Case 136 - People v.

Endaya
RULE 115 – RIGHTS OF THE ACCUSED 
731 SCRA 1,23 July 2014

FACTS: A buy-bust operation was conducted against accused after the police acting on a report
from a barangay official that appellant is involved in illegal drug activities conducted surveillance
operations on Endaya. He was then apprehended and charged with possession and sale of illegal
drugs (shabu), and the police made the necessary documentation of the alleged shabu.

Accused alleged that at the police station, he was immediately put in jail but he was unable to ask
the reason for his imprisonment because one of the police officers punched him again. When he was
subsequently taken out of his cell, the police officers led him to a table where they showed him
plastic sachets containing shabu allegedly found in his wallet. Thereafter, the police officers took
photographs of him and the items supposedly seized from him, although he refused to be
photographed. He was also made to sign a document, which later turned out to be the inventory of
property seized, without allowing him to read the contents thereof and without the assistance of a
counsel. Neither did the police officers inform him of his constitutional rights. Basically, accused
contends that he was not assisted by a lawyer when he signed the "Receipt for Property
Seized;"therefore, the document cannot be admitted in evidence against him as his act of signing the
same is a form of confession or admission.

ISSUE: Whether or not there is a violation of accused’s rights. 

RULING: YES. There is no showing in the records of this case that appellant was assisted by a
counsel when he signed the “Receipt for Property Seized.” It is settled that the signature of an
accused in the receipt of property seized is inadmissible in evidence if it was obtained without the
assistance of counsel. The signature of the accused on such a receipt is a declaration against his
interest and a tacit admission of the crime charged; hence, the constitutional safeguard must be
observed.

Nevertheless, as aptly found by the CA, while it is true that appellant signed the receipt of property
seized without the assistance of a counsel, the same only renders inadmissible the receipt itself.54
Thus, according to the CA:

x x x the evidentiary value of the "Receipt of Property Seized" in the present circumstances is
irrelevant in light of the ample evidence proving [appellant’s] guilt beyond reasonable doubt. As
[w]e have earlier stated, the prosecution was able to prove that a valid buy-bust operation was
conducted to entrap [appellant]. The testimonies of the arresting police officers clearly established
[the illegal possession] and that the sale of shabu by [appellant] was consummated. The corpus
delicti, which is the shabu, [were] presented in court and confirmed by the other members of the
buy-bust team and they have acknowledged that they were the same drugs subject of that
particular buy-bust operation [and subsequent body search on [appellant].

Ultimately, the accused was found guilty, it is only the “receipt of property seized” as evidence was
deemed inadmissible. 

Case 137 - People v. Ramirez

RULE 115 – RIGHTS OF THE ACCUSED
 855 SCRA 481 ,14 February 2018

FACTS: Ramirez was charged with multiple rape committed against his daughter, when she was
still 7 or 8 years old.. This case was filed when the victim was no longer a minor(she was already 27
years old). Still the RTC convicted him based on the credibility of the victim’s testimony, and the CA,
based on circumstantial evidence. 

The victim testified that her father let her smell something and she was unconscious thereafter. She
alleged that when she regained consciousness there was already blood on her shorts and her panty
was already reversed and felt pain in her vagina. When she woke up her father was out of the
house. Because of this, she presumed that her father raped her (according to the cross examination
of the defense lawyer).

ISSUE: W/N the rights of the accused was violated when his conviction was made based on the
victim’s testimony and circumstantial evidence.

RULING: YES. Although as a rule in rape cases, when the complainant’s testimony is credible, it may
be the sole basis for the accused’s conviction. The findings of the trial court regarding the credibility
of witnesses are generally accorded great respect and even finality on appeal. However, this
principle does not preclude a re-evaluation of the evidence to determine whether material facts or
circumstances have been overlooked or misinterpreted by the trial court. Here, the court applied
the exception. In criminal cases, ‘‘speculation and probabilities cannot take the place of proof
required to establish the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt. Suspicion, no matter
how strong, must not sway judgment.”

To the mind of the Court, these circumstances did not establish with certainty the guilt of
appellant as to convince beyond reasonable doubt that the crime of rape was in fact committed
or that he was the perpetrator of the offense charged. Significantly, the testimonial account of
"AAA" even created a glaring doubt as to whether rape was indeed committed and as regards
the real identity of the culprit.

