Constitutional Law

Constitutional
Law
1. Qualification and Appointments
Section 7.
(1) No person shall be appointed Member of the Supreme Court or any lower collegiate court unless he
is a natural-born citizen of the Philippines. A Member of the Supreme Court must be at least forty years
of age, and must have been for fifteen years or more, a judge of a lower court or engaged in the practice
of law in the Philippines.
(2) The Congress shall prescribe the qualifications of judges of lower courts, but no person may be
appointed judge thereof unless he is a citizen of the Philippines and a member of the Philippine Bar.
(3) A Member of the Judiciary must be a person of proven competence, integrity, probity, and
independence.
Case: RE: SENIORITY AMONG FOUR APPOINMENTS 631RA377

Facts of the Cases
Prior to the conduct of the May 2010 elections, then President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo (President Macapagal-Arroyo) issued
more than 800 appointments to various positions in several government offices.
The ban on midnight appointments in Section 15, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution reads:
Two months immediately before the next presidential elections and up to the end of his term, a President or Acting President
shall not make appointments, except temporary appointments to executive positions when continued vacancies therein will
prejudice public service or endanger public safety.
Thus, for purposes of the 2010 elections, 10 March 2010 was the cut-off date for valid appointments and the next day, 11 March
2010, was the start of the ban on midnight appointments. Section 15, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution recognizes as an
exception to the ban on midnight appointments only “temporary appointments to executive positions when continued vacancies
therein will prejudice public service or endanger public safety.” None of the petitioners claim that their appointments fall under
this exception.

The paper evidencing Atty. Velicaria-Garafil’s appointment as State Solicitor II at the OSG was dated 5 March 2010. There was a
transmittal letter dated 8 March 2010 of the appointment paper from the Office of the President (OP), but this transmittal letter
was received by the Malacañang Records Office (MRO) only on 13 May 2010. There was no indication as to the OSG’s date of
receipt of the appointment paper. On 19 March 2010, the OSG’s Human Resources Department called up Atty. Velicaria-Garafil to
schedule her oath-taking. Atty. Velicaria-Garafil took her oath of office as State Solicitor II on 22 March 2010 and assumed her
position on 6 April 2010.
G.R. No. 206290
The paper evidencing Atty. Venturanza’s appointment as Prosecutor IV (City Prosecutor) of Quezon City was dated 23 February 2010. It is
apparent, however, that it was only on 12 March 2010 that the OP, in a letter dated 9 March 2010, transmitted Atty. Venturanza’s appointment
paper to then Department of Justice (DOJ) Secretary Alberto C. Agra. During the period between 23 February and 12 March 2010, Atty.
Venturanza, upon verbal advice from Malacañang of his promotion but without an official copy of his appointment paper, secured clearances from
the Civil Service Commission (CSC), Sandiganbayan, and the DOJ. Atty. Venturanza took his oath of office on 15 March 2010, and assumed office
on the same day.
G.R. No. 209138
The paper evidencing Villanueva’s appointment as Administrator for Visayas of the Board of Administrators of the CDA was dated 3 March 2010.
There was no transmittal letter of the appointment paper from the OP. Villanueva took her oath of office on 13 April 2010.
The paper evidencing Rosquita’s appointment as Commissioner, representing Region I and the Cordilleras, of the NCIP was dated 5 March 2010.
Like Villanueva, there was no transmittal letter of the appointment paper from the OP. Rosquita took her oath of office on 18 March 2010.
G.R. No. 212030
The paper evidencing Atty. Tamondong’s appointment as member, representing the private sector, of the SBMA Board of Directors was dated 1
March 2010. Atty. Tamondong admitted that the appointment paper was received by the Office of the SBMA Chair on 25 March 2010 and that he
took his oath of office on the same day. He took another oath of office on 6 July 2010 as “an act of extra caution because of the rising crescendo
of noise from the new political mandarins against the so-called ‘midnight appointments.”

On 30 June 2010, President Benigno S. Aquino III (President Aquino) took his oath of office as President of the Republic of the Philippines. On 30
July 2010, President Aquino issued EO 2 recalling, withdrawing, and revoking appointments issued by President Macapagal-Arroyo which violated
the constitutional ban on midnight appointments.
The entirety of EO 2 reads:
EXECUTIVE ORDER NO. 2
RECALLING, WITHDRAWING, AND REVOKING APPOINTMENTS ISSUED BY THE PREVIOUS ADMINISTRATION IN

VIOLATION OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL BAN ON MIDNIGHT APPOINTMENTS, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES.
WHEREAS, Sec. 15, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution provides that “Two months immediately before the next
presidential elections and up to the end of his term, a President or Acting President shall not make appointments, except
temporary appointments to executive positions when continued vacancies therein will prejudice public service or
endanger public safety.”;
WHEREAS, in the case of “In re: Appointments dated March 30, 1998 of Hon. Mateo Valenzuela and Hon. Vallarta as
Judges of the Regional Trial Court of Branch 62 of Bago City and Branch 24 of Cabanatuan City, respectively” (A.M. No.
98-5-01-SC Nov. 9, 1998), the Supreme Court interpreted this provision to mean that the President is neither required to
make appointments nor allowed to do so during the two months immediately before the next presidential elections and
up to the end of her term. The only known exceptions to this prohibition are (1) temporary appointments in the executive
positions when continued vacancies will prejudice public service or endanger public safety and in the light of the recent
Supreme Court decision in the case of De Castro, et al. vs. JBC and PGMA, G.R. No. 191002, 17 March 2010, (2)
appointments to the Judiciary;
WHEREAS, Section 261 of the Omnibus Election Code provides that:
“Section 261. Prohibited Acts.– The following shall be guilty of an election offense:
(g) Appointments of new employees, creation of new position, promotion, or giving salary increases. – During the period
of forty-five days before a regular election and thirty days before a special election.
(1) Any head, official or appointing officer of a government office, agency or instrumentality, whether national or local,
including government-owned or controlled corporations, who appoints or hires any new employee, whether provisional,
temporary or casual, or creates and fills any new position, except upon prior authority to the Commission. The
Commission shall not grant the authority sought unless it is satisfied that the position to be filled is essential to the
proper functioning of the office or agency concerned, and that the position shall not be filled in a manner that may
influence the election.
As an exception to the foregoing provisions, a new employee may be appointed in the case of urgent need:
Provided, however, that notice of the appointment shall be given to the Commission within three days from the date of
the appointment. Any appointment or hiring in violation of this provision shall be null and void.
(2) Any government official who promotes or gives any increase of salary or remuneration or privilege to any government
official or employee, including those in government-owned or controlled corporations.”;
2. Salary
Section 10.
The salary of the Chief Justice and of the Associate Justices of the Supreme Court, and of judges of lower courts, shall be fixed by law. During
their continuance in office, their salary shall not be decreased .
3. Congressional power to reorganize and security of tenure
ARTICLE VIII
Section 11. The Members of the Supreme Court and judges of lower courts shall hold office during good behavior until they reach the
age of seventy years or become incapacitated to discharge the duties of their office. The Supreme Court en banc shall have the power
to discipline judges of lower courts, or order their dismissal by a vote of a majority of the Members who actually took part in the
deliberations on the issues in the case and voted thereon.

Section 2. The Congress shall have the power to define, prescribe, and apportion the jurisdiction of the various courts but may not
deprive the Supreme Court of its jurisdiction over cases enumerated in Section 5 hereof.
No law shall be passed reorganizing the Judiciary when it undermines the security of tenure of its Members.
De La Llana v. Alba
March 12, 1982 |G.R. No. L-57883
FACTS:
Batasang Pambansa Blg. 129 entitled, “An act reorganizing the Judiciary, Appropriating Funds Therefor and for Other Purposes” was passed,
providing for the separation of Justices and judges of inferior courts from the Court of Appeals to municipal circuit courts (except the occupants
of the Sandiganbayan and the Court of Tax appeals). The honorable petitioner sought to prohibit the respondents from implementing BP 129,
alleging that the security of tenure provision of the Constitution has been ignored and disregarded. Furthermore, they assert that the
reorganization was done in lack of good faith. However, the Solicitor General denies his claim and maintains that the allegation of lack of good
faith is unwarranted and devoid of any support in law, and that BP 129 was a legitimate exercise of the power vested in the Batasang Pambansa
to reorganize the judiciary.
ISSUE:
Was there lack of good faith in reorganizing the judiciary?
HELD:
No. The Court held that there was good faith in reorganizing the judiciary. Citing the separate opinion of Justice Laurel in the case of Zandueta v.
De La Costa, the Court similarly maintains that the passage of BP 129 was in good faith seeing as its purpose was for the fulfillment of what was
considered a great public need by the legislative department, not intended to adversely affect the tenure of judges or any particular judge. While it
is possible that the legislature could deliberately abuse the power to reorganize the judiciary, thus lacking good faith, the Court is unconvinced that
such was the case in this situation. Thus, where the Court holds that the reorganization of the judiciary by virtue of BP 129 was done in good faith,
the “separation” of the petitioner due to the abolition of his office is valid and constitutional.
4. Removal
Section 11. The Members of the Supreme Court and judges of lower courts shall hold office during good behavior until they reach the age of
seventy years or become incapacitated to discharge the duties of their office. The Supreme Court en banc shall have the power to discipline
judges of lower courts, or order their dismissal by a vote of a majority of the Members who actually took part in the deliberations on the issues in
the case and voted thereon.
People vs Gacott GR No 116049 13 July 1995

Facts: For failure to check citations of the prosecutions, the order of respondent RTC Judge Eustaquio Gacott Jr dismissing a criminal case was
annulled by the Supreme Court. The respondent judge was also sanctioned with a reprimand and a fine of PHP 10k for gross ignorance of law.
The judgment was made by the Second Division of the Supreme Court.
Issue: Whether or not the Second Division of the Supreme Court has the competence to administratively discipline respondent judge?
Decision: To require the entire court to deliberate upon and participate in all administrative matter or cases regardless of the sanctions, imposable
or imposed, would result in a congested docket and undue delay in the adjudication of cases in the Court, especially in administrative matters,
since even cases involving the penalty of reprimand would require action by the Court En Banc.
5. Jurisdiction
Section 1. The judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in such lower courts as may be established by law.
G.R. NO. 74457 MARCH 20, 1987

RESTITUTO YNOT, PETITIONER, VS. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT, THE STATION COMMANDER, INTEGRATED NATIONAL POLICE,
BAROTAC NUEVO, ILOILO AND THE REGIONAL DIRECTOR, BUREAU OF ANIMAL INDUSTRY, REGION IV, ILOILO CITY, RESPONDENTS.
Facts:
Former President Ferdinand E. Marcos has given orders prohibiting the interprovincial movement of carabaos and the slaughtering of carabaos
not complying with the requirements of Executive Order No. 626, effective October 25, 1980.
On January 13, 1984, the petitioner transported six carabaos in a pump boat from Masbate to Iloilo when the same was confiscated by the police
station commander of Barotac Nuevo, Iloilo for the violation of E.O. 626-A. A case was filed by the petitioner questioning the constitutionality of
executive order and the recovery of the carabaos. After considering the merits of the case, the confiscation was sustained and the court declined
to rule on the constitutionality issue. The petitioner appealed the decision to the Intermediate Appellate Court but it also upheld the ruling of RTC.
Issue:
Is E.O. 626-A unconstitutional?

Ruling:
The Respondent contends that it is a valid exercise of police power to justify EO 626-A amending EO 626 in asic rule prohibiting the slaughter of
carabaos except under certain conditions. The supreme court said that The reasonable connection between the means employed and the purpose
sought to be achieved by the questioned measure is missing the Supreme Court do not see how the prohibition of the inter-provincial transport of
carabaos can prevent their indiscriminate slaughter, considering that they can be killed anywhere, with no less difficulty in one province than in
another. Obviously, retaining the carabaos in one province will not prevent their slaughter there, any more than moving them to another province
will make it easier to kill them there
The Supreme Court found E.O. 626-A unconstitutional. The executive act defined the prohibition, convicted the petitioner and immediately
imposed punishment, which was carried out forthright. Due process was not properly observed. In the instant case, the carabaos were arbitrarily
confiscated by the police station commander, were returned to the petitioner only after he had filed a complaint for recovery and given a
supersedeas bond of Php 12,000.00. The measure struck at once and pounced upon the petitioner without giving him a chance to be heard, thus
denying due process.
6. Requirements As To Preparation Of Decisions
Section 15. (1) All cases or matters filed after the effectivity of this Constitution must be decided or resolved within twenty-four months from date
of submission for the Supreme Court, and, unless reduced by the Supreme Court, twelve months for all lower collegiate courts, and three months
for all other lower courts.
(2) A case or matter shall be deemed submitted for decision or resolution upon the filing of the last pleading, brief, or memorandum required by
the Rules of Court or by the court itself.
(3) Upon the expiration of the corresponding period, a certification to this effect signed by the Chief Justice or the presiding judge shall forthwith
be issued and a copy thereof attached to the record of the case or matter, and served upon the parties. The certification shall state why a decision
or resolution has not been rendered or issued within said period.
(4) Despite the expiration of the applicable mandatory period, the court, without prejudice to such responsibility as may have been incurred in
consequence thereof, shall decide or resolve the case or matter submitted thereto for determination, without further delay.
7. Mandatory Period for Deciding
Section 15. (1) All cases or matters filed after the effectivity of this Constitution must be decided or resolved within twenty-four months from date
of submission for the Supreme Court, and, unless reduced by the Supreme Court, twelve months for all lower collegiate courts, and three months
for all other lower courts.
(2) A case or matter shall be deemed submitted for decision or resolution upon the filing of the last pleading, brief, or memorandum required by
the Rules of Court or by the court itself.
(3) Upon the expiration of the corresponding period, a certification to this effect signed by the Chief Justice or the presiding judge shall forthwith
be issued and a copy thereof attached to the record of the case or matter, and served upon the parties. The certification shall state why a decision
or resolution has not been rendered or issued within said period.
(4) Despite the expiration of the applicable mandatory period, the court, without prejudice to such responsibility as may have been incurred in
consequence thereof, shall decide or resolve the case or matter submitted thereto for determination, without further delay.
SECOND DIVISION
[A.M. No. RTJ-99-1496. October 13, 1999]
EDESIO ADAO, complainant, vs. JUDGE CELSO F. LORENZO, Regional Trial Court, Branch 1, Borongan, Eastern Samar, Respondent.
DECISION
MENDOZA, J.:
This is a complaint filed against Judge Celso F. Lorenzo of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 1, of Borongan, Eastern Samar in connection with the
issuance by him of a temporary restraining order in Civil Case No. 3391, entitled Nerio B. Naputo v. Edesio Adao and the Municipal Local
Government Officer of Taft, Eastern Samar. The case was assigned by special raffle to Branch 2 of the RTC of Borongan, Eastern Samar to which
respondent judge had been designated as Acting Presiding Judge. The administrative complaint charges that, in issuing the TRO, respondent
acted with gross inexcusable negligence, manifest partiality, and evident bad faith.
Complainant Edesio Adao was elected barangay captain of Mabuhay, Taft, Eastern Samar. It is alleged that after his proclamation as barangay
captain, the losing candidate, Nerio Naputo, filed against him an election protest, which was docketed as Civil Case No. 56-97 in the Municipal
Trial Court of Taft, Eastern Samar; that on June 13, 1997, Naputos lawyers, Attys. Edwin B. Docena and Rodolfo Joji A. Acol, Jr., also filed a
complaint for injunction (Civil Case No. 3391) to prevent complainant from being elected president in the elections held on June 14, 1997 for
officers of the Association of Barangay Captains of the Municipality of Taft, Eastern Samar; that on the same day the said complaint was filed
(June 13, 1997), respondent judge issued a temporary restraining order; that on June 23, 1997, after successfully preventing complainant from
participating in the elections, Naputos lawyer, Atty. Edwin Docena, filed a notice of dismissal of Civil Case No. 3391; that complainant objected;
that until now complainants objection to the dismissal of the case remains unacted upon; that respondent judge acted in violation of Supreme
Court Administrative Circular 20-95, as the temporary restraining order was issued by him without notice to complainant and a summary hearing
and in the absence of urgency for the issuance of the same; that respondent judge was politically motivated in issuing the TRO because he was
promoted to RTC judge through the efforts of former Rep. Jose Ramirez, one of whose supporters is Nerio Naputos lawyer, Atty. Edwin Docena;
and that respondent judge is guilty of violation of 3, par. 2 (Dishonesty and violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act); 3, par. 3
(Violation of the Code of Judicial conduct); and 3, par. 9 of Rule 140 (Gross ignorance of the law and procedure) and the following provisions of
the Code of Judicial Conduct:
Rule 2.03 A judge shall not allow family, social, or other relationships to influence judicial conduct or judgment. The prestige of judicial office shall
not be used or lent to advance the private interests of others, nor convey or permit others to convey the impression that they are in a special
position to influence the judge.
Rule 2.04 A judge shall refrain from influencing in any manner the outcome of litigation or dispute pending before another court or administrative
agency.
Rule 3.02 In every case, a judge shall endeavor diligently to ascertain the facts and the applicable law unswayed by partisan interests, public
opinion or fear of criticism.
Respondent judge filed two comments. In his first comment, dated July 7, 1999, respondent judge alleged that after Civil Case No. 3391 had been
brought to his attention on June 13, 1997, he issued an order requiring herein complainant to comment within ten (10) days from notice on the
application for preliminary injunction; that he later issued a temporary restraining order after careful perusal of the petition and the attached
affidavit of merit of complainant and after concluding that no fair and reasonable redress can be had by petitioner unless a temporary restraining
order is issued; that his issuance of the temporary restraining order was in accordance with 8 of the Interim Rules 1 that despite receipt of the
temporary restraining order at 8:30 in the morning of July 14, 1997, complainant never questioned the propriety of the same; that while former
Rep. Ramirez had helped him get appointed as RTC judge, this fact did not influence him to issue a temporary restraining order in favor of Nerio
Naputo; and that the present complaint was filed only after one year and 11 months from the issuance of the temporary restraining order and was
intended to malign him and put pressure on him because he was trying criminal cases for attempted and frustrated murder against some
relatives of the complainant.
In his second comment, dated July 14, 1999, respondent judge further alleged that Civil Case No. 3391 was assigned by special raffle to Branch 2
to which he had been designated Acting Presiding Judge; that it was almost physically impossible for him to act on complainants objection to the
notice of dismissal of said case because of his multifarious duties as Presiding Judge of Branch 1, Acting Presiding Judge of Branch 2, and
Judge-Designate of Branch 4 at Dolores and Branch 5 at Oras, Eastern Samar; and that he did not resolve the matter because he thought it best
that it be resolved by the permanent judge of the RTC, Branch 2, Borongan, considering that complainant had filed both an administrative and a
criminal complaint against him.
The complaint is meritorious
A. Re Issuance of Temporary Restraining Order
It is not clear whether respondent judge issued the temporary restraining order in Civil Case No. 3391 in his capacity as Executive Judge or as
Acting Presiding Judge of Branch 2 of the RTC of Borongan, Eastern Samar. There is a difference with respect to the requisites for the issuance of
a temporary restraining order and the life of the TRO when it is issued by an Executive Judge or by a Presiding Judge of a court.
If the temporary restraining order was issued by respondent in his capacity as Executive Judge, the TRO was good for 72 hours only. Within that
period he was required to summon the parties to a conference before issuing the TRO and then assign the case by raffle. Thus, par. 3 of
Administrative Circular No. 20-95 provides:
If the matter is of extreme urgency, such that unless a TRO is issued, grave injustice and irreparable injury will arise, the Executive Judge shall
issue the TRO effective only for seventy-two (72) hours from issuance but shall immediately summon the parties for conference and immediately
raffle the case in their presence. Thereafter, before the expiry of the seventy-two (72) hours, the Presiding Judge to whom the case is assigned
shall conduct a summary hearing to determine whether the TRO can be extended for another period until a hearing in the pending application for
preliminary injunction can be conducted. In no case shall the total period of the TRO exceed (20) days, including the original seventy-two (72)
hours, for the TRO issued by the Executive Judge. (Emphasis added)
On the other hand, if the TRO was issued after Civil Case No. 3391 had been raffled to Branch 2 and respondent judge issued it in his capacity as
Acting Judge, then he should have complied with the following provision of Administrative Circular No. 20-95, par. 2:
The application for a TRO shall be acted upon only after all parties are heard in a summary hearing conducted within twenty-four (24) hours after
the records are transmitted to the branch selected by raffle. The records shall be transmitted immediately after raffle.
The TRO issued by respondent judge indicates that the same was issued by him as Executive Judge. The heading of the order shows it was
issued by Branch 1 of the RTC of which he was the Presiding Judge, thus:
Republic of the Philippines
REGIONAL TRIAL COURT
Eighth (8th) Judicial Region
BRANCH 1
Borongan, Eastern Samar
The same information appears in another order of respondent judge of the same date, June 13, 1997, requiring complainant to file his answer to
the complaint for injunction. The order, according to respondent judge, was issued prior to the temporary restraining order. The heading of
subsequent pleadings filed by the parties in Civil Case No. 3391 (plaintiffs Notice of Dismissal and herein complainants Memorandum in
opposition thereto) also show that Civil Case No. 3391 was heard in Branch 1. It would thus appear that respondent issued the temporary
restraining order and the order requiring answer, both dated June 13, 1997, in his capacity a Executive Judge. Respondent himself states in his
comment, dated July 7, 1999, that my issuance of the TRO may be said to be necessary and incidental to the performance of my functions as
[executive judge] despite the fact that I am burdened by workload, that aside from being the executive judge, I am also the judge designate of
branches 4 and 5 located at Dolores and Oras, Eastern Samar approximately more or less one hundred kilometers from the municipality of
Borongan, Eastern Samar. (Emphasis added)
However, respondent judge alleges at the same time that he issued the TRO after Civil Case No. 3391 had been assigned by special raffle to
Branch 2 of which he was Acting Presiding Judge. In his comment, dated July 14, 1999, respondent alleged:
When said case was filed before the multiple sala of RTC, Borongan, Eastern Samar and forthwith assigned to Branch 2 by way of a special
raffle, I was the designated Acting Presiding Judge of said court. (Emphasis added)
In his comment, dated July 7, 1999 he stated:
a. When the records of Civil Case No. 3391 was brought to my attention by way of a special raffle on June 13, 1997 (minutes of the raffle is hereto
attached as annex A) I accordingly issued an order requiring respondents to answer within a period of ten (10) days (order to answer the
complaint is hereto attached as annex B);
c. As regards the allegation of bad faith by complainant in the issuance of the TRO, the same has no basis in fact and law. As expressly provided
under Supreme Court Circular No. 6, on the powers and duties of the executive judge, I could have acted on the application of the TRO upon the
filing of the complaint without waiting for the required raffle. However, to show good faith, I ordered for the raffle of the case regardless of the fact
that I preside [over] branches I and II of the Regional Trial Courts of Borongan, Eastern Samar. (Emphasis added)
Respondent seems to be justifying his order granting a TRO simultaneously under par. 3 of Administrative Circular No. 20-95 and under par. 2 of
the same. But this cannot be done because, as already shown, different rules apply depending whether respondent acted as Executive Judge or
as Acting Presiding Judge. At all events, the TRO he issued was for 20 days. However, the minutes of Civil Case No. 3391 do not show that before
the TRO was issued the parties were summoned and heard. Indeed, respondent does not dispute the fact that no notice, much less a hearing, was
ever given complainant before the TRO was issued.
Respondent claims that In the nature of a TRO, the same is generally granted without notice to the opposite party until the propriety of granting an
injunction can be determined and goes no further than to preserve the status quo until the determination. This is certainly not so, being contrary
to the provisions of Administrative Circular No. 20-95 as above quoted. The purpose of Administrative Circular No. 20-25 precisely to minimize the
ex-parte issuance of temporary restraining orders.
Nor was there any irreparable injury to Nerio Naputo to justify the issuance of a temporary restraining order enjoining complainant from
participating in the elections for officers of the barangay captains of the Municipality of Taft. Complainant had been proclaimed and had been
serving as barangay captain. Unless his election was annulled, he was entitled to all the rights as such, including the right to take part in said
elections.
As Executive Judge, respondent is expected to be familiar with the requirements of pertinent rules and regulations. The hedging and trimming
earlier noted in his two comments as to whether he issued the temporary restraining order in his capacity as Executive Judge or as the Acting
Presiding Judge of the RTC to which the case had been raffled is an indication that he acted not so much in ignorance of Administrative Circular
No. 20-95 as in deliberate disregard of the same.
Nor can respondent point to his order, dated June 13, 1997, requiring herein complainant to show cause why preliminary injunction should not be
granted, as evidence of his (respondents) good faith and impartiality. In the same order he set the hearing on the application for preliminary
injunction on June 23, 1997, long after the June 14, 1997 elections of officers of the Association of Barangay Captains of the Municipality of Taft,
Eastern Samar. Respondent judge ought to have known that by that time the case would be moot. If anything, this circumstance only makes his
non-observance of Administrative Circular No. 20-95 more glaring and flagrant.
Respondent judge argues that complainant could have questioned the propriety of the issuance of the TRO by means of Objection to or Motion
for Dissolution of restraining order (Rule 58, Section 6 of the Rules of Court), Motion for Reconsideration [as] a precondition to the filing of Petition
for Certiorari under Rule 65 (temporary restraining order being an interlocutory order). However, the fact is that complainant received the
temporary restraining order only at 8:20 a.m. of June 14, 1997, the very day that the elections for officers of the Association of Barangay Captains
of the Municipality of Taft, Eastern Samar were to be held. There was little time for him to question the order. On the other hand, had respondent
observed the requirements of Administrative Circular No. 20-95, complainant would have been given more time to be heard on his objections to
the issuance of the temporary restraining order in question.
Respondent judges failure to abide by Administrative Circular No. 20-95 in issuing the TRO constitutes an offense of grave abuse of authority,
misconduct, and conduct prejudicial to the proper administration of justice.2 Under the circumstances, a fine of P5,000.00 should be imposed on
him.
B. Re Failure to act on Complainants Opposition to the Dismissal of Civil Case No. 3391.
Respondent does not deny that he has failed to rule on complainants objection to the dismissal of Civil Case No. 3391 filed by Nerio Naputo on
June 13, 1997. In his comment, dated July 14, 1999, he cites pressure of work and his belief that the matter be better left to the permanent judge
of Branch 2 considering the administrative and criminal complaints filed against him (respondent) by complainant.
Respondents excuse is unjustifiable. The fact that respondent judge presides over four branches of the RTC is not a valid excuse for his inaction.
As we stated in Request of Judge Irma Zita V. Masamayor, RTC-Branch 52, Talibon, Bohol for Extension of Time to Decide Criminal Case No. 96-
185,3
A heavy caseload may excuse a judges failure to decide cases within the reglementary period, but not his/her failure to request an extension of
time within which to decide the case on time.
Nor can respondent use as an excuse the administrative and criminal complaints filed against him by complainant as the complaints were filed
only in May, 1999, more than a year after complainant filed his memorandum in opposition to the notice of dismissal on September, 1997. Under
Art. VIII,15(1) of the Constitution, judges of lower courts are required to decide cases or resolve matters within three months from the date of
their submission for resolution. In at least two cases,4 we considered the failure of judges to decide even a single case within the 90-day period
gross inefficiency warranting the imposition on them of fines ranging from P5,000.00 to the equivalent of their salary for one month. In this case,
we believe that a fine of P5,000.00 would be an appropriate sanction for respondents inaction.
WHEREFORE, the Court finds respondent Judge Celso F. Lorenzo GUILTY of grave abuse of authority and of undue delay in resolving an incident in
Civil Case No. 3391 and IMPOSES on him a fine in the total amount of Ten Thousand Pesos (P10,000.00) with warning that repetition of the same
or similar acts will be dealt with more severely.
The complaint against Attys. Edwin B. Docena and Rodolfo Joji A. Acol, Jr. is referred to the Office of the Bar Confidant for appropriate action
after docketing it as a separate administrative case.
Tirol vs. Commission on Audit

