CHAPTER 13.

THE CONSTITUTIONAL COMMISSIONS

1. Salaries
Chairmen – 204,000
Members – 180,000
2. Disqualifications
 No member shall hold any other office or employment
 No engagement in the practice of any profession, busines which affects the
functions of his office
 No financial interest to agencies, instrumentalities including GOCCs or their
subsidiaries.
3. Staggering of Terms
Appointees were given terms of 3, 5 and 7 years, so that the vacancy will occur every 2
years. Its object is to minimize the multiple appointment of the president during his
term, thus impairs the commission’s independence.
4. Reappointment
No re-appointment because it is expressly prohibited in the constitution
5. Other Perquisites
 Commission shall enjoy fiscal autonomy.
 Each commission en banc may promulgate its own rules.
6. Proceedings
 Section 7. Each commission shall decide by a majority vote of all its members any
case or matter brought before it within sixty days from the date of its submission for
decision or resolution. A case or matter is deemed submitted for decision or
resolution upon the filing of the last pleading, brief, or memorandum required by
the rules of the Commission or by the Commission itself. Unless otherwise provided
by this constitution or by law, any decision, order, or ruling of each commission may
be brought to the Supreme Court on certiorari by the aggrieved party within thirty
days from receipt of a copy thereof.

Cases:
1. Republic v. Imperial, 96 Phil 770
FACTS
On June 21, 1941, Commonwealth Act 657 (antedated on Article X for the establishment of
COMELEC) was enacted to organize the Commission on Elections. In July 1945, the first
COMELEC commissioners were duly appointed, with the following terms of office: 

Hon. Jose Lopez Vito, Chairman, for nine years, expiring on July 12, 1954.
Hon. Francisco Engage, Member, for six years, expiring on July 12, 1951.
Hon. Vicente Vera, Member, for three years, expiring on July 12, 1948;

Chairman Vito died in May 1947, and member Vera succeeded Chairmanship to serve until
July 12, 1954. Chairman Vera died in August 1951, before his term of nine years (on July 12,
154). Respondent Imperial was appointed to succeed Vera for a term expiring July 12,
1960.

Similarly, Respondent Perez was appointed as a commission member on December 8,

1949, for a term of nine years expiring November 24, 1958, when Enage retired on
November 1949.

The solicitor general instituted a quo warranto proceeding against respondents assailing
their appointment's legality. Would it deemed to have expired and vacant since their
appointment was a continuance of the predecessors, not an appointment for a period of
one term.

ISSUE
Whether or not respondents' continuance of office has not yet expired.
RULING
Yes, as the respondents' legal terms of office have not yet expired, whether their legal
terms have opted to the Constitutional amendments or the enactment of CA 657.

The organization of the constitutional COMELEC under CA 657 shall be established as the
starting term of the first appointments because appointment to a Constitution office is not
only a right but equally a duty that should not be shirked or delayed, for it not to impede or
frustrate the plain intent of the fundamental law.

Petition for quo warranto is hereby dismissed.

2. Funa v. The Chairman, Commission on Audit, G.R. No. 192791, April 24, 2012
FACTS
On February 15, 2001, President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo (President Macapagal-Arroyo)
appointed Guillermo N. Carague (Carague) as Chairman of the Commission on Audit
(COA) for a term of seven (7) years, pursuant to the 1987 Constitution. Carague's office
term started on February 2, 2001, to end on February 2, 2008.

Meanwhile, on February 7, 2004, President Macapagal-Arroyo appointed Reynaldo A.

Villar (Villar) as the third member of the COA for a term of seven (7) years starting
February 2, 2004, until February 2, 2011.

Following the retirement of Carague on February 2, 2008, and during the fourth year of
Villar as COA Commissioner, Villar was designated as Acting Chairman of COA from
February 4, 2008, to April 14, 2008. Subsequently, on April 18, 2008, Villar was
nominated and appointed as Chairman of the COA. Shortly after that, on June 11, 2008,
the Commission on Appointments confirmed his appointment. He was to serve as
Chairman of COA, as expressly indicated in the appointment papers, until the expiration
of his office's original term as COA Commissioner or on February 2, 2011. Challenged in
this recourse, Villar, in an obvious bid to lend color of title to his hold on the
chairmanship, insists that his appointment as COA Chairman accorded him a fresh term
of seven (7) years, which is yet to lapse. In fine, he would argue that his term of office,
as such Chairman, is up to February 2, 2015, or 7 years reckoned from February 2, 2008,
when he was appointed to that position.

Dennis Funa, in his Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition, challenged the
constitutionality of the appointment of respondent as Chairman of the COA and prayed
a judgment to declare the unconstitutionality of his appointment.

ISSUE
Whether or not the appointment of Commissioner Reynaldo A. Villar, whose term as
Chairman has expired, is valid.

RULING
No, his appointment is declared unconstitutional for violation of Section 1(2), Article
IX(D) of the Constitution.

The court held that the appointment of members shall always be for a fixed term of
seven years. Appointment to vacancies shall only be for the unexpired portion of the
term of the predecessor. Appointees of the Commission who served the entire period of
one term are barred from reappointment in the Commission. A commissioner who
resigns after serving in the Commission for less than seven years is eligible for an
appointment to the position of Chairman for the unexpired portion of the term of
departing Chairman.

His appointment was prohibited under Section 1(2), Article IX(D) of the Constitution
because an appointment involving a movement to a different office constitutes a new
appointment. Hence, reappointment is barred under the Constitution.
 

CHAPTER 14. THE CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION

1. Composition and Qualifications

SECTION 1. (1) The Civil Service shall be administered by the Civil Service Commission
composed of a Chairman and two Commissioners who shall be natural-born citizens of
the Philippines and, at the time of their appointment, at least thirty-five years of age,
with proven capacity for public administration, and must not have been candidates for
any elective position in the elections immediately preceding their appointment.

(2) The Chairman and the Commissioners shall be appointed by the President with the
consent of the Commission on Appointments for a term of seven years without
reappointment. Of those first appointed, the Chairman shall hold office for seven years,
a Commissioner for five years, and another Commissioner for three years, without
reappointment. Appointment to any vacancy shall be only for the unexpired term of the
predecessor. In no case shall any Member be appointed or designated in a temporary or
acting capacity.

2. Scope of the Civil Service

SECTION 2. (1) The civil service embraces all branches, subdivisions, instrumentalities,
and agencies of the Government, including government-owned or controlled
corporations with original charters.

National Service Corp. v. NLRC, 168 SCRA 122

FACTS
Eugenia C. credo was an employee of the National Service Corporation (NASECO).
Sometime before November 7, 1983, Credo was administratively charged by Sisinio S.
Loren on her non-compliance with Lloren's memorandum. Credo's scandalous manner
to her co-employees forced her a mandatory 15 days leave.