The victim’s testimony indubitably casts doubt on her credibility and the veracity of her narration
of the incident considering that she was already 27 years old when she testified. There was no
allegation that appellant was actually seen inside the house before the alleged incident and the only
occupant before she went to sleep. The circumstances relied upon by the CA in its assailed Decision
failed to sufficiently link appellant to the crime. What is extant on record is that the allegation of
sexual molestation on the victim by appellant was anchored principally on presumption. 

Case no. 138 - People v. Cabanada

RULE 115 – RIGHTS OF THE ACCUSED
831 SCRA 485 ,19 July 2017

FACTS: Cabanada was charged with the crime of Qualified Theft. Cabanada, being then employed as
a house maid. The aggregate amount of the stolen personal properties was P154K. Accused made
two confessions in relation to the stolen money and jewelry of her employer (Qualified Theft).

In the course of the interview at the Victoria's residence, Cabanada admitted to the police (PO2
Cotoner) that she took the money. She led them to her room and took a pouch (white envelope)
containing ₱16,000.00 cash. She also showed a white leather wallet containing the missing master
key of Victor's vehicle. Thereafter, Cabanada was brought at the Criminal Investigation Unit (CIU)
for further investigation. Cabanada apologized to Catherine, and admitted that she still had some of
the missing jewelry in her house at Panatag Compound, Welfareville, Mandaluyong City. The police
went to her house and recovered the Technomarine, Pierre Cardin, Relic and Santa Barbara
watches and a pair of earrings with diamonds placed in a tool box. She was not assisted by a lawyer
at the police station nor was allowed to call her relatives.

CA ruled that Cabanada's admissions were not obtained under custodial investigation as it was
established that she was not yet arrested at that time. The "uncounselled admissions" were given
freely and spontaneously during a routine inquiry.

ISSUE: Whether or not her confessions are admissible in evidence. 

RULING: Partially Yes.  The "investigation" in Section 12, paragraph 1 of the Bill of Rights pertains
to "custodial investigation." Custodial investigation commences when a person is taken into
custody and is singled out as a suspect in the commission of a crime under investigation and the
police officers begin to ask questions on the suspect's participation therein and which tend to elicit
an admission.

The prosecution established that the confession was elicited during the initial interview of the
police after Catherine called to report the missing money and personal effects. The investigation
was still a general inquiry of the crime and has not focused on a particular suspect. Also, she
admitted to the crime while at the residence of her employer, thus, she was not yet taken into
custody or otherwise deprived of her freedom. Thus, this was admissible.

However, the circumstances surrounding Cabanada's appearance before the police station falls
within the definition of custodial investigation. Despite the claim that she was not considered as a
suspect at that time, the fact remains that she confessed to having committed the crime and was
able to produce the money from her room. The investigation, therefore, ceased to be a general
inquiry even if they contemplated that she was covering for someone.

The subsequent confession of Cabanada at the police station can be considered as having been done
in a custodial setting because (1) after admitting the crime, Cabanada was brought to the police
station for further investigation; (2) the alleged confession happened in the office of the chief; (3)
PO2 Cotoner was present during Cabanada’s apology and admission to Catherine. The compelling
pressures of custodial setting were present when the accused was brought to the police station
along with Catherine. Thus, this confession is not admissible in evidence because she was not
assisted by counsel at this stage, or this taking of the confession runs against the Constitutional
Right of the accused.

In People v. Javar, it was ruled that any statement obtained in violation of the constitutional
provision, whether exculpatory or inculpatory, in whole or in part, shall be inadmissible in
evidence. Even if the confession contains a grain of truth, if it was made without the assistance of
counsel, it becomes inadmissible in evidence, regardless of the absence of coercion or even if it had
been voluntarily given. Cabanada's confession without counsel at the police station, which led to the
recovery of the other items at her house, is inadmissible.

