Roces v.

HRET
469 SCRA681

FACTS:
Petitioner Miles Roces (Roces) and former Congressman Harry Ang Ping (Mr. Ang Ping) filed their
respective certificates of candidacy (COCs) for the position of Representative for the 3rd Congressional
District of Manila in the May 2004 elections.

On January 5, 2004, a registered voter of Manila named Alejandro Gomez questioned Mr. Ang Ping’s
candidacy before the COMELEC through a petition to deny due course or cancel his COC. The petition
alleged that Mr. Ang Ping misrepresented himself to be a natural-born citizen, hence was disqualified for
the position.

On the election day itself, the Manila City Board of Canvassers resolved not to canvass the votes for Mr.
or Mrs. Ang Ping citing COMELEC Resolution No. 6823. On May 15, 2004, after counting only 6,347
votes out of the 150,387 registered voters in the district, it proclaimed Roces winner. The spouses Ang
Ping appealed the Board resolution to the COMELEC en banc and filed a petition to annul the
proclamation but these were dismissed by COMELEC’s Resolution No. 7257 and Omnibus Order of July
6, 2004.
On August 10, 2004, this Court dismissed G.R. No. 163259 in view of the pending HRET protest filed by
Mrs. Ang Ping. The resolution eventually became final and executory.30 Thereafter, Mrs. Ang Ping filed
in the HRET a motion to convert the ad cautelam protest to a regular protest. The HRET granted the
motion on September 9, 2004.

In the HRET, Roces filed a motion to dismiss the protest, assailing in the main the personality of Mrs.
Ang Ping to file the protest. After extensive oral arguments, the HRET denied Roces’s motion to dismiss
on March 3, 2005. It ruled that Mrs. Ang Ping was a proper party to file the protest against Roces.

Roces then filed the present petition for certiorari assailing the two preceding resolutions of the HRET.
Issue:

whether or not the HRET committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction
when it ruled that Mrs. Ang Ping is a proper party to file the election protest despite the denial in due
course and cancellation of her COC under COMELEC Resolution No. 6823
Held:
We hold that the HRET did not commit grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction when it denied the petitioner’s motion to dismiss for the following reasons:

The HRET is the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of the
members of the House of Representatives and has the power to promulgate procedural rules to govern
proceedings brought before it. This exclusive jurisdiction includes the power to determine whether it has
the authority to hear and determine the controversy presented, and the right to decide whether that state of
facts exists which confers jurisdiction, as well as all other matters which arise in the case legitimately
before it. Accordingly, it has the power to hear and determine, or inquire into, the question of its own
jurisdiction, both as to parties and as to subject matter, and to decide all questions, whether of law or fact,
the decision of which is necessary to determine the question of jurisdiction. One of the three essential
elements of jurisdiction is that proper parties must be present. Consequently, the HRET merely exercised
its exclusive jurisdiction when it ruled that Mrs. Ang Ping was a proper party to contest the election of
Roces.

Petitioner contends that the HRET cannot review decisions of the COMELEC and that COMELEC
decisions, orders, or rulings may be solely reviewed by the Supreme Court on certiorari by the aggrieved
party within thirty days from receipt of a copy thereof. It is true that generally, the method of assailing a
judgment or order of the COMELEC is via petition for certiorari. As aforestated, however, it was
petitioner who submitted these resolutions to the HRET as proofs that Mrs. Ang Ping was not a proper
party. These same resolutions were collaterally attacked by Mrs. Ang Ping before the HRET when she
alleged that these violated her right to due process. A void judgment or resolution may be impeached
through collateral attack. A direct attack on a judgment or resolution is defined as an attempt to avoid or
correct it in some manner provided by law, in a proceeding instituted for that very purpose, in the same
action and in the same tribunal. Conversely, a collateral attack is an attempt to impeach the judgment or
resolution by matters dehors the record, before a tribunal other than the one in which it was rendered, in
an action other than that in which it was rendered; an attempt to avoid, defeat, or evade it, or deny its
force and effect, in some incidental proceeding not provided by law for the express purpose of attacking
it; any proceeding which is not instituted for the express purpose of annulling, correcting, or modifying
such decree; an objection, incidentally raised in the course of the proceeding, which presents an issue
collateral to the issues made by the pleadings. The rule that a void judgment or decree is subject to
collateral attack at any time is based upon a court's inherent authority to expunge void acts from its
records. The void resolutions of the COMELEC, especially the April 30, 2004 resolution issued by its
First Division, cannot oust the HRET of its jurisdiction over the case at bar.

