Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. L-11872       December 1, 1917

DOMINGO MERCADO and JOSEFA MERCADO, plaintiffs-appellants,

vs.
JOSE ESPIRITU, administrator of the estate of the deceased Luis Espiritu, defendant-appellee.

Perfecto Salas Rodriguez for appellants.

Vicente Foz for appellee.

TORRES, J.:

This is an appeal by bill of exceptions, filed by the counsel for the plaintiffs from the judgment of
September 22, 1914, in which the judge of the Seventh Judicial District dismissed the complaint filed
by the plaintiffs and ordered them to keep perpetual silence in regard to the litigated land, and to pay
the costs of the suit.

By a complaint dated April 9, 1913, counsel for Domingo and Josefa Mercado brought suit in the
Court of First Instance of Bulacan, against Luis Espiritu, but, as the latter died soon thereafter, the
complaint was amended by being directed against Jose Espiritu in his capacity of his administrator
of the estate of the deceased Luis Espiritu. The plaintiffs alleged that they and their sisters
Concepcion and Paz, all surnamed Mercado, were the children and sole heirs of Margarita Espiritu,
a sister of the deceased Luis Espiritu; that Margarita Espiritu died in 1897, leaving as her
paraphernal property a tract of land of 48 hectares in area situated in the barrio of Panducot,
municipality of Calumpit, Bulacan, and bounded as described in paragraph 4 of the amended
complaint, which hereditary portion had since then been held by the plaintiffs and their sisters,
through their father Wenceslao Mercado, husband of Margarita Espiritu; that, about the year 1910,
said Luis Espiritu, by means of cajolery, induced, and fraudulently succeeded in getting the plaintiffs
Domingo and Josefa Mercado to sign a deed of sale of the land left by their mother, for the sum of
P400, which amount was divided among the two plaintiffs and their sisters Concepcion and Paz,
notwithstanding the fact that said land, according to its assessment, was valued at P3,795; that one-
half of the land in question belonged to Margarita Espiritu, and one-half of this share, that is, one-
fourth of said land , to the plaintiffs, and the other one-fourth, to their two sisters Concepcion and
Paz; that the part of the land belonging to the two plaintiffs could produce 180 cavanes of rice per
annum, at P2.50 per cavan, was equivalent to P450 per annum; and that Luis Espiritu had received
said products from 1901 until the time of his death. Said counsel therefore asked that judgment be
rendered in plaintiffs' favor by holding to be null and void the sale they made of their respective
shares of their land, to Luis Espiritu, and that the defendant be ordered to deliver and restore to the
plaintiffs the shares of the land that fell to the latter in the partition of the estate of their deceased
mother Margarita Espiritu, together with the products thereof, uncollected since 1901, or their
equivalent, to wit, P450 per annum, and to pay the costs of the suit.

In due season the defendant administrator answered the aforementioned complaint, denying each
and all of the allegations therein contained, and in special defense alleged that the land, the subject-
matter of the complaint, had an area of only 21 cavanes of seed rice; that, on May 25, 1894, its
owner, the deceased Margarita Espiritu y Yutoc, the plaintiffs' mother, with the due authorization of
her husband Wenceslao Mercado y Arnedo Cruz sold to Luis Espiritu for the sum of P2,000 a
portion of said land, to wit, an area such as is usually required for fifteen cavanes of seed; that
subsequently, on May 14, 1901, Wenceslao Mercado y Arnedo Cruz, the plaintiffs' father, in his
capacity as administrator of the property of his children sold under pacto de retro to the same Luis
Espiritu at the price of P375 the remainder of the said land, to wit, an area covered by six cavanes of
seed to meet the expenses of the maintenance of his (Wenceslao's) children, and this amount being
still insufficient the successively borrowed from said Luis Espiritu other sums of money aggregating
a total of P600; but that later, on May 17,1910, the plaintiffs, alleging themselves to be of legal age,
executed, with their sisters Maria del Consejo and Maria dela Paz, the notarial instrument inserted
integrally in the 5th paragraph of the answer, by which instrument, ratifying said sale under pacto de
retro of the land that had belonged to their mother Margarita Espiritu, effected by their father
Wenceslao Mercado in favor of Luis Espiritu for the sum of P2,600, they sold absolutely and
perpetually to said Luis Espiritu, in consideration of P400, the property that had belonged to their
deceased mother and which they acknowledged having received from the aforementioned
purchaser. In this cross-complaint the defendant alleged that the complaint filed by the plaintiffs was
unfounded and malicious, and that thereby losses and damages in the sum of P1,000 had been
caused to the intestate estate of the said Luis Espiritu. He therefore asked that judgment be
rendered by ordering the plaintiffs to keep perpetual silence with respect to the land in litigation and,
besides, to pay said intestate estate P1,000 for losses and damages, and that the costs of the trial
be charged against them.

In reply to the cross-complaint, the plaintiffs denied each and all of the facts therein set forth, and in
special defense alleged that at the time of the execution of the deed of sale inserted in the cross-
complaint the plaintiffs were still minors, and that since they reached their majority the four years
fixed by law for the annulment of said contract had not yet elapsed. They therefore asked that they
be absolved from the defendant's cross-complaint.

After trial and the introduction of evidence by both parties, the court rendered the judgment
aforementioned, to which the plaintiffs excepted and in writing moved for a reopening of the case
and a new trial. This motion was overruled, exception was taken by the petitioners, and the proper
bill of exceptions having been presented, the same was approved and transmitted to the clerk of this
court.

As the plaintiffs assailed the validity of the deed of sale, Exhibit 3, executed by them on May 17,
1910, on the ground that they were minors when they executed it, the questions submitted to the
decision of this court consist in determining whether it is true that the plaintiffs were then minors and
therefore incapable of selling their property on the date borne by the instrument Exhibit 3; and in
case they then were such, whether a person who is really and truly a minor and, notwithstanding,
attests that he is of legal age, can, after the execution of the deed and within legal period, ask for the
annulment of the instrument executed by him, because of some defect that invalidates the contract,
in accordance with the law (Civ. Code, arts. 1263 and 1300), so that he may obtain the restitution of
the land sold.

The records shows it to have been fully proven that in 1891 Lucas Espiritu obtained title by
composition with the State, to three parcels of land, adjoining each other, in the sitio of Panducot of
the pueblo of Calumpit, Bulacan, containing altogether an area of 75 hectares, 25 ares, and 59
centares, which facts appear in the title Exhibit D; that, upon Luis Espiritu's death, his said lands
passed by inheritance to his four children named Victoria, Ines, Margarita, and Luis; and that, in the
partition of said decedent's estate, the parcel of land described in the complaint as containing forty-
seven and odd hectares was allotted to the brother and sister Luis and Margarita, in equal shares.
Margarita Espiritu, married to Wenceslao Mercado y Ardeno Cruz, had by this husband five children,
Maria Consejo, Maria de la Paz, Domingo, Josefa, and Amalia, all surnamed Mercado y Espiritu,
who, at the death of their mother in 1896 inherited, by operation of law, one-half of the land
described in the complaint.

The plaintiffs' petition for annulment of the sale and the consequent restitution to them of two-fourths
of the land left by their mother, that is, of one-fourth of all the land described in the complaint, and
which, they stated, amounts to 11 hectares, 86 ares and 37 centares. To this claim the defendant
excepted, alleging that the land in question comprised only an area such as is customarily covered
by 21 cavanes of seed.

It was also duly proven that, by a notarial instrument of May 25, 1894, the plaintiffs' mother conveyed
by actual and absolute sale for the sum of P2,000, to her brother Luis Espiritu a portion of the land
now on litigation, or an area such as is usually covered by about 15 cavanes of seed; and that, on
account of the loss of the original of said instrument, which was on the possession of the purchaser
Luis Espiritu, and furthermore because, during the revolution, the protocols or registers of public
documents of the Province of Bulacan were burned, Wenceslao Mercado y Arnedo Cruz, the
widower of the vendor and father of the plaintiffs, executed, at the instance of the interested party
Luis Espiritu, the notarial instrument Exhibit 1, of the date of May 20, 1901, in his own name and
those of his minor children Maria Consejo, Maria de la Paz, Domingo, Josefa, and Amalia, and
therein set forth that it was true that the sale of said portion of land had been made by his
aforementioned wife, then deceased, to Luis Espiritu in 1894.

However, even prior to said date, to wit, on May 14th of the same year, 1901, the widower
Wenceslao Mercado, according to the private document Exhibit 2, pledged or mortgaged to the
same man, Luis Espiritu, for P375, a part, or an area covered by six cavanes of seed, of the land
that had belonged to this vendor's deceased wife, to the said Luis Espiritu and which now forms a
part of the land in question — a transaction which Mercado was obliged to make in order to obtain
funds with which "to cover his children's needs." Wenceslao Mercado, the plaintiffs' father, having
died, about the year 1904, the plaintiffs Domingo and Josefa Mercado, together with their sisters
Consejo and Paz, declaring themselves to be of legal age and in possession of the required legal
status to contract, executed and subscribed before a notary the document Exhibit 3, on May 17,
1910, in which referring to the previous sale of the land, effected by their deceased mother for the
sum of P2,600 and with her husband's permission and authorization, they sold absolutely and in
perpetuity to Luis Espiritu, for the sum of P400 "as an increase" of the previous purchase price, the
land described in said instrument and situated in Panducot, pueblo of Calumpit, Bulacan, of an area
equal to that usually sown with 21 cavanes of seed bounded on the north by the lands of Flaviano
Abreu and the heirs of Pedro Espiritu, on the east by those of Victoria Espiritu and Ines Espiritu, on
the south by those of Luis Espiritu, and on the west by those of Hermogenes Tan-Toco and by the
Sapang-Maitu stream.

In this status of the case the plaintiffs seek the annulment of the deed Exhibit 3, on the ground that
on the date of its execution they were minors without legal capacity to contract, and for the further
reason that the deceased purchaser Luis Espiritu availed himself of deceit and fraud in obtaining
their consent for the execution of said deed.

As it was proven by the testimony of the clerk of the parochial church of Apalit (plaintiffs were born in
Apalit) that the baptismal register books of that parish pertaining to the years 1890-1891, were lost
or burned, the witness Maria Consejo Mercado recognized and identified the book Exhibit A, which
she testified had been kept and taken care of by her deceased father Wenceslao Mercado, pages
396 and 397 of which bear the attestation that the plaintiff Domingo Mercado was born on August 4,
1890, and Josefa Mercado, on July 14, 1891. Furthermore, this witness corroborated the averment
of the plaintiffs' minority, by the personal registration certificate of said Domingo Mercado, of the year
1914, Exhibit C, by which it appears that in 1910 he was only 23 years old, whereby it would also be
appear that Josefa Mercado was 22 years of age in 1910, and therefore, on May 17,1910, when the
instrument of purchase and sale, Exhibit 3, was executed, the plaintiffs must have been,
respectively, 19 and 18 years of age.

The witness Maria Consejo Mercado also testified that after her father's death her brother and
sisters removed to Manila to live there, although her brother Domingo used to reside with his uncle
Luis Espiritu, who took charge of the administration of the property left by his predecessors in
interest; that it was her uncle Luis who got for her brother Domingo the other cedula, Exhibit B,
pertaining to the year 1910, where in it appears that the latter was then already 23 years of age; that
she did not know why her uncle did so; that she and her brother and sisters merely signed the deed
of May 17, 1910; and that her father Wenceslao Mercado, prior to his death had pledged the land to
her uncle Luis Espiritu.

The witness Ines Espiritu testified that after the death of the plaintiffs' father, it was Luis Espiritu who
directed the cultivation of the land in litigation. This testimony was corroborated by her sister Victoria
Espiritu, who added that her nephew, the plaintiff Domingo, had lived for some time, she did not
know just how long, under the control of Luis Espiritu.

Roque Galang, married to a sister of Luis Espiritu, stated that the land that fell to his wife and to his
sister-in-law Victoria, and which had an area of about 8 hectares less than that of the land allotted to
the aforementioned Luis and Margarita produced for his wife and his sister-in-law Victoria a net and
minimum yield of 507 cavanes in 1907, in spite of its being high land and of inferior quality, as
compared with the land in dispute, and that its yield was still larger in 1914, when the said two
sisters' share was 764 cavanes.

Patricio Tanjucto, the notary before whom the deed Exhibit 3 was ratified, was a witness for the
defendant. He testified that this deed was drawn up by him at the request of the plaintiff Josefa
Mercado; that the grantors of the instrument assured him that they were all of legal age; that said
document was signed by the plaintiffs and the other contracting parties, after it had been read to
them and had been translated into the Pampangan dialect for those of them who did not understand
Spanish. On cross-examination, witness added that ever since he was 18 years of age and began to
court, he had known the plaintiff Josefa Mercado, who was then a young maiden, although she had
not yet commenced to attend social gatherings, and that all this took place about the year 1898, for
witness said that he was then [at the time of his testimony, 1914,] 34 years of age.

Antonio Espiritu, 60 years of age, who knew Lucas Espiritu and the properties owned by the latter,
testified that Espiritu's land contained an area of 84 cavanes, and after its owner's death, was under
witness' administration during to harvest two harvest seasons; that the products yielded by a portion
of this land, to wit, an area such as is sown by about 15 cavanes of seed, had been, since 1894,
utilized by Luis Espiritu, by reason of his having acquired the land; and that, after Margarita Espiritu's
death, her husband Wenceslao Mercado took possession of another portion of the land, containing
an area of six cavanes of seed and which had been left by this deceased, and that he held same
until 1901, when he conveyed it to Luis Espiritu.  lawphi1.net

The defendant-administrator, Jose Espiritu, son of the deceased Luis Espiritu, testified that the
plaintiff Domingo Mercado used to live off and on in the house of his deceased father, about the year
1909 or 1910, and used to go back and forth between his father's house and those of his other
relatives. He denied that his father had at any time administered the property belonging to the
Mercado brother and sisters.
In rebuttal, Antonio Mercado, a cousin of Wenceslao, father of the plaintiffs, testified that he mediate
in several transactions in connection with a piece of land belonging to Margarita Espiritu. When
shown the deed of purchase and sale Exhibit 1, he stated that he was not acquainted with its
contents. This same witness also testified that he mediated in a transaction had between Wenceslao
Mercado and Luis Espiritu (he did not remember the year), in which the former sold to the latter a
parcel of land situated in Panducot. He stated that as he was a witness of the deed of sale he could
identify this instrument were it exhibited to him; but he did not do so, for no instrument whatever was
presented to him for identification. The transaction mentioned must have concerned either the
ratification of the sale of the land of 15 cavanes, in 1901, attested in Exhibit 1, or the mortgage or
pledge of the other parcel of 6 cavanes, given on May 14, 1901, by Wenceslao Mercado to Luis
Espiritu, as may be seen by the private document Exhibit 2. In rebuttal, the plaintiff Josefa Mercado
denied having gone to the house of the notary Tanjutco for the purpose of requesting him to draw up
any document whatever. She stated that she saw the document Exhibit 3 for the first time in the
house of her uncle Luis Espiritu on the day she signed it, on which occasion and while said
document was being signed said notary was not present, nor were the witnesses thereto whose
names appear therein; and that she went to her said uncle's house, because he had sent for her, as
well as her brother and sisters, sending a carromata to fetch them. Victoria Espiritu denied ever
having been in the house of her brother. Luis Espiritu in company with the plaintiffs, for the purpose
of giving her consent to the execution of any deed in behalf of her brother.

The evidence adduced at the trial does not show, even circumstantially, that the purchaser Luis
Espiritu employed fraud, deceit, violence, or intimidation, in order to effect the sale mentioned in the
document Exhibit 3, executed on May 17, 1910. In this document the vendors, the brother and the
sisters Domingo, Maria del Consejo, Paz and, Josefa surnamed Mercado y Espiritu, attested the
certainty of the previous sale which their mother, during her lifetime, had made in behalf of said
purchaser Luis Espiritu, her brother with the consent of her husband Wenceslao Mercado, father of
the vendors of the portion of land situated in the barrio of Panducot, pueblo of Calumpit, Bulacan;
and in consideration of the fact that the said vendor Luis Espiritu paid them, as an increase, the sum
of P400, by virtue of the contract made with him, they declare having sold to him absolutely and in
perpetuity said parcel of the land, waive and thenceforth any and all rights they may have, inasmuch
as said sum constitutes the just price of the property.

So that said document Exhibit 3 is virtually an acknowledgment of the contract of sale of the parcel
or portion of land that would contain 15 cavanes of seed rice made by the vendors' mother in favor of
the purchaser Luis Espiritu, their uncle, and likewise an acknowledgment of the contract of pledge or
mortgage of the remainder of said land, an area of six cavanes, made with the same purchaser, at
an increase of P400 over the price of P2,600, making an aggregate sum of P3,000, decomposed as
follows: P2,000, collected during her lifetime, by the vendors' father; and the said increase of P400,
collected by the plaintiffs.

In the aforementioned sale, according to the deed of May 25, 1894, Margarita Espiritu conveyed to
her brother Luis the parcel of 15 cavanes of seed, Exhibit 1, and after her death the plaintiffs'
widowed father mortgaged or pledged the remaining parcel or portion of 6 cavanes of seed to her
brother-in-law, Luis Espiritu, in May, 1901 (Exhibit 2). So it is that the notarial instrument Exhibit 3,
which was assailed by the plaintiffs, recognized the validity of the previous contracts, and the totality
of the land, consisting of an area containing 21 cavanes of seed rice, was sold absolutely and in
perpetuity, the vendors receiving in exchange P400 more; and there is no conclusive proof in the
record that this last document was false and simulated on account of the employment of any
violence, intimidation, fraud, or deceit, in the procuring of the consent of the vendors who executed
it.

Considering the relation that exists between the document Exhibit 3 and those of previous dates,
Exhibits 1 and 2, and taking into the account the relationship between the contracting parties, and
also the general custom that prevails in many provinces of these Islands for the vendor or debtor to
obtain an increase in the price of the sale or of the pledge, or an increase in the amount loaned,
without proof to the contrary, it would be improper and illegal to hold, in view of the facts
hereinabove set forth, that the purchaser Luis Espiritu, now deceased, had any need to forge or
simulate the document Exhibit 3 inasmuch as, since May, 1894, he has held in the capacity of owner
by virtue of a prior acquisition, the parcel of land of 15 cavanes of seed, and likewise, since May,
1901, according to the contract of mortgage or pledge, the parcel of 6 cavanes, or the remainder of
the total area of 21 cavanes.

So that Luis Espiritu was, during his lifetime, and now, after his death, his testate or intestate estate
is in lawful possession of the parcel of land situated in Panducot that contains 21 cavanes of seed,
by virtue of the title of conveyance of ownership of the land measuring 15 cavanes, and, in
consequence of the contract of pledge or mortgage in security for the sum of P600, is likewise in
lawful possession of the remainder of the land, or an area containing 6 cavanes of seed.

The plaintiffs have absolutely no right whatever to recover said first parcel of land, as its ownership
was conveyed to the purchaser by means of a singular title of purchase and sale; and as to the other
portion of 6 cavanes of seed, they could have redeemed it before May 17, 1910, upon the payment
or the return of the sum which their deceased father Wenceslao Mercado had, during his lifetime,
received as a loan under security of the pledged property; but, after the execution of the document
Exhibit 3, the creditor Luis Espiritu definitely acquired the ownership of said parcel of 6 cavanes. It is
therefore a rash venture to attempt to recover this latter parcel by means of the contract of final and
absolute sale, set forth in the deed Exhibit 3.

Moreover, the notarial document Exhibit 1, are regards the statements made therein, is of the nature
of a public document and is evidence of the fact which gave rise to its execution and of the date of
the latter, even against a third person and his predecessors in interest such as are the plaintiffs.
(Civ. Code, art. 1218.)

The plaintiffs' father, Wenceslao Mercado, recognizing it to be perfectly true that his wife Margarita
Espiritu sold said parcel of land which she inherited from her father, of an area of about "15 cavanes
of seed," to her brother Luis Espiritu, by means of an instrument executed by her on May 25,1894 —
an instrument that disappeared or was burned — and likewise recognizing that the protocols and
register books belonging to the Province of Bulacan were destroyed as a result of the past
revolution, at the request of his brother-in-law Luis Espiritu he had no objection to give the testimony
recorded in said notarial instrument, as it was the truth regarding what had occurred, and in so doing
he acted as the plaintiffs' legitimate father in the exercise of his parental authority, inasmuch as he
had personal knowledge of said sale, he himself being the husband who authorized said
conveyance, notwithstanding that his testimony affected his children's interest and prejudiced his
own, as the owner of any fruits that might be produced by said real property.

The signature and handwriting of the document Exhibit 2 were identified as authentic by one of the
plaintiffs, Consejo Mercado, and as the record shows no evidence whatever that this document is
false, and it does not appear to have been assailed as such, and as it was signed by the plaintiffs'
father, there is no legal ground or well-founded reason why it should be rejected. It was therefore
properly admitted as evidence of the certainty of the facts therein set forth.

