APR1400 SSAR

Chapter 13
Conduct of Operations

Contents
Page

13.1 Organizational Structure of Site Operator . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13.1-1

13.2 Training . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13.2-1

13.3 Emergency Planning . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13.3-1

13.3.1 Preliminary Planning . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13.3-1
13.3.2 Emergency Planning . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13.3-1
13.3.3 BOP Interfaces . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13.3-1

13.4 Review and Audit . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13.4-1

13.5 Plant Procedures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13.5-1

13.5.1 Plant Operating Procedures Development Plan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13.5-1
13.5.2 Administrative Control Procedures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13.5-6

13.6 Industrial Security . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13.6-1

13.6.1 Interface Requirements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13.6-1

Tables
Page

13.3.3-1 Transfer of Emergency Response Functions from the Main Control Room
to the Technical Support Center and the Emergency Operations Facility . . . . . . . . 13.3-15

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13.0 Conduct of Operations

13.1 Organizational Structure of Site Operator

[[Information concerning the site operator's organizational structure is within the site operator's scope and
shall be provided in the site-specific Safety Analysis Report (SAR). This will include site-specific
information to address the issues in the TMI Action Plan Items I.A.1.4 and II.J.3.1.]]1

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13.2 Training

[[Information concerning the site operator's training program is within the site operator's scope and shall
be provided in the site-specific SAR. This will include site-specific information to address the issues in
TMI Action Plan Items I.A.2, I.A.4.1(2), I.A.4.2, II.B.4 and II.K.1(26).]]1

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13.3 Emergency Planning

[[Information concerning the Emergency Planning is within the CP/OL applicant's scope and will be presented by
the CP/OL applicant in a separate document]]1

The plan will be prepared in accordance with the enforcement decree of Atomic Energy Act Article 106.2.

13.3.1 Preliminary Planning

[[See site-specific SAR.]]1

13.3.2 Emergency Planning

[[See site-specific SAR.]]1

13.3.3 BOP Interfaces

13.3.3.1 Technical Support Center

13.3.3.1.1 Summary Description

The Technical Support Center (TSC) is an onsite facility located adjacent to the Main Control
Room(MCR) within the auxiliary building that provides the capability for plant management and technical
support to the reactor operating personnel located in the MCR during emergency conditions. In addition,
It has technical data displays and plant records available to assist in the detailed analysis and diagnosis of
abnormal plant conditions and any significant release of radioactivity to the environment. The TSC is the
primary communications center for the plant during an emergency. The TSC assists the MCR operators
by providing resources and facilities for handling the administrative items, technical evaluations, and
contact with offsite activities.

Until the TSC is activated, following functions are performed in the MCR.:

! Performing EOF function.

! Classifying the grade of emergency.

! Initial notification to onsite and offsite.

! Management of plant emergency operation.

! Management of plant emergency response.

! Communication with TSC, EOF, and OSC.

The MCR voice communications facilities are provided to support above MCR functions. Section 9.5.2
describes the MCR voice communications facilities.

When the TSC is functional, emergency response functions, except direct supervision of reactor operations
and manipulation of reactor system controls, shift to the TSC. Plant administration, technical support
functions, and contact with offsite activities to assist the MCR operators are performed in the TSC

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throughout the course of an accident.

Table 13.3.3-1 outlines the transfer of emergency response functions from the MCR to the TSC under the
various emergency classes.

The level of staffing of the TSC may vary according to the severity of the emergency condition. The
staffing criteria for each emergency class is fully detailed in the licensee's emergency plan. Section
13.3.3.1.5 defines the TSC work space size.

13.3.3.1.2 Function

The TSC is a licensee controlled and operated support center that provides the following functions:

! Provides for plant management and technical support to plant operations personnel during
emergency conditions.

! Relieves the reactor operators of peripheral duties and communications not directly related to
reactor system manipulations during emergency conditions.

! Prevents congestion in the MCR during emergency and/or normal conditions.

! Performs Emergency Operations Facility (EOF) functions for the Alert Emergency class and for
the Site Area Emergency class and General Emergency class until the EOF is functional.

The TSC is the emergency operations work area for designated technical, engineering, and senior licensee
management personnel, any other licensee-designated personnel required to provide the needed technical
support, and a small staff of Korean Regulatory Authority personnel. The resources of the TSC are
sufficient such that a senior licensee official can provide guidance and technical assistance to the operating
supervisor in the MCR. However, all manipulations are performed by the MCR licensed operators.

The TSC has facilities to support the plant management and technical personnel who are assigned there
during an emergency and is the primary onsite communications center for the plant during the emergency.

The TSC facilities may be used by designated operating personnel for normal daily operations, as well as
for training and emergency drills. Use of the TSC facility during normal operation is limited to activities
that will not degrade TSC preparedness for reactor abnormal conditions or reduce TSC systems reliability.

The TSC viewing gallery is designed so personnel situated therein will have a clear unobstructed view of
the main operating area. as well as the LDP. The gallery will facilitate a better awareness of MCR
activities for personnel located within the TSC. In addition, during normal operations, the gallery will
function as a visitors area and thus serve to minimize distractions in the MCR due to the presence of
guests.

13.3.3.1.3 Location

To optimize communications, the TSC is located as close as possible to the MCR within the auxiliary
building. This close location allows the senior plant manager, normally working in the TSC, to quickly
enter the MCR for face-to-face interaction with MCR personnel. This proximity also provides access to
information in the MCR that is not available in the TSC data system.

