Policy Studies Journca, Vol. 21, No.

1,1993 (104-114)

Reforming Local Govemment Policymaking

and Management Through Organizational
Learning and Experimentation: The Case of
Norway
Harold Baldersheim and Per Stava

This article preserUs Mo ongoing programs of local government rtform in

Norway, the Free Commune Program and the Pilot Commtme Program.
These programs are fairly typical ofthinlang on local government develop-
ment in the Nordic countries at the moment. On the one hand, the welfare
states are seen as being in danger cf becoming overloaded. On the other
hand, local government is seen as being in need of developing a capacity to
respond better to local communities; consequently, national regulationshave
to become less standardized in order to allow for greater local adaptability
and more variation. The emergent mumcipal organizational models reflect
a more community-oriented approach to local government and a deemphasis
on loca! governments as distributive channels for central ministries. A New
Nordic Welfare Model is emerging with more emphasis on local initiatives.

During the latter half of the 1980s a new vocabulary of local govemment
reform started emwging in the Nordic countries. Terms like "pathfinders," "free
communes," and "pilots" were increasingly used to describe approaches to change and
reorganization conceming the local authorities. Local authorities having long been
regarded as mere appendages to the welfare state, instruments for the implementation
of welfare policies, or distributive channels for public goods, and having beai
organizedonpattons that faciiitatedavotical integration with the national govemment's
many agencies (Kjellberg 1988), they are now increasingly seeing their own organi-
zation as overly segmented and, therefore, out of tune with the demands of changing
local communities. Their organizational pattems seem to be changing from a distribu-
tive model to a more community-oriented one. While the former type emphasizes the
role of local authorities as distributive mechanisms for national pobcies, the latter
emphasizes their role as decisionmaking arenas for local communities, or in Dahl and
Tufte'sphrase, as bodies responsible for"respondingfully to the collective preferences
of their citizens" (Dahl & Tufte, 1973, pp. 20ff.).
Both the approach to change in local govemment as well as the actual models
local authorities want to try out, reflect the trend mentioned above. The trend is even
inho-ent in the vocabulary of change now in vogue. "Free commune," "pilot com-
munes," and "pathfinders" are terms that conjure up images of organizations and actors
wanting to take control of their own destiny, and at the same time being on an open-
ended course of development, indeed of organizations in a continuous state of
adaptation. As a reform strategy the new approach is characterized by a combination
of learning and experimentation which join central and local govemment together in
learning partnerships. The central govemment's motivation for such a strategy comes
Symposium on Local Government Policymaking and Manageinent: BaldersheirrVStava

largelyfinima perception of an overloaded welfare state. Initiatives and responsibili-

ties are shifted to the local level. In local government, the yeais of growth led to more
and better qualified staff, which increasingly felt that national regulations of OTganiza-
tion and management were unnecessary shackles on their competence.
This article will present two majorpro^^ns illustrating this new ^pfsoach—OK
free commune program and the pilot commune program. The fiee commune program
opened the wayfcrlooseninglocalauthoritiesfiomaministaialgnpmanyaudioritiesfound
restrictive in their search for pattems of efficient service delivery (Harsheim & Rose,
1987). The pilot commune program followed in the path qjened by the free
communes. The pilot communes have taken a fresh look at the basic way of organizing
their activities. They have found that their current organization is not well tuned to
tackling the challenges they now face—challenges more complex than they used to be.
Some are now in a process of a radical reorganization.
The following presentation of the free commune program is structured so as
to highlight the new strategy of reform indicated above. The presentation of the pilot
commune program is focused on the conlentsof reform (i.e., the organizational models
that local authorities are currently developing in order to achieve the goal of more
community-oriented decisionmaking).

