CIVIL PROCEDURES CASE DIGESTS

03 September 2022
[G.R. No. 160261.November 10, 2003]

ERNESTO FRANCISCO, JR. vs. THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

FACTS:

● On June 2, 2003, former President Joseph E. Estrada filed an impeachment

complaint (first impeachment complaint) against Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide
Jr. and seven Associate Justices of this Court for "culpable violation of the
Constitution, betrayal of the public trust and other high crimes."

● It was October 22, 2003 when the House Committee on Justice voted to
dismiss the same for being insufficient in substance.

● The next day, October 23, 2003, Representatives Gilberto C. Teodoro, Jr.,
First District, Tarlac and Felix William B. Fuentebella, Third District, Camarines
Sur, filed another verified impeachment complaint with the Office of the
Secretary General of the House against Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr.,
alleging underpayment of the COLA of the members and personnel of the
judiciary from the JDF and unlawful disbursement of said fund for various
infrastructure projects and acquisition of service vehicles and other equipment.

● Subsequently, eighteen (18) petitions were filed and

consolidated by in this Court petitioning for Certiorari and Prohibition
asserting their rights, among others, as taxpayers, to stop the illegal spending of
public funds for the impeachment proceedings against the Chief Justice.
Petitioners contended that the filing of second impeachment complaint against
the Chief Justice was barred under Article XI, Sec. 3 (5) of the 1987 Constitution
which states that "no impeachment proceedings shall be initiated against the
same official more than once within a period of one year."

● On October 28, 2003, respondent House of Representatives submitted a

Manifestation asserting that this Court has no jurisdiction to hear, much less
prohibit or enjoin the House of Representatives, which is an independent and co
equal branch of government under the Constitution, from the performance of its
constitutionally mandated duty to initiate impeachment cases.

● On the same date, Senator Aquilino Pimentel, Jr. filed a Motion

to Intervene and prayed that the “consolidated petitions be dismissed for
lack of jurisdiction of the Court over the issues affecting the impeachment
proceedings and that the sole power, authority and jurisdiction of the Senate as
the impeachment court to try and decide impeachment cases, including the one
where the Chief Justice is the respondent, be recognized and upheld pursuant to
the provisions of Article XI of the Constitution.
 2
ISSUE/S:

• Whether or not the power of judicial review extends to those arising from
impeachment proceedings.

RULING:

The Supreme Court ruled in the affirmative.

Respondents are on the view that judicial review of impeachments undermines

their finality and may also lead to conflicts between Congress and the judiciary.
Thus, they call upon this Court to exercise judicial statesmanship on the principle
that "whenever possible, the Court should defer to the judgment of the people
expressed legislatively, recognizing full well the perils of judicial willfulness and
pride."

But did not the people also express their will when they instituted the above
mentioned safeguards in the Constitution? This shows that the Constitution did
not intend to leave the matter of impeachment to the sole discretion of Congress.

The Supreme has the exclusive power to resolve with definitiveness the issues of
constitutionality. It is duty bound to take cognizance of the petitions to exercise
the power of judicial review as the guardian of the Constitution.

This Court's power of judicial review is conferred on the judicial branch of the
government in Section 1, Article VIII of our present 1987 Constitution: SECTION
1. The judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in such lower
courts as may be established by law.

Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual
controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, and
to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting
to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any.

Finally, there exists no constitutional basis for the contention that the exercise of
judicial review over impeachment proceedings would upset the system of checks
and balances. Verily, the Constitution is to be interpreted as a whole and "one
section is not to be allowed to defeat another." Both are integral components of
the calibrated system of independence and interdependence that insures that no
branch of government act beyond the powers assigned to it by the Constitution.

3
 [G.R. No. 226679, August 15, 2017]

SALVADOR ESTIPONA, JR. vs. HON. FRANK LOBRIGO

FACTS:
• Petitioner Salvador A. Estipona, Jr. (Estipona) is the accused in Criminal Case No.
13586 for violation of Section 11, Article II of R.A. No. 9165 (Possession of
Dangerous Drugs).

• On June 15, 2016, Petitioner filed a Motion to Allow the Accused to Enter into a
Plea-Bargaining Agreement, praying to withdraw his not guilty plea and, instead,
to enter a plea of guilty for violation of Section 12, Article II of R.A. No. 9165
(Possession of Equipment, Instrument, Apparatus and Other Paraphernalia for
Dangerous Drugs).

