Jacutin, Mark Vencent P.

Remedial Review I-Judge Emmanuel Pasal

Case Digest for August 23-24, 2023
1. Bustos vs. Lucero, 81 Phil 648, March 8, 1949
Topic: General Principles-Substantive law v. Remedial law
Facts:
Dominador B. Bustos was the petitioner while Antonio G. Lucero was the
respondent.
During preliminary investigation, after pleading guilty of a crime, Bustos sought a
reconsideration of the decision arguing that his constitutional right to be confronted by
the witnesses against him was violated. However the fiscal and the private prosecutor
objected invoking Section 11 of Rule 108.
Hence the petition.
Issue:
Whether Bustos constitutional rights was violated.
Ruling:
The Court ruled that Section 11 of Rule 108 defines the bounds of the defendant’s
right in the preliminary investigation, there is nothing in it or any other law restricting the
authority inherent in a court of justice to pursue a course of action reasonably calculated
to bring out the truth. The constitutional rights of an accused to be confronted by the
witnesses against him does not apply to preliminary hearings nor will be the absence of a
preliminary examination be an infringement of his right to confront witnesses. The
contention that section 11 of Rule 108 of the Rules of Court infringes section 13, Article
VIII of the Constitution is not true. Section 11 of Rule 108, like a predecessors, is an
adjective law and not a substantive law or substantive right. Substantive law creates
substantive rights and the two terms in this respect may be said to be synonymous.
Substantive rights is a term which includes those rights which one enjoys under the legal
system prior to the disturbance of normal relations. Substantive law is that part of the law
which creates, defines and regulates rights, or which regulates the rights and duties
which give rise to a cause of action; that part of the law which courts are established to
administer; as opposed to adjective or remedial law, which prescribes the method of
enforcing rights or obtains redress for their invasion. Preliminary investigation is
evidently and essentially remedial; it is the first step taken in a criminal prosecution.
Preliminary investigation is not an essential part of the due process of law. It may be
suppressed entirely, and if this may be done, mere restriction of the privilege formerly
enjoyed thereunder cannot be held to fall within the constitutional prohibition. Lastly, the
distinction between remedy and substantive law is incapable of exact definition. The
difference is somewhat a question of degree. It is difficult to draw a line in any particular
case beyond which legislative power over remedy and procedure can pass... without
touching upon the substantive right of parties affected, as it is impossible to fix the
boundary by any general condition. Thus, the motion for reconsideration is granted.
2. Fabian vs. Desierto G.R. No. 129742. September 16, 1998
Topic: Substantive law v. Remedial law

Facts:
Teresita G. Fabian was the major stockholder and president of PROMAT
Construction Corporation. She filed an administrative complaint against Agustin, an
employee of the corporation, accusing him of dishonesty, misconduct, and violation of
company rules and regulations. The Office of the Ombudsman conducted an investigation
and found Agustin guilty of the charges. As a result, Agustin was dismissed from service.
Aggrieved by the decision, Agustin filed an appeal before the Court of Appeals,
questioning the jurisdiction of the Ombudsman to investigate and decide administrative
cases involving private individuals. Fabian elevated the case to the SC, arguing that
Section 27 of Republic Act No. 6770 (Ombudsman Act of 1989) that all administrative
disciplinary cases, orders, directives or decisions of the Office of the Ombudsman may be
appealed to the Supreme Court by filing a petition for certiorari within ten (10) days from
receipt of the written notice of the order, directive or decision or denial of the motion for
reconsideration in accordance with Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.
Issue:
Whether administrative disciplinary cases, orders, directives or decisions of the
Office of the Ombudsman may be appealed to the Supreme Court.
Ruling:
The Court ruled, No. Section 27 of Republic Act No. 6770 cannot validly
authorize an appeal to this Court from decisions of the Office of the Ombudsman in
administrative disciplinary cases. In determining whether a rule prescribed by the
Supreme court for the practice and procedure of the lower courts, abridges, enlarges, or
modifies any substantive right, the test is whether the rule really regulates procedure, that
is the judicial process for enforcing rights and duties recognized by substantive law and
for justly administering remedy and redress for a disregard or infraction of them. If the
rule takes away a vested right it is not procedural and if it creates a right such as the right
to appeal, it may be classified as a substantive matter but if it operates as a means of
implementing an existing right then the rule deals merely with procedure. Furthermore, it
cannot be said that the transfer of appellate jurisdiction to the Court of Appeals is an act
of creating a new right of appeal because such power of the Supreme Court to transfer
appeals to subordinate appellate courts is purely a procedural and not substantive power.
Thus, Section 27 of R.A No. 6770 together with Section 7, Rule III of
Administrative Order No. 07 Rules of Procedure of the Office of the Ombudsman and
any other provision of the law or issuance implementing the aforesaid Act and insofar as
they provide for appeals in administrative disciplinary cases from the Office of the
Ombudsman to the Supreme Court are hereby declared invalid and of no further force
 and effect. Thus instant petition is hereby referred to the Court of Appeals for final
disposition not to Supreme Court.