The Free Commune Program

Local Govemment Reform as a Learning Cycle

The free commune programs represent an approach to local govemment
reform that has now spread to all Nordic countries except Iceland. In the 1980s,
Sweden, Denmark, Norway, and Finland all introduced such programs (Engen, 1988;
Rose, 1989; Stahlberg, 1990), along with other schemes to "modernize" public
administration (Olsen, 1988). The core of the free commune programs is the establish-
ment of a legal procedure for granting dispensations to local authorities from national
legislation and regulations (the technical details of this procedure vary from one
country to another). The basic idea is that he who has the shoe on is enabled to tell where
it pinches, and in some cases a change of shoes is allowed, with the further purpose of
finding out whether or not the new type of footwear being tried out might be an
altogether better solution for everyone concemed.
Arguably, some aspects of this approach to local govemment reform might
take "theScandinavianmodel" some steps towards an "autonomy"modelof central-local
relations; some even claim that the approach smacks of a laissez-faire attitude, with
privatization of local services looming on the horizon. Other aspects of the free
commune programs belong firmly in the traditional Scandinavian postwar model of
integration of central and local levels of govemment (Kjellberg, 1988; Dente &
Kjellberg, 1988). The bottom-up and teaming approach might even amount to a
reconstruction of the central-local partnership, one that is more adapted to a situation
with greater professional competence at the local level and more demanding citizens
knocking at the doors of local govemment.
Here, the free commune programs are emphasized as strategies for organi-
zational leaming. The central aspect of organizational teaming is a process whereby

105
Policy Studies Journai, 21:1

an organizatioi is able to COTrect its course of action cm the basis of information about
consequences of its own previous actions and decisi(»isOTon the basis of infonn^on
about the ccHisequences of the actions and decisionsof others (March &01sen, 1976;
Brad>ak & Olsen, 1980). An OTganization may be able to leam both from its o>»^
experiences and fvcm those of others. It does not have to make all the mistakes itself
in cxdet to team, which is rather the point of the free commune programs.
The setup of the free commune i»ograms can quite readily be reconstructed
as a leaming cycle. The process is subdivided into four phases with distinct sets of
participants and (Hitcomes. First, local authOTities are mobilized by the central
govemment issuing invitations to submit ^jplications to become free communes (i.e.,
they are asked to point to legislation which they think stands in the way of a more
rational way of doing things locally, and from which they have the oppOTtunity to sedc
a waiver). TTie outcome of the first phase is a set of local initiatives concaning
experimental projects and ^jptications for dispensations. The larger the number of
such initiatives, the better is the outlook for creating a rational process of leaming. The
assumption behind this way of strucuidng the mobilization process is that local
authorities actually see national regulations as a problem to local adaptation, and that
they think that being granted a free commune status will be a relevant soluticm to their
problem. If this assumption is valid, the process of mobilization may tum into an
avalanche of ^iplications. If it is not valid, the process may die down like seeds faUrai
on stony ground. A third possible outcome may be that many local authorities had not,
at the outset,thought of national regulations as a problem, but that the free commune
initiative made them aware that such regulations might be a hindrance for them. In the
latter case, the mobilization process may take the form of an awakening, first with a
small groupof highly aware authorities seeking the haven of free commune status, with
a growing tide following these leaders later. In the next phase, the central govemmait
makes a selection from the poo! of local initiatives. The outeome here is a set of
experimental projects to be carried outby local authorities on the basis of dispensations.
The composition of this setof initiatives determines thescopeofleaming that can occur
asaresultof the projects. The more structured the selection is,themorestmcturedthe
leaming process will be. That is, if the aim is to generate experiences of relevance to
all authorities, there must be a selection of experimental authorities and projects that
are rejHesentative of the universe of authorities. At the national level, the process of
selection will have to take place in an instiuitional envinmment that is highly
segmaited (Egeberg, Olsen, & Saetren, 1978) and also noted for its corporatist
character (Hemes, 1978). These characteristics of the national political system make
it likely that the process of selection will become one of bargaining just as much as one
of rational choice, and so the final shape of an individual project may differ substan-
tially from what the municipality originally had in mind.
However, if experiences are to be generated, the experimental authorities
have to possess an ability to implement the projects that have been selected, so that there
are some kind of results on the basis of which the projects may be judged. In the
Norwegian version of the free commune program, the first step of implementation is
the fulfillment of the requirement that the free commune works outaset of local bylaws
that are substitutes fOT the paragr£5)hs from which the authority is seeking a dispensa-