Nevertheless, the inadmissibility of Cabanada's admission made in CIU does not necessarily entitle
her to a verdict of acquittal. Her admission during the general inquiry is still admissible.
 Case 139. Conjuangco vs. Sandiganbayan 18 April 2021
Speedy Trial/Speedy Disposition of Cases

Facts: A Petition for Prohibition under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court was filed which seeks to enjoin
the Sandiganbayan from further exercising jurisdiction over 6 Civil Cases involving complaints for
recovery of ill-gotten wealth filed by respondent Presidential Commission on Good Government
(PCGG) against petitioner Eduardo M. Cojuangco, Jr. (petitioner) and other defendants, and for the
Court to order the dismissal of the aforesaid cases on the reason that the Sandiganbayan has
unjustly allowed the same to be pending for more than 32 years without commencing trial proper
and without exerting any effort to dispose them, in violation of petitioner's constitutional rights to
due process and speedy disposition of cases.

In particular, petitioner highlighted the following circumstances: the length of delay of more than
32 years without trial proper; no justifiable reason in not allowing any of the subject cases to
proceed to trial or at least include the same in the Sandiganbayan calendar for trial despite
petitioner's demand for trial and despite invoking his right to speedy disposition of cases at the
earliest opportunity; the prejudice caused by the delay - difficulty in preparing his defense, i.e.,
witnesses and handling lawyers of petitioner may no longer be available; and financial losses from
the properties that have been subject of sequestration.

Issue: W/N accused’s rights to due process and to speedy disposition of cases were violated.

Ruling: Yes. The right to a speedy disposition of cases is a relative and flexible concept. A mere
mathematical reckoning of the time involved is not sufficient. Particular regard must be taken of the
facts and circumstances peculiar to each case. Otherwise stated, the right must be consistent with
reasonable delay as the same is deemed violated only when there is inordinate delay, such as when
the proceedings are attended by vexatious, capricious, and oppressive delays; or when unjustified
postponements of the trial are asked for and secured, or when without cause or unjustifiable
motive, a long period of time is allowed to elapse without the party having his case tried.

Four factors or the balancing test as a guide in the determination of inordinate delay: the conduct of
both the prosecution and the defendant are weighed apropos the four-fold factors, to wit: (1) length
of the delay; (2) reason for the delay; (3) defendant's assertion or non-assertion of his right; and (4)
prejudice to defendant resulting from the delay. None of these elements, however, is either a
necessary or sufficient condition; they are related and must be considered together with other
relevant circumstances.

First, the fact that 32 years has elapsed from the time of the filing of the original complaint and 24
years from the subdivision thereof without trial proper being commenced, on its face, constitutes
delay by any reasonable standard. Second, the parties do not dispute that there is delay in this case;
they only differ in their arguments as to whether such delay is unjustified. Third, under Cagang, the
defendant would only carry the burden of proof if the right is invoked within the given time
periods. The defendant's burden of proof is premised on a circumstance where he invokes his right
while the time limits set by the rules has not expired yet, hence, he must prove that the case took
much longer than was reasonably necessary to resolve.78 Without a given period set by the rules as
to when the Sandiganbayan should terminate pre-trial and commence trial proper from the time
the complaint is filed, and in view of the delay of 32 years from the time of the filing of the
complaint and 24 years from the subdivision thereof without having his case tried, the Court cannot
reasonably place the burden of proof on petitioner. Fourth, a survey of jurisprudence reveals that
most of the complaints dismissed for violation of the right to speedy disposition of a case stems
from the failure of the State, or the Republic in this case, to satisfactorily explain the inordinate
delay,79 except when there is a clear case of waiver in asserting the right to a speedy disposition of
cases or when there is acquiescence to the delay.

Right to Speedy Trial Right to Speedy Disposition of Cases

May only be invoked in criminal prosecutions May be invoked before any tribunal, whether
against courts of law. judicial or quasi-judicial.

Take note of the “Cagang Guildelines”

First, the right to speedy disposition of cases is different from the right to speedy trial. While the
rationale for both rights is the same, the right to speedy trial may only be invoked in criminal
prosecutions against courts of law. The right to speedy disposition of cases, however, may be
invoked before any tribunal, whether judicial or quasi-judicial. What is [important] is that the
accused may already be prejudiced by the proceeding for the right to speedy disposition of cases to
be invoked.

Second, a case is deemed initiated upon the filing of a formal complaint prior to a conduct of a
preliminary investigation. This Court acknowledges, however, that the Ombudsman should set
reasonable periods for preliminary investigation, with due regard to the complexities and nuances
of each case. Delays beyond this period will be taken against the prosecution. The period taken for
fact-finding investigations prior to the filing of the formal complaint shall not be included in the
determination of whether there has been inordinate delay.

