was represented by Senator Antonio F. Trillanes as its Chairperson.

On October 26, 2009, the COMELEC Second Division issued its Resolution denying the
Petition for Registration filed by Petitioner, on the ground that, Senator Antonio F. Trillanes
IV, and some members participated in the take-over of the Oakwood Premier Apartments
in Ayala Center, in which clearly shows their purpose in employing violence and using
unlawful means to achieve their goals in the process defying the laws of organized
societies.

MAGDALO filed a Motion for Reconsideration, which was elevated to the COMELEC En Banc
for resolution but, to no avail, was denied in its assailed Resolution dated January 4, 2010.

Herewith, an instant petition.

ISSUE
Whether or not COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion in its assailed Resolutions.

RULING
No, the COMELEC did not commit grave abuse of discretion in denying the Petition for
 Registration filed by MAGDALO. However, in the supervening events, the court take
cognizance on the subsequent grant of amnesty to the military personnel involved in the
Oakwood standoff. Nevertheless, the court is not unmindful of the apprehensions of the
COMELEC as regards the use of violence. Thus, should MAGDALO decide to file another
Petition for Registration, its officers must individually execute affidavits renouncing the use
of violence or other harmful means to achieve the objectives of their organization. Further,
MAGDALO membership cannot include military officers who are in active service.

The instant petition is dismissed and the COMELC resolutions dated October 26, 2009 and
January 4, 2010 is affirmed.

 Monsanto v. Factoran, G.R. No. 78239, February 9, 1989

One who, because of conviction of a crime, has forfeited her right to the public office but
was extended a plenary pardon by the President, cannot, by reason of the pardon, demand
reinstatement as a matter of right

FACTS
Petitioner, in this case, Assistant treasurer of Calbayog City, Salvacion A. Monsanto was
convicted a complex crime of estafa thru falsification of public documents. Petitioner
Monsanto appealed her conviction to this Court which subsequently affirmed the same.
She then filed a motion for reconsideration but while said motion was pending, she was
extended on December 17, 1984 by then President Marcos absolute pardon which she
accepted on December 21, 1984.

By reason of said pardon, petitioner requested for the restoration to her former post as
assistant city treasurer which was referred to the Ministry of Finance and was ruled that
petitioner was reinstated to her position without the necessity of a new appointment.
However, Deputy Executive Secretary Fulgencio S. Factoran denied both the Ministry of
Finance and petitioner. Her subsequent motion for reconsideration having been denied,
petitioner filed the present petition in her behalf.

ISSUE
Whether or not a public officer, who has been granted an absolute pardon by the Chief
Executive is entitled to reinstatement to her former position without need of a new
appointment.

RULING
No, the absolute disqualification or ineligibility from public office forms part of the
punishment prescribed by the RPC for estafa thru falsification of public documents.
Petitioner’s automatic reinstatement is untenable on the notion that a pardon virtually
acquitted on from the offense she committed. The pardon granted to her has resulted in
removing her disqualification from holding public employment but it cannot go beyond
that. To regain her former post as assistant treasurer, she must reapply and undergo the
usual procedure required for a new appointment. Henceforth, her application for re-
appointment to the office should be evaluated and taken into account to determine
ultimately whether she can once again be entrusted with public funds.

8. Borrowing Power
Section 20, Article VII
The President may contract or guarantee foreign loans on behalf of the Republic of the Philippines
with the prior concurrence of the Monetary Board, and subject to such limitations as may be provided
by law. The Monetary Board shall, within thirty days from the end of every quarter of the calendar
year, submit to the Congress a complete report of its decisions on applications for loans to be
contracted or guaranteed by the Government or government-owned and controlled corporations
which would have the effect of increasing the foreign debt, and containing other matters as may be
provided by law.

9. Diplomatic Power
The President is supposed to be the spokesperson of the nation on external affairs. In this capacity, he
may deal with foreign states and governments, extend or withhold recognition, maintain diplomatic
relations, enter into treaties and otherwise transact the business of foreign relations.

Cases:
 Bayan Muna v. Romulo, G.R. No. 175888, February 11, 2009
 FACTS
Respondent Lance Corporal (L/CPL) Daniel Smith is a member of the US Armed Forces. He
was charged with the crime of rape committed against a Filipina, Suzette S. Nicolas.
Pursuant to the Visiting Force Agreement (VFA) between the Republic of the Philippines
and the United States, the US, at its request, was granted custody of defendant Smith
pending the proceedings. During the trial, the RTC of Makati found respondent Smith guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of rape, as a result, the Makati Court ordered to
detain him at the Makati jail until further orders.

However, under the new agreements between the Philippines and the US, referred to as
the Romulo-Kenney Agreement, defendant Smith was taken out of the Makati jail and
brought to a facility for detention under the control of the US government. Several
petitions were brought before the CA but was dismissed for having become moot.

Hence, the present actions.

ISSUE
Whether or not the presence of US Armed Forces in Philippine territory pursuant to the
VFA is allowed and recognized as a treaty by the other contracting State.

RULING
Yes, the VFA between the Republic of the Philippines and the United states is upheld
constitutional. The provisions of VFA is self-executing as it intends to carry out obligations
and undertakings under the RP-US Mutual Defense Treaty. The VFA has been implemented
and executed, with the US faithfully complying with its obligation to produce L/CPL Smith
before the court during trial. Further, the executive agreement in VFA is a treaty within the
meaning of international law and constitutes enforceable law vis-à-vis the United States.
However, the Romulo-Kenny Agreements are declared not in accordance with the VFA.

