Atienza, Adrian Gabriel S.

Case Digests_Asynch 4_HR

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. MARIVIC GENOSA; G.R. No. 135981; January 15, 2004

FACTS: Ben Genosa was murdered by his wife Marivic Genosa, the appellant in this case. Ben and
Marivic had a happy first year of marriage, but it seems that after that, Ben changed, and the pair
started constantly fighting, sometimes to the point of violence.

According to the appellant's statement, her spouse would harass her and occasionally hit her
when he got home intoxicated. She sought the advice of doctors when her husband beat her, they
testified for her. Appellant and the victim got into a fight the night of the murder, and the victim
assaulted the appellant. However, the appellant managed to escape to a different room. The appellant
acknowledged using a gun to kill the victim. However, the parricide information against the appellant
claimed that the victim's death was caused by a beating with a lead pipe. The appellant claimed that she
was acting in self-defense and defense of her unborn child. After a trial, the Regional Trial Court
sentenced the appellant to death after finding her beyond a guilty beyond reasonable of the crime of
parricide with the additional charge of treachery.

On automatic review before the Supreme Court, the appellant filed a URGENT OMNIBUS
MOTION asking the Honorable Court to permit the exhumation of Ben Genosa and a new investigation
into the circumstances surrounding his death; permit the examination of Marivic Genosa by qualified
psychologists and psychiatrists to ascertain her mental state at the time she killed her husband;
and permit the inclusion of the said experts' reports in the case's records for the purposes of the
automatic review. The appellant's URGENT OMNIBUS MOTION was partially granted by the Supreme
Court. The case was sent back to the trial court so that the "battered woman syndrome" defense may be
reviewed by experts in psychologists and psychiatrists.

ISSUE: Whether or not appellant can validly invoke the Battered Woman Syndrome as constituting self-
defense.

HELD: No. The defense, according to the court, was unable to prove each of the following aspects of
battered woman syndrome self-defense:

a) each of the phases of the cycle of violence must be proven to have characterized at least two
battering episodes between the appellant and her intimate partner;
 (b) the final acute battering episode preceding the killing of the batterer must have produced in
the battered persons mind an actual fear of an imminent harm from her batterer and an honest belief
that she needed to use force in order to save her life; and

(c) at the time of the killing, the batterer must have posed probable not necessarily immediate
and actual grave harm to the accused, based on the history of violence perpetrated.

Not all of these were adequately demonstrated based on the case's current circumstances. In
this instance, there was enough time between Ben's illegal action and her fatal attack on him. She had
already managed to disengage from his abusive conduct and find refuge in their kids' bedroom. It
appeared that the assault had stopped and that there was no longer any risk from him, not even a
threat that was imminent. Marivic was no longer in a situation where she was actually in danger of
losing her life or being injured.

However, on the issue of “treachery”, according to the court, when a killing is followed by an
argument or a dispute, treachery cannot be considered a qualifying circumstance because the victim
may be said to have been warned and expected aggression from the attacker. To recognize alevosia, the
aggressor's method of attack must have been consciously and purposefully chosen with the aim of
completing the unlawful act without risk from any defense that the party attacked may mount. There is
no proof that the appellant purposefully selected a particular method of successfully attacking her
husband without running the risk of suffering any consequences from any possible retaliation his part. It
seems that she only decided to kill her batterer-spouse at around the same time that she considered
using the gun. Because there was no convincing evidence that she purposefully and consciously used the
method she used to commit the crime in order to ensure its execution, the Court decided in her favor.

Republic vs. Karbasi; G.R. No. 210412; July 29, 2015

FACTS: Kamran F. Karbasi filed a petition for naturalization with the RTC, where he alleged the following:

a. He is designated as a Person of Concern by the UNHCR, as evidenced by a certification;

b. He was born on September 4, 1966, in Tehran, Iran, and is currently living with his family at
341 Burgos Street in Dipolog City. His previous country of residence was Pakistan;

c. He is married and the parent of one child;

d. According to their marriage certificate, he married Cliji G. Lim Karbasi on October 12, 2000, in
Dipolog City. She is a Filipino citizen, 22 years old, and was born on August 10, 1979, in Cebu City;

e. His child, Keenyji L. Karbasi, 1-year old , was born on 9 June 2001 in Dipolog City and presently
residing with him and his wife at 341 Burgos Street, Dipolog City;
 f. He qualifies for the benefits of Section 3 of Commonwealth Act No. 473 because of his
marriage, which reduced the requirement for continuous residence from ten to five years;

g. He satisfies all the requirements of Section 2 of the Commonwealth Act No. 473 and is not
disqualified by any of its provisions.