G.R. No. 133954, Aug. 3, 2000
FACTS:
During petitioner's capacity as the DECS Regional Director of Region VIII, he and some officials of the Lalawigan National High School in Eastern
Samar entered into a contract with Fairchild Marketing and Construction in the total amount of P80,000.
Upon filing of complaint by the Teachers and Employees Union, COA investigated the transaction and found that there was malversation of public
funds. Instead of a competitive public bidding, the purchase of certain supplies and equipment was done through a negotiated contract, which
resulted in an overprice of P35,100.
Petitioner's main allegation is that the Requisition and Issue Voucher (RIV) and check were previously reviewed by his subordinates before he
approved and signed them. Said act, therefore, only constitutes a ministerial act on his part.
But the Office of the Ombudsman-Visayas rejected petitioner's defense because had he carefully scrutinized the documents he would have
discovered that the purchases were made without competitive public bidding. Moreover, the magnitude of the amount involved would prevent a
reasonable mind from accepting the claim that petitioner was merely careless or negligent in the performance of his functions.
Accordingly, it was recommended that petitioner and co-petitioners be indicted for violation of Sec. 3 (g) of R.A. No. 3019, as amended for
entering into a contract or transaction manifestly and grossly disadvantageous to the Government. An information was subsequently filed with
the Sandiganbayan, charging the petitioner and two others with the aforementioned offense.
Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the Ombudsman's ruling but the Motion was dismissed, prompting petitioner to file the instant
petition, seeking reversal of the Ombudsman's assailed Resolution and Order.
Petitioner alleged that (1) his participation was limited to signing of the RIV and the check as a matter of routine; (2) that the RIV did not involve
the determination of the price of the supplies and equipment; (3) that the signing of the check was authority vested in him as the DECS Regional
Director; and (4) that the presumption of regularity in the performance of public functions by public officers should apply in his favor.
Petitioner cited the cases of Arias v. Sandiganbayan and Magsuci v. Sandiganbayan where the Court held that heads of office may rely to a
reasonable extent on their subordinates and on the good faith of those who prepare bids, purchase supplies, or enter into negotiations.
In his comment, the Solicitor General contends that there was a conspiracy of silence and inaction and because of that petitioner was guilty of
negligence. He further asserverates that it is beyond the ambit of the Court's authority to review the power of the Ombudsman in prosecuting and
dismissing a complaint filed before it.
In his Reply, petitioner states that the petition does not involve a review of the factual finding of the Ombudsman but rather its conclusion based
on undisputed facts.
ISSUES:
(1) Whether or not the issue is a question of law, and may therefore, be reviewed by the Supreme Court
(2) Whether or not the defense of good faith and regularity of performance of duty may be raised by the accused
(3) Whether or not there is conspiracy as would warrant conviction of the accused
HELD:
From the pleadings, it is clear that the questions raised by the petitioner are questions of fact rather than of law. What petitioner wants to happen
is for the Supreme Court to review the evidence and determine whether in fact he acted in good faith and that no conspiracy existed among the
accused.
The rulings in Arias and Magasuci are inapplicable to petitioner because the petitioners in the said cases were indicted and submitted themselves to
trial before the Sandiganbayan, which convicted them for the offense charged. In Arias, the Court set aside the judgment against the petitioner becasue
there was no evidence that the Government suffered undue injury. And in Magsuci, the reversal by the Court of the judgment of conviction was based on
a finding that Magsuci acted in good faith and that there has been no intimation at all that he had foreknowledge of any irregularity committed by either
or both Engr. Enriquez and Acia.
In both Arias and Magsuci, there was paucity of evidence on conspiracy, while in this case, there is only the claim of peitioner that he acted in good faith
and that there was no conspiracy. The Ombudsman believes otherwise and the Court does not ordinarily interfere with the discretion of the said Office.
Moreover, this case is an appeal under Sec. 27 of the Ombudsman Act of 1989 in relation to Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure which has
been declared unconstitutional in Fabian v. Desierto for increasing appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court without its advice and consent. Also,
there is no right of appeal available since the Section mentions only appeals from all administrative disciplinary cases, orders, directives or decisions of
the Ombudsman.
The Supreme Court also found that the petition was in fact a modified form of forum shopping as shown in the other case filed.
"WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari in this case is hereby DENIED, and the Resolution of 20 March 1997 and Order of 5 March 1998 of the Office of the
Ombudsman in OMB-Visayas-Crim-94-0836 are AFFIRMED.“
[G.R. No. 141496.October 3, 2001]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. LUCIO TENG
THIRD DIVISION
Gentlemen:
Quoted hereunder, for your information, is a resolution of this Court dated OCT 3 2001.
G.R. No. 141496(People of the Philippines vs. Lucio Teng)
The instant case was "certified" to this Court by the Court of Appeals in its Decision dated January 30, 1998 in CA-G.R. CR No. 17196, "People of the
Philippines, Appellee, vs. Lucio Teng, Appellant."
It appears that on November 6, 1992, appellant Lucio Teng was charged in Criminal Case No. Q-92-38304 for violation of Batas Pambansa Bilang 22, and in
Criminal Case No. Q-92-38305 for estafa, before the Regional Trial Court, Branch 104, Quezon City. The cases stemmed from appellant's issuance to Daniel Pe of
Metrobank check No. 793666 dated November 20, 1991 for P35,000.00.
On August 2, 1994, the trial court rendered a decision1 Rendered by the late Judge Maximiano C. Asunsion, Rollo p. 132. convicting Teng of the crimes charged,
thus:
"WHEREFORE, for Crim. Case No. 92-38304, judgment is hereby rendered finding accused Lucio Teng guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the
crime of Violation of B.P. Blg. 22 as charged in the information, where said accused is hereby sentenced to suffer the imprisonment of ONE YEAR,
and a FINE of P200,000.00
"Likewise, for Crim. Case No. 92-38305. Judgment is hereby rendered finding accused Lucio Teng guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the
crime of ESTAFA as charged in the information, where said accused is hereby sentenced to suffer the imprisonment of EIGHT (8) YEARS & ONE (1)
DAY to TWELVE (12) YEARS of Prision Mayor in its maximum period, without subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, and to pay the costs.
"In both cases, the said accused is hereby ordered to pay the complainant the amount of P35,000.00 as the amount indicated in the check in
question.
"SO ORDERED."
Upon appeal, the Court of Appeal First Division, Chaired by Justice Arturo B. Buena, now with this Court, with Justice Buenaventura J. Guerrero and
Justice Portia Aliño-Hormachuelos, as members.
affirmed the RTC decision with modification, and "certified" the estafa case to this Court, thus:
"WHEREFORE, the appealed decision is MODIFIED to read:
(a) In Criminal Case No. Q-92-383-04, the conviction of appellant Lucio Teng for violation of B.P. 22 is AFFIRMED but the penalty should be
imprisonment of One (1) year and a fine of Thrity-Five Thousand (P35,000.00) Pesos; and
(b) In Criminal Case No. Q-92-383-05, We certify this case to the Honorable Supreme Court for final determination and appropriate action
(People vs. Demeciilo, 186 SCRA 161,164).
"SO ORDERED." (Emphasis supplied)

This Court, upon receipt of the records of the case, issued a Resolution dated March 1, 2000 requiring the parties to file supplemental briefs.
Considering that the case was "certified" by the Court of Appeals to this Court, we directed the trial court to order the bondsman/surety of appellant to
surrender him and cause his transfer to the Bureau of Corrections, Muntinlupa, Metro Manila, through the Philippine National Police.
Upon being informed by trial court that the bond posted by the appellant was cancelled because his bondsman (Asia Traders Insurance Corporation)
failed to comply with the order to surrender him, this Court Issued a Resolution dated August 14, 2000 ordering his arrest and commitment due to the
forfeiture of the bailbond.
Thus, on August 21, 2000, the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) arrested appellant. Thereafter, he was committed to the Bureau of Corrections,
where he is presently detained.
Eventually, appellant filed with this Court a motion for bail pursuant to Section 5, Rule 114 of the 2000 Rules of Criminal Procedure, as amended.
Upon examination of the records, we found that the appellate court did not properly certify the instant case to this Court by failing to render
judgment. Section 13, Rule 124 of the 2000 Rules of Criminal Procedure, as amended, provides:
"Sec. 13. Quorum of the court; certification or appeal of cases to Supreme Court. -
xxxx
Whenever the Court of Appeals finds that the penalty of death, reclusion perpetua, or life imprisonment should be imposed in a
case, the court, after discussion of the evidence and the law involved, shall render judgment imposing the penalty of death, reclusion
perpetua, or life imprisonment as the circumstances warrant. However, it shall refrain from entering the
judgment and forthwith certify the case and elevate the entire record thereof to the Supreme Court for review. (13a)" (Emphasis
Supplied)
Under the above provisions, it is essential that before a criminal case can be certified to this Court for review, the Court of Appeals must
first render judgment finding the appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime charged and imposing upon him the penalty of either
death, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment as the circumstances warrant. However, the appellate court must refrain from entering the
judgment. Only then can it certify the case to this Court.
The ratio dicidendi and the dispositive portion of the Court of Appeals Decision failed to comply with the above requirements. An
examination of the ratio dicidendi shows merely a discussion of appellant's liability for estafa, thus:
"In Criminal Case No. Q-92-383-05, since appellant Lucia Teng is guilty of estafa under Article 315, paragraph 2 (d) of the Revised
Penal Code, as amended by PD. 818 and the imposable penalty is Eighteen (18) Years Four (4) Months and One (1) Day to Twenty (20)
Years of Reclusion Perpetua, as the amount involved is Thirty-Five Thousand (P35, 000.00) Pesos, We must comply with the mandate of
Section 13, Rules 124, 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure x x x."
While the Court of Appeals found appellant guilty of estafa, it did not impose any penalty therefor. Moreover, the dispositive portion of
the Decision, which actually constitutes the judgment of that court, does not contain (a) an express finding that appellant is guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of estafa and (b) the corresponding penalty. Thus, the instant case is improperly certified to this Court.
There being no judgment rendered by the Court of Appeals in regards appellant's estafa case, this Court is without jurisdiction review the
Court of Appeals Decision.
WHEREFORE, let the records of this case be REMANDED to the Court of Appeals IMMEDIATELY, with the directive to observe Section 13,
Rule 124 of the 2000 Rules of Criminal Procedure, as amended, by rendering judgment in the appeal of Lucio Teng from the decision of the
Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 104, in Criminal Case No. Q-92-38305 for estafa.
The Court of Appeals is likewise required to resolve appellant's motion for bail WITH DISPATCH.
SANTIAGO VS. BAUTISTA

SANTIAGO VS. BAUTISTA
judicial power and judicial function
Teodoro Santiago was a Grade 6 pupil at Sero Elem. School. He was adjudged 3 rd Honors (3rd placer). 3 days before graduation, Teodoro and
his parents sought the invalidation of the ranking of honor students. They filed a CERTIORARI case against the principal and teachers who
composed the committee on rating honors.
They contend that the committee acted with grave abuse of official discretion because they claim that
o the 1st and 2nd placers had never been a close rival of Santiago before, except in Grade 5 only.
o That Santiago was a consistent honor student from Grade 1 to 5
o that the 1st placer was coached and tutored by grade 6 teachers during the summer (gaining unfair advantage)
o The committee was composed only of Grade 6 teachers.
o That some teachers gave Santos a 75% with an intention to pull him to a much lower rank
o That in the Honors Certificate in Grade 1, the word “first place” was erased and replaced with “second place”
o That the Principal and district supervisors merely passed the buck to each other to delay his grievances.
The respondents filed a MTD claiming that the action was improper, and that even assuming it was proper, the question has become academic
(because the graduation already proceeded).
Respondents also argue that there was no GADALEJ on the part of the teachers since the Committee on Ratings is not a tribunal, nor board, exercising
judicial functions. (under Rule 65, certiorari is a remedy against judicial functions)
ISSUE: may judicial function be exercised in this case? What is judicial power?