Provisions are made for the safe and timely movement of personnel between the TSC and the MCR under

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emergency conditions. These provisions include consideration of the effects of direct radiation and
airborne radioactivity from in-plant sources on personnel traveling between the two facilities.

13.3.3.1.4 Staffing and Training

[[The site-specific SAR addresses all staffing and training issues.]]1

13.3.3.1.5 Size

The area of TSC is more than 200 m2/1unit and the TSC is sized to provide the following:

! Working space, without crowding, for the personnel assigned to the TSC at the maximum level
of occupancy

! Space for the TSC data system equipment needed to acquire, process, and display data used in the
TSC.

! Sufficient space to perform repair, maintenance, and service of equipment, displays, and
instrumentation.

! Space for data transmission equipment needed to transmit data originating in the TSC to other
locations.

! Space for personnel access to functional displays of TSC data.

! Space for unhindered access to communications equipment by all TSC personnel who need
communications capabilities to perform their functions.

! Space for storage of and/or access to plant records and historical data.

13.3.3.1.6 Habitability

TSC personnel are protected from radiological hazards, including direct radiation and airborne
radioactivity from in-plant sources under accident conditions, to the same degree as control room
personnel, so far as the maximum permissible radiation exposure is concerned while the TSC is habitable.
Applicable criteria are specified in MOST Notice 98-13.

To ensure adequate radiological protection of TSC personnel, radiation monitoring systems are provided
in the TSC. These systems continuously indicate radiation dose rates and airborne radioactivity
concentrations inside the TSC while it is in use during an emergency. These monitoring systems shall
include local alarms with trip levels set to provide early warning to TSC personnel of adverse conditions
that may affect the habitability of the TSC. Detectors are able to distinguish the presence or absence of
radioiodines at concentrations as low as 10-7 microcuries/cc.

Reference Section 6.4 TSC for habitability details. Control room HVAC is discussed in Section 9.4.1.

13.3.3.1.7 Communications

The TSC is the primary onsite communications center for the nuclear power plant during an emergency.
It has reliable voice communications to the MCR, the OSC, the emergency operations facility (EOF),

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MOST and NERC in KHNP head office. The primary functions of this voice communication system are
plant management communications and the immediate exchange of information on plant status and
operations. Provisions for communications with MOST and local operations centers are provided in the
TSC to provide early notification and recommendations to offsite authorities prior to activation of the EOF.

The TSC voice communications facilities includes means for reliable primary and backup communication.
The TSC voice communications will include private telephones, commercial telephones, radio networks,
and intercommunication systems as appropriate to accomplish the TSC functions during emergency
operating conditions. [[The licensee provides a means for TSC telephone access to commercial telephone
common-carrier services that may be susceptible to loss of power during emergencies. The licensee
ensures that spare commercial telephone lines to the plant are available for use by the TSC during
emergencies.]]1

The TSC voice communications equipment includes:

! Dedicated telephone to the MCR, the EOF, and the OSC.

! Dedicated telephone to the Ministry of Science and Technology(MOST), Korean Regulatory

Authority, and local officials in emergency plan area.

! Dial telephones that provide access to onsite and offsite locations.

! Communications to local operations centers prior to EOF activation

Facsimile transmission capability between the TSC, the EOF, the OSC, and the Korean Regulatory
Authority Operations Center is also provided.

Sufficient alternate or backup power sources are provided to maintain continuity of TSC functions and to
immediately resume data acquisition, storage, and display of TSC data if loss of the primary TSC power
sources occurs.

13.3.3.1.8 Technical Data and Data System

The TSC Technical Data System receives, stores, processes, and displays information acquired from
different areas of the plant as needed to perform the TSC function. The data available for display in the
TSC is sufficient to enable the plant management, engineering, and technical personnel assigned there to
aid the MCR operators in handling emergency conditions. The data system provides access to accurate
and reliable information sufficient to determine:

! Plant steady-state operating conditions prior to the accident.

! Transient conditions producing the initiating event.

! Plant system dynamic behavior throughout the course of the accident.

The TSC data system can be used for:

! Reviewing an accident sequence.

! Determining appropriate mitigating actions.

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! Evaluating the extent of any damage.

! Determining plant status during recovery operations.

The data system supports the TSC functions independent of actions in the MCR without degrading or
interfering with MCR and plant functions. Similarly, MCR and other plant functions do not degrade or
interfere with the TSC functions. TSC instrumentation data system equipment and power supplies are not
safety-grade.

The data set available to the TSC is sufficient to permit accurate assessment of the accident without
interfering with the MCR emergency operation. The set of Type A, B, C, D, and E variables specified in
Regulatory Guide 1.97, Revision 3, "Instrumentation for Light-Water-Cooled Nuclear Power Plants to
Assess Plant and Environs Conditions During and Following an Accident," where appropriate, are
available for display and printout in the TSC. In addition, all sensor data and calculated variables, not
specified in Regulatory Guide 1.97 but included in the data sets of the IPS safety related parameters are
available for display in the TSC or for transmission to offsite locations. The accuracy of the data displayed
is not significantly less than the accuracy of comparable data displayed in the MCR. The time resolution
of data acquisition is sufficient to provide data without loss of information during transient conditions.
The time resolution for each sensor signal will depend on the potential transient behavior of the variable
being measured. The TSC data displays of Regulatory Guide 1.97 variables meet the criteria for TSC data
but are not required to meet the Regulatory Guide 1.97 design and qualification criteria for display of those
variables in the MCR.