106
Symposium on Local Government Policymaking and Management: Baldersheim/Stava

tion. This may in some cases be a complex process since many poojects involve several
acts or cut across the donfiains of several ministries. Next, implementaticm will require
the maintenance of attention, resources, and suppOTt at the local level. Municipal
leacters will always be exposed to competing claims on thdr attention and loyalty. So
the implementation of an experimental project, although initiated with gresu enthusi-
asm, cannot be taken for granted.
Evaluation is has seen as the establishment of systonatic dtannels of
feedback to decisionmakers from the level where the project is carried out.
Decisionmakffl^ that are supposed to leam from the free commune projects are located
in the experimenting authority, in ministries at the nation^ level, and in other local
authorities that are supposed to benefit from successful projects. Opinion fcxmation
and leaming may, of course, also be based on other foundations than systematic
evaluation, such as rumors, ideologies, and fashions (i.e., "superstitious leaming")
(Mareh & Olsen, 1976).
The four phases of the leaming cycle outiined above lead to the four general
research questions which the next part ofthe paper seeks to address: (a) how effective
was the mobilization process (i.e., how many and varied initiatives came from the local
level in response to the central govemment's invitation? (b) how rigorous was the
selection process (did the central government manage to screen the initiatives)? (c) to
what extent did the local authorities manage to implement their projects? (d) how
systOTiatic was the evaluation process set up (how much did the central govemment
know about results of the local projects)?

Did the Strategy Work?

Some lessons can be drawn from each ofthe four phases ofthe leaming cycle
presented in the previous section.

Mobilization
The free commune programs assumed that local aithodties were waiting for
an opportunity to introduce innovations. If the central coik were to be removed from
the bottie, innovative initiatives would flow freely from below. In Norway, 47 local
authorities applied to become free communes, or around 10% of all authorities (tiie
proportion of initial applicants was much the same in the other Nordic countries also).
The low number of authorities that actually responded suggests that the "theory" of
innovation mentioned above may be false. Few and far between are those authorities
sitting there in frustration over central regulations, waiting with innovations. The
reality is either that local authorities have many ways of getting around central control
when they have a problem to solve (i.e., that their innovative capacity is sufficiendy
high) or the case may be that they have a very low innovative capacity, ground down
by routine tasks and a chronic shortage of funds. With a large number of local
authorities like that, the time period allowed for applications was much too short
If the forms' is the case, the free commune programs are supoiluous, at least
as seen from the point of view of local authorities; the programs serve mostiy to
enhance the images of the political masters at the center. If the latter is the case, a
different approach than the free commune strategy is needed, one that follows the

107
Policy Studies Journal, 21:1

"gardening" approach suggested by March and Olsen (1983), whereby innovative

aqjacity is built up slowly and painstakingly.
However, the latter may be too pessimistic a view. We have at a later stage
seal an increasing willingness among local authorities to initiate audacious experi-
mental (Kojects of many kinds (some of which are described below). The idea of
experimentation is catehing on; in addition to theOTiginalfreecommunes there is now
a wave of experimenting pilot communes (note below) followed by a wave of
"renewal" communes. So if our observations are extended to take in what is happening
in the wake of the free communes, an "awakening" may beabetter characteristic of the
process of mobilization than "seeds on stony ground."