SC:
A judicial function is an act performed by virtue of judicial powers. The exercise of judicial function is the doing of something in the nature of the action
of the court. In order for an action for certiorari to exist, (TEST TO DETERMINE WHETHER A TRIBUNAL OR BOARD EXERCISES JUDICIAL FUNCTIONS)
1) there must be specific controversy involving rights of persons brought before a tribunal for hearing and determination. , and
2) that the tribunal must have the power and authority to pronounce judgment and render a decision.
3) the tribunal must pertain to that branch of the sovereign which belongs to the judiciary (or at least the not the legislative nor the executive)
It maybe said that the exercise of judicial function is to determine what the law is, and what the legal rights of parties are, with respect to a matter in
controversy.
The phrase judicial power is defined:
 as authority to determine the rights of persons or property.
 authority vested in some court, officer or persons to hear and determine when the rights of persons or property or the propriety of doing an act is
the subject matter of adjudication.
 The power exercised by courts in hearing and determining cases before them.
 The construction of laws and the adjudication of legal rights.
The so-called Committee for Rating Honor Students are neither judicial nor quasi-judicial bodies in the performance of its assigned task. It is necessary
that there be a LAW that gives rise to some specific rights of persons or property under which adverse claims to such rights are made, and the
controversy ensuring therefrom is brought in turn, to the tribunal or board clothed with power and authority to determine what that law is and
thereupon adjudicate the respective rights of contending parties.
There is nothing about any rule of law that provides for when teachers sit down to assess individual merits of their pupils for purposes of rating them
for honors. Worse still, the petitioners have not presented the pertinent provisions of the Service Manual for Teachers which was allegedly violated by
the Committee.
The judiciary has no power to reverse the award of the board of judges.
And for that matter, it would not interfere in literary contests, beauty contests, and similar competitions.
Felipe vs Leuterio GR No 4606 20 May 1952

Facts: In an oratorical contest held in Naga, Camarines Sur, first honour was given by the board of judges to Nestor Nosce and second honor to Emma
Imperial. Six days later, Emma asked the Court of First Instance of that province to reverse that award alleging that one of the judges had fallen to error
in grading her performance. After a hearing and over the objection of four judges of the contest, the Court declared Emma as winner. Hence the special
civil action challenging the Court’s power to modify the board’s verdict.
Issue: Whether or not the Court has jurisdiction over the board’s decision?
Decision: The judiciary has no power to reverse the award of the board of judges of an oratorical contest. For that matter it would not interfere in
literary contest, beauty contests and similar competitions.

8. Deliberations
CASE BRIEF, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, POLITICAL AND INTERNATIONAL LAW
Prudential Bank vs. Castro (1988)

Posted on 2021-01-10
PRUDENTIAL BANK, Complainant, v. JUDGE JOSE P. CASTRO and ATTY. BENJAMIN M. GRECIA, Respondents.
A.M. No. 2756 | March 15, 1988 | 158 SCRA 646 | En Banc Resolution | Per Curiam
Constitutional Law | Judicial Department | Decisions of the Court
The certification requirement that the conclusions of the SC was reached in consultation and the mandate that no motion for reconsideration shall be
denied without stating the legal basis therefor are both NOT applicable in administrative cases.
Article VIII, Sections 13 and 14

FACTS:
An administrative complaint was filed against respondent Atty. Grecia, and a Decision to disbar him was subsequently rendered. He moved to
reconsider but was denied in a Minute Resolution “for lack of merit, the issues raised therein having been previously duly considered and passed upon.”
Grecia now prays that the Decision and the Resolution of the denial of the motion for reconsideration be set aside. He challenges the Decision as
violative of Art VIII, Sec 13 of the Constitution due to lack of certification by the Chief Justice that the conclusions of the Court were reached in
consultation before the case was assigned to a member for writing of the opinion of the Court. He also avers that the Minute Resolution disregarded
the constitutional mandate in Art VIII, Sec 14.
ISSUES:
(1) Is the certification requirement in Art VIII, Sec 13 of the Constitution applicable to the case at bar, an administrative case?
(2) Did the denial of the motion for reconsideration by minute resolution violate Art VIII, Sec 14 of the Constitution?
RULING:
(1) No. The certification requirement refers to decisions in judicial, not administrative cases. From the very beginning, resolutions/decisions of the
Court in administrative cases have not been accompanied by any formal certification. In fact, such a certification would be a superfluity in
administrative cases, which by their very nature, have to be deliberated upon considering the collegiate composition of this Court. xxx
(2) No. The Constitutional mandate that “no xxx motion for reconsideration of a decision of the court shall be xxx denied without stating the legal basis
therefor” is inapplicable in administrative cases. And even if it were applicable, said Resolution stated the legal basis for the denial, and therefore
adhered faithfully to the Constitutional requirement. “Lack of merit” which was one of the grounds for denial, is a legal basis.

Consing vs. CA (1989)

DR. and MRS. MERLIN CONSING, petitioners,
vs.
THE COURT OF APPEALS and CARIDAD SANTOS, respondents.
G.R. No. 78272 | 177 SCRA 14 | August 29, 1989 | Third Division | Justice Cortes
Constitutional Law | Judicial Department | Judicial Decisions

FACTS:
Santos filed with the then Court of First Instance (CFI) a complaint for specific performance with damages against the Consings. The CFI ruled in favor
of Santos. Thus, The Consings interposed an appeal to the Court of Appeals which affirmed the decision of the CFI with modification as to the
computation of the amount to be deducted from the purchase price. Hence, from the decision of the Court of Appeals, petitioner-spouses filed this
petition for review. They contend that the decision rendered by the Court of Appeals inn this case does not comply with the requirements of Article VIII,
section 13, of the 1987 Constitution.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Court of Appeals must comply with the certification requirement under Article VIII, Section 13, of the 1987 Constitution.
RULING:
The absence, however, of the certification would not necessarily mean that the case submitted for decision had not been reached in consultation
before being assigned to one member for the writing of the opinion of the Court since the regular performance of official duty is presumed [Sec. 5 (m)
of Rule 131, Rules of Court]. The lack of certification at the end of the decision would only serve as evidence of failure to observe the certification
requirement and may be basis for holding the official responsible for the omission to account therefor. Such absence of certification would not have
the effect of invalidating the decision.
9. Voting
Cruz vs Secretary of DENR
Natural Resources and Environmental Law; Constitutional Law; IPRA; Regalian Doctrine
GR. No. 135385, Dec. 6, 2000
FACTS:
Petitioners Isagani Cruz and Cesar Europa filed a suit for prohibition and mandamus as citizens and taxpayers, assailing the constitutionality of certain
provisions of Republic Act No. 8371, otherwise known as the Indigenous People’s Rights Act of 1997 (IPRA) and its implementing rules and regulations
(IRR). The petitioners assail certain provisions of the IPRA and its IRR on the ground that these amount to an unlawful deprivation of the State’s
ownership over lands of the public domain as well as minerals and other natural resources therein, in violation of the regalian doctrine embodied in
section 2, Article XII of the Constitution.
ISSUE:
Do the provisions of IPRA contravene the Constitution?

HELD:
No, the provisions of IPRA do not contravene the Constitution. Examining the IPRA, there is nothing in the law that grants to the ICCs/IPs ownership
over the natural resources within their ancestral domain. Ownership over the natural resources in the ancestral domains remains with the State and the
rights granted by the IPRA to the ICCs/IPs over the natural resources in their ancestral domains merely gives them, as owners and occupants of the
land on which the resources are found, the right to the small scale utilization of these resources, and at the same time, a priority in their large scale
development and exploitation.
Additionally, ancestral lands and ancestral domains are not part of the lands of the public domain. They are private lands and belong to the ICCs/IPs by
native title, which is a concept of private land title that existed irrespective of any royal grant from the State. However, the right of ownership and
possession by the ICCs/IPs of their ancestral domains is a limited form of ownership and does not include the right to alienate the same.
10. Requirements as to decisions- Article VIII, Section 13-14
Section 13. The conclusions of the Supreme Court in any case submitted to it for decision en banc or in division shall be reached in consultation
before the case is assigned to a Member for the writing of the opinion of the Court. A certification to this effect signed by the Chief Justice shall be
issued and a copy thereof attached to the record of the case and served upon the parties. Any Member who took no part, or dissented, or abstained
from a decision or resolution, must state the reason therefor. The same requirements shall be observed by all lower collegiate courts.
Section 14. No decision shall be rendered by any court without expressing therein clearly and distinctly the facts and the law on which it is based.
Cases:
SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. L-52364 March 25, 1983
RICARDO VALLADOLID, petitioner,
vs.
HON. AMADO G. INCIONG, Deputy Minister of Labor, and COPACABANA APARTMENT-HOTEL, respondents.
G.R. No.L-53349 March 25, 1983
J.R.M. & CO., INC. as owner and operator of Copacabana Apartment-Hotel petitioners,
vs.
HON. AMADO G. INCIONG, as Deputy Minister of Labor,HON. FRANCISCO L. ESTRELLA, as Regional Director of the National Capital
Region, Ministry of Labor, nd RICARDO VALLADOLID, respondents.
Daniel Co for petitioner Ricardo Valadolid.
The Solicitor General for respondents.
Vicente V. Ocampo & Antonio V. de Ocampo for J.R.M. & Co., Inc.

MELENCIO-HERRERA, J.:
The Order dated December 26, 1979 of the Deputy Minister of Labor affirming the Order of May 2, 1979 for reinstatement without backwages issued
by Regional Director Francisco L. Estrella in Case No. R4-STF-2-1316-79 entitled, "Ricardo C. Valladolid, Jr. vs. Copacabana Apartment-Hotel," is
being assailed by the parties in these petitions.
According to the affidavit of Daniel T. Yu, Executive Vice-President, attached to the position paper submitted by JRM before the Regional Director, the
transfer was motivated by the fact:
xxx xxx xxx
That as such switchboard operator numerous telephone conversations and communications relating to business and confidential matters
were intercepted and relayed to Tropicana Apartment-Hotel, a competitor;
That to confirm suspicion on Ricardo Valladolid as the person responsible for said interception and relay, Mrs. Lourdes T. Yu, President of
JRM & Co., Inc. sent him on an errand to Manila Hotel to bring flowers on the occasion of Wedding Anniversary of Mr. & Mrs. Yu Hong Ty.
Matters which Mrs. Lourdes Yu told him in confidence and admonitions not to tell anyone, reached Tropicana people;
xxx xxx xxx 1
The affidavit further disclosed:
xxx xxx xxx
That while serving in his capacity as clerk/collector, copies of Accounts Receivables, reach Tropicana Management although said copies
were not referred to them;
That conferred (sic) on numerous confidential matters taken in the office of Copacabana Apartment-Hotel reached Tropicana Apartment-
Hotel;
That to finally and fully confirmed suspicions that Ricardo Valladolid was the person responsible for the aforementioned disclosures, a plan
for the entrapment was conceived by the management of Copacabana Apartment- Hotel;
That on November 9, 1979, pursuance of said plan, a cash voucher for P500,000.00 supposedly in payment for representation expenses to
myself with the corresponding check were prepared and issued respectively by Juan V. Bermudo, Apartment-Hotel Manager, who thereafter
called Ricardo Valladolid and asked the latter to bring the said cash voucher and check to my room which he did; few minutes later I came
down to the office and asked Mr. Ricardo Valladolid to prepare the corresponding deposit slip to Pacific Banking Corporation for said
check;
That thereafter, the aforementioned cash voucher, corresponding check and deposit slip were kept in the hotel vault with no other person
other than myself, Juan Bermudo and Ricardo Valladolid having any knowledge of preparation and existence thereof;
That unknown to Ricardo Villadolid, the aforementioned check, cash voucher and deposit slip were cancelled;
That on December 4, 1978, Mr. Manuel Yu Chua, came to Copacabana Apartment-Hotel as minority stockholder of the latter, vehemently
demanding for an accounting of Copacabana books;
That he strongly charged that information reached him that I received a disbursement of P500,000.00 from Copacabana Apartment-Hotel
as representation expenses in my capacity as Executive Vice-President thereof;
That at this juncture, I brought out the cancelled cash voucher, check and deposit slip with mouth agape Manuel Yu Chua, could do nothing
else but admit that in fact, his informer within Copacabana Apartment-Hotel was no other than Mr. Ricardo C. Villadolid;
That I then informed Manuel Yu Chua, that under the circumstances, I could no longer repose any trust whatsoever on Ricardo Valladolid
and requested him to take the latter to Tropicana Apartment-Hotel and just swap him with someone else; Mr. Manuel Yu Chua directed me
to tell Valladolid to see him;
That after few days, Ricardo Valladolid came back and told me that Manuel Yu Chua has no place for him at Tropicana Apartment-Hotel; in
this conversation, Ricardo Valladolid apologized for having betrayed the trust that we had reposed on him, especially after Mrs. Lourdes T.
Yu had told him to stay impartial; that he then having done this for Manuel Yu Chua, the latter could not even accept him in Tropicana
Apartment-Hotel;
xxx xxx xxx 2
The entrapment scheme was corroborated by the affidavits of Sofia Mo. Gianan, External Auditor of J.R.M. & Co., Inc., and Juan V. Bermudo,
Copacabana Apartment-Hotel Manager, which affidavits formed part of JRM's position paper filed before the agency below. 3 The cancelled Cash
Voucher, the uncashed check, and the unused deposit slip, all in the respective amounts of P500,000.00 were also attached to the same position paper
as Exhibits "4", "5" and "6".
On December 29, 1978, or after the entrapment scheme had been effected, Valladolid filed a written request for a five (5) day vacation leave starting
December 30, 1978 with the Manager of Copacabana, stating therein that he would report for work on January 5, 1979. 4 He did not report for work on
January 5 but sent a telegram from Bicol on January 8, 1979 requesting for 15 days sick leave as he was confined for flu at the Dr. Estrellado Clinic. 5
On January 23, 1979, Valladolid's wife allegedly called up JRM informing the company through its accountant, Eddie Escueta, that her husband was
still sick and requested for 30 days sick leave, which was allegedly granted. This was denied by JRM.
Valladolid reported for work on February 16, 1979. The Executive Vice- President, Mr. Daniel Yu, allegedly refused to admit him and instead asked him
to resign. JRM maintains that Valladolid left the office that same day and never returned, because he was reprimanded for his unauthorized absences.
On February 22, 1979, Valladolid filed a Complaint for Illegal Dismissal with vacation and sick leave pay. 6
On February 24, 1979, JRM sent a letter to Valladolid signed by Daniel T. Yu, advising him of his preventive suspension effective February 26, 1979
preparatory to the termination of his services 10 days from receipt of a copy of the application for clearance to dismiss him. The grounds given were:
(1) Willful Breach of Trust for having divulged, in various instances, confidential business matters to competitors of the company; and (2) Gross
Neglect of Duty for having been absent without leave or notice for more than 25 days, to the detriment of the company. 7
On February 28, 1979, JRM filed said application for clearance with the Ministry of Labor. 8 The application for clearance and Valladolid's complaint for
Illegal Dismissal were consolidated and docketed as R4-STF-2-1316-79. The parties submitted their respective position papers and documentary
evidence. On May 2, 1979, the Regional Director issued the following challenged Order:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the application for clearance with preventive suspension is hereby denied. Respondent is hereby
ordered to reinstate complainant to his former position without backwages and without loss of seniority rights. Let the time this case was
pending be considered as complainant's suspension for his absences.
The claim for vacation sick leave pay is dismissed for failure to substantiate the same.
Valladolid appealed the foregoing order to the Minister of Labor seeking modification of the same, praying for the award of backwages from the time
he was illegally dismissed on February 16, 1979 to the date of his actual reinstatement. JRM also appealed the said Order.
On December 26, 1979, the Deputy Minister of Labor, in a succinct Order, dismissed both appeals after finding "no sufficient justification or valid reason
to alter, modify, much less reverse the Order appealed from."
On January 21, 1980, Valladolid filed a Petition for certiorari with this Court, docketed as G.R. No. 52364, praying for a modification of the Order of
December 26, 1979 of the Deputy Minister of Labor so as to grant him backwages. This Court resolved. on February 4, 1980, to give due course to the
petition, and required the parties to submit simultaneous memoranda.
On March 12, 1980, JRM also filed a petition for certiorari with this Court assailing that same Order. This Court gave due course to the petition and
consolidated the same with G.R. No. 52364. Thereafter, the parties filed their respective memoranda.
The non-award of backwages is the only issue being raised by Valladolid claiming that the Orders in question are contrary to law and evidence, and
were issued arbitrarily and capriciously with grave abuse of discretion, amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction.
JRM, on the other hand, assails the said Orders on the following grounds:
I
That respondent Deputy Minister of Labor committed grave abuse of discretion when in his questioned order in effect sustained the finding
of respondent Regional Director that there is no evidence to support the dismissal of private respondent.
II
That respondent Deputy Minister Amado Inciong and Regional Director Francisco Estrella committed grave abuse of discretion when they
arbitrarily failed to consider in their respective orders under review, established jurisprudence.
III
That respondent Regional Director committed grave abuse of discretion when he held that preventive suspension is equivalent to
dismissal.
IV
That the order of respondent Hon. Amado Inciong was a capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment when it failed to state the facts
and conclusion of law upon which it is based.
V
That respondent Regional Director Francisco Estrella acted in excess of his jurisdiction when, without any statutory authority or
transcending beyond his jurisdiction, he absolutely disregarded procedural requirement in the hearing of the present controversy, thus
depriving petitioner of its right to due process.
Valladolid, in his affidavit dated March 29, 1979, denied having committed any breach of trust. 9 In corroboration, he presented the affidavits of Mr.
Manuel Yu dated March 20, 1979 and March 29, 1979, wherein the latter stated that Valladolid was "one of Copacabana's most hard-working and
efficient employees;" that Valladolid's work is "mere routinary collection and clerical in nature which do not involve trust (or) confidential business or
trade secrets which he may 'divulge' to other companies.“
On this issue, the Regional Director ruled that "there is no evidence on record that Valladolid furnished copies of receivables or divulged confidential
business matters to Mr. Manuel Yu and the 'Tropicana People' including the P500,000.00 'entrapment scheme.'"
That finding is not supported by the records. The affidavits attached to petitioner's position paper adequately show that JRM did not act on mere
suspicion but on the contrary, acted prudently when it first transferred Valladolid from switchboard operator where he could eavesdrop on telephone
conversations, to a less crucial position of clerk-collector. But even in the latter capacity, JRM's fears were confirmed as shown by the entrapment
scheme. Manuel Yu's certification as to Valladolid's trustworthiness cannot be given much weight not only because it was disproved by the entrapment
contrived but more so because even Manuel Yu himself refused to employ him at Tropicana when Daniel Yu had suggested that Tropicana absorb
Valladolid because JRM had lost confidence in the latter. And although Manuel Yu, who owns 15% of the equity holding of Copacabana, and being a
member of the Board of Directors of JRM had a right to know the business standing of said establishment, there is basis to believe that he would not
have been able to pinpoint the particular "disbursement" of P500,000.00, if the same had not been leaked out to him.
Loss of confidence is a valid ground for dismissing an employee. Proof beyond reasonable doubt of the employee's misconduct is not required, it being
sufficient that there is some basis for the same or that the employer has reasonable ground to believe that the employee is responsible for the
misconduct and his participation therein renders him unworthy of the trust and confidence demanded of his position. 11 However, as this was
Valladolid's first offense, as found by the Regional Director, dismissal from the service is too harsh a punishment, considering that he had not been
previously admonished, warned or suspended for any misdemeanor. Besides as clerk-collector, he need not be given access to facts relative to the
business of Copacabana, which, if divulged to Tropicana would be to the former's prejudice.
Moreover, we find basis for the finding of the Regional Director that Valladolid was terminated without prior clearance. J.R.M. sent a memorandum to
Valladolid on February 24, 1979 advising him of his preventive suspension effective February 26, 1979 pending approval of the application for
clearance to dismiss him. The clearance application was filed on February 28, 1979. However, even prior to that date, or on February 22, 1979,
Valladolid had already filed a complaint for Illegal Dismissal. This shows that Valladolid was indeed refused admittance on February 16, 1979 when he
reported back to work, so that he was practically dismissed before he was formally notified of his suspension leading to his dismissal, in violation of
the requirement of Section 3, Rule XIV, Book V, Rules & Regulation Implementing the Labor Code. 12 And as provided in Section 2 of the same Rule, any
dismissal without prior clearance shall be "conclusively presumed to be termination of employment without a just cause.“
JRM cannot claim that it was deprived of due process considering that applications for clearance have to be summarily investigated and a decision
required to be rendered within ten (10) days from the filing of the opposition 13 As this Court had occasion to hold there is no violation of due process
where the Regional Director merely required the submission of position papers and resolved the case summarily thereafter.
Nor is the questioned Order of the Deputy Minister of Labor violative of Section 9, Article X of the Constitution, which requires a statement of the facts
and the conclusions of law upon which it is based. That prescription applies to decisions of Courts of record. The Ministry of Labor is an administrative
body with quasi-judicial functions. Section 5, Rule XIII, Book V, Ibid, states that proceedings in the NLRC shall be non-litigious and summary in nature
without regard to legal technicalities obtaining in courts of law. As the Deputy Minister was in full accord with the findings of fact and the conclusions
of law drawn from those facts by the Regional Director, there was no necessity of discussing anew the issues raised therein.
JRM admits that Valladolid requested for leave for 5 days from December 30, 1978, and thereafter for 15 days, but denies that he notified the company
of his absences subsequent to this. The Regional Director ruled that the absences of Valladolid were unauthorized but did not amount to gross neglect
of duty or abandonment of work which requires deliberate refusal to resume employment or a clear showing in terms of specific circumstances that
the worker does not intend to report for work. We agree. But as Valladolid had been AWOL, no error was committed by respondent Regional Director in
ordering his reinstatement without backwages.
WHEREFORE, both Petitions for certiorari are hereby denied. No costs.

SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 78648 January 24, 1989
RAFAEL N. NUNAL, petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON AUDIT AND MUNICIPALITY OF ISABELA, BASILAN, respondents.
Romulo D. Plagata for petitioner.
RESOLUTION

MELENCIO-HERRERA, J.:
For resolution is petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration of the Minute Resolution of this Court of 11 May 1988 dismissing the Petition for certiorari "for
failure of the petitioner to sufficiently show that the public respondent had committed grave abuse of discretion in holding, among others, that the
compromise agreement of the parties is not enforceable against the Municipality of Isabela, the latter not having been impleaded as an indispensable
party in the case.
In the present Motion, petitioner contends:
1. The decision does not clearly and distinctly express the facts and the law on which it is based;
2. The Municipality of Isabela, Basilan, is bound by the compromise agreement; and
3. Public respondent "Commission on Audit (COA, for short) gravely abused its discretion in denying the lawful claim for separation pay by your
petitioner." (Motion for Reconsideration, p. 1; Rollo, p. 67)
The facts disclose that on 24 February 1986 petitioner was appointed as Municipal Administrator of Isabela, Basilan. On 1 February 1980 he was
administratively charged and dismissed from the service for dishonesty, misconduct and for lack of confidence. On appeal, the Merit Systems Board
exonerated petitioner and reinstated him to his position as Municipal Administrator on 8 May 1980.
On 29 January 1981 petitioner was again dismissed for lack of confidence by then Municipal Mayor Alvin Dans under Administrative Order No. 54,
Series of 1981. Upon denial of his Motion for Reconsideration, petitioner filed Case No. 43, a suit for mandamus and Damages with Preliminary
Injunction against the Municipal Mayor, the Municipal Treasurer, and the Sangguniang Bayan of Isabela, Basilan, before the then Court of First Instance
in Basilan Province, Branch 1, praying for reinstatement "with full backwages and other rights inherent in the position." He also filed Case No. 45 with
the same Court seeking that he and his wife be paid their back salaries from 1 February 1980 to 31 May 1980 pursuant to the Decision of the Merit
Systems Board on 16 February 1981.
On 20 February 1984, during the pendency of the said case, the Sangguniang Bayan of Isabela, Basilan, abolished the subject position in its Resolution
No. 902, Series of 1984, and Ordinance No. 336, pursuant to the provisions of the Local Government Code.
On 5 December 1984, petitioner and his wife, on the one hand, and on the other, Mayor Dans in his capacity both as Municipal Mayor and as Presiding
Officer of the Sangguniang Bayan of Isabela, Basilan, the Municipal Treasurer and the Provincial Fiscal (p. 4, Reply To Comment of COA), entered into a
Compromise Agreement stipulating, among others, that:
l. The respondents shall pay petitioner Rafael Nunal all back salaries and other emoluments due him by reason of his employment as
Municipal Administrator of Isabela, Basilan, covering the period from January 1, 1980 to August 15, 1984, together with accumulated
vacation/sick leaves, mid-year and Christmas bonuses in 1982 and 1983, and separation pay under the Local Government Code, which are
reflected in the computation hereto attached and made an integral part hereof... (p. 13, Rollo)
Under the same Compromise Agreement, petitioner was also considered as "retired" upon receipt of the monetary considerations mentioned therein.
On 12 December 1984, the Court approved the Compromise Agreement.
On 1 April 1985, petitioner collected his retirement benefits although, concededly, no provision for the same had been included in the Compromise
Agreement (Petition, p. 6; Rollo, P. 9).
On 17 September 1985, petitioner filed his claim for separation pay in the amount of P54,092.50 to which he is allegedly entitled due to the abolition of
the position of Municipal Administrator, which separation pay is provided for by the Local Government Code (B.P. 337, Section 76).
On 6 January 1986 the Municipal treasurer forwarded petitioner's claim to the Provincial Auditor of Basilan. On 11 January, 1986, in a First
Indorsement, the Provincial Auditor opined that the claim was legal and proper but payment thereof was made subject to availability of funds and the
ruling of the Regional Office of the Commission on Audit, Region IX, Zamboanga City.
On 12 February 1986, in a 2nd Indorsement, the Regional Director of the Commission on Audit, Region IX, Zamboanga City, reversed the Provincial
Auditor of Basilan and denied petitioner's claim for separation pay. Petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration was forwarded to the Commission on Audit
(COA), Central Office, Quezon City.
On 13 October 1986 the COA Central Office, in its Decision No. 388, not only denied petitioner's claim for separation pay but also disallowed the other
payments made to petitioner. It held:.
Premises considered, and it appearing that Mr. Nunal has been paid back salaries and other emoluments in the total amount of P90,362.96
pursuant to the Compromise Agreement, supra, this Commission hereby directs that any and all payments made to Mr. Nunal corresponding to the
period when he was no longer in the government service should be disallowed in audit without prejudice to his right of recourse against the officials
personally liable for his unlawful dismissal. (pp. 15-16, Rollo)
Thus, this recourse by petitioner alleging grave abuse of discretion by COA, which Petition we had previously dismissed in our Resolution of 11 May
1988 as heretofore adverted to.
It appearing, however, that the Compromise agreement was duly signed by Mayor Alvin Dans as Mayor and as Presiding Officer of the Sangguniang
Bayan, by the Municipal Treasurer, and by the Provincial Fiscal as their lawyer (Motion for Reconsideration, p. 3); that the case was one for
reinstatement and backwages; and following the ruling of this Court in Gementiza vs. Court of Appeals (G.R. Nos. L-41717-33, 113 SCRA 477, April 12,
1982), the Municipality of Isabela should be deemed as impleaded in this case, it being apparent that the officials concerned had been sued in their
official capacity.
It should be noted that before the Court below, respondents sued petitioner Mayor alone. However, respondents, too, prayed for a Writ of
mandamus to compel petitioner Mayor to reinstate them with back salaries and damages. Respondents, therefore, actually intended to sue
petitioner in his official capacity. Failure to implead the Municipality and other municipal authorities should not deter this Court, in the
interests of justice and equity, from including them herein as respondents. (at p. 488)
The Compromise Agreement, therefore, must be held binding on the Municipality of Isabela, which was not, in any way, deprived of its day in Court
(Gabutas vs. Castellanes, L- 17323, 14 SCRA 376, June 23, 1965). Thus, the payments to petitioner of the sums of P68,389.25 as back salaries,
P21,387.71 as total accumulated vacation/sick leaves, P772.75 as Christmas bonus, and the back salaries of Mrs. Nanie B. Nunal in the sum of
P3,096.00, have to be upheld. It likewise appears that retirement benefits bad also been collected by petitioner on 1 April 1985.
In respect, however, of the separation pay claimed by petitioner, we uphold the ruling of the COA reading in part:
Anent the second issue, this Commission believes and so holds that the instant claim for separation pay in addition to the retirement
benefits earlier received by claimant is bereft of any legal basis. Culled from the records is the fact that Mr. Nunal was dismissed from the
service on January 29, 1981 and has not been reinstated to the service until his position of Municipal Administrator of Isabela was
abolished. In other words, he was no longer in, or had already been separated from, the service when the said position was abolished.
Evidently then, his separation from the service was not attributable to the abolition of the position but was due to his dismissal and,
therefore, Section 76 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 337 which provides —
'Section 76.-Abolition of Position. When the position of an official or employee under the civil service is abolished by law or ordinance, the
official or employee so affected shall be reinstated in another vacant position without diminution of salary. Should such position not be
available, the official or employee affected shall be granted a separation pay equivalent to one month salary for every year of service over
and above the monetary privileges granted to officials and employees under existing law.’
cannot be validly invoked as legal basis for the claim for separation pay. Moreover, the fact remains that as earlier seen Mr. Nunal has
already been paid his retirement benefits under the existing retirement law. His entitlement, therefore, to separation pay under Batas
Pambansa Blg. 337 is offensive to the general policy of the government prohibiting payment of double retirement benefits to an employee.
(p. 4, COA Decision No. 388; p. 15, Rollo)
To grant double gratuity is unwarranted (See Cajiuat, et al. vs. Mathay, Sr., G.R. No. L-39743, 124 SCRA 710, September 24, 1983).
It may be that the matter of separation pay was included in the Compromise Agreement. Nonetheless, it could not be granted outright but still had to
be claimed and passed in audit, and has been aptly denied by COA. And although petitioner did file suit against the Municipality for reinstatement, it
does not follow that he was not effectively dismissed such that he could still be considered an incumbent whose position had been abolished. A
dismissed employee can be considered as not having left his office only upon reinstatement and should be given a comparable position and
compensation at the time of reinstatement (Cristobal vs. Melchor, No. L-43203, 101 SCRA 857, December 29, 1980).
Finally, a word on petitioner's contention that the Resolution of this Court under date of 11 May 1988 is not in accordance with Section 14, Article VIII
of the 1987 Constitution, which provides:
Sec. 14. No decision shall be rendered by any Court without expressing therein clearly and distinctly the facts and the law on which it is
based.
No petition for review or motion for reconsideration of a decision of the Court shall be refused due course or denied without stating the
legal basis therefor.
In the first place, our "Resolution" of 11 May 1988 was not a "Decision" within the meaning of the Constitutional requirement. This mandate is
applicable only in cases "submitted for decision," i.e., given due course and after the filing of Briefs or Memoranda and/or other pleadings, as the case
may be. It is not applicable to an Order or Resolution refusing due course to a Petition for Certiorari. In the second place, the assailed Resolution does
state the legal basis for the dismissal of the Petition and thus complies with the Constitutional provision. (Tayamura, et al., vs. IAC, et al., G.R. No.
76355, May 21, 1987 [en banc]; see also Que vs. People, G.R. Nos. L-75217-18, 154 SCRA 160, September 21, 1987).
It may be added that the Writ of certiorari dealt with in Rule 65 of the Rules of Court is a prerogative Writ, never demandable as a matter of right, "never
issued except in the exercise of judicial discretion." (Bouvier's Law Dictionary, 3d Rev. [8th ed.]; Francisco, The Revised Rules, 1972 ed., Vol. IV- B, pp.
4546, citing 14 C.J.S., 121-122).
ACCORDINGLY, the Resolution of this Court of 11 May 1988 is hereby PARTIALLY RECONSIDERED in that the disallowance by respondent Commission
on Audit of the amounts ordered paid by the Court of First Instance of Basilan, Branch 1, in its Decision dated 12 December 1984, is hereby SET ASIDE,
but its disallowance of petitioner's claim for separation pay of P54,092.50, is hereby SUSTAINED. No costs.
SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION

G.R. Nos. 110817-22 June 13, 1997
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
MARCELINO A. BUGARIN, accused-appellant.

MENDOZA, J.:
This is an appeal from the decision, dated February 11, 1993, which the Regional Trial Court, Branch 97 of Quezon City rendered in Criminal Cases
1
Nos. Q-92-28785 to 86 and Q-92-31157 to 31160, finding accused-appellant Marcelino Bugarin guilty of four counts of consummated rape and one
count of attempted rape and sentencing him as follows:
WHEREFORE, this Court finds the accused GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt as charged of multiple (3 Counts) rape and one count of attempted
rape, and in accordance with Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code sentences him to prison terms as follows:
1) For each of the four counts of the above rape, reclusion perpetua.
2) For the attempted rape, two (2) years and four (4) months in the minimum penalty to four (4) years in the maximum period and to
indemnify the private complainant in the amount of P50,000.00 as moral damages and exemplary damages of P50,000.00 to deter sexual
crimes of the sort committed by accused.
SO ORDERED.
The complainant, Maryjane Bugarin, is the daughter of accused- appellant. On February 22, 1992, accompanied by her mother, Regina Bugarin, and her
maternal aunt, Nena Padecio, she complained to the Central Police District Command that she had been repeatedly raped by accused-appellant. In her
sworn statement she related how, on nine different occasions between November 1989 and January 17, 1992, her father entered the common sleeping
area of their house in Payatas, Quezon City and, after holding her knees and spreading her legs, succeeded in inserting his penis into her vagina and
kissed her breasts. She claimed that, on January 17, 1992, her father molested her by "kissing her vagina" and that only by repeatedly kicking him did
he desist from molesting her any further.
Complainant was examined on the same date by Emmanuel I. Aranas, PNP Medico-Legal Officer, who found that she was "in non-virgin state
physically." 2 On February 25, 1992, she returned to the police station to file formal charges against her father. The case was referred to the Office of the
Quezon City Prosecutor which found probable cause and accordingly filed charges for consummated rape and attempted rape by means of force and
intimidation committed on December 23, 1991 and January 17, 1992 against accused-appellant Marcelino Bugarin. No bail was recommended
"considering that the evidence of guilt of the respondent is strong." The cases were docketed as Criminal Cases Nos. Q-92-28785 and Q-92-28786 and
raffled to Branch 88 of the Quezon City Regional Trial Court.
On May 7, 1992, four more charges for rape by means of force and intimidation committed on November 1989, May 1990, June 1990 and March 14,
1991 were filed against accused-appellant. Docketed as Criminal Cases Nos. Q-92-31157 to 31160, the additional cases were raffled to Branch 97 of
the same court. These cases were eventually consolidated and assigned to Branch 88.
The informations in the six cases alleged as follows:

Crim Case No. 92-31157
That on or about the month of June 1990 In Quezon City, Philippines, the said accused by means of force and intimidation, did then and
there, wilfully and feloniously have carnal knowledge of the undersigned MARY JANE BUGARIN y ASUNCION, a minor, 15 years of age,
without her consent and against her will, to the damage and prejudice of the latter.
The crime was attended by the aggravating circumstance of relationship.
Crim. Case No. 92-31158
That on or about the month of November, 1989 in Quezon City, Philippines, the said accused, by means of force and intimidation, did then and
there, wilfully and feloniously have carnal knowledge with the undersigned MARY JANE BUGARIN y ASUNCION without her consent and against
her will, to the damage and prejudice of the latter.
That on or about the 14th day of March, 1991 in Quezon City, Philippines, the said accused, by means of force and intimidation, did then and
there, wilfully and feloniously have carnal knowledge of the undersigned MARYJANE BUGARIN y ASUNCION, a minor, 15 years of age, without
her consent and against her will, to the damage and prejudice of the latter.
That on or about the month of May 1990 in Quezon City, Philippines, the said accused by means of force and intimidation, did then and there
wilfully and feloniously have carnal knowledge of the undersigned MARYJANE BUGARIN y ASUNCION, a minor, 15 years of age, without her
consent and against her will, to the damage and prejudice of the latter.
That on or about the 17th day of January, 1992, in Quezon City, Metro Manila, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
above-named accused, with lewd designs and by means of force and intimidation, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously commence
the commission of the crime of Rape directly by overt acts, by then and there kissing the nipples and the vagina of the undersigned MARYJANE
BUGARIN Y ASUNCION, a minor, and about to lay on top of her, all against her will, however, the said accused did not perform all the acts of
execution which would have produced the crime of Rape by reason of some causes other than his own spontaneous desistance, that is,
undersigned complainant push him away, to the damage and prejudice of the undersigned in such amount as may be awarded to her under the
provisions of the New Civil Code.
That on or about the 23rd day of December, 1991, in Quezon City, Metro Manila, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused, with lewd designs and by means of force and intimidation, did then and there wilfully,
unlawfully and feloniously have sexual intercourse with the undersigned MARYJANE BUGARIN Y ASUNCION, a minor, without her
consent and against her will, to her damage and prejudice in such amount as may be awarded to her under the provisions of the
New Civil Code.
Upon arraignment, accused-appellant pleaded not guilty in each case, after which trial ensued. Under questioning by the prosecutor, Maryjane
Bugarin narrated how her father sexually assaulted her in their family's common sleeping area while no one was at home and threatened her
if she told anyone about what happened.
Accused-appellant denied the charges against him. He claimed to be God fearing and morally upright and that his wife, Regina Bugarin, must
have induced their daughter to file the complaints against him because his wife blamed him for financially neglecting their family since 1989.
In rebuttal, the prosecution presented Regina Bugarin who testified that a good mother would not expose her child to humiliation just to get
back at her husband. She further claimed that her daughter, who had been raised properly and taught to be honest, could not have fabricated
the charges against the accused-appellant.
In a two-page decision, promulgated on February 11, 1993, the trial court, after giving a summary of the testimonies of the complainant and
accused-appellant, laconically ruled:
The issue is simple. Is the private complainant credible in her story of how she was raped? The answer of this Court is an
undoubtful and a definite yes.
Accused-appellant questions the trial court's decision on the ground that: (1) the testimony of Maryjane Bugarin is not credible; (2) the
elements of force and intimidation had not been proved; and (3) the decision of the trial court does not state the facts and law upon which it
was based.
On the other hand, the Solicitor General, representing the prosecution, contends that complainant, who was only 15 years old when she
reported the crime, was not likely to concoct charges against her father and that the moral ascendancy of the father over her took the place of
force and intimidation in rape.
We take up first accused-appellant's charge that the decision of the trial court does not state the grounds therefor. Indeed, the Constitution provides
in part in Art. VIII, §14 that "No decision shall be rendered by any court without expressing therein clearly and distinctly the facts and the law on
which it is based." This requirement is reiterated and implemented by the 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure which provides in Rule 120, §2:
Sec. 2. Form and contents of judgment. — The judgment must be written in the official language, personally and directly prepared by the
judge and signed by him and shall contain clearly and distinctly a statement of the facts proved or admitted by the accused and the law
upon which the judgment is based.
If it is of conviction, the judgment shall state (a) the legal qualification of the offense constituted by the acts committed by the accused,
and the aggravating or mitigating circumstances attending the commission thereof, if there are any; (b) the participation of the accused
in the commission of the offense, whether as principal, accomplice, or accessory after the fact; (c) the penalty imposed upon the
accused; and (d) the civil liability or damages caused by the wrongful act to be recovered from the accused by the offended party, if there
is any, unless the enforcement of the civil liability by a separate action has been reserved or waived.
In case of acquittal, unless there is a clear showing that the act from which the civil liability might arise did not exist, the judgment shall
make a finding on the civil liability of the accused in favor of the offended party.
The decision of the trial court falls short of this requirement in at least three respects. First, it does not contain an evaluation of the evidence of the
parties and a discussion of the legal questions involved. It does not explain why the trial court considered the complainant's testimony credible
despite the fact that, as accused-appellant points out, complainant could not remember the time of the day when she was allegedly raped. It does
not explain why accused-appellant's licking of complainant's genital constituted attempted rape and not another crime. Second, the complainant
testified that she had been raped five times, to wit, in November 1989, on December 24, 1989, in June 1990, on March 14, 1991, and on December 23,
1991, and that once, on January 17, 1992, she was molested by her father who licked her private part, for which reason six informations were filed
against him, but the decision found the accused-appellant guilty of only four counts of rape (which the trial court erroneously said three counts) and
one count of attempted rape, without explaining whether accused-appellant was being acquitted of one charge of rape. Third, the decision is so
carelessly prepared that it finds the accused-appellant guilty of three counts of consummated rape but sentences him to suffer the penalty
of reclusion perpetua "for each of the four counts of . . . rape."
Maryjane claimed she had been raped on December 24, 1989, but the information in Criminal Case No. Q-92-31160 is far rape allegedly committed in
May 1990. It must be for this reason that the trial court convicted accused-appellant of only four counts of rape, instead of five. But the trial court
should have explained so, if this was really the reason, and expressly acquitted the accused-appellant of the charge under this information.
The requirement that the decisions of courts must be in writing and that they must set forth clearly and distinctly the facts and the law on which they
are based serves many functions. It is intended, among other things, to inform the parties of the reason or reasons for the decision so that if any of
them appeals, he can point out to the appellate court the findings of facts or the rulings on points of law with which he disagrees. More than that, the
requirement is an assurance to the parties that, in reaching judgment, the judge did so through the processes of legal reasoning. It is, thus, a
safeguard against the impetuosity of the judge, preventing him from deciding by ipse dexit. Vouchsafed neither the sword nor the purse by the
Constitution but nonetheless vested with the sovereign prerogative of passing judgment on the life, liberty or property of his fellowmen, the judge
must ultimately depend on the power of reason for sustained public confidence in the justness of his decision. The decision of the trial court in this
case disrespects the judicial function.
We would normally remand this case to the trial court for compliance with the constitutional requirement for decisions. But this case has been
pending for sometime and further delay can be avoided if the Court simply reviews the whole evidence. After all, the records of the trial court contain
the transcript of stenographic notes, the complainant's sworn statement dated February 22, 1992, the resolution of the prosecutor, and the statement
of the arresting officer, on the basis of which the Court may properly decide the case. 3 For this reason the Court has decided to review this case
despite the failure of the trial court to make detailed findings of facts and a statement of the reasons underlying its decision.
Now it is settled that when the complainant in a rape case, more so if she is a minor, 4 testifies that she has been raped, she says, in effect, all that is
necessary to prove the commission of the crime. 5 Care must be taken, however, that her testimony is credible for a conviction to be justified based
on her testimony alone. 6 In this case, Maryjane Bugarin testified on November 25, 1992 7 as follows:
Q — On November 1989, was your father residing with you or was he living with you?
A — Yes, sir.
Q — Now, on November, 1989 do you remember any unusual incident that happened, if any?
A — Yes, sir, when he entered the room.
Q — When you say "he," are you referring to Marcelino Bugarin?
A — Yes, sir.
Q — If Marcelino Bugarin is present today, would you be able to identify him?
A — Yes, sir. (witness is pointing to a man wearing a green t-shirt who answers by the name Marcelino Bugarin when asked by
the Court).
Q — On November 1989, you were mentioning that "he", referring to the accused, entered your room, what happened?
A — (witness crying) When he entered the room, he embraced me and touched the different parts of my body and he informed
me that when I grow up, I would not become innocent.
Q — What do you mean by those words that he told you that when you grow up you would not be innocent?
A — So that when I grow up I will know what he will be doing.
Q — What did he do?
A — He touched my knees and spread them out and then holding my breast and he put his sex organ inside me.
Q — When you say inside me, what do you mean?
A — His sex organ entered my what, I am fertile.
Q — What do you mean by what?
A — My sex organ, sir.
Q — What did you do when your father tried to put his sex organ to your sex organ?
A — I was trying to push his body away from me, and I said to him, father, I don't like it, ayoko po.
Q — Despite your pleas, what happened next?
A — He still continued what he is doing, and when I fainted, he suddenly moved back.
Q — After he moved back, what transpired afterwards?
A — He went out and I was left crying.
Q — After this first incident, were there any other similar incident which happened, if any?
A — There are, sir, but I can't recall when.
Q — How many times more or less?
A — Around four (4) times.
Q — After November 1989?
A — Including November 1989.
Q — How about on December 24, 1989, do you remember where you were?
A — Yes, sir. I was in our house.
Q — Do you remember any unusual or extraordinary incident that happened on December 24, 1989?
A — Yes, sir. It is the same thing that he did to me.
Q — Please explain what the same thing he do to you?
A — He embraced and kissed me on my cheek, my neck and also my breast.
Q — What happened next?
A — He was spreading my legs.
Q — Then, after spreading your legs, what did the accused do?
A — He let his sex organ touched my sex organ.
Q — After that, what happened next?
A — I cried again.
Q — When you cried again, what did your father do, if any?
A — His face became scaring.
Q — Now, after December 24, 1989 incident, do you remember where you were sometime in June 1990?
A — I was in our house.
Q — Specifically, in June of 1990, do you remember any unusual incident that happened?
A — The same thing happened, over and over.
Q — What do you mean by the same thing happened, over and over?
A — He would embraced me and then kissed me and touched my breast and kissed my nipples.
Q — And, besides in embracing, kissing and kissing your nipples, what else did your father do on June 1990?
A — He kissed also my sex organ.
Q — Beside kissing your sex organ, what else did he do, if any?
A — He placed inside my sex organ his sex organ.
Q — In March 14, 1991, where were you?
A — I was also in our house.
Q — Do you remember what happened, if any, On March 14, 1991?
A — That's it again, I was in the room and again he embraced me made me lie down then kiss my sex organ and then, he
placed again his sex organ inside my sex organ.
Q — How about December 23, 1991, do you remember where you were?
A — I was also in the house.
Q — What happened?
A — I was lying down and he lied there beside me and told me to accede to his desire.
Q — What do you mean to accede to his desire?
A — He wanted to use me again.
Q — Then, he actually used you?
A — Yes, sir.
Q — Now, on January 17, 1992, do you remember where you were?
Q — Would you kindly tell what happened in your house on this day?
A — He licked my sex organ.
Q — After that, what did he do next?
A — He was threatening me.
Q — What did you do when he threatened you?
A — I was so afraid. (witness is crying)
Q — What did the accused to after threatening you?
A — He was doing nothing. He was just walking beside me.
Q — What happened after you saw him walking just beside you on that date?
A — None, sir. I was just crying.
The accused-appellant claims that Maryjane's testimony contains inconsistencies which indicate that the charges against him were fabricated. He
points to the failure of complainant on cross-examination to state in some instances the exact date and time she was allegedly raped, and to the fact
that it took complainant two years before reporting the incidents and that the prosecution did not present the medico-legal officer who examined the
complainant. Accused-appellant also claims that no evidence was adduced to prove that the rape was committed by force and intimidation.
The failure of the complainant to state in some cases the exact date and time of the commission of rape is a minor matter and can be expected
when a witness is recounting the details of a humiliating experience which are painful and difficult to recall in open court and in the presence of other
people. Indeed, this Court has ruled that complainant's failure to recall some details of the crime, instead of suggesting prevarication, precisely
indicates spontaneity and is to be expected from a witness who is of tender age and unaccustomed to court proceedings.
Besides, the date of the commission of the rape is not an essential element of the crime. The precise time of the crime has no substantial bearing on
its commission, especially since in this case the date and time of the commission of the crime is not material to the accused-appellant's defense.
Indeed, accused-appellant's contention is only that he could not have raped his daughter in the common bedroom at nighttime because the place
where they sleep is shut off from the rest of their house by a curtain.
Suffice it to state that lust is no respecter of time and place. 11 Our cases record instances of rape committed inside family dwellings when other
occupants are asleep. 12 In the case at bar, Maryjane testified that the accused-appellant was able to rape her by sending out her siblings to play with
their neighbors' children, and while her mother was at work from 3 p.m. to 11 p.m. Complainant explained her apparent inability to recall the exact
dates of the assaults upon her, thus:
Q — Madam witness, you mentioned that you were raped sometime November 1989, June 1990, December 24, 1989, March
14, 1991, December 23, 1991, how come that you knew very well the date as December 24, March 14, December 23; or rather,
how come that your complaint is only sometime in the early part of 1991?
A — I remember because that was closed to the birthday of my brother.
Q — How about March 14, how come you knew very well that you were molested by your father?
A — Because at that time, our class will almost end and we were given clearances.
Q — What day is your last school day?
A — I cannot remember, sir.
Q — Is it usual that you knew very well March 14, and you do not know very well your last day of your school day?
A — Because March 14 is our clearance.
Neither does the delay in making a criminal accusation impair the credibility of a witness if such delay is satisfactorily explained. 13 In People
v. Coloma, 14 where the complainant was also only 13 years old when first molested by her father, the Court adverted to the father's moral and
physical control over the young complainant in explaining the delay of eight years before the complaint against her father was made. In this case,
Maryjane must have been overwhelmed by fear and confusion, and shocked that her own father had defiled her. After all, she had been very close to
him. She also testified that she was afraid to tell her mother because the latter might be angered, so that she finally confided to her aunt. Indeed, a
survey conducted by the University of the Philippines Center for Women's Studies showed that victims of rape committed by their fathers took much
longer in reporting the incidents to the authorities than did other victims. Many factors account for this difference: the fact that the father lives with
the victim and constantly exerts moral authority over her, the threat he might make against her, the victim's fear of her mother and other relatives.
Nor is it entirely true that no evidence of force and intimidation had been adduced during the trial. Maryjane testified that she tried to resist her
father's advances but, on several occasions, she was overpowered by him. She was embraced and thus prevented from escaping. 15 At other times
she was intimidated by menacing looks cast on her 16 and by threats of harm. 17 Indeed, even if there was no violence or force employed against her,
the moral influence of accused-appellant over the complainant sufficed to make the crime rape. 18
Nor is a medical examination an indispensable element in prosecutions for rape. 19 That the prosecution did not present the medico-legal officer is,
therefore, not an obstacle to a finding of guilt in this case.
We think the evidence in this case proves beyond all reasonable doubt that Maryjane had been raped on four occasions by accused-appellant:
November 1989, June 1990, March 14, 1991, and December 23, 1991. Complainant has no motive to incriminate her father. To the contrary, she
testified that she was close to him. The absence of a motive lends greater credence to her testimony. 20 Neither does her mother have any reason to
falsely accuse Marcelino Bugarin. Regina Bugarin suspected her husband of having an affair with her sister in 1980 and confronted him, but she
continued to live with him. This fact makes it unlikely that she would use her daughter to destroy her husband more than ten years later. A mother
would not expose her child to public trial, if the charges she makes are not true. 21
We find no evidence, however, to find accused-appellant guilty of the charge in Criminal Case No. Q-92-31160 for alleged rape committed in May
1990. There is no evidence to prove that accused-appellant raped complainant on that date. Her testimony is to the effect that she was raped on
another date, December 24, 1989. But accused-appellant cannot be convicted for this as no complaint was formally filed regarding it. Accused-
appellant must accordingly be acquitted of the charge in Criminal Case No. Q-92-31160.
Nor do we think that accused-appellant is guilty of attempted rape committed on January 17, 1992 as the trial court held. Maryjane testified:
Q — Now, on January 17, 1992, do you remember where you were?
Q — Would you kindly tell what happened in your house on this day?
A — He licked my sex organ.
Q — After that, what did he do next?
A — He was threatening me.
Q — What did you do when he threatened you?
A — I was so afraid. (witness is crying)
Q — What did the accused to after threatening you?
A — He was doing nothing. He was just walking beside me.
Q — What happened after you saw him walking just beside you on that date?
A — None, sir. I was just crying.
The intent to commit rape is not apparent from the act described. It cannot be inferred from this act (licking complainant's genital) alone that his
intention was to have sexual intercourse with her because it has not been shown that he had at least placed himself on top of the complainant. 22 The
act imputed to him cannot be considered a preparatory act to sexual intercourse. 23 Accused-appellant is instead guilty of acts of lasciviousness. It
can at least be inferred from his act of kissing the genital of the complainant that he was moved by lewd designs. 24
Although relationship, as an aggravating circumstance, is alleged only in Criminal Cases Nos. Q-92-31157 to 31160, this circumstance was
nonetheless proved during the trial in Criminal Case No. Q-92-28785 and, therefore, should also be appreciated in that case to justify the imposition
of the penalty in its maximum period.
WHEREFORE, the decision dated February 11, 1993 of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City is SET ASIDE and another one is RENDERED finding
accused-appellant Marcelino Bugarin GUILTY of four counts of consummated rape in Criminal Cases Nos. Q-92-28786, Q-92-31157, Q-92-31158, and
Q-92-31159 and SENTENCED to reclusion perpetua and ORDERED to INDEMNIFY the complainant Maryjane Bugarin in the amount of P30,000.00 in
damages for each count of rape committed; and of acts of lasciviousness in Criminal Case No. Q-92-28785, for which he is SENTENCED to suffer
imprisonment from 6 months of arresto mayor, as minimum, to six 6 years of prision correccional, as maximum.
In Criminal Case No. Q-92-31160, accused-appellant is hereby ACQUITTED.
Hernandez v. Court of Appeals, 320 SCRA 76, Dec.08, 1999
FACTS: Lucita and Marcio met in Philippine Christian University in Dasmarinas when lucita was Marcio’s teacher for two consecutive semesters.
Lucita was 5 years older than Marcio. They later on became sweethearts and eventually got married. They also had a child. Lucita supported the
family as her husband continued studying, supported by his parents. The first few years of their marriage went okay. But this eventually changed.
Marcio had an extra-marital relation with another student who was also married. When Lucita discovered this, he asked Lucio to end it. He promised
to but did not fulfill it and left their conjugal home and child. After some time, he returned to Lucita and she accepted him. However, his attitude
worsened when he got employed to Reynold Philippines, Inc. He engaged in extreme promiscuous conduct during the latter part of 1986. As a
result, private respondent contracted gonorrhea and infected petitioner. Petitioner averred that on one occasion of a heated argument, private
respondent hit their eldest child who was then barely a year old. Private respondent is not close to any of their children as he was never affectionate
and hardly spent time with them. On July 10, 1992, petitioner filed before the RTC a petition seeking the annulment of her marriage to private
respondent on the ground of psychological incapacity. RTC and CA denied the petition. Hence, this case.
ISSUE: W/N Marcio is psychologically incapacitated to fulfill his marital obligations
HELD: The psychological incapacity of a spouse, as a ground for declaration of nullity of marriage, must exist at the time of the celebration of
marriage. More so, chronic sexual infidelity, abandonment, gambling and use of prohibited drugs are not grounds per se, of psychological incapacity
of a spouse. Certainly, petitioner-appellant’s declaration that at the time of their marriage her respondent-husband’s character was on the “borderline
between a responsible person and the happy-go-lucky,” could not constitute the psychological incapacity in contemplation of Article 36 of the Family
Code.
SUPREME COURT
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 132428 October 24, 2000
GEORGE YAO, petitioner,
vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS, and THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.
DAVIDE, JR., J.:
In this petition for review on certiorari, George Yao (hereafter YAO) assails the 25 April 1995 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. No. 16893
which dismissed his appeal and ordered the remand of the records of the case to the Metropolitan Trial Court, Branch 52, Caloocan * City (hereafter
MeTC) for execution. YAO was convicted by said MeTC for unfair competition.
YAO's legal dilemma commenced in June 1990 when the Philippine Electrical Manufacturing Company (hereafter PEMCO) noticed the proliferation
locally of General Electric (GE) lamp starters. As the only local subsidiary of GE-USA, PEMCO knew that it was a highly unlikely market situation
considering that no GE starter was locally manufactured or imported since 1983. PEMCO commissioned Gardsmarks, Inc. to conduct a market
survey. Gardsmarks, Inc., thru its trademark specialist, Martin Remandaman, discovered that thirty (30) commercial establishments sold GE starters.
All these establishments pointed to Tradeway Commercial Corporation (hereafter TCC) as their source. Remandaman was able to purchase from
TCC fifty (50) pieces of fluorescent lamp starters with the GE logo and design. Assessing that these products were counterfeit, PEMCO applied for
the issuance of a search warrant. This was issued by the MeTC, Branch 49, Caloocan City. Eight boxes, each containing 15,630 starters, were
thereafter seized from the TCC warehouse in Caloocan City.
Indicted before the MeTC, Branch 52, Caloocan City for unfair competition under Article 189 of the Revised Penal Code were YAO, who was TCC's
President and General Manager, and Alfredo Roxas, a member of TCC's Board of Directors. The indictment1 charged YAO and Roxas of having
mutually and in conspiracy sold fluorescent lamp starters which have the General Electric (GE) logo, design and containers, making them appear as
genuine GE fluorescent lamp starters; and inducing the public to believe them as such, when they were in fact counterfeit. The case was docketed as
Criminal Case No. C-155713.
Both accused pleaded not guilty. At the trial, the prosecution presented evidence tending to establish the foregoing narration of facts. Further, the
State presented witnesses Atty. Hofilena of the Castillo Laman Tan and Pantaleon Law Offices who underwent a familiarization seminar from
PEMCO in 1990 on how to distinguish a genuine GE starter from a counterfeit, and Allan de la Cruz, PEMCO's marketing manager. Both described a
genuine GE starter as having "a stenciled silk-screen printing which includes the GE logo . . . back to back around the starter, a drumlike glowbulb and
a condenser/capacitor shaped like an M&M candy with the numbers .006." They then compared and examined random samples of the seized
starters with the genuine GE products. They concluded that the seized starters did not possess the full design complement of a GE original. They
also observed that some of the seized starters did not have capacitors or if they possessed capacitors, these were not shaped like M&M. Still others
merely had sticker jackets with prints of the GE logo. Mr. de la Cruz added that only Hankuk Stars of Korea manufactured GE starters and if these
were imported by PEMCO, they would cost P7.00 each locally. As TCC's starters cost P1.60 each, the witnesses agreed that the glaring differences in
the packaging, design and costs indisputably proved that TCC's GE starters were counterfeit.
The defense presented YAO as its lone witness. YAO admitted that as general manager, he has overall supervision of the daily operation of the
company. As such, he has the final word on the particular brands of products that TCC would purchase and in turn sold. He also admitted that TCC is
not an accredited distributor of GE starters. However, he disclaimed liability for the crime charged since (1) he had no knowledge or information that
the GE starters supplied to TCC were fake; (2) he had not attended any seminar that helped him determine which TCC products were counterfeit; (3)
he had no participation in the manufacture, branding, stenciling of the GE names or logo in the starters; (4) TCC's suppliers of the starters delivered
the same already branded and boxed; and (5) he only discussed with the suppliers matters regarding pricing and peak-volume items.
In its 13-page 20 October 1993 decision,2 the MeTC acquitted Roxas but convicted YAO. In acquitting Roxas, the trial court declared that the
prosecution failed to prove that he was still one of the Board of Directors at the time the goods were seized. It anchored its conviction of YAO on the
following: (1) YAO's admission that he knew that the starters were not part of GE's line products when he applied with PEMCO for TCC's accreditation
as distributor; (2) the prosecution's evidence (Exhibit G-7), a delivery receipt dated 25 May 1989 issued by Country Supplier Center, on which a TCC
personnel noted that the 2000 starters delivered were GE starters despite the statement therein that they were China starters; this fact gave rise to a
presumption that the TCC personnel knew of the anomaly and that YAO as general manager and overall supervisor knew and perpetrated the
deception of the public; (3) the fact that no genuine GE starter could be sold from 1986 whether locally manufactured or imported or at the very least
in such large commercial quantity as those seized from TCC; and (4) presence of the elements of unfair competition.
The dispositive portion of the decision reads as follows:
For the failure of the prosecution to prove the guilt of the accused, Alfredo Roxas, of Unfair Competition under Article 189 (1) of the Revised
Penal Code . . . i.e., to prove that he was Chairman of the Board of the Tradeway Commercial Corporation on October 10, 1990, as well as to have
him identified in open court during the trial, he is acquitted of the same.
But because the prosecution proved the guilt of the other accused, George Yao, beyond reasonable doubt as principal under the said Article
189 (1) for Unfair Competition, he is convicted of the same. In the absence of any aggravating or mitigating circumstances alleged/proven, and
considering the provisions of the Indeterminate Sentence Law, he is sentenced to a minimum of four (4) months and twenty-one (21)days of
arresto mayor to a maximum of one (1) year and five (5) months of prision correccional.
This case was prosecuted by the law offices of Castillo Laman Tan and Pantaleon for . . . PEMCO . . . Considering that no document was
submitted by the private complainant to show how the claim of 300,000 for consequential damages was reached and/or computed, the court is
not in a position to make a pronouncement on the whole amount. However, the offender, George Yao, is directed to pay PEMCO the amount of
P20,000 by way of consequential damages under Article 2202 of the New Civil Code, and to pay the law offices of Castillo, Laman Tan and
Pantaleon the amount of another P20,000.00 as PEMCO's attorney's fees under Article 2208 (11) of the same.
This decision should have been promulgated in open court on July 28, 1993 but the promulgation was reset for August 31, 1993 in view of
the absence of parties; it was again re-set for today.
Promulgated this 20th day of October, 1993 in Kalookan City, Philippines.3
YAO filed a motion for reconsideration, which the MeTC denied in its order4 of 7 March 1994.
YAO appealed to the Regional Trial Court of Caloocan City (RTC). The appeal was docketed as Criminal Case No. C-47255(94) and was assigned to
Branch 121 of the court.
On 24 May 1994, Presiding Judge Adoracion G. Angeles of Branch 121 issued an order5 directing the parties to file their respective memoranda.
On 4 July 1994 YAO filed his Appeal Memorandum.6
Without waiting for the Memorandum on Appeal of the prosecution, which was filed only on 20 August 1994,7 Judge Adoracion Angeles rendered on
27 July 1994 a one-page Decision8 which affirmed in toto the MeTC decision. In so doing, she merely quoted the dispositive portion of the MeTC and
stated that "[a]fter going over the evidence on record, the Court finds no cogent reason to disturb the findings of the Metropolitan Trial Court."
YAO filed a motion for reconsideration9 and assailed the decision as violative of Section 2, Rule 20 of the Rules of Court.10 In its order11 of 28
September 1994, the RTC denied the motion for reconsideration as devoid of merit and reiterated that the findings of the trial court are entitled to
great weight on appeal and should not be disturbed on appeal unless for strong and cogent reasons.
On 4 October 1994, YAO appealed to the Court of Appeals by filing a notice of appeal.12
The appealed case was docketed as CA-G.R. CR No. 16893. In its Resolution13 of 28 February 1995, the Court of Appeals granted YAO an extension
of twenty (20) days from 10 February or until 12 March 1995 within which to file the Appellant's Brief. However, on 25 April 1995 the Court of Appeals
promulgated a Resolution14 declaring that "[t]he decision rendered on July 27, 1994 by the Regional Trial Court, Branch 121, has long become final
and executory" and ordering the records of the case remanded to said court for the proper execution of judgment. The pertinent portion of the
Resolution reads:
In Our resolution, dated February 28, 1995, accused-appellant was granted an extension of twenty (20) days from February 10, 1995, or
until March 12, 1995 within which to file appellant's brief.
To date, no appellant's brief has been filed.
From the Manifestation, filed on March 24, 1995, by City Prosecutor Gabriel N. dela Cruz, Kalookan City, it would appear that:
xxx xxx xxx
2. George Yao received a copy of the RTC's decision on August 16, 1994, and filed a motion for reconsideration on August 30, 1994. On
October 3, 1994, George Yao received a copy of the RTC's order, dated September 28, 1994, denying his motion for reconsideration.