Data storage and recall capability is provided for the TSC data set. At least 2 hours of pre-event data and
12 hours of post-event data are recorded. The sample frequency is chosen to be consistent with the use of
the data. Capacity to record at least two weeks of additional post-event data with reduced-time resolution
is provided. Archival data storage and the capability to transfer data between active memory and archival
data storage without interrupting TSC data acquisition and displays are provided for all TSC data.

Data displays and printout devices are provided in the TSC to allow all TSC personnel to perform their
assigned tasks with unhindered access to data. The TSC displays include, but are not limited to,
alphanumeric and/or graphical representations of:

! Plant systems variables.

! In-plant radiological variables.

! Meteorological information.

! Offsite radiological information.

Trend information display and time-history display capability is provided in the TSC to give the TSC
personnel a dynamic view of the plant status during abnormal operating conditions. The TSC displays are
designed so that callup, manipulation, and presentation of data is easily performed. The TSC data display
format presents information that is easily understood by the TSC personnel performing analyses.

The Information Processing System (IPS) data set associated with plant safety status is displayed in the
TSC. This duplication will improve the exchange of information between the MCR and the TSC. The
total TSC data system reliability is designed to achieve an operational unavailability goal of 0.01 during
all plant conditions above cold shutdown. Operational unavailability is defined as DOWN TIME divided
by OPERATING TIME.

13.3.3.1.9 Records Availability

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The TSC includes provisions for a complete and up-to-date repository of plant records and procedures at
the disposal of TSC personnel to aid in their technical analysis and evaluation of emergency conditions.

13.3.3.2 Emergency Operations Facility

The following sections contain a description of a typical EOF and interface requirements which must be
met to ensure adequacy with the APR1400 Standard Design. The word "shall" is used to distinguish
interface requirements that are mandatory from text that is purely descriptive.

13.3.3.2.1 Summary Description

[[The Emergency Operations Facility (EOF) is a nearsite (within 10 km from boundary of emergency plan
area) support facility for the management of overall licensee emergency response (including coordination
with and local officials), coordination of radiological and environmental assessments, and determination
of recommended public protective actions.]]1 The EOF has appropriate technical data displays and plant
records as discussed in the site-specific SAR.

[[When the EOF is activated, the functions of providing overall emergency response management,
monitoring and assessing radiological effluent and the environs, making offsite dose projections, providing
recommendations to local officials, and coordinating with local officials shift to the EOF in accordance
with site procedures.]]2

Transfer of emergency response functions from the MCR to the EOF under the various emergency classes
shall be accomplished as outlined in Table 13.3.3-1. The EOF shall be designed to the criteria given in
MOST Notice 98-13.

13.3.3.2.2 Functions

The EOF is a licensee controlled and operated offsite support center. The EOF shall have facilities for:

! Management of overall licensee emergency response.

! Coordination of radiological and environmental assessment.

! Determination of recommended public protective actions.

! Coordination of emergency response activities with local agencies.

[[When the EOF is activated, it is staffed by licensee, local and other emergency personnel designated by
the emergency plan to perform these functions. It is the location where the licensee provides overall
management of licensee resources in response to an emergency having actual or potential environmental
consequences.]]1

Facilities shall be provided in the EOF for the acquisition, display, and evaluation of all radiological,
meteorological, and plant system data pertinent to determine offsite protective measures. These facilities
are used to evaluate the magnitude and effects of actual or potential radioactive releases from the plant and
to determine offsite dose projections. Facilities used in performing essential EOF functions shall be
located within the EOF complex; however, supplemental calculations and analytical support of EOF
evaluations may be provided from facilities outside the EOF. Emergency power system is equipped in

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Conceptual Design information.

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EOF against power loss. The licensee also may use the EOF as the post-accident recovery management
center.

[[The EOF allows the licensee to coordinate emergency response activities with local agencies, including
the Korean Regulatory Authority. Licensee personnel in the EOF use the evaluations of offsite effects to
make protective action recommendations for the public to local emergency response agencies.

Local agencies are responsible for implementing emergency response actions involving the general public.
The local agencies may operate from the EOF or from their own control centers at other locations,
dependent upon the site-specific provisions of the emergency plan at each plant.]]1

13.3.3.2.3 Staffing and Training

The EOF shall be staffed to provide the overall management of licensee resources and the continuous
evaluation and coordination of licensee activities during and after an accident. Upon EOF activation,
designated personnel shall report management person designated by the licensee shall be in charge of all
licensee activities in the EOF. The EOF staff will include personnel to manage the licensee onsite and
offsite radiological monitoring, to perform radiological evaluations, and to interface with offsite officials.
The EOF staff assignments shall be part of the licensee's emergency plan. The specific number and type
of personnel assigned to the EOF may vary according to the emergency class. The staffing for each
emergency class shall be fully detailed in the licensee's emergency plan. Operating procedures and staff
training in the use of data systems and instrumentation shall contain guidance on the limitations of
instrumentation including whether the information can be relied upon following serious accidents.

In order to function effectively, the EOF staff personnel must be aware of their responsibilities during an
accident. To maintain proficiency, the EOF staff shall participate in EOF activation drills, which shall be
conducted periodically in accordance with the licensee's emergency plan. These drills shall include
operation of all facilities that will be used to perform the EOF functions, including any support facilities
located outside the EOF.

13.3.3.2.4 Size

The area of EOF is more than 400 m2/1site and the EOF is sized to provide the following:

! Working space for the personnel assigned to the EOF as specified in the licensee's emergency plan,
including local agency personnel, at the maximum level of occupancy without crowding.