The principal defect attributed by the plaintiffs to the document Exhibit 3 consists in that, on the date
of May 17, 1910, when it was executed that they signed it, they were minors, that is, they had not yet
attained the age of 21 years fixed by Act No. 1891, though no evidence appears in the record that
the plaintiffs Josefa and Domingo Mercado were in fact minors, for no certified copies were
presented of their baptismal certificates, nor did the plaintiffs adduce any supplemental evidence
whatever to prove that Domingo was actually 19 and Josefa 18 years of age when they signed the
document Exhibit 3, on May 17, 1910, inasmuch as the copybook, Exhibit A, notwithstanding the
testimony of the plaintiff Consejo Mercado, does not constitute sufficient proof of the dates of births
of the said Domingo and Josefa.

However, even in the doubt whether they certainly were of legal age on the date referred to, it
cannot be gainsaid that in the document Exhibit 3 they stated that they were of legal age at the time
they executed and signed it, and on that account the sale mentioned in said notarial deed Exhibit 3
is perfectly valid — a sale that is considered as limited solely to the parcel of land of 6 cavanes of
seed, pledged by the deceased father of the plaintiffs in security for P600 received by him as a loan
from his brother-in-law Luis Espiritu, for the reason that the parcel of 15 cavanes had been lawfully
sold by its original owner, the plaintiffs' mother.

The courts, in their interpretation of the law, have laid down the rule that the sale of real estate,
made by minors who pretend to be of legal age, when in fact they are not, is valid, and they will not
be permitted to excuse themselves from the fulfillment of the obligations contracted by them, or to
have them annulled in pursuance of the provisions of Law 6, title 19, of the 6th Partida; and the
judgment that holds such a sale to be valid and absolves the purchaser from the complaint filed
against him does not violate the laws relative to the sale of minors' property, nor the juridical rules
established in consonance therewith. (Decisions of the supreme court of Spain, of April 27, 1860,
July 11, 1868, and March 1, 1875.)  itc@alf

With respect to the true age of the plaintiffs, no proof was adduced of the fact that it was Luis
Espiritu who took out Domingo Mercado's personal registration certificate on April 13, 1910, causing
the age of 23 years to be entered therein in order to corroborate the date of the notarial instrument of
May 17th of the same year; and the supposition that he did, would also allow it to be supposed, in
order to show the propriety of the claim, that the cedula Exhibit C was taken out on February 14,
1914, where in it is recorded that Domingo Mercado was on that date 23 years of age, for both these
facts are not proved; neither was any proof adduced against the statement made by the plaintiffs
Domingo and Josefa in the notarial instrument Exhibit 3, that, on the date when they executed it,
they were already of legal age, and, besides the annotation contained in the copybook Exhibit A, no
supplemental proof of their true ages was introduced.

Aside from the foregoing, from a careful examination of the record in this case, it cannot be
concluded that the plaintiffs, who claim to have minors when they executed the notarial instrument
Exhibit 3, have suffered positive and actual losses and damages in their rights and interests as a
result of the execution of said document, inasmuch as the sale effected by the plaintiffs' mother,
Margarita Espiritu, in May, 1894, of the greater part of the land of 21 cavanes of seed, did not
occasion any damage or prejudice to the plaintiffs, inasmuch as their father stated in the document
Exhibit 2 that he was obliged to mortgage or pledge said remaining portion of the land in order to
secure the loan of the P375 furnished by Luis Espiritu and which was subsequently increased to
P600 so as to provide for certain engagements or perhaps to meet the needs of his children, the
plaintiff; and therefore, to judge from the statements made by their father himself, they received
through him, in exchange for the land of 6 cavanes of seed, which passed into the possession of the
creditor Luis Espiritu, the benefit which must have accrued to them from the sums of money received
as loans; and, finally, on the execution of the impugned document Exhibit 3, the plaintiffs received
and divided between themselves the sum of P400, which sum, added to that P2,000 received by
Margarita Espiritu, and to that of the P600 collected by Wenceslao Mercado, widower of the latter
and father of the plaintiffs, makes all together the sum of P3,000, the amount paid by the purchaser
as the price of all the land containing 21 cavanes of seed, and is the just price of the property, was
not impugned, and, consequently, should be considered as equivalent to, and compensatory for, the
true value of said land.

For the foregoing reasons, whereby the errors assigned to the judgment appealed from have been
refuted, and deeming said judgment to be in accordance with law and the evidence of record, we
should, and do hereby, affirm the same, with costs against the appellants. So ordered.

Arellano, C. J., Johnson, Street, and Malcolm, JJ., concur.

Separate Opinions

CARSON, J., concurring:

I concur.

But in order to avoid misunderstanding, I think it well to indicate that the general statement, in the
prevailing opinion to the effect that the making of false representations as to his age by an infant
executing a contract will preclude him from disaffirming the contract or setting up the defense of
infancy, must be understood as limited to cases wherein, on account of the minor's representations
as to his majority, and because of his near approach thereto, the other party had good reason to
believe, and did in fact believe the minor capable of contracting.

The doctrine set forth in the Partidas, relied upon by the supreme court of Spain in the cases cited in
the prevailing opinion, is substantially similar to the doctrine of estoppel as applied in like instances
by many of the courts in the United States.

For the purposes of convenient comparison, I here insert some citations of authority, Spanish and
American, recognizing the limitations upon the general doctrine to which I am inviting attention at this
time; and in this connection it is worthy of note that the courts of the United States look with rather
less favor than the supreme court of Spain upon the application of the doctrine, doubtless because
the cases wherein it may properly be applied, are much less likely to occur in a jurisdiction where
majority is reached at the age of 21 than a jurisdiction wherein majority is not ordinarily attained until
the infant reaches the age of 25.

Ley 6, tit. 19, Partida 6. is, in part, as follows:

If he who is minor (1) deceitfully says or sets forth in an instrument that he is over twenty-five
years of age, and this assertion is believed by another person who takes him to be of about
that age, (2) in an action at law he should be deemed to be of the age he asserted, and
should no (3) afterwards be released from liability on the plea that he was not of said age
 when he assumed the obligation. The reason for this is that the law helps the deceived and
not the deceivers.

In the glossary to these provisions of the Partidas by Gregorio Lopez, I find the following:

(1) De tal tiempo. Nota bene hoc verbum, nam si appareret ex aspectu eum esse minorem,
tunc adversarius non potest dicere se deceptum; imo tam ipse, quam minor videntur esse in
dolo, quo casu competit minori restitutio, quia facta doli compensatione, perinde ast ac si
nullus fuiset in dolo, et ideo datur restitutio; et quia scienti dolus non infertur, l. 1. D. de act.
empt. secundum Cyn. Alberic et Salic. in l. 3. C. si minor se major. dixer. adde Albericum
tenentem, quabndo per aspectum a liter constaret, in authent. sacramenta puberum, col. 3.
C. si advers vendit.

(2) Engoñosamente. Adde 1. 2. et 3. C. si minor se major. dixer. Et adverte nam per istam

legem Partitarum, que non distinguit, an adultus, vel pupillus talem assertionem faciat,
videtur comprobari dictum Guillielm. de Cun. de quo per Paul. de Castr. in 1. qui jurasse. in
princ. D. de jurejur. quod si pupillus proximus pubertari juret, cum contrahit, se esse
puberem, et postea etiam juret, quod non veniet contra contractum quod habebit locum
dispositio authenticae sacramenta puberum, sicut si esset pubes: et cum isto dicto transit ibi
Paul. de Cast. multum commendans, dicens, se alibi non legisse; si tamen teneamus illam
opinionem, quod etiam pupillus doli capax obligatur ex juramento, non esset ita miranda
dicat, decissio; vide per Alexand. in dict. 1. qui jurasse, in princ. Item lex ista Partitarum
expresse sentit de adulto, non de pupillo, cum superius dixit, que paresciere de tal tiempo:
Doctores etiam intelligunt de adulto 11. dict. tit. C. si minor. se major. dixer. et patet ex 11.
illius tituli. Quid autem dicemus in dubio, cum non constat de dolo minoris? Azon. in summa
illius tit. in fin. Cynus tamen, et alli, tenent oppositum, quia dolus non praesumitur, nisi
probetur, 1. quotiens, s., qui dolo, D. de probat. Et hoc etiam vult ista lex Partitarum, cum
dicit, si lo faze engoñosamente: et ita tenent Alberic. et Salicet. in dict. 1. 3. ubi etiam Bart. in
fin. Si autem minor sui facilitate asserat se mojorem, et ita juret, tunc distingue, ut habetur
dict. 1. 3 quia aut juravit verbo tenus, et tunc non restituitur, nisi per instrumentum seu
scripturam probet se minorem; et si juravit corporaliter, nullo modo restituitur, ut ibi; et per
quae instrumenta probentur, cum verbo tenus juravit, vide per Specul. tit. de restit, in integr.
s. quis autem, col. 4. vers. sed cujusmodi erit scriptura, ubi etiam vide per Speculatorem
aliquas notabiles quaestiones in ista materia, in col. 5. videlicet, an praejudicet sibi minor ex
tali juramento in aliis contractibus, et tenet, quod non; et tenet glossa finalis in 1. de aetate,
D. de minor. in fin. gloss. vide ibi per Speculat. ubi etiam de aliis in ista materia.

In the decision of the supreme court of Spain dated the 27th of April, 1860, I find an excellent
illustration of the conditions under which that court applied the doctrine, as appears from the
following resolution therein set forth.

Sales of real estate made by minors are valid when the latter pretend to be twenty-five years
of age and, due to the circumstances that they are nearly of that age, are married, or have
administration of their property, or on account of other special circumstances affecting them,
the other parties to the contract believe them to be of legal age.

With these citations compare the general doctrine in the United States as set forth in 22 Cyc. (p.
610), supported by numerous citations of authority.

Estoppel to disaffirm — (I) In General. — The doctrine of estoppel not being as a general
rule applicable to infants, the court will not readily hold that his acts during infancy have
created an estoppel against him to disaffirm his contracts. Certainly the infant cannot be
estopped by the acts or admissions of other persons.

(II) False representations as to age. — According to some authorities the fact that an infant
at the time of entering into a contract falsely represented to the person with whom he dealt
that he had attained the age of majority does not give any validity to the contract or estop the
infant from disaffirming the same or setting up the defense of infancy against the
enforcement of any rights thereunder; but there is also authority for the view that such false
representations will create an estoppel against the infant, and under the statutes of some
states no contract can be disaffirmed where, on account of the minor's representations as to
his majority, the other party had good reason to believe the minor capable of contracting.
Where the infant has made no representations whatever as to his age, the mere fact that the
person with whom he dealt believed him to be of age, even though his belief was warranted
by the infant's appearance and the surrounding circumstances, and the infant knew of such
belief, will not render the contract valid or estop the infant to disaffirm.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. L-1720             March 4, 1950

SIA SUAN and GAW CHIAO, petitioners,

vs.
RAMON ALCANTARA, respondent.

Antonio Barredo for petitioners.

Zosimo D. Tanalega for respondents.

PARAS, J.:

On August 3, 1931, a deed of sale was executed by Rufino Alcantara and his sons Damaso
Alcantara and Ramon Alcantara conveying to Sia Suan five parcels of land. Ramon Alcantara was
then 17 years, 10 months and 22 days old. On August 27, 1931, Gaw Chiao (husband of Sia Suan)
received a letter from Francisco Alfonso, attorney of Ramon Alcantara, informing Gaw Chiao that
Ramon Alcantara was a minor and accordingly disavowing the contract. After being contacted by
Gaw Chiao, however, Ramon Alcantara executed an affidavit in the office of Jose Gomez, attorney
of Gaw Chiao, wherein Ramon Alcantara ratified the deed of sale. On said occasion Ramon
Alcantara received from Gaw Chiao the sum of P500. In the meantime, Sia Suan sold one of the lots
to Nicolas Azores from whom Antonio Azores inherited the same.

On August 8, 1940, an action was instituted by Ramon Alcantara in the Court of First Instance of
Laguna for the annulment of the deed of sale as regards his undivided share in the two parcels of
land covered by certificates of title Nos. 751 and 752 of Laguna. Said action was against Sia Suan
and her husband Gaw Chiao, Antonio, Azores, Damaso Alcantara and Rufino Alcantara (the latter
two being, respectively, the brother and father of Ramon Alcantara appealed to the Court of
Appealed which reversed the decision of the trial court, on the ground that the deed of sale is not
binding against Ramon Alcantara in view of his minority on the date of its execution, and accordingly
sentenced Sia Suan to pay to Ramon Alcantara the sum of P1,750, with legal interest from
December 17, 1931, in lieu of his share in the lot sold to Antonio Azores (who was absolved from the
complaint), and to reconvey to Ramon Alcantara an undivided one-fourth interest in the lot originally
covered by certificate of title NO. 752 of Laguna plus the cost of the suit. From this judgment Sia
Suan and Gaw Chiao have come to us on appeal by certiorari.

It is undeniable that the deed of sale signed by the appellee, Ramon Alcantara, On August 3, 1931,
showed that he, like his co-signers (father and brother), was then of legal age. It is not pretend and
there is nothing to indicate that the appellants did not believe and rely on such recital of fact. This
conclusion is decisive and very obvious in the decision of the Court of Appeals It is true that in the
resolution on the for reconsideration, the Court of Appeals remarked that "The fact that when
informed of appellant's minority, the appellees too no steps for nine years to protect their interest
beyond requiring the appellant to execute a ratification of the sale while still a minor, strongly
indicates that the appellees knew of his minority when the deed of sale was executed." But the
feeble insinuation is sufficiently negative by the following positive pronouncements of the Court of
Appeals as well in said resolution as in the decision.

As to the complaint that the defendant is guilty of laches, suffice it to say that the appellees
were informed of his minority within one (1) month after the transaction was completed.
(Resolution.)

Finally, the appellees were equally negligent in not taking any action to protect their
interest form and after August 27, 1931, when they were notified in writing of appellant's
minority. (Resolution.)

. . . The fact remains that the appellees were advised within the month that appellant was a
minor, through the letter of Attorney Alfonso (Exhibit 1) informing appellees of his client's
desire to disaffirm the contract . . . (Decision.)

The purchaser having been apprised of incapacity of his vendor shortly after the contract
was made, the delay in bringing the action of annulment will not serve to bar it unless the
period fixed by the statute of limitations expired before the filing of the complaint. . . .
(Decision.)
In support of the contend that the deed of sale is binding on the appellee, counsel for the appellants
invokes the decision in Mercado and Mercado vs. Espiritu (37 Phil., 215), wherein this court held:

The courts, in their interpretation of the law, have laid down the rule that the sale of real
estate, made by minors who pretend to be of legal age, when it fact they are not, is valid,
and they will not be permitted to excuse themselves from the fulfillment of the obligations
contracted by them, or to have them annulled in pursuance of the provisions of Law 6 title
19, of the 6th Partida; and the judgment that holds such a sale to valid and absolves the
purchaser from the complaint filed against him does not violate the laws relative to the sale
of minors' property, nor the juridical rules established in consonance therewith. (Decisions of
the Supreme Court of Spain, of April 27, 1840, July 11, 1868, and March 1, 1875.)

The Court of Appeals has refused to apply this doctrine on the ground that the appellants did not
actually pay any amount in cash to the appellee and therefore did not suffer any detriment by reason
of the deed of sale, it being stipulated that the consideration therefore was a pre-existing
indebtedness of appellee's father, Rufino Alcantara. We are of the opinion that the Court of Appeals
erred. In the first place, in the case cited, the consideration for sale consisted in greater part of pre-
existing obligation. In the second place, under the doctrine, to bind a minor who represents himself
to be of legal age, it is not necessary for his vendee to actually part with cash, as long as the
contract is supported by a valid consideration. Since appellee's conveyance to the appellants was
admittedly for and in virtue of a pre-existing indebtedness (unquestionably a valid consideration), it
should produce its full force and effect in the absence of any other vice that may legally invalidate
the same. It is not here claimed that the deed of sale is null and void on any ground other than the
appellee's minority. Appellee's contract has become fully efficacious as a contract executed by
parties with full legal capacity.

The circumstance that, about one month after the date of the conveyance, the appellee informed the
appellants of his minority, is of no moment, because appellee's previous misrepresentation had
already estopped him from disavowing the contract. Said belated information merely leads to the
inference that the appellants in fact did not know that the appellee was a minor on the date of the
contract, and somewhat emphasizes appellee's had faith, when it is borne in mind that no sooner
had he given said information than he ratified his deed of sale upon receiving from the appellants the
sum of P500.

Counsel for the appellees argues that the appellants could not have been misled as to the real age
of the appellee because they were free to make the necessary investigation. The suggestion, while
perhaps practicable, is conspicuously unbusinesslike and beside the point, because the findings of
the Court of Appeals do not show that the appellants knew or could suspected appellee's minority.

The Court of Appeals seems to be of the opinion that the letter written by the appellee informing the
appellants of his minority constituted an effective disaffirmance of the sale, and that although the
choice to disaffirm will not by itself avoid the contract until the courts adjudge the agreement to be
invalid, said notice shielded the appellee from laches and consequent estoppel. This position is
untenable since the effect of estoppel in proper cases is unaffected by the promptness with which a
notice to disaffirm is made.

The appealed decision of the Court of Appeals is hereby reversed and the appellants absolved from
the complaint, with costs against the appellee, Ramon Alcantara. So ordered.

Ozaeta, Tuason, Montemayor and Torres, JJ., concur.

Separate Opinions

PADILLA, J., concurring:

I concur in the result not upon the grounds stated in the majority opinion but for the following
reasons: The deed of sale executed by Ramon Alcantara on 3 August 1931 conveying to Sia Suan
five parcels of land is null and void insofar as the interest, share, or participation of Ramon Alcantara
in two parcels of land is concerned, because on the date of sale he was 17 years, 10 months and 22
days old only. Consent being one of the essential requisites for the execution of a valid contract, a
minor, such as Ramon Alcantara was, could not give his consent thereof. The only
misrepresentation as to his age, if any, was the statement appearing in the instrument that he was of
age. On 27 August 1931, or 24 days after the deed was executed, Gaw Chiao, the husband of the
vendee Sia Suan, was advised by Atty. Francisco Alfonso of the fact that his client Ramon Alcantara
was a minor. The fact that the latter, for and in consideration of P500, executed an affidavit, whereby
he ratified the deed of sale, is of no moment. He was still minor. The majority opinion invokes the
rule laid down in the case of Mercado et al. vs. Espiritu, 37 Phil., 215. The rule laid down by this
Court in that case is based on three judgments rendered by the Supreme Court of Spain on 27 April
1960, 11 July 1868, and 1 March 1875. In these decisions the Supreme Court of Spain applied Law
6, Title 19, of the 6th Partida which expressly provides:

"Diziendo o ortogando el que fuese menor, que era mayor de XXV años, si ouiesse persona
que paresciesse de tal tiempo, si lo faze enganosamente, valdria el pleyto que assi fuere
fecho con el e non deue ser desatado despues, como quier que non era de edad quando lo
fizo: esto es, porque las leyes ayudan a los enganados, e non a los enganadores. . . ."
(Alcubilla, Codigos Antigous de España, p. 613.)

The contract of sale involved in the case of Mercado vs. Espiritu, supra, was executed by the minors
on 17 May 1910. The Law in force on this last-mentioned date was not Las Siete Partidas, 1 which
was the in force at the time the cases decided by the Supreme Court of Spain
referred to, but the Civil Code which took effect in the Philippines on 8
December 1889. As already stated, the Civil Code requires the consent of
both parties for the valid execution of a contract (art. 1261, Civil Code). As a
minor cannot give his consent, the contract made or executed by him has no
validity and legal effect. There is no provision in the Civil Code similar to that
of Law 6, Title 19, of the 6th Partida which is equivalent to the common law
principle of estoppel. If there be an express provision in the Civil Code similar
law 6, Title 19, of the 6th Partida, I would agree to the reasoning of the
majority. The absence of such provision in the Civil Code is fatal to the validity
of the contract executed by a minor. It would be illogical to uphold the validity
of a contract on the ground of estoppel, because if the contract executed by a
minor is null and void for lack of consent and produces no legal effect, how
could such a minor be bound by misrepresentation about his age? If he could
not be bound by a direct act, such as the execution of a deed of sale, how
could he be bound by an indirect act, such as misrepresentation as to his
age? The rule laid down in Young vs. Tecson, 39 O. G. 953, in my opinion, is
the correct one.
Nevertheless, as the action in this case was brought on 8 August 1940, the same was barred,
because it was not brought within four (4) years after the minor had become of age, pursuant to
article 1301 of the Civil Code. Ramon Alcantara became of age sometime in September 1934.

Moran, C.J. and Bengzon, J., concur.

PABLO, M., disidente:

No creo que Ramon Alcantara este en estoppel al querer recuperar su participacion en los lotes que
el cedio a Sia Suan en la escritura de 3 de Agosto de 1931. Las circunstancias que concurrieron en
su otorgamiento demostraran que es insostenible esa conclusion. La acreedora era Sia Suan, y el
deudor, Rufino Alcantara por transactiones que tuvo con ella en el negocio de copra. Al fallecimiento
de la esposa de Rufino, alguien se habra percatado de la dificultad de cobrar el credito porque
Rufino no tenia mas que tres lotes de su exclusiva propiedad y dos lotes, como bienes gananciales.
Ramon, uno de los herederos, era un menor de edad. Por eso, se procuro el otorgamiento de tal
escritura, vendiendo el padre (Rufino) y sus dos hijos (Damaso y Ramon) cinco lotes amillarados en
P19,592.85 por P2,500; que en realidad no fue mas que una dacion en pago de la deuda. Si no se
otorgaba tal escritura, la acreedora tenia necesidad de utilizar un proceso largo de abintestato para
obtener el pago de la deuda en cuanto afecte, si podia afectar, los bienes gananciales de Rufino
Alcantara y su difunta esposa, o de tutela para que alguien actue en lugar del menor Ramon. El
procedimiento mas corto y menos costoso entonces era hacer que el menos apareciera como con
edad competente para otorgar la escritura de venta. Y asi sucedio: se otorgo la escritura. El menor
no recibio ni un solo centimo. Con la herencia que habia de recibier de su difunta madre, pago la
deuda de su padre.

