CASE ANALAYSIS

INTERPRETATION OF SATUTES
(CLAW 222)

Submitted to:

Dr. Vedashree. A

Submitted by:

ANSH GOEL

BBA-LLB [2020-2025]

Alliance School of Law

Alliance University, Bengaluru

Date of Submission:

19/10/2022

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 RULE OF LITERAL INTERPRETATION
CASE 1
B. Premanand and Ors.
V
Mohan Koikal and Ors

FACTS OF THE CASE:

An appeal was filed against the impugned order/judgement of full bench of the high court of
Kerala, by that judgement the writ appeal filed by appellants against the judgement was
dismissed.
ISSUE:
The issue is about the inter se seniority on the post of block development officer between the
general category candidates and the Scheduled Caste/Scheduled Tribe candidates .
Rule 27(c) of the Kerala State and Subordinate Services Rules, 1959 which states:
27(c) Notwithstanding anything contained in Clauses (a) and (b) above, the seniority of a person appointed to a
class, category or grade in a service on the advice of the Commission shall, unless he has been reduced to a
lower rank as punishment, be determined by the date of first effective advice made for his appointment to such
class, category or grade and when two or more persons are included in the same list of candidates advised,
their relative seniority shall be fixed according to the order in which their names are arranged in the advice
list.

The above rule shows the seniority which has to be determined by the date of first effective advice
made by the Public Service Commission to the State Government for appointment.

JUDGEMENT:
It was held by the court-
 Equity can only supplement the law when there is a gap in it, but it cannot supplant the law,
 The first and foremost principle of interpretation of a statute in every system of interpretation
is the literal rule of interpretation,
 The literal rule of interpretation really means that there should be no interpretation, we should
read the statute as it is, without distorting or twisting its language.

Last it was held that in our law courts today do not cite these principles. Educated people are largely
ignorant about the great intellectual achievements of our ancestors, and the intellectual treasury which
they have bequeathed to us.
As a result, this appeal is allowed and the impugned judgment of the Full Bench of the High Court as
also the judgment of the learned Single Judge are set aside and the writ petition filed by the private
Respondents before the High Court is dismissed. No costs.

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SUMMARY OF THE RULE
The literal rule of interpretation is the primary rule of interpretation under which courts interpret the
statutes and provisions in the literal sense and ordinary sense without adultery the meaning and
modifying them. In this rule the laws are often enacted by legal experts under guidance of different
fields where the words and phrases used might have caused confusion and ambiguity which is needed
to be understand and explained.

Conclusion
It can be concluded with the above case, that literal interpretation rule shall be applied in
understanding the literal and ordinary meaning of section 27(c) of the Kerala state and subordinate
services rule shall be read. As per the judgement ordered the full bench of the high court and equity
can only supplement th3e law where there is a gap in understanding the language or the literal and
ordinary sense of the statute.

STATUTE MUST BE READ AS WHOLE IN ITS CONTEXT

SUMMARY OF THE RULE

The statute should be read

as whole.
"It is well-settled principle that
while interpreting a statute, the
interpretative function of
the court is to discover the true
legislative intent. A statute is
best interpreted when we know