IN VIEW WHEREOF, the petition is dismissed. The temporary restraining order previously issued by
the Court is lifted.

Sandoval v. HRET
GR149380

FACTS:
Petitioner Sandoval and respondent Oreta were candidates for the lone congressional district of Malabon-
Navotas during the 14 May 2001 national elections. The canvass of the election returns yielded ninety
two thousand and sixty-two (92,062) votes for petitioner while respondent obtained seventy two thousand
eight hundred sixty-two (72,862) votes,or a difference of nineteen thousand two hundred (19,200) votes.
On 22 May 2001 petitioner was proclaimed duly elected representative by the District Board of
Canvassers of Malabon-Navotas. After taking his oath of office, he assumed the post at noon of 30 June
2001.

On 1 June 2001 respondent Oreta filed with HRET an election protest against petitioner, docketed as
HRET Case No. 01-027. The protest assailed the alleged electoral frauds and anomalies in one thousand
three hundred eight (1,308) precincts of the Malabon-Navotas District.3 On 4 June 2001 HRET issued the
corresponding summons for service upon petitioner. On 7 June 2001 HRET Process Server Pacifico Lim
served the summons by substituted service upon a certain Gene Maga who signed the process server’s
copy of the summons and indicated thereon his position as "maintenance" along with the date and time of
his receipt thereof as 7 June 2001 at 1:25 p.m.The pro-forma affidavit of service executed by the process
server a day after service of the summons stated –
That on 6/7/01 I personally served the following document to counsels and parties at their respective
addresses.
DOCUMENT – Summons
HRET CASE NO. – 01-027
PARTY/COUNSEL – Rep. Federico S. Sandoval
ADDRESS – No. 992 M. Naval St., Navotas, M.M.
RECEIVED BY – Gene Maga
POSITION – Maintenance

On 12 July 2001 HRET issued Resolution No. 01-081 which took note of petitioner Sandoval’s failure to
file an answer to the election protest within ten (10) days from date of service of the summons on 7 June
2001 and entered in his behalf a general denial of the allegations set forth in the protest. The HRET also
ordered the parties to proceed to preliminary conference. On 18 July 2001 the HRET ordered both
petitioner and respondent to file their respective preliminary conference briefs. On 29 October 2001
respondent Oreta filed her Comment to the instant petition. On 3 January 2002 the Office of the Solicitor
General filed a Manifestation and Motion In Lieu of Comment. The Solicitor General found that the
substituted service of summons upon petitioner was faulty and thus recommended favorable action on the
petition. On 12 February 2002 HRET also submitted a Manifestation and Motion In lieu of Comment
manifesting that as a nominal party in the instant case it was not filing a "separate comment" from the
Solicitor General’s pleading.

ISSUE:
Whether or not a substituted service of summons validly effected on herein petitioner Federico S.
Sandoval II in the election protest filed by herein respondent Aurora Rosario A. Oreta before the House
of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET)

HELD:

It is well-established that summons upon a respondent or a defendant (i.e., petitioner herein) must be
served by handing a copy thereof to him in person or, if he refuses to receive it, by tendering it to him.
Personal service of summons most effectively ensures that the notice desired under the constitutional
requirement of due process is accomplished. If however efforts to find him personally would make
prompt service impossible, service may be completed by substituted service, i.e., by leaving copies of the
summons at his dwelling house or residence with some person of suitable age and discretion then residing
therein or by leaving the copies at his office or regular place of business with some competent person in
charge thereof.
Substituted service derogates the regular method of personal service. It is an extraordinary method since it
seeks to bind the respondent or the defendant to the consequences of a suit even though notice of such
action is served not upon him but upon another whom the law could only presume would notify him of
the pending proceedings. As safeguard measures for this drastic manner of bringing in a person to answer
for a claim, it is required that statutory restrictions for substituted service must be strictly, faithfully and
fully observed.In our jurisdiction, for service of summons to be valid, it is necessary first to establish the
following circumstances, i.e., (a) impossibility of service of summons within a reasonable time, (b) efforts
exerted to locate the petitioners and, (c) service upon a person of sufficient age and discretion residing
therein or some competent person in charge of his office or regular place of business. It is also essential
that the pertinent facts proving these circumstances be stated in the proof of service or officer's return
itself and only under exceptional terms may they be proved by evidence aliunde. Failure to comply with
this rule renders absolutely void the substituted service along with the proceedings taken thereafter for
lack of jurisdiction over the person of the defendant or the respondent.

