BILL OF RIGHTS
DUE PROCESS
CASES
Ichong vs. Hernandez
G.R. No. L-7995. May 3, 1957
Philippine Phosphate Fertilizer
Corp. vs. Torres
G.R. No. 98050. March 17, 1994
Ynot vs. Intermediate Appellate
Court
G.R. No. 74457. March 20, 1987
Alonte vs. Savellano
G.R. No. 131652. March 9, 1998
Aniag vs. COMELEC
G.R. No. 104961. October 7,
1994
Spouses Romualdez vs
COMELEC
G.R. No. 167011. April 30, 2008
DOCTRINE
Balance is the essence of due process; there can be no absolute power neither can there be absolute liberty.
The essence of due process is simply an opportunity to be heard or, as applied to administrative proceedings, an opportunity to
explain one's side or an opportunity to seek a reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of.
The minimum requirements of due process are notice and hearing which generally speaking, may not be dispensed with
because they are intended as a safeguard against arbitrariness but this is not an absolute rule. Judicial hearing may be omitted
without violation of due process in view of the nature of the property involved or the urgency of the need to protect the general
welfare from a clear and present danger.
Due process, rightly occupying the first and foremost place of honor in our Bill of Rights, is an enshrined and invaluable right
that cannot be denied even to the most undeserving.
• Jurisprudence acknowledges that due process in criminal proceedings, require:
o that the court or tribunal trying the case is properly clothed with judicial power to hear and determine the matter
before it;
o that jurisdiction is lawfully acquired by it over the person of the accused;
o that the accused is given an opportunity to be heard; and
o that judgment is rendered only upon lawful hearing.
The manner by which COMELEC proceeded against petitioner runs counter to the due process clause of the Constitution. The
facts show that the petitioner was not among those charged by the PNP with violation of the Omnibus Election Code. Nor was
he subjected by the City Prosecutor to a preliminary investigation for such offense. The non-disclosure by the City Prosecutor
to the petitioner that he was a respondent in the preliminary investigation is violative of due process. Petitioner then was made
to believe that he was not a party respondent in the case, so that his written explanation on the incident was only intended to
exculpate Arellano, not petitioner himself.
This Court has declared that facial invalidation or an "on-its-face" invalidation of criminal statutes is not appropriate.
o An "on-its-face" invalidation of criminal statutes would result in a mass acquittal of parties whose cases may not
have even reached the courts. Such invalidation would constitute a departure from the usual requirement of "actual

PCSC vs. Alcuaz
G.R. No. 84818. December 18,
1989
Ang Tibay vs CIR
G.R. No. 46496 February 27,
1940
Ateneo De Manila vs Capulong
G.R. No. 99372 May 27, 1993
case and controversy" and permit decisions to be made in a sterile abstract context having no factual
concreteness. In Younger v. Harris, this evil was aptly pointed out by the U.S. Supreme Court in these words:
o "[T]he task of analyzing a proposed statute, pinpointing its deficiencies, and requiring correction of these
deficiencies before the statute is put into effect, is rarely if ever an appropriate task for the judiciary. The
combination of the relative remoteness of the controversy, the impact on the legislative process of the relief sought,
and above all the speculative and amorphous nature of the required line-by-line analysis of detailed statutes,
ordinarily results in a kind of case that is wholly unsatisfactory for deciding constitutional questions, whichever way
they might be decided."
The rule is that the power of the State to regulate the conduct and business of public utilities is limited by the consideration that
it is not the owner of the property of the utility, or clothed with the general power of management incident to ownership, since
the private right of ownership to such property remains and is not to be destroyed by the regulatory power. The power to
regulate is not the power to destroy useful and harmless enterprises, but is the power to protect, foster, promote, preserve, and
control with due regard for the interest, first and foremost, of the public, then of the utility and of its patrons. Any regulation,
therefore, which operates as an effective confiscation of private property or constitutes an arbitrary or unreasonable
infringement of property rights is void, because it is repugnant to the constitutional guaranties of due process and equal
protection of the laws.
Cardinal Primary Rights
• There are cardinal primary rights which must be respected even in proceedings of this character.
• The first of these rights is the
• (1) right to a hearing, which includes the right of the party interested or affected to present his own case and submit
evidence in support thereof. Not only must the party be given an opportunity to present his case and to adduce evidence
tending to establish the rights which he asserts but the
• (2) tribunal must consider the evidence presented. While the duty to deliberate does not impose the obligation to decide
right, it does imply a necessity which cannot be disregarded, namely,
• (3) that of having something to support its decision. Not only must there be some evidence to support a finding or
conclusion, but the evidence must be substantial.
• (4) The decision must be rendered on the evidence presented at the hearing, or at least contained in the record and
disclosed to the parties affected. The Court of Industrial Relations or any of its judges, therefore, must act on its or his own
independent consideration of the law and facts of the controversy, and not simply accept the views of a subordinate in
arriving at a decision. The Court of Industrial Relations should, in all controversial questions, render its (5) decision in such
a manner that the parties to the proceeding can know the various issues involved, and the reasons for the decisions
rendered. The performance of this duty is inseparable from the authority conferred upon it.
Minimum standards to be satisfied in imposing disciplinary sanction by an academic institution:
(1.) The students must be informed in writing of the nature and cause of any accusation against them;
(2.) That they shall have the right to answer the charges against them with the assistance of counsel, if desired;
(3.) They shall be informed of the evidence against them;
(4.) They shall have the right to adduce evidence in their own behalf; and
 (5.) The evidence must be duly considered by the investigating committee or official designated by the school authorities to
hear and decide the case.