3
why it was enacted. It must be
read, first as a whole, and then
section by section, clause by
clause, phrase by phrase and
word by word and therefore,
taking into consideration the
contextual connotation and the
scheme of the Act, its
provisions in their entirety, "It
is well-
settled principle that while
interpreting a statute, the
interpretative function of the
court is to
discover the true legislative
intent.
4
The statute should be read
as whole.
"It is well-settled principle that
while interpreting a statute, the
interpretative function of
the court is to discover the true
legislative intent. A statute is
best interpreted when we know
why it was enacted. It must be
read, first as a whole, and then
section by section, clause by
clause, phrase by phrase and
word by word and therefore,
taking into consideration the
contextual connotation and the
scheme of the Act, its
5
provisions in their entirety, "It
is well-
settled principle that while
interpreting a statute, the
interpretative function of the
court is to
discover the true legislative
intent.
The statute should be read
as whole.
"It is well-settled principle that
while interpreting a statute, the
interpretative function of
the court is to discover the true
legislative intent. A statute is
best interpreted when we know
6
why it was enacted. It must be
read, first as a whole, and then
section by section, clause by
clause, phrase by phrase and
word by word and therefore,
taking into consideration the
contextual connotation and the
scheme of the Act, its
provisions in their entirety, "It
is well-
settled principle that while
interpreting a statute, the
interpretative function of the
court is to
discover the true legislative
intent.
7
The statute should be read
as whole.
"It is well-settled principle that
while interpreting a statute, the
interpretative function of
the court is to discover the true
legislative intent. A statute is
best interpreted when we know
why it was enacted. It must be
read, first as a whole, and then
section by section, clause by
clause, phrase by phrase and
word by word and therefore,
taking into consideration the
contextual connotation and the
scheme of the Act, its
8
provisions in their entirety, "It
is well-
settled principle that while
interpreting a statute, the
interpretative function of the
court is to
discover the true legislative
intent.
The statute should be read
as whole.
"It is well-settled principle that
while interpreting a statute, the
interpretative function of
the court is to discover the true
legislative intent. A statute is
best interpreted when we know
9
why it was enacted. It must be
read, first as a whole, and then
section by section, clause by
clause, phrase by phrase and
word by word and therefore,
taking into consideration the
contextual connotation and the
scheme of the Act, its
provisions in their entirety, "It
is well-
settled principle that while
interpreting a statute, the
interpretative function of the
court is to
discover the true legislative
intent.
10
The statute should be read
as whole.
"It is well-settled principle that
while interpreting a statute, the
interpretative function of
the court is to discover the true
legislative intent. A statute is
best interpreted when we know
why it was enacted. It must be
read, first as a whole, and then
section by section, clause by
clause, phrase by phrase and
word by word and therefore,
taking into consideration the
contextual connotation and the
scheme of the Act, its
11
provisions in their entirety, "It
is well-
settled principle that while
interpreting a statute, the
interpretative function of the
court is to
discover the true legislative
intent.
Whenever the question arises as to the meaning of a certain provision in a statute, it is proper and
legitimate to read that provision in its context. This means that the statute must be read as a whole.
What was the previous state of the law, study of other statutes in Pari Materia, It is now firmly
established as a rule that the intention of the Legislature must be found by reading the statute as a
whole.
The language used by the legislature is plain or ambiguous can only be truly arrived at by studying the statute as
a whole. Words take colour from the context in which they are used, keeping pace with the time. Words used as
an adjective draws colour from the context too. The same word may mean one thing in one context and another
in different context, therefore, the same word used in different sections of a statute or even when used at
different places in the same clause or section of a statute may bear different meanings. That is why it is
necessary to read the statute as a whole in its context.

CASE 2
Manik Lal Majumdar and Ors.
V
Gouranga Chandra Dey and Ors

FACTS OF THE CASE

Gauranga Chandra dey the respondent filed and eviction petition under section 12 of the act on the
ground Bona fide requirement and & default in payment of rent.

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The Rent Control Court, after appraisal of evidence on record, recorded a finding that the plea raised
by the landlord regarding bona fide requirement of the premises was not established, but the
appellants were defaulters in payment of rent and accordingly passed an order directing their eviction
and for handing over possession of the premises, appellants preferred an appeal against the decision of
the Rent Control Court, but it was dismissed by Civil Judge (Senior Division), West Tripura, on the
ground that as the appellants had failed to deposit the arrears of rent as directed by the Rent Control
Court, the appeal preferred by them was not maintainable in view of Section 13(1) of the Act.
Revision Petition before the District Judge which was allowed and the order of Civil Judge (Senior
Division) was set aside and the appeal was remanded for consideration on merits. Feeling aggrieved,
respondent No. 1 filed a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution before the Gawhati High Court.

ISSUE
whether an appeal preferred under Section 20 of the Tripura Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act,
1975 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act') without payment to the landlord or deposit with the appellate
court all arrears of rent admitted by the tenant to be due is not maintainable and is liable to be rejected
on that ground alone.

JUDGEMENT
It was a well-settled principle that the intention of the legislature must be found by reading the statute
as a whole and in order to ascertain the meaning of a clause in a statute, the court must look at the
whole statute, at what precedes and what succeeds and not merely the clause itself. The court must
ascertain the intention of the legislature by directing its attention not merely to the clauses to be
construed, but to the entire statute it must be compared to other laws.

The Division Bench of the High Court, under the impugned order, has held that the reference to larger
bench made by the learned Single Judge was not called for and directed the writ petition to be placed
for hearing on merits before the learned Single Judge. Since we have held that the appeal filed by the
appellant against the decision of the Rent Control Court could not be rejected only on the ground that
the admitted arrears of rent had not been paid or deposited, the hearing of the writ petition now by the
learned Single Judge would entail waste of public time. We, therefore, direct that the appeal preferred
by the appellant be heard and decided in accordance with the direction issued by the learned District
Judge, West Tripura, by the judgment.