Subsequently, Credo was terminated with forfeiture of benefits from NASECO, thereby
filed a supplemental complaint about her illegal dismissal alleging the absence of just or
authorized cause for her dismissal and lack of opportunity to be heard. The labor arbiter
rendered a decision after both parties submitted their position papers, dismissing the
complaint, and directing NASECO to pay Credo separation pay. 

Both parties appealed to the respondent National Labor Relations Commission, which
the NLRC subsequently denied the same in a resolution of January 1985. On Credo's
subsequent petition in GR No. 70295, respondent NLRC ordered her reinstatement to
office.

However, Petitioner argued that the NLRC has no jurisdiction to order Credo's
reinstatement, claiming that NASECO, as a government corporation, the terms and
conditions of employees are governed by the Civil Service Law, rules and regulations,
not by respondent NLRC.

ISSUE
Whether or not NLRC has jurisdiction over Credo's reinstatement.

RULING
Yes, as the 1987 Constitution was governed in the instant case, the NLRC has jurisdiction
to accord relief to the parties. As a subsidiary of the National Investment and
Development Corporation (NIDC), in turn, a subsidiary of the Philippine National Bank,
the NASECO is a government-owned or controlled corporation without an original
charter. Thereby, the NLRC decision is affirmed.
 
3. Appointments; Exceptions
Section 2. (2) Appointments in the civil service shall be made only according to merit
and fitness to be determined, as far as practicable, and, except to positions which are
policy-determining, primarily confidential, or highly technical, by competitive
examination.
Exceptions
1. policy-determining position, eg. Head of departments
2. primarily confidential position, eg. Chief legal counsel of the PNB

PAGCOR v. Angara, 475 SCRA 41 (2005)

FACTS
Respondents Beatriz T. La Victoria (La Victoria) and Marita A. Angara (Angara) were Slot
Machine Roving Token Attendants(SMRTAs) of petitioner Philippine Amusement and
Gaming Corporation (PAGCOR) assigned at its casino in Davao City. Eventually, they
were dismissed by the PAGCOR Board of Directors for loss of trust and confidence.
Respondents filed a motion for reconsideration, but their motion was denied. They then
filed their appeal memorandum with the Civil Service Commission (CSC), which ruled in
their favor; hence, the case.

ISSUE
Whether or not respondents hold confidential positions whose removal from the service
can be justified through a loss of trust and confidence.

RULING
No, from the nature of respondents’ functions, their organizational ranking, and their
compensation level, it is obviously beyond debate that respondents, occupying one of
the lowest ranks in petitioner, cannot be considered confidential employees. Their job
description spells out their routine functions. Petitioner, therefore, cannot justify
respondents’ dismissal on the loss of trust and confidence since the latter are not
confidential employees. Being regular employees who enjoy tenure security,
respondents can only be dismissed for just cause and with due process, notice, and
hearing. 

Petitioner cannot, in the alternative, allege that respondents are being dismissed for
dishonesty since petitioner’s thesis, in its motion for reconsideration in the CSC and
petition before the CA, has always been that respondents, as confidential employees,
can be dismissed for loss of trust and confidence. Besides, dishonesty is not why they
were dismissed per the letter of dismissal of July 23, 1997, but for loss of trust and
confidence.

4. Security of Tenure
Section 2. (3) No officer or employee of the civil service shall be removed or suspended
except for cause provided by law.

5. Partisan Political Activity

Section 2. (4) No officer or employee in the civil service shall engage, directly or
indirectly, in any electioneering or partisan political campaign.

Quinto v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 189698, February 22, 2010

FACTS
The assailed Decision granted the Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition filed by Eleazar
P. Quinto and Gerino Tolentino, Jr. It declared as unconstitutional the second proviso in
the third paragraph of Section 13 of RA NO. 9369, Section 66 of the Omnibus Election
Code and Section 4(a) of COMELEC Resolution No. 8878, on the ground that they violate
the equal protection clause of the Constitution and suffer from overbreadth. They assail
the Court’s December 1, 2009 decision, paving the way for appointive public officials to
continue discharging the powers, prerogatives, and functions of their office
 notwithstanding their entry into the political arena.

ISSUE
Whether or not appointive officials are prohibited for candidacy, whether they be
partisan or nonpartisan in character.

RULING
Yes, civil servants holding apolitical offices are prohibited for candidacy in the national,
municipal, or barangay level whether they be partisan or nonpartisan in character
pursuant Section 2(4), Article IX-B of the 1987 Constitution. The constitutional ban is
intended for civil service officers and employees from engaging in any electioneering or
partisan political campaign.

6. Self-Organization
Section 2. (5) The right to self-organization shall not be denied to government
employees.
SSS Employees Association v. Court of Appeals, 175 SCRA 686
FACTS
Petitioners, in this case, questioned their right to right strike as a matter of right to an
organization when they went on strike after the SSS failed to act on their demands.
Respondent SSS filed with RTC Quezon City to enjoin them to issue a temporary
restraining order against petitioners or to pursue notice of strike they filed with the
Department of Labor and Employment.

Petitioners' position argued that the RTC had no jurisdiction to hear the case, as
jurisdiction lay with the DOLE or the National Labor Relations Commission since the case
involves a labor dispute.

In dismissing the petitioners' petition, the Court of Appeals held that they are not
allowed to strike and may be enjoined by the RTC, which had jurisdiction over the case.

ISSUE
Whether or not the petitioners' right to self-organization does include the right to strike

RULING
No, the right to self-organization does not carry with it the right to strike. Petitioners, as
employees in the civil service, may not resort to strikes, walk-outs, and other temporary
work stoppages to pressure the Government to accede to their demands. Pursuant to
Section 4, Rule III of the Rules and Regulations to Govern the Exercise of the Rights of
Government Employees to self-organization, the terms and conditions of employment in
the Government, including any political subdivision or instrumentality thereof and
GOCCs with original charters, are governed by law and employees therein shall not
strike for the purpose of securing changes thereof.

7. Temporary Employees
Section 2. (6) Temporary employees of the Government shall be given such protection
as may be provided by law.

Temporary employees generally do not have any fixed term and may be replaced at
pleasure made by the appointing power.

8. Objectives of the Civil Service

SECTION 3. The Civil Service Commission, as the central personnel agency of the
Government, shall establish a career service and adopt measures to promote morale,
efficiency, integrity, responsiveness, progressiveness, and courtesy in the civil service. It
shall strengthen the merit and rewards system, integrate all human resources
 development programs for all levels and ranks, and institutionalize a management
climate conducive to public accountability. It shall submit to the President and the
Congress an annual report on its personnel programs.

9. Oath
SECTION 4. All public officers and employees shall take an oath or affirmation to uphold and
defend this Constitution.

10. Disqualifications
SECTION 7. No elective official shall be eligible for appointment or designation in any
capacity to any public office or position during his tenure.

Unless otherwise allowed by law or by the primary functions of his position, no appointive
official shall hold any other office or employment in the Government or any subdivision,
agency or instrumentality thereof, including government-owned or controlled corporations
or their subsidiaries.