Southern Hemisphere vs. Anti-
Terrorism Council
G.R. No. 178552. October 5,
2010
Mosqueda vs. Pilipino Banana
G.R. Nos. 189185 & 189305.
August 16, 2016A
The overbreadth and vagueness doctrines then have special application only to free speech cases. They are inapt for testing
the validity of penal statutes.
THE RATIONAL BASIS TEST
The petitioners correctly argue that the rational basis approach appropriately applies herein. Under the rational basis test, we
shall:
(1.) discern the reasonable relationship between the means
and the purpose of the ordinance; and
(2.) examine whether the means or the prohibition against
aerial spraying is based on a substantial or reasonable distinction. A reasonable classification includes all persons or
things similarly situated with respect to the purpose of the law.

BILL OF RIGHTS
EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSE
CASES DOCTRINES
People vs. Vera • There is no difference between a law which actually denies equal protection of the law and a law which permits such
G.R. No. 45685. November 16, denial. A law may appear to be fair on its face and impartial in appearance, yet, if it permits of unjust and illegal
1937 discrimination, it is within the constitutional prohibitions. The equal protection of the laws, sententiously observes the
Supreme Court of the United States, "is a pledge of the protection of equal laws." The classification, however, to be
reasonable must be based on substantial distinctions which make real differences; it must be germane to the purposes
of the law; it must not be limited to existing conditions only, and must apply equally to each member of the class.

Ichong vs. Hernandez • The equal protection of the law clause is against undue favor and individual or class privilege, as well as hostile
G.R. No. L-7995. May 31, 1957 discrimination or the oppression of inequality. It is not intended to prohibit legislation, which is limited either in the
object to which it is directed or by territory within which is to operate. It does not demand absolute equality among
residents; it merely requires that all persons shall be treated alike, under like circumstances and conditions both as to

