a.

As to Restrictions / Qualification
Section 13. Par 2. The spouse and relatives by consanguinity or affinity within the fourth civil degree
of the President shall not, during his tenure, be appointed as Members of the Constitutional
Commissions, or the Office of the Ombudsman, or as Secretaries, Undersecretaries, chairmen or
heads of bureaus or offices, including government-owned or controlled corporations and their
subsidiaries. (Art VII)

b. Appointment of Personnel
Section 4. The Constitutional Commissions shall appoint their officials and employees in accordance
with law. (Art IX A)

c. Salaries
Section 17. Until the Congress provides otherwise, …the Chairmen of the Constitutional
Commissions, two hundred four thousand pesos each; and the Members of the Constitutional
Commissions, one hundred eighty thousand pesos each. (Art XVIII)
Section 3. The salary of the Chairman and the Commissioners shall be fixed by law and shall not be
decreased during their tenure. (Art IX A)

d. Disqualification
Section 2. No member of a Constitutional Commission shall, during his tenure, hold any other office
or employment. Neither shall he engage in the practice of any profession or in the active
management or control of any business which, in any way, may be affected by the functions of his
office, nor shall he be financially interested, directly or indirectly, in any contract with, or in any
franchise or privilege granted by the Government, any of its subdivisions, agencies, or
instrumentalities, including government-owned or controlled corporations or their subsidiaries. (Art IX
A)
They may not:
a. Hold any other office or employment.
b. Engage in the practice of any profession or in the active management or control of any business
which, in any way, may be affected by the functions of his office.
c. Be financially interested, directly or indirectly, in any contract with, or in any franchise or privilege
granted by the Government, any of its subdivisions, agencies, or instrumentalities, including
government-owned or controlled corporations or their subsidiaries.

e. Impeachment
Section 2. The President, the Vice-President, the Members of the Supreme Court, the Members of
the Constitutional Commissions, and the Ombudsman may be removed from office on impeachment
for, and conviction of, culpable violation of the Constitution, treason, bribery, graft and corruption,
other high crimes, or betrayal of public trust. All other public officers and employees may be removed
from office as provided by law, but not by impeachment. (Art X)

II - SAFEGUARDS THAT GUARANTEE THE INDEPENDENCE OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL

COMMISSIONS - (Nachura)
a. They are Constitutionally created, and thus cannot be abolished by statute
b. Each is expressly described as “independent”
c. Each is conferred with certain powers and functions which cannot be reduced by statute
d. The chairmen and the members cannot be removed except by impeachment (Art 10 sec 2)
e. The Chairmen and the members are given a fairly long term of 7 years
f. The chairmen and members may not be re-appointed or appointed in an acting capacity
g. The salaries of the chairmen and the members are relatively high and may not be decreased
during their continuance in office.
h. They enjoy fiscal autonomy. - Book II, Chapter 5 of the Administrative Code of 1987 states that
the Constitutional Commissions enumerated in the Constitution are “independent” and “enjoy fiscal
autonomy.”

Sec. 26. Fiscal Autonomy. - The Constitutional Commissions shall enjoy fiscal autonomy. The
approved annual appropriations shall be automatically and regularly released.

i. Each commission may promulgate its own procedural rules, provided that they do not diminish,
increase or modify substantive rights.

j. The chairmen and the members are subject to certain disqualifications calculated to strengthen
their integrity

k. The commissions may appoint their own officials in accordance with the civil service law (sec 4,
Art IX-A)

III - APPOINTMENT AND TERM

COMELEC - Section 1. 2. The Chairman and the Commissioners shall be appointed by the
President with the consent of the Commission on Appointments for a term of seven years without
reappointment. Of those first appointed, three Members shall hold office for seven years, two
Members for five years, and the last Members for three years, without reappointment. Appointment
to any vacancy shall be only for the unexpired term of the predecessor. In no case shall any Member
be appointed or designated in a temporary or acting capacity. (Art IX C)

Commonalities
a. The requirement of appointed by the President with the consent of the Commission on
Appointments.
No re-appointments are allowed. The Chairmen and the Commissioners shall be appointed by the
President with the consent of the Commission on Appointments for a term of seven years without
reappointment

b. Rotational scheme

COMELEC - Of those first appointed, three Members shall hold office for seven years, two Members
for five years, and the last Members for three years, without reappointment.