Selection
Among the applicants, 20 municipalities and 6 counties were selected as free
communes (i.e., around half of those applying). As of September, 1990, a total of 305
dispensations were granted from 88 different acts and regulations (Hovik, 1990). TTie
initial selection of free communes was a fairly strict screening accoiding to preset
criteria which ensured that a variety of types of aithorities was represented among the
free communes, geographically and otherwise. With regard to project details and the
drafting of by laws, however, selection seems to have been a bargaining process just as
much as rational choices. In more than a few cases, ministries proved reluctant to give
up responsibility and control to local authorities, especially where the transfer of
functions to the local level was the issue, and not only the intemal organization of an
individual municipality. In some cases, bargaining took nearly a year and a half to
complete, and some issues had to be resolved by ministerial intervention or aftar
Cabinet discussions. However, the selection processes could also be seen to generate
new role sets in caitral-local relations. Many ministries and local authorities appeared
in their traditional roles, as guardians of institutional turfs and champions of local
autonomy, respectively. However, the advocate role played by the Ministry of Local
Government's civil servants responsible for the free commune programs tumed the
bargaining into a new type of three-way game (Baldersheim & Fimreite, 1989). The
introduction of the advocates into the traditional two-party game made the game less
adversarial and prisoners' dilemma-like than it had been on many occasions in the past
(Fevoldoi & Sorensen, 1983). A similar role seems also to have been developed by
the corresponding ministries in the other Nordic countries (Fimreite, 1990). Small
authorities, especially, seem to have felt that such a supportive role was helpful in their
dealings with reluctant ministries (Pedersen, 1989). Without the advocates, the setof
experimental projects would definitely have been narrower than it tumed out to be.

Iiiy}lementation
Bylaws for around 70 projects had been approved as of September, 1990, out
of a total of 97 preliminarily approved projects. Out of these 70,65 projects were
opCTational. This is a fairly good rate of implementation. However, the process of
implementation at the local level was not always a smooth one. One of the clearest
lessons was that motivation to follow up projects could be highly ephemeral. Initiatives
undertaken with great enthusiasm may be forgotten in a comer ofthe local "fire station"

108
jymposium on Local Government Policymaking and Management: BaldersheimiStava

after a few months as new fires require the management's att^tion. Also, even in large
authorities, innovative ideas are often the brainchUdOTpet of individuals. Theporsonal
"ownership" of ideas is an important source of motivation (Ifolbek, 1990). Projects
whose initiatOTs remain in place seem to stand a better chance of being implemented.
Tumover of personnel is, therefore, a threat to the implementation of innovative ideas.
When aproject's "owner" leaves, the project'senergy may evapOTate as well. Insisting
that projects should possess innovative qualities may, therefore, make the implemen-
tation ofthe projects more uncatain, as it will then often be less well anchored in the
organization and more tied to particular individuals. The speed and rate of implemen-
tation was also clearly enhanced by the advocate roles in the national administration
ofthe iwograms.Tothe extent that ad vocatessCTvedU) speed upcentral decisionmaking,
motivation was preserved at the local level.

Evaluation
Evaluation and monitoring structures were quite well developed in all four
countries, and were perhaps most formalized in Sweden and Norway, with fairly large
research programs as integral parts of the fr^ commune schemes. In Norway, the
evaluation program resulted in 30 project reports and 4 books summarizing the results
(Baldersheim, 1991; Bukve & Hagen, 1991; Lesjo0,1991; Rose, 1991). T h e l ^ l i a -
mentary White Paper on the free communes, written in the spring of 1991, builds to a
large extent on material from the research program. In addition, the civil servants
responsible for the schemes had numerous informal channels of contact with the free
communes, through which they were kept informed about developments in individual
authorities. The necessary feedback channels for leaming should therefore be in place.
However, what the actual basis of opinion formation will be, remains to be seen. And
politicians are not always prepared to wait for the results of evaluation researeh before
making decisions, not even in Scandinavia (Stromberg, 1990).

Pilot Communes

The Setting
The free commune program demonstrated a growing concem with local
govemment's capacity to respond to local electorates and consumers, and showed a
way for national and local authorities to cooperate in removing obstacles to bettCT
organizational responsiveness at the local level. The pilot commune program is well
suited to give a demonstration ofthe organizational thinking on which local authorities
draw in their present efforts to become more responsive and flexible organizations in
the service of their communities.