• He argued that Section 23 of R.A. No. 9165 violates: (1) the intent of the law
expressed in paragraph 3, Section 2 thereof; (2) the rule-making authority of the
Supreme Court under Section 5 (5), Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution; and (3)
the principle of separation of powers among the three equal branches of the
government.

• On June 29, 2016, the prosecution manifested that it "is open to the Motion of
the accused to enter into plea bargaining to give life to the intent of the law as
provided in paragraph 3, Section 2 of [R.A. No.] 9165, however, with the express
mandate of Section 23 of [R.A. No.] 9165 prohibiting plea bargaining, [it] is left
without any choice but to reject the proposal of the accused."

• The accused opined that Sec. 23 of RA No. 9165, which prohibits plea bargaining,
encroaches on the exclusive constitutional power of the Supreme Court to
promulgate rules of procedure because plea bargaining is a "rule of procedure."
Indeed, plea bargaining forms part of the Rules on Criminal Procedure,
particularly under Rule 118, the rule on pre-trial conference. It is only the Rules of
Court promulgated by the Supreme Court pursuant to its constitutional rule
making power that breathes life to plea bargaining. It cannot be found in any
statute.

• On July 12, 2016, respondent Judge Frank E. Lobrigo of the Regional Trial Court
(RTC), Branch 3, Legazpi City, Albay, issued an Order denying Estipona's motion.
The accused filed a motion for reconsideration but it was denied on July 26,
2016. Hence this petition.

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ISSUE/S:
 • Whether Section 23 of Republic Act No. 9165 is unconstitutional as it encroached
upon the power of the Supreme Court to promulgate rules of procedure.

RULING:
The Supreme Court ruled in the affirmative.

Plea bargaining is a rule of procedure.

The Supreme Court's sole prerogative to issue, amend, or repeal procedural rules
is limited to the preservation of substantive rights, i.e., the former should not
diminish, increase or modify the latter.

"Substantive law is that part of the law which creates, defines and regulates rights,
or which regulates the right and duties which give rise to a cause of action; that
part of the law which courts are established to administer; as opposed to adjective
or remedial law, which prescribes the method of enforcing rights or obtain redress
for their invasions."

Considering the presence of mutuality of advantage, the rules on plea bargaining

neither create a right nor take away a vested right. Instead, it operates as a means
to implement an existing right by regulating the judicial process for enforcing
rights and duties recognized by substantive law and for justly administering
remedy and redress for a disregard or infraction of them.

Section 5 (5) Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution explicitly provides the power of
the Supreme Court to promulgate rules of pleading, practice and procedure which
is the Court’s exclusive domain and no longer shared with the Executive and
Legislative departments.

The rule making power of the Supreme Court was expanded by giving it the power
to promulgate rules concerning the protection and enforcement of constitutional
rights. It was also granted for the first time the power to disapprove rules of
procedure of special courts and quasi-judicial bodies.

But most importantly, the 1987 Constitution took away the power of Congress to
repeal, alter, or supplement rules concerning pleading, practice and procedure. In
fine, the power to promulgate rules of pleading, practice and procedure is no
longer shared by this Court with Congress, more so with the Executive.

5
The separation of powers among the three co-equal branches of our government
has erected an impregnable wall that keeps the power to promulgate rules of
pleading, practice and procedure within the sole province of this Court. The other
 branches trespass upon this prerogative if they enact laws or issue orders that
effectively repeal, alter or modify any of the procedural rules promulgated by the
Court.

To reiterate, the Court's authority to promulgate rules on pleading, practice, and

procedure is exclusive and one of the safeguards of the Court’s institutional
independence.

6
[G.R. No. 202836, June 19, 2018]

FIRST SARMIENTO PROPERTY HOLDINGS, INC. vs. PHILIPPINE BANK

 OF COMMUNICATIONS

FACTS:

● This resolves the Petition for Review filed by First Sarmiento Property
Holdings, Inc. assailing the 03 April 2012 Decision and July 25, 2012 Order
of Branch 11, Regional Trial Court, Malolos City, Bulacan in Civil Case No. 04-M
2012.

● 19 June 2002 – First Sarmiento obtained a loan from Philippine Bank of

Communications (PBCOM) P40,000,000.00 loan, which was secured by a real
estate mortgage over 1,076 parcels of land.

● 15 March 2003 – Loan agreement was amended with the increase of the loan
amount to P51,200,000.00.