Appointment to any vacancy in any of the Commissions shall be only for the unexpired portion of the
term of the predecessor.

Early on, in Republic v. Imperial (96 Phil. 770 (1955).), the Court wrote of two conditions, "both
indispensable to [the] workability" of the rotational plan. These conditions may be described as
follows: (a) that the terms of the first batch of commissioners should start on a common date;
and (b) that any vacancy due to death, resignation or disability before the expiration of the
term should be filled only for the unexpired balance of the term. Otherwise, Imperial continued,
"the regularity of the intervals between appointments would be destroyed." There appears to be near
unanimity as to the purpose/s of the rotational system, as originally conceived, i.e., to place in the
commission a new appointee at a fixed interval (every two years presently), thus preventing a four-
year administration appointing more than one permanent and regular commissioner,( Seven years
under the 1987 Constitution, nine years under the 1935 Constitution.) or to borrow from
Commissioner Monsod of the 1986 CONCOM, "to prevent one person (the President of the
Philippines) from dominating the commissions." It has been declared too that the rotational plan
ensures continuity in, and, as indicated earlier, secure the independence of, the commissions as a
body.

In Gaminde v. Commission on Audit, (G.R. No. 140335, December 13, 2000, 347 SCRA 655,
662-663; citing Republic v. Imperial) the Court described how the smooth functioning of the rotational
system contemplated in said and like provisions covering the two other independent commissions is
achieved thru the staggering of terms: “The terms of the first Chairmen and Commissioners of the
Constitutional Commissions under the 1987 Constitution must start on a common date, irrespective
of the variations in the dates of appointments and qualifications of the appointees, in order that the
expiration of the first terms of seven, five and three years should lead to the regular recurrence of the
twoyear interval between the expiration of the terms" and therefore, "the appropriate starting point of
the terms of office of the first appointees to the Constitutional Commissions under the 1987
Constitution must be on February 02, 1987, the date of the adoption of the 1987 Constitution."

c. Temporary Appointments
In no case shall any Member of the Commissions be appointed or designated in a temporary or
acting capacity In G.R. No. L-3452 December 7, 1949 Nacionalista Party vs. Felix Angelo Bautista,
et al. a case decided under the 1935 Constitution, which did not have a provision prohibiting
temporary or acting appointments to the COMELEC, the Court declared unconstitutional the
designation of the Solicitor General as acting member of the COMELEC. The Court ruled that the
designation of an acting Commissioner would undermine the independence of the COMELEC and
hence violate the Constitution. The Court declared then: "It would be more in keeping with the intent,
purpose and aim of the framers of the Constitution to appoint a permanent Commissioner than to
designate one to act temporarily."

In Brillantes vs. Yorac, 192 SCRA 358 (1990). The Supreme Court struck down as unconstitutional
the designation by then President Corazon Aquino of Associate Commissioner Haydee Yorac as
Acting Chairperson of the COMELEC. This Court ruled that:
"A designation as Acting Chairman is by its very terms essentially temporary and therefore revocable
at will. No cause need be established to justify its revocation. Assuming its validity, the designation
of the respondent as Acting Chairman of the Commission on Elections may be withdrawn by the
President of the Philippines at any time and for whatever reason she sees fit. It is doubtful if the
respondent, having accepted such designation, will not be estopped from challenging its withdrawal.

The Constitution provides for many safeguards to the independence of the Commission on
Elections, foremost among which is the security of tenure of its members. That guarantee is not
available to the respondent as Acting Chairman of the Commission on Elections by designation of
the President of the Philippines."

