Article 14

The State of West Bengal vs. Anwar Ali Sarkar (11.01.1952 - SC) :
MANU/SC/0033/1952

58. Article 14 of our Constitution, it is well known, corresponds to the last

portion of section 1 of the fourteenth Amendment to the American Constitution
except that our article 14 has also adopted the English doctrine of rule of law by
the addition of the words "equality before the law." It has not however, been
urged before us that the addition of these extra words has made any substantial
difference in its practical application. The meaning, scope and effect of article
14 of our Constitution have been discussed and laid down by this Court in the
case of Chiranjit Lal Chowdhury v. The Union of India and Others
MANU/SC/0009/1950 : [1950] S.C.R. 869. Although Sastri J., as he then was,
and myself differed from the actual decision of the majority of the Court, there
was no disagreement between us and the majority as to the principles
underlying the provisions of article 14. The difference of opinion in that case
was not so much on the principles to be applied as to the effect of the
application of such principles. Those principles were again considered and
summarised by this Court in The State of Bombay v. F. N. Balsara
MANU/SC/0009/1951 : [1951] S.C.R. 682. It is now well established that while
article 14 is designed to prevent a person or class of persons from being singled
out from others similarly situated for the purpose of being specially subjected to
discriminating and hostile legislation, it does not insist on an "abstract
symmetry" in the sense that every piece of legislation must have universal
application. All persons are not, by nature, attainment or circumstances, equal
and the varying needs of different classes of persons often require separate
treatment and, therefore, the protecting clause has been construed as a guarantee
against discrimination amongst equals only and not as taking away from the
state the power to classify persons for the purpose of legislation. This
classification may be on different bases. It may be geographical or according to
objects or occupations or the like Mere classification, however, is not enough to
get over the inhibition of the Article. The classification must not be arbitrary but
must be rational, that is to say, it must not only be based on some qualities or
characteristics which are to be found in all the persons grouped together and not
in others who are left out but those qualities or characteristics must have a
reasonable relation to the object of the legislation. In order to pass the test, two
conditions must be fulfilled, namely, that the classification must be founded on
an intelligible differentia which distinguishes those that are grouped together
from others and that that differentia must have a rational relation to the object
sought to be achieved by the Act.

Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India MANU/SC/0133/1978 : [1978]2SCR621

...what is the content and reach of the great equalising principle enunciated in
this article? There can be no doubt that it is a founding faith of the Constitution.
It is indeed the pillar on which rests securely the foundation of our democratic
republic. And, therefore, it must not be subjected to a narrow, pedantic or
lexicographic approach. No attempt should be made to truncate its all-
embracing scope and meaning for, to do so would be to violate its activist
magnitude. Equality is a dynamic concept with many aspects and dimensions
and it cannot be imprisoned within traditional and doctrinaire limits.... Article
14 strikes at arbitrariness in State action and ensures fairness and equality of
treatment. The principle of reasonableness, which legally as well as
philosophically, is an essential element of equality or non-arbitrariness pervades
Article 14 like a brooding omnipresence.

EP. Royappa v. State of Tamil Nadu MANU/SC/0380/1973 :

(1974)ILLJ172SC , it was held that the basic principle which informs both
Articles 14 and 16 is equality and inhibition against discrimination. this Court
further observed as under:
From a positivistic point of view, equality is antithetic to arbitrariness. In fact,
equality and arbitrariness are sworn enemies; one belongs to the rule of law in a
republic while the other, to the whim and caprice of an absolute monarch.
Where an act is arbitrary it is implicit in it that it is unequal both according to
political logic and constitutional law and is, therefore, violative of Article 14,
and if it affects any matter relating to public employment, it is also violative of
Article 16. Articles 14 and 16 strike at arbitrariness in State action and ensure
fairness and equality of treatment.

15. Affirming and explaining this view, the Constitution Bench in Ajay Hasia
etc. v. Khalid Mujib Sehravardi and Ors etc. MANU/SC/0498/1980 :
(1981)ILLJ103SC held that it must, therefore, now be taken to be well settled
that what Article 14 strikes at is arbitrariness because any action that is arbitrary
must necessarily involve negation of equality. The Court made it explicit that
where an act is arbitrary it is implicit in it that it is un equal both according to
political logic and constitutional law and is, therefore, violative of Article 14.
After a review of large number of decisions bearing on the subject, in Air India
etc. v. Nargesh Meerza and Ors. etc. MANU/SC/0688/1981 :
(1981)IILLJ314SC the Court formulated propositions emerging from analysis
and examination of earlier decisions. One such proposition held well established
is that Article 14 is certainly attracted where equals are treated differently
without any reasonable basis.