● 15 September 2003 – Loan agreement was further amended, loan amount

increased to P100,000,000.00

● 02 January 2006 - PBCOM filed a Petition for Extrajudicial Foreclosure of Real

Estate Mortgage. It claimed in its Petition that it sent First Sarmiento several
demand letters, yet First Sarmiento still failed to pay the principal amount and
accrued interest on the loan. This prompted PBCOM to resort to extrajudicial
foreclosure of the mortgaged properties, a recourse granted to it under the loan
agreement.

● 27 December 2011 - First Sarmiento attempted to file a Complaint for

annulment of real estate mortgage with the Regional Trial Court. However, the
Clerk of Court refused to accept the Complaint in the absence of the mortgaged
properties' tax declarations, which would be used to assess the docket fees.

● On 29 December 2011, Executive Judge Renato C. Francisco (Judge

Francisco),First Vice-Executive Judge Ma. Theresa A. Mendoza Arcega, Second
Vice-Executive Judge Ma. Belen R. Liban, and Third Vice-Executive Judge Basilio
R. Gabo, Jr. of the Regional Trial Court of City of Malolos, Bulacan, granted First
Sarmiento's Urgent Motion to Consider the Value of Subject Matter of the
Complaint as Not Capable of Pecuniary Estimation, and ruled that First
Sarmiento's action for annulment of real estate mortgage was incapable of
pecuniary estimation.

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● 02 January 2012 - First Sarmiento filed a Complaint for annulment of real estate
mortgage and its amendments, with prayer for the issuance of temporary
restraining order and preliminary injunction. It paid a filing fee of P5,545.00.
● First Sarmiento claimed in its Complaint that it never received the loan proceeds
of P100,000,000.00 from PBCOM, yet the latter still sought the extrajudicial
foreclosure of real estate mortgage. It prayed for the issuance of a temporary
restraining order and preliminary injunction to enjoin the Ex-Officio Sheriff from
proceeding with the foreclosure of the real estate mortgage or registering the
certificate of sale in PBCOM's favor with the Registry of Deeds of Bulacan.

● That same day, Judge Francisco issued an ex-parte temporary restraining order for
72 hours, enjoining the registration of the certificate of sale with the Registry of
Deeds of Bulacan.

● 04 January 2012 - the Regional Trial Court directed the parties to observe the
status quo ante.

● 03 April 2012 - Branch 11, Regional Trial Court, 25 Malolos City, Bulacan
dismissed the Complaint for lack of jurisdiction.

● 25 July 2012 – The Regional Trial Court denied First Sarmiento’s motion for
reconsideration.

● 17 August 2012 - First Sarmiento sought direct recourse to this Court with its
Petition for Review under Rule 45. It insists that its Complaint for the annulment
of real estate mortgage was incapable of pecuniary estimation.

o Petitioner highlights that the Supreme Court in Lu v. Lu Ym held "that an

action for declaration of nullity of issuance of shares or an action
questioning the legality of a conveyance is one not capable of pecuniary
estimation.”
o It emphasizes that Home Guaranty Corporation v. R-II
Builders,which the Regional Trial Court relied on to dismiss its complaint
for lack of jurisdiction, was rendered by a division of the Supreme Court;
hence, it cannot modify or reverse a doctrine or principle of law laid down
by the Supreme Court.

● 30 May 2013 - the parties filed their respective memoranda.

o In its Memorandum, petitioner continues to insist that it did not receive the
loan proceeds from PBCOM. Petitioner reiterates that its Complaint for
annulment of real estate mortgage was an action incapable of pecuniary

8
estimation because it merely sought to remove the lien on its properties,
not the recovery or re-conveyance of the mortgaged properties.