11. Standardization of Compensation

SECTION 5. The Congress shall provide for the standardization of compensation of
government officials and employees, including those in government-owned or controlled
corporations with original charters, taking into account the nature of the responsibilities
pertaining to, and the qualifications required for their positions.

12. Double Compensation

SECTION 8. No elective or appointive public officer or employee shall receive additional,
double, or indirect compensation, unless specifically authorized by law, nor accept
without the consent of the Congress, any present, emolument, office, or title of any kind
from any foreign government.

Pensions or gratuities shall not be considered as additional, double, or indirect

compensation.

Peralta v. Auditor General, 148 Phil. 261

FACTS
On May 17, 1996, GSIS resolution, petitioner Pedro D. Peralta was granted an optional
retirement gratuity of 40,336.07. Of that amount, he could not collect the sum of
P7032.26, covering the P3,982.26 as a cost of living allowance, P1,275 as incentive
bonus, and P1,775 as Christmas bonus. Such items were not passed in the audit.
Respondent Auditor General said that those sums should be deducted from his gratuity.
However, during the petitioner’s incumbency as Trustee, no question was raised when
he was paid such allowance and bonuses. Respondent justified his action on the ground
that they partake like additional compensation. A trustee’s remuneration is fixed by law
in the per diem of P25 for every board meeting of the GSIS attended. Respondent so
ruled on June 28, 1966, and maintained such a stand on September 1, 1966, when he
denied a motion for reconsideration.

Hence, this appeal for review.

ISSUE
Whether or not petitioner, as a government employee, is constitutionally prohibited in
receiving double compensation.

RULING
Yes, as expressly provided in the Constitution, no officer or employee of the government
shall receive additional or double compensation unless specifically authorized by law.
This principle is to resist the temptation to further personal ends and public
employment as a means for the acquisition of wealth. It raises awareness on the part of
an employee or officer of the government that he receives only such compensation as
fixed by law.
Cases:
1. National Service Corp. v. NLRC, 168 SCRA 122
2. PAGCOR v. Angara, 475 SCRA 41 (2005)
3. Quinto v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 189698, February 22, 2010
4. SSS Employees Association v. Court of Appeals, 175 SCRA 686
5. Peralta v. Auditor General, 148 Phil. 261

CHAPTER 15. THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS

1. Composition and Qualifications

SECTION 1. (1) There shall be a Commission on Elections composed of a Chairman and
six Commissioners who shall be natural-born citizens of the Philippines and, at the time
of their appointment, at least thirty-five years of age, holders of a college degree, and
must not have been candidates for any elective position in the immediately preceding
elections. However, a majority thereof, including the Chairman, shall be Members of the
Philippine Bar who have been engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years.
(2) The Chairman and the Commissioners shall be appointed by the President with the
consent of the Commission on Appointments for a term of seven years without
reappointment. Of those first appointed, three Members shall hold office for seven
years, two Members for five years, and the last Members for three years, without
reappointment. Appointment to any vacancy shall be only for the unexpired term of the
predecessor. In no case shall any Member be appointed or designated in a temporary or
acting capacity.

2. Powers and Functions (Section 1)

a. Enforcement of Election Laws
(1) Enforce and administer all laws and regulations relative to the conduct of an
election, plebiscite, initiative, referendum, and recall.
Sanchez v. COMELEC, 114 SCRA 454
FACTS
On January 30, 1980, local election, Armado Biliwang of the Kilusang Bagong
Lipunan (KBL) was proclaimed winner by the Municipal Board of Canvassers
against Virginilio Sanchez of the Nacionalista Party (NP) for Municipal Mayor of
San Fernando, Pampanga.

Sanchez filed with the COMELEC to declare null and void the local election held
in San Fernando due to alleged large scale terrorism. In its resolution, the
COMELEC annulled the local election in San Fernando Pampanga and recalled a
special election.

Petitioners filed a petition for certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus against the
respondent, assailing that the respondent has no power to annul an entire
municipal election. Petitioner also asserted on respondents' refusal to call a
special election.

ISSUE
a) Whether or not COMELEC has the power to annul an entire municipal
election on the ground of post-terrorism.
b) Whether or not COMELEC has the authority to call for a special election.
 
RULING
a) Yes, COMELEC has its power and function to protect the integrity of
elections. COMELEC must be deemed possessed of authority to annul
elections where the voters' will has been defeated and the purity of
election tainted. The fact that widespread terrorism after the elections,
and not in the casting of votes, should make no difference on the
 COMELEC's duty to perform and at the same time deny it the
wherewithal to fulfill its task.
b) Yes, COMELEC has vested the authority to call for the holding or
continuation of the election. Thus, the power and prerogative of the
COMELEC to annul an election where the voters' will have been defeated
and call for a special election where widespread terrorism, whether
before or after the election, has been proven, failing to elect.
 
b. Decision of Election Contests
SECTION 2. The Commission on Elections shall exercise the following powers
and functions:
(2) Exercise exclusive original jurisdiction over all contests relating to the
elections, returns, and qualifications of all elective regional, provincial, and
city officials, and appellate jurisdiction over all contests involving elective
municipal officials decided by trial courts of general jurisdiction, or involving
elective barangay officials decided by trial courts of limited jurisdiction.

Decisions, final orders, or rulings of the Commission on election contests

involving elective municipal and barangay offices shall be final, executory,
and not appealable.

Cagas v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 194139, January 24, 2012

FACTS
On May 10, 2010, automated national and local elections, petitioner Douglas
R. Cagas was proclaimed winner against respondent Claude P. Bautista for
Governor of Davao Del Sur. Respondent Bautista filed an electoral protest
alleging fraud, anomalies, irregularities, vote-buying, and election laws, rules,
and resolution violations. The protest was raffled to the COMELEC First
Division.

Petitioner averred in his special affirmative defenses that Bautista did not
make the requisite cash deposit on time and did not render a detailed
specification of the acts or omissions complained herein. In the preceding,
the COMELEC first division resolves to deny the petitioner’s special
affirmative defenses.

Likewise, the petitioner’s prayer to elevate the instant Motion for

Reconsideration to the COMELEC en banc is denied. Hence, this special civil
action.

ISSUE
Whether or not the Court has jurisdiction over the case.

RULING
No, the Court has jurisdiction for the petition for certiorari only to final
orders, rulings, and the decision of the COMELEC en banc, not of a division.
The Court has no power to review via certiorari, an interlocutory order, or
even a final resolution of a Division of the COMELEC. Likewise, a petition on
certiorari may only be brought to the Supreme Court by COMELEC en banc in
its final decisions.

c. Decision of Administrative Questions

(3) Decide, except those involving the right to vote, all questions affecting
elections, including determination of the number and location of polling
places, appointment of election officials and inspectors, and registration of
voters.

d. Deputization of Law-Enforcement Agencies

 (4) Deputize, with the concurrence of the President, law enforcement
agencies and instrumentalities of the Government, including the Armed
Forces of the Philippines, for the exclusive purpose of ensuring free, orderly,
honest, peaceful, and credible elections.

e. Registration of Political Parties

(5) Register, after sufficient publication, political parties, organizations, or
coalitions which, in addition to other requirements, must present their
platform or program of government; and accredit citizens’ arms of the
Commission on Elections. Religious denominations and sects shall not be
registered. Those which seek to achieve their goals through violence or
unlawful means, or refuse to uphold and adhere to this Constitution, or
which are supported by any foreign government shall likewise be refused
registration.