The mere fact that Maga allegedly identified himself to the process server as "member of the staff of
[petitioner] Rep. Federico S. Sandoval II," does not ipso facto render him competent to receive the
summons. By this alleged statement, Maga did not communicate any assurance that he could take
delivery of the summons effectively to justify the process server to assume such authority. Even in the
affidavit of service, which should have proved first hand the pertinent facts justifying substituted service,
Maga's indisputable representation was only that of a "maintenance" man, an affirmation which should
have immediately alerted the process server to the fact that he had no authority to receive the summons
for petitioner Sandoval. There is certainly nothing contained in the record to demonstrate that he was the
"receiving (employee?) of said office, which sufficiently conveys that he was tasked as he is to receive for
the office," which would have given rise to the presumption that the process server left or tendered the
summons on a duly qualified person.

WHEREFORE, the instant Petition for Certiorari is GRANTED. Resolutions Nos. 01-081 and 01-118 of
respondent House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET) are MODIFIED to the effect that the
Answer with Counter-Protest of petitioner Federico S. Sandoval II is admitted to form part of the record
of the election protest filed by respondent Aurora Rosario A. Oreta and to govern, in a manner
appropriate under the Revised Rules of the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal, the proceedings
to be taken hereafter, including but not limited to the right to present evidence on his counter-protest. No
pronouncement as to costs.

Arnault v. Nazareno
87Phil25

FACTS:
In October 1949, the Philippine Government, through the Rural Progress Administration, bought two
estates known as Buenavista and Tambobong for P4.5M and P0.5M respectively, or for an aggregate
amount of P5M. Of this sum, P1.5M was paid to Ernest H. Burt, a nonresident American, supposedly as
payment for his interest in the two aforementioned estates. Jean L. Arnaut, Burt's representative in the
Philippines, collected the sum of P1.5M in the form of checks. From this amount, he encashed P400,000,
which he eventually gave to an undisclosed person as per Burt's instructions.

It turned out, however, that these transactions were dubious in nature. For one, both estates were already
owned by the Philippine Government, so there was no need to repurchase them for P5M. Second, Burt's
interest in both estates amounted to only P20,000, which he wasn't even entitled to because of his failure
to pay off his previous loans.

A Senate investigation was thereafter held to determine how the Philippine Government was duped and
who ultimately benefited from the assailed transaction. One of the issues pursued was to whom did
Arnault give the cash amounting to P400,000. Arnault's refusal to provide the name of the person, initially
because he couldn't remember it and later for fear of self-incrimination, led to his being cited for
contempt. He was thereafter held in prison, and was to be freed only after saying the name of the person
he gave the P400,000 to.

Subsequently, Arnault filed this instant petition for habeas corpus in an apparent bid to be freed from
imprisonment.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the Senate has the power to punish Arnault for contempt.

HELD:
Before delving into the issues at hand, the Court laid down some general principles of law:

The Philippine Constitution is patterned after the US Constitution. But despite similarities in the basic
structure of government, one essential difference is that the Philippine legislative department is more
powerful than its US counterpart, in the sense that the latter shares power with the congresses of
individual states.
The power of inquiry -- with process to enforce it -- is an essential and appropriate auxiliary to the
legislative function of the Philippine congress. Although there are no express provisions in the
constitution that invest either the House or the Senate with the power to conduct investigations and exact
testimony, such power is implied.

Yes, the Court ruled that such power is necessary, especially in the conduct of inquiries that fall within
the Senate's jurisdiction (see [b] above). With this in mind, it is not a requirement that each and every
single question asked of witnesses necessarily be material to the case. This is so because the necessity or
lack of necessity for legislative action and the form and character of the action itself are determined by
the sum total of the information to be gathered as a result of the investigation, and not by a fraction of
such information elicited from a single question.

Pichay v. Office of the Deputy Exec. Secretary

GR No. 196425

FACTS:
On April 16, 2001, then President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo issued Executive Order No. 12 (E.O. 12)
creating the Presidential Anti-Graft Commission (PAGC) and vesting it with the power to investigate or
hear administrative cases or complaints for possible graft and corruption, among others, against
presidential appointees and to submit its report and recommendations to the President.
On November 15, 2010, President Benigno Simeon Aquino III issued Executive Order No. 13 (E.O. 13),
abolishing the PAGC and transferring its functions to the Office of the Deputy Executive Secretary for
Legal Affairs (ODESLA), more particularly to its newly-established Investigative and Adjudicatory
Division (IAD).