o On the other hand, respondent in its Memorandum restates its stand that
 petitioner's Complaint involved a real action; hence, the estimated value of
the mortgaged properties should have been alleged and used as the basis
for the computation of the docket fees.
● There is a need to reassess the place of Home Guaranty v. R-II Builders in the
Court’s jurisprudence.
o In Home Guaranty,R-II Builders, Inc. (R-II Builders) filed a Complaint for
the rescission of the Deed of Assignment and Conveyance it entered into
with Home Guaranty Corporation and National Housing Authority. The
Complaint was initially determined to have a subject that is incapable of
pecuniary estimation and the docket fees were assessed and paid
accordingly.
o R-II Builders later filed a motion to admit its Amended and Supplemental
Complaint,The Regional Trial Court ruled that the Amended and
Supplemental Complaint involved a real action and directed R-II Builders
to pay the correct docket fees.
o Instead of paying the additional docket fees, R-II Builders withdrew its
Amended and Supplemental Complaint and instead filed a motion to admit
its Second Amended Complaint, which revived the prayer in its original
Complaint to resolve the Deed of Assignment and Conveyance and deleted
the causes of action for conveyance of title to and/or possession of the
entire Asset Pool in its Amended and Supplemental Complaint.
o The Court of Appeals upheld the ruling of the Regional Trial Court and
reiterated that the case involved a subject that was incapable of pecuniary
estimation. However, Home Guaranty reversed the Court of Appeals
Decision, ruling that the Complaint and the Amended and Supplemental
Complaint both involved prayers for the conveyance and/or transfer of
possession of the Asset Pool, causes of action which were undoubtedly real
actions.
o Home Guaranty stated that to determine whether an action is
capable or incapable of pecuniary estimation, the nature of the
principal action or remedy prayed for must first be determined.
ISSUE/S:

• Whether or not the Regional Trial Court obtained jurisdiction over First Sarmiento
Corporation, Inc.'s Complaint for annulment of real estate mortgage.

9
RULING

The Supreme court ruled in affirmative.

Nonetheless, if subject matter jurisdiction is assailed during the

 course of the trial and evidence is presented to prove the defense's
allegation of lack of jurisdiction, this will lead to an anomaly where
the defense's evidence, instead of the complaint, will effectively
determine the remedy and cause of action.

In the case at bar, petitioner contends that its complaint prayed for the
annulment of the real estate mortgage it entered into with respondent and not for
the recovery or reconveyance of the mortgaged properties because it was still the
registered owner when it filed its complaint. The evidence on record supports
petitioner's claim; hence, there was no reason for the dismissal of its Complaint
for lack of jurisdiction.

Home Guaranty likewise erred in dismissing the action because of non-payment

of the correct filing fees.

In light of the foregoing, this Court reaffirms that the nature of an action is
determined by the principal relief sought in the complaint, irrespective of the
other causes of actions that may also crop up as a consequence of the principal
relief prayed for. The contrary rule espoused in Home Guaranty is thereby set
aside.

The assailed April 3, 2012 Decision and July 25, 2012 Order of Branch 11,
Regional Trial Court, City of Malolos, Bulacan in Civil Case No. 04-M-2012 are
REVERSED and SET ASIDE.

10
[G.R. No. 140954, April 12, 2005, 455 SCRA 460]

HEIRS OF BERTULDO HINOG vs. MELICOR

FACTS
• 21 May 1991 - "Recovery of Ownership and Possession, Removal of Construction
and Damages" against the Balanes towards Bertuldo Hinog.

o They alleged that: they own a 1,399-square meter parcel of land situated in
Malayo Norte, Cortes, Bohol, designated as Lot No. 1714.

• March 1980 – the Balanes:

o Allowed Bertuldo to use a portion of the said property for a period of ten
years.
o Allowed the construction of a small house of light materials at a nominal
annual rental of P100.00
o After the expiration of the ten-year period, they demanded the return of the
occupied portion and removal of the house constructed thereon but
Bertuldo refused and instead claimed ownership of the entire
property.

• 02 July 1991 – Bertuldo alleged ownership of the disputed property by virtue of a

Deed of Absolute Sale dated July 2, 1980, executed by one Tomas Pahac with the
knowledge and conformity of private respondents.

• 18 November 1997 – After the pre-trial, trial on merits ensued with the private
respondents resting their case.

• 24 June 1998 – Bertuldo died without completing his evidence.

• 04 August 1998 – Atty. Tinampay withdrew as counsel for Bertuldo, Atty

Petalcorin then entered as a new counsel for Bertuldo.

• 22 September 1998 - Atty. Petalcorin filed a motion to expunge the complaint

from the record and nullify all court proceedings on the ground that private
respondents failed to specify in the complaint the amount of damages claimed so
as to pay the correct docket fees; and that under Manchester Development
Corporation vs. Court of Appeals, non-payment of the correct docket fee is
jurisdictional.

• 02 October 1998 – Atty. Petalcorin further alleged that the private respondents
failed to pay the correct docket fee.

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o since the main subject matter of the case cannot be estimated as it is for
recovery of ownership, possession and removal of construction.