Third, courts must first determine which party carries the burden of proof. If the right is invoked
within the given time periods contained in current Supreme Court resolutions and circulars, and
the time periods that will be promulgated by the Office of the Ombudsman, the defense has the
burden of proving that the right was justifiably invoked. If the delay occurs beyond the given time
period and the right is invoked, the prosecution has the burden of justifying the delay.

If the defense has the burden of proof, it must prove first, whether the case is motivated by malice
or clearly only politically motivated and is attended by utter lack of evidence, and second, that the
defense did not contribute to the delay.

Once the burden of proof shifts to the prosecution, the prosecution must prove first, that it followed
the prescribed procedure in the conduct of preliminary investigation and in the prosecution of the
case; second, that the complexity of the issues and the volume of evidence made the delay
inevitable; and third, that no prejudice was suffered by the accused as a result of the delay.

Fourth, determination of the length of delay is never mechanical. Courts must consider the entire
context of the case, from the amount of evidence to be weighed to the simplicity or complexity of
the issues raised.
An exception to this rule is if there is an allegation that the prosecution of the case was solely
motivated by malice, such as when the case is politically motivated or when there is continued
prosecution despite utter lack of evidence. Malicious intent may be gauged from the behavior of the
prosecution throughout the proceedings. If malicious prosecution is properly alleged and
substantially proven, the case would automatically be dismissed without need of further analysis of
the delay.

Another exception would be the waiver of the accused to the right to speedy disposition of cases or
the right to speedy trial. If it can be proven that the accused acquiesced to the delay, the
constitutional right can no longer be invoked.

In all cases of dismissals due to inordinate delay, the causes of the delays must be properly laid out
and discussed by the relevant court.
Fifth, the right to speedy disposition of cases or the right to speedy trial must be timely raised. The
respondent or the accused must file the appropriate motion upon the lapse of the statutory or
procedural periods. Otherwise, they are deemed to have waived their right to speedy disposition of
cases.
Case No. 140 - People vs. Magat, 332 SCRA 517, May 31, 2000
Rule 116 Arraignment and Plea

FACTS: 2 Informations for rape were filed against Magat for raping his daughter on 2 occasions.
Upon arraignment, he pleaded guilty but bargained for a lesser penalty for each case. Complainant’s
mother and the public prosecutor agreed. Magat was sentenced to 10 years imprisonment for each
case. The case was revived on the ground that the initial sentence was too light. He was re-
arraigned and was sentenced to death. Magat now claims that the re-arraignment was erroneous
since he was already found guilty on the basis of his initial plea of guilt.

ISSUE: Whether the finding of guilt on the basis of his initial plea was correct.

RULING: NO. The order of the trial court convicting the accused-appellant on his own plea of guilt is
void ab initio on the ground that accused-appellant’s plea is not the plea bargaining contemplated
and allowed by law and the rules of procedure. The only instance where a plea bargaining is
allowed under the Rules is when an accused pleads guilty to a lesser offense.

It must be emphasized that accused-appellant did not plead to a lesser offense but pleaded guilty to
the rape charges and only bargained for a lesser penalty. In short, as aptly observed by the Solicitor
General, he did not plea bargain but made conditions on the penalty to be imposed. This is
erroneous because by pleading guilty to the offense charged, accused-appellant should be
sentenced to the penalty to which he pleaded. It is the essence of a plea of guilty that the accused
admits absolutely and unconditionally his guilt and responsibility for the offense imputed to him.
Hence, an accused may not foist a conditional plea of guilty on the court by admitting his guilt
provided that a certain penalty will be meted unto him.

Accused-appellant's plea of guilty is undoubtedly a conditional plea. Hence, the trial court should
have vacated such a plea and entered a plea of not guilty for a conditional plea of guilty, or one
subject to the proviso that a certain penalty be imposed upon him, is equivalent to a plea of not
guilty and would, therefore, require a full-blown trial before judgment may be rendered.
In effect, the judgment rendered by the trial court which was based on a void plea bargaining is also
void ab initio and can not be considered to have attained finality for the simple reason that a void
judgment has no legality from its inception. Thus, since the judgment of conviction rendered against
accused-appellant is void, double jeopardy will not lie.