Financial contributions from foreign governments and their agencies to

political parties, organizations, coalitions, or candidates related to elections
constitute interference in national affairs, and, when accepted, shall be an
additional ground for the cancellation of their registration with the
Commission, in addition to other penalties that may be prescribed by law.

Magdalo Para sa Pagbabago v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 190793, June 19, 2012
FACTS
Petitioner Magdalo sa Pagbabago (MAGDALO) filed its Petition for
Registration with COMELEC, seeking its registration and/or accreditation as a
regional political party based in the National Capital Region (NCR) for
participation in the May 10, 2010, National and Local Election. The COMELEC
Second Division issued its Resolution denying the Petition for Registration
filed by MAGDALO.

Thereafter, MAGDALO filed a Manifestation and Motion for Early Resolution

to the COMELEC en banc, which subsequently denied the same.

Hence, an instant petition arguing COMELEC when it gravely abused its

discretion in denying MAGDALO’s Petition for Registration.

ISSUE
Whether or not COMELEC gravely abused its discretion in denying Petition
for Registration filed by MAGDALO.

RULING
No, COMELEC did not commit grave abuse of discretion in denying the
Petition for Registration filed by MAGDALO.

MAGDALO’s Petition for Registration was disqualified under Article IX-C,

Section 2(5) of the 1987 Constitution and Section 61 of BP 881, which states
that no political party seeks to achieve its goals through violence shall be
entitled to accreditation. The Oakwood incident was one that attended with
violence, which disqualified MAGDALO.

Therefore, the COMELEC did not commit grave abuse of discretion when it
treated the Oakwood standoff as a manifestation of the prediction of
MAGDALO for resorting to violence or threats thereof to achieve its
objectives.

Atienza v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 188920, February 16, 2010

FACTS
Drilon, the former President of the Liberal Party (LP), announced that his
party withdrew support for the former President's administration Gloria
Macapagal- Arroyo. However, Atienza, LP Chairman, alleged that Drilon
announced without consulting the party first.

Atienza hosted a party conference, which resulted in new officers' election,

with Atienza as LP president. Drilon immediately filed a petition with the
COMELEC to nullify the said election claiming that it was illegal considering
that the party's elected bodies, NECO and NAPOLCO, were not properly
convened. Moreover, Drilon claimed that under the LP Constitution, there is
a three-year term. Meaning, his term has not yet ended.

However, Atienza alleged that the amendment to the LP Constitution

providing the three-term had not been properly ratified. The COMELEC held
that Atienza and others' election was invalid since the LP Constitution did not
convene the electing assembly.

The COMELEC ruled that since the said Constitution was not ratified, Drilon
was only sitting in a hold-overcapacity since his term ended already.
Subsequently, the LP held a NECO meeting to elect new party leaders before
respondent Drilon's term expired, which resulted in Roxas's election as the
new LP president. Atienza et al. sought to enjoin Roxas from assuming the LP
presidency questioning the validity of the quorum. The COMELEC issued a
resolution denying petitioners Atienza et al.'s petition.

As for the validity of petitioners Atienza et al.'s expulsion as LP members, the

COMELEC observed that this was a membership issue related to disciplinary
action within the political party. The COMELEC treated it as an internal party
matter that was beyond its jurisdiction to resolve. 

ISSUE
Whether or not the COMELEC has jurisdiction to resolve issues over intra-
party disputes.

RULING
Yes, under the COMELEC's powers and functions under Section 2, Article IX-C
of the Constitution, include the ascertainment of the political party's identity
and its legitimate officers responsible for its acts. Thus, the COMELEC may
resolve an intra-party leadership dispute, in a proper case brought before it,
as an incident of its power to register political parties.

ABC Party v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 193256, March 22, 2011

FACTS
Private respondent Melanio Mauricio, Jr. filed a petition with the COMELEC
for the cancellation and accreditation of petitioner ABC Party-List on the
ground that the petitioner is a front for a religious organization; hence, it is
disqualified to become a party-list group under Section 6(1) of RA 7941,
known as the Party-List System Act. The COMELEC Second division dismissed
the private respondent’s petition.

Subsequently, the private respondent filed a Motion for Reconsideration

with Motion to Annul Proclamation and Suspend its Effects, in which
COMELEC en banc partially granted the same.

Contrary to COMELEC en banc resolution, petitioners filed this petition

assailing the COMELEC jurisdiction over the case, that the House of
Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET) is properly divested to pass upon
its qualification.
 ISSUE
Whether or not the COMELEC has jurisdiction for the cancellation of
registration of the ACB Party-list.

RULING
Yes, the COMELEC has jurisdiction over the petition for cancellation of the
registration and accreditation of petitioner ABC Party-List for alleged
violation of Section 6(1) of RA 7941. The Constitution grants the COMELEC
the authority to register political parties, organizations or coalitions, and the
authority to cancel the registration of the same on legal ground. Petitioner’s
contention that HRET has jurisdiction over the case was not derived but
rather on the violations provided under Section 6(1) of RA 7941, which
cancels the ABC Party-list registration.

The petition is hereby dismissed for lack of merit.

f. Improvement of Elections
(7) Recommend to the Congress effective measures to minimize election
spending, including limitation of places where propaganda materials shall be
posted, and to prevent and penalize all forms of election frauds, offenses,
malpractices, and nuisance candidacies.

(9) Submit to the President and the Congress a comprehensive report on the
conduct of each election, plebiscite, initiative, referendum, or recall.

3. Election Period
SECTION 9. Unless otherwise fixed by the Commission in special cases, the election
period shall commence ninety days before the day of the election and shall end thirty
days after.

4. Party System
SECTION 6. A free and open party system shall be allowed to evolve according to the
free choice of the people, subject to the provisions of this Article.
SECTION 7. No votes cast in favor of a political party, organization, or coalition shall be
valid, except for those registered under the party-list system as provided in this
Constitution.
SECTION 8. Political parties, or organizations or coalitions registered under the party-list
system, shall not be represented in the voters’ registration boards, boards of election
inspectors, boards of canvassers, or other similar bodies. However, they shall be entitled
to appoint poll watchers in accordance with law.

5. Funds
SECTION 11. Funds certified by the Commission as necessary to defray the expenses for
holding regular and special elections, plebiscites, initiatives, referenda, and recalls, shall
be provided in the regular or special appropriations and, once approved, shall be
released automatically upon certification by the Chairman of the Commission.