! Space for EOF data system equipment needed to transmit data to other locations.

! Sufficient space to perform repair, maintenance, and service of equipment, displays, and
instrumentation.

! Space for ready access to communications equipment by all EOF personnel who need
communications capabilities to perform their functions.

! Space for ready access to functional displays of EOF data.

! Space for storage of plant records and historical data or space for means to readily acquire and
display those records.

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Conceptual Design information.

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13.3.3.2.5 Communications

The EOF shall have reliable voice communications facilities to the TSC, the MCR, Korean Regulatory
Authority and MOST and local emergency operations centers. The normal communication path between
the EOF and the MCR shall be through the TSC. The primary functions of the EOF voice communications
facilities are:

! EOF management communications with the designated senior licensee manager in charge of the
TSC.

! Communications to manage licensee emergency response resources.

! Communications to coordinate radiological monitoring.

! Communications to coordinate offsite emergency response activities.

! Communications to disseminate information and recommended protective actions to responsible

government agencies.

The EOF voice communications facilities shall include reliable primary and backup means of
communication. Voice communications shall include private telephones, commercial telephones, portable
cellular telephone, radio networks, and intercommunications systems as appropriate to accomplish the EOF
functions during emergency conditions. [[The licensee shall provide a means for EOF telephone access
to commercial telephone common-carrier services that bypasses any local telephone switching facilities
that may be susceptible to loss of power during emergencies. The licensee shall ensure that spare
commercial telephone lines to the plant are available for use by the EOF during emergencies.]]1

The EOF voice communications equipment include:

! Dedicated telephone to MCR and TSC.

! Dedicated telephone to MOST, Korean Regulatory Authority and local officials in emergency plan
area.

! Dial telephones reserved for EOF use to provide access to onsite and offsite locations.

! Intercommunications systems between work areas of the EOF, if needed, for EOF functional
performance or if the EOF is comprised of separate functional areas or separate buildings.

! Radio communications to licensee's mobile monitoring teams.

! Communications to local operations centers.

! Communications to facilities outside the EOF used to provide supplemental support for EOF
evaluations.

Facsimile transmission capability between the EOF, the TSC, the OSC, and the Korean Regulatory
Authority Operations Center shall be provided.

13.3.3.2.6 Technical Data and Data System

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The EOF technical data system shall be designed to receive, store, process and display information
sufficient to perform assessments of the actual and potential onsite and offsite environmental consequences
of an emergency condition. Data providing information on the general condition of the plant also shall be
available for display in the EOF for utility resource management.

The EOF data set shall include radiological, meteorological, and other environmental data as needed to:

! Assess environmental conditions.

! Coordinate radiological monitoring activities.

! Recommend implementation of offsite emergency plans.

The EOF data system equipment shall perform these functions independently from actions in the MCR and
without degrading or interfering with MCR and plant functions.

Similarly, MCR and other plant functions do not degrade or interfere with the EOF functions. EOF
instrumentation, data system equipment, and power supplies shall not be safety grade.

The sensor data of the Type A, B, C, D, and E variables specified in Regulatory Guide 1.97, Revision 3,
and of those meteorological variables specified in proposed Revision 1 to Regulatory Guide 1.23,
"Meteorological Measurements Programs in Support of Nuclear Power Plants," and in NUREG-0654,
Revision 1, Appendix 2, shall be available for display in the EOF. All data that is available for display in
the TSC, including data transmitted from the plant to Korean Regulatory Authority, shall be part of the
EOF data set.

The accuracy of data in the EOF shall be consistent with the data accuracy needed to perform the EOF
functions. The accuracy of data displays in the EOF shall be equivalent to that for the data displayed in
the TSC. The time resolution of data requisition shall be sufficient to provide data without loss of
information during transient conditions. The time resolution required for each sensor signal depends on
the potential transient behavior of the variable being measured. The EOF data displays of Regulatory
Guide 1.97 variables meet the criteria for EOF data but are not required to meet the design and qualifi-
cation criteria in Regulatory Guide 1.97 for display of those variables in the MCR.

Data storage capability shall be provided for the EOF data set. At least 2 hours of pre-event data and 12
hours of post-event data shall be recorded. The sample frequency shall be chosen to be consistent with the
use of the data. Capacity to record at least two weeks of additional post-event data with reduced time
resolution shall be provided. Archival data storage and the capability to transfer data between active
memory and archival data storage without interrupting EOF data acquisition and displays shall be provided
for all EOF data. Data display devices shall be provided in the EOF to allow all EOF personnel to perform
their assigned tasks with unhindered access to alphanumeric and/or graphical representations of:

! Plant systems variables.

! In-plant radiological variables.

! Meteorological information.

! Offsite radiological information.

Trend-information display and time-history display capability shall be provided in the EOF to give EOF
personnel a dynamic view of plant systems, radiological status, and environmental status during an
emergency. The EOF displays shall be designed so that callup, manipulation, and presentation of data is

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easily performed. The displays shall be partitioned to facilitate the retrieval of information by the different
functional groups in the EOF.

The IPS data set associated with plant safety status shall be displayed in the EOF. This duplication
provides licensee management and Korean Regulatory Authority representatives information about the
current reactor systems status and will facilitate communications among the MCR, TSC, and EOF. The
total EOF data system shall be designed to achieve an operational unavailability goal of 0.01 during all
plant operating conditions above cold shutdown. Operational unavailability is defined as DOWN TIME
divided by OPERATING TIME.

