CRIMINAL LAW 1

CASE DIGESTS
ARTICLE 2
G.R. No. L-13005 October 10, 1917
THE UNITED STATES vs. AH SING

FACTS:
Ah Sing is a subject of China employed as a fireman on the steamship Shun Chang. The Shun Chang is a
foreign steamer which arrived at the port of Cebu after a voyage direct from the port of Saigon. The
defendant bought eight cans of opium in Saigon, brought them on board the steamship Shun Chang, and
had them in his possession during the trip from Saigon to Cebu. When the steamer anchored in the port
of Cebu, the authorities on making a search found the eight cans of opium above mentioned hidden in
the ashes below the boiler of the steamer's engine. The defendant confessed that he was the owner of
this opium, and that he had purchased it in Saigon. He did not confess, however, as to his purpose in
buying the opium. He did not say that it was his intention to import the prohibited drug into the
Philippine Islands. No other evidence direct or indirect, to show that the intention of the accused was to
import illegally this opium into the Philippine Islands, was introduced.

ISSUES:
Whether or not the crime of illegal importation can be proven against Ah Sing

RULING:
YES. It is to be noted that section 4 of Act No. 2381 begins, "Any person who shall unlawfully import or
bring any prohibited drug into the Philippine Islands." "Import" and "bring" are synonymous terms. The
Federal Courts of the United States have held that the mere act of going into a port, without breaking
bulk, is prima facie evidence of importation. And again, the importation is not the making entry of goods
at the custom house, but merely the bringing them into port; and the importation is complete before
entry of the Custom House. As applied to the Opium Law, the Court expressly hold that any person
unlawfully imports or brings any prohibited drug into the Philippine Islands, when the prohibited drug is
found under this person's control on a vessel which has come direct from a foreign country and is within
the jurisdictional limits of the Philippine Islands. In such case, a person is guilty of illegal importation of
the drug unless contrary circumstances exist or the defense proves otherwise.

Applied to the facts herein, it would be absurd to think that the accused was merely carrying opium back
and forth between Saigon and Cebu for the mere pleasure of so doing. It would likewise be impossible to
conceive that the accused needed so large an amount of opium for his personal use. No better
explanation being possible, the logical deduction is that the defendant intended this opium to be
brought into the Philippine Islands. We accordingly find that there was illegal importation of opium from
a foreign country into the Philippine Islands. To anticipate any possible misunderstanding, let it be said
that these statements do not relate to foreign vessels in transit, a situation not present.

The defendant and appellant, having been proved guilty beyond a reasonable doubt as charged and the
sentence of the trial court being within the limits provided by law, it results that the judgment must be
affirmed with the costs of this instance against the appellant. So, ordered.
CRIMINAL LAW 1
CASE DIGESTS

G.R. No. L-5887 (18 PHIL 573)

THE UNITED STATES vs. LOOK CHAW

FACTS:
Defendant Look Chaw was charged for possession of two sacks of opium on board the steamship Errol of
English Nationality. The ship came from Hong Kong bound for Mexico, via the call ports of Manila and
Cebu. Though the defendant voluntarily admitted that the contraband belonged to him for the purpose
of selling it, the defense moved for the dismissal of the case, on the ground that the Philippine court has
no jurisdiction to try the case and that mere possession of the articles seized does not constitute a
crime. The Court of First Instance of Cebu ruled that it did not lack jurisdiction in as much as the crime
had been committed within its district, on the wharf of Cebu. With this, the defendant appealed the case
to the Supreme Court.

ISSUE:
Whether the Philippine Courts have jurisdiction over unlawful possession of opium on a foreign vessel
stationed within Philippine ports.

RULING:
Yes, the Supreme Court ruled that the Philippine Courts have jurisdiction to try the case. The general rule
states that mere possession of a prohibited thing in the Philippine Islands, aboard a foreign vessel in
transit does not constitute a crime triable by the courts of this country, on account that such foreign
vessel is an extension of its own nationality. However, in the case at bar, the opium landed from the
vessel upon Philippine soil, thus committing an open violation of the laws of the land. It is a violation of
the penal law in force at the place of the commission of the crime, only the court established in that said
place itself had competent jurisdiction, in the absence of an agreement under an international treaty.
Therefore, the Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the lower court.