New Organizational Models

Today, practically all Norwegian municipalities are organized according to
the Principal Standing Committee Model. This model tends to group together people
with the same professional background (e.g., engineers in one administration and
teachers in another). As an administrative organizing principle this sounds reasonable;
it makes for a professionally stimulating working environment. As a principle for

109
Policy Studies Journal, 21:1

organizing political work, it may be more dubious. Politicians are supposed to tise
ccmnHHi sense as rq)res»it£Uives ofthe electOTate and not to duplicate tte professional
knowledge of the administration. Why should political woilc thai be organized
according to professicHial pinciples? Will not such an organization induce the
politicians to try to match the professional competence of the administratiOTi? Will it
not make for an unclear division of labOT between politics and administration?
Two altemative pinciples for organizing political woik are p r e s s e d
(Kcanmunenes Soitndforabund, 1989); (a) organization according to area, and (b)
OTganizatiOTi accOTding to type of task.
Many citizens find the municipality di^ant, not only geographically, but also
moitally.Thoe are signs ofan increasinggap between the govanOTS and the govemed.
ITte gap seems to widen with populaticai size. In addition, many citizens have a sense
of belonging to an area smaller than the whole municipality. This loyalty \o the local
area may be perceived as irrational and a problem in the sectorial model where loyalty
andOTganizationdo not match. Why not use the local allegiance as a positive foree and
OTganize political woik around it? The area model tries to do thaL Instead of
COTnmittees based on professional principles, this model has area-based committees.
Those committees should be responsible for sovice provision fOT its local peculation
within a block grant from the council. The same committee will handle services
whether they be school services or social services. The barriers between different
sectors will be broken down.
The council will handle questions not related to individual service provision:
the overall budget, municipal planning, stnttegies for development, and questions
about infrastructure. This can make fOT two political roles. Those who enter politics
to solve local problems here and now will probably be attracted to the area committees.
Those who are interested in strategy, and what kind of community the municipality
should be in five or fifteen years, wiU probably be attracted to the council.
This kind of organization is being practiced in Oslo, where it is combined with
a parliamentary system for goveming the city. Trondheim and Stavanger—two otho'
cities big by Norwegian standards—are testing out the model.
A second altemative principle to organize along is type of task. Local
govemment performs different types of tasks. It may be useful to distinguish among
(a) regulation, (b) service provision, and (c) development. Regulation is the classic
public mission. It regulates the lives of citizens, tells what they can do and what they
cannot Regulation requires laws or other rules to apply, and the principle of equal and
impartial ^jplication of a set of rules is basic to regulation.
Service povision is today the main local govemmait activity in Norway.
Citizens receive municipal services from cradle to grave, from infant health control to
serviced housing and medical care for the elderly. When celebrating the 150th
anniversary of the Municij)al Constitution in 1987, local government ran a series of
advertisements on the theme—"Without us...." It tried to demonstrate tiiat if local
govemment services were taken away, life would become difficult indeed. Tap water
would dis^pear, thwe would be no electricity, schools would be closed. In short, it
showed that local govemment today provides essential services taken for granted by
the public.