Despues de notificada Sia Suan de la reclamacion de nulidad del documento, por gestion de Gaw
Chiao, Ramon Alcantara siendo menor de edad aun, firmo un affidavit ratificando la venta en la
oficina del abogado de Gaw Chiao. Esta actuacion de Gar Chiao, marido de Sia Suan, denuncia que
no fue Ramon el que les hacia creer que era mayor de edad y que oficiosa y voluntariamente haya
solicitado el otorgamiento de la escritura de venta. Si Gaw Chiao, marido de Sia Suan, fue el que
gestiono el otorgamientodel affidavit de ratificacion, ?por que no debemos concluir que el fue quien
gestiono a indicacion tal vez de algun abogado, que Ramon Alcantara estampara su firma en la
escritura de 3 de agosto de 1931? Pero la firma de un menor no vale nada; debia aparecer
entonces que Ramon era de mayor edad. ¿Por que habia de interesarse el menor en otorgar una
escritura de venta de tales terrenos? ¿No es mas probable que la acreedora o su marido o algun
agente haya sido el que se intereso por que Ramon tomara parte en el otorgamiento de la
escritura?

Que beneficio obtuvo el menor en el otorgamiento de la escritura? Nada; en cambio, la acreedora

consiguio ser duena de los cinco lotes a cambio de su credito. ¿Quedaba favorecido el menor al
firmas su affidavit de ratificacion? Tampoco; con todo, Sia Suan reclama que el menor fue quien la
indujo a error. Si alguien engano al alguien, no habra sido Ramon. Tenia que ser la acreedora o
alguien que ayudaba a ella en conseguir el pago del credito; pero no fue, no podia ser el menor.

Teniendo en cuenta todas estas circunstancias, no podemos concluir que Ramon Alcantara haya
inducido a error a Sia Suan. No es aplicable, por tanto, la decision de este Tribunal en Mercado y
Mercado contra Espiritu (37 Jur. Fil., 227); ni la del Tribunal Supremo de Espana, pues en tales
casos, el menor fingio e hizo creer a los compradores que era mayor de edad: no era justo que el
que indujo a los compradores a comprar un terreno desprendiendosedel precio de compra, sea
permitido despues alegar su minoria de edad para anular la actuacion hecha por el. Eso es
verdadero estoppel; pero en el caso presente no lo hay.

Laches es el otro fundamento sobre que descansa la mayoria para revocar la decision
apelada. Laches es medida de equidad, y no es aplicable al caso presente. Solamente debe
admitirse como defensa cuando la aplicacion y hay necesidad de hacer uso de la equidad. No debe
aplicarse para fomentar una injusticia sino para minimizar sus efectos y solamente debe ser
utilizada como defensa cuando en la aplicacion de una ley se comete verdadera injusticia (30 C. J.
S., 531). En el caso presente Ramon Alcantara tiene diez anos de plazo a contar del 3 de Agosto de
1931, dentro del cual puede pedir la anulacion de la venta. Y la demanda que inicio esta causa se
presento dentro de ese plazo; no esta prescrita pues aun la accion (art. 43, Cod. Proc. Civ.).

Suponiendo que Ramon Alcantara hubiera presentado su demanda antes de la venta de un lote a
Nicolas Azores que sentencia se hubiera dictado? El otorgamiento de una escritura de traspaso de
una cuarta parte de los dos lotes; pero despues de vendido un lote, se ordenaria, como decidio el
Tribunal de Apelacion, el traspaso de la cuarta parte del lote restante y el pago de la cuarta parte
del importe en venta del lote vendido a Ramon. En uno y otro caso no se hace ningun dano a Sia
Suan, solamente se le obliga a traspasar a Ramon la parte que, en herencia de los bienes
gananciales dejados por su difunta madre, le corresponde. No hay daño desproporcionado que en
equidad autorica a Sia Suan a invocar la defensa de laches. Si Sia Suan antes de la presentacion
de la demanda, hubiera construido edificios en los lotes por valor de P3,000,000, demos por caso,
tal vez seria de equidad para Sia Suan invocar la defensa de laches, pues por el silencio de Ramon
Alcantara, ella ha hecho mejoras de mucho valor que con una decision semejante seria perjudicada.
El trasparo a Ramon Alcantara de una cuarta parte de cada uno de los dos lotes pondria a ella en la
alternativa de comprar esa cuarta parte de los lotes con precio excesivo o derribar parte de los
edificios construidos. En el caso presente no se le ha puesto en esa dificil situacion; al contrario, ella
estuvo disfrutando de esos dos lotes sin hacer mejoras extraordinarias, y despues de vendido el
segundo lote, utilizo el dinero recibido, y no hay pruebas de que se haya causado a ella dano por no
presentarse la demanda mas temprano.

Voto por la confirmacion de la decision del Tribunal de Apalacion

 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. L-59318 May 16, 1983

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
ROGELIO RAMOS y GAERLAN, defendant-appellant.

The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.

Antonio N. Salamera for defendant-appellant.

GUERRERO, J.:

This is an automatic review of the decision of the Court of First Instance of Manila finding the
accused Rogelio Ramos y Gaerlan in Criminal Case No. 61029 guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
violation of Section 4, Article II, in relation to Section 2(i), Article I of the Republic Act No. 6425, as
amended by P.D. No. 44 and further amended by P.D. No. 1675, and imposing upon him the penalty
of reclusion perpetua.

There is no dispute about the facts of this case. At about 10:00 o'clock in the evening of May 3.
1981, while P/Lt. E. Mediavillo and P/Sgt. A. Linga were on routine patrol along Taft Avenue, they
had seen and observed one MALCON OLEVERE y NAPA, acting suspiciously near the corner of
Estrada Street.   The police officers, after Identifying themselves, stopped and frisked the suspect
1

and found in his possession dried marijuana leaves.   The police officers thereafter placed Malcon
2

Olevere under arrest. Upon investigation, suspect Olevere declared that he bought the recovered
marijuana leaves from one ROGELIO RAMOS y GAERLAN, alias "Balanchoy".  3

The following day, May 4, 1981, at about 12:00 o'clock noon, a police team with suspect Malcon
Olevere y Napa proceeded to the residence of appellant Rogelio Ramos y Gaerlan in 2366
Singalong, Malate, Manila and arrested him. The police operatives immediately brought appellant to
the Drugs Enforcement Section Western Police Department Headquarters for investigation.

During the custodial investigation, suspect Malcon Olevere executed a written sworn statement
implicating the accused-appellant Rogelio Ramos as the source of the marijuana leaves.   The 4

accused, after having been duly apprised of his constitutional rights, verbally admitted before Lt. E.
Mediavillo and Sgt. A. Linga the commission of the offense charged. He likewise admitted that he
sold to Malcon Olevere the marijuana leaves for P10.00.  5

On May 22, 1981, upon arraignment, the accused-appellant Ramos entered a plea of not guilty to
the information filed by assistant fiscal Antonio J. Ballena which states:

That on or about May 4, 1981, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said accused,
not being authorized by law to sell, deliver, give away to another or distribute any
prohibited drug, did then and there willfully and unlawfully sell or offer for sale and
deliver dried marijuana leaves, which is a prohibited drug.

Contrary to law.  6

At the trial, the prosecution presented three witnesses to wit: Patrolman Jaime Cruz, a police
investigator, Patrolman Agapito Linga, a police agent, and Felisa Vequilla, an NBI forensic chemist.

Patrolman Cruz testified that on May 5, 1981, he investigated and took down the sworn statement of
one Malcon Olevere who disclosed that the accused-appellant Ramos was the source of the
marijuana leaves. Patrolman Cruz also testified that he prepared the Booking Sheet and Arrest
Report of the appellant Ramos and the corresponding Crime Report.   Patrolman Agapito Linga
7

declared on the witness stand that Lt. Mediavilla arrested appellant Ramos because Malcon Olevere
declared that the appellant sold to him the confiscated marijuana leaves.   The third witness, Felisa
8

Vequilla, a forensic chemist, affirmed that after conducting a dangerous drug test, the leaves
confiscated from Malcon Olevere are positive for marijuana.  9

The prosecution offered the following as documentary evidence:  10

 Exhibit "A" The Booking Sheet and Arrest Report of accused Rogelio Ramos
prepared by witness Patrolman Cruz which was offered as part of his testimony;

Exhibit "B" Crime Report dated May 6, 1981 also prepared by the witness Patrolman
Cruz;

Exhibit "B-1" second page of Exhibit "B'

Exhibit "C" Sworn Statement of Malcon Olevere y Napa;

Exhibit "C-1" The bracketed portions of Exhibit "C" stating among others that it was
Rogelio Ramos herein accused who furnished Malcon Olevere the marijuana leaves;

Exhibit "D-1" marijuana leaves examined;

Exhibit "E" the envelope containing the marijuana leaves which was
confiscated from Malcon Olevere.

After the trial, the Court of First Instance of Manila (now the Regional Trial Court) found the accused-
appellant Ramos guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime charged in view of the verbal
admission given by the appellant himself and the evidence offered and admitted in court. The
dispositive portion of its judgment reads:

WHEREFORE, accused ROGELIO RAMOS y GAERLAN is hereby found guilty

beyond reasonable doubt of a violation of Section 4, Article II in relation to Section
2(i), Article I Republic Act No. 6425, as amended by PD 44 and further amended by
PD 1675 as charged in the present information, for selling subject prohibited drugs
(marijuana leaves) without any lawful authority and is hereby sentenced to suffer the
penalty of reclusion perpetua (life imprisonment); to pay a fine of Twenty Thousand
(P20,000.00) pesos, without any subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency; and
to pay the costs. Let the accused be given full credit of the entire period of his
preventive imprisonment.

Subject marijuana leaves (Exhibit E) are confiscated, to be destroyed by the

Dangerous Drugs Board pursuant to law.

SO ORDERED.  11

The case is now before Us for automatic review. Accused-appellant submits before this Honorable
Court the following errors: 
12

That the court erred in finding the accused guilty of violation of Section 4 Article II of
Republic Act No. 6425 otherwise known as the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972, as
amended (Selling-Pushing).

II

That the court erred in its findings both in question of law and fact in convicting the
accused notwithstanding the failure of the prosecution to adduce the quantum of
evidence necessary to establish the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt by
failing to present Malcon Olevere y Napa, the person who claimed that it was the
therein accused who allegedly sold the marijuana leaves.

III

That the constitutional rights of the accused, more particularly the right to meet the
witness against him face to face and to cross-examination e him has been violated.

IV

That the court has acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to a denial of due
process of law.

The principal issue in this case is whether there is competent and/or admissible evidence in the
record to justify the conviction of the accused-appellant Ramos.
We find petitioner's case meritorious. The lower court erred in admitting as evidence the written
sworn affidavit of Malcon Olevere. It can be gleaned from the records that Malcon Olevere executed
the written sworn statement declaring that appellant Ramos sold to him the marijuana leaves for
P10.00. This piece of evidence is a mere scrap of paper because Malcon Olevere was not produced
in court for cross-examination. An affidavit being taken ex-parte is often incomplete and
inaccurate.   Such kind of evidence is considered hearsay.   The constitutional right to meet
13 14

witnesses face to face   in order not to deprive persons of their lives and properties without due
15

process of law is well-protected in our jurisprudence. Thus, in People vs. Toledo,   We elucidated:
16

Testimony in open court in actual trial cannot be equated with any out-of-court
declaration, even when the witness has in fact been confronted already by the
defendant. The direct relevance of the trial to the ultimate judgment as to the guilt or
innocence of the accused is not present in any other proceeding and is thus a factor
that can influence materially the conduct and demeanor of the witness as well as the
respective efforts of the counsels of the parties.

For the court to admit the sworn statement of Malcon Olevere without giving the adverse party the
right to cross-examine him would easily facilitate the fabrication of evidence and the perpetration of
fraud. The inadmissibility of this sort of evidence is based, not only on the lack of opportunity on the
part of the adverse party to cross-examine the affiant,   but also on the commonly known fact that,
17

generally, an affidavit is not prepared by the affiant himself but by another who uses his own
language in writing the affiant's statements which may either be omitted or misunderstood by the one
writing them. 18

The Booking Sheet and the Dangerous Drug Report of chemist Felisa Vequilla which were
presented as evidence by the prosecution, established nothing to support the conviction of the
appellant herein. For the same reason, that Malcon Olevere was not presented as a witness and
insofar as they impute to appellant the commission of the crime charged, the adduced evidence are
nothing but hearsay evidence. They cannot be regarded as competent evidence as to the veracity of
the contents therein.

It is not disputed that the marijuana leaves recovered and tested by witness Vequilla came from
Malcon Olevere and not from appellant. It would be absurd and manifestly unjust to conclude that
appellant had been selling marijuana stuff just because what were recovered from Olevere were real
marijuana. Proof of one does not necessarily prove another. Nowhere can it be found on the record
that appellant was caught in possession or in the act of selling the prohibited marijuana leaves.

The oral testimonies given by the witnesses for the prosecution prove nothing material and culpable
against the accused. As correctly pointed out by the Solicitor General not anyone of the three
witnesses presented testified on the basis of their personal knowledge that the appellant sold the
marijuana leaves to Malcon Olevere. Under Rule 130, Sec. 30 of the Revised Rules of Court, "a
witness can testify only to those facts which he knows of his own knowledge, that is, which are
derived from his own perception. ...

A witness, therefore, may not testify as to what he merely learned from others, either because he
was told or having read or heard the same. Such testimony is considered hearsay and may not be
received as proof of the truth of what he has learned. Since Malcon Olevere was not presented as a
witness, the testimonies offered by the witnesses for the prosecution are regarded as hearsay,
insofar as they impute to the appellant the commission of the offense charged.

The lower court in convicting appellant of the crime charged, Partly relief on the verbal admission
made by appellant himself before Lt. Mediavillo and Sgt. Linga during the custodial investigation.
Although the records prove that the appellant has been duly apprised of his constitutional rights to
silence and to counsel,   We are not fully convinced that this apprisal was sufficiently manifested and
19

intelligently understood and accepted by the appellant. This is fatal to the admissibility of appellant's
verbal admission. We have repeatedly emphasized that care should be taken in accepting
extrajudicial admissions, especially when taken during custodial investigation. In People vs.
Caquioa,   We ruled:
20

As for the procedural safeguards to be employed, unless other fully effective means
are devised to inform accused persons of their right to silence and assure a
continuous opportunity to exercise it, the following measures are required. Prior to
questioning, the person must be warned that he has a right to remain silent, that any
statement he does make be used as evidence against him, and that he has a right to
the presence of an attorney, either retained or appointed. The defendant may waive
effectuation of those rights provided the waiver is made voluntarily, knowingly and
intelligently. If however, he indicates in any manner and at any stage of the
prosecution that he wishes to consult with an attorney before speaking, there can be
no questioning. Likewise, if the individual is alone and indicates in any manner that
he does not wish to be interrogated, the police may not question him. The mere fact
 that he may have answered some questions or volunteered some statements on his
own does not deprive him of the right to refrain from answering any further inquiries
until he has consulted with an attorney and thereafter consents to be questioned.

Again, the constitutional rights of the accused to silence and to counsel is fortified in the very recent
case of Morales and Moncupa vs. Enrile   where this Court said:
21

At the time a person is arrested, it shall be the duty of the arresting officer to inform
him of the reason for the arrest and he must be shown the warrant of arrest, if any.
He shall be informed of his constitutional rights to remain silent and to counsel and
that any statement he might make could be used against him. The person arrested
shall have the right to communicate with his lawyer, a relative, or anyone he chooses
by the most expedient means - by telephone if possible - or by letter or messenger. It
shall be the responsibility of the arresting officer to see to it that this is accomplished.
No custodial investigation shall be conducted unless it be in the presence of counsel
engaged by the person arrested, by any person on his behalf, or appointed by the
court upon petition either of the detainee himself or by anyone on his behalf. The
right to counsel may be waived but the waiver shag not be valid unless made with
the assistance of counsel. Any statement obtained in violation of the procedure
herein laid down, whether exculpatory or inculpatory, in whole or in part, shall be
inadmissible in evidence.

In the case at bar, appellant has only finished Grade VI,   which means that he is not adequately
22

educated to understand fairly and fully the significance of his constitutional rights to silence and to
counsel. As mandated, it is not enough that the police investigator merely informs him of his
constitutional rights to silence and to counsel, and then taking his statements down, the interrogating
officer must have patience in explaining these rights to him. The records do not reveal that these
requirements have been fully complied with, nor was there any showing that appellant has been
represented by counsel during custodial investigation. In consonance with Section 20 of the Bill of
Rights which states that "any confession obtained in violation of this section shall be inadmissible in
evidence," We hold that the verbal admissions of appellant during custodial investigation may not be
taken in evidence against him.

We hold and rule that the guilt of the accused has not been established beyond reasonable doubt
and he is, therefore, entitled to acquittal.

WHEREFORE, IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the decision of the Court of First Instance of Manila
is REVERSED, and appellant is hereby ACQUITTED of the crime charged in the information. No
costs.

SO ORDERED.

Makasiar (Chairman), Concepcion Jr., A bad Santos, De Castro and Escolin JJ., concur.

Aquino, J., took no part.

 EN BANC

[G.R. No. 28643. March 19, 1928. ]

NICOLAS JUAREZ, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. RAMONA D. TURON, Defendant-

Appellee.

Mateo D. Cipriano, for Appellant.

No appearance for Appellee.

DECISION

JOHNS, J.:

The decision of the lower court is as follows:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"This is a complaint for divorce wherein it is alleged by the plaintiff among other
things:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"That the defendant, after legal proceedings, was convicted of adultery committed with
Gregorio Ramos in the City of Manila, P. I., in criminal case No. 32005 of this court, the
offended party in said case being the plaintiff himself above named; and

"That the judgment for adultery mentioned in the preceding paragraph has become
final and was executed.

"The defendant having been summoned, she was later declared in default at the
instance of the plaintiff whose evidence was received by the court in the absence of the
defendant. The plaintiff, however, has not presented any evidence upon the adultery
committed by the defendant and which can be the only ground for the action herein
brought. He did present the judgment render in the aforesaid criminal case for adultery
against the same defendant, proving, moreover, that said judgment has become final;
but this being a civil action, completely different from the criminal one for adultery
against the same defendant, and in which the parties are also different, although in fact
and substance the cause of action is the same in the two cases, in the one now before
the court for divorce evidence must have been presented that adultery was committed
by the defendant, the judgment of conviction rendered in the criminal case against the
same defendant not being sufficient, since as evidence it has no effect in this action
other than to show that the guilt of the defendant was proven in a final judgment
rendered in a criminal case, which is a condition required by section 8 of Act No. 2710
before divorce can be granted. Where it not for this requirement said judgment would
be inadmissible as evidence in this case, except for the purpose of impeaching the
veracity of the defendant as witness, if she had appeared and testified. Upon this point
the following doctrine is well known: ’Upon the foregoing principle, it is obvious that, as
a general rule, a verdict and judgment in a criminal case, though admissible to
establish the fact of the mere rendition of the judgment, cannot be given in evidence in
a civil action, to establish the facts on which it was rendered.’ Vol. 1, Green leaf on
Evidence, par. 537. Which doctrine was cited and approved by the Supreme Court of
these Islands in the case of ’Ocampo v. Jenkins, 14 Phil., pp. 681, 689.’

"On the other hand, the law requires that the action for divorce be brought within one
year from the date when the plaintiff acquired knowledge of the cause of action brought
by him, but the herein complaint was filed on February 10,1927, notwithstanding that
according to plaintiff himself, he acquired knowledge of the adultery of the defendant
about August, 1924.

"For the foregoing, the court overrules the complaint, holding that judgment cannot be
rendered for divorce as prayed for by the plaintiff. Without special pronouncement as to
costs.

"So ordered."cralaw virtua1aw library

The finding of the lower court, that the plaintiff knew of the alleged adultery in August,
1924, is well sustained by his own evidence, and the complaint in this action was filed
on February 10, 1927, about two and a half years after the plaintiff knew of the
adultery, for which he now seeks a divorce.

All things considered, the judgment of the lower court is affirmed, with costs. So
ordered.

Malcolm, Ostrand and Romualdez, JJ., concur.

Separate Opinions

JOHNSON, J., concurring:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

I concur in the dispositive part of the majority decision. I prefer to leave the discussion
of the incongruities of section 4 of Act No. 2710 until the question is squarely
presented, hoping that in the meantime the Legislature may have time to make it more
plain if that seems necessary. Section 4 contains three periods of prescription or
limitation of action for divorce:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

(a) Under said section an action for divorce cannot be filed except within one year from
and after the date on which the complainant became cognizant of the cause; (b) an
action for divorce must be filed within five years from and after the date when such
cause occurred; and (c) when the cause occurred prior to the date on which this Act
took effect (March 11, 1917), then the action for divorce must be commenced within
one year from and after such date.