• Private respondents opposed the motion to expunge on the following grounds:

o (a) said motion was filed more than seven years from the institution of the
case;
 o (b) Atty. Petalcorin has not complied with Section 16, Rule 3 of the Rules of
Court which provides that the death of the original defendant requires a
substitution of parties before a lawyer can have legal personality to
represent a litigant and the motion to expunge does not mention of any
specific party whom he is representing;
o (c) Collectible fees due the court can be charged as lien on the judgment;
and
o (d) Considering the lapse of time, the motion is merely a dilatory scheme
employed by petitioners.

• 21 January 1999 - the trial court, while ordering the complaint to be expunged
from the records and the nullification of all court proceedings taken for failure to
pay the correct docket fees, nonetheless, held:

o The Court can acquire jurisdiction over this case only upon the payment of
the exact prescribed docket/filing fees for the main cause of action, plus
additional docket fee for the amount of damages being prayed for in the
complaint, which amount should be specified so that the same can be
considered in assessing the amount of the filing fees. Upon the complete
payment of such fees, the Court may take appropriate action in the light
of the ruling in the case of Manchester Development Corporation vs.
Court of Appeals, supra.

ISSUE/S:

• Whether or not the petition for certiorari and prohibition is proper.

RULING:

It is worth noting that when Bertuldo filed his Answer on July 2, 1991, he did not
raise the issue of lack of jurisdiction for non-payment of correct
docket fees. Instead, he based his defense on a claim of ownership and
participated in the proceedings before the trial court.

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It was only in September 22, 1998 or more than seven years after filing the
answer, and under the auspices of a new counsel, that the issue of
jurisdiction was raised for the first time in the motion to expunge by
Bertuldo's heirs.

No formal substitution of the parties was effected within thirty days from date of
death of Bertuldo, as required by Section 16, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court.
 Needless to stress, the purpose behind the rule on substitution is the protection
of the right of every party to due process.

The list of names and addresses of the heirs was submitted sixteen months after
the death of Bertuldo and only when the trial court directed Atty. Petalcorin to
comply with the provisions of Section 16, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court. Strictly
speaking therefore, before said compliance, Atty. Petalcorin had no standing
in the court a quo when he filed his pleadings.

To be sure, certiorari under Rule 65 is a remedy narrow in scope and inflexible in

character. It is not a general utility tool in the legal workshop. It offers only a
limited form of review. Its principal function is to keep an inferior
tribunal within its jurisdiction.

Petitioners utterly failed to show that the trial court gravely abused its discretion
in issuing the assailed resolutions. On the contrary, it acted prudently, in
accordance with law and jurisprudence.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition for certiorari is DISMISSED for lack of MERIT.

13
[G.R. No. 105308. September 25, 1998.]

HERBERT CANG vs. COURT OF APPEALS and Spouses RONALD V.

CLAVANO and MARIA CLARA CLAVANO
FACTS:

● Petitioner Herbert Cang and Anna Marie Clavano who were

married on January 27, 1973, had three children, namely: Keith,
born on July 3, 1973; Charmaine, born on January 23, 1977, and
Joseph Anthony, born on January 3, 1981.

● Anna Marie Clavano filed for legal separation with alimony

pendente lite upon learning of her husband’s alleged
extramarital affair with their family friend, Wilma Soco.

● The Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court of Cebu rendered a

decision approving the joint manifestation of the Cang spouses
to legally separate. They also further agreed:
➔ That the children shall be entitled to a monthly support of ONE
THOUSAND PESOS (P1,000.00) and which shall constitute a first lien on
the net proceeds of the house and lot jointly owned by the parties situated
at Cinco Village, Mandaue City
➔ That the plaintiff shall be entitled to enter into any contract or agreement
with any person or persons, natural or juridical without the written consent
of the husband; or any undertaking or acts that ordinarily requires
husband's consent as the parties are by this agreement legally separated.

● Petitioner left for the US and filed for divorce from the
plaintiff before the Second Judicial District Court of the State
of Nevada. The said court issued a divorce decree and granted
custody to Anna Marie, reserving visitation rights to the
petitioner.

● The petitioner married an American woman and became a

naturalized American Citizen. In 1986, they got divorced.