 Saguisag v. Executive Secretary, G.R. No. 212426, Jan. 12, 2016

FACTS
The petitions questioned the constitutionality of the Enhanced Defense Cooperation
Agreement (EDCA) between the Republic of the Philippines and the USA. Petitioners allege
that respondents committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction when they entered into EDCA with the US, claiming that the instrument
violated multiple constitutional provisions. In reply, respondents argue that petitioners lack
standing to bring the suit. To support the legality of their actions, respondents invoke the
1987 Constitution, treaties, and judicial precedents.

ISSUE
Whether or not the President may enter into an executive agreement.

RULING
Yes, EDCA is not constitutionally infirm, as an executive agreement, it remains consistent
with the existing laws and treaties it purports to implement.

The power of the President to enter into binding executive agreement without Senate
concurrence is already well-established jurisdiction entrenched on Section 5(2)(a), Article
VII of the Constitution. The President’s choice to enter into EDCA in the form of an
executive agreement is a constitutional infirmity consistent with the content, purpose, and
framework of the Mutual Defense Treaty and the Visiting Forces Agreement.

Petition is dismissed.

10. Budgetary Power (Article VI, Section 25(1))

The President shall submit to the Congress within thirty days from the opening of every regular
session, as the basis of the general appropriations bill, a budget of expenditures and sources of
financing, including receipts from existing and proposed revenue measures.

11. Informing Power (Article VII, Section 23)

The President shall address the Congress at the opening of its regular session. He may also appear
before it at any other time.
 12. Residual Powers

13. Emergency Powers

14. Other Powers:

a. Call Congress to a special session (Art. VI, Section 15);
b. Approve or veto bills (Art. VI, Section 27);
c. Prevent Entry of or Deport aliens;
d. Consent to deputization of government personnel by COMELEC;
e. Discipline such deputies (Article IX-C, Section 2, Paragraph 8));
f. By delegation from Congress, exercise tariff powers (Article VI, Section 28, Paragraph 2))
g. Power to classify or reclassify lands (Commonwealth Act No. 141, Section 6)
Cases:
 Qua Chee Gan v. The Deportation Board, G.R. No. L-10280, September 30, 1963
FACTS
Special Prosecutor Emilio L. Galang charged petitioners before the Deportation
Board with having purchased $130,000, without the necessary license from the
Central Bank of the Philippines, and of having remitted the same to Hongkong with
having attempted to bribe officers of the Philippine and US Governments to evade
prosecution for said unauthorized purchase of US dollars. Following the deportation
charges, a warrant of arrest to the petitioners was issued by presiding Deportation
Board member.
 
Petitioner filed a joint motion to dismiss the charges against them in the
Deportation Board because the same does not constitute a legal ground for the
deportation of aliens from this country. The petition was given due course made
returnable to the Court of First Instance of Manila.
 
Hence, the lower court issued a petition of writ of a preliminary injunction,
restraining the respondent Deportation Board from hearing deportation charges
against petitioners.
 
On January 5, 1951, President Quirino reorganized the Deportation Board by virtue
of Executive Order No. 398 that the Board was authorized to file formal charges by
the Special Prosecutor of the Board to issue a warrant for the arrest of the
petitioner and to hold them under detention during the investigation.
 
ISSUE
Whether or not the respondent has the power to issue a warrant of arrest and fix
bonds for the alien’s temporary release pending investigation of charges against
him.
 
RULING
No, EO 398, S. 1951 as it empowers the Deportation Board to issue a warrant of
arrest upon the filing of formal charges against an alien/s and to fix bond and
prescribe the conditions for the temporary release of said aliens, is declared illegal.
 
The President, as the power to carry out the order of deportation and to order
arrest of the deportee, such power may not be delegated to the Deportation board
as there is no express authority was granted by the law that would serve the
curtailment or limitation on the fundamental right of a person, such as his security
of life and liberty.
 
Wherefore, the arrest issued by the respondent Deportation Board is declared null
and void.

Cases:
1. Villena v. Secretary of the Interior, G.R. No. L-46570, April 21, 1939
2. Marcos v. Manglapus, G.R. No. 88211, October 27, 1989
3. Laurel v. Garcia, G.R. No. 92013, July 25, 1990
4. Philippine Coconut Producers Federation Inc., v. Republic, G.R. Nos. 177857-58, February 11, 2010
5. Ocampo v. Rear Admiral Ernesto C. Enriquez, G.R. No. 225973, November 8, 2016
6. Sarmiento v. Mison, G.R. No. L-79974, December 17, 1987
7. De Castro v. JBC, G.R. No. 191002, March 17, 2010
8. Velicaria-Garafil v. Office of the President, G.R. No. 203372, June 16, 2015
9. Alejar v. Alba, G.R. Nos. L-10360 and L-10433, January 17, 1957
10. Mondano v. Silvosa, G.R. No. L-7708, May 30, 1955
11. Drilon v. Lim, G.R. No. 112497 August 4, 1994
12. Manubay vs. Garilao, G.R. No. 140717, April 16, 2009
13. Villena v. Secretary of the Interior, G.R. No. 140717, April 16, 2009
14. Biraogo v. The Philippine Truth Commission, G.R. No. 192935, December 7, 2010
15. Kulayan v. Abdusakur M. Tan, G.R. No. 187298, July 3, 2012
16. Lagman v. Medialdea, G.R. No. 231658, July 4, 2017
17. Magdalo v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 190793, June 19, 2012
18. Monsanto v. Factoran, G.R. No. 78239, February 9, 1989
19. Bayan Muna v. Romulo, G.R. No. 175888, February 11, 2009
20. Saguisag v. Executive Secretary, G.R. No. 212426, Jan. 12, 2016
21. Qua Chee Gan v. The Deportation Board, G.R. No. L-10280, September 30, 1963.