110
Symposimt on Local Government Policymaking and Management: Baldersheim/Stava

Develqnnent is essential fOT any (xgmhaikm not wanting to be the passive

[ffisono'of extemal forces and circumstances. Development implies evaluiUing one's
position relative to external changes and designing ^jfxopdate re^nnses. Develop-
ment is especially important in dynamic and changing envirOTiments.
An organization good at regulation may not be equally good at sovice
provisiOTi—and vice versa. A classic bureaucracy as described by Max Weber may be
the bestOTganizationforregulation. This organization is built specifically to administer
a set of rules in an impartial way, securing equal treatment of equal cases. To
accomplish this, theOTganizationis in certain ways insulated from the environmrait,
(e.g., by bdng centralized). The mles point to the relevant information fOT making a
decisicm. This infOTmaticHi shcmld be gathered—all other information is irrelevant and
may even be detrimental to the proper reguIatiOTi.
Service provisionrequires the oppositeof a bureaucracy. Here the areet-level
employee, the one meeting the client or the customer, should have leeway—within
financial and other constraints—to fmd the best solution in the current case. Whether
that solution is equal to other comparable cases is basically of no relevance. Service
provision requires the bureaucratic pyramid to be "tumed on its head."
Development is often best taken care of in loosely organized settings (e.g.,
project organizations). These organizations are flat; there are few fomial authority
levels. There are few rules to be guided by. Processes are often somewhat ch^)tic, but
new i(kas are often considered and new possibilities discovered—ideas and fKJSsibili-
ties not so easily being brought forth in a bureaucracy or a service organization.
Municipalities responsible for all of these functions—regulation, service
delivery, and development—should ideally have different types of organization for
doing each task. One problem for local govemments may be that their organizations
WCTe built for regulation in a period when regulation was the main task. Today they
try to deliver service with an organization built for regulation, resulting in suboptimal
performance. Development may also suffer for lack of appropriate organizing for this
type of task.
It is problematic to build clear-cut organizations according to these principles
though, because so much ofpublic service is regulated by law. Regulation and service
cannot be organizationally separated without creating new problems of coordination.
The functional model is one way of finding a balanced solution to this
dilemma. This model places responsibility for regulation and service delivery in the
sameOTganizationalunit The regulatory tasks are placed at the top while as much as
possible of service decisionmaking is decentralized to street level.
Distinguishing between different types of tasks may also help in clarifying
tiie roles of politicians and of administrative officers. This interface is unclear and
problematic in many municipalities today. It is perfectly reasonable to argue that
elected members should play different roles relative to the three types of tasks. In
regulation the role may be to make the mles, oversee implementation, £md monitor the
consequences of applying the mles, but not to partake in the direct application of the
rules. In service provision, the role may be to allocate resourees; establish goals,
priorities, and "rules of the game;" and monitOT and evaluate results. This may mean
that politicians will not be as directly involved in the actual "production process" as

111
Policy Studies Journal, 21:1

they are today. In development, politicians should probably be more deeply involved
than they usually are today. Too often develq)ment woric is taken care of by the
administration, and politicians enter the scene in the later stages when degrees of
freedom have been strongly reduced.
In the functional model, thCTe are no mandatory standing committees. Each
counci! shotild discuss and decide its own committee structure relative to its own
political priOTities and challenges. It is proposed that the committees should not have
decisiOTimaking powers, only powers of recommendation conceming issues to be
decided by the full council. This should counteract the tendency for the council to
becOTne a rubber stamp body for decisions taken e!sewhere.
In collabOTation with the Norwegian Association of Local Authorities, 8
municipalities and 2 counties were chosen to try out the new models. The population
of the "pilots" range from 1,600 to 135,000 for the municipalities. The counties have
between 250,000 and400,000 inhabitants. Five "pilots" want to testout the functional
model, two a combination ofthe functions and area model, and three want to develop
further the Principal Standing Committee Model. In addition, four networks were
established, so that other municipalities could have an arena to discuss and exchange
infOTmjUion when working on introducing new models. The ten pilot communes al!
plan to introduce the new models from January 1,1992, starting with a new election
period.
The pilot communes are to beevaluated by aresearch team. Separate surveys
have been sent to the inhabitants, the politicians, and the employees of each munici-
pality before the organizational changes. FoUowup studies will be conducted when the
new organizations have worked 2-3 years. From January 1, 1992 some decision
processes will be foUowed to trace changes (e.g., budgeting).