3. In re NPC, A.M. NO. 05-10-20-SC

Topic: Rule-Making Power of the Supreme Court

Facts:
The National Power Corporation (NPC) seeks clarification from the Court on
whether or not it is exempt from the payment of filing fees, appeal bonds and supersedeas
bonds. NPC contended Section 22 of Rule 141. The Court Resolved, upon the
recommendation of the Office of the Court Administrator, deny that the National Power
Corporation (NPC) is still exempt from the payment of filing fees, appeals bond, and
supersedeas bonds pursuant to Section 13 of P.D. No.938 and Sec 5(5) Article VIII of the
Constitution in the rule-making power of the Supreme Court over rules on pleading,
practice and procedure in all court, which include the sole power to fix the filing fees of
cases in courts. Hence the suit was filed.

Issue:
Whether NPC is not exempt from payment of filing fees.

Ruling:
Under the 1935 Constitution, the power SC to promulgate rules concerning
pleading, practice and procedure was granted but it appeared to be co-existent with
legislative power for it was subject to the Congress to repeal, alter or supplement same
through under 1973 Constitution particularly Section 13 Article VIII. However, under the
1987 Constitution, the rule making power of SC was expanded. The Supreme Court for
the first time was given the power to promulgate rules concerning the protection and
enforcement of constitutional rights. The Court was also granted for the first time the
power to disapprove rules of procedure of special courts and quasi-judicial bodies.
Significantly, the 1987 Constitution took away the power of Congress to repeal, alter, or
supplement rules concerning pleading, practice and procedure. In fine, the power to
promulgate rules of pleading, practice and procedure is no longer shared by this Court
with Congress, more so with the Executive. Thus, NPC can no longer invoke R.A. No.
6395 known as NPC Charter as amended by P.D. No. 938 as its basis for exemption from
the payment of legal fees.
4. Estipona vs. Lobrigo, G.R. No. 226679. August 15, 2017
Topic: Rule-Making Power of the Supreme Court
Facts:
Salvador A. Estipona, Jr. was charged with criminal case for violation of Section
11, Article II of R.A. No. 9165 (Possession of Dangerous Drugs). Estipona filed a Motion
to Allow the Accused to Enter into a Plea Bargaining Agreement praying to withdraw his
not guilty plea and, instead, to enter a plea of guilty for violation of Section 12, Article II
of R.A. No. 9165 (Possession of Equipment, Instrument, Apparatus and Other
Paraphernalia for Dangerous Drugs) with a penalty of rehabilitation in view of his being a
first-time offender and the minimal quantity of the dangerous drug seized in his
possession. However, Section 23 of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9165, or the
"Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002" which provides:
SEC 23. Plea-Bargaining Provision. - Any person charged under any provision
of this Act regardless of the imposable penalty shall not be allowed to avail of the
provision on plea-bargaining.
Estipona argued that Section 23 of R.A. No. 9165 violates: (1) the intent of the
law expressed in paragraph 3, Section 2 thereof; (2) the rule-making authority of the
Supreme Court under Section 5(5), Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution; and (3) the
principle of separation of powers among the three equal branches of the government. But
an order from the Court denying Estipona's motion. Hence the petition.

Issue:
Whether Section 23 of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9165 unconstitutional.