13.3.3.2.7 Records Availability

The EOF shall have ready access to up-to-date plant records, procedures, and emergency plans needed to
exercise overall management of licensee emergency response resources.

13.3.3.3 Operations Support Center

13.3.3.3.1 Summary Description

The Operations Support Center (OSC) is an onsite facility separate from the MCR and the Technical
Support Center where operations support personnel will assemble in an emergency. The OSC is located
in the compound building, and the area of OSC is more than 150 m2/1unit. This facility is not specifically
required by 10 CFR 50 Appendix A, but is included in this plant design to ensure that an adequate facility
is provided for onsite emergency maintenance and other personnel to gather as a ready resource to support
actions initiated by the MCR. There is a direct communications link between the MCR and the OSC so
that all personnel reporting to the OSC can be assigned to duties in support of emergency operations.

Until such time as the Operations Support Center is activated, all functions of this facility are performed
in the MCR. The OSC is activated based on the emergency class and the specific conditions surrounding
an accident. The activation and use of the OSC is specified in the emergency planning section of the site-
specific SAR. OSC staffing levels will depend on the severity of the emergency condition; these are also
addressed in the emergency planning section of the site-specific SAR.

13.3.3.3.2 Function

The Operations Support Center provides two main functions. The OSC:

! Provides a location where plant logistic support can be coordinated during an emergency.

! Restricts MCR access to those support personnel specifically requested by the shift supervisor.

! Emergency power system is equipped in OSC against power loss.

13.3.3.3.3 Location

The Operations Support Center is located in the compound building

13.3.3.3.4 Habitability

Operations Support Center personnel are protected from radiological hazards, including direct radiation
and airborne radioactivity from in-plant sources under accident conditions, by the compound building

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general building ventilation system. Therefore, the OSC protection level is the same as that of the rest of
the building, with the exception of the TSC and the MCR which are covered by a different system. Should
the OSC become uninhabitable, the OSC functions can be performed by essential support personnel in the
MCR or other designated on-site locations. Reference the site-specific SAR for emergency plans and
habitability details.

13.3.3.3.5 Communications

Since the function of the OSC is one of support to emergency operations, the OSC has direct
communications with the MCR and the TSC. This ensures that personnel reporting to the OSC can be
assigned to duties in support of emergency operations.

The OSC communications system consists of:

! One dedicated telephone line to the MCR

! One dedicated telephone line to the TSC

! Dial telephones that provide access to onsite and offsite locations

The OSC communications system may also include direct voice and/or radio intercommunications links
as backup or supplementary communications means. Refer to the site-specific SAR for detailed
information on the applicability and use of these other means of communications.

Facsimile transmission capability between the OSC, the TSC, the EOF, and the Korean Regulatory
Authority Center is also provided.

13.3.3.4 Laboratory Facilities

13.3.3.4.1 Summary Description

Consistent with the requirements stated in NUREG-0654, II.H.9 and NUREG-0737, II.B.3, the APR1400
Plant design makes provisions for inclusion of both hot and conventional Laboratory Facilities. Hot
facilities are currently located in the Compound Building. Space for a large conventional laboratory should
be provided in the Compound Building. Locations for other, smaller lab facilities are allocated at various
places throughout the plant. The facilities themselves shall be designed according to particular owner
preference, but they shall support efforts to monitor plant systems and environmental samples for
compliance with technical specifications. Complete descriptions of the facilities shall be provided by the
licensee.

The following sections contain interface requirements which must be met to ensure adequacy with the
APR1400 Design. The word "shall" is used to distinguish interface requirements that are mandatory from
text that is purely descriptive.

13.3.3.4.2 Function

The laboratory facilities shall provide for the following primary functions:

! to provide plant support services for routine analyses required for personnel protection, surveys,
and related health physics functions,

! to provide normal and post-accident cold chemical analyses on required plant chemistry samples,

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! to provide routine and post-accident counting on all plant radioactivity samples,

! to provide grab sample analyses used as a check on the accuracy of the continuous on-line process
monitoring instrumentation, and

! to provide a facility to store and secure radioactive calibration and check sources and instruments
undergoing calibration, maintenance, or repair.

13.3.3.4.3 Location

The hot laboratory facilities are currently shown to be located in the Compound Building design. Space
for a large conventional laboratory should be provided in the compound building. Radiation counting
rooms and instrument calibration areas are located at elevation 85'-0" in the Compound Building.
Locations for other, smaller lab facilities are provided at various places throughout the plant. Locations
for these facilities are provided to assure that all critical onsite sampling capabilities (see Regulatory Guide
1.97) can be performed to the required accuracy at the plant site, and such that ALWR normal and post-
accident sampling requirements are met.

13.3.3.4.4 Features

In order to meet the intent of the ALWR Requirements Document and the aforementioned government
regulations, the laboratory facilities shall be designed with the following features:

! adequate space for expansion to accommodate changes in available technology and equipment,

! radiation counting rooms, instrument calibration areas and checkout areas located in low radiation
zones and provided with shielding to reduce background radiation "noise", and

! secured access to radioactive calibration and check sources.

Liquid wastes from laboratory drains shall be processed by the Liquid Waste Management Systems
(LWMS) described in Section 11.2. Types of waste shall be segregated at the point of origin and routed
to the appropriate LWMS subsystem, e.g., chemical drains accept non-detergent cleaning solutions,
chemical sample solutions, etc., whereas liquid waste from reactor grade lab drains would be routed to the
Equipment Drain Tank. Due to the cost and complexity of waste disposal considerations, the generation
of mixed waste shall be avoided whenever possible.