G.R. No. L-5887 December 16, 1910

THE UNITED STATES vs. LOOK CHAW

FACTS:
Between 11 and 12 o'clock a. m. on August 19, 1909, several persons, among them Messrs. Jacks and
Milliron, chief of the department of the port of Cebu and internal-revenue agent of Cebu, respectively,
went aboard the steamship Erroll to inspect and search its cargo, and found two sacks of opium. The
defendant stated, freely and voluntarily, that he had bought these sacks of opium, in Hongkong with the
intention of selling them as contraband in Mexico or Vera Cruz. All evidence found properly constitutes
corpus delicti. The defense moved for a dismissal of the case, on the grounds that the court had no
jurisdiction to try the same and the facts concerned therein did not constitute a crime.
CRIMINAL LAW 1
CASE DIGESTS
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Philippine court has jurisdiction of the case

RULING:
YES. The court ruled that it did not lack jurisdiction, inasmuch as the crime had been committed within
its district, on the wharf of Cebu. Although the mere possession of a thing of prohibited use in these
Islands, aboard a foreign vessel in transit, in any of their ports, does not, as a general rule, constitute a
crime triable by the courts of this country, on account of such vessel being considered as an extension of
its own nationality, the same rule does not apply when the article, whose use is prohibited within the
Philippine Islands, in the present case a can of opium, is landed from the vessel upon Philippine soil, thus
committing an open violation of the laws of the land, with respect to which, as it is a violation of the
penal law in force at the place of the commission of the crime, only the court established in that said
place itself had competent jurisdiction, in the absence of an agreement under an international treaty.

It is also found: That, even admitting that the quantity of the drug seized, the subject matter of the
present case, was considerable, it does not appear that, on such account, the two penalties fixed by the
law on the subject, should be imposed in the maximum degree.

Therefore, reducing the imprisonment and the fine imposed to six months and P1,000, respectively, we
affirm in all other respects the judgment appealed from, with the costs of this instance against the
appellant. So ordered.

G.R. No. 17958 February 27, 1922

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS vs. LOL-LO and SARAW

FACTS:
Two boats left matuta, a Dutch possession, for Peta, another Dutch possession. In one of the boats was
one individual, a Dutch subject, and in the other boat eleven men, women, and children, likewise
subjects of Holland. After a number of days of navigation, the second boat arrived between the Islands
of Buang and Bukid in the Dutch East Indies. There the boat was surrounded by six vintas manned by
twenty-four Moros all armed. The Moros first asked for food, but once on the Dutch boat, too for
themselves all of the cargo, attacked some of the men, and brutally violated two of the women. All of
the persons on the Dutch boat, with the exception of the two young women, were again placed on it and
holes were made in it, the idea that it would submerge. The Moros finally arrived at Maruro, a Dutch
possession. Two of the Moro marauder were Lol-lo, who also raped one of the women, and Saraw. At
Maruro the two women were able to escape.

Lol-lo and Saraw later returned to their home in South Ubian, Tawi-Tawi, Sulu, Philippine Islands. There
they were arrested and were charged in the Court of First Instance of Sulu with the crime of piracy. A
demurrer was interposed by counsel de officio for the Moros, based on the grounds that the offense
charged was not within the jurisdiction of the Court of First Instance, nor of any court of the Philippine
Islands, and that the facts did not constitute a public offense, under the laws in force in the Philippine
Islands. After the demurrer was overruled by the trial judge, trial was had, and a judgment was rendered
finding the two defendants guilty and sentencing each of them to life imprisonment (cadena perpetua),
CRIMINAL LAW 1
CASE DIGESTS
to return together with Kinawalang and Maulanis, defendants in another case, to the offended parties,
the thirty-nine sacks of copras which had been robbed, or to indemnify them in the amount of 924
rupees, and to pay a one-half part of the costs.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the Court of First Instance of Sulu have jurisdiction over the case.