Ruling:
The Court ruled, Yes. Section 23 of R.A. No. 9165 is unconstitutional for being
contrary to the rule-making authority of the Supreme Court under Section 5(5), Article
VIII of the 1987 Constitution. The rule-making power of the Supreme Court under the
1987 Constitution explicitly provides that the power to promulgate rules of pleading,
practice and procedure is now the exclusive domain of the Supreme Court and no longer
shared with the Executive and Legislative departments. Plea bargaining is a rule of
procedure. The Supreme Court's sole prerogative to issue, amend, or repeal procedural
rules is limited to the preservation of substantive rights. Substantive law is that part of the
law which creates, defines and regulates rights, or which regulates the right and duties
which give rise to a cause of action; that part of the law which courts are established to
 administer; as opposed to adjective or remedial law, which prescribes the method of
enforcing rights or obtain redress for their invasions. In the case of Fabian v. Hon.
Desierto it laid down the test for determining whether a rule is substantive or procedural
in nature. If the rule takes away a vested right, it is not procedural. If the rule creates a
right such as the right to appeal, it may be classified as a substantive matter; but if it
operates as a means of implementing an existing right then the rule deals merely with
procedure. Thus, Section 23 of Republic Act No. 9165 is declared unconstitutional for
being contrary to the rule-making authority of the Supreme Court under Section 5(5),
Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution.

5. Lu vs. Lu YM Sr. G.R. No. 153690 & 157381 February 15, 2011
Topic: Rule-Making Power of the Supreme Court

Facts:
The three consolidated cases stemmed from the complaint for “Declaration of
Nullity of Share Issue, Receivership and Dissolution. The case involves a dispute
between family members over the ownership and control of corporations. David Lu,
Paterno Lu YM Sr., Paterno Lu YM Jr., Victor Lu YM, John Lu YM, Kelly Lu YM, and
Ludo & Luym Development Corporation were parties to the case. David Lu filed a
complaint seeking, among other things, to declare certain corporate documents as null
and void and to remove Paterno Lu YM Sr. as the corporate president. The case was filed
before the Regional Trial Court (RTC). The RTC dismissed the complaint for David Lu's
failure to pay the correct docket fees. David Lu appealed the dismissal to the Court of
Appeals but the CA affirmed the RTC's decision.

Issue:
Whether the trial court acquired jurisdiction over the case.

Ruling:
The Supreme Court held that the trial court did not acquire jurisdiction over the
case due to David Lu's failure to pay the correct docket fees. Therefore, all interlocutory
orders issued by the trial court, including the dismissal of the complaint, are considered
void. The Court emphasized that the payment of the correct docket fees is essential for
the trial court to acquire jurisdiction over the case. Failure to pay the correct fees deprives
the court of jurisdiction, and any judgment rendered without jurisdiction is null and void.
Even the Amended Complaint was filed on March 31, 2003 during which time the
applicable rule expressed that paragraphs (a) and (b) l & 3 shall be the basis for
computing the filing fees in intra-corporate cases, recognizing that there could be an
intra-corporate controversy where the value of the subject matter cannot be estimated,
such as an action for inspection of corporate books. The immediate illustration shows that
no mistake can even be attributed to the RTC clerk of court in the assessment of the
 docket fees. Moreover, assuming there was deficiency in paying the docket fees and
assuming further that there was a mistake in computation, the deficiency may be
considered a lien on the judgment that may be rendered, there being no established intent
to defraud the government. Thus, the assailed Resolutions of August 4, 2009 and
September 23, 2009 are reversed and set aside. The Court’s Decision of August 26, 2008
is reinstated. The Court of Appeals is directed to resume the proceedings and resolve the
remaining issues.

6. Dagan vs. Ombudsman, G.R. No. 184083, November 19, 2013

Topic: Principle of Judicial Hierarchy

Facts:
The case involves a petition filed by William C. Dagan against the Office of the
Ombudsman. Dagan sought to declare as null and void the resolution issued by the Office
of the Ombudsman, which found him guilty of grave misconduct and imposed the penalty
of dismissal from service. Dagan argued that the Office of the Ombudsman violated his
right to due process by denying his motion for reconsideration without giving him the
opportunity to present additional evidence and arguments.

Issue:
Whether the Office of the Ombudsman violated the petitioner's right to due
process by denying his motion for reconsideration without allowing him to present
additional evidence and arguments.

Ruling:
The Supreme Court ruled, No. The Office of the Ombudsman did not violate
Dagan's right to due process. The Ombudsman, in the exercise of its quasi-judicial
powers, has the discretion to grant or deny a motion for reconsideration. It is required to
act in accordance with law and established procedure, it is not obliged to grant every
motion for reconsideration and allow the presentation of additional evidence. Basic is the
rule that the findings of fact of the Office of the Ombudsman are conclusive when
supported by substantial evidence and are accorded due respect and weight, especially
when, as in this case, they are affirmed by the Court of Appeals. It is only when there is
grave abuse of discretion by the Ombudsman that a review of factual findings may aptly
be made. In reviewing administrative decisions, it is beyond the province of this Court to
weigh the conflicting evidence, determine the credibility of witnesses, or otherwise
substitute its judgment for that of the administrative agency with respect to the
 sufficiency of evidence. It is not the function of this Court to analyze and weigh the
parties evidence all over again except when there is serious ground to believe that a
possible miscarriage of justice would thereby result.