● On September 25, 1987, respondents Ronald V. Clavano and Maria

Clara Diago Clavano, respectively the brother and sister-inlaw
of Anna Marie, filed Special Proceedings No. 1744-CEB for the
adoption of the three minor Cang children before the Regional
Trial Court of Cebu. The petition includes:
➔ Signature of 14-year old Keith Cang signifying consent to his adoption

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➔ Affidavit of consent filed by Anna Marie Clavano stating that her brother
and sister in law had been helping her raise her three children and keeping
her children would hamper her job- seeking ventures abroad. She also
claimed that her husband had “long forfeited his parental rights” for the
 following reasons:

1. The decision in Civil Case No. ID-707 allowed her to enter into any
contract without the written consent of her husband;
2. Her husband had left the Philippines to be an illegal alien in the United
States and had been transferring from one place to another to avoid
detection by Immigration authorities, and
3. Her husband had divorced her.

● The petitioner returned to the Philippines upon learning of the

adoption petition and filed an opposition.

● January 11, 1988 - The Regional Trial Court of Cebu issued an

order finding that Anna Marie had in effect, relinquished
custody of the children, therefore such custody should be
transferred to the father, The court directed the Clavanos to
deliver custody of the minors to the petitioner.

● March 27, 1990 - The Regional Trial Court of Cebu, Branch 14,
issued a decree of adoption with the following disposition:

"WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition for adoption of the

minors Keith, Charmaine and Joseph Anthony all surnamed Cang,by
the petitioners-spouses Ronald V. Clavano and Maria Clara Diago
Clavano are hereby granted and approved. These children shall
henceforth be known and called as Keith D. Clavano, Charmaine D.
Clavano and Joseph Anthony D. Clavano respectively. Moreover, this
Decree of Adoption shall:
(1) Confer upon the adopted children the same rights and duties as
though they were in fact the legitimate children of the petitioners; (2)
Dissolve the authority vested in the parents by nature, of the children;
and,
(3) Vest the same authority to the petitioners.

Furnish the Local Civil Registrar of Cebu City, Philippines with

a copy of this Decree of Adoption for registration purposes.

SO ORDERED.

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ISSUE/S:

• Whether or not minor children could be adopted without the written consent
of a natural parent on the ground that the latter has abandoned them
 • Whether or not the court has the authority to review the lower court's
decision through the writ of certiorari

RULING:

The petition for review on certiorari was granted. The decision made by the
Regional Trial Court of Cebu was set aside. The Court ruled that the adoption
must be denied because the petition was filed without the required consent of the
father, who by law and under the facts of the case at bar, has not abandoned
them.

16
[G.R. No. 83982. January 12, 1990]

JESUS C. JAKIHACA v. SPS LILIA AQUINO an APOLONIO AQUINO,

JOSE TORALDE, and HON. EMMA CENIDOZA-ONA
FACTS:

• 10 September 1986 – Petitioner Jesus Jakihaca filed an ejectment suit against

respondents-spouses Lilia Aquino and Apolonio Aquino, and Jose Toralde before
the Municipal Trial Court of San Mateo, Rizal on account of the latter’s refusal to
remove their houses despite verbal demand, which they have allegedly illegally
constructed without the knowledge and consent and against the will of the former.

• 03 November 1986 – Due to repeated refusal of respondents to appear before

the Barangay Lupon, they were served with summons pursuant to the Rules on
Summary Procedure upon issuance of a “certification to file action” by the Lupon
Chairman and Secretary.

The respondents filed and answer with Special and Affirmative Defenses alleging
that there was a verbal contract of tenancy between the defendants and the former
owner, Gloria Gener, further stated that they cannot be ejected under the Land
Reform Law more particularly P.D. No 1 due to the alleged fact that they are
agricultural tenant-farmers who occupied the place for more than 10 years.

• 22 December 1987 – It was found that the private respondents are not
agricultural tenant-farmers of the land in question, either through its former
Gloria Gener or through the present owner- petitioner Jesus Jakihaca.

Bound by their implied promise, that is to vacate the land upon demand, since
entering the premises 10 to 20 years ago, private respondents built their houses
thereon by tolerance from the former owner. Thus, the respondents were ordered
to:
1. remove their respective houses on the portion of the land occupied by
them and surrender possession thereof to the petitioner
2. pay the petitioner jointly and severally the amount of P3,000.00 for
attorney’s fees
3. reimburse the petitioner for the cost of the suit.

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• 08 April 1988 – Private respondents appealed to the RTC. The appellate court
dismissed the case on the ground that the lower court acted without jurisdiction.