3. On October 4, 1994, George Yao filed a notice of appeal by registered mail.
We will assume from the said Manifestation that the decision of the RTC and the order denying YAO's motion for reconsideration were
sent to and received by YAO's counsel.
Proceeding from said assumption, Yao had fifteen (15) days from August 16, 1994 to elevate his case to this Court. On August 30, 1994, or
fourteen (14) days thereafter, Yao filed a motion for reconsideration. When he received the Order denying his aforesaid motion on October 3,
1994, he had one more day left to elevate his case to this Court by the proper mode of appeal, which is by petition for review. Yao, however, on
October 4, 1994, filed a notice of appeal by registered mail informing the RTC that he is appealing his conviction to the Court of Appeals. By then,
the fifteen (15) day period had already elapsed.
That notwithstanding, the Branch Clerk of Court, RTC, Branch 121, transmitted to this Court the entire records of the case, thru a
transmittal letter, dated October 13, 1994, and received by the Criminal Section of this Court on October 28, 1994. YAO's counsel, on February 20,
1995, filed with this Court, a motion for extension of period to file brief for accused-appellant which was granted in Our resolution mentioned in
the opening paragraph of this resolution.
Petitions for review shall be filed within the period to appeal. This period has already elapsed even when Yao filed a notice of appeal by
registered mail, with the RTC of Kalookan City. Worse, the notice of appeal is procedurally infirm.
YAO filed an Urgent Motion to Set Aside Entry of Judgment contending that the 25 April 1995 resolution did not specifically dismiss the appeal, for
which reason, there was no Judgment on which an entry of judgment could be issued. He also argued that the attendant procedural infirmities in the
appeal, if any, were cured with the issuance of the 28 February 1995 resolution granting him twenty (20) days from 10 February 1995 or until 12
March 1995 within which to file an appellant's brief and in compliance thereto, consequently filed his appellant's brief on 2 March 1995.
In its Resolution16 of 26 January 1998, the Court of Appeals denied the Urgent Motion to Set Aside the Entry of Judgment for lack of merit. It
considered the 25 April 1995 resolution as having "in effect dismissed the appeal, [hence] the Entry of Judgment issued on May 26, 1995. . . was
proper."
In this petition for review on certiorari, YAO reiterates the arguments he raised in his Urgent Motion to Set Aside the Entry of Judgment of the Court of
Appeals, thus: (1) that the entry of judgment was improvidently issued in the absence of a final resolution specifically dismissing the appeal; (2) the
procedural infirmity in the appeal, if any, has been cured; and (3) the Court of Appeals committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of
jurisdiction in denying him (YAO) due process of law.
In support of his first argument, YAO cites Section 1, Rule 11 of the Revised Internal Rules of the Court of Appeals, thus:
SECTION 1. Entry of Judgment — Unless a motion for reconsideration is filed or an appeal is taken to the Supreme Court, judgments and final
resolutions of the Court of Appeals shall be entered upon the expiration of fifteen (15) days after notice to parties.
YAO claims that the 25 April 1995 resolution of the Court of Appeals was not a judgment on his appeal nor was it "a final resolution" contemplated in
the Internal Rules since it did not specifically dismiss his appeal. A fortiori, the entry of judgment was improvidently issued for lack of legal basis.
YAO also repeats his argument that any procedural infirmity in the appeal was cured when the RTC gave due course to the appeal, elevated the
records to the Court of Appeals which in turn issued on 13 December 1994 a notice to file his Appellant's Brief and granted him until 12 March 1995
within which to file the appellant's brief.
Finally, YAO asserts that he was denied due process considering that (1) none of the elements of unfair competition are present in this case; (2) he
filed his appeal to the Court of Appeals within the reglementary period; and (3) notwithstanding his filing of a notice of appeal (instead of a petition
for review), it was a mere procedural lapse, a technicality which should not bar the determination of the case based on intrinsic merits. YAO then
invokes the plethora of jurisprudence wherein the Supreme Court "in the exercise of equity jurisdiction decided to disregard technicalities"; "decided
[the case] on merits and not on technicalities"; "found manifest in the petition strong considerations of substantial justice necessitating the relaxing
of the stringent application of technical rules," or "heeded petitioner's cry for justice because the basic merits of the case warrant so, as where the
petition embodies justifying circumstances"; discerned "not to sacrifice justice to technicality"; discovered that the application of "res judicata" and
estoppel by judgment amount to a denial of justice and/or a bar to a vindication of a legitimate grievance.“
In its Comment, the Office of the Solicitor General prays that the petition should be dismissed for lack of merit. It maintains that although the 25 April
1995 resolution did not specifically state that the appeal was being dismissed, the intent and import are clear and unequivocable. It asserts that the
appeal was obviously dismissed because the RTC decision has long become final and executory. YAO failed to challenge the RTC decision, within the
reglementary period, by filing a petition for review of the same with the Court of Appeals pursuant to Section 1 of Rule 42 of the Rules of Court.
Instead, he filed an ordinary appeal by way of a notice of appeal. Hence, the period to file the correct procedural remedy had lapsed.
There is no dispute that YAO availed of the wrong procedural remedy in assailing the RTC decision. It is clear from the records that YAO received a
copy of the adverse RTC judgment on 16 August 1994. He has fifteen (15) days or until 31 August 1994 within which to file either a motion for
reconsideration or a petition for review with the Court of Appeals. Fourteen (14) days thereafter or on 30 August 1994, YAO opted to file a motion for
reconsideration the pendency of which tolled the running of the period. He received a copy of the RTC's order denying the motion for reconsideration
on 3 October 1994. He had therefore, only one day left, 4 October 1994 as the last day, within which to file with the Court of Appeals a petition for
review.18 However, on said date, YAO filed a notice of appeal. He palpably availed of the wrong mode of appeal. And since he never instituted the
correct one, he lost it.
The right to appeal is not a constitutional, natural or inherent right. It is a statutory privilege of statutory origin and, therefore, available only if granted
or provided by statute. Since the right to appeal is not a natural right nor a part of due process, it may be exercised only in the manner and in
accordance with the provisions of law. Corollarily, its requirements must be strictly complied with.
That an appeal must be perfected in the manner and within the period fixed by law is not only mandatory but jurisdictional. Non-compliance with
such legal requirements is fatal, for it renders the decision sought to be appealed final and executory, with the end result that no court can exercise
appellate jurisdiction to review the decision.
In the light of these procedural precepts, YAO's petition appears to be patently without merit and does not deserve a second look. Hence, the reasons
he enumerated to persuade this Court to grant his petition and reinstate his appeal are obviously frivolous if not downright trivial. They need not even
be discussed here.
In the normal and natural course of events, we should dismiss the petition outright, if not for an important detail which augurs well for YAO and
would grant him a reprieve in his legal battle. The decision of the RTC affirming the conviction of YAO palpably transgressed Section 14, Article VIII of
the Constitution, which states:
SECTION 14. No decision shall be rendered by any court without expressing therein clearly and distinctly the facts and the law on which it is
based.
xxx xxx xxx
Let us quote in full the RTC judgment:
This is an appeal from the decision of the Metropolitan Trial Court, Branch 52, Kalookan City, in Crim. Case No. C-155713, the dispositive
portion of which reads as follows:
xxx xxx xxx
But because the prosecution proved the guilt of the other accused, George Yao, beyond reasonable doubt as principal under the said Article
189 (1) for Unfair Competition, he is convicted of the same. In the absence of any aggravating or mitigating circumstances alleged/proven, and
considering the provisions of the Indeterminate Sentence Law, he is sentenced to a minimum of four (4) months and twenty-one (21) days of
arresto mayor to a maximum of one (1) year and five (5) months of prision correccional.
xxx xxx xxx
After going over the evidence on record, the Court finds no cogent reason to disturb the findings of the Metropolitan Trial Court.
WHEREFORE, this Court affirms in toto the decision of the Metropolitan Trial Court dated October 20, 1993.
SO ORDERED.
That is all there is to it.
We have sustained decisions of lower courts as having substantially or sufficiently complied with the constitutional injunction notwithstanding the
laconic and terse manner in which they were written and even if "there (was left) much to be desired in terms of (their) clarity, coherence and
comprehensibility" provided that they eventually set out the facts and the law on which they were based, as when they stated the legal qualifications
of the offense constituted by the facts proved, the modifying circumstances, the participation of the accused, the penalty imposed and the civil
liability; or discussed the facts comprising the elements of the offense that was charged in the information, and accordingly rendered a verdict and
imposed the corresponding penalty; or quoted the facts narrated in the prosecution's memorandum but made their own findings and assessment of
evidence, before finally agreeing with the prosecution's evaluation of the case.
We have also sanctioned the use of memorandum decisions, a specie of succinctly written decisions by appellate courts in accordance with the
provisions of Section 40, B.P. Blg. 129 on the grounds of expediency, practicality, convenience and docket status of our courts. We have also
declared that memorandum decisions comply with the constitutional mandate.
In Francisco v. Permskul, however, we laid down the conditions for the of validity of memorandum decisions, thus:
The memorandum decision, to be valid, cannot incorporate the findings of fact and the conclusions of law of the lower court only by remote
reference, which is to say that the challenged decision is not easily and immediately available to the person reading the memorandum decision.
For the incorporation by reference to be allowed, it must provide for direct access to the facts and the law being adopted, which must be
contained in a statement attached to the said decision. In other words, the memorandum decision authorized under Section 40 of B.P. Blg. 129
should actually embody the findings of fact and conclusions of law of the lower court in an annex attached to and made an indispensable part of
the decision.
It is expected that this requirement will allay the suspicion that no study was made of the decision of the lower court and that its decision
was merely affirmed without a proper examination of the facts and the law on which it is based. The proximity at least of the annexed
statement should suggest that such an examination has been undertaken. It is, of course, also understood that the decision being adopted
should, to begin with, comply with Article VIII, Section 14 as no amount of incorporation or adoption will rectify its violation.
The Court finds necessary to emphasize that the memorandum decision should be sparingly used lest it become an addictive excuse for
judicial sloth. It is an additional condition for the validity that this kind of decision may be resorted to only in cases where the facts are in the main
accepted by both parties and easily determinable by the judge and there are no doctrinal complications involved that will require an extended
discussion of the laws involved. The memorandum decision may be employed in simple litigations only, such as ordinary collection cases, where the
appeal is obviously groundless and deserves no more than the time needed to dismiss it.
xxx xxx xxx
Henceforth, all memorandum decisions shall comply with the requirements herein set forth both as to the form prescribed and the
occasions when they may be rendered. Any deviation will summon the strict enforcement of Article VIII, Section 14 of the Constitution and
strike down the flawed judgment as a lawless disobedience.
Tested against these standards, we find that the RTC decision at bar miserably failed to meet them and, therefore, fell short of the constitutional
injunction. The RTC decision is brief indeed, but it is starkly hallow, otiosely written, vacuous in its content and trite in its form. It achieved nothing
and attempted at nothing, not even at a simple summation of facts which could easily be done. Its inadequacy speaks for itself.
We cannot even consider or affirm said RTC decision as a memorandum decision because it failed to comply with the measures of validity laid down
in Francisco vs. Permskul. It merely affirmed in toto the MeTC decision without saying more. A decision or resolution, especially one resolving an
appeal, should directly meet the issues for resolution; otherwise, the appeal would be pointless.
We therefore reiterate our admonition in Nicos Industrial Corporation v. Court of Appeals, in that while we conceded that brevity in the writing of
decisions is an admirable trait, it should not and cannot be substituted for substance; and again in Francisco v. Permskul,35 where we cautioned that
expediency alone, no matter how compelling, cannot excuse non-compliance with the constitutional requirements.
This is not to discourage the lower courts to write abbreviated and concise decisions, but never at the expense of scholarly analysis, and more
significantly, of justice and fair play, lest the fears expressed by Justice Feria as the ponente in Romero v. Court of Appeals36 come true, i.e., if an
appellate court failed to provide the appeal the attention it rightfully deserved, said court deprived the appellant of due process since he was not
accorded a fair opportunity to be heard by a fair and responsible magistrate. This situation becomes more ominous in criminal cases, as in this case,
where not only property rights are at stake but also the liberty if not the life of a human being.
Faithful adherence to the requirements of Section 14, Article VIII of the Constitution is indisputably a paramount component of due process and fair
play. It is likewise demanded by the due process clause of the Constitution.38 The parties to a litigation should be informed of how it was decided,
with an explanation of the factual and legal reasons that led to the conclusions of the court. The court cannot simply say that judgment is rendered
in favor of X and against Y and just leave it at that without any justification whatsoever for its action. The losing party is entitled to know why he lost,
so he may appeal to the higher court, if permitted, should he believe that the decision should be reversed. A decision that does not clearly and
distinctly state the facts and the law on which it is based leaves the parties in the dark as to how it was reached and is precisely prejudicial to the
losing party, who is unable to pinpoint the possible errors of the court for review by a higher tribunal. More than that, the requirement is an assurance
to the parties that, in reaching judgment, the judge did so through the processes of legal reasoning. It is, thus, a safeguard against the impetuosity of
the judge, preventing him from deciding ipse dixit. Vouchsafed neither the sword nor the purse by the Constitution but nonetheless vested with the
sovereign prerogative of passing judgment on the life, liberty or property of his fellowmen, the judge must ultimately depend on the power of reason
for sustained public confidence in the justness of his decision.
Thus the Court has struck down as void, decisions of lower courts and even of the Court of Appeals whose careless disregard of the constitutional
behest exposed their sometimes cavalier attitude not only to their magisterial responsibilities but likewise to their avowed fealty to the Constitution.
Thus, we nullified or deemed to have failed to comply with Section 14, Article VIII of the Constitution, a decision, resolution or order which: contained
no analysis of the evidence of the parties nor reference to any legal basis in reaching its conclusions; contained nothing more than a summary of the
testimonies of the witnesses of both parties; convicted the accused of libel but failed to cite any legal authority or principle to support conclusions
that the letter in question was libelous ; consisted merely of one (1) paragraph with mostly sweeping generalizations and failed to support its
conclusion of parricide ; consisted of five (5) pages, three (3) pages of which were quotations from the labor arbiter's decision including the
dispositive portion and barely a page (two [2] short paragraphs of two [2] sentences each) of its own discussion or reasonings ; was merely based on
the findings of another court sans transcript of stenographic notes; or failed to explain the factual and legal bases for the award of moral damages.
In the same vein do we strike down as a nullity the RTC decision in question.
In sum, we agree with YAO that he was denied due process but not on the grounds he ardently invoked but on the reasons already extensively
discussed above. While he indeed resorted to the wrong mode of appeal and his right to appeal is statutory, it is still an essential part of the judicial
system that courts should proceed with caution so as not to deprive a party of the prerogative, but instead afford every party-litigant the amplest
opportunity for the proper and just disposition of his case, freed from the constraints of technicalities.
In the interest of substantial justice, procedural rules of the most mandatory character in terms of compliance, may be relaxed. In other words, if
strict adherence to the letter of the law would result in absurdity and manifest injustice or where the merit of a party's cause is apparent and
outweighs consideration of non-compliance with certain formal requirements, procedural rules should definitely be liberally construed. A party-
litigant is to be given the fullest opportunity to establish the merits of his complaint or defense rather than for him to lose life, liberty, honor or
property on mere technicalities. We therefore withhold legal approbation on the RTC decision at bar for its palpable failure to comply with the
constitutional and legal mandates thereby denying YAO of his day in court. We also remind all magistrates to heed the demand of Section 14, Article
VIII of the Constitution. It is their solemn and paramount duty to uphold the Constitution and the principles enshrined therein, lest they be lost in the
nitty-gritty of their everyday judicial work.
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, the petition in this case is GRANTED. The questioned 25 April 1995 resolution of the Court of AppeaLs in
CA-G.R. No. 16893 is hereby SET ASIDE and the 27 July 1994 decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 121 of Kalookan City rendered in its
appellate jurisdiction is NULLIFIED. The records are hereby remanded to said Regional Trial Court for further proceedings and for the rendition of
judgment in accordance with the mandate of Section 14, Article VIII of the Constitution.
SECOND DIVISION
[A.M. No. RTJ-96-1338. September 5, 1997]
ENGINEER FERNANDO S. DIZON, Complainant, vs. JUDGE LILIA C. LOPEZ, Regional Trial Court, Branch 109, Pasay
City, Respondent.
DECISION
MENDOZA, J.:
This is a complaint charging Judge Lilia C. Lopez of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 109, Pasay City, with violation of the Constitution, serious
misconduct, inefficiency, and falsification in connection with her decision in Criminal Case No. 91-0716 entitled People of the Philippines v. Engineer
Fernando S. Dizon.
It appears that on April 22, 1993, judgment was rendered, convicting complainant of falsification of private document. The promulgation of the
judgment consisted of reading the dispositive portion of the decision sentencing him to imprisonment, without serving a copy of the decision on him.
The accused and his counsel were told to return in a few days for their copy of the decision, but although petitioner and his father by turns went to
the court to obtain a copy of the decision they were not able to do so. To protect his right, complainant filed a partial motion for reconsideration on
May 5, 1993, expressly reserving his right to submit a more elaborate one upon receipt of the decision. The hearing of the motion for reconsideration
was scheduled on May 12, 1993, but the case was not called as complainants counsel was told that the decision had not yet been finished. On
November 29, 1994, complainant filed an Omnibus Motion to Annul Promulgation of Sentence and to Dismiss the case. On December 16, 1994, the
date set for hearing the motion, complainant was served a copy of the decision, dated April 22, 1993, the dispositive portion of which states:
In view of all the foregoing, the Court finds the accused Fernando Dizon guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Falsification of Private
Document as defined and penalized under Art. 172, par. 2 in relation to Art. 171 par. 2 and 4 thereof and hereby sentences him to imprisonment of
Two (2) Years, Four (4) Months and One (1) Day to Six (6) Years and a fine of P5,000.00.
Complainant alleges that the failure of respondent judge to furnish him a copy of the decision until almost one year and eight months after the
promulgation of its dispositive portion on April 22, 1993 constitutes a violation of Art. VIII, 14 of the Constitution which prohibits courts from
rendering decisions without expressing therein clearly and distinctly the facts and law on which they are based and 15 of the same Art. VIII, which
provides that in all cases lower courts must render their decisions within three months from the date of their submission. He alleges further that he
was denied the right to a speedy trial in violation of Art. III, 14(2) of the Constitution and that Judge Lopez falsified her decision by antedating it and
including therein, as additional penalty, a fine of P5,000.00.
On December 26, 1994, complainant filed another motion for reconsideration after receiving a copy of the full decision of the court. On January 3,
1995, he moved to disqualify respondent from hearing the motions for reconsideration which he had filed. Respondent judge responded by
voluntarily inhibiting herself from further consideration of the case and ordered it forwarded to the Office of the Clerk of Court for re-raffle. The case
was eventually assigned to Judge Manuel F. Dumatol of Branch 113 of the Pasay City RTC.
Judge Lopez claims that on April 22, 1993, when the judgment was promulgated with the reading of the dispositive portion, her decision was already
prepared, although to prevent leakage in the process of preparing it, she withheld its dispositive portion until the day of its promulgation. Respondent
judge states that after the dispositive portion had been read to complainant, respondent gave it to Ma. Cleotilde Paulo (Social Worker II, presently
OIC of Branch 109) for typing and incorporation into the text of the decision. The court found complainant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
falsification of private document under Art. 172, par. 2 of the Revised Penal Code. Respondent states that the delay in furnishing complainant with a
copy of the decision was unintentional.
Respondent judge referred to difficulties she had in preparing her decision and to a series of personal problems which contributed to this delay in the
release of her decision, to wit: she has only two (2) stenographers to attend to daily trials in her court, making it necessary for her to make use of the
Social Worker assigned to her to type her decisions. During the period January to December 1993 she had to dispose of 285 cases, apart from the
fact that there was an unusually big number of criminal, civil, and land registration cases as well as special proceedings filed in her court which
required the holding of hearings in the mornings and in the afternoons. During the same period, she went through some personal tragedies. She lost
her niece, Gloria Lopez Roque, whom she had raised from childhood, due to a hospital accident. This was followed by the death on March 1, 1992 of
her mother, Margarita Lopez, who had been under respondents care for the past eight years after suffering a stroke. On September 17, 1993,
respondents father died of diabetes, renal failure, pneumonia, and cardiac arrest. Respondent was the one who single-handedly brought them in and
out of the hospital because all her able-bodied relatives are abroad. Respondent herself was found to be suffering from diabetes and hypertension,
necessitating her treatment and leave of absence from September 27, 1994 to December 12, 1994, in addition to her other leaves of absence. Aside
from these, respondents family suffered financial reverses because of estafa committed against them.
On February 19, 1996, Deputy Court Administrator Bernardo P. Abesamis submitted a memorandum, finding the charge of violation of the
Constitution to be without merit. He called attention to the written decision of respondent judge, which, albeit delivered to complainant late,
nonetheless states the facts and law on which it is based. He likewise finds the charge of serious misconduct and falsification to be without basis in
view of the absence of malice. However, he finds the charge of inefficiency to be well founded on the basis of respondents failure to furnish
complainant or his counsel a copy of the decision within a reasonable time after its promulgation. Hence, the Deputy Court Administrator believes
that Judge Lopez should be given admonition for her negligence, but recommends that the other charges against her for violation of the
Constitution, serious misconduct, and falsification be dismissed for lack of merit.
The Court finds that respondent violated Art. VIII, 15(1) of the Constitution which provides:
All cases or matters filed after the effectivity of this Constitution must be decided or resolved within twenty-four months from date of submission for
the Supreme Court, and, unless reduced by the Supreme Court, twelve months for all lower collegiate courts and three months for all other lower
courts.
Although respondent judge promulgated her decision within three months of the submission of the case for decision, the fact is that only the
dispositive portion was read at such promulgation. She claims that on April 22, 1993 the text of her decision, containing her findings and discussion
of complainants liability, had already been prepared although it had to be put in final form by incorporating the dispositive portion. However, the fact
is that it took a year and eight months more before this was done and a copy of the complete decision furnished the complainant on December 16,
1994. Rule 120 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure provides:
1. Judgment defined. - The term judgment as used in this Rule means the adjudication by the court that the accused is guilty or is not guilty of the
offense charged, and the imposition of the proper penalty and civil liability provided for by law on the accused.
2. Form and contents of judgment. - The judgment must be written in the official language, personally and directly prepared by the judge and signed by
him and shall contain clearly and distinctly a statement of the facts proved or admitted by the accused and the law upon which the judgment is based.
6. Promulgation of judgment. - The judgment is promulgated by reading the same in the presence of the accused and any judge of the court in which it
was rendered. However, if the conviction is for a light offense, the judgment may be pronounced in the presence of his counsel or representative. When
the judge is absent or outside of the province or city, the judgment may be promulgated by the clerk of court.
It is clear that merely reading the dispositive portion of the decision to the accused is not sufficient. It is the judgment that must be read to him, stating
the facts and the law on which such judgment is based. Since this was done only on December 16, 1994 when a copy of the complete decision was
served on complainant, it is obvious that the respondent failed to render her decision within three months as required by Art. VIII, 15 of the Constitution.
If indeed all that had to be done after the dispositive portion had been read in open court on April 22, 1993 was to incorporate it in the text of the
decision allegedly then already prepared, it is difficult to see why it took respondent judge one year and eight more months before she was able to do
so. Respondent claims that she was prevented from putting out her decision by a series of personal and other problems which leads the Court to
believe that when she promulgated her sentence she had not finished the preparation of the entire decision. At all events, she could have applied for
extension of time to decide the case and put off the promulgation of judgment until she had finished it.
What respondent did in this case was to render what is known as a sin perjuicio judgment, which is a judgment without a statement of the facts in
support of its conclusion to be later supplemented by the final judgment.1 That is why, in answer to complainants charge that the dispositive portion of
the judgment read to him did not impose a fine, respondent contends that the addition of the fine of P5,000.00 was within her power to do even if no
such fine had been included in the oral sentence given on April 22, 1993. As respondent judge states, because the decision was not complete it could
be modified and cites in support of her contention the case of Abay, Sr. v. Garcia.2 Respondent only succeeds in showing that the judgment
promulgated on April 22, 1993 was a sin perjuicio judgment which was incomplete and needed a statement of the facts and law upon which the
judgment was based. As early as 1923, this Court already expressed its disapproval of the practice of rendering sin perjuicio judgments, what with all
the uncertainties entailed because of the implied reservation that it is subject to modification when the decision is finally rendered.3 This Court has
expressed approval of the practice of some judges of withholding the dispositive portion from their opinions until the very last moment of promulgation
of their judgment in order to prevent leakage,4 but that refers to the preparation of their decision, not its promulgation. What must be promulgated must
be the complete decision. There would be no more reason to keep the dispositive portion a secret at the stage of promulgation of judgment.
However, the Court finds the other charges against respondent to be without merit.
First, the claim that complainant was deprived of his right to a speedy trial by reason of respondents failure to furnish him with a copy of the decision
until after one year and eight months is without basis. It appears that despite the destruction of records by fire in the Pasay City Hall on January 18,
1992 the parties were required to submit simultaneously their memoranda on August 18, 1992. The delay, if any, was not such vexatious, capricious,
and oppressive delay5 as to justify finding a denial of the right to a speedy trial. The fact is that the reading of the sentence on April 22, 1993, albeit not
in compliance with the requirement for promulgation of judgments, nonetheless put an end to trial.
Second, the delay in furnishing complainant a copy of the complete decision did not prejudice his right to appeal or file a motion for reconsideration. It
is true that an accused must be given a copy of the decision in order to apprise him of the basis of such decision so that he can intelligently prepare his
appeal or motion for reconsideration. However, in accordance with the ruling in Director of Lands v. Sanz,6 complainants period to appeal or file a
motion for reconsideration did not begin to run until after he actually received a copy of the judgment on December 16, 1994. He therefore suffered no
prejudice. If at all, complainant suffered from the anxiety to refute a conviction which he could not do for lack of a statement of the basis of the
conviction.
Nonetheless, certain factors mitigate respondent judges culpability. Except for this incident, respondents record of public service as legal officer and
agent of the National Bureau of Investigation, as State Prosecutor, and later Senior State Prosecutor, of the Department of Justice for 17 years and as
Regional Trial Judge for more than 13 years now is unmarred by malfeasance, misfeasance or wrongdoing. This is the first time she is required to
answer an administrative complaint against her. Her failure to decide the case of complainant was brought about by factors not within her control, to
wit, lack of stenographers and unusually big number of cases; and her personal loss as a result of the death of her niece and both her parents, financial
reverses of the family, and poor health as a result of diabetes and hypertension.
In Mangulabnan v. Tecson,7 a joint decision in two criminal cases was rendered by respondent judge on February 24, 1978, six months and eight days
from submission of the case, and a copy was delivered to complainant on September 28, 1979, over 19 months after rendition of the decision. Two
complaints were filed for violation of the constitutional provision requiring submitted cases to be decided by lower courts within three months and for
violation of complainants right to a speedy trial. Respondent judge blamed the delay in deciding the cases on the fact that his clerks had misfiled the
records. As to the delay in furnishing complainant with a copy of the decision, the judge attributed this to the mistake of his clerk who did not think
complainant was entitled to receive the same. The judge was reprimanded. The reason for the delay in that case was even less excusable than the
difficulties experienced by respondent Judge Lopez, i.e., deaths in respondents family, her own poor state of health, financial reverses suffered by her
family, and the volume of work done within the period in question, which somewhat mitigate her liability. The Court believes that a similar penalty would
be appropriate.
In view of the foregoing, respondent is hereby REPRIMANDED with WARNING that repetition of the same acts complained of will be dealt with more
severely.
ASIAVEST VS. CA AND PNCC