It is difficult to harmonize the provisions of paragraphs (a) and (b) above, of said
section 4. They must mean, first, that the party aggrieved must bring his action for
divorce within one year after he had knowledge of the cause and, second, that such
action cannot be maintained after the lapse of five years from the date when such
cause occurred, whether the complainant was cognizant of the cause or not. In other
words, an action for divorce under said Act must be commenced within a period of one
year from the time the complainant has become cognizant of the causes justifying his
divorce, but such action cannot be maintained after the lapse of five years from and
after the date when the cause for divorce occurred. That, in my judgment, must be the
interpretation of that section as to the two causes of prescription or limitation of action.
However, that conclusion leaves much yet to be explained.

In the present case the action was not begun within one year from and after the date
on which the complainant became cognizant of the causes justifying his divorce. His
action is therefore clearly barred.

VILLAMOR, J., dissenting:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

The preceding decision affirms the judgment of the lower court with costs.

The lower court’s decision is here reproduced in its entirety, and this court, in affirming
it, makes the following comment: "The finding of the lower court, that the plaintiff knew
of the alleged adultery in August, 1924 is well sustained by his own evidence, and the
complaint in this action was filed on February 10,1927, about two and a half years after
the plaintiff knew of the adultery, for which he now seeks a divorce."cralaw virtua1aw
library

I vote for the reversal of the judgment appealed from, on the grounds hereinafter
briefly set forth.

The judgment appealed from dismissed the herein complaint for divorce for two
reasons: (1) Because the action was instituted out of time; and (2) because the final
judgment in a criminal action for adultery is insufficient evidence in a civil action for
divorce. Both reasons are, in my opinion, untenable.

According to the evidence, the plaintiff learned of his wife’s adultery in August, 1924;
or, more correctly, the adultery took place on August 1, 1924. The information for
adultery was filed on January 21, 1926, and judgment was rendered in the criminal
case on March 2, 1926. This judgment became final and subject, to execution. The
complaint for divorce was filed on February 10, 1927, and the judgment dismissing it
was rendered on August 17, 1927. Such are the facts proved at the trial. Has the
plaintiff’s action to divorce his legitimate wife prescribed? What does the law provide
with respect to the prescription of the action for divorce?

Section 4 of Act No. 2710 provides:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"An action for divorce cannot be filed except within one year from and after the date on
which the plaintiff became cognizant of the cause and within five years from and after
the date when such cause occurred; but if such cause occurred prior to the date on
which this Act takes effect, then only within one year from and after such date."cralaw
virtua1aw library

This law took effect on March 11, 1917.

As may be seen, the law establishes two prescriptive periods, according to whether the
cause of the divorce occurred before or after said law went into operation. If before, the
prescriptive period of the action is one year, that is, within the first year after the law
became effective; if after, as in the present case, the prescriptive period is five years,
to be reckoned from the year following the date on which the plaintiff learned of the
cause for divorce, namely, his wife’s adultery.

As August 1, 1924, was the date on which the plaintiff learned of the adultery, the
action for divorce does not arise from said date, but from August 1, 1925, or one year
from August 1, 1924. The year from August, 1924 to August, 1925, is not to be
counted for the purposes of prescription; it is the year of grace which the law grants the
spouses for their reconciliation, because the State is more interested in the continuance
of the conjugal union than in the separation of the spouses, for the welfare of the family
and of society. If according to the law, the plaintiff’s action lasts five years from August
1, 1925, he may bring it at any time between then and August 1, 1930. And the action
having been instituted on February 10, 1927, it is evident that said action was filed
within the period of time authorized by the law.

It must be noted that, as has been said, the aforementioned section 4 of Act No. 2710
establishes two periods of prescription: One of one year, if the cause of action occurred
before Act No. 2710 took effect; and another of five years, if the cause arose
thereafter. If the opinion of this court affirming that of the lower court were to prevail,
the distinction established by the law would disappear, and the law amended by a
judicial decision.

To my mind, the reason for the two prescriptive periods of action rests on the fact that
when the cause of action took place before the Divorce Law became effective, the
legislator intended to limit the effects of this law, so as not to favor the institution of
divorce proceedings; and when the cause of action occurred after said law had become
effective, the same legislator probably took into account the precedents of several
States of America, such as Arkansas, Kentucky, etc., which fix the period of five years
for the commencement of the action, to be reckoned from the date of the act giving rise
to it. (See Hirsh, Tabulated Digest of the Divorce Law of the United States.)

At any rate, no matter how arbitrary the fixing of this second period may seem, the law
has deemed it wise to establish a period of five years to be reckoned from the year
following the date on which the plaintiff became aware of the cause of action for the
filing of the action for divorce, that is, August 1, 1924. Therefore, it is contrary both to
the letter and to the spirit of the law to hold that the action for divorce has prescribed
because it was instituted two and a half years after the plaintiff became aware of the
cause of action.

With respect to the second ground for dismissal, the judgment appealed from cites the
case of Ocampo v. Jenkins and Worcester (14 Phil., 681), wherein it was held: "The fact
that an appeal is pending in the Supreme Court in a criminal case for libel, under Act
No. 277 of the Philippine Commission, does not prevent the prosecution of a civil action
for damages under the same Act, which clearly recognizes two distinct actions, upon
the theory that there are two separate and distinct injuries received from the crime,
one by the State and the other by the individual damaged by the libel. In such a case,
therefore, a petition for a writ of prohibition enjoining the prosecution of the civil suit
while the criminal appeal is pending, will be denied.

"The general rule is that the plea of res adjudicata cannot be interposed except where
the parties, the facts, and the questions involved are the same. As between civil and
criminal actions, a judgment in one is no bar to the prosecution of the other. Hence, a
judgment in a criminal cause cannot be pleaded as res adjudicata in a civil
action."cralaw virtua1aw library

That case dealt with the interpretation of section 11 of Act No. 277, which
reads:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"In addition to the criminal action hereby prescribed, a right of civil action is also
hereby given to any person libeled . . . against the person libeling him for damages
sustained by such libel . . ."cralaw virtua1aw library

And it was held that Act No. 277 recognized two distinct and independent actions on the
theory that two distinct and independent injuries are caused by the crime of libel — one
to the State and another to the private individual, prejudiced by reason of the crime.
The rule adopted was substantially enunciated as follows:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"A judgment in a criminal prosecution constitutes no bar or estoppel in a civil action

based upon the same acts or transactions, and conversely of a judgment in a civil
action sought to be given in evidence in a criminal prosecution. The reason most often
given for this holding is that the two proceedings are not between the same parties.
Different rules as to the competency of witnesses and weight of evidence necessary to
the findings in the two proceedings also exist. As between civil and criminal actions, a
judgment in one is no bar or estoppel to the prosecution of the other. A judgment in a
criminal cause cannot be pleaded as res judicata in a civil action."cralaw virtua1aw
library

There is no need to amass citations in support of the general rule thus stated, since
there can be no doubt that it is well founded upon justice and authority. Nevertheless, I
believe that this general rule with respect to a civil action for libel and the criminal
action arising therefrom, is not applicable to the instant case, wherein the civil action
for divorce is so closely linked to the criminal action for adultery that the very life of the
former depends upon the success of the latter. While a judgment of acquittal in a
criminal case for libel is no bar to the institution of a civil action for damages caused by
the libel, a judgment of acquittal for adultery kills the action for divorce. While,
pursuant to Act No. 277, the civil action may be commenced and prosecuted until the
rendering of judgment independently of the criminal action; under Act No. 2710, the
action for divorce cannot be prosecuted, although it may be commenced, until
judgment is rendered in the criminal action for adultery or concubinage.

And this shows the intimate relation established by the law between the civil action for
divorce and the criminal action for adultery or concubinage.

Section 3 of the Divorce Law provides:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"The divorce may be claimed only by the innocent spouse, provided there has been no
condonation of or consent to the adultery or concubinage, as the case may be. Where
both spouses are guilty, a divorce cannot be claimed by either of them."cralaw
virtua1aw library
And section 8 of the same Act prescribes:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"A divorce shall not be granted without the guilt of the defendant being established by
final sentence in a criminal action."cralaw virtua1aw library

In view of these legal provisions, I am of opinion that the judgment rendered in the
action for adultery, Exhibit B, is conclusive proof of the defendant’s guilt in the civil
action for divorce, which is an indispensable requisite for the granting of a divorce.

On the hypothesis that the plaintiff has proved his allegations in the complaint for
divorce, and having filed his action within the period authorized by the law, I am of the
opinion that the lower court committed an error rejudicial to the appellant’s rights in
dismissing the present action; and I hold that the judgment appealed from should be
reversed, and the case remanded to the court of origin with instruction to grant the
divorce applied for in the complaint, in accordance with Act No. 2710, without a special
pronouncement as to costs.

Villa-Real, J., concurs.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. L-26435             March 4, 1927

JUANARIA FRANCISCO, plaintiff-appellant,
vs.
LOPE TAYAO, defendant-appellee.

Roman Ozaeta for appellant.

The appellee in his own behalf.

MALCOLM, J.:

As rightly stated by counsel for the appellant in his well prepared brief, the present appeal raises
only a question of law, which is whether or not, under the facts, the plaintiff is entitled to a decree of
divorce in accordance with the Philippine Divorce Law. The related question resolutory of the appeal
is whether or not the wife can secure a divorce from the husband, where the latter has been
convicted of adultery and not of concubinage, although the acts for which the husband was
convicted of adultery may also constitute concubinage.

Juanaria Francisco, the plaintiff, and Lope Tayao, the defendant, contracted marriage in the City of
Manila in 1912. They separated in 1917. The husband then removed to Zamboanga. There he was
later prosecuted for having committed adultery with a married woman named Bernardina Medrano,
wife of Ambrosio Torres, at whose instance the criminal complaint was instituted. As a result of that
proceeding, Lope Tayao, together with his coaccused Bernardina Medrano, was sentenced by the
late Judge Ponciano Reyes to suffer three years, six months, and twenty-one days
imprisonment prision correccional, and to pay the costs. (Exhibit A.)

On these facts, the action of Juanaria Francisco, the plaintiff, against Lope Tayao, the defendant, to
have the bonds of matrimony between them dissolved was instituted in the Court of First Instance of
Manila and was there denied by Judge of First Instance Revilla. The trial judge based his decision
principally on the point that the plaintiff was not an innocent spouse within the meaning of sections 1
and 3 of the Divorce Law. This findings, as well as the dismissal of the complaint, is challenged by
the plaintiff on appeal.

In the Philippine Islands, the causes for divorce are prescribed by statute. (19 C. J.,36; Benedicto vs.
De la Rama [1903], 3 Phil., 34, reversed by the United States Supreme Court for other reasons).
The grounds for divorce are two: Adultery on the part of the wife or concubinage on the part of the
husband. (Villanueva, La Ley de Divorcio, pp. 27, 46, and 47.) The Philippine Divorce Law, Act No.
2710, is emphatically clear in this respect. Section 1 of the law reads: "A petition for divorce
can only be filed for adultery on the part of the wife or concubinage on the part of the husband . . . ."
Note well the adverb "only" and the conjunctive "or." The same thought is again emphasized in
section 3 of the Divorce Law which provides that "The divorce may be claimed only by the innocent
spouse, provided there has been no condonation of or consent to the adultery or concubinage, as
the case may be. . . . " Later on comes section 8 providing that "A divorce shall not be granted
without the guilt of the defendant being established by final sentence in a criminal action"—that is, in
relation with section 1 of the same law, by final sentence in a criminal action for adultery on the part
of the wife or concubinage on the part of the husband. Act No. 2716, amendatory of article 437 of
the Penal Code, adds nothing to the Divorce Law except as it clarifies the meaning of concubinage.

Counsel argues along the line that the plaintiff is here the innocent spouse and that acts for which
the defendant was convicted of adultery also constitute concubinage. But the undeniable fact
remains that the defendant was prosecuted for, and was convicted of, the crime of adultery and not
the crime of concubinage. The criminal case was instituted on the complaint of the injured husband.
It was not instituted by the injured wife which is essential for the proper initiation of a prosecution for
concubinage. (Albert, The Law on Crimes, pp. 406, 407; 3 Viada Codigo Penal, pp. 144 et seq.;
U.S. vs. Rivera and Vitug [1914], 28 Phil., 13.)

In its last analysis, what counsel is asking this court to do is to sit as a trial court to convict the
defendant of the crime of concubinage, although no prosecution for the same has been instituted by
the aggrieved wife and no hearing has been had or judgment rendered in a lower court. This the
appellate court cannot do. What counsel also desires this court to do is to add a third cause for
divorce to the law and to insert two words in section 1 of the Divorce Law so that it will read: "A
petition for divorce can only be filed for adultery on the part of the wife or husband or concubinage
on the part of the husband." This likewise the court cannot do. It would amount to judicial
amendment of the law.

For somewhat different reasons but with the same result, the judgement appealed from must be
affirmed without special pronouncement as to costs in this instance.

Avanceña C.J., Johnson, Street, Villamor, Ostrand, Romualdez and Villa-Real, JJ., concur.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. L-19671           November 29, 1965

PASTOR B. TENCHAVEZ, plaintiff-appellant,
vs.
VICENTA F. ESCAÑO, ET AL., defendants-appellees.

I. V. Binamira & F. B. Barria for plaintiff-appellant.

Jalandoni & Jarnir for defendants-appellees.

REYES, J.B.L., J.:

Direct appeal, on factual and legal questions, from the judgment of the Court of First Instance of
Cebu, in its Civil Case No. R-4177, denying the claim of the plaintiff-appellant, Pastor B. Tenchavez,
for legal separation and one million pesos in damages against his wife and parents-in-law, the
defendants-appellees, Vicente, Mamerto and Mena, 1 all surnamed "Escaño," respectively.2

The facts, supported by the evidence of record, are the following:

Missing her late afternoon classes on 24 February 1948 in the University of San Carlos, Cebu City,
where she was then enrolled as a second year student of commerce, Vicenta Escaño, 27 years of
age (scion of a well-to-do and socially prominent Filipino family of Spanish ancestry and a "sheltered
colegiala"), exchanged marriage vows with Pastor Tenchavez, 32 years of age, an engineer, ex-
army officer and of undistinguished stock, without the knowledge of her parents, before a Catholic
chaplain, Lt. Moises Lavares, in the house of one Juan Alburo in the said city. The marriage was the
culmination of a previous love affair and was duly registered with the local civil register.

Vicenta's letters to Pastor, and his to her, before the marriage, indicate that the couple were deeply
in love. Together with a friend, Pacita Noel, their matchmaker and go-between, they had planned out
their marital future whereby Pacita would be the governess of their first-born; they started saving
money in a piggy bank. A few weeks before their secret marriage, their engagement was broken;
Vicenta returned the engagement ring and accepted another suitor, Joseling Lao. Her love for Pastor
beckoned; she pleaded for his return, and they reconciled. This time they planned to get married and
then elope. To facilitate the elopement, Vicenta had brought some of her clothes to the room of
Pacita Noel in St. Mary's Hall, which was their usual trysting place.

Although planned for the midnight following their marriage, the elopement did not, however,
materialize because when Vicente went back to her classes after the marriage, her mother, who got
wind of the intended nuptials, was already waiting for her at the college. Vicenta was taken home
where she admitted that she had already married Pastor. Mamerto and Mena Escaño were
surprised, because Pastor never asked for the hand of Vicente, and were disgusted because of the
great scandal that the clandestine marriage would provoke (t.s.n., vol. III, pp. 1105-06). The
following morning, the Escaño spouses sought priestly advice. Father Reynes suggested a
recelebration to validate what he believed to be an invalid marriage, from the standpoint of the
Church, due to the lack of authority from the Archbishop or the parish priest for the officiating
chaplain to celebrate the marriage. The recelebration did not take place, because on 26 February
1948 Mamerto Escaño was handed by a maid, whose name he claims he does not remember, a
letter purportedly coming from San Carlos college students and disclosing an amorous relationship
between Pastor Tenchavez and Pacita Noel; Vicenta translated the letter to her father, and
thereafter would not agree to a new marriage. Vicenta and Pastor met that day in the house of Mrs.
Pilar Mendezona. Thereafter, Vicenta continued living with her parents while Pastor returned to his
job in Manila. Her letter of 22 March 1948 (Exh. "M"), while still solicitous of her husband's welfare,
was not as endearing as her previous letters when their love was aflame.

Vicenta was bred in Catholic ways but is of a changeable disposition, and Pastor knew it. She fondly
accepted her being called a "jellyfish." She was not prevented by her parents from communicating
with Pastor (Exh. "1-Escaño"), but her letters became less frequent as the days passed. As of June,
1948 the newlyweds were already estranged (Exh. "2-Escaño"). Vicenta had gone to Jimenez,
Misamis Occidental, to escape from the scandal that her marriage stirred in Cebu society. There, a
lawyer filed for her a petition, drafted by then Senator Emmanuel Pelaez, to annul her marriage. She
did not sign the petition (Exh. "B-5"). The case was dismissed without prejudice because of her non-
appearance at the hearing (Exh. "B-4").
On 24 June 1950, without informing her husband, she applied for a passport, indicating in her
application that she was single, that her purpose was to study, and she was domiciled in Cebu City,
and that she intended to return after two years. The application was approved, and she left for the
United States. On 22 August 1950, she filed a verified complaint for divorce against the herein
plaintiff in the Second Judicial District Court of the State of Nevada in and for the County of Washoe,
on the ground of "extreme cruelty, entirely mental in character." On 21 October 1950, a decree of
divorce, "final and absolute", was issued in open court by the said tribunal.

In 1951 Mamerto and Mena Escaño filed a petition with the Archbishop of Cebu to annul their
daughter's marriage to Pastor (Exh. "D"). On 10 September 1954, Vicenta sought papal dispensation
of her marriage (Exh. "D"-2).

On 13 September 1954, Vicenta married an American, Russell Leo Moran, in Nevada. She now lives
with him in California, and, by him, has begotten children. She acquired American citizenship on 8
August 1958.

But on 30 July 1955, Tenchavez had initiated the proceedings at bar by a complaint in the Court of
First Instance of Cebu, and amended on 31 May 1956, against Vicenta F. Escaño, her parents,
Mamerto and Mena Escaño, whom he charged with having dissuaded and discouraged Vicenta from
joining her husband, and alienating her affections, and against the Roman Catholic Church, for
having, through its Diocesan Tribunal, decreed the annulment of the marriage, and asked for legal
separation and one million pesos in damages. Vicenta claimed a valid divorce from plaintiff and an
equally valid marriage to her present husband, Russell Leo Moran; while her parents denied that
they had in any way influenced their daughter's acts, and counterclaimed for moral damages.

The appealed judgment did not decree a legal separation, but freed the plaintiff from supporting his
wife and to acquire property to the exclusion of his wife. It allowed the counterclaim of Mamerto
Escaño and Mena Escaño for moral and exemplary damages and attorney's fees against the
plaintiff-appellant, to the extent of P45,000.00, and plaintiff resorted directly to this Court.

The appellant ascribes, as errors of the trial court, the following:

1. In not declaring legal separation; in not holding defendant Vicenta F. Escaño liable for
damages and in dismissing the complaint;.

2. In not holding the defendant parents Mamerto Escano and the heirs of Doña Mena
Escaño liable for damages;.

3 In holding the plaintiff liable for and requiring him to pay the damages to the defendant
parents on their counterclaims; and.

4. In dismissing the complaint and in denying the relief sought by the plaintiff.

That on 24 February 1948 the plaintiff-appellant, Pastor Tenchavez, and the defendant-appellee,
Vicenta Escaño, were validly married to each other, from the standpoint of our civil law, is clearly
established by the record before us. Both parties were then above the age of majority, and otherwise
qualified; and both consented to the marriage, which was performed by a Catholic priest (army
chaplain Lavares) in the presence of competent witnesses. It is nowhere shown that said priest was
not duly authorized under civil law to solemnize marriages.

The chaplain's alleged lack of ecclesiastical authorization from the parish priest and the Ordinary, as
required by Canon law, is irrelevant in our civil law, not only because of the separation of Church
and State but also because Act 3613 of the Philippine Legislature (which was the marriage law in
force at the time) expressly provided that —

SEC. 1. Essential requisites. Essential requisites for marriage are the legal capacity of the
contracting parties and consent. (Emphasis supplied)

The actual authority of the solemnizing officer was thus only a formal requirement, and, therefore,
not essential to give the marriage civil effects,3 and this is emphasized by section 27 of said marriage
act, which provided the following:

SEC. 27. Failure to comply with formal requirements. No marriage shall be declared invalid
because of the absence of one or several of the formal requirements of this Act if, when it
was performed, the spouses or one of them believed in good faith that the person who
solemnized the marriage was actually empowered to do so, and that the marriage was
perfectly legal.
The good faith of all the parties to the marriage (and hence the validity of their marriage) will be
presumed until the contrary is positively proved (Lao vs. Dee Tim, 45 Phil. 739, 745; Francisco vs.
Jason, 60 Phil. 442, 448). It is well to note here that in the case at bar, doubts as to the authority of
the solemnizing priest arose only after the marriage, when Vicenta's parents consulted Father
Reynes and the archbishop of Cebu. Moreover, the very act of Vicenta in abandoning her original
action for annulment and subsequently suing for divorce implies an admission that her marriage to
plaintiff was valid and binding.