CASE 3
Hukumdev Narain Yadav
V
Lalit Narain Mishra

FACTS OF THE CASE

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In the bye-election to the Lok Sabha from Darbhanga Parliamentary Constituency held on January 30,
1972, the respondent Lalit Narain Mishra a candidate of the Indian National Congress was declared
elected on February 2, 1972, by a margin of 91,078 votes against his rival Ramsewak Yadav a
candidate of the Socialist Party at that election.
The appellant an elector in that constituency presented an election petition on Monday, March 20,
1972. instead of on Saturday March 18, 1972, which was the last day of limitation. The petition,
however, was dismissed by the High Court as being time-barred. Against that judgment and order this
appeal has been filed under Section 116-A of the Representation of the People Act, 1951.
Also it is mentioned that Section 80-A was added to the Act by the Amendment Act 47 of 1966,
whereunder the High Court was given jurisdiction to try election petitions.

Issue
 Do Rule 6 and 7 of those Rules warrant the submission that the Court is closed on the day
when the Judges do not sit, though the office of the High Court is open?
 Section 5 of the Limitation Act is applicable, do the facts of the case warrant condonation of
delay?

Judgement
Rule 6 & 7 shows that:
(1) the petition must first be presented to the Stamp Reporter.
(2) the Stamp Reporter has to certify thereon whether it is in time and in conformity with the
requirements of the Act and the rules in that behalf or is defective; and thereafter
(3) the petition shall be returned to the petitioner for removing defects if any. and for formal
presentation after removing the defects.
(4) if the Judge who is designated to entertain and try election petitions is absent, the petition shall be
presented before the Bench hearing Civil applications and motions.
(5) the date of presentation before the Judge or Bench, as the case may be, as provided in the proviso
to Rule
(6) shall be deemed to be the date of filing the election petition for the purposes of limitation.
If Rule 7(1) of the Election Rules had stated that the date of presentation to the Judge shall be deemed
to be the date of the filing of the election petition for the purpose of determining whether the petition
is barred by time, then such a provision could be said to be inconsistent with Rule 26 of the High
Court Rules. But that is not the case here. What Rule 7(1) provides if that the date of presentation to a
Judge or a Bench as mentioned in the proviso to Rule 6 which contemplates the presentation of a
petition before a Bench hearing Civil applications and motions on a court day, when a Judge is not
available on account of temporary absence or otherwise, but it does not provide for a contingency
where a Judge or a Bench sitting on any other day when the Court is not closed.
For all the reasons, the conclusion that the provisions of Section 5 of the Limitation Act do not govern
the filing of election petitions or their trial and, it is unnecessary to consider whether there are any
merits in the application for condonation of delay.

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 PLAIN MEANING RULE

SUMMARY OF THE RULE

The plain meaning rule dictates that statutes are to be interpreted using the ordinary meaning of the
language of the statute. In other words, a statute is to be read word for word and is to be interpreted
according to the ordinary meaning of the language, unless a statute explicitly defines some of its terms
otherwise or unless the result would be cruel or absurd. Ordinary words are given their ordinary
meaning, technical terms are given their technical meaning, and local, cultural terms are recognized as
applicable. The plain meaning rule is the mechanism that prevents courts from taking sides in
legislative or political issues. Additionally, it is the mechanism that underlies textualism and, to a
certain extent, originalism.

FACTS OF THE CASE:

A Company Petition No. 57 of 1983 - S.P. Nagrath & Co. v. Bareja Knipping Fasteners Ltd., the High
Court vide ordered winding up of the Company and an Official Liquidator was appointed who took
over possession of the properties of the Company. Bank filed a Suit for recovery of Rs. 14,53,577/-
with pendente lite and future interest. A preliminary decree for recovery of Rs. 19,07,800/- with future
interest @ 12% per annum was passed by the High Court in favour of the decree-holder Bank.
a decree was passed in favour of the Bank on 15.1.1987
BANK then filed a third Execution Petition No. 1 of 1999 dated 11.01.1999 against M/s. Bareja
Knipping Fasteners Limited through the Official Liquidator, without impleading the appellants and
Shri K.M.Bareja.

ISSUE
The issue was whether rule 9 of the company rules,1959 read with sections 17 & 18 of RBD act for
transfer of the execution petition to the tribunal and also that whether high court has jurisdiction to
entertain such application?
Relations of Sections 17, 18, 24 and 31 of the RDB Act!

JUDGEMENT
 The rules of interpretation other than the literal rule would come into play only if there is any
doubt with regard to the express language used or if the plain meaning would lead to an
absurdity. Where the words are unequivocal, there is no scope for importing any rule of
interpretation, & Section 31 is plain and unambiguous and it clearly says that only those suits
or proceedings pending before a Court shall stand transferred to the Tribunal which were
pending on the date when the Tribunal was established

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  It was clear that the literal rule applies, and the other rules have no application to interpreting
Section 31, since the language of Section 31 is plain and clear, and cannot be said to be
ambiguous or resulting in some absurdity. In view of the above, we are clearly of the opinion
that the recovery in question is time barred and it is hereby quashed. The impugned order of
the High Court is set aside. The appeals are accordingly allowed. No costs.

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