Villegas vs. Hiu Chong Tsai Pao
Ho
G.R. No. L-29646. November 10,
1978
People vs Cayat
G.R. No. L-45987. May 5 1939
Dumlao vs Comelec
G.R. No. L-52245. January 22,
1980
Himagan vs. People
G.R. No. 113811. October 7,
1994
Quinto vs. COMELEC
No. 189698. February 22, 2010
Biraogo vs The Philippine Truth
Commission
privileges conferred and liabilities enforced. The equal protection clause is not infringed by legislation which applies
only to those persons falling within a specified class, if it applies alike to all persons within such class, and reasonable
grounds exists for making a distinction between those who fall within such class and those who do not. (2 Cooley,
Constitutional Limitations, 824-825.)
• Broadly speaking, the power of the legislature to make distinctions and classifications among persons is not curtailed
or denied by the equal protection of the laws clause. The legislative power admits of a wide scope of discretion, and a
law can be violative of the constitutional limitation only when the classification is without reasonable basis. Citizenship
is a legal and valid ground for classification
A LAW THAT DOES NOT SPECIFY THE MANNER OF EXERCISE OF DISCRIMINATION IS VIOLATIVE OF EQUAL
PROTECTION CLAUSE.
• The contention that Ordinance No. 6537 is not a purely tax or revenue measure because its principal purpose is
regulatory in nature has no merit. While it is true that the first part which requires that the alien shall secure an
employment permit from the Mayor involves the exercise of discretion and judgment in the processing and approval or
disapproval of applications for employment permits and therefore is regulatory in character the second part which
requires the payment of P50.00 as employee's fee is not regulatory but a revenue measure. There is no logic or
justification in exacting P50.00 from aliens who have been cleared for employment. It is obvious that the purpose of the
ordinance is to raise money under the guise of regulation.
IT IS AND ESTABLISHED PRINCIPLE OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW THAT THE GUARANTY OF THE EQUAL
PROTECTION OF THE LAWS IS NOT VIOLATED BY A LEGISLATION BASED ON REASONABLE CLASSIFICATION.
AND THE CLASSIFICATION, TO BE REASONABLE.
(1) Must rest on substantial distinctions;
(2) Must be germane to the purposes of the law
(3) Must not be limited to existing conditions only; and
(4) must apply equally to all members of the same class.
The constitutional guarantee of equal protection of the laws is subject to rational classification. If the groupings are based on
reasonable and real differentiations, one class can be treated and regulated differently from another class. Equal protection
clause does not forbid all legal classification.
The equal protection clause does not demand absolute equality. It merely requires that all persons shall be treated alike, under
like circumstances and conditions both as to the privileges conferred and liabilities enforced.
The classification is justified when anchored upon material and significant distinctions and all the persons belonging under the
same classification are similarly treated, the equal protection clause of the Constitution is, thus, not infringed.
The classification will be regarded as invalid if all the members of the class are not similarly treated, both as to rights conferred
and obligations imposed. The Court is aware that “mere under inclusiveness is not fatal to the validity of a law under the equal
protection clause. Legislation is not unconstitutional merely because it is not all-embracing and does not include all the evils
G.R. No. 192935 December 7,
2010
Almonte vs. Vasquez
G.R. No. 95367. May 23, 1995
Ormoc Sugar Co., Inc., vs.
Treasurer of Ormoc City
G.R. No-L-23794. February 17,
1968
within its reach. It has been written that a regulation challenged under the equal protection clause is not devoid of a rational
predicate simply because it happens to be incomplete.
EQUAL PROTECTION OF THE LAWS NOT DENIED TO RESPONDENTS WHERE OMBUDSMAN COMMENCED
INVESTIGATION ON THE BASIS OF UNVERIFIED COMPLAINT. Nor is there violation of petitioners' right to the equal
protection of the laws. Petitioners complain that "in all forums and tribunals . . . the aggrieved parties . . . can only hail
respondents via their verified complaints or sworn statements with their identities fully disclosed," while in proceedings before
the Office of the Ombudsman anonymous letters suffice to start an investigation. In the first place, there can be no objection to
this procedure because it is provided in the Constitution itself. In the second place, it is apparent that in permitting the filing of
complaints ``in any form or manner," the framers of the Constitution took into account the well- known reticence of the people
which keep them from complaining against official wrongdoings. As this Court had occasion to point out, the Office of the
Ombudsman is different from the other investigative and prosecutorial agencies of the government because those subject to its
jurisdiction are public officials who, through official pressure and influence, can quash, delay or dismiss investigations held
against them. On the other hand complainants are more often than not poor and simple folk who cannot afford to hire lawyers.
THE EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSE APPLIES ONLY TO PERSONS OR THINGS IDENTICALLY SITUATED AND DOES
NOT BAR A REASONABLE CLASSIFICATION OF THE SUBJECT OF LEGISLATION. A CLASSIFICATION IS
REASONABLE WHERE:
(1) it is based on substantial distinctions which make real differences;
(2) these are germane to the purpose of the law;
(3) the classification applies not only to present conditions but also to future conditions which are substantially identical to those
of the present; and
(4) the classification applies only to those who belong to the same class.