Defendant Vicenta Escaño argues that when she contracted the marriage she was under the undue
influence of Pacita Noel, whom she charges to have been in conspiracy with appellant Tenchavez.
Even granting, for argument's sake, the truth of that contention, and assuming that Vicenta's consent
was vitiated by fraud and undue influence, such vices did not render her marriage ab initio void, but
merely voidable, and the marriage remained valid until annulled by a competent civil court. This was
never done, and admittedly, Vicenta's suit for annulment in the Court of First Instance of Misamis
was dismissed for non-prosecution.

It is equally clear from the record that the valid marriage between Pastor Tenchavez and Vicenta
Escaño remained subsisting and undissolved under Philippine law, notwithstanding the decree of
absolute divorce that the wife sought and obtained on 21 October 1950 from the Second Judicial
District Court of Washoe County, State of Nevada, on grounds of "extreme cruelty, entirely mental in
character." At the time the divorce decree was issued, Vicenta Escaño, like her husband, was still a
Filipino citizen.4 She was then subject to Philippine law, and Article 15 of the Civil Code of the
Philippines (Rep. Act No. 386), already in force at the time, expressly provided:

Laws relating to family rights and duties or to the status, condition and legal capacity of
persons are binding upon the citizens of the Philippines, even though living abroad.

The Civil Code of the Philippines, now in force, does not admit absolute divorce, quo ad vinculo
matrimonii; and in fact does not even use that term, to further emphasize its restrictive policy on the
matter, in contrast to the preceding legislation that admitted absolute divorce on grounds of adultery
of the wife or concubinage of the husband (Act 2710). Instead of divorce, the present Civil Code only
provides for legal separation (Title IV, Book 1, Arts. 97 to 108), and, even in that case, it expressly
prescribes that "the marriage bonds shall not be severed" (Art. 106, subpar. 1).

For the Philippine courts to recognize and give recognition or effect to a foreign decree of absolute
divorce betiveen Filipino citizens could be a patent violation of the declared public policy of the state,
specially in view of the third paragraph of Article 17 of the Civil Code that prescribes the following:

Prohibitive laws concerning persons, their acts or property, and those which have for their
object public order, policy and good customs, shall not be rendered ineffective by laws or
judgments promulgated, or by determinations or conventions agreed upon in a foreign
country.

Even more, the grant of effectivity in this jurisdiction to such foreign divorce decrees would, in effect,
give rise to an irritating and scandalous discrimination in favor of wealthy citizens, to the detriment of
those members of our polity whose means do not permit them to sojourn abroad and obtain absolute
divorces outside the Philippines.

From this point of view, it is irrelevant that appellant Pastor Tenchavez should have appeared in the
Nevada divorce court. Primarily because the policy of our law cannot be nullified by acts of private
parties (Civil Code,Art. 17, jam quot.); and additionally, because the mere appearance of a non-
resident consort cannot confer jurisdiction where the court originally had none (Area vs. Javier, 95
Phil. 579).

From the preceding facts and considerations, there flows as a necessary consequence that in this
jurisdiction Vicenta Escaño's divorce and second marriage are not entitled to recognition as valid; for
her previous union to plaintiff Tenchavez must be declared to be existent and undissolved. It follows,
likewise, that her refusal to perform her wifely duties, and her denial of consortium and her desertion
of her husband constitute in law a wrong caused through her fault, for which the husband is entitled
to the corresponding indemnity (Civil Code, Art. 2176). Neither an unsubstantiated charge of deceit
nor an anonymous letter charging immorality against the husband constitute, contrary to her claim,
adequate excuse. Wherefore, her marriage and cohabitation with Russell Leo Moran is technically
"intercourse with a person not her husband" from the standpoint of Philippine Law, and entitles
plaintiff-appellant Tenchavez to a decree of "legal separation under our law, on the basis of adultery"
(Revised Penal Code, Art. 333).

The foregoing conclusions as to the untoward effect of a marriage after an invalid divorce are in
accord with the previous doctrines and rulings of this court on the subject, particularly those that
were rendered under our laws prior to the approval of the absolute divorce act (Act 2710 of the
Philippine Legislature). As a matter of legal history, our statutes did not recognize divorces a
vinculo before 1917, when Act 2710 became effective; and the present Civil Code of the Philippines,
in disregarding absolute divorces, in effect merely reverted to the policies on the subject prevailing
before Act 2710. The rulings, therefore, under the Civil Code of 1889, prior to the Act above-
mentioned, are now, fully applicable. Of these, the decision in Ramirez vs. Gmur, 42 Phil. 855, is of
particular interest. Said this Court in that case:

As the divorce granted by the French Court must be ignored, it results that the marriage of
Dr. Mory and Leona Castro, celebrated in London in 1905, could not legalize their relations;
and the circumstance that they afterwards passed for husband and wife in Switzerland until
her death is wholly without legal significance. The claims of the very children to participate in
the estate of Samuel Bishop must therefore be rejected. The right to inherit is limited to
legitimate, legitimated and acknowledged natural children. The children of adulterous
relations are wholly excluded. The word "descendants" as used in Article 941 of the Civil
Code cannot be interpreted to include illegitimates born of adulterous relations. (Emphasis
supplied)

Except for the fact that the successional rights of the children, begotten from Vicenta's marriage to
Leo Moran after the invalid divorce, are not involved in the case at bar, the Gmur case is authority
for the proposition that such union is adulterous in this jurisdiction, and, therefore, justifies an action
for legal separation on the part of the innocent consort of the first marriage, that stands undissolved
in Philippine law. In not so declaring, the trial court committed error.

True it is that our ruling gives rise to anomalous situations where the status of a person (whether
divorced or not) would depend on the territory where the question arises. Anomalies of this kind are
not new in the Philippines, and the answer to them was given in Barretto vs. Gonzales, 58 Phil. 667:

The hardship of the existing divorce laws in the Philippine Islands are well known to the
members of the Legislature. It is the duty of the Courts to enforce the laws of divorce as
written by Legislature if they are constitutional. Courts have no right to say that such laws are
too strict or too liberal. (p. 72)

The appellant's first assignment of error is, therefore, sustained.

However, the plaintiff-appellant's charge that his wife's parents, Dr. Mamerto Escaño and his wife,
the late Doña Mena Escaño, alienated the affections of their daughter and influenced her conduct
toward her husband are not supported by credible evidence. The testimony of Pastor Tenchavez
about the Escaño's animosity toward him strikes us to be merely conjecture and exaggeration, and
are belied by Pastor's own letters written before this suit was begun (Exh. "2-Escaño" and "Vicenta,"
Rec. on App., pp. 270-274). In these letters he expressly apologized to the defendants for
"misjudging them" and for the "great unhappiness" caused by his "impulsive blunders" and "sinful
pride," "effrontery and audacity" [sic]. Plaintiff was admitted to the Escaño house to visit and court
Vicenta, and the record shows nothing to prove that he would not have been accepted to marry
Vicente had he openly asked for her hand, as good manners and breeding demanded. Even after
learning of the clandestine marriage, and despite their shock at such unexpected event, the parents
of Vicenta proposed and arranged that the marriage be recelebrated in strict conformity with the
canons of their religion upon advice that the previous one was canonically defective. If no
recelebration of the marriage ceremony was had it was not due to defendants Mamerto Escaño and
his wife, but to the refusal of Vicenta to proceed with it. That the spouses Escaño did not seek to
compel or induce their daughter to assent to the recelebration but respected her decision, or that
they abided by her resolve, does not constitute in law an alienation of affections. Neither does the
fact that Vicenta's parents sent her money while she was in the United States; for it was natural that
they should not wish their daughter to live in penury even if they did not concur in her decision to
divorce Tenchavez (27 Am. Jur. 130-132).

There is no evidence that the parents of Vicenta, out of improper motives, aided and abetted her
original suit for annulment, or her subsequent divorce; she appears to have acted independently,
and being of age, she was entitled to judge what was best for her and ask that her decisions be
respected. Her parents, in so doing, certainly cannot be charged with alienation of affections in the
absence of malice or unworthy motives, which have not been shown, good faith being always
presumed until the contrary is proved.

SEC. 529. Liability of Parents, Guardians or Kin. — The law distinguishes between the right
of a parent to interest himself in the marital affairs of his child and the absence of rights in a
stranger to intermeddle in such affairs. However, such distinction between the liability of
parents and that of strangers is only in regard to what will justify interference. A parent
isliable for alienation of affections resulting from his own malicious conduct, as where he
wrongfully entices his son or daughter to leave his or her spouse, but he is not liable unless
he acts maliciously, without justification and from unworthy motives. He is not liable where he
acts and advises his child in good faith with respect to his child's marital relations in the
 interest of his child as he sees it, the marriage of his child not terminating his right and liberty
to interest himself in, and be extremely solicitous for, his child's welfare and happiness, even
where his conduct and advice suggest or result in the separation of the spouses or the
obtaining of a divorce or annulment, or where he acts under mistake or misinformation, or
where his advice or interference are indiscreet or unfortunate, although it has been held that
the parent is liable for consequences resulting from recklessness. He may in good faith take
his child into his home and afford him or her protection and support, so long as he has not
maliciously enticed his child away, or does not maliciously entice or cause him or her to stay
away, from his or her spouse. This rule has more frequently been applied in the case of
advice given to a married daughter, but it is equally applicable in the case of advice given to
a son.

Plaintiff Tenchavez, in falsely charging Vicenta's aged parents with racial or social discrimination and
with having exerted efforts and pressured her to seek annulment and divorce, unquestionably
caused them unrest and anxiety, entitling them to recover damages. While this suit may not have
been impelled by actual malice, the charges were certainly reckless in the face of the proven facts
and circumstances. Court actions are not established for parties to give vent to their prejudices or
spleen.

In the assessment of the moral damages recoverable by appellant Pastor Tenchavez from
defendant Vicente Escaño, it is proper to take into account, against his patently unreasonable claim
for a million pesos in damages, that (a) the marriage was celebrated in secret, and its failure was not
characterized by publicity or undue humiliation on appellant's part; (b) that the parties never lived
together; and (c) that there is evidence that appellant had originally agreed to the annulment of the
marriage, although such a promise was legally invalid, being against public policy (cf. Art. 88, Civ.
Code). While appellant is unable to remarry under our law, this fact is a consequence of the
indissoluble character of the union that appellant entered into voluntarily and with open eyes rather
than of her divorce and her second marriage. All told, we are of the opinion that appellant should
recover P25,000 only by way of moral damages and attorney's fees.

With regard to the P45,000 damages awarded to the defendants, Dr. Mamerto Escaño and Mena
Escaño, by the court below, we opine that the same are excessive. While the filing of this unfounded
suit must have wounded said defendants' feelings and caused them anxiety, the same could in no
way have seriously injured their reputation, or otherwise prejudiced them, lawsuits having become a
common occurrence in present society. What is important, and has been correctly established in the
decision of the court below, is that said defendants were not guilty of any improper conduct in the
whole deplorable affair. This Court, therefore, reduces the damages awarded to P5,000 only.

Summing up, the Court rules:

(1) That a foreign divorce between Filipino citizens, sought and decreed after the effectivity of the
present Civil Code (Rep. Act 386), is not entitled to recognition as valid in this jurisdiction; and
neither is the marriage contracted with another party by the divorced consort, subsequently to the
foreign decree of divorce, entitled to validity in the country;

(2) That the remarriage of divorced wife and her co-habitation with a person other than the lawful
husband entitle the latter to a decree of legal separation conformably to Philippine law;

(3) That the desertion and securing of an invalid divorce decree by one consort entitles the other to
recover damages;

(4) That an action for alienation of affections against the parents of one consort does not lie in the
absence of proof of malice or unworthy motives on their part.

WHEREFORE, the decision under appeal is hereby modified as follows;

(1) Adjudging plaintiff-appellant Pastor Tenchavez entitled to a decree of legal separation from
defendant Vicenta F. Escaño;

(2) Sentencing defendant-appellee Vicenta Escaño to pay plaintiff-appellant Tenchavez the amount
of P25,000 for damages and attorneys' fees;

(3) Sentencing appellant Pastor Tenchavez to pay the appellee, Mamerto Escaño and the estate of
his wife, the deceased Mena Escaño, P5,000 by way of damages and attorneys' fees.

Neither party to recover costs.

Bengzon, C.J., Bautista Angelo, Concepcion, Dizon, Regala, Makalintal, Bengzon, J.P. and Zaldivar,
JJ., concur.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. L-27683 October 19, 1976

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
SILVESTRE LIWANAG alias LINDA BIE, defendant-appellant.

Paterno R. Canlas Law Offices for appellant.

Solicitor General Felix V. Makasiar, Assistant Solicitor General Felicismo R. Rosete and Solicitor
Teodulo R. Dino for appellee.

CONCEPCION JR., J.:

Appeal from the judgment of the Court of First Instance of Bataan, finding the accused guilty of
violating the provisions of Republic Act No. 1700, otherwise known as the Anti-Subversion Act., and
sentencing him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua, with the accessories of the law, and to
pay the costs.

It is not disputed that in June, 1942, the accused Silvestre Liwanag alias Linda Bie, Nene, Bets,
Apong Iro, Silver, Pet, Apong Pedro, Agustin, and Seniong, then a young man from the farms of
Concepcion, Lubao, Pampanga, fired by patriotic fervor, joined the "Hukbo ng Bayan Laban sa
Hapon", more popularly known by its acronym "Hukbalahap", an organization whose purpose, as its
name implies, was to resist the Japanese occupation forces in the Philippines. He held the position
of commander of Squadron 18-E with the station in Lubao, Pampanga until 1944, when he was
promoted to the rank of military inspector, a position he held until liberation when the organization
was disbanded. Before the national elections of 1946, the Hukbalahap was revived. The accused
was designated provincial commander for Pampanga and later as vice commander of the Central
Luzon Regional Command (CLRC).

Sometime in 1948, the Communist Party of the Philippines (CPP) held a conference in the
mountains of Norzagaray, Bulacan, attended, among others, by Luis Taruc, Pedro Taruc, Peregrino
Taruc, Castro Alejandrino, Jose and Jesus Lava and the herein accused Silvestre Liwanag. The
accused was nominated to the Central Committee (CC), which is the governing body of the Party. In
that conference, it was also agreed to change the name of "Hukbong Mapagpalaya ng Bayan" or
HMB. Being a member of the Hukbalahap and the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the
Philippines, the accused was designated as supervisor and adviser to Squadron 18 of Field
Command (FC) 25 of the HMB operating in the province of Bataan until early in 1956. Among his
duties were to see to it that orders and directives coming from the Regional Command (RECO) 2,
comprising the provinces of Bataan, Zambales, Pampanga, Tarlac, Pangasinan and Bulacan, are
obeyed and implemented. The accused upon orders of his superior, planned and effected the
capture of Orani, Bataan in 1949 and Camp Makabolos in Tarlac on August 26, 1950.

In the latter part of 1956, the accused was named chief of the RECO Military Department (RMD) of
RECO 2, a position he held until March, 1958. His territory included the provinces of Tarlac,
Pampanga, Zambales and Bataan. As chief of the RMD, he supervised the armed forces of RECO 2
and gave lectures to members.

In February, 1958, the appellant and his men had an encounter with Government forces in
Magalang, Pampanga. The HMB sustained three casualties, while the Government had two,
including a P.C. lieutenant. The HMB under the command of the appellant retreated to
Telabastagan, San Fernando, Pampanga, where they stayed until about the last part of March,
1958, when they again had an encounter with the P.C. and had to retreat to Bataan.

After this encounter, the appellant asked for, and was granted, leave to rest and recuperate from his
ailment which he spent in the mountain of Bataan. Although on leave, his advice was sought after.

In the evening of June 21, 1960, a PC patrol led by then Major Wilfredo Encarnacion captured the
appellant and his wife, Rosita Manuel, in their hideout at Barrio Kalungusan, Orion, Bataan.

Thenceforth, the appellant was charged for violating the provisions of Republic Act No. 1700,
otherwise known as the Anti-Subversion Act, in an information filed before the Court of First Instance
of Bataan, for having unlawfully and wilfully continued and remained as officer and/or ranking leader
of the outlawed Communist Party of the Philippines and its military arm, the Hukbong Mapagpalaya
ng Bayan, until his apprehension on June 21, 1960, without having renounced his aforementioned
leadership and/or membership therein within the period prescribed by law, and, while remaining as
such leader or high-ranking member, has taken up arms against the Government by making and
conducting raids, ambuscades and armed attacks against civilians, Philippine Constabulary, and
local police forces.  1

Pursuant to the provisions of Section 5 of Republic Act No. 1700, the preliminary investigation was
conducted by the Court of First Instance of Bataan. The appellant was present during said
preliminary investigation and was represented by counsel who extensively cross-examined the
witnesses for the prosecution. Finding a prima facie case against the appellant, the Court issued the
corresponding warrant for the arrest of the appellant   and thereafter set the case for trial.
2

Upon being arraigned, the appellant, assisted by his counsel, waived the reading of the information
and entered a plea of not guilty.   In view of the desire of his counsel to file a motion to quash, the
4

court granted the appellant twenty (20) days within which to do so.  5

On April 14, 1961, the appellant filed a motion to quash the information upon the grounds that the
defendant has been previously convicted of rebellion based upon the same overt acts as in the
instant case, and that Republic Act No. 1700 is an ex post facto law (bill of attainder) in that it
changes the punishment and inflicts a greater punishment or penalty than that annexed to the crime
when committed.   The court denied the motion on September 11, 1961. 
6 7

The case was subsequently set for trial, and in the course thereof, the prosecution moved that the
testimony of the witnesses presented during the preliminary investigation of this case be adopted as
part of the evidence in chief of the prosecution. The trial court granted the motion subject to the
condition that the witnesses be further cross-examined by counsel for the accused.  8

At the trial, the witnesses for the prosecution who testified at the preliminary investigation were
recalled and were again cross-examined by counsel for the appellant. To bolster their case, the
prosecution presented three (3) additional witnesses. The defense, on the other hand, presented the
appellant himself who stated that after his apprehension, he was charged with rebellion before the
Court of First Instance of Pampanga and found guilty thereof;   and he was also charged with murder
9

before the Court of First Instance of Tarlac and acquitted;   and that he surrendered to the PC patrol
10

at Calungusan, Orion, Bataan on June 21, 1960.   On being cross-examined by the court, however,
11

the appellant admitted membership in the Hukbalahap, and later in the HMB, from 1948 to 1960, and
did not take advantage of the amnesty offered in 1948.  12

On March 28, 1967, the trial court rendered the appealed decision finding the accused guilty of the
crime of subversion, as charged. For security reasons and upon previous request, the decision was
promulgated in the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Pasig Branch, since the accused was then
confined at the Fort Bonifacio Stockade, Makati, Rizal.  13

In seeking a reversal of the decision, the appellant assigned four errors allegedly committed by the
trial court. On the fore is his claim that he was deprived of his fundamental right to confront the
witnesses against him when the trial court granted the motion of the Fiscal that the testimony of the
witnesses presented during the preliminary investigation be adopted and made part of the evidence
for the prosecution.

The Constitution guarantees an accused person the right to meet the witnesses against him fact of
face.   This provision "intends to secure the accused in the right to be tried, so far as facts provable
14

by witnesses are concerned, by only such witnesses as meet him face to face at the trial, who give
their opportunity of cross-examination. It was intended to prevent the conviction of the accused upon
depositions or ex-parte affidavits, and particularly to preserve the right of the accused to test the
recollection of the witnesses in the exercise of the right of cross-examination." 15

Here, the testimony sought to be made part of the evidence in chief are not ex-parte affidavits, but
testimony of witnesses taken down by question and answer during the preliminary investigation in
the presence of the accused and his counsel who subjected the said witnesses to a rigid and close
cross-examination. The inclusion of said testimony was made subject to the right of the defendant to
further cross-examine the witnesses whose testimony are sought to be reproduce and, pursuant to
said order, the witnesses were recalled to the stand during the trial and again examined in the
presence of the appellant. Upon the fact, there was no curtailment of the constitutional right of the
accused to meet the witnesses face to face.

The appellant also contends that the "two-witness" rule on the same over act, as provided for under
Republic Act No. 1700, has not been observed and complied with in convicting him. In support
thereof, the appellant presented a brief summary of the testimony of the witnesses for the
prosecution which would tend to show that no two witnesses testified to the same overt act.

The law adverted to, Section 7 o f Republic Act No. 1700, provides that "No person shall be
convicted of any of the offenses penalized herein with prision mayor to death unless on the
testimony of at least two witnesses to the same overt act or on confession of the accused in open
court."