Article 19(1)(g)

Chintaman Rao and Ors. vs. State of Madhya Pradesh (08.11.1950 - SC) :
MANU/SC/0008/1950
7. The question for decision is whether the statute under the guise of protecting
public interests arbitrarily interferes with private business and imposes
unreasonable and unnecessarily restrictive regulations upon lawful occupation;
in other words, whether the total prohibition of carrying on the business of
manufacture of bidis within the agricultural season amounts to a reasonable
restriction on the fundamental rights mentioned in article 19(1)(g) of the
Constitution.

Unless it is shown that there is a reasonable relation of the provisions of the Act
to the purpose in view, the right of freedom of occupation and business cannot
be curtailed by it.

8. The phrase "reasonable restriction" connotes that the limitation imposed on a

person in enjoyment of the right should not be arbitrary or of an excessive
nature, beyond what is required in the interests of the public.

Bishambhar Dayal Chandra Mohan v. State of Uttar Pradesh (1982) 1 SCC 39 : (AIR

1982 SC 33)

"Under Article 19(1)(g) of the Constitution a citizen has the right to carry on any
occupation, trade or business and the only restriction on this unfettered right is the
authority of the State to make a law imposing reasonable restrictions under Clause (6).
The principles underlying in Clauses (5) and (6) of Article 19 are now well settled and
ingrained in our legal system in a number of decisions of this Court, and it is not
necessary to burden this judgment with citations. The expression "reasonable restriction"
signifies that the limitation imposed on a person in enjoyment of the right should not be
arbitrary or of an excessive nature, beyond what is required in the interests of the public,
The test of reasonableness, wherever prescribed, should be applied to each individual
statute impugned and no abstract standard, or general pattern of reasonableness can be
laid down as applicable in all cases. The restriction which arbitrarily or excessively
invades the right cannot be said to contain the quality of reasonableness and unless it
strikes a proper balance between the freedom guaranteed in Article 19(1)(g) and the
social control permitted by Clause (6) of Article 19, it must be held to be wanting in that
quality."

The Supreme Court in the case of Karnataka Live Band Restaurants Association Vs.
State of Karnataka and others reported in MANU/SC/0037/2018 : (2018) 4 SCC 372
has held as under:-

45. Similarly, so far as Article 19(1)(g) of the Constitution is concerned, this article
accords fundamental rights to carry on any profession, occupation, trade or business.
However, the right guaranteed under sub-clause (g) is made subject to imposition of
appropriate reasonable restrictions by the State in the interest of general public under
clause (6).

46. As and when the question arises as to whether a particular restriction imposed by law
under clause (6) of Article 19 is reasonable or not, such question is left for the court to
decide. The test of reasonableness is required to be viewed in the context of the issues,
which faced the impugned legislature. In construction of such laws and while judging
their validity, the court has to approach the issue from the point of furthering the social
interest, moral and material progress of the community as a whole. Likewise, while
examining such question, the Court cannot proceed on a general notion of what is
reasonable in its abstract form nor can the court proceed to decide such question from the
point of view of the person on whom such restriction is imposed. What is, therefore,
required to be decided in such case is whether the restrictions imposed are reasonable in
the interest of general public or not.

The Supreme Court in the case of Christian Medical College Vellore

Association Vs. Union of India and others reported in
MANU/SC/0424/2020 : (2020) 8 SCC 705 has held as under:-

38.3. The Court further considered the criteria of proportionality and

emphasised for proper balance between the two facets viz. the rights and
limitations imposed upon it by a statute. The concept of proportionality is an
appropriate criterion. The law imposing restrictions will be treated as
proportional if it is meant to achieve a proper purpose. If the measures taken to
achieve such a goal are rationally connected to the object, such steps are
necessary. The Court considered the concept of proportionality thus: (Modern
Dental College & Research Centre case [Modern Dental College & Research
Centre v. State of M.P., MANU/SC/0495/2016 : (2016) 7 SCC 353 : 7 SCEC
1], SCC pp. 411-15, paras 57-64)

"57. It is well settled that the right under Article 19(1)(g) is not absolute in
terms but is subject to reasonable restrictions under clause (6). Reasonableness
has to be determined having regard to the nature of right alleged to be infringed,
purpose of the restriction, extent of restriction and other relevant factors. In
applying these factors, one cannot lose sight of the directive principles of State
policy. The Court has to try to strike a just balance between the fundamental
rights and the larger interest of the society. The Court interferes with a statute if
it clearly violates the fundamental rights. The Court proceeds on the footing that
the legislature understands the needs of the people. The Constitution is
primarily for the common man. Larger interest and welfare of student
community to promote merit, achieve excellence and curb malpractices, fee and
admissions can certainly be regulated.

Article 21 vis-à-vis right to livelihood.