In this case, the Court found that the Office of the Ombudsman had already given
Dagan ample opportunity to present his evidence and arguments during the investigation.
The denial of his motion for reconsideration, without allowing the presentation of
additional evidence, did not amount to a violation of his right to due process. Thus, the
instant petition is denied for lack of merit.

7. Pacific Ace Finance vs. Yanagisawa, G.R. No. 175303, April 11, 2012
Topic: Doctrine of Non-Interference/Judicial Stability

Facts:
Eiji Yanagisawa, a Japanese national and Evelyn F. Castañeda, a Filipina were
married. Evelyn purchased a townhouse unit located at Bo. Sto. Niño, Parañaque. But due
to circumstances, Eiji filed a complaint for the declaration of nullity of his marriage with
Evelyn on the ground of bigamy. The complaint was raffled to the Regional Trial Court
of Makati (Makati RTC). During the pendency of the case, Eiji filed a Motion for the
Issuance of a Restraining Order against Evelyn and an Application for a Writ of a
Preliminary Injunction. He asked that Evelyn be enjoined from disposing or encumbering
all of the properties registered in her name. At the hearing on the said motion, Evelyn and
her lawyer voluntarily undertook not to dispose of the properties registered in her name
during the pendency of the case, thus rendering Eiji’s application and motion moot.
Evelyn obtained a loan of ₱500,000.00 from petitioner Pacific Ace Finance Ltd.
(PAFIN). To secure the loan, Evelyn executed on August 25, 1998 a real estate mortgage
(REM) in favor of PAFIN over the Parañaque townhouse unit. The instrument was
submitted to the Register of Deeds of Parañaque City for annotation on the same date. At
the time of the mortgage, Eiji’s appeal in the nullity of marriage case was pending before
the CA. The Makati RTC had dissolved Eiji and Evelyn’s marriage, and had ordered the
liquidation of their registered properties, including the Parañaque townhouse unit, with its
proceeds to be divided between the parties. The Decision of the Makati RTC did not lift
or dissolve its October 2, 1996 Order on Evelyn’s commitment not to dispose of or
encumber the properties registered in her name. Eiji learned of the REM upon its
annotation. Deeming the mortgage as a violation of the Makati RTC’s Order, Eiji filed a
complaint for the annulment of REM against Evelyn and PAFIN. The complaint was
raffled to Regional Trial Court of Parañaque City (Parañaque RTC). Hence the petition.
Issue:
Whether the Parañaque RTC can rule on the issue of ownership, even as the same
issue was already ruled upon by the Makati RTC and is pending appeal in the CA.

Ruling:
The Court agrees with the CA. The issue of ownership and liquidation of
properties acquired during the cohabitation of Eiji and Evelyn has been submitted for the
resolution of the Makati RTC, and is pending appeal before the CA. The doctrine of
judicial stability or non-interference dictates that the assumption by the Makati RTC over
the issue operates as an "insurmountable barrier" to the subsequent assumption by the
Parañaque RTC. By insisting on ruling on the same issue, the Parañaque RTC effectively
interfered with the Makati RTC’s resolution of the issue and created the possibility of
conflicting decisions. It is a familiar principle that when a court of competent jurisdiction
acquires jurisdiction over the subject matter of a case, its authority continues, subject
only to the appellate authority, until the matter is finally and completely disposed of, and
that no court of co-ordinate authority is at liberty to interfere with its action. This doctrine
is applicable to civil cases, to criminal prosecutions, and to courts-martial. The principle
is essential to the proper and orderly administration of the laws; and while its observance
might be required on the grounds of judicial comity and courtesy, it does not rest upon
such considerations exclusively, but is enforced to prevent unseemly, expensive, and
dangerous conflicts of jurisdiction and of the process. An injunction or restraining order
must be obeyed while it remains in full force and effect until the injunction or restraining
order has been set aside, vacated, or modified by the court which granted it, or until the
order or decree awarding it has been reversed on appeal. The injunction must be obeyed
irrespective of the ultimate validity of the order, and no matter how unreasonable and
unjust the injunction may be in its terms. Thus, the petition is denied for lack of merit.