Conclusion: A New Model for Nordic WeHare

What does all this pathfinding, piloting,and free comm uning add up to? Does
it represent something new—or is it just cosmetic changes masking the unchanged
woridngs of local govemment in Norway? We think the changes are more than
cosmetic. The new approach represents renewal and change in the Nordic Welfare
Model.
Increasingly, questions are being asked whether that model has reached the
end of the road. In its classic manifestation the mode! woiked by centralizing decisions.
The welfare programs were national in scope and they were formed and govemed from
the center. As the scope grew, implemenlation hadtobe delegated to local govemment.
This was the distributive era.
Wh£tt we witness now is the change from a centralized, distributive era to the
decentralized, community-Isased one. As we have described above, municipalities and
counties "rediscover" their communities. The pathfinders and pilots are preoccupied
with the relationship between electors and elected. Many want to spend less time
together with the administration and more time communicating with the citizens. It is
in a way a revival of local democracy, so it is interesting to follow from a purely local
perspective.

112
Symposium on Local Government Policymaking and Management: Baldersheim/Stava

The new approach is significant also from a national perspective. We think

the new ^ p o a c h may be the next phase in the Nordic Welfare Model, a phase as
interesting and foxxluctive as the first one. O i the othCT hand, if the national political
systons do not utilize this oppOTtunity for renewal, we are afraid the Nordic Welfare
Model may well have seen its best days.
Rapid change, intemationalization, and the mere weight and scope of
natiOTial welfare programs have made it almost impossible to fine-tune the welfare
programs to new circumstances. They are very difficult to manage and govem
properly. They need renewal from Ijelow. This is what thepathfindCTS and pilots offer.
If national policy makCTS and administrators are to benefit from this pluralistic
and diversified experimentation, there have to be systematic leaming procedures.
Otherwise pluralism may well produce chaos more than improvement Leaming is of
course more difficult in the new decentralized testing situation than in a centralized,
uniform program situation. Many actors, municipalities, and projects liave to be
monitored to find out which ones woik wel! under what circumstances. That is one
reason why evaluation by research teams has to be, and has been, an important
concomitant to the experimentation.
In Norway, each municipality and each county pays a premium to the
Association of Local Authorities, a premium earmarked for research. Resources from
this fund has been used in both of the programs discussed in this paper to evaluate and
leam from them. This is an important aspect of the renewal now taking place in
Norwegian local govemment
Local govemment in Norway has for a long period been leading a somewhat
sheltered life, providing ever more services to the public, but not being critically
scmtinized—either conceming the quality of loca! democracy or the efficiency of
service provision. That era is definitely over. Those municipalities and those nations
which manage to establish stmctures for self-correction, aggregation, and integration
of many diverse and fragmented experiences will, we think, perfoim great services to
democracy—^both local and central. The pathfinders and pilots are, we think, highly
relevant in this context.

Harald Baldersheim is professor of public administration at the University

of Bergen, Norway. He is currently affiliated with the Norwegian Research Center in
Organization and Management, and coordinated research on the Norwegian "free
commune" experiments and the Norwegian Fiscal Authority and Urban Innovation
Project He has published several books and articles on urban policy.

Per Stava is currently with the Norwegian Association of Local Authorities.

He is project leadCT for a research and development project on municipal organization.
He has formerly held positions at the University of Bergen and the Institute for Urban
and Regional Research.

113
Policy Studies Journal, 21:1

References
Baldersheim, H., og Hmreitt:, A. L. (1989, August 24-26). The Nordic Free Commune experiments:
Local autonomy as a three-way game. IPSA Roioid Table, Oslo.
BaMersheim, H. (Ed.). (1991). Hvorskelgrensenga?. Oslo: KonMnuneforiageL
Bratbak, B. og Olsen, J. P (1980). Depariemenl og opinion: Tilbakefoiing av infonusjon omviikningene
av (^entlige tillak. i J.P.Olsen (red.), Meiunger og makt. Oslo: Universiteufoilaget.
Bukve, O., & Hagen, T. (Eds.). (1991). NyestyringsmodeUerikanimunene,Odo, KominuneforlageL
DaM,A., & Tufte, ER. (1974). Size and democracy. Stanford: Stanford University Press.

in Western democracies. London: Sage.