6. Judicial Review
Luison v. Garcia, 101 Phil. 1218
FACTS
On the November 8, 1955, general elections, Anacleto M. Luison and Fidel A. D. Garcia
were the only candidates for Mayor of Tubay, Agusan. The sufficiency of the certificate
of candidacy of Garcia was challenged, at which point the COMELEC issued Resolution
No. 23 declaring ineligible to run for the Office.

Despite the ineligibility of Garcia, he continued his campaign and was proclaimed the
winner against Luison. Believing the Garcia is ineligible to hold Office, Luision filed a
 petition of quo warrant in the proper Court of First Instance to dispute Garcia’s
ineligibility but was dismissed for lack of merit on a motion filed by respondent Garcia.
Luison appealed and filed a protest on the same Court on the ground that Garcia was
ineligible because his certificate of candidacy was declared null and void by the
COMELEC but was again dismissed.
Hence the present appeal.

ISSUE
Whether or not Protestee Garcia, being ineligible, Protestant Luison can be declared
entitled to hold Office vacated by the former.

RULING
No, most votes cast for an ineligible candidate in an election do not entitle the
candidate receiving the highest number of votes to be declared elected. In such a case,
the electors have failed to choose, and the election is a nullity. The Court also said that
where the winning candidate has been declared ineligible, the person who obtained
second place in the election cannot be declared elected since our law not only does not
contain an express provision authorizing such declaration but seems to prohibit it.
Thereby, the Court declares that neither protestee nor protestant has been validly
elected, and so none is entitled to the position of Mayor.

Cases:
1. Magdalo Para sa Pagbabago v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 190793, June 19, 2012
2. Luison v. Garcia, 101 Phil. 1218
3. ABC Party v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 193256, March 22, 2011
4. Cagas v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 194139, January 24, 2012
5. Sanchez v. COMELEC, 114 SCRA 454
6. Atienza v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 188920, February 16, 2010

CHAPTER 16. THE COMMISSION ON AUDIT

1. Composition and Qualifications

SECTION 1.
(1) There shall be a Commission on Audit composed of a Chairman and two
Commissioners, who shall be natural-born citizens of the Philippines and, at the time of
their appointment, at least thirty-five years of age, certified public accountants with not
less than ten years of auditing experience, or members of the Philippine Bar who have
been engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years, and must not have been
candidates for any elective position in the elections immediately preceding their
appointment. At no time shall all Members of the Commission belong to the same
profession.
(2) The Chairman and the Commissioners shall be appointed by the President with the
consent of the Commission on Appointments for a term of seven years without
reappointment. Of those first appointed, the Chairman shall hold office for seven years,
one Commissioner for five years, and the other Commissioner for three years, without
reappointment. Appointment to any vacancy shall be only for the unexpired portion of
the term of the predecessor. In no case shall any Member be appointed or designated in
a temporary or acting capacity.

2. Powers and Functions

SECTION 2.
(1) The Commission on Audit shall have the power, authority, and duty to examine,
audit, and settle all accounts pertaining to the revenue and receipts of, and
expenditures or uses of funds and property, owned or held in trust by, or pertaining to,
the Government, or any of its subdivisions, agencies, or instrumentalities, including
government-owned or controlled corporations with original charters, and on a post-
audit basis: (a) constitutional bodies, commissions and offices that have been granted
fiscal autonomy under this Constitution; (b) autonomous state colleges and universities;
(c) other government-owned or controlled corporations and their subsidiaries; and (d)
such non-governmental entities receiving subsidy or equity, directly or indirectly, from
or through the Government, which are required by law or the granting institution to
submit to such audit as a condition of subsidy or equity. However, where the internal
control system of the audited agencies is inadequate, the Commission may adopt such
measures, including temporary or special pre-audit, as are necessary and appropriate to
correct the deficiencies. It shall keep the general accounts of the Government and, for
such period as may be provided by law, preserve the vouchers and other supporting
papers pertaining thereto.
(2) The Commission shall have exclusive authority, subject to the limitations in this
Article, to define the scope of its audit and examination, establish the techniques and
methods required therefor, and promulgate accounting and auditing rules and
regulations, including those for the prevention and disallowance of irregular,
unnecessary, excessive, extravagant, or unconscionable expenditures, or uses of
government funds and properties.

Philippine Coconut Producers Federation, Inc. v. Republic of the Philippines, G.R. Nos.
177857-58, January 24, 2012
FACTS
In 1971, RA No. 6260 was enacted, creating the Coconut Investment Fund (CIF). The
source of the CIF was a P0.55 levy on the sale of every 100kg of copra. The Philippine
Coconut Administration (PCA) was tasked to collect and administer the Fund. Out of the
0.55 levy, P0.02 has placed the disposition of the COCOFED, the recognized national
association of coconut producers declared by the PCA. Coco Fund Receipts ought to be
issued to every copra seller. During the martial law regime, then President Ferdinand
Marcos issued several Presidential Decrees purportedly to improve the coconut
industry. The most relevant among these is PD No.755, which permitted the use of the
Fund to acquire a commercial bank for the benefit of coconut farmers and the
distribution of the shares of the stock of the Bank it acquired free to the coconut
farmers. Thus, the PCA acquired the First United Bank, later renamed the United
Coconut Planters Bank. The PCA bought 72.2% of the PUB’s outstanding capital stock
from Pedro Cojuangco on behalf of the coconut farmers.

The rest of the Fund was deposited to the UPCB interest-free. Farmers who had paid the
CIF and registered their receipts with PCA were given their corresponding UPCB stock
certificates. Only 16 million worth of Coco Fund receipts were registered, and a large
number of the coconut farmers opted to sell all/part of their UCPB shares to private
individuals. President Corazon Aquino issued EO 1, which created the Presidential
Commission on Good Government (PCGG) to help recover ill-gotten wealth accumulated
by the Marcoses. PCGG was empowered to file a case for sequestration in the
Sandiganbayan. Among the sequestered properties were the shares in the UPCB
registered in the name of over a million coconut farmers held in trust by the PCA. The
Sandiganbayan allowed the sequestration by ruling in Partial Summary Judgement that
the Coconut Levy Funds are public funds and that Section 1 and 2 of PD No 755 were
unconstitutional.

ISSUE
Whether or not the Coconut Levy Fund is subject to audit jurisdiction of the Commission
on Audit.

RULING
Yes, the COA has jurisdiction over the coconut levy funds, special public funds pursuant
to Article IX(D), Section 3 of the Constitution. Similarly, the COA has the power,
authority, and duty to examine, audit, and settle all accounts pertaining to the coconut
levy funds and, consequently, to the UCPB shares purchased using the shared funds.

Riel v. Wright, 49 Phil 195

FACTS
 Petitioner Magdaleno Riel was appointed a temporary clerk in the office of the
Secretary, Philippine Senate on September 1, 1925, with an agreed compensation of P40
per month. On February 1 to 14, 1926, there is due and owing him P20 and on account
of his services as clerk, for which amount a warrant was issued to and in his favor by the
chairman of the committee on accounts of the Philippine Senate. 