The COMELEC is mandated with the following functions:

 Enforce and administer all laws and regulations relative to the conduct of and elections, plebiscite,
initiative, referendum, and recall.
 Exercise exclusive original jurisdiction over all contests relating to the elections, returns, and
qualifications of all elective regional, provincial, and city officials, and appellate jurisdiction over all
contests involving elective municipal officials decided by trial courts of general jurisdiction, or
involving elective barangay official decided by trial courts of limited jurisdiction.
 Decide, except those involving the right to vote, all questions affecting elections, including
determination of the number and location of polling places, appointment of election officials and
inspectors, and registration of voters.
 Deputize, with the concurrence of the President, law enforcement agencies and instrumentalities of
the Government, including the Armed Forces of the Philippines, for the exclusive purposes of
ensuring free, orderly, honest, peaceful credible elections.
 Register, after sufficient publication, political parties, organizations, of coalitions which, in addition
to other requirements, must present their platform or program of government; and accredit citizens
arms of the Commission on Elections.
 File, upon a verified complaint, or on its own initiative, petitions in court for inclusion or exclusion of
voters; investigate and, where appropriate, prosecute cases of violations of elections laws, including
acts or omissions constituting election frauds, offenses, and malpractices.
 Recommend to the Congress effective measures to minimize election spending, including limitation
of places where propaganda materials shall be posted, and to prevent and penalize all forms of
election frauds, offenses, malpractices, and nuisance candidates.
 Recommend to the President the removal of any officer of employee it has deputized, or the
imposition of any other disciplinary action, for violation or disregard of, or disobedience to its
directive, order, or decision.
 Submit to the President and the Congress a comprehensive report on the conduct of each election,
plebiscite, initiative, referendum, or recall.

c. Appeal
Rule: The jurisdiction of the RTC was challenged by respondent Empeynado contending that this is
a "case" or "matter" cognizable by the COMELEC under Sec. 7 Art. IX-A of the 1987 Constitution.
The COMELEC resolution cancelling the appointment of Garces as Election Registrar of Gutalac, he
argues, should be raised only on certiorari before the Supreme Court and not before the RTC, else
the latter court becomes a reviewer of an en banc COMELEC resolution contrary to Sec. 7, Art. IX-A.

The contention is without merit. Sec. 7, Art. IX-A of the Constitution provides:

“Each commission shall decide by a majority vote of all its members any case or matter brought
before it within sixty days from the date of its submission for decision or resolution. A case or matter
is deemed submitted for decision or resolution upon the filing of the last pleading, brief, or
memorandum required by the rules of the commission or by the commission itself. Unless otherwise
provided by this constitution or by law, any decision, order, or ruling of each commission may be
brought to the supreme court on certiorari by the aggrieved party within thirty days from receipt of a
copy thereof”

This provision is inapplicable as there was no case or matter filed before the COMELEC. On the
contrary, it was the COMELEC's resolution that triggered this controversy. The "case" or "matter"
referred to by the constitution must be something within the jurisdiction of the COMELEC, i.e., it
must pertain to an election dispute. The settled rule is that "decision, rulings, order" of the
COMELEC that may be brought to the Supreme Court on certiorari under Sec. 7 Art. IX-A are those
that relate to the COMELEC's exercise of its adjudicatory or quasi-judicial powers involving "elective
regional, provincial, and city officials." In this case, what is being assailed is the COMELEC's choice
of an appointee to occupy the Gutalac Post which is an administrative duty done for the operational
setup of an agency. The controversy involves an appointive, not an elective, official. Hardly can this
matter call for the certiorari jurisdiction of the Supreme Court. To rule otherwise would surely burden
the Court with trivial administrative questions that are best ventilated before the RTC, a court which
the law vests with the power to exercise original jurisdiction over "all cases not within the exclusive
jurisdiction over of any court, tribunal, person or body exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions."
G.R. No. 114795 July 17, 1996 LUCITA Q. GARCES vs. THE HONORABLE COURT OF
APPEALS