The offense is punishable by prision mayor to death if the offender is an officer or ranking leader of
the Communist Party of the Philippines or of any subversive association a defined in Section 2 of
Republic Act No. 1700; or if such member takes up arms against the Government.  16

Appellant's being an officer or ranking leader of the Communist Party of the Philippines and its
military arm, the "Hukbong Mapagpalaya ng Bayan" or HMB, is borne out by the testimony of Santos
Miguel, Melencio Guevara, Pablo Guintu, and Lazaro Esteban, former associates of the appellant in
the Communist Party of the Philippines and the HMB. In addition, there is his sworn
statement   wherein the appellant admitted membership in the Central Committee of the Communist
17

Party of the Philippines and recounted his prismatic rise in the "Hukbalahap" and later in the HMB,
as well as the numerous armed clashed he and his men had with the Philippine Constabulary and
police forces. There is also the testimony of Pablo Guintu, Melencio Guevara, and Sgt. Sales
Cresencia as to the gun battle between a PC patrol and a group of HMB men led by the appellant on
June 8, 1960, in Mt. Timak, Abucay, Bataan, and on June 21, 1960, in Calungusan, Orion, Bataan,
where the appellant was captured along with his wife. Besides, where the appellant was captured
along with his wife. Besides, appellant admitted in court that he was a member of the "Hukbalahap"
and later the "Hukbong Mapagpalaya ng Bayan" or HMB and fought against the government.

The appellant further claims that he had been charged with rebellion ad subversion based upon the
same overt act, and since he had already been convicted of rebellion, he cannot now be prosecuted
for subversion.

Violation of Republic Act No. 1700, or subversion, as it is more commonly called, is a crime distinct
from that of actual rebellion.   The crime of rebellion is committed by rising publicly and taking up
18

arms against the Government for any of the purposes specified in Article 134 of the Revised Penal
Code; while the Anti-Subversion Act (Republic Act No. 1700) punishes affiliation or membership in a
subversive organization as defined therein. In rebellion, there must be a public uprising and the
taking of arms against the Government;   whereas, in subversion, mere membership in a subversive
19

association is sufficient, and the taking up of arms by a member of a subersive organization against
the Government is but a circumstance which raises the penalty to be imposed upon the offender.

Anyway, in the rebellion case, the appellant and several others were charged and convicted of
rebellion for having risen publicly and taken up arms against the Government for the purpose of
removing the allegiance of the Republic of the Philippines or its law, the territory of the Philippines,
and in furtherance thereof, engaged in combat against the forces of the Government, destroyed
property, and committed serious violence during the period from May 28, 1946 to June 19, 1957.  20

In the instant case, however, the accused is prosecuted under Republic Act No. 1700 for having
remained a high ranking member of the Communist Party of the Philippines and its military arm, the
HMB, from January, 1946 to June 21, 1960, without having renounced his membership in said
organizations; and, being a member or officer of said subversive association, has taken up arms
against the Government.

Although the information charges the appellant with having taken up arms against the Government,
the same is not specific as to the period covered by it. But, since the appellant is prosecuted for
violation of Republic Act No. 1700 it is deducible that the period covered is that from June 20, 1957,
when the Act took effect, up to June 21, 1960, when the appellant was captured. Inasmuch as the
rebellion case covered the period up to June 19, 1957 and the period covered in the instant case is
from June 20, 1957 to June 21, 1960, the claim of having been put twice in jeopardy for the same
act cannot be sustained.

Finally, the appellant asserts that the decision should have been promulgated in the Court of First
Instance of Rizal, Quezon City Branch, considering that he was then detained or confined at Camp
Crame, Quezon City, and not in the Pasig Branch of said Court; and that the decision should have
been promulgated by Judge Pedro Navarro of the Court of First

Instance of Rizal and not Judge Tito V. Tizon of the Court of First Instance of Bataan.

The appellant's contention is premised upon his claim that he was then confined at Camp Crame,
Quezon City. The records show, however, that he had been confined at Fort Bonifacio (then known
as Fort William Mckinley), Makati, Rizal, since November 20, 1962   and continued to be detained
21
therein during the continuation of the trial, up to its termination.   Appellant's claim is, therefore,
22

without merit.

As to the fact that Judge Tito V. Tizon personally read the decision instead of Judge Pedro Navarro,
suffice it to state that the decision was promulgated in the sala of Judge Pedro jurisdiction over the
place of confinement or detention of the accused, upon the request of the Judge of the Court of First
Instance of Bataan, pursuant to the provisions of Section 6 of Rule 120.   The reading of a decision
23

is a mechanical act which may be delegated by the court.

UPON THE FOREGOING, the decision appealed from should be, as it is, hereby affirmed, with
costs.

SO ORDERED.

Fernando, (Chairman), Barredo, Antonio, Antonio and Aquino, JJ., concur.

 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. L-64261 December 26, 1984

JOSE BURGOS, SR., JOSE BURGOS, JR., BAYANI SORIANO and J. BURGOS MEDIA
SERVICES, INC., petitioners,
vs.
THE CHIEF OF STAFF, ARMED FORCES OF THE PHILIPPINES, THE CHIEF, PHILIPPINE
CONSTABULARY, THE CHIEF LEGAL OFFICER, PRESIDENTIAL SECURITY COMMAND, THE
JUDGE ADVOCATE GENERAL, ET AL., respondents.

Lorenzo M. Tañada, Wigberto E. Tañada, Martiniano Vivo, Augusto Sanchez, Joker P. Arroyo,
Jejomar Binay and Rene Saguisag for petitioners.

The Solicitor General for respondents.

ESCOLIN, J.:

Assailed in this petition for certiorari prohibition and mandamus with preliminary mandatory and
prohibitory injunction is the validity of two [2] search warrants issued on December 7, 1982 by
respondent Judge Ernani Cruz-Pano, Executive Judge of the then Court of First Instance of Rizal
[Quezon City], under which the premises known as No. 19, Road 3, Project 6, Quezon City, and 784
Units C & D, RMS Building, Quezon Avenue, Quezon City, business addresses of the "Metropolitan
Mail" and "We Forum" newspapers, respectively, were searched, and office and printing machines,
equipment, paraphernalia, motor vehicles and other articles used in the printing, publication and
distribution of the said newspapers, as well as numerous papers, documents, books and other
written literature alleged to be in the possession and control of petitioner Jose Burgos, Jr. publisher-
editor of the "We Forum" newspaper, were seized.

Petitioners further pray that a writ of preliminary mandatory and prohibitory injunction be issued for
the return of the seized articles, and that respondents, "particularly the Chief Legal Officer,
Presidential Security Command, the Judge Advocate General, AFP, the City Fiscal of Quezon City,
their representatives, assistants, subalterns, subordinates, substitute or successors" be enjoined
from using the articles thus seized as evidence against petitioner Jose Burgos, Jr. and the other
accused in Criminal Case No. Q- 022782 of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, entitled People
v. Jose Burgos, Jr. et al. 1

In our Resolution dated June 21, 1983, respondents were required to answer the petition. The plea for preliminary mandatory and prohibitory
injunction was set for hearing on June 28, 1983, later reset to July 7, 1983, on motion of the Solicitor General in behalf of respondents.

At the hearing on July 7, 1983, the Solicitor General, while opposing petitioners' prayer for a writ of
preliminary mandatory injunction, manifested that respondents "will not use the aforementioned
articles as evidence in the aforementioned case until final resolution of the legality of the seizure of
the aforementioned articles. ..."   With this manifestation, the prayer for preliminary prohibitory
2

injunction was rendered moot and academic.

Respondents would have this Court dismiss the petition on the ground that petitioners had come to
this Court without having previously sought the quashal of the search warrants before respondent
judge. Indeed, petitioners, before impugning the validity of the warrants before this Court, should
have filed a motion to quash said warrants in the court that issued them.   But this procedural flaw3

notwithstanding, we take cognizance of this petition in view of the seriousness and urgency of the
constitutional issues raised not to mention the public interest generated by the search of the "We
Forum" offices, which was televised in Channel 7 and widely publicized in all metropolitan dailies.
The existence of this special circumstance justifies this Court to exercise its inherent power to
suspend its rules. In the words of the revered Mr. Justice Abad Santos in the case of C. Vda. de
Ordoveza v. Raymundo,   "it is always in the power of the court [Supreme Court] to suspend its rules
4

or to except a particular case from its operation, whenever the purposes of justice require it...".

Respondents likewise urge dismissal of the petition on ground of laches. Considerable stress is laid
on the fact that while said search warrants were issued on December 7, 1982, the instant petition
impugning the same was filed only on June 16, 1983 or after the lapse of a period of more than six
[6] months.
Laches is failure or negligence for an unreasonable and unexplained length of time to do that which,
by exercising due diligence, could or should have been done earlier. It is negligence or omission to
assert a right within a reasonable time, warranting a presumption that the party entitled to assert it
either has abandoned it or declined to assert it. 5

Petitioners, in their Consolidated Reply, explained the reason for the delay in the filing of the petition
thus:

Respondents should not find fault, as they now do [p. 1, Answer, p. 3, Manifestation]
with the fact that the Petition was filed on June 16, 1983, more than half a year after
the petitioners' premises had been raided.

The climate of the times has given petitioners no other choice. If they had waited this
long to bring their case to court, it was because they tried at first to exhaust other
remedies. The events of the past eleven fill years had taught them that everything in
this country, from release of public funds to release of detained persons from
custody, has become a matter of executive benevolence or largesse

Hence, as soon as they could, petitioners, upon suggestion of persons close to the
President, like Fiscal Flaminiano, sent a letter to President Marcos, through counsel
Antonio Coronet asking the return at least of the printing equipment and vehicles.
And after such a letter had been sent, through Col. Balbino V. Diego, Chief
Intelligence and Legal Officer of the Presidential Security Command, they were
further encouraged to hope that the latter would yield the desired results.

After waiting in vain for five [5] months, petitioners finally decided to come to Court.
[pp. 123-124, Rollo]

Although the reason given by petitioners may not be flattering to our judicial system, We find no
ground to punish or chastise them for an error in judgment. On the contrary, the extrajudicial efforts
exerted by petitioners quite evidently negate the presumption that they had abandoned their right to
the possession of the seized property, thereby refuting the charge of laches against them.

Respondents also submit the theory that since petitioner Jose Burgos, Jr. had used and marked as
evidence some of the seized documents in Criminal Case No. Q- 022872, he is now estopped from
challenging the validity of the search warrants. We do not follow the logic of respondents. These
documents lawfully belong to petitioner Jose Burgos, Jr. and he can do whatever he pleases with
them, within legal bounds. The fact that he has used them as evidence does not and cannot in any
way affect the validity or invalidity of the search warrants assailed in this petition.

Several and diverse reasons have been advanced by petitioners to nullify the search warrants in
question.

1. Petitioners fault respondent judge for his alleged failure to conduct an examination under oath or
affirmation of the applicant and his witnesses, as mandated by the above-quoted constitutional
provision as wen as Sec. 4, Rule 126 of the Rules of Court .  This objection, however, may properly
6

be considered moot and academic, as petitioners themselves conceded during the hearing on
August 9, 1983, that an examination had indeed been conducted by respondent judge of Col.
Abadilla and his witnesses.

2. Search Warrants No. 20-82[a] and No. 20- 82[b] were used to search two distinct places: No. 19,
Road 3, Project 6, Quezon City and 784 Units C & D, RMS Building, Quezon Avenue, Quezon City,
respectively. Objection is interposed to the execution of Search Warrant No. 20-82[b] at the latter
address on the ground that the two search warrants pinpointed only one place where petitioner Jose
Burgos, Jr. was allegedly keeping and concealing the articles listed therein, i.e., No. 19, Road 3,
Project 6, Quezon City. This assertion is based on that portion of Search Warrant No. 20- 82[b]
which states:

Which have been used, and are being used as instruments and means of committing
the crime of subversion penalized under P.D. 885 as amended and he is keeping
and concealing the same at 19 Road 3, Project 6, Quezon City.

The defect pointed out is obviously a typographical error. Precisely, two search warrants were
applied for and issued because the purpose and intent were to search two distinct premises. It would
be quite absurd and illogical for respondent judge to have issued two warrants intended for one and
the same place. Besides, the addresses of the places sought to be searched were specifically set
forth in the application, and since it was Col. Abadilla himself who headed the team which executed
the search warrants, the ambiguity that might have arisen by reason of the typographical error is
more apparent than real. The fact is that the place for which Search Warrant No. 20- 82[b] was
applied for was 728 Units C & D, RMS Building, Quezon Avenue, Quezon City, which address
appeared in the opening paragraph of the said warrant.   Obviously this is the same place that
7

respondent judge had in mind when he issued Warrant No. 20-82 [b].

In the determination of whether a search warrant describes the premises to be searched with
sufficient particularity, it has been held "that the executing officer's prior knowledge as to the place
intended in the warrant is relevant. This would seem to be especially true where the executing officer
is the affiant on whose affidavit the warrant had issued, and when he knows that the judge who
issued the warrant intended the building described in the affidavit, And it has also been said that the
executing officer may look to the affidavit in the official court file to resolve an ambiguity in the
warrant as to the place to be searched."  8

3. Another ground relied upon to annul the search warrants is the fact that although the warrants
were directed against Jose Burgos, Jr. alone, articles b belonging to his co-petitioners Jose Burgos,
Sr., Bayani Soriano and the J. Burgos Media Services, Inc. were seized.

Section 2, Rule 126 of the Rules of Court, enumerates the personal properties that may be seized
under a search warrant, to wit:

Sec. 2. Personal Property to be seized. — A search warrant may be issued for the
search and seizure of the following personal property:

[a] Property subject of the offense;

[b] Property stolen or embezzled and other proceeds or fruits of the

offense; and

[c] Property used or intended to be used as the means of committing

an offense.

The above rule does not require that the property to be seized should be owned by the person
against whom the search warrant is directed. It may or may not be owned by him. In fact, under
subsection [b] of the above-quoted Section 2, one of the properties that may be seized is stolen
property. Necessarily, stolen property must be owned by one other than the person in whose
possession it may be at the time of the search and seizure. Ownership, therefore, is of no
consequence, and it is sufficient that the person against whom the warrant is directed has control or
possession of the property sought to be seized, as petitioner Jose Burgos, Jr. was alleged to have in
relation to the articles and property seized under the warrants.

4. Neither is there merit in petitioners' assertion that real properties were seized under the disputed
warrants. Under Article 415[5] of the Civil Code of the Philippines, "machinery, receptables,
instruments or implements intended by the owner of the tenement for an industry or works which
may be carried on in a building or on a piece of land and which tend directly to meet the needs of the
said industry or works" are considered immovable property. In Davao Sawmill Co. v. Castillo  where 9

this legal provision was invoked, this Court ruled that machinery which is movable by nature
becomes immobilized when placed by the owner of the tenement, property or plant, but not so when
placed by a tenant, usufructuary, or any other person having only a temporary right, unless such
person acted as the agent of the owner.

In the case at bar, petitioners do not claim to be the owners of the land and/or building on which the
machineries were placed. This being the case, the machineries in question, while in fact bolted to
the ground remain movable property susceptible to seizure under a search warrant.

5. The questioned search warrants were issued by respondent judge upon application of Col.
Rolando N. Abadilla Intelligence Officer of the P.C. Metrocom.  The application was accompanied by
10

the Joint Affidavit of Alejandro M. Gutierrez and Pedro U. Tango, 11 members of the Metrocom Intelligence and
Security Group under Col. Abadilla which conducted a surveillance of the premises prior to the filing of the application for the search warrants
on December 7, 1982.

It is contended by petitioners, however, that the abovementioned documents could not have
provided sufficient basis for the finding of a probable cause upon which a warrant may validly issue
in accordance with Section 3, Article IV of the 1973 Constitution which provides:

SEC. 3. ... and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon
probable cause to be determined by the judge, or such other responsible officer as
may be authorized by law, after examination under oath or affirmation of the
complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place
to be searched and the persons or things to be seized.
We find petitioners' thesis impressed with merit. Probable cause for a search is defined as such facts
and circumstances which would lead a reasonably discreet and prudent man to believe that an
offense has been committed and that the objects sought in connection with the offense are in the
place sought to be searched. And when the search warrant applied for is directed against a
newspaper publisher or editor in connection with the publication of subversive materials, as in the
case at bar, the application and/or its supporting affidavits must contain a specification, stating with
particularity the alleged subversive material he has published or is intending to publish. Mere
generalization will not suffice. Thus, the broad statement in Col. Abadilla's application that petitioner
"is in possession or has in his control printing equipment and other paraphernalia, news publications
and other documents which were used and are all continuously being used as a means of
committing the offense of subversion punishable under Presidential Decree 885, as amended ..." 12 is
a mere conclusion of law and does not satisfy the requirements of probable cause. Bereft of such particulars as would justify a finding of the
existence of probable cause, said allegation cannot serve as basis for the issuance of a search warrant and it was a grave error for
respondent judge to have done so.

Equally insufficient as basis for the determination of probable cause is the statement contained in
the joint affidavit of Alejandro M. Gutierrez and Pedro U. Tango, "that the evidence gathered and
collated by our unit clearly shows that the premises above- mentioned and the articles and things
above-described were used and are continuously being used for subversive activities in conspiracy
with, and to promote the objective of, illegal organizations such as the Light-a-Fire Movement,
Movement for Free Philippines, and April 6 Movement." 13

In mandating that "no warrant shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined by the
judge, ... after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may
produce; 14 the Constitution requires no less than personal knowledge by the complainant or his witnesses of the facts upon which the
issuance of a search warrant may be justified. In Alvarez v. Court of First Instance, 15 this Court ruled that "the oath required must refer to
the truth of the facts within the personal knowledge of the petitioner or his witnesses, because the purpose thereof is to convince the
committing magistrate, not the individual making the affidavit and seeking the issuance of the warrant, of the existence of probable cause."
As couched, the quoted averment in said joint affidavit filed before respondent judge hardly meets the test of sufficiency established by this
Court in Alvarez case.

Another factor which makes the search warrants under consideration constitutionally objectionable is
that they are in the nature of general warrants. The search warrants describe the articles sought to
be seized in this wise:

1] All printing equipment, paraphernalia, paper, ink, photo (equipment, typewriters,

cabinets, tables, communications/recording equipment, tape recorders, dictaphone
and the like used and/or connected in the printing of the "WE FORUM" newspaper
and any and all documents communication, letters and facsimile of prints related to
the "WE FORUM" newspaper.

2] Subversive documents, pamphlets, leaflets, books, and other publication to

promote the objectives and piurposes of the subversive organization known as
Movement for Free Philippines, Light-a-Fire Movement and April 6 Movement; and,

3] Motor vehicles used in the distribution/circulation of the "WE FORUM" and other
subversive materials and propaganda, more particularly,

1] Toyota-Corolla, colored yellow with Plate No. NKA 892;

2] DATSUN pick-up colored white with Plate No. NKV 969

3] A delivery truck with Plate No. NBS 524;

4] TOYOTA-TAMARAW, colored white with Plate No. PBP 665; and,

5] TOYOTA Hi-Lux, pick-up truck with Plate No. NGV 427 with
marking "Bagong Silang."

In Stanford v. State of Texas 16 the search warrant which authorized the search for "books, records, pamphlets, cards, receipts,
lists, memoranda, pictures, recordings and other written instruments concerning the Communist Party in Texas," was declared void by the
U.S. Supreme Court for being too general. In like manner, directions to "seize any evidence in connectionwith the violation of SDC 13-3703
or otherwise" have been held too general, and that portion of a search warrant which authorized the seizure of any "paraphernalia which
could be used to violate Sec. 54-197 of the Connecticut General Statutes [the statute dealing with the crime of conspiracy]" was held to be a
general warrant, and therefore invalid. 17 The description of the articles sought to be seized under the search warrants in question cannot be
characterized differently.

In the Stanford case, the U.S. Supreme Courts calls to mind a notable chapter in English history: the
era of disaccord between the Tudor Government and the English Press, when "Officers of the Crown
were given roving commissions to search where they pleased in order to suppress and destroy the
literature of dissent both Catholic and Puritan Reference herein to such historical episode would not
be relevant for it is not the policy of our government to suppress any newspaper or publication that
speaks with "the voice of non-conformity" but poses no clear and imminent danger to state security.
As heretofore stated, the premises searched were the business and printing offices of the
"Metropolitan Mail" and the "We Forum newspapers. As a consequence of the search and seizure,
these premises were padlocked and sealed, with the further result that the printing and publication of
said newspapers were discontinued.

Such closure is in the nature of previous restraint or censorship abhorrent to the freedom of the
press guaranteed under the fundamental law, 18 and constitutes a virtual denial of petitioners' freedom to express
themselves in print. This state of being is patently anathematic to a democratic framework where a free, alert and even militant press is
essential for the political enlightenment and growth of the citizenry.

Respondents would justify the continued sealing of the printing machines on the ground that they
have been sequestered under Section 8 of Presidential Decree No. 885, as amended, which
authorizes "the sequestration of the property of any person, natural or artificial, engaged in
subversive activities against the government and its duly constituted authorities ... in accordance
with implementing rules and regulations as may be issued by the Secretary of National Defense." It
is doubtful however, if sequestration could validly be effected in view of the absence of any
implementing rules and regulations promulgated by the Minister of National Defense.

Besides, in the December 10, 1982 issue of the Daily Express, it was reported that no less than
President Marcos himself denied the request of the military authorities to sequester the property
seized from petitioners on December 7, 1982. Thus:

The President denied a request flied by government prosecutors for sequestration of

the WE FORUM newspaper and its printing presses, according to Information
Minister Gregorio S. Cendana.