Sampling methods and instrumentation shall be described in plant operations manuals provided by the
licensee. General maintenance shall be described in other licensee plant operating documents.

13.3.3.5 Post Accident Sampling

Consistent with the guidance stated in NUREG-0737, II.B.3, the APR1400 Plant design provides for a Post
Accident Sampling System. This system is located on the primary sample control panel in the PASS
sample room. System functions and design requirements are covered in Section 9.3.2.

13.3.3.6 Onsite Decontamination Facilities

13.3.3.6.1 Summary Description

[[These facilities shall be provided to remove or reduce radioactive contaminants from plant equipment,

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protective clothing, and personnel.]]1 Complete descriptions of the facilities shall be provided by the
licensee.

The following sections contain a description of a typical ODF and interface requirements which must be
met to ensure adequacy with the APR1400 Design. The word "shall" is used to distinguish interface
requirements that are mandatory from text that is purely descriptive.

The ODF shall include the hot laundry facilities, personnel decontamination fixtures, hot shower, radiation
detection equipment and personnel decontamination supplies. Also equipment necessary to decontaminate
small tools and instruments as well as larger tools and pieces of equipment shall be provided.

These facilities shall be designed to meet the requirements as stated in 10 CFR 50 Appendix E, IV.E.3; and
10 CFR 50.47 (b) (8). The role(s) of the Onsite Decontamination Facilities in the event of a plant
emergency shall be described in the emergency planning documents provided by the licensee.

13.3.3.6.2 Function

The Onsite Decontamination Facilities shall provide for the following functions:

! To facilitate equipment disposal by reducing contamination and radiation levels to releasable

limits.

! To facilitate equipment repair by reducing contamination and radiation levels consistent with
ALARA guidelines.

! To provide location and supplies for personnel decontamination.

13.3.3.6.3 Location

Onsite Decontamination Facilities shall be located as follows:

! Personnel Decontamination Facilities - Personnel decontamination areas shall be located in the

compound building.

! Equipment Decontamination Facilities - Equipment decontamination facilities shall be located in

the hot machine shop. The hot laundry facilities shall be located in the compound building.

13.3.3.6.4 Features

The Onsite Decontamination Facilities shall be designed in full compliance with the intent of 10 CFR 50,
Appendix E, IV.E.3 and 10 CFR 50.47 and the guiding principles of ALARA considerations. As such, the
following shall be included in the design of the facilities:

! Sinks, workbenches, and decontamination supply cabinets

! Alarmed radiation monitors near tanks, filters, demineralizers, etc. which are used in the
decontamination processes

! Clean, adequate areas and provisions for staging, decontamination and checkout for applying and
removing protective materials.

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Conceptual Design information.

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Liquid wastes shall be processed by the Liquid Waste Management Systems (LWMS) described in Section
11.2. Types of waste shall be segregated at the point of origin and routed to the appropriate LWMS
subsystem, e.g., chemical drains accept non-detergent cleaning solutions, etc., whereas liquid waste from
personnel decontamination would be routed to the detergent drains. Due to the cost and complexity of
waste disposal considerations, the generation of mixed waste shall be avoided whenever possible.

13.3.3.6.5 Decontamination Methods and Procedures

[[Selection of decontamination methods to be employed in the Onsite Decontamination Facilities at a

specific generating plant is the responsibility of the individual licensee. Some of the decontamination
requirements may be met by using portable or otherwise transportable facilities at the discretion of the
individual licensee. Description of those methods and rationale for their selection shall be provided by the
licensee.

Decontamination and radwaste control procedures are considered to be a fundamental part of the plant
operations documentation. The licensee plant operations documents shall contain these detailed
procedures.]]1

13.3.3.7 Emergency Response Data System(ERDS)

The Emergency Response Data System(ERDS) has no direct plant control function. The function of the
ERDS is to send a set of variables the Nuclear Emergency Response Center(NERC) in KHNP headquarter,
Korean Regulatory Authority and MOST during emergency. This data will be used for analysis by the
NERC technical support groups. The ERDS shall transmit information that will aid KHNP in its role of
providing advice and support to the nuclear power plant licensee, government and local authorities, and
other government officials.

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CP/OL information item.

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Table 13.3.3-1 Transfer of Emergency Response Functions from the Main Control
Room to the Technical Support Center and the Emergency Operations
Facility

Emergency Class
Emergency Response Notification Alert Site Area General
Functions of Emergency Emergency
Unusual
Event
Supervision of reactor operations and MCR MCR MCR MCR
manipulation of controls
Management of plant operations MCR(TSC)1 TSC TSC TSC
Management of corporate emergency MCR(TSC,EOF) TSC EOF EOF
response resources (EOF)
Radiological effluent and environs MCR(TSC,EOF) TSC EOF EOF
monitoring, assessment, and dose (EOF)
projections
Inform MOST and local emergency MCR(TSC,EOF) TSC EOF EOF
response organizations and make (EOF)
recommendations for public protective
actions
Event monitoring by regional Korean Regulatory TSC TSC&EOF TSC&EOF
emergency response team2 Authority (MCR) (EOF)

Management of recovery operations MCR(TSC,EOF) TSC EOF EOF

(EOF)
Technical support of recovery MCR(TSC,EOF) TSC TSC TSC
operations

[1]
Parenthesis indicates that activation of this facility, i.e., (MCR), (TSC), (EOF), or (TSC, EOF) (or the
performance of this function) is optional for the indicated emergency class.
[2]
One Korean Regulatory Authority individual also may be stationed in the main control room.