MARCH 28, 2013 ~ VBDIAZ
ASIAVEST MERCHANT BANKERS (M) BERHAD vs. CA and PNCC

G.R. No. 110263, July 20, 2001
Facts: Petitioner Asiavest Merchant Bankers (M) Berhad is a corporation organized under the laws of Malaysia while private respondent Philippine
National Construction Corporation is a corporation duly incorporated and existing under Philippine laws.
Petitioner initiated a suit for collection against private respondent, then known as Construction and Development Corporation of the Philippines,
before the High Court of Malaya in Kuala Lumpur entitled “Asiavest Merchant Bankers (M) Berhad v. Asiavest CDCP Sdn. Bhd. and Construction and
Development Corporation of the Philippines.”
Petitioner sought to recover the indemnity of the performance bond it had put up in favor of private respondent to guarantee the completion of the
Felda Project and the nonpayment of the loan it extended to Asiavest-CDCP Sdn. Bhd. for the completion of Paloh Hanai and Kuantan By Pass;
Project.
The High Court of Malaya (Commercial Division) rendered judgment in favor of the petitioner and against the private respondent. Following
unsuccessful attempts to secure payment from private respondent under the judgment, petitioner initiated the complaint before RTC of Pasig, Metro
Manila, to enforce the judgment of the High Court of Malaya.
Private respondent sought the dismissal of the case via a Motion to Dismiss, contending that the alleged judgment of the High Court of Malaya
should be denied recognition or enforcement since on in face, it is tainted with want of jurisdiction, want of notice to private respondent, collusion
and/or fraud, and there is a clear mistake of law or fact. Dismissal was, however, denied by the trial court considering that the grounds relied upon
are not the proper grounds in a motion to dismiss under Rule 16 of the Revised Rules of Court.
Subsequently, private respondent filed its Answer with Compulsory Counter claim’s and therein raised the grounds it brought up in its motion to
dismiss. In its Reply filed, the petitioner contended that the High Court of Malaya acquired jurisdiction over the person of private respondent by its
voluntary submission the court’s jurisdiction through its appointed counsel. Furthermore, private respondent’s counsel waived any and all objections
to the High Court’s jurisdiction in a pleading filed before the court.
In due time, the trial court rendered its decision dismissing petitioner’s complaint. Petitioner interposed an appeal with the Court of Appeals, but the
appellate court dismissed the same and affirmed the decision of the trial court.
Issue: Whether or not the CA erred in denying recognition and enforcement to the Malaysian Court judgment.
Ruling: Yes.
Generally, in the absence of a special compact, no sovereign is bound to give effect within its dominion to a judgment rendered by a tribunal of
another country; however, the rules of comity, utility and convenience of nations have established a usage among civilized states by which final
judgments of foreign courts of competent jurisdiction are reciprocally respected and rendered efficacious under certain conditions that may vary in
different countries.
In this jurisdiction, a valid judgment rendered by a foreign tribunal may be recognized insofar as the immediate parties and the underlying cause of
action are concerned so long as it is convincingly shown that there has been an opportunity for a full and fair hearing before a court of competent
jurisdiction; that the trial upon regular proceedings has been conducted, following due citation or voluntary appearance of the defendant and under a
system of jurisprudence likely to secure an impartial administration of justice; and that there is nothing to indicate either a prejudice in court and in
the system of laws under which it is sitting or fraud in procuring the judgment.
A foreign judgment is presumed to be valid and binding in the country from which it comes, until a contrary showing, on the basis of a presumption
of regularity of proceedings and the giving of due notice in the foreign forum Under Section 50(b), Rule 39 of the Revised Rules of Court, which was
the governing law at the time the instant case was decided by the trial court and respondent appellate court, a judgment, against a person, of a
tribunal of a foreign country having jurisdiction to pronounce the same is presumptive evidence of a right as between the parties and their
successors in interest by a subsequent title. The judgment may, however, be assailed by evidence of want of jurisdiction, want of notice to the party,
collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law or fact. In addition, under Section 3(n), Rule 131 of the Revised Rules of Court, a court, whether in the
Philippines or elsewhere, enjoys the presumption that it was acting in the lawful exercise of its jurisdiction. Hence, once the authenticity of the
foreign judgment is proved, the party attacking a foreign judgment, is tasked with the burden of overcoming its presumptive validity.
In the instant case, petitioner sufficiently established the existence of the money judgment of the High Court of Malaya by the evidence it offered.
Petitioner’s sole witness, testified to the effect that he is in active practice of the law profession in Malaysia; that he was connected with Skrine and
Company as Legal Assistant up to 1981; that private respondent, then known as Construction and Development Corporation of the Philippines, was
sued by his client, Asiavest Merchant Bankers (M) Berhad, in Kuala Lumpur; that the writ of summons were served on March 17, 1983 at the
registered office of private respondent and on March 21, 1983 on Cora S. Deala, a financial planning officer of private respondent for Southeast Asia
operations; that upon the filing of the case, Messrs. Allen and Gledhill, Advocates and Solicitors, with address at 24th Floor, UMBC Building, Jalan
Sulaiman, Kuala Lumpur, entered their conditional appearance for private respondent questioning the regularity of the service of the writ of summons
but subsequently withdrew the same when it realized that the writ was properly served; that because private respondent failed to file a statement of
defense within two (2) weeks, petitioner filed an application for summary judgment and submitted affidavits and documentary evidence in support of
its claim; that the matter was then heard before the High Court of Kuala Lumpur in a series of dates where private respondent was represented by
counsel; and that the end result of all these proceedings is the judgment sought to be enforced.
In addition to the said testimonial evidence, petitioner also offered the documentary evidence to support their claim.
Having thus proven, through the foregoing evidence, the existence and authenticity of the foreign judgment, said foreign judgment enjoys
presumptive validity and the burden then fell upon the party who disputes its validity, herein private respondent, to prove otherwise. However, private
respondent failed to sufficiently discharge the burden that fell upon it – to prove by clear and convincing evidence the grounds which it relied upon to
prevent enforcement of the Malaysian High Court judgment.
11. Petition for Review/Motion for Reconsideration
Tichangco vs. Enriquez (2004)