RULING:
YES. The CFI of Sulu has jurisdiction of the case. Piracy is a crime not against any particular state but
against all mankind. It may be punished in the competent tribunal of any country where the offender
may be found or into which he may be carried. The jurisdiction of piracy unlike all other crimes has no
territorial limits. As it is against all so may it be punished by all. Nor does it matter that the crime was
committed within the jurisdictional 3-mile limit of a foreign state, "for those limits, though neutral to
war, are not neutral to crimes." (U.S. vs. Furlong [1820], 5 Wheat., 184.)

The vote upon the sentence is unanimous with regard to the propriety of the imposition of the death
penalty upon the defendant and appellant Lo-lo (the accused who raped on of the women), but is not
unanimous with regard to the court, Mr. Justice Romualdez, registers his nonconformity. In accordance
with provisions of Act No. 2726, it results, therefore, that the judgment of the trial court as to the
defendant and appellant Saraw is affirmed, and is reversed as to the defendant and appellant Lol-lo, who
is found guilty of the crime of piracy and is sentenced therefor to be hung until dead, at such time and
place as shall be fixed by the judge of first instance of the Twenty-sixth Judicial District. The two
appellants together with Kinawalang and Maulanis, defendants in another case, shall indemnify jointly
and severally the offended parties in the equivalent of 924 rupees, and shall pay a one-half part of the
costs of both instances. So ordered.

ARTICLE 3 – ELEMENTS OF FELONY

G.R. No. 80762 March 19, 1990

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. GONZALES, et al.

FACTS:
A previous decision in the Regional Trial Court, the Court found the accused-appellants Gonzales et al.
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of murder as defined under Article 248 of the Revised
Penal Code. Through their counsel, all the accused filed a notice of appeal from the trial court’s decision.
However, during the pendency of appeal, all accused-appellants except Custodio Gonzales Sr. withdrew
their appeal and chose instead to pursue their respective applications for parole before the then
Ministry now Department of Justice Parole Division. Thus, the Court of Appeals rendered a decision on
Gonzales’ appeal. It modified the appealed decision in that the lone appellant was sentenced to
reclusion perpetua and indemnification of the heirs of Lloyd in the amount of P30,000.00.
CRIMINAL LAW 1
CASE DIGESTS
The antecedent facts show that: At around 9pm on February 1981, the barangay captain of Barangay
Tipacla Iloilo was awakened from his sleep by the spouses Augusto and Fausta Gonzales. Augusto
informed Paja that his wife had just killed their landlord Lloyd Penacerrada and thus would like to
surrender to the authorities. Seeing Augusto still holding the knife allegedly used in the killing and Fausta
with her dress smeared in blood, Paja immediately ordered his nephew to take the spouses to the police
authorities at their municipal hall. Thus, an investigation was made behind the killing, and two days after
the said incident, Augusto appeared before the police station and voluntarily surrendered for detention
and protective custody for “having been involved” in the killing of Lloyd. He requested that he be taken
in the same headquarters where his wife Fausta was detained. During arraignment, the spouses entered
a plea of ‘not guilty’. Before trial however, Huntoria, who claimed to have witnessed the killing,
presented himself to Nanie Penacerrada — the victim’s widow, and volunteered to testify for the
prosecution.

A reinvestigation was therefore conducted, and the prosecution’s case rested on Huntoria’s
Alleged eyewitness account of the incident, who alleges to have seen the incident. The Court of Appeals
affirmed Huntoria’s testimony and found lone accused-appellant Custodio Gonzales guilty, who, among
all the accused-appellants, did not seek for parole before the Department of Justice.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Custodio Gonzales is guilty of murder, based on Hustoria’s account where the
prosecution’s case rested.