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13.4 Review and Audit

[[Information concerning the site operator's reviews and audits is within the site operator's scope and shall
be provided in the site-specific SAR.]]1

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CP/OL information item.

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13.5 Plant Procedures

[[Information concerning the site operator's plant procedures is within the site operator's scope and shall
be provided in the site-specific SAR.]]1

13.5.1 Plant Operating Procedures Development Plan

! A Plant Operating Procedures (POP) development plan (i.e., the Plan) shall be created to formally
guide development of the POPs for normal, abnormal, and emergency operations.

! The Plan shall specify the process by which the POPs will be developed, verified, validated,
revised, and maintained.

! The scope of the plan shall include the applicable operating procedures in Subsection 13.5.1.1

! The Plan shall ensure that POPs follow standard formats implemented through Writer's Guides
(e.g., per References 1 and 8).

! The Plan shall specify that the POPs' technical bases are documented to ensure that their content
is consistent with plant design basis material including applicable procedure guidelines, task
analyses, and PSA, and applicable plant-specific aspects, per Reference 1.

! The Plan shall specify the process by which training of operators on the POPs and on changes to
the POPs is provided and kept current.

! The plan shall specify the POP validation activities that demonstrate the acceptability of the
completed procedures for the scope specified above.

! The plan shall specify that the POPs comply with the applicable requirements of References 1
through 7.

13.5.1.1 Procedures Included in Scope of Plan

All safety-related operations will be conducted using written and approved procedures. Procedures will
be reviewed periodically and will be revised as necessary to ensure proper and safe operation of the plant.
Operating personnel will be thoroughly trained to ensure familiarity with the appropriate procedures.

The following procedures shall be included in the scope of the Plant Operating Procedures Development
Plan:

System Procedures

Such procedures include all system procedures that require operator action in the MCR or RSR.
Procedures shall be prepared for PWR system operation. Typical PWR systems having procedures are
listed below:

! Reactor Coolant System

! Control Rod Drive System (including part-length rods)

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CP/OL information item.

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! Shutdown Cooling System

! Emergency Core Cooling System

! Component Cooling Water System

! Containment

1. Maintaining Containment Integrity

2. Containment Purge System

3. Containment Building HVAC Systems

! Spent Fuel Pool Cooling and Cleanup System

! Main Steam System

! Pressurizer Pressure and Spray Control Systems

! Feedwater System (feedwater pumps to steam generator)/Startup Feedwater System

! Auxiliary Feedwater system

! Service Water System

! Chemical and Volume Control System (including Letdown/Purification System)

! Auxiliary or Reactor Building Heating and Ventilation

! Control Room Heating and Ventilation

! Compound Building Heating and Ventilation

! Instrument Air System

! Electrical System

1. Offsite (circuits between the offsite transmission network and the onsite Class 1E
distribution system)

2. Onsite

Emergency Power Sources (e.g., diesel generator, batteries)

A.C. System
D.C. System

! Nuclear Instrument System

1. Source Range

2. Intermediate Range

13.5-2
 APR1400 SSAR

3. Power Range

4. Incore System

! Reactor Control and Protection System

Procedures for Off-Normal or Alarm Conditions

Such procedures include all procedures for off-normal or alarm conditions that require operator action in
the MCR or RSR. These correspond to the number of alarm annunciators. Each annunciator important
to safety should have its own written procedure, which should normally contain (1) the meaning of the
annunciator, (2) the source of the signal, (3) the immediate action that is to occur automatically, (4) the
immediate operator action and (5) the long-range actions.

General Plant Operating Procedures

Such procedures include all general plant operating procedures that require operator action in the MCR
or RSR. Procedures shall be prepared for the integrated operations of the plant. Typical general plant
procedures are listed below:

! Cold Shutdown to Hot Standby

! Hot Standby to Minimum Load (nuclear startup)

! Recovery from Reactor Trip

! Operating at Hot Standby

! Turbine Startup and Synchronization of Generator

! Changing Load and Load Follow (if applicable)

! Plant Shutdown to Hot Standby

! Hot Standby to Cold Shutdown

! Reactor coolant system operation with loops partially drained

Radiation Control Procedures

Such procedures include all radiation control procedures that require operator action in the MCR or RSR.
Typical radiation control procedures are listed below:

! PWR Gaseous Effluent System

1. Collection, Storage, and Discharge

2. Sampling and Monitoring

3. Air Ejector and Stack Monitoring

4. Ventilation Air Monitoring

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 APR1400 SSAR

! Process radiation Monitoring System Operation

! Meteorological Monitoring

Maintenance, Calibration, Inspection and Test Procedures

All portions of maintenance, calibration, inspection and test procedures that require operator action in the
MCR or RSR will conform to the requirements of the Plant Operating Procedures Development Plan.