RENATO TICHANGCO; ROMEO RAMOS, for himself and the SAMAHANG MAGKAKAPITBAHAY NG DULONG GAGALANGIN; ANTONIO
PASCO, for himself and the SAMAHANG MAGKAKAPITBAHAY NG BARANGAY 186; CELSO SANTIAGO, for himself and the SAMAHANG
NAGKAKAISANG damdamin ng sunog apog;and arturo ballo,for himself and the FEDERATION KAPIT-BISIG HOMEOWNERS ASSOCIATION,
INC., Petitioners, v. The Honorable ALFREDO ENRIQUEZ, Administrator, Land Registration Authority; The LAND REGISTRATION
AUTHORITY;and/or The SUCCESSORS-IN-INTEREST OF SEVERINO MANOTOK, BENITA MANOTOK, AMBROSIO MANOTOKand/or
RICARDO MANOTOK,namely, PATRICIA L. TIONGSONand/or ELISA V. MANOTOK, Respondents.
G.R. NO. 150629 | June 30, 2004 | 433 SCRA 324 | First Division Decision | Justice Panganiban
Constitutional Law
FACTS:
On March 1996, Renato Tichangco, in behalf of the homeowners’ association of Gagalangin and Sunog Apog (Tondo, Manila), filed a land title
verification request with the Land Registration Authority (LRA), docketed as LTV No. 96-0376. The verification request was prompted by an alleged
claim of ownership of a certain Manotok over the land which petitioners occupy, and which they perceive as public land, being portions of the dried
or filled bed of Estero de Maypajo and Sunog Apog area, and which allegedly have already been identified as Area for Priority Development under the
Urban Poor Law.
Petitioners sought the assistance of the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) for legal action on OCTs Nos. 820 and 7477. On 18 February 1999, the
OSG wrote a letter to public respondent for a review and evaluation of the records on the issuance of TCTs Nos. 128240 to 128249, and 128270
covering parcels of land in Gagalangin, Tondo, Manila, docketed as Task Force TM No. 98-0087.
However, this case is a Petition for Review challenging the August 8, 2001 Decision and the October 29, 2002 Resolution of the Court of Appeals (CA)
in CA-GR SP No. 54648. The assailed Decision affirmed the findings of the then Land Registration Authority (LRA) administrator, Alfredo Enriquez,
that there were no legal grounds to initiate appropriate proceedings to nullify Original Certificate of Title (OCT) Nos. 820 and 7477 and the
subsequent titles derived therefrom: Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) Nos. 128240 to 128249, inclusive, and TCT No. 128270 – all covering parcels
of land in Tondo, Manila registered in the names of private respondents.
ISSUE:
Whether the Court of Appeals commits grave abuse of discretion tantamount to or in excess of jurisdiction when it failed to declare OCT Nos. 820
and 7477 null and void?
RULING:
The CA held that OCT No. 820 had been issued on January 7, 1907, not on January 31, 1905, as petitioners claim. True, Decree No. 1424 had been
issued on January 31, 1905, but it was entered or transcribed in the registration book of the Register of Deeds only in 1907. Pursuant to Section 42 of
Act No. 496 (otherwise known as the Land Registration Act), OCT No. 820 took effect on January 7, 1907, the date of the transcription of the decree.
The CA also held that OCT No. 7477 was already incontrovertible, because it had been the subject of regular land registration proceedings. More than
one year after its registration, the decree was not controverted by any adverse party.
The fundamental purpose of the Land Registration Law (Act No. 496, now PD 1529) is to finally settle title to real property in order to preempt any
question on the legality of the title — except claims that were noted on the certificate itself at the time of registration or those that arose subsequent
thereto. Consequently, once the title is registered under the said law, owners can rest secure on their ownership and possession.
The proceedings for the judicial registration of land under the Torrens system involve more consequences than an ordinary action would. Once a
decree of registration is made under the Torrens system, and the reglementary period has passed within which the decree may be questioned, the
title is perfected and cannot be collaterally questioned later on.
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-35612-14 June 27, 1973
NORBERTO MENDOZA, Petitioner, vs. COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF QUEZON, NINTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT, GUMACA
BRANCH, PRESIDED OVER BY THE HONORABLE JUAN MONTECILLO, and THE PROVINCIAL WARDEN OF QUEZON
PROVINCE, Respondents.
Estanislao A. Fernandez and Feliciano Landicho for petitioner.
Office of the Solicitor General Estelito P. Mendoza and Assistant Solicitor General Hugo E. Gutierrez, Jr. for respondents.
-->
RESOLUTION
FERNANDO, J.:
Our resolution of January 26, 1973 dismissing these petitions for habeas corpus, certiorari and mandamus for lack of merit is sought to be
reconsidered. It was our ruling that petitioner failed to sustain the burden of showing that his confinement was marked by illegality or that the order
cancelling the bail previously issued was tainted with grave abuse of discretion. It is to credit of his able counsel, former Senator Estanislao
Fernandez, that his fight for provisional liberty is carried on with a further manifestation of skilled scholarly effort, but such valiant attempt to secure
his release is doomed to fail. The law, as will hereafter be set forth, points to the contrary. Deference to its command precludes a reconsideration.
This resolution will likewise briefly touch upon the question of why the issuance of a brief dismissal order does not in any wise offend against the
constitutional provision requiring that no decision "shall be rendered by any court of record without on which it is based.“
1. Habeas corpus could be invoked by petitioner if he were able to show the illegality of his detention. There is aptness and accuracy in the
characterization of the writ of habeas corpus as the writ of liberty. Rightfully it is latitudinarian in scope. It is wide-ranging and all embracing in its
reach. It can dig deep into the facts to assure that there be no toleration of illegal restraint. Detention must be for a cause recognized by law. The writ
imposes on the judiciary the grave responsibility of ascertaining whether a deprivation of physical freedom is warranted. This it has to discharge
without loss of time. The party who is keeping a person in custody has to produce him in court as soon as possible. What is more, he must justify the
action taken. Only if it can be demonstrated that there has been no violation of one's right to liberty will he be absolved from responsibility. Unless
there be such a showing, the confinement must thereby cease.
The above formulation of what is settled law finds no application to the present situation. Petitioner's deprivation of liberty is in accordance with a
warrant of arrest properly issued after a determination by the judge in compliance with the constitutional provision requiring the examination under
oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses produced. 2No allegation to the contrary may be entertained. It cannot be denied that
petitioner's co-accused, Nelso Unal, Hermogenes Lumanglas and Leopoldo Trinidad, had previously come to this court to challenge the filing of one
information where there were three victims. Accordingly, this Court, in Unal v. People, 3required three separate amended informations. There was no
question, however, as to the legality of the warrants of arrest previously issued, not only in the case of the parties in such petition, but likewise of
petitioner. Habeas corpus, under the circumstances, would not therefore lie."
2. Even if it be granted that petitioner may not be released on a habeas corpus proceeding, is he, however, entitled to bail? Precisely that is the
remedy by which, notwithstanding the absence of any flaw in one's confinement, provisional liberty may still be had. Such a remedy, as a matter of
fact, was granted him in accordance with an order of the municipal court of Mulanay. Thereafter, however, the bail was revoked by the Court of First
Instance in the order now challenged. Such actuation he would now condemn as a grave abuse of discretion. In the landmark decision of Chief
Justice Concepcion, People v. Hernandez, 5the right to bail was rightfully stress as an aspect of the protection accorded individual freedom which, in
his eloquent language," is too basic, too transcendental and vital in a republican state, like ours, ...."To be more matter of fact about it, there is this
excerpt from de la Camara v. Enage "Before conviction, every person is bailable except if charged with capital offense when the evidence of guilt is
strong. Such a right flows from the presumption of innocence in favor of every accused who should not be subjected to the loss of freedom as
thereafter he would be entitled to acquittal, unless his guilt be proved beyond reasonable doubt. Thereby a regime of liberty is honored in the
observance and not in the breach. It is not beyond the realm of probability, however, that a person charged with a crime, especially so where his
defense is weak, would just simply make himself scarce and thus frustrate the hearing of his cage. A bail is intended as a guarantee that such an
intent would be thwarted. It is, in the language of Cooley, a mode short of confinement which would, with reasonable certainty, insure the attendance
of the accused for the subsequent trial. Nor is there anything unreasonable in denying this right to one charged with a capital offense when evidence
of guilt is strong, as the likelihood is, rather than await the outcome of the proceeding against him with a death sentence, an ever-present threat,
temptation to flee the jurisdiction would be too great to be resisted.“
The precise question however, is whether once the provisional liberty has been thus obtained, it could be terminated by the cancellation of the bail. In
the answer filed on behalf of respondent Court, Solicitor General Estelito Mendoza did stress the absence of authority on the part of special
counselor Antonio R. Robles who was not authorized to intervene in this case on behalf of the state but did so, his failure to object being the basis of
the bail granted by the municipal court of Mulanay, Quezon. Such an allegation was denied by petitioner. We are not called upon to rule definitely on
this aspect as independently thereof, there are two other basic objections. One was that petitioner, when the bail was granted, was still at large. The
municipal court, therefore, could not have granted bail in accordance with our ruling in Feliciano v. Pasicolan. Thus: "'The constitutional mandate that
all persons shall before conviction be bailable except those charged with capital offenses when evidence of guilt is strong, is subject to the limitation
that the person applying for bail should be in custody of the law, or otherwise deprived of his liberty. The purpose of bail is to secure one's release
and it would be incongruous as to grant bail to one who is free.'"Secondly, and what is worse, the prosecution was never given a chance to present its
evidence. The authoritative doctrine in People v. San Diego is thus squarely in point: "Whether the motion for bail of a defendant who is in custody for
a capital offense be resolved in summary proceeding or in the course of a regular trial, the prosecution must be given an opportunity to present,
within a reasonable time, all the evidence that it may desire to introduce before the Court should resolve the motion for bail. If, as in the criminal case
involved in the instant special civil action, the prosecution should be denied such an opportunity, there would be a violation of procedural due
process, and order of the Court granting bail should be considered void.“
Nor is the San Diego ruling novel. As far back as 1958, in People v. Raba, it was held: "Considering that Talantor did not serve notice of his motion to
reduce bail on the provincial fiscal at least three days before the hearing thereof and the court failed to require that a reasonable notice thereof be
given to said fiscal, it is evident that the court acted improperly in reducing the bail without giving the fiscal an opportunity to be heard"Just after San
Diego, this Court had occasion to stress anew such a principle in People v. Bocar. As set forth in the opinion of Justice J.B.L. Reyes: "It cannot be
denied that, under our regime of laws, and concomitant with the legal presumption of innocence before conviction, an accused is entitled to
provisional liberty on bail, the only exception being when he is charged with a capital offense and the evidence of his guilt is strong. But even in the
latter instance, the high regard reserved by the law for personal freedom is underscored by the provision placing upon the prosecution, not on the
defense, the burden of proving that the accused is not entitled to bail. This protective attitude towards the sanctity of the liberty of a person
notwithstanding, due process also demands that in the matter of bail the prosecution should be afforded full opportunity to present proof of the guilt
of the accused. Thus, if it were true that the prosecution in this case was deprived of the right to present its evidence against the bail petition, or that
the order granting such petition was issued upon incomplete evidence, then the issuance of the order would really constitute grave abuse of
discretion that would call for the remedy of certiorari."
The last sentence in the above excerpt finds application in the matter before us. No grave abuse of discretion yo justify the grant of the writ certiorari
prayed for has been shown. That is why our resolution sought to be reconsidered should stand.
3. That brings us to the point raised in the motion for reconsideration objecting to our dismissing the petition through a minute resolution. It is his
contention that there should be an extended decision. As noted at the outset, reliance is had on the constitutional provision requiring a decision by a
court of record to contain "clearly and distinctly the facts and the law on which it is based." According to a recent decision, Jose v. Santos, what is
expected of the judiciary "is that the decision rendered makes clear why either party prevailed under the applicable law to the facts as established.
Nor is there any regid formula as to the language to be employed to satisfy the requirement of clarity and distinctness. The discretion of the
particular judge in this respect, while not unlimited, is necessarily broad. There is no sacramental form of words which he must use upon pain of
being considered as having failed to abide by what the Constitution directs."What must then be stressed is that under such a provision as held in the
early case of Soncuya v. National Investment Board, the decision spoken of is the judgment rendered after the previous presentation of the proof in
an ordinary civil or criminal case upon a stipulation of facts upon which its disposition is to be based. In Bacolod Murcia Milling Co., Inc. v.
Henares, the above decision was cited with approval, with the opinion of Justice J.B.L. Reyes containing the following. "Plaintiff-appellant assigns as
another error that the order appealed from does not contain any statement of the facts and the law on which it is based. Obviously, this is based on
Section 1, Rule 35 of the Rules of Court, and Section 12, Article VIII of the Constitution. The contention is untenable, since these provisions have been
held to refer only to decisions of the merit and not to orders of the trial court resolving incidental matters such as the one at bar.“
It is thus not self-evident that petitioner could justly lay claim to a grievance. For if the situation is subjected, to searching analysis, it cannot be
denied that what is really involved is just a mere incident in the prosecution of petitioner Had he prevailed, he would have been entitled to
provisionary liberty. Under the circumstances, as the facts of the clearly demonstrate, with the plea for habeas corpus be unavailing, we felt that a
minute resolution which certainly would require less time than a full-blown decision, was not inappropriate. Precisely, the leniency shown the parties
dwell at length on their respective contentions should disprove any suspicion that the decision arrived at was reached without according the parties
the fundamental fairness to which they are entitled under the Constitution. Since, at the most, the relief sought by petitioner will not, in any way,
foreclose the ultimate outcome of the cases against him one way or the other, we deemed that the constitutional provision invoked did not strictly
call for application. In that sense, a minimum resolution certainly cannot be stigmatized as in any wise failing to abide by a constitutional command.
WHEREFORE, the motion for reconsideration is denied, our resolution of January 26, 1973 dismissing the petitions for of merit reiterated and the
temporary restraining order issue by us on October 16, 1973 lifted so that the case against petitioner can be duly heard forthwith. Without
pronouncement as to costs.
G.R. No. 123547. May 21, 2001
REV. FR. DANTE MARTINEZ, petitioner,
vs.
HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, HONORABLE JUDGE JOHNSON BALLUTAY, PRESIDING JUDGE, BRANCH 25, REGIONAL TRIAL
COURT OF CABANATUAN CITY, HONORABLE JUDGE ADRIANO TUAZON, JR., PRESIDING JUDGE, BRANCH 28, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT
OF CABANATUAN CITY, SPOUSES REYNALDO VENERACION and SUSAN VENERACION, SPOUSES MAXIMO HIPOLITO and MANUELA DE
LA PAZ and GODOFREDO DE LA PAZ, respondents.
Facts:
Sometime in February 1981, private respondents Godofredo De la Paz and his sister Manuela De la Paz, married to Maximo Hipolito, entered into an
oral contract with petitioner Rev. Fr. Dante Martinez, then Assistant parish priest of Cabanatuan City, for the sale of lot for the sum of P15,000.00. At
the time of the sale, the lot was still registered in the name of Claudia De la Paz, mother of private respondents, although the latter had already sold it
to private respondent Manuela de la Paz by virtue of a Deed of Absolute Sale dated May 26, 1976. Private respondent Manuela subsequently
registered the sale in her name on October 22, 1981 and was issued TCT No. T-40496. When the land was offered for sale to petitioner, private
respondents De la Paz were accompanied by their mother, since petitioner dealt with the De la Pazes as a family and not individually. He was
assured by them that the lot belonged to Manuela De la Paz. It was agreed that petitioner would give a downpayment of P3,000.00 to private
respondents De la Paz and that the balance would be payable by installment. After giving the P3,000.00 downpayment, petitioner started the
construction of a house on the lot, with the written consent of the then registered owner, Claudia de la Paz. Petitioner likewise began paying the real
estate taxes on said property. Construction on the house was completed subsequently. Since then, petitioner and his family have maintained their
residence there.
On January 31, 1983, petitioner completed payment of the lot for which private respondents De la Paz executed two documents. However, private
respondents De la Paz never delivered the Deed of Sale they promised to petitioner.
In the meantime, in a Deed of Absolute Sale with Right to Repurchase dated October 28, 198, private respondents De la Paz sold three lots with right
to repurchase the same within one year to private respondents spouses Reynaldo and Susan Veneracion for the sum of P150,000.00. One of the lots
sold was the lot previously sold to petitioner. Reynaldo Veneracion had been a resident of Cabanatuan City since birth. Two of the lots subject of the
sale were located along Maharlika Highway, one of which was the lot sold earlier by the De la Pazes to petitioner. The third lot (hereinafter referred to
as the Melencio lot) was occupied by private respondents De la Paz. Private respondents Veneracion never took actual possession of any of these
lots during the period of redemption, but all titles to the lots were given to him.
Before the expiration of the one year period, private respondent Godofredo De la Paz informed private respondent Reynaldo Veneracion that he was
selling the three lots to another person for P200,000.00. Indeed, private respondent Veneracion received a call from a Mr. Tecson verifying if he had
the titles to the properties, as private respondents De la Paz were offering to sell the two lots along Maharlika Highway to him (Mr. Tecson) for
P180,000.00 The offer included the lot purchased by petitioner in February, 1981. Private respondent Veneracion offered to purchase the same two
lots from the De la Pazes for the same amount. The offer was accepted by private respondents De la Paz. Accordingly, on June 2, 1983, a Deed of
Absolute Sale was executed over the two lots. Sometime in January, 1984, private respondent Reynaldo Veneracion asked a certain Renato Reyes,
petitioners neighbor, who the owner of the building erected on the subject lot was. Reyes told him that it was Feliza Martinez, petitioners mother, who
was in possession of the property. Reynaldo Veneracion told private respondent Godofredo about the matter and was assured that Godofredo would
talk to Feliza. Based on that assurance, private respondents Veneracion registered the lots with the Register of Deeds of Cabanatuan on March 5,
1984. The lot in dispute was registered under TCT No. T-44612.
Petitioner discovered that the lot he was occupying with his family had been sold to the spouses Veneracion after receiving a letter from private
respondent Reynaldo Veneracion on March 19, 1986, claiming ownership of the land and demanding that they vacate the property and remove their
improvements thereon. Petitioner, in turn, demanded through counsel the execution of the deed of sale from private respondents De la Paz and
informed Reynaldo Veneracion that he was the owner of the property as he had previously purchased the same from private respondents De la Paz.
Both RTC and CA ruled in favor of respondents Veneracion.
Issue:
Whether or not private respondents Veneracion are buyers in good faith of the lot in dispute as to make them the absolute owners thereof in
accordance with Art. 1544 of the Civil Code on double sale of immovable property.
Held: NO.
This case involves double sale and, on this matter, Art. 1544 of the Civil Code provides that where immovable property is the subject of a double sale,
ownership shall be transferred (1) to the person acquiring it who in good faith first recorded it to the Registry of Property; (2) in default thereof, to the
person who in good faith was first in possession; and (3) in default thereof, to the person who presents the oldest title. The requirement of the law,
where title to the property is recorded in the Register of Deeds, is two-fold: acquisition in good faith and recording in good faith. To be entitled to
priority, the second purchaser must not only prove prior recording of his title but that he acted in good faith, i.e., without knowledge or notice of a
prior sale to another. The presence of good faith should be ascertained from the circumstances surrounding the purchase of the land.
1. With regard to the first sale to private respondents Veneracion, private respondent Reynaldo Veneracion testified that on October 10, 1981, 18 days
before the execution of the first Deed of Sale with Right to Repurchase, he inspected the premises and found it vacant. However, this is belied by the
testimony of the building inspector of the Department of Public Works and Highways, that he conducted on October 6, 1981 an ocular inspection of
the lot in dispute in the performance of his duties as a building inspector to monitor the progress of the construction of the building subject of the
building permit issued in favor of petitioner on April 23, 1981, and that he found it 100 % completed. Thus, as early as October, 1981, private
respondents Veneracion already knew that there was construction being made on the property they purchased.
2. The Court of Appeals failed to determine the nature of the first contract of sale between the private respondents by considering their
contemporaneous and subsequent acts. More specifically, it overlooked the fact that the first contract of sale between the private respondents
shows that it is in fact an equitable mortgage.
The requisites for considering a contract of sale with a right of repurchase as an equitable mortgage are (1) that the parties entered into a contract
denominated as a contract of sale and (2) that their intention was to secure an existing debt by way of mortgage. A contract of sale with right to
repurchase gives rise to the presumption that it is an equitable mortgage in any of the following cases: (1) when the price of a sale with a right to
repurchase is unusually inadequate; (2) when the vendor remains in possession as lessee or otherwise; (3) when, upon or after the expiration of the
right to repurchase, another instrument extending the period of redemption or granting a new period is executed; (4) when the purchaser retains for
himself a part of the purchase price; (5) when the vendor binds himself to pay the taxes on the thing sold; (6) in any other case where it may be fairly
inferred that the real intention of the parties is that the transaction shall secure the payment of a debt or the performance of any other obligation. In
case of doubt, a contract purporting to be a sale with right to repurchase shall be construed as an equitable mortgage.
In this case, the following circumstances indicate that the private respondents intended the transaction to be an equitable mortgage and not a
contract of sale: (1) Private respondents Veneracion never took actual possession of the three lots; (2) Private respondents De la Paz remained in
possession of the Melencio lot which was co-owned by them and where they resided; (3) During the period between the first sale and the second
sale to private respondents Veneracion, they never made any effort to take possession of the properties; and (4) when the period of redemption had
expired and private respondents Veneracion were informed by the De la Pazes that they are offering the lots for sale to another person for
P200,000.00, they never objected. To the contrary, they offered to purchase the two lots for P180,000.00 when they found that a certain Mr. Tecson
was prepared to purchase it for the same amount. Thus, it is clear from these circumstances that both private respondents never intended the first
sale to be a contract of sale, but merely that of mortgage to secure a debt of P150,000.00.
With regard to the second sale, which is the true contract of sale between the parties, it should be noted that this Court in several cases, has ruled
that a purchaser who is aware of facts which should put a reasonable man upon his guard cannot turn a blind eye and later claim that he acted in
good faith. Private respondent Reynaldo himself admitted that petitioner was already in possession of the property in dispute at the time the second
Deed of Sale was executed on June 1, 1983 and registered on March 4, 1984. He, therefore, knew that there were already occupants on the property
as early as 1981. The fact that there are persons, other than the vendors, in actual possession of the disputed lot should have put private
respondents on inquiry as to the nature of petitioners right over the property. But he never talked to petitioner to verify the nature of his right. He
merely relied on the assurance of private respondent Godofredo De la Paz, who was not even the owner of the lot in question, that he would take care
of the matter. This does not meet the standard of good faith.
The appellate courts reliance on Arts. 1357 and 1358 of the Civil Code to determine private respondents Veneracions lack of knowledge of
petitioners ownership of the disputed lot is erroneous. Art. 1357 and Art. 1358, in relation to Art. 1403(2) of the Civil Code, requires that the sale of
real property must be in writing for it to be enforceable. It need not be notarized. If the sale has not been put in writing, either of the contracting
parties can compel the other to observe such requirement. This is what petitioner did when he repeatedly demanded that a Deed of Absolute Sale be
executed in his favor by private respondents De la Paz. There is nothing in the above provisions which require that a contract of sale of realty must
be executed in a public document. In any event, it has been shown that private respondents Veneracion had knowledge of facts which would put
them on inquiry as to the nature of petitioners occupancy of the disputed lot.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals is REVERSED and a new one is RENDERED:
(1) declaring as null and void the deed of sale executed by private respondents Godofredo and Manuela De la Paz in favor of private respondents
spouses Reynaldo and Susan Veneracion;
(2) ordering private respondents Godofredo and Manuela De la Paz to execute a deed of absolute sale in favor of petitioner Rev. Fr. Dante Martinez;
(3) ordering private respondents Godofredo and Manuela De la Paz to reimburse private respondents spouses Veneracion the amount the latter may
have paid to the former;
(4) ordering the Register of Deeds of Cabanatuan City to cancel TCT No. T-44612 and issue a new one in the name of petitioner Rev. Fr. Dante Martinez;
and
(5) ordering private respondents to pay petitioner jointly and severally the sum of P20,000.00 as attorneys fees and to pay the costs of the suit.
THANK YOU !!!

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Constitutional

Case: RE: SENIORITY AMONG FOUR APPOINMENTS 631RA377

G.R. No. 209138

G.R. No. 212030

EXECUTIVE ORDER NO. 2

RECALLING, WITHDRAWING, AND REVOKING APPOINTMENTS ISSUED BY THE PREVIOUS ADMINISTRATION IN

3. Congressional power to reorganize and security of tenure

People vs Gacott GR No 116049 13 July 1995

G.R. NO. 74457 MARCH 20, 1987

Is E.O. 626-A unconstitutional?

Tirol vs. Commission on Audit

"WHEREFORE, the appealed decision is MODIFIED to read:

"SO ORDERED." (Emphasis supplied)

SANTIAGO VS. BAUTISTA

ISSUE: may judicial function be exercised in this case? What is judicial power?

Felipe vs Leuterio GR No 4606 20 May 1952

Article VIII, Sections 13 and 14

CASE BRIEF, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, POLITICAL AND INTERNATIONAL LAW

Do the provisions of IPRA contravene the Constitution?

10. Requirements as to decisions- Article VIII, Section 13-14

WHEREFORE, both Petitions for certiorari are hereby denied. No costs.

Republic of the Philippines

The informations in the six cases alleged as follows:

ASIAVEST VS. CA AND PNCC

ASIAVEST MERCHANT BANKERS (M) BERHAD vs. CA and PNCC

CASE BRIEF, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, POLITICAL AND INTERNATIONAL LAW

Tichangco vs. Enriquez (2004)

Both RTC and CA ruled in favor of respondents Veneracion.

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