However, respondent Insular Auditor unjustly refused the said warrant, alleging that
petitioner’s service ended on November 9, 1925, after the Legislature closed its last
session. Respondent also argued that the petitioner was paid his salary to and including
January 31, 1926, which latter date was many more than several days after the close of
a session.
Petitioner prays for a writ of mandamus against respondent commanding him to sign
the warrant.
 
ISSUE
Whether or not the petitioner is entitled to such compensation.
 
RULING
No, the services come under the provision for the appropriation supplementary force,
that he was employed as a temporary clerk. As such, he is distinguished from a
permanent employee of the Legislature, and that the services in question were
rendered after the final adjournment of the Legislature. Thus, the petitioner was not
legally employed and is not entitled to the compensation in question.
 
The writ is denied and the petition dismissed.

3. Prohibited Exemptions
Section 3. No law shall be passed exempting any entity of the Government or its
subsidiary in any guise whatever, or any investment of public funds, from the
jurisdiction of the Commission on Audit.
4. Report
SECTION 4. The Commission shall submit to the President and the Congress, within the
time fixed by law, an annual report covering the financial condition and operation of the
Government, its subdivisions, agencies, and instrumentalities, including government-
owned or controlled corporations, and non-governmental entities subject to its audit,
and recommend measures necessary to improve their effectiveness and efficiency. It
shall submit such other reports as may be required by law.

Cases:
1. Philippine Coconut Producers Federation, Inc. v. Republic of the Philippines, G.R. Nos.
177857-58, January 24, 2012
2. Riel v. Wright, 49 Phil 195

CHAPTER 17. ACCOUNTABILITY OF PUBLIC OFFICERS

1. Impeachment
The power of the congress to remove a public official for serious crimes or misconduct
as provided in the Constitution.

Corona v. Senate of the Philippines, G.R. No. 200242, July 17, 2012
FACTS
A complaint was filed against Chief Justice Renato C. Corona by the respondents,
charging him with culpable violation of the Constitution, betrayal of public trust, and
graft and corruption. By the House of Representatives' majority bloc, the complaint was
transmitted to the Senate, which convened as an impeachment court. 

Petitioner filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition with a prayer of issuance of TRO
and writ of preliminary injunction filed assailing the impeachment cases initiated by
respondents. 

Petitioner also sought the inhibition of Justice Antonio T. Carpio and Maria Lourdes P.A.
Sereno on the ground of partiality. He likewise assails the Senate in proceeding with the
trial under the said complaint, and in the alleged partiality exhibited by some Senator-
Judges who were apparently aiding the prosecution during the hearings.

ISSUE
Whether or not the Court's certiorari jurisdiction may be invoked to assail impeachment
proceedings of the petitioner.

RULING
No, the Congress, in its power to impeach a public official for serious crimes or
misconduct, is provided in the Constitution. Unless there is a clear violation of the
Congress's constitutional limitation, the Court may exercise its vested power of judicial
review over the respondents' actions on the impeachment proceedings. Likewise, by the
nature of the functions they discharge when sitting as an Impeachment Court, Senator-
Judges are clearly entitled to propound questions on the witnesses, prosecutors and
counsel during the trial.

Wherefore, the petition for certiorari and prohibition with prayer for injunctive relief/s
is dismissed.

a. Impeachable Officers
a. President
b. Vice President
c. Members of the Supreme Court
d. Members of the constitutional commission
e. Ombudsman
b. Grounds for Impeachment
a. Culpable violation of the constitution
b. Treason
c. Bribery
d. Other high crimes
e. Graft and corruption
f. Betrayal of public trust
c. Procedure
SECTION 3.
(1) The House of Representatives shall have the exclusive power to initiate all
cases of impeachment.
(2) A verified complaint for impeachment may be filed by any Member of the
House of Representatives or by any citizen upon a resolution of endorsement
by any Member thereof, which shall be included in the Order of Business
within ten session days, and referred to the proper Committee within three
session days thereafter. The Committee, after hearing, and by a majority vote
of all its Members, shall submit its report to the House within sixty session
days from such referral, together with the corresponding resolution. The
resolution shall be calendared for consideration by the House within ten
session days from receipt thereof.
(3) A vote of at least one-third of all the Members of the House shall be
necessary either to affirm a favorable resolution with the Articles of
Impeachment of the Committee, or override its contrary resolution. The vote
of each Member shall be recorded.
(4) In case the verified complaint or resolution of impeachment is filed by at
least one-third of all the Members of the House, the same shall constitute
the Articles of Impeachment, and trial by the Senate shall forthwith proceed.
(5) No impeachment proceedings shall be initiated against the same official
more than once within a period of one year.
 (6) The Senate shall have the sole power to try and decide all cases of
impeachment. When sitting for that purpose, the Senators shall be on oath
or affirmation. When the President of the Philippines is on trial, the Chief
Justice of the Supreme Court shall preside, but shall not vote. No person shall
be convicted without the concurrence of two-thirds of all the Members of
the Senate.
(7) Judgment in cases of impeachment shall not extend further than removal
from office and disqualification to hold any office under the Republic of the
Philippines, but the party convicted shall nevertheless be liable and subject
to prosecution, trial, and punishment according to law.
(8) The Congress shall promulgate its rules on impeachment to effectively
carry out the purpose of this section.

Francisco v. House of Representatives, G.R. No. 160261, November 10, 2003

FACT
On November 28, 2001, the 12th Congress of the House of Representatives
adopted and approved the Rules of Procedure in Impeachment Proceedings
superseding the previous House Impeachment Rules approved by the 11th
congress.

On July 22, 2002, the House of Representatives adopted a Resolution, which

directed the Committee on Justice "to conduct an investigation, in aid of
legislation, on the manner of disbursements and expenditures by the Chief
Justice of the Supreme Court of the Judiciary Development Fund (JDF)."

On June 2, 2003, former President Joseph E. Estrada filed an impeachment

complaint (first impeachment complaint) against Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide
Jr. and seven Associate Justices of this Court for "culpable violation of the
Constitution, betrayal of the public trust and other high crimes."

The house committee on justice ruled on October 13, 2003, that the first
impeachment was "sufficient in form" but voted to dismiss on October 22, 2003,
for being "insufficient in substance."

On October 23, 2003, a second impeachment complaint was filed with Secretary
General of the House by Representatives Gilberto C. Teodoro, Jr. and Felix
William B. Fuentebella against Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr., founded on the
alleged results of the legislative inquiry.

Petitioner contends the declaration of November 28, 2001, House Impeachment

Rules as null and void for being unconstitutional.

ISSUE
Whether or not the filing of a second impeachment complaint is unconstitutional
and constitutes a political question.