• 21 April 1988 – Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration of the order

dismissal.
 • 25 June 1988 – Motion for reconsideration was denied

• 12 July 1988 – Not satisfied, this petition was filed

• 15 March 1989 – The Court in a minute resolution gave due course to the petition

ISSUE:

• Whether or not the Regional Trial Court was incorrect in dismissing Civil Case No.
616 for lack of jurisdiction

RULING:

YES. The Rule on Summary Procedure applies only in cases filed before the
Metropolitan Trial Court and Municipal Trial Courts, pursuant to Section 36 of
Batas Pambansa Blg. 129. Summary procedures have no application to cases
before the Regional Trial Courts. Hence, when the respondents appealed the
decision of the Municipal Trial Court to the Regional Trial Court, the applicable
rules are those of the latter court.

Respondents contend that the petition was filed with the wrong court. They are
mistaken.

In the case of Lacsamana v. Second Special Cases Division of the Intermediate

Appellate Court, 143 SCRA 643, We held that the final judgment or order of the
Regional Trial Court in an appeal from the final judgment or order of the
Metropolitan Trial Court, Municipal Trial Court and Municipal Circuit Trial
Court, may be appealed to the Court of Appeals through a petition for review in
accordance with Section 22 of the Interim Rules, or to the Supreme Court through
a petition for review on certiorari in accordance with Rule 45 of the Rules of Court
and Section 25 of the Interim Rules.

Clearly, the petitioners filed this appeal with a proper court.

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[G.R. No. 204528. February 19, 2013]

SECRETARY LEILA M. DE LIMA, DIRECTOR NONNATUS R. ROJAS AND

DEPUTY DIRECTOR REYNALDO O. ESMERALDA v. MAGTANGGOL B.
GATDULA

FACTS:
 • 27 February 2012 – Respondent Magtanggol B. Gatdula filed a petition for the
Issuance of a Writ of Amparo in the Regional Trial Court of Manila. And was
raffled to the sala of Judge Silvino T. Pampilo on the same day.

The Writ of Amparo was directed against De Lima, et al. “to cease and desistfrom
framing upGatdulaforthefake ambush incident by filing bogus charges of
Frustrated Murder against Gatdula in relation to the alleged ambush incident.”

• 01 March 2012 – Judge Pampilo set the case for hearing and issued summons
and ordered De Lima, et.al to file and Answer instead of deciding on whether to
issue a Writ of Amparo.

The hearing was allegedly for determining whether a temporary protection order
may be issued. During that hearing, counsel for De Lima, et.al manifested that a
Return, not an Answer is appropriate for Amparo cases.

• 2 March 2012 – Judge Pampilo in an Order, insisted that “since no writ has been
issued, return is not the required pleading but answer”. Further noted that, the
Rules of Court apply suppletorily in Amparo cases and that the Revised Rules of
Summary Procedure applied and thus required an Answer.

• 07 March 2012 – Even without a Return nor an Answer from De Lima, et.al,
Judge Pampilo proceeded to conduct a hearing on the main case.

• 20 March 2012 – The Regional Trial Court granted the Writ of Amparo and other
interim reliefs namely: temporary protection, production and inspection orders.

• 08 October 2012 – RTC denied the Motion for Reconsideration thus prompted
Sec. De Lima, et.al to come to this court assailing the decision of RTC through a
Petition for Review via Rule 45, as enunciated in Section 19 of the Rule on the
Writ of Amparo.

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It is the Court’s view that the “Decision” granting the Writ of Amparo is not the
judgment or final order contemplated under this rule. Hence, a Petition for Review
under Rule 45 may not yet be the proper remedy at this time.

ISSUES:

• Whether or not the “Decision” dated 20 March 2012 could be a judgment or final
order that is appealable via Rule 45 as enunciated under Section 19 of the Rule on
the Writ of Amparo
RULING:

NO. The “Decision” dated 20 March is an interlocutory order since it pertained to

the issuance of the Writ under Section 6 of the Rule on the Writ of Amparo, not
the judgment under Section 18.

The “Decision” being an interlocutory order is suggested by the fact that

temporary protection, production and inspection orders were given together with
the decision. The temporary protection, production and inspection orders are
interim reliefs that may be granted by the court upon filing of the petition but
before final judgment is rendered. Hence, a Petition for Review under Rule 45
may not yet be the proper remedy at this time since such remedy can only be
availed for a final order such as a judgment under section 18 of the Rule on
Amparo.

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