Olga Tellis and Ors. vs. Bombay Municipal Corporation and Ors.
(10.07.1985 - SC) : MANU/SC/0039/1985

32. As we have stated while summing up the petitioners' case, the main plank of
their argument is that the right to life which is guaranteed by Article 21 includes
the right to livelihood and since, they will be deprived of their livelihood if they
are evicted from their slum and pavement dwellings, their eviction is
tantamount to deprivation of their life and is hence unconstitutional. For
purposes of argument, we will assume the factual correctness of the premise
that if the petitioners are evicted from their dwellings, they will be deprived of
their livelihood. Upon that assumption, the question which we have to consider
is whether the right to life includes the right to livelihood. We see only one
answer to that question, namely, that it does. The sweep of the right to life
conferred by Article 21 is wide and far reaching. It does not mean merely that
life cannot be extinguished or taken away as, for example, by the imposition
and execution of the death sentence, except according to procedure established
by law. That is but one aspect of the right to life. An equally important facet of
that right is the right to livelihood because, no person can live without the
means of living, that is, the means of livelihood. If the right to livelihood is not
treated as a part of the constitutional right to life, the easiest way of depriving a
person his right to life would be to deprive him of his means of livelihood to the
point of abrogation. Such deprivation would not only denude the life of its
effective content and meaningfulness but it would make life impossible to live.
And yet, such deprivation would not have to be In accordance with the
procedure established by law, if the right to livelihood is not regarded as a part
of the right to life. That, which alone makes it possible to live, leave aside what
makes life livable, must be deemed to be an integral component of the right to
life. Deprive a person of his right to livelihood and you shall have deprived him
of his life.

Indeed, that explains the massive migration of the rural population to big cities.
They migrate because they have no means of livelihood in the villages. The
motive force which people their desertion of their hearths and homes in the
villages that struggle for survival, that is, the struggle for life. So unimpeachable
is the evidence of the nexus between life and the means of livelihood. They
have to eat to live : Only a handful can afford the luxury of living to eat. That
they can do, namely, eat, only if they have the means of livelihood.

That is the context in which it was said by Douglas J. in Baksey that the right to
work is the most precious liberty because, it sustains and enables a man to live
and the right to life is a precious freedom. "Life", as observed by Field, J. in
Munn v. Illinois (1877) 94 U.S. 113, means something more than mere animal
existence and the inhibition against the deprivation of life extends to all those
limits and faculties by which life is enjoyed. This observation was quoted with
approval by this Court in Kharak Singh v. The State of U.P.
MANU/SC/0085/1962 : 1963CriLJ329

Registration of FIR in cognizable offences.

Lalita Kumari vs. Govt. of U.P. and Ors. (12.11.2013 - SC) :

MANU/SC/1166/2013

Conclusion/Directions:

111. In view of the aforesaid discussion, we hold:

(i) Registration of FIR is mandatory under Section 154 of the Code, if the
information discloses commission of a cognizable offence and no preliminary
inquiry is permissible in such a situation.

(ii) If the information received does not disclose a cognizable offence but
indicates the necessity for an inquiry, a preliminary inquiry may be conducted
only to ascertain whether cognizable offence is disclosed or not.

(iii) If the inquiry discloses the commission of a cognizable offence, the FIR
must be registered. In cases where preliminary inquiry ends in closing the
complaint, a copy of the entry of such closure must be supplied to the first
informant forthwith and not later than one week. It must disclose reasons in
brief for closing the complaint and not proceeding further.

(iv) The police officer cannot avoid his duty of registering offence if cognizable
offence is disclosed. Action must be taken against erring officers who do not
register the FIR if information received by him discloses a cognizable offence.
(v) The scope of preliminary inquiry is not to verify the veracity or otherwise of
the information received but only to ascertain whether the information reveals
any cognizable offence.

(vi) As to what type and in which cases preliminary inquiry is to be conducted

will depend on the facts and circumstances of each case. The category of cases
in which preliminary inquiry may be made are as under:

(a) Matrimonial disputes/family disputes

(b) Commercial offences

(c) Medical negligence cases

(d) Corruption cases

(e) Cases where there is abnormal delay/laches in initiating criminal

prosecution, for example, over 3 months delay in reporting the matter without
satisfactorily explaining the reasons for delay.

The aforesaid are only illustrations and not exhaustive of all conditions which
may warrant preliminary inquiry.

(vii) While ensuring and protecting the rights of the accused and the
complainant, a preliminary inquiry should be made time bound and in any case
it should not exceed fifteen days generally and in exceptional cases, by giving
adequate reasons, six weeks time is provided. The fact of such delay and the
causes of it must be reflected in the General Diary entry.

(viii) Since the General Diary/Station Diary/Daily Diary is the record of all
information received in a police station, we direct that all information relating to
cognizable offences, whether resulting in registration of FIR or leading to an
inquiry, must be mandatorily and meticulously reflected in the said Diary and
the decision to conduct a preliminary inquiry must also be reflected, as
mentioned above.