Eg«*eig, M., Olsen, J.P., & Siaren, H. S. ((978). OrganisasJOTssamfiinnel og den segmenterte sut in J.P.
Olsrai (Ed), Politisk organisering (115-143). Bergen: UniversitetsforiageL
Engen, T. (1988). Frikommunfors0keniNt^den-enlu)inparativanalysfrdnidefillfors4k. G0teborg:
Statsvetenskai^ga instiuitionen, G0teborgs Universilet
Jwolden,T.,iS«ensen,R.(1983). SpilletomskatteutjamningsmidUne. Tidsskriftforsamfunnsforskning.
Hnueite, A.L. (1990). En tanke,fire land, uiike utforminger—eUer om organiseringen av de nordiske
frikommunefors0kenepdsentralthold. Paper til workshop: Forsoksvirksomhetsomoffentlig
refonnstrategi. Nordisk statsviteikonferanse. Island.
Harsheim, I , & Rose, L. (1987). Sut-koinmunefc»holdet 1987. Den kommunale ledelses oppfuning
av statlig regelverk. Arbeidsnotat nr 5 i serien Om kommunal respons pi statlige
fofsoksordninger. Oslo: NIBR.
Hemes,G. (Ed.). (i9ni).Forhandlings^lamomogblandingsadministrasjon. Bergen: Universiletsforlaget
Hdbek, J. (Ed.). (1990). Ldcale innovasjonstiltak—pidrivers plass som ildsjel og integrator. In H.
Baldersheim (Ed.), Ledelse og innovasjon i kommunene. Oslo: Tano.
Hovik,S.(Ed.).(1990). Slipperstatenttytene? Omkonvmmaneserfaringmedsmenifrikommuneforstkel.
Paper til workshop: Forsoksvirksomhet som offentlig reformstrategi. Nordisk
statsviterkonferanse. Island.
Kjellberg,F.(1988): Localgovemmentand the wdfaresute: Reorganization in Scandinavia. inB.Dente
andF. Kjellberg (Eds.), The dynamicsofinstituticxialchange:Localgovemment reorganization
in Westem democracies. Lcmdon: Sage.
KommunenesSentralforbimd. (1989). Kommuneni90-dra.Nyeorganisasjonsmodellar—nye politiske
og administrative roller. Oslo: KammunefoilageL
Lesj0, J. H. (Ed.). (1991). Naeringsutvikling. Kommtinenes roUe. Oslo: Kommuneforlaget.
Mardi, J., and Olsen, J.P.( 1976). Organizational leaniing and the ambiguity of the pasL InJ.G.March
& J.P.Olsen, Ambiguity and choice in organizatums. Bergen: Universitetsfodaget.
March, J. and Olsen, J.P. (1983). Organizing political life: What administrative reorganization tells us
about political life. American Political Science Review, 77,281-297.
Olsen, J.P. (1988). The modemization of public administration in the Nordic countries. Bergen: LOS-
senterel, notat 88/43.
Pedersen, S.W. (1989). FrUcommuneforstget: Et velegnet reforminstrument? Aarhus: Institutt for
Statskundskap, Aarhus Universitet.
Rose, L (1989). De nordiske frikommuneforsokene i el komparativt perspektiv. Oslo: NIBR.
Rose,L.(Ed.). (1991). Deterlovdprtveseg.Fors0k,reorganiseringogledelse ikommunene. Oslo:
Kommuneforiaget.
Strombeig, L (1990). Det svenskefrikommuneforspket 19S3-1989. Arbeidsrappott, StaUvetenskapUga
Institaicmen, G0teboi^s Universitet 1990.
Stlhlberg, K. (Ed.). (1990). Frikommunforsfk i Norden. kioo\990.

114