Anti-Vehicle Mines

IHL and Technical Fixes

17.02.2015
 Military Utility

• Tactical obstacles
o Combined with anti-armour weapons and
terrain in integrated plans
• Protective obstacles
o Protection of borders, installations
• Nuisance or Point minefields
• Ambush weapons
 Scope of Concern
• Legacy of previous use

• Use in current conflicts

• Use in future conflicts, including

conflict between major military powers
 IHL on AVMs
General rules of IHL apply to all
weapons including mines.

Specific rules
• CCW Convention.
o Protocol II on Landmines, Booby-traps and
Other Devices as amended on 03 May 1996
(APII)
• Anti-personnel landmine convention 1997
(Ottawa Convention)
 CCW Convention
Amended Protocol II
Article 1 - Application
Article 2 – Definitions
Article 3 – General Restrictions
Article 6 – Remotely delivered mines
Article 8 – Transfers
Article 9 – Recording
Article 10 – Removal
Article 12 – Protection
Technical Annex
 Article 2 Definitions
For the purpose of this Protocol:

"Mine" means a munition placed

under, on or near the ground or other
surface area and designed to be
exploded by the presence, proximity or
contact of a person or vehicle.
 Article 2 (Cont)
"Anti-personnel mine" means a mine
primarily designed to be exploded by the
presence, proximity or contact of a person
and that will incapacitate, injure or kill one
or more persons.

Mines minus APMs = MOTAPM or AVM

 Ottawa Definition

Mines designed to be detonated by the

presence, proximity or contact of a
vehicle as opposed to a person, that
are equipped with anti-handling
devices, are not considered anti-
personnel mines as a result of being so
equipped.
 CCW Article 2 (Cont)
• "Booby-trap" means any device or material which is
designed, constructed or adapted to kill or injure, and
which functions unexpectedly when a person disturbs or
approaches an apparently harmless object or performs an
apparently safe act.

• "Other devices" means manually-emplaced munitions

and devices including improvised explosive devices
designed to kill, injure or damage and which are activated
manually, by remote control or automatically after a lapse
of time.
 AVM Features causing
Humanitarian concerns
• Persistent fuzes
• Mines laid outside perimeter marked areas
• Sensitivity of fuze systems
o Pressure activated contact mines
o Trip wires, break wires, tilt rods
• Detectability of mines
• Remotely delivered mines
 Previous Work

CCW Rev Con – 1994-6

• AP II negotiated

CCW Rev Con – 2001

• US- DA Draft Protocol

CCW GGE – 2002-06

• Successive GGEs
• Draft Protocol (Reimaa 2, 2005)
 Previous Work

CCW Rev Con – 2006

• Draft Protocol Blocked by small group of states
• Declaration by States on AVM

CCW Rev Con – 2011

• Mandate for Expert Meeting – 2012
• Future meetings blocked – 2012 MSP
• Remains on CCW Agenda

GICHD – SIPRI AVM Study 2013-14

 Declaration 2006
Governments indicated intention to
• (i) not to use any anti-vehicle mine
outside of a perimeter-marked area if
that mine is not detectable.

• (ii) not to use any anti-vehicle mine

outside of a perimeter-marked area that
does not incorporate a self-destruction or
self-neutralization mechanism
 Declaration 2006
(iii) to prevent the transfer of any anti-vehicle
mine

(a) to any recipient other than a State or State

agency authorized to receive it;
(b) if it does not meet the detectability and active
life standards set out in this declaration..;
(c) to any State that has not stated the same policy
that is set out in this declaration; and
(d) without an end-user certificate.
 Declaration 2006
3. If it appears possible that consensus may be
achieved on a protocol on anti-vehicle mines,
each of our governments intends to join other
governments in efforts to adopt such a protocol.

4. Each of our governments encourages all States

that have not announced an intention to apply
the policies set out in this declaration to do so as
promptly as possible.
 Need for more data
• AVM or APM or Other Device
• Mine type and fuze type
• IEDs
o AP or AV
o Victim operated, command detonated, timed
o Targets – military, civilian, infrastructure,
economic etc.
o All IEDs (conventional) covered in AP II
 Other MOTPAM / AVM Data

• Mines cleared
• Types of mines and fuze
types
• Size of stockpiles
• Quantities of stockpiles
destroyed
• Details of new production
• Details of Transfers
 Factors impeding new
IHL
• Some states continue to maintain that
existing IHL is adequate.
• Some states have argued that there is
insufficient evidence of humanitarian
harm.
• Some states nervous that a process
could lead to pressure for a total ban.
• Some states nervous to make an effort
that might not succeed.
 Next steps
• Continue work on AVM – MOTPAM in all
relevant forums.
• Improve data acquisition and quality.
• Incidents, Stockpiles, Production, Minefields,
Clearance, Stockpile Destruction
• Seek updates from Declaration States on
national progress.
• Encourage more states to join Declaration.
• Confirm that mine transfers are compliant
with Declaration.
• Encourage sceptical states to engage on
issue.
 Desired End State

Agreement on IHL measures to address

remaining humanitarian concerns on
MOTAPM / AVM
 Future opportunities

• 2015/16 CCW Expert Meetings

• 2015 CCW MSP
• APLC MSP
• Possible Meetings of Experts on AVM /
MOTAPM
• 5 Review Conference, CCW, 2016
Unfinished business