RULING:
The Supreme Court found that the prosecution’s stand is insufficient to convict Custodio Gonzales guilty
of the crime charged.
1. The investigation conducted by the police authorities leave much to be desired. During
investigation, there were conflicts as to where the scene of the crime was. While the sketch
indicated are the alleged various blood stains and their locations relative to the scenes of the
crime, there was however no indication as to their quantity. Considering there were two versions
where the killing was carried out, the extent of blood stains found would have provided a
definite clue as to which version was more credible.
2. The police also failed to state the reason of Augusto Gonzales’ surrender. Further, Augusto never
mentioned the participation of other persons in the killing of the victim.
3. Furthermore, the autopsy report would show that the killing would have been caused by two or
more bladed instrument, but opined that one bladed instrument is still possible. And insofar as
Dr. Rojas’ testimony was concerned, while Huntoria admitted that he saw six persons taking
turns in killing the victim, he however could not determine who among the six accused did the
stabbing and what particular weapon was used. Considering the abovesaid facts, Article 4 of the
Revised Penal Code provides how criminal liability is incurred:

a.) By any person committing a felony (delitos) although the wrongful act done be different
from that which he intended,
CRIMINAL LAW 1
CASE DIGESTS
b.) By any person performing an act which would be an offense against persons or property,
were it not for the inherent impossibility of its accomplishments or on account of the
employment of inadequate or ineffectual means.

Further, Article 3 defines how felony is committed—which is either by means of deceit (dolo) or
by means of fault (culpa). Thus there is deceit when the act performed is by deliberate intent,
while there is fault when the wrongful act results from imprudence, negligence, lack of foresight,
or lack of skill. In this case, while the prosecution accuses and the two lower courts both found
that the appellant has committed felony in Lloyd’s death, there is paucity of proof as to what act
was performed by the appellant.

Yet, Huntoria, as earlier emphasized, admitted candidly that he failed to see who stabbed or
hacked the victim. In fact, he does not even know what specific act was performed in the killing.
This lack of specificity then makes the case fall short of the test laid down by Article 3 of the
Revised Penal Code. Moreover, Huntoria’s credibility as witness is tarnished by the fact that he
only came out eight months since he allegedly saw the incident. He also failed to explain
satisfactorily the reason for his long delay in revealing what he allegedly witnessed.

G.R. No. 152133, February 9, 2006

ROLLIE CALIMUTAN V. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, ET AL.

FACTS:
Calimutan was charged with the crime of homicide. On 04 February 1996, Cantre harboring a grudge
against Bulalacao, suddenly punched the latter. Calimutan in order to protect his helper Bulalacao who
was much younger and smaller in built than the victim Cantre picked up a stone as big as a fist and threw
the same to Cantre. The stone hit Cantre at the left side of his back. After which Sañano (who was then
with Cantre) was able to convinced both Cantre and Calimutan to stop fighting and go home. The
following day Cantre died. An autopsy of the body of the victim Cantre was conducted by Dr. Ronaldo B.
Mendez of NBI. In his testimony before the RTC, Dr. Mendez affirmed the contents of his exhumation and
autopsy report. He explained that the victim Cantre suffered from an internal hemorrhage and there was
massive accumulation of blood in his abdominal cavity due to his
instrument, such as a stone. Hence, Dr. Mendez confirmed the possibility that the victim Cantre was
stoned to death by petitioner Calimutan.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Calimutan may be held liable for an intentional felony.

HELD:
The Supreme Court held in the negative. In intentional felonies, the act or omission of the offender is
malicious. In the language of Art. 3, the act is performed with deliberate intent (with malice). The
offender, in performing the act or in incurring the omission, has the intention to cause an injury to
another. In culpable felonies, the act or omission of the offender is not malicious. The injury caused by
the offender to another person is “unintentional, it being simply the incident of another act performed
CRIMINAL LAW 1
CASE DIGESTS
without malice.” (People vs. Sara, 55 Phil. 939). As stated in Art. 3, the wrongful act results from
imprudence, negligence, lack of foresight or lack of skill.

In the Petition at bar, this Court cannot attribute to petitioner Calimutan any malicious intent to injure,
much less to kill, the victim Cantre. Instead, this Court finds petitioner Calimutan guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the culpable felony of reckless imprudence resulting in homicide under Article 365
of the Revised Penal Code. Reckless imprudence consists in voluntarily, but without malice, doing
or failing to do an act from which material damage results by reason of inexcusable lack of precaution on
the part of the person performing or failing to perform such act, taking into consideration his
employment or occupation, degree of intelligence, physical condition and other circumstances regarding
persons, time and place (Article 365, RPC).