RULING
Sections 16 and 17 of Rule V of the Rules of Procedure in Impeachment
Proceedings, which were approved by the House of Representatives, are
unconstitutional. Consequently, the second impeachment complaint against
Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide is barred under paragraph 5, section 3 of Article XI
of the Constitution.

The Court did not go beyond assuming jurisdiction where it had none, nor
indiscriminately justiciable issues out of decidedly political questions. It is not at
all the business of this Court to assert judicial dominance over the other two
great government branches.
 Gutierrez v. The House of Representatives, G.R. No. 193459, February 15, 2011
FACTS
Before the 15th Congress opened its first session, private respondents known as
the Baraquel group filed an impeachment complaint against the petitioner, upon
the endorsement of Party-List Representatives Arlene Bag-ao and Walden Bello.

A day after the opening of the 15th Congress, Private respondents collectively
known as the Reyes group filed another impeachment complaint against the
petitioner with a resolution of endorsement by Party-List Representatives Neri
Javier Colmenares et al.

After hearing, by Resolution, public respondent found the two complaints, which
both allege a culpable violation of the Constitution and betrayal of public trust,
sufficient in substance.

Petitioner filed with this Court the present petition with an application for
injunctive reliefs. The Court En Banc resolve to direct the issuance of a status quo
ante order and require respondents to comment on the petition in 10 days. 

Respondents raise the impropriety of the remedies of certiorari and prohibition.

They argue that the public respondent was not exercising any judicial, quasi-
judicial, or ministerial function in taking cognizance of the two impeachment
complaints. It was exercising a political act that is discretionary, and that its
function is inquisitorial that is akin to a preliminary investigation.

Petitioner invokes the Court’s expanded certiorari jurisdiction, using the special
civil actions of certiorari and prohibition as procedural vehicles. 

ISSUE
Whether or not respondents violate the one-year bar rule in issuing its two
assailed Resolution.

RULING
Article XI, Section 3(5) of the Constitution provides that no impeachment
proceedings shall be initiated against the same official more than once within a
period of one year. The term initiate means to file the complaint and take initial
action on it. The initiation starts with the filing of the complaint must be
accompanied with an action to set the complaint moving. It refers to the filing of
the impeachment complaint coupled with Congress’ taking initial action of said
complaint. The initial action taken by the House on the complaint is the referral
of the complaint to the Committee on Justice.

d. Judgment
(7) Judgment in cases of impeachment shall not extend further than removal
from office and disqualification to hold any office under the Republic of the
Philippines, but the party convicted shall nevertheless be liable and subject to
prosecution, trial, and punishment according to law.

2. Sandiganbayan
SECTION 4. The present anti-graft court known as the Sandiganbayan shall continue to
function and exercise its jurisdiction as now or hereafter may be provided by law.

3. Ombudsman
a. Composition
b. SECTION 5. There is hereby created the independent Office of the
Ombudsman, composed of the Ombudsman to be known as Tanodbayan,
one overall Deputy and at least one Deputy each for Luzon, Visayas, and
 Mindanao. A separate Deputy for the military establishment may likewise be
appointed.

c. Qualification and Appointment

SECTION 8. The Ombudsman and his Deputies shall be natural-born citizens
of the Philippines, and at the time of their appointment, at least forty years
old, of recognized probity and independence, and members of the Philippine
Bar, and must not have been candidates for any elective office in the
immediately preceding election. The Ombudsman must have for ten years or
more been a judge or engaged in the practice of law in the Philippines.

During their tenure, they shall be subject to the same disqualifications and
prohibitions as provided for in Section 2 of Article IX-A of this Constitution.

SECTION 9. The Ombudsman and his Deputies shall be appointed by the

President from a list of at least six nominees prepared by the Judicial and Bar
Council, and from a list of three nominees for every vacancy thereafter. Such
appointments shall require no confirmation. All vacancies shall be filled
within three months after they occur.

d. Term
SECTION 11. The Ombudsman and his Deputies shall serve for a term of
seven years without reappointment. They shall not be qualified to run for
any office in the election immediately succeeding their cessation from office.

e. Powers and Functions

SECTION 12. The Ombudsman and his Deputies, as protectors of the people,
shall act promptly on complaints filed in any form or manner against public
officials or employees of the Government, or any subdivision, agency or
instrumentality thereof, including government-owned or controlled
corporations, and shall, in appropriate cases, notify the complainants of the
action taken and the result thereof.

f. Salary
SECTION 10. The Ombudsman and his Deputies shall have the rank of
Chairman and Members, respectively, of the Constitutional Commissions,
and they shall receive the same salary, which shall not be decreased during
their term of office.

g. Deputy Ombudsman and Personnel of the Office of the Ombudsman

SECTION 6. The officials and employees of the Office of the Ombudsman,
other than the Deputies, shall be appointed by the Ombudsman according to
the Civil Service Law.

4. The Special Prosecutor

5. Ill-gotten Wealth
SECTION 15. The right of the State to recover properties unlawfully acquired by public
officials or employees, from them or from their nominees or transferees, shall not be
barred by prescription, laches, or estoppel.

6. Loans
SECTION 16. No loan, guaranty, or other form of financial accommodation for any
business purpose may be granted, directly or indirectly, by any government-owned or
controlled bank or financial institution to the President, the Vice-President, the
Members of the Cabinet, the Congress, the Supreme Court, and the Constitutional
Commissions, the Ombudsman, or to any firm or entity in which they have controlling
interest, during their tenure.
 7. Assets and Liabilities
SECTION 17. A public officer or employee shall, upon assumption of office and as often
thereafter as may be required by law, submit a declaration under oath of his assets,
liabilities, and net worth. In the case of the President, the Vice-President, the Members
of the Cabinet, the Congress, the Supreme Court, the Constitutional Commissions and
other constitutional offices, and officers of the armed forces with general or flag rank,
the declaration shall be disclosed to the public in the manner provided by law.

8. Change of Citizenship
SECTION 18. Public officers and employees owe the State and this Constitution
allegiance at all times, and any public officer or employee who seeks to change his
citizenship or acquire the status of an immigrant of another country during his tenure
shall be dealt with by law.

Almonte v. Vasquez, G.R. No. 95367, May 23, 1995

FACTS: 
Ombudsman Vasquez required Rogado and Rivera of Economic Intelligence and
Investigation Bureau (EIIB) to produce all documents relating to Personal Service Funds year
1988 and all evidence for the whole plantilla of EIIB for 1988. The subpoena duces tecum
was issued to investigate funds representing savings from unfilled positions in the EIIB,
legally disbursed. Almonte and Perez denied the anomalous activities that circulate the EIIB
office. They moved to quash the subpoena duces tecum. They claim the privilege of an
agency of the Government.

ISSUE:
Whether or not an Ombudsman can oblige the petitioners by subpoena duces tecum to
provide documents relating to personal service and salary vouchers of EIIB employers.