On the basis of court orders, government agents went to the We Forum offices in
Quezon City and took a detailed inventory of the equipment and all materials in the
premises.

Cendaña said that because of the denial the newspaper and its equipment remain at
the disposal of the owners, subject to the discretion of the court. 19

That the property seized on December 7, 1982 had not been sequestered is further confirmed by the reply of then Foreign Minister Carlos P.
Romulo to the letter dated February 10, 1983 of U.S. Congressman Tony P. Hall addressed to President Marcos, expressing alarm over the
"WE FORUM " case. 20 In this reply dated February 11, 1983, Minister Romulo stated:

2. Contrary to reports, President Marcos turned down the recommendation of our

authorities to close the paper's printing facilities and confiscate the equipment and
materials it uses.  21

IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, Search Warrants Nos. 20-82[a] and 20-82[b] issued by respondent
judge on December 7, 1982 are hereby declared null and void and are accordingly set aside. The
prayer for a writ of mandatory injunction for the return of the seized articles is hereby granted and all
articles seized thereunder are hereby ordered released to petitioners. No costs.

SO ORDERED.

Fernando, C.J., Teehankee, Makasiar, Concepcion, Jr., Melencio-Herrera, Plana, Relova, Gutierrez,
Jr., De la Fuente and Cuevas, JJ., concur.

Aquino, J., took no part.

Separate Opinions

ABAD SANTOS, J., concurring

I am glad to give my concurrence to the ponencia of Mr. Justice Escolin At the same time I wish to
state my own reasons for holding that the search warrants which are the subject of the petition are
utterly void.

The action against "WE FORUM" was a naked suppression of press freedom for the search warrants
were issued in gross violation of the Constitution.
The Constitutional requirement which is expressed in Section 3, Article IV, stresses two points,
namely: "(1) that no warrant shall issue but upon probable cause, to be determined by the judge in
the manner set forth in said provision; and (2) that the warrant shall particularly describe the things
to be seized." (Stonehill vs. Diokno, 126 Phil. 738, 747: 20 SCRA 383 [1967].)

Any search warrant is conducted in disregard of the points mentioned above will result in wiping "out
completely one of the most fundamental rights guaranteed in our Constitution, for it would place the
sanctity of the domicile and the privacy of communication and correspondence at the mercy of the
whims caprice or passion of peace officers." (Ibid, p. 748.)

The two search warrants were issued without probable cause. To satisfy the requirement of probable
cause a specific offense must be alleged in the application; abstract averments will not suffice. In the
case at bar nothing specifically subversive has been alleged; stated only is the claim that certain
objects were being used as instruments and means of committing the offense of subversion
punishable under P.D. No. 885, as amended. There is no mention of any specific provision of the
decree. I n the words of Chief Justice C Concepcion, " It would be legal heresy of the highest order,
to convict anybody" of violating the decree without reference to any determinate provision thereof.

The search warrants are also void for lack of particularity. Both search warrants authorize Col.
Rolando Abadilla to seize and take possession, among other things, of the following:

Subversive documents, pamphlets, leaflets, books and other publication to promote

the objectives and purposes of the subversive organizations known as Movement for
Free Philippines, Light-a-Fire Movement and April 6 Movement.

The obvious question is: Why were the documents, pamphlets, leaflets, books, etc. subversive?
What did they contain to make them subversive? There is nothing in the applications nor in the
warrants which answers the questions. I must, therefore, conclude that the warrants are general
warrants which are obnoxious to the Constitution.

In point of fact, there was nothing subversive published in the WE FORUM just as there is nothing
subversive which has been published in MALAYA which has replaced the former and has the same
content but against which no action has been taken.

Conformably with existing jurisprudence everything seized pursuant to the warrants should be
returned to the owners and all of the items are subject to the exclusionary rule of evidence.

Teehankee, J., concur.

Separate Opinions

ABAD SANTOS, J., concurring

I am glad to give my concurrence to the ponencia of Mr. Justice Escolin At the same time I wish to
state my own reasons for holding that the search warrants which are the subject of the petition are
utterly void.

The action against "WE FORUM" was a naked suppression of press freedom for the search warrants
were issued in gross violation of the Constitution.

The Constitutional requirement which is expressed in Section 3, Article IV, stresses two points,
namely: "(1) that no warrant shall issue but upon probable cause, to be determined by the judge in
the manner set forth in said provision; and (2) that the warrant shall particularly describe the things
to be seized." (Stonehill vs. Diokno, 126 Phil. 738, 747: 20 SCRA 383 [1967].)

Any search warrant is conducted in disregard of the points mentioned above will result in wiping "out
completely one of the most fundamental rights guaranteed in our Constitution, for it would place the
sanctity of the domicile and the privacy of communication and correspondence at the mercy of the
whims caprice or passion of peace officers." (Ibid, p. 748.)

The two search warrants were issued without probable cause. To satisfy the requirement of probable
cause a specific offense must be alleged in the application; abstract averments will not suffice. In the
case at bar nothing specifically subversive has been alleged; stated only is the claim that certain
objects were being used as instruments and means of committing the offense of subversion
punishable under P.D. No. 885, as amended. There is no mention of any specific provision of the
decree. I n the words of Chief Justice C Concepcion, " It would be legal heresy of the highest order,
to convict anybody" of violating the decree without reference to any determinate provision thereof.

The search warrants are also void for lack of particularity. Both search warrants authorize Col.
Rolando Abadilla to seize and take possession, among other things, of the following:

Subversive documents, pamphlets, leaflets, books and other publication to promote

the objectives and purposes of the subversive organizations known as Movement for
Free Philippines, Light-a-Fire Movement and April 6 Movement.

The obvious question is: Why were the documents, pamphlets, leaflets, books, etc. subversive?
What did they contain to make them subversive? There is nothing in the applications nor in the
warrants which answers the questions. I must, therefore, conclude that the warrants are general
warrants which are obnoxious to the Constitution.

In point of fact, there was nothing subversive published in the WE FORUM just as there is nothing
subversive which has been published in MALAYA which has replaced the former and has the same
content but against which no action has been taken.

Conformably with existing jurisprudence everything seized pursuant to the warrants should be
returned to the owners and all of the items are subject to the exclusionary rule of evidence.

Teehankee, J., concur.

 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

FIRST DIVISION

G.R. No. L-50127-28 March 30, 1979

VICTOR JUANIZA, Heirs of Josefa P. Leus etc., et al., plaintiffs and appellees,

vs.
EUGENIO JOSE, THE ECONOMIC INSURANCE COMPANY, INC., and ROSALIA
ARROYO, defendants and appellants.

Victoriano O. Javier and Ricardo A. Fabros, Jr. for appellees.

Luis Viscocho and Francisco E. Rodrigo, Jr. for appellants.

DE CASTRO, J.:

This case was certified by the Court of Appeals to this Court on the ground that the questions raised
in the appeal of the decision of the Court of First Instance of Laguna are purely questions of law.

Eugenio Jose was the registered owner and operator of the passenger jeepney involved in an
accident of collision with a freight train of the Philippine National Railways that took place on
November 23, 1969 which resulted in the death to seven (7) and physical injuries to five (5) of its
passengers. At the time of the accident, Eugenio Jose was legally married to Socorro Ramos but
had been cohabiting with defendant-appellant, Rosalia Arroyo, for sixteen (16) years in a relationship
akin to that of husband and wife.

In the resulting cages for damages filed in the Court of First Instance of Laguna, decision was
rendered, the dispositive part of which reads as follows:

(4) In Civil Case No. SP-867 ordering defendants Eugenio Jose and Rosalia Arroyo
jointly and severally to pay plaintiff Victor Juaniza the sum of P1,600.00 plus legal
interest from date of complaint until fully paid and costs of suit;

(5) In Civil Case No. SP-872, ordering defendants Eugenio Jose and Rosalia Arroyo
jointly and severally to pay the respective heirs of the deceased Josefa P. Leus,
Fausto Retrita, Nestor del Rosario Añonuevo and Arceli de la Cueva in the sum of
P12,000.00 for the life of each of said deceased, with legal interest from date of
complaint, and costs of suit. (pp. 47-48, Rello).

Motion for reconsideration was filed by Rosalia Arroyo praying that the decision be reconsidered
insofar as it condemns her to pay damages jointly and severally with her co-defendant, but was
denied. The lower court based her liability on the provision of Article 144 of the Civil Code which
reads:

When a man and woman driving together as husband and wife, but they are not
married, or their marriage is void from the beginning, the property acquired by either
or both of them through their work or industry or their wages and salaries shall be
governed by the rules on co-ownership.

Rosalia Arroyo then filed her appeal with the Court of Appeals which, as previously stated, certified
the same to Us, the question raised being purely legal as may be seen from the lone assigned error
as follows:

The lower court erred in holding defendant-appellant Rosalia Arroyo liable 'for
damages resulting from the death and physical injuries suffered by the passengers'
of the jeepney registered in the name of Eugenio Jose, on the erroneous theory that
Eugenio Jose and Rosalia Arroyo, having lived together as husband and wife,
without the benefit of marriage, are co- owners of said jeepney. (p. 2, Appellant's
Brief).

The issues thus to be resolved are as follows: (1) whether or not Article 144 of the Civil Code is
applicable in a case where one of the parties in a common-law relationship is incapacitated to marry,
and (2) whether or not Rosalia who is not a registered owner of the jeepney can be held jointly and
severally liable for damages with the registered owner of the same.

It has been consistently ruled by this Court that the co-ownership contemplated in Article 144 of the
Civil Code requires that the man and the woman living together must not in any way be
incapacitated to contract marriage. (Camporedondo vs. Aznar, L-11483, February 4, 1958, 102 Phil.
1055, 1068; Osmeña vs. Rodriguez, 54 OG 5526; Malajacan vs. Rubi, 42 OG 5576). Since Eugenio
Jose is legally married to Socorro Ramos, there is an impediment for him to contract marriage with
Rosalia Arroyo. Under the aforecited provision of the Civil Code, Arroyo cannot be a co-owner of the
jeepney. The jeepney belongs to the conjugal partnership of Jose and his legal wife. There is
therefore no basis for the liability of Arroyo for damages arising from the death of, and physical
injuries suffered by, the passengers of the jeepney which figured in the collision.

Rosalia Arroyo, who is not the registered owner of the jeepney can neither be liable for damages
caused by its operation. It is settled in our jurisprudence that only the registered owner of a public
service vehicle is responsible for damages that may arise from consequences incident to its
operation, or maybe caused to any of the passengers therein. (De Peralta vs. Mangusang, L-18110,
July 31, 1964, 11 SCRA 598; Tamayo vs. Aquino, L-12634 and L-12720, May 29, 1959; Roque vs.
Malibay Transit, L-8561, November 18,1955; Montoya vs. Ignacio, L-5868, December 29, 1953).

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, Rosalia Arroyo is hereby declared free from any liability for
damages and the appealed decision is hereby modified accordingly. No costs.

Teehankee (Chairman), Makasiar, Fernandez, Guerrero, and Melencio-Herrera, JJ., concur.

 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. L-68159 March 18, 1985

HOMOBONO ADAZA, petitioner,
vs.
FERNANDO PACANA, JR., respondent

ESCOLIN, J.:

The issues posed for determination in this petition for prohibition with prayer for a writ of preliminary
injunction and/or restraining order are: [1] whether or not a provincial governor who was elected and
had qualified as a Mambabatas Pambansa [MP] can exercise and discharge the functions of both
offices simultaneously; and [2] whether or not a vice-governor who ran for the position of
Mambabatas Pambansa, but lost, can continue serving as vice-governor and subsequently succeed
to the office of governor if the said office is vacated.

The factual background of the present controversy is as follows:

Petitioner Homobono A. Adaza was elected governor of the province of Misamis Oriental in the
January 30, 1980 elections. He took his oath of office and started discharging his duties as provincial
governor on March 3, 1980. Elected vice-governor for said province in the same elections was
respondent Fernando Pacana, Jr., who likewise qualified for and assumed said office on March 3,
1980. Under the law, their respective terms of office would expire on March 3, 1986.

On March 27, 1984, respondent Pacana filed his certificate of candidacy for the May 14, 1984
Batasan Pambansa elections; petitioner Adaza followed suit on April 27, 1984. In the ensuing
elections, petitioner won by placing first among the candidates, while respondent lost.

Petitioner took his oath of office as Mambabatas Pambansa on July 19, 1984   and since then he
1

has discharged the functions of said office.

On July 23, 1984, respondent took his oath of office as governor of Misamis Oriental before
President Ferdinand E. Marcos,   and started to perform the duties of governor on July 25, 1984.
2

Claiming to be the lawful occupant of the governor's office, petitioner has brought this petition to
exclude respondent therefrom. He argues that he was elected to said office for a term of six years,
that he remains to be the governor of the province until his term expires on March 3, 1986 as
provided by law, and that within the context of the parliamentary system, as in France, Great Britain
and New Zealand, a local elective official can hold the position to which he had been elected and
simultaneously be an elected member of Parliament.

Petitioner further contends that respondent Pacana should be considered to have abandoned or
resigned from the position of vice-governor when he filed his certificate of candidacy for the 1984
Batas Pambansa elections; and since respondent had reverted to the status of a mere private citizen
after he lost in the Batas Pambansa elections, he could no longer continue to serve as vice-
governor, much less assume the office of governor.

1. The constitutional prohibition against a member of the Batasan Pambansa from holding any other
office or employment in the government during his tenure is clear and unambiguous. Section 10,
Article VIII of the 1973 Constitution provides as follows:

Section 10 A member of the National Assembly [now Batasan Pambansa shall not
hold any other office or employment in the government or any subdivision, agency or
instrumentality thereof, including government owned or controlled corporations,
during his tenure, except that of prime minister or member of the cabinet. ...

The language used in the above-cited section is plain, certain and free from ambiguity. The only
exceptions mentioned therein are the offices of prime minister and cabinet member. The wisdom or
expediency of the said provision is a matter which is not within the province of the Court to
determine.

A public office is a public trust.   It is created for the interest and the benefit of the people. As such, a
3

holder thereof "is subject to such regulations and conditions as the law may impose" and "he cannot
complain of any restrictions which public policy may dictate on his holding of more than one
office."   It is therefore of no avail to petitioner that the system of government in other states allows a
4

local elective official to act as an elected member of the parliament at the same time. The dictate of
the people in whom legal sovereignty lies is explicit. It provides no exceptions save the two offices
specifically cited in the above-quoted constitutional provision. Thus, while it may be said that within
the purely parliamentary system of government no incompatibility exists in the nature of the two
offices under consideration, as incompatibility is understood in common law, the incompatibility
herein present is one created by no less than the constitution itself. In the case at bar, there is no
question that petitioner has taken his oath of office as an elected Mambabatas Pambansa and has
been discharging his duties as such. In the light of the oft-mentioned constitutional provision, this
fact operated to vacate his former post and he cannot now continue to occupy the same, nor attempt
to discharge its functions.

2. The second proposition advanced by petitioner is that respondent Pacana, as a mere private
citizen, had no right to assume the governorship left vacant by petitioner's election to the Batasan
Pambansa. He maintains that respondent should be considered as having abandoned or resigned
from the vice-governorship when he filed his certificate of candidacy for the Batas Pambansa
elections. The point pressed runs afoul of Batas Pambansa Blg. 697, the law governing the election
of members of the Batasan Pambansa on May 14, 1984, Section 13[2] of which specifically provides
that "governors, mayors, members of the various sangguniang or barangay officials shall, upon filing
a certificate of candidacy, be considered on forced leave of absence from office." Indubitably,
respondent falls within the coverage of this provision, considering that at the time he filed his
certificate of candidacy for the 1984 Batasan Pambansa election he was a member of the
Sangguniang Panlalawigan as provided in Sections 204 and 205 of Batas Pambansa Blg.
337,   otherwise known as the Local Government Code. The reason the position of vice-governor
5

was not included in Section 13[2] of BP Blg. 697 is explained by the following interchange between
Assemblymen San Juan and Davide during the deliberations on said legislation:

MR. DAVIDE. If I was able to get correctly the proposed amendment it would cover
only governors and members of the different sanggunians? Mayor, governors?

MR. SAN JUAN. Governors, mayors, members of the various sanggunian or

barangay officials. A vice-governor is a member of the Sanggunian Panlalawigan.

MR. DAVIDE. All. Why don't we instead use the word, "Local officials?

MR. SAN JUAN. Well, Mr. Speaker, your humble representation ...

MR. DAVIDE. And, secondly, why don't we include the vice-governor, the vice-
mayors?

MR. SAN JUAN. Because they are members of the Sanggunians, Mr. Speaker. They
are covered by the provision on members of sanggunian. [Record of Proceedings,
February 20, 1984, p. 92, Rollo]

Thus, when respondent reassumed the position of vice-governor after the Batas Pambansa
elections, he was acting within the law. His succession to the governorship was equally legal and
valid, the same being in accordance with Section 204[2] [a] of the same Local Government Code,
which reads as follows:

SECTION 204. Powers, Duties and Privileges:

1] x x x

2] He shall:

a] Assume the office of the governor for the unexpired term of the latter in the cases
provided for in Section 48, paragraph 1  of this Code;
6

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby dismissed. No costs.

SO ORDERED.

Teehankee, Makasiar, Aquino, Concepcion Jr., Melencio-Herrera, Plana, Relova, Gutierrez, Jr., De
la Fuente, Cuevas and Alampay, JJ., concur.

Fernando, C.J., and Abad Santos, J., took no part.

 REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES
SUPREME COURT

FIRST DIVISION

G.R. No. L-68566 April 15, 1985

ALEX COMBATE, Petitioner, vs. THE HON. GERONIMO R. SAN JOSE, JR., Municipal

Trial Judge of the Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Magarao-Canaman,
Camarines Sur, Respondent. chanrobles virtual law library

MELENCIO-HERRERA, J.:

In this Petition for Certiorari, filed with the assistance of the Citizens Legal Assistance
Office (Naga City), petitioner-accused seeks to annul respondent Judge's Decision in
Criminal Case No. 1915 of the Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Magarao-Canaman,
Camarines Sur, convicting him of Theft, on the ground that it was rendered in violation
of his constitutional rights. chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

The records disclose that petitioner was charged before the Municipal Circuit Trial Court
of Magarao-Canaman, Camarines Sur, presided by respondent Judge, with the crime of
Theft of "one (1) Rooster [Fighting Cock] color red, belonging to Romeo Posada worth
P200.00." 1chanrobles virtual law library

Following the procedure laid down in the Rule on Summary Procedure in Special Cases,
respondent Judge required petitioner and his witnesses to submit counter-affidavits to
the supporting affidavits of the complainant, 2 with which petitioner complied within the
period designated by the Court. chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

On June 5, 1984, petitioner was subpoenaed to appear before respondent Judge and
was arraigned without the assistance of counsel. He pleaded not guilty. 3 chanrobles virtual law library

Subsequently, in an Order dated July 5, 1984, respondent Judge deemed the case
submitted for resolution purportedly pursuant to the Rule on Summary Procedure. 4 chanrobles virtual law library

In a Decision promulgated on July 16, 1984, without benefit of trial, petitioner was
sentenced to suffer six (6) months' imprisonment and to pay the complainant the
amount of P200.00, plus costs. 5 chanrobles virtual law library

Seeking redress before this Court, petitioner alleges that respondent Judge had denied
him due process for having been arraigned without the assistance of counsel, and for
having been convicted without the benefit of trial. chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

The Petition is highly meritorious. The Rule on Summary Procedure in Special Cases
applies only to criminal cases where the penalty prescribed by law for the offense
charged does not exceed six (6) months imprisonment or a fine of one thousand pesos
(P1,000.00), or both. The crime of Theft as charged herein is penalized with arresto
mayor in its medium period to prision correccional  in its minimum period, or, from two
(2) months and one (1) day to two (2) years and four (4) months. 6 Clearly, the Rule
on Summary Procedure is inapplicable. chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

But even assuming that the case falls under the coverage of said Rule, the same does
not dispense with trial. On the contrary, it specifically provides:

Section 11. When case set for arraignment and trial. - Should the court, upon a
consideration of the complaint or information and the affidavits submitted by both
parties, find no cause or ground to hold the defendant for trial, it shall order the
dismissal of the case; otherwise, the court shall set the case for arraignment and trial.

Section 14. Procedure of Trial. - Upon a plea of not guilty being entered, the trial shall
immediately proceed  The affidavits submitted by the parties shall constitute the direct
testimonies of the witnesses who executed the same. Witnesses who testified may be
subjected to cross-examination. Should the affiant fail to testify, his affidavit shall not
be considered as competent evidence for the party presenting the affidavit, but the
adverse party may utilize the same for any admissible purpose. chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

No witness shall be allowed to testify unless he had previously submitted an affidavit to

the court in accordance with Sections 9 and 10 hereof. (emphasis supplied)

In the case at bar, since petitioner-accused had pleaded not guilty, trial should have
proceeded immediately. But not only was petitioner unrepresented by counsel upon
arraignment; he was neither accorded the benefit of trial. Respondent Judge based his
judgment of conviction merely on the affidavits submitted, without the petitioner having
been even given the chance to confront or cross-examine the affiants. There being a
clear deprivation of petitioner's fundamental right to due process of law, 7 the assailed
Decision should be set aside. When judgment is rendered in complete disregard of all
norms of procedure, the whole proceeding in question is completely void, 8and the case
should be remanded for trial and proceedings strictly in accordance with
law. 9Considering that the judgment is void, it is as if there were no judgment at all and
no double jeopardy attaches. 10chanrobles virtual law library

ACCORDINGLY, granting Certiorari, respondent Judge's Decision promulgated on July

16, 1984, is hereby ANNULLED for having been issued with grave abuse of discretion.
The case is remanded to the Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Magarao-Canaman,
Camarines Sur, for proceedings strictly in accordance with law. chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

SO ORDERED.

Teehankee, (Chairman), Plana, Relova Gutierrez, Jr., De la Fuente and Alampay, JJ.,
concur.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. L-27607 May 7, 1981

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee

vs.
BEN CUEVO, defendant-appellant.

AQUINO, J.: 1äwphï1.ñët

This case presents for reexamination the liability for estafa of the holder of a trust receipt who
disposed of the goods covered thereby and, in violation of its terms, failed to deliver to the bank the
proceeds of the sale as payment of the debt secured by the trust receipt.

We say reexamination because it is a well-entrenched rule in our jurisprudence that the conversion
by the importer of the goods covered by a trust receipt constitutes estafa through misappropriation
under article 315(l) (b) of the Revised Penal Code, (People vs. Yu Chai Ho 53 Phil. 874 and Samo
vs. People. 115 Phil. 346. As to civil cases, see National Bank vs. Viuda e Hijos de Angel Jose, 63
Phil. 814; Philippine National Bank vs. Catipon, 98 Phil. 286 and Philippine National Bank vs. Arrozal
103 Phil. 213).

In this case, an information dated July 27, 1966 was filed in the Court of First Instance of Manila,
charging Ben Cuevo with estafa committed as follows (Criminal Case No. 83309):  1äwphï1.ñët

That on or about the 16th day of February, 1964 in the City of Manila, Philippines, the
said accused did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously defraud the
Prudential Bank and Trust Company in the following manner, to wit: the said accused
having received in trust from the Prudential Bank and Trust Company merchandise,
i.e., 1,000 bags of grind yellow corn and 1,000 bags of palay specified in a trust
receipt covered by Letter of Credit No. 5643, executed by him in favor of said bank,
of the total value of P24,000.00, to be sold by him, under the express obligation on
the part of the said accused to account for the said merchandise, or to deliver and
turn over to the Prudential Bank and Trust Company the proceeds of the sale
thereof;

But said accused once in possession of said merchandise, far from complying with
the aforesaid obligation, notwithstanding repeated demands made upon him, with
intent to defraud, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously misappropriated, misapplied and
converted the said merchandise or the value, thereof in the sum of P24,000.00 to his
own personal use and benefit, to the damage and prejudice of the Prudential Bank
and Trust Company in the aforesaid of P24,000.00, Philippine Currency. (p. 2, Rollo.)

Upon arraignment, the accused pleaded not guilty (p. 11, Record). Later, or on December 13, 1966,
before the trial had started, Cuevo filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that the facts alleged in
the information do not constitute an offense.

Judge Ruperto Kapunan, Jr., in his order of January 3, 1967, granted the motion and dismissed the
case but "without prejudice to whatever civil action the complaining bank may take to recover the
amount of P24,000" which it had advanced to cover the price of the merchandise delivered to the
accused (p. 7, Rollo). From that order of dismissal, the prosecution appealed to this Court.

The appeal is meritorious. Judge Kapunan, Jr. erred in holding that the accused did not commit
estafa under article 315(l) (b), which reads:  1äwphï1.ñët

(b) By misappropriating or converting, to the prejudice of another, money, goods, or

any other personal property received by the offender in trust or on commission, or for
administration, or under any other obligation involving the duty to make delivery of or
to return the same, even though such obligation be totally or partially guaranteed by
a bond; or by denying having received such money, goods, or other property.
Judge Kapunan, Jr., in sustaining the motion to dismiss, relied on the Spanish version of paragraph
(b) of article 315 wherein the expression used is "recibido en deposito". In his opinion, that phrase is
not accurately translated as "in trust" and, as he explained, it does not allegedly cover the
conversion or misappropriation of the goods covered by a trust receipt. The Spanish version reads:  1äwphï1.ñët

(b) Apropiandose o distrayendo, en perjuicio de otro dinero, efectos o cualquiera otra

cosa mueble, que hubiere recibido en deposito, commission o administracion o por
otro titulo que produzca obligacion de entregarla o devolveria, aungue dicha
obligacion estuviese afianzada total or parcialmente, o negando haberla recibido.

The lower court ratiocinated that the contract covered by a trust receipt is merely a secured loan
(U.S. vs. Tan Tok, 15 Phil. 538) where the borrower is allowed to dispose of the collateral, whereas,
in a deposit the depositary is not empowered to dispose of the property deposited. Hence, the lower
court concluded that the violation of the provisions of the trust receipt gives rise to a civil action and
not to a criminal prosecution for estafa.

The lower court also ventured the opinion that the other phrase in paragraph (b), por otro titulo que
produzca obligacion de entregarla o devolverla" ("under any other obligation involving the duty to
make delivery of or to return the same") is not applicable because that phrase allegedly refers to the
very "money, goods, or any other personal property received by the offender" as a deposit, and not
to the proceeds of the sale of the goods covered by the trust receipt.

The lower court observed further that the framers of the Spanish Penal Code could not have
contemplated the inclusion of the trust receipt in article 315(l) (b) because that transaction did not
exist in the nineteenth century. The usual form of a trust receipt is as follows: 1äwphï1.ñët

I/We hereby agree to hold said goods in trust for the said corporation (meaning the
bank as trustor), and as its property with liberty to sell the same for its account, but
without authority to make any other disposition whatever of the said goods or any
part thereof (or of proceeds thereof) either by way of conditional sale, pledge or
otherwise.

In case of sale I/We further agree to hand the proceeds, as soon as received, to the
International Banking Corporation to apply against the relative acceptances (as
described above) and for the payment of any other indebtedness of mine/ours to the
International Banking Corporation. (People vs. Yu Chai Ho 53 Phil. 874, 876.)

A trust receipt is considered as a security transaction intended to aid in financing importers and retail
dealers who do not have sufficient funds or resources to finance the importation or purchase of
merchandise, and who may not be able to acquire credit except through utilization, as collateral, of
the merchandise imported or purchased" (53 Am. Jur. 961, cited in Samo vs. People, 115 Phil. 346,
349).

In the instant case, it is alleged in the indictment that the accused, by means of a trust receipt,
received from the Prudential Bank and Trust Company 1,000 bags of corn and 1,000 bags of palay
to be sold by him with the express obligation to deliver the proceeds of the sale to the bank or, if not
sold, to account for the merchandise and that, instead of complying with either obligation, he
misappropriated the merchandise or the value thereof (p. 2, Rollo).

We hold that even if the accused did not receive the merchandise for deposit, he is, nevertheless,
covered by article 315(l) (b) because after receiving the price of the sale, he did not deliver the
money to the bank or, if he did not sell the merchandise, he did not return it to the bank.

Those two situations are within the purview of article 315(l) (b). The first situation is covered by the
provision which refers to money received under the obligation involving the duty to deliver it
(entregarla) to the owner of the merchandise sold.

The other contingency is covered by the provision which refers to merchandise received under the
obligation to "return" it (devolvelra) to the owner.

The fact that in the first case the money was received from the purchaser of the merchandise and
not from the bank does not remove it from the operation of article 315(l) (b).

As noted by Justice Street in People vs. Yu Chai Ho, supra, the conversion by the trustee in a trust
receipt of the proceeds of the sale falls "most literally and directly under" the provisions of article
315(l) (b).

Thus, it was held that where, notwithstanding repeated oral and written demands by the bank, the
petitioner had failed either to turn over to the said bank the proceeds of the sale of the goods, or to
return said goods if they were not sold, the petitioner is guilty of estafa under article 315(l) (b) (Samo
vs. People, 115 Phil. 346).

In this connection, it is relevant to state that Presidential Decree No. 115, the Trust Receipts Law,
regulating trust receipts transactions, was issued on January 29, 1973.

One objective of that law is "to declare the misuse and/or misappropriation of goods or proceeds
realized from the sale of goods, documents or instruments released under trust receipts as a
criminal offense punishable under" article 315.

Section 13 of the decree provides that "the failure of an entrustee to turn over the proceeds of the
sale of the goods, documents or instruments covered by a trust receipt to the extent of the amount
owing to the entruster or as appears in the trust receipt or to return said goods, documents or
instruments if they were not sold or disposed of in accordance with the terms of the trust receipt shall
constitute the crime of estafa, punishable under the provisions" of article 315 of the Revised Penal
Code.

The enactment of the said penal provision is confirmatory of existing jurisprudence and should not
be construed as meaning that, heretofore, the misappropriation of the proceeds of a sale made
under a trust receipt was not punishable under article 315. That penal provision removed any doubt
as to the criminal liability of the holder of a trust receipt who misappropriated the proceeds of the
sale.

The other issue raised in the last part of accused Cuevo's brief is whether the lower court's
erroneous dismissal of the information against him amounts to an acquittal which placed him in
jeopardy and whether the return of the case to the lower court for trial would place him in double
jeopardy.

No person shall be twice put in jeopardy of punishment for the same offense" (Sec. 22, Art. IV of the
Constitution). The maxim is non bis in Idem (not twice for the same). The ban against double
jeopardy is similar to the rule on res judicata in civil cases.

Jeopardy attaches when an accused was charged with an offense (a) upon a valid complaint or
information sufficient in form and substance to sustain a conviction (b) in a court of competent
jurisdiction and (c) after the accused had been arraigned and entered his plea, he was convicted or
acquitted, or the case against him was "dismissed or otherwise terminated without his express
consent".

In such a case, his conviction or acquittal (autrefois convict or autrefois acquit) is a "bar to another
prosecution for the offense charged, or for any attempt to commit the same or frustration thereof, or
for any offense charged in the former complaint or information " (Sec. 9, Rule 117, Rules of Court).

The accused invokes the ruling that "where a trial court has jurisdiction but mistakenly dismisses the
complaint or information on the ground of lack of it, the order of dismissal is, after the prosecution
has presented its evidence, unappealable because an appeal by the government therefrom would
place the accused in second jeopardy for the same offense" (People vs. Duran, Jr., 107 Phil. 979).

That ruling has no application to this case because in the Duran case (as in People vs. Caderao 69
Phil. 327, also cited by the accused herein) the dismissal was made after the prosecution had
presented its evidence. The accused filed a demurrer to the evidence but the trial court dismissed
the case, not on the ground of insufficiency of evidence, but on the ground of lack of jurisdiction. In
the instant case, the prosecution has not commenced the presentation of its evidence. The dismissal
was with the consent of the accused because he filed a motion to dismiss.

In Esguerra vs. De la Costa, 66 Phil. 134, another case cited by the accused, the erroneous
dismissal on the ground of lack of jurisdiction was made by the lower court motu proprio. Hence, the
dismissal without the consent of the accused amounted to an acquittal which placed him in jeopardy.

Moreover, in the Duran case, it was expressly indicated that the erroneous dismissal on the ground
of lack of jurisdiction does not place the accused in jeopardy if the dismissal was made with the
consent of the accused, as held in People vs. Salico, 84 Phil. 722. As already stated, in the instant
case the dismissal was with the consent of accused Cuevo. The dismissal did not place him in
jeopardy.

The Chief Justice and six Justices voted to reverse the order of dismissal. Justices Teehankee and
De Castro dissented. As only seven Justices voted to reverse the order of dismissal, the same has
to be affirmed.

WHEREFORE, the order of dismissal is affirmed. Costs de oficio.

SO ORDERED.

Makasiar, Fernandez, Guerrero, Abad Santos, De Castro and Melencio-Herrera, JJ., concur. 1äwphï1.ñët

Fernando, CJ., concurs on the basis of absence of double jeopardy.

Barredo, J., and Concepcion Jr., J., took no part.

Separate Opinions

TEEHANKEE, J., dissenting:

I concur with the dissent of Mr. Justice De Castro insofar as it upholds the more liberal interpretation
to the trust receipt transaction which would give rise only to civil liability on the part of the offender.
The very definition of trust receipt as given in the main opinion (at pp. 4-5) to wit, "'(A) trust receipt is
considered as a security transaction intended to aid in financing importers and retail dealers who do
not have sufficient funds or resources to finance the importation or purchase of merchandise, and
who may not be able to acquire credit except through utilization, as collateral, of the merchandise
imported or purchased' (53 Am. Jr. 961, cited in Samo vs. People, 115 Phil. 346, 349)," sustains the
lower court's rationale in dismissing the information that the contract covered by a trust receipt is
merely a secured loan. The goods imported by the small importer and retail dealer through the
bank's financing remain of their own property and risk and the old capitalist orientation of putting
them in jail for estafa for non-payment of the secured loan (granted after they had been fully
investigated by the bank as good credit risks) through the fiction of the trust receipt device should no
longer be permitted in this day and age.

DE CASTRO, J., dissenting:

I regret to have to dissent from the majority opinion.

The question is whether the violation of the terms of a trust receipt would constitute estafa. There is
no more doubt that under P.D. 115, the violation is defined as estafa, but before the promulgation of
said decree, I have entertained grave doubts to such an extent that I would acquit a person accused
of the crime allegedly committed before said decree, the promulgation of which serves to confirm my
doubts. For if there had been no such doubt, especially as some decisions had already been
rendered by this Court holding that estafa is committed when there is a violation of a trust receipt,
there would have been no need for P.D. 115.

One view is to consider the transaction as merely that of a security of a loan, and that the trust
element is but an inherent feature of the security aspect of the arrangement where the goods are
placed in the possession of the "entrustee," to use the term used in P.D. 115, violation of the
element of trust not being intended to be in the same concept as how it is understood in the criminal
sense. The other view is that the bank as the owner and "entrustor" delivers the goods to the
"entrustee " with the authority to sell the goods, but with the obligation to give the proceeds to the
"entrustor" or return the goods themselves if not sold, a trust being thus created in the full sense as
contemplated by Art. 315, par. 1(b)

I consider the view that the trust receipt arrangement gives rise only to civil liability as the more
feasible, before the promulgation of P.D. 115. The transaction being contractual, the intent of the
parties should govern. Since the trust receipt has, by its nature, to be executed upon the arrival of
the goods imported, and acquires legal standing as such receipt only upon acceptance by the
"entrustee," the trust receipt transaction itself, the antecedent acts consisting of the application of the
L/C the approval of the L/C and the making of the marginal deposit and the effective importation of
the goods, all through the efforts of the importer who has to find his supplier, arrange for the
payment and shipment of the imported goods – all these circumstances would negate any intent of
subjecting the importer to criminal prosecution, which could possibly give rise to a case of
imprisonment for non-payment of a debt. The parties, therefore, are deemed to have consciously
entered into a purely commercial transaction that could give rise only to civil liability, never to subject
the "entrustee" to criminal prosecution. Unlike, for instance, when several pieces of jewelry are
received by a person from the owner for sale on commission, and the former misappropriates for his
personal use and benefit, either the jewelries or the proceeds of the sale, instead of returning them
to the owner as is his obligation, the bank is not in the same concept as the jewelry owner with full
power of disposition of the goods, which the bank does not have, for the bank has previously
extended a loan which the L/C represents to the importer, and by that loan, the importer should be
the real owner of the goods. If under the trust receipt, the bank is made to appear as the owner, it
was but an artificial expedient more of a legal fiction than fact, for if it were really so, it could dispose
of the goods on any manner it wants, which is cannot do, just to give consistency with the purpose of
the trust receipt of giving a stronger security for the loan obtained by the importer. To consider the
bank as the true owner from the inception of the transaction would be to disregard the loan feature
thereof, a feature totally absent in the case of the transaction between the jewel owner and his
agent.

Consequently, if only from the fact that the trust receipt transaction is susceptible to two (2)
reasonable interpretations, one as giving rise only to civil liability for the violation of the condition
thereof, and the other, as generating also criminal liability, the former should be adopted as more
favorable to the supposed offender. (Duran vs. CA, L-39758, May 7, 1976, 71 SCRA 68; People vs.
Parayno L-24804, July 5, 1968, 24 SCRA 3; People vs. Abendan, L-1481, January 28, 1949, 82 Phil.
711; People vs. Bautista. L- 1502, May 24, 1948, 81 Phil. 78; People v . Abana, L-39, February 1,
1946, 76 Phil. 1.)

Accordingly, I vote for the affirmance of the questioned order.

Separate Opinions

TEEHANKEE, J., dissenting:

I concur with the dissent of Mr. Justice De Castro insofar as it upholds the more liberal interpretation
to the trust receipt transaction which would give rise only to civil liability on the part of the offender.
The very definition of trust receipt as given in the main opinion (at pp. 4-5) to wit, "'(A) trust receipt is
considered as a security transaction intended to aid in financing importers and retail dealers who do
not have sufficient funds or resources to finance the importation or purchase of merchandise, and
who may not be able to acquire credit except through utilization, as collateral, of the merchandise
imported or purchased' (53 Am. Jr. 961, cited in Samo vs. People, 115 Phil. 346, 349)," sustains the
lower court's rationale in dismissing the information that the contract covered by a trust receipt is
merely a secured loan. The goods imported by the small importer and retail dealer through the
bank's financing remain of their own property and risk and the old capitalist orientation of putting
them in jail for estafa for non-payment of the secured loan (granted after they had been fully
investigated by the bank as good credit risks) through the fiction of the trust receipt device should no
longer be permitted in this day and age.

DE CASTRO, J., dissenting:

I regret to have to dissent from the majority opinion.

The question is whether the violation of the terms of a trust receipt would constitute estafa. There is
no more doubt that under P.D. 115, the violation is defined as estafa, but before the promulgation of
said decree, I have entertained grave doubts to such an extent that I would acquit a person accused
of the crime allegedly committed before said decree, the promulgation of which serves to confirm my
doubts. For if there had been no such doubt, especially as some decisions had already been
rendered by this Court holding that estafa is committed when there is a violation of a trust receipt,
there would have been no need for P.D. 115.

One view is to consider the transaction as merely that of a security of a loan, and that the trust
element is but an inherent feature of the security aspect of the arrangement where the goods are
placed in the possession of the "entrustee," to use the term used in P.D. 115, violation of the
element of trust not being intended to be in the same concept as how it is understood in the criminal
sense. The other view is that the bank as the owner and "entrustor" delivers the goods to the
"entrustee " with the authority to sell the goods, but with the obligation to give the proceeds to the
"entrustor" or return the goods themselves if not sold, a trust being thus created in the full sense as
contemplated by Art. 315, par. 1(b)

I consider the view that the trust receipt arrangement gives rise only to civil liability as the more
feasible, before the promulgation of P.D. 115. The transaction being contractual, the intent of the
parties should govern. Since the trust receipt has, by its nature, to be executed upon the arrival of
the goods imported, and acquires legal standing as such receipt only upon acceptance by the
"entrustee," the trust receipt transaction itself, the antecedent acts consisting of the application of the
L/C the approval of the L/C and the making of the marginal deposit and the effective importation of
the goods, all through the efforts of the importer who has to find his supplier, arrange for the
payment and shipment of the imported goods – all these circumstances would negate any intent of
subjecting the importer to criminal prosecution, which could possibly give rise to a case of
imprisonment for non-payment of a debt. The parties, therefore, are deemed to have consciously
entered into a purely commercial transaction that could give rise only to civil liability, never to subject
the "entrustee" to criminal prosecution. Unlike, for instance, when several pieces of jewelry are
received by a person from the owner for sale on commission, and the former misappropriates for his
personal use and benefit, either the jewelries or the proceeds of the sale, instead of returning them
to the owner as is his obligation, the bank is not in the same concept as the jewelry owner with full
power of disposition of the goods, which the bank does not have, for the bank has previously
extended a loan which the L/C represents to the importer, and by that loan, the importer should be
the real owner of the goods. If under the trust receipt, the bank is made to appear as the owner, it
was but an artificial expedient more of a legal fiction than fact, for if it were really so, it could dispose
of the goods on any manner it wants, which is cannot do, just to give consistency with the purpose of
the trust receipt of giving a stronger security for the loan obtained by the importer. To consider the
bank as the true owner from the inception of the transaction would be to disregard the loan feature
thereof, a feature totally absent in the case of the transaction between the jewel owner and his
agent.

Consequently, if only from the fact that the trust receipt transaction is susceptible to two (2)
reasonable interpretations, one as giving rise only to civil liability for the violation of the condition
thereof, and the other, as generating also criminal liability, the former should be adopted as more
favorable to the supposed offender. (Duran vs. CA, L-39758, May 7, 1976, 71 SCRA 68; People vs.
Parayno L-24804, July 5, 1968, 24 SCRA 3; People vs. Abendan, L-1481, January 28, 1949, 82 Phil.
711; People vs. Bautista. L- 1502, May 24, 1948, 81 Phil. 78; People v . Abana, L-39, February 1,
1946, 76 Phil. 1.)

Accordingly, I vote for the affirmance of the questioned order.