Procedures for Emergencies, Operational Transients and Other Significant Events

Such procedures include emergency, operational transient and other significant-event-related procedures
that require operator action in the MCR or RSR. Typical procedures for emergencies, operational
transients and other significant events are listed below:

! Loss of Coolant (including significant PWR steam generator leaks), (inside and outside primary
containment), (response to large and small breaks, including leak rate determination)

! Loss of Instrument Air

! Loss of Electrical Power (or degraded power sources, or both)

! Loss of Core Coolant Flow/Achievement and Maintenance of Natural Circulation, including

connection of the pressurizer heaters to the emergency bus, if necessary

! Loss of Condenser Vacuum

! Loss of Service Water

! Loss of Shutdown Cooling

! Loss of Component Cooling System and Cooling to Individual Components

! Loss of Feedwater or Feedwater System Failure (including verification of proper operation of the
auxiliary feedwater system, pressurizer Pilot Operated Safety Relief Valve (POSRV), and steam
generator level control system, as applicable)

! Loss of Protective System Channel

! Mispositioned Control Rod or Rods (and rod drops)

! Inability to Drive Control Rods

! Conditions Requiring Use of Emergency Boration or Standby Liquid Control System

! Fuel Cladding Failure or High Activity in Reactor Coolant or Offgas

! Fire in Control Room or Forced Evacuation of Main Control Room

! Turbine and Generator Trips

! Malfunction of Automatic Reactivity Control System

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 APR1400 SSAR

! Malfunction of Pressure Control System

! Reactor Trip

! Plant Fires

! Acts of Nature (e.g., tornado, flood, dam failure, earthquake)

! Abnormal releases of Radioactivity

! Hydrogen Explosions

! Containment Isolation (including reopening of individual isolation valves following reset of safety
injection or containment isolation valves)

! Loss of Annunciators

! Administrative Procedures

Administrative procedures will be prepared in accordance with ANSI N18.7, "Administrative

Controls for Nuclear Power Plant ". The applicable portions of Regulatory Guide 1.33, "Quality
Assurance Program Requirements(Operation)" will be used for guidance. Typical administrative
procedures are listed below:
- Procedures for Shift Supervisors and Operators
- Equipment Control Procedures
- Control of Maintenance and Modification Procedures
- Master Surveillance Testing Schedule
- Log Book Usage and Control Procedures
- Temporary Procedures

13.5.1.2 References

1. Guidelines for the Preparation of Emergency Operating Procedures. NUREG-0899, 1982.

2. Code of Federal Regulations: Energy. 10CFR50.34(F)(2)(ii), 1993.

3. Clarification of TMI Action Plan Requirements. NUREG-0737, 1980.

4. Supplement 1 to NUREG-0737, Requirements for Emergency Response Capability. 1982.

5. ANSI 18.7-1976/ANS-3.2, 1976.

6. Lessons Learned from the Special Inspection Program for Emergency Operating Procedures.
NUREG-1358, 1989.

7. Supplement 1 to NUREG-1358, Lessons Learned from the Special Inspection Program for
Emergency Operating Procedures. 1992.

8. Techniques for Preparing Flowchart Format Emergency Operating Procedures. NUREG/CR-5228,

1989.

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13.5.2 Administrative Control Procedures

[[Such procedures will be a CP/OL action item including "Review and Modify Procedures for Removing
Safety-Related Systems from Service" TMI Action Plan Item II.K.1(10), "Guidelines for Upgrading Other
Procedures," and "Revise Deficiency Reporting Requirements," TMI Action Plan Item II.J.4.1.]]1

To avoid excessive fouling and plugging of the screens near the IRWST suction inlets during an accident
(see Section 6.8 and Appendix 19.3, Subsection 2.9), the containment must be cleaned of sand,
maintenance debris, and other particulate materials prior to startup from a refueling outage. There are no
specific requirements for determining acceptable cleanliness, but maintenance practices should be
consistent with generally accepted practices for nuclear power plant containment interiors. This is a DRAP
item; see Section 17.3.

The CP/OL applicant/holder shall consider the guidance of NUMARC-8700, "Guidelines and Technical
Bases for NUMARC Initiatives Addressing Station Blackout at Light Water Reactors," (11/20/87) in
developing plant procedures for severe weather conditions such as typhoon and tornadoes.

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13.6 Industrial Security

[[Information concerning the site operator's industrial security is within the CP/OL applicant's scope and
will be presented by the CP/OL applicant in a separate document.]]1

13.6.1 Interface Requirements

Site security is an out of scope item which shall be provided by the CP/OL applicant. The CP/OL applicant
shall verify that the following interface requirements are met to ensure adequacy with the System and
Standard Design:

! The design of the physical security system shall be in conformance with 10 CFR Part 73, 73.55
including:

1. 10 CFR Part 73, 73.55 in its entirety and Part 73 Appendices B and C

2. 10 CFR Part 25 and 10 CFR Part 95

3. Regulatory Guide 5.44

4. NUREG-0674

5. 10 CFR 73.56

6. 10 CFR Part 50, 50.70 (b) (3)

7. Regulatory Guide 5.12

8. Regulatory Guide 5.20

9. Regulatory Guide 5.65

10. Regulatory Guide 5.66

! A comprehensive listing and evaluation of all vital equipment, vital piping, vital power sources,
vital water storage facilities, etc., shall be developed. The listing and evaluation should include
all support functions vital to equipment operation (e.g. diesel generator cooling water, D/G fuel,
HVAC considerations for vital electrical equipment, cooling water for component cooling, etc).
This listing and evaluation shall be controlled in accordance with current security safeguards
information (SGI) procedures and guidelines.

! Security system facilities and equipment (e.g. PAP, CAP, security computer(s), security
communications (fixed and portable) equipment, security power system, etc.) shall be located
within the protected area to assure that the security force can respond to security events.

! The security communications subsystem shall meet the related requirements

! [[A sabotage vulnerability analysis shall be performed by the CP/OL Applicant on the final site-
specific design.]]1

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CP/OL information item.

13.6-1