RULING:
Yes. A government privilege against disclosure is recognized concerning state secrets
bearing on military, diplomatic, and similar matters. This privilege is based upon the public
interest of such paramount importance as in and of itself transcending the individual
interests of a private citizen. Even though, as a consequence thereof, the plaintiff cannot
enforce his legal rights.

In the case at bar, there is no claim that military or diplomatic secrets will be disclosed by
the production of records about the personnel of the EIIB. EIIB's function is the gathering
and evaluation of intelligence reports and information regarding "illegal activities affecting
the national economy, such as, but not limited to, economic sabotage, smuggling, tax
evasion, dollar salting." Consequently, while in cases that involve state secrets, it may be
sufficient to determine the circumstances of the case that there is a reasonable danger that
compulsion of the evidence will expose military matters without compelling production, no
similar excuse can be made for privilege resting on other considerations.

Cases:
1. Corona v. Senate of the Philippines, G.R. No. 200242, July 17, 2012
2. Francisco v. House of Representatives, G.R. No. 160261, November 10, 2003
3. Gutierrez v. The House of Representatives, G.R. No. 193459, February 15, 2011
4. Almonte v. Vasquez, G.R. No. 95367, May 23, 1995

CHAPTER 18. AMENDMENT OR REVISION

1. Kinds of Constitutions
 Written – precepts are embodied in one document or set of documents
 Unwritten – consists of rules which have not integrated into a single, concrete form.
 Conventional – an enacted constitution, formally struck off at a definite time and
place following a conscious effort taken by a constituted body.
  Cumulative – result of political evolution not inaugurated at any specific time but
changing by accretion rather by systematic method
 Rigid – can be amended only by a formal and usually difficult process.
 Flexible – can be changed by ordinary legislation
The Philippine Constitution is written, conventional and rigid.

2. Permanence of the Constitution

One advantage of the written, conventional and rigid constitution is its permanence or
its capacity to resist capricious change dictated not by legitimate needs but only by
passing fancies, temporary passions or occasional infatuations of the people with ideas
or personalities

Lambino v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 174153, October 25, 2006

FACTS                                            
On 25 August 2006, Lambino et al. filed a petition with the COMELEC to hold a plebiscite
that will ratify their initiative petition to change the 1987 Constitution under Section
5(b) and (c)2 and Section 73 of Republic Act No. 6735 or the Initiative and Referendum
Act.

The Lambino Group alleged that their petition had the support of 6,327,952 individuals
constituting at least twelve per centum (12%) of all registered voters, with each
legislative district represented by at least three per centum (3%) of its registered voters.
The Lambino Group also claimed that COMELEC election registrars had verified the
signatures of the 6.3 million individuals.

The Lambino Group’s initiative petition changes the 1987 Constitution by modifying
Sections 1-7 of Article VI (Legislative Department)4 and Sections 1-4 of Article VII
(Executive Department) and by adding Article XVIII entitled “Transitory Provisions.”
These proposed changes will shift the present Bicameral-Presidential system to a
Unicameral-Parliamentary form of government.

On 30 August 2006, the Lambino Group filed an Amended Petition with the COMELEC
indicating modifications in the proposed Article XVIII (Transitory Provisions) of their
initiative.

The COMELEC denied the petition citing Santiago v. COMELEC, declaring RA 6735
inadequate to implement the initiative clause on proposals to amend the Constitution.

ISSUE
Whether or not the Lambino Group’s initiative petition to amend the Constitution
through people’s initiative is compliant with Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution.

RULING
No, Lambino Group’s initiative is void and unconstitutional because it dismally fails to
comply with the requirement of Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution that the
people must directly propose the initiative through initiative upon a petition. Lambino
Group’s initiative shall likewise violate the aforestated provisions disallowing revision
through initiatives. People’s initiative to change the Constitution applies only to an
amendment of the Constitution and not its revision.

3. Amendment and Revision

Article XVII provides that the Constitution may be changed either by amendment or
revision.
Amendment refers to isolated or piecemeal change only, as distinguished from revision,
which is a revamp or rewriting of the whole instrument.
4. Procedure
a. Proposal
Usually made either directly by the Congress or by a constitutional
 convention.
i. Position of the Constitutional Convention
1. Constitutional convention is supreme over the other departments
of the government because it exercises are in the nature of
sovereign powers (Theory of conventional sovereignty)
2. Constitutional convention inferior to the other departments of the
government since it is merely a creation of the legislature.
3. Constitutional convention must be considered independent of and
co-equal with the other departments of the government.
b. Ratification
SECTION 4. Any amendment to, or revision of, this Constitution under Section
1 hereof shall be valid when ratified by a majority of the votes cast in a
plebiscite which shall be held not earlier than sixty days nor later than ninety
days after the approval of such amendment or revision.
Any amendment under Section 2 hereof shall be valid when ratified by a
majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite which shall be held not earlier than
sixty days nor later than ninety days after the certification by the Commission
on Elections of the sufficiency of the petition.

5. Judicial Review of Amendments

Santiago v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 127325, March 19, 1997
FACTS:
On December 6, 1996, private respondent Atty. Jesus S. Delfin filed with public
respondent Commission on Elections (COMELEC) a Petition to Amend the Constitution,
to Lift Term Limits of Elective Officials, by People's Initiative. Upon the Petition filing, the
COMELEC, through its Chairman, issued an Order directing Delfin to cause the
publication of the petition daily newspapers of general circulation at his own expense.

On December 12, 1996, Senator Roco filed a Motion to Dismiss the Petition on the
ground that it is not the initiatory petition properly cognizable by the COMELEC.

On December 18, 1996, Senator Miriam Defensor Santiago, Alexander Padilla, and Maria
Isabel Ongpin filed this special civil action for prohibition, raising that R.A. No. 6735
provides three systems of initiative, namely, initiative on the Constitution, statutes, and
local legislation. However, it failed to provide any subtitle on the Constitution's
initiative, unlike in the other modes of initiative, which are specifically provided for in
Subtitle II and Subtitle III. This deliberate omission indicates that people's initiative to
amend the Constitution was left to some future law.

ISSUE:
Whether or not R.A. No. 6735 was intended to include or cover initiative on
amendments to the Constitution.

RULING
No, Insofar as initiative to propose amendments to the Constitution is concerned, R.A.
No. 6735 miserably failed to satisfy both requirements in subordinate legislation.
Section 2 of the Act does not suggest an initiative on amendments to the Constitution.
The inclusion of the word "Constitution" therein was a delayed afterthought. That word
is neither germane nor relevant to said section, which exclusively relates to initiative
and referendum on national laws and local laws, ordinances, and resolutions. That
section is silent as to amendments to the Constitution. As pointed out earlier, initiative
on the Constitution is confined only to proposals to AMEND. The people are not
accorded the power to "directly propose, enact, approve, or reject, in whole or in part,
the Constitution" through the system of initiative. They can only do so with respect to
"laws, ordinances, or resolutions."
Cases:
1. Lambino v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 174153, October 25, 2006
2. Santiago v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 127325, March 19, 1997