On April 6, 2011, respondent Finance Secretary Cesar V. Purisima filed before the IAD-ODESLA a
complaint affidavit2 for grave misconduct against petitioner Prospero A. Pichay, Jr., Chairman of the
Board of Trustees of the Local Water Utilities Administration (LWUA), as well as the incumbent
members of the LWUA Board of Trustees, namely, Renato Velasco, Susana Dumlao Vargas, Bonifacio
Mario M. Pena, Sr. and Daniel Landingin, which arose from the purchase by the LWUA of Four Hundred
Forty-Five Thousand Three Hundred Seventy Seven (445,377) shares of stock of Express Savings Bank,
Inc.

ISSUE:
Whether or not EO 13 is unconstitutional for usurping the power of the legislature to appropriate funds.

HELD:
In assailing the constitutionality of E.O. 13, petitioner asseverates that the President is not authorized
under any existing law to create the Investigative and Adjudicatory Division, Office of the Deputy
Executive Secretary for Legal Affairs (IAD-ODESLA) and that by creating a new, additional and distinct
office tasked with quasi-judicial functions, the President has not only usurped the powers of congress to
create a public office, appropriate funds and delegate quasi-judicial functions to administrative agencies
but has also encroached upon the powers of the Ombudsman. Petitioner avers that the unconstitutionality
of E.O. 13 is also evident when weighed against the due process requirement and equal protection clause
under the 1987 Constitution.

The contentions are unavailing. The President has Continuing Authority to Reorganize the Executive
Department under E.O. 292.

However, the President's power to reorganize the Office of the President under Section 31 (2) and (3) of
EO 292 should be distinguished from his power to reorganize the Office of the President Proper. Under
Section 31 (1) of EO 292, the President can reorganize the Office of the President Proper by abolishing,
consolidating or merging units, or by transferring functions from one unit to another. In contrast, under
Section 31 (2) and (3) of EO 292, the President's power to reorganize offices outside the Office of the
President Proper but still within the Office of the President is limited to merely transferring functions or
agencies from the Office of the President to Departments or Agencies, and vice versa.

Apparently, the budgetary requirements that the IAD-ODESLA needed to discharge its functions and
maintain its personnel would be sourced from the following year's appropriation for the President's
Offices under the General Appropriations Act of 2011.15 Petitioner asseverates, however, that since
Congress did not indicate the manner by which the appropriation for the Office of the President was to be
distributed, taking therefrom the operational funds of the IAD-ODESLA would amount to an illegal
appropriation by the President. The contention is without legal basis.
There is no usurpation of the legislative power to appropriate public funds.
In the chief executive dwell the powers to run government. Placed upon him is the power to recommend
the budget necessary for the operation of the Government, which implies that he has the necessary
authority to evaluate and determine the structure that each government agency in the executive
department would need to operate in the most economical and efficient manner. Hence, the express
recognition under Section 78 of R.A. 9970 or the General Appropriations Act of 2010 of the President’s
authority to "direct changes in the organizational units or key positions in any department or agency." The
aforecited provision, often and consistently included in the general appropriations laws, recognizes the
extent of the President’s power to reorganize the executive offices and agencies under him, which is,
"even to the extent of modifying and realigning appropriations for that purpose." And to further enable
the President to run the affairs of the executive department, he is likewise given constitutional
authority to augment any item in the General Appropriations Law using the savings in other items
of the appropriation for his office. In fact, he is explicitly allowed by law to transfer any fund
appropriated for the different departments, bureaus, offices and agencies of the Executive Department
which is included in the General Appropriations Act, to any program, project or activity of any
department, bureau or office included in the General Appropriations Act or approved after its enactment.

Thus, while there may be no specific amount earmarked for the IAD-ODESLA from the total amount
appropriated by Congress in the annual budget for the Office of the President, the necessary funds for the
IAD-ODESLA may be properly sourced from the President's own office budget without committing any
illegal appropriation. After all, there is no usurpation of the legislature's power to appropriate funds when
the President simply allocates the existing funds previously appropriated by Congress for his office.