The RTC granted the petition.

The OSG opposed and filed an appeal with the CA alleging that the RTC erred in granting
Karbasi's petition as he failed to comply with the provisions of Commonwealth Act No. 473
(Naturalization Law) on character, income and reciprocity. OSG claims that Karbasi failed to establish
that Iran grants reciprocal rights to Filipino citizens; he has lucrative income; and he is of good moral
character because he did not comply with Philippine tax laws.

Karbasi cites his sincere explanation that his failure to disclose his true annual income was made
in good faith and was not done with the intent to commit fraud. Karbasi insisted that, in contrast to
other foreigners who applied for naturalization, he was forced to flee Iran out of fear of persecution
without any prior planning or resources, and only with the intention of finding refuge in the Philippines.

ISSUE: Whether or not Karbasi’s petition for naturalization should be granted.

HELD: Yes. To accept the OSG's logic is a dangerous precedent that would peg the compliance to this
requirement in the law to a comparison with the results of research, the purpose of which is unclear.

In his current situation, it does not seem at all likely that Karbasi will ever become a public
charge. It is important to emphasize that Karbasi had in fact refused to be the recipient of charity
despite being a refugee who had nothing when he arrived in the Philippines. By exerting great effort to
complete college and eventually start a business, he can support and comfort his family. Karbasi
transformed himself from a refugee who depended on the UNCHR for assistance into a self-made
businessman who can comfortably support himself and his family. Therefore, there is no evidence that
Karbasi might end up being a public expense and a strain on our nation's resources. Further evidence
that he could be a valuable asset to the nation comes from the fact that he overcame this adversity with
the help of his education and abilities.

Karbasi also did not deny the charge of the OSG and instead admitted a procedural lapse on his
part. Therefore there is no showing that the undeclared income was for the benefit of obtaining tax
exemptions.

Similarly, the Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, of which the Philippines is a
signatory, expressly provides exemptions from reciprocity. It also states that contracting parties have a
sincere obligation to "as far as possible facilitate the assimilation and naturalization of refugees."
According to the circumstances of this case, Karbasi's status as a refugee must end  with him obtaining
Philippine citizenship in accordance with statutory requirements and international commitments. In
fact, it is important to read the Naturalization Law in the context of recent developments in
international human rights law, particularly the awarding of citizenship to refugees and stateless people.
Silverio vs. Republic of the Philippines; GR No. 174689; Oct 22, 2007

FACTS: Rommel Jacinto Dantes Silverio submitted a petition to have his name and gender on his birth
certificate changed from "male" to "female" and from "Rommel Jacinto" to "Mely." Petitioner claims to
be transsexual; “born male, but identifies as female”. He had underwent hormone therapy, a
psychological evaluation, and breast augmentation. He had also underwent gender reassignment
surgery in Bangkok, Thailand and was engaged to an American, Richard Edel.

The RTC approved Silverio's request. The RTC determined that it should be granted based on
equity; that the petitioner's misfortune to be imprisoned in a man's body is not his own doing and
should not be held against him; that granting the petition will not cause anyone any harm; that there is
no opposition to his petition; and that there is no harm, injury, or prejudice to the community.

The OSG on behalf of the Republic of the Philippines submitted a petition for certiorari to the
Court of Appeals. It claimed that there is no law permitting the modification of birth certificate
information due to sex alteration. The Court of Appeals rendered a decision in favor of the Republic; it
ruled the trial court’s decision lacked any legal basis.

ISSUE: Whether or not changing the name and sex on the birth certificate is allowed on the ground of
sex reassignment.

HELD: No. According to the Supreme Court, there is no precedent in the law for changing these entries.
RA 9048 only authorizes the city or municipal civil registrar or the Consul General to correct clerical or
typographical error in an entry and/or change of first name or nickname in the Civil Register without
need of judicial order. Simply put, to correct something is to "make or set aright; to remove the faults or
error from," whereas to change something is to "replace something with another of the same kind or
with something that serves as a substitute." The petitioner's birth certificate had no errors. There's
nothing to fix.

Given that there is no law that recognizes sex reassignment, the determination of a person's sex
made at the time of his or her birth, if not accompanied by error, is immutable. This is stated in Section 5
of the Civil Register Law, which states that "the declaration of the physician or midwife in attendance at
the birth or, in default thereof, the declaration of either parent of the newborn child, shall be sufficient
for the registration of a birth in the civil register.

The SC claims that granting the petitioner's requests for change would fundamentally alter the
laws governing marriage and family relationships. It will permit a man to get married to another man
who has had his sex changed, a male-to-female post-operative transsexual. Additionally, there will be
significant